05000305/FIN-2011005-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Two of Six Operating Crew Failures on the Simulator Operational Evaluation Portion of the 2011 Annual Requalification Operating Test |
| Description | A self-revealed finding associated with operating crew performance on the simulator during a licensee-administered requalification examination was identified. Two of the six crews evaluated during the annual operating tests failed to pass their simulator examinations. As immediate corrective action, the failed operating crews were remediated (i.e., the operating crews were re-trained and successfully re-tested) prior to returning to shift. The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as CR456328. The inspectors determined that the crew failures constituted a performance deficiency based on the fact that licensed operators are expected to operate the plant with acceptable standards of knowledge and abilities demonstrated through periodic testing as required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). Two out of six crews of licensed operators failed to demonstrate a satisfactory understanding of the required actions and mitigating strategies required to safely operate the facility under normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions. The finding was more than minor because the performance deficiency potentially affects the Human Performance attribute of the MS Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the finding reflected the potential inability of the crews to take appropriate SR action in response to actual abnormal and emergency conditions. The perceived risk associated with the number of crews failing the annual operating test is provided in the Simulator Operational Evaluation matrix of IMC 0609, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification SDP. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because only two of six of the operating crews failed; the failed operating crews were remediated (i.e., the operating crews were re-trained and successfully re-tested) prior to returning to shift; and because there was not a finding associated with operating crew failures during calendar year 2010. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of personnel training and qualifications in the area of Human Performance Resources, in that the licensee failed to ensure the adequacy of the training provided to operators to assure nuclear safety. |
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000305/2011005 Section 1R11 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.11 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Mcneil R Winter K Riemer J Cassidy D Betancourt K Barclay N Feliz -Adomo M Jones J Beavers V Myers S Shah M Ziolkowsk |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Kewaunee - IR 05000305/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Kewaunee) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Kewaunee)
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