05000335/FIN-2012003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure To Perform Examinations Of Reactor Pressure Vessel Supports |
| Description | A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a was identified for failure to establish adequate maintenance procedures associated with the EDG system. Specifically, station personnel failed to establish preventative maintenance inspections of diesel immersion heaters in accordance with vendor manual recommendations. As a result, the Unit 1 1A EDG was immediately rendered inoperable for 43.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> due to a failed immersion heater that resulted in a leak of the 1A2 EDG jacket water system. The failure to conduct inspections of the EDG jacket water immersion heaters in accordance with vendor manual recommendations is a performance deficiency. The finding was considered to be more than minor because it impacted the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, the failed immersion heater resulted in a loss of jacket water that caused the 1A EDG to trip during a routine surveillance run. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 evaluation per Inspection Manual Chapter (MC) 0609, Attachment 4 and determined that the finding represented an actual loss of safety function for a single train of equipment, potentially for greater-than its technical specification allowed outage time. Consequently a Phase 2 analysis was performed by the inspectors in accordance with MC 0609, Appendix A, which indicated the risk significance of the performance deficiency was potentially > 1E-6 (White). A Senior Reactor Analyst subsequently performed a Phase 3 analysis of the risk impact both while at-power and while the unit was shut-down. The analyst determined that the risk significance of the issue was very low (Green). The primary cause of the performance deficiency, as determined by the inspectors, was failure to implement vendor recommendations to periodically inspect the immersion heaters. The inspectors determined that the cause of this finding was related to the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area due to the failure to plan work activities to ensure the long term equipment availability |
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
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| Report | IR 05000335/2012003 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Butcavage D Rich L Lake R Reyes T Hoeg |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Saint Lucie - IR 05000335/2012003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Saint Lucie) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Saint Lucie)
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