05000298/FIN-2012002-06
From kanterella
Revision as of 14:04, 30 September 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Requirements |
| Description | The inspectors identified two examples of a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, associated with station personnels failure to follow radiation work permit requirements. Specifically, on two separate occasions inspectors observed different workers breaching contaminated systems during planned maintenance activities without radiation protection personnel present as specified by the radiation work permit requirements. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-CNS-2012-00461, and CR-CNS-2012-00763. The inspectors determined that the failure of craft personnel to follow radiation work permit requirements when breaching contaminated systems was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the continued failure of craft personnel to follow radiation work permit requirements when breaching contaminated systems could become more significant, in that, it could lead to personnel contamination events and unplanned/unexpected dose, and is therefore a finding. The finding was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspector determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because: (1) it was not associated with as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning or work controls; (2) there was no overexposure; (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure; and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component, because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt requirements to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action when performing work activities that breached contaminated systems |
| Site: | Cooper |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2012002 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Henderson J Josey J Laughlin S Garchow V Gaddy |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2012002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Cooper) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Cooper)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||