05000454/FIN-2012002-05
From kanterella
Revision as of 14:04, 30 September 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Control the Operating Status of Eight New Valves Affecting Two Safety-Related Systems |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIV, Inspection, Test, and Operating Status, when licensee personnel failed to control the operating status of eight manual isolation valves that were installed as part of a modification. Specifically, the licensee performed a modification that added piping between the CC and SX systems while the systems were operable and in service, but did not ensure appropriate operational control of system isolation boundaries. As part of their immediate corrective actions, the licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 1347396 and placed temporary identification tags on the valves and initiated a Clearance Order to control the position of these valves. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Specifically, the inspectors answered Yes to Question 1 Is the finding a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality? Based upon this Phase 1 screening, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because licensee personnel failed to properly coordinate work activities between operations and maintenance groups, which potentially impacted the pressure boundary of a safety-related system, thereby affecting nuclear safety |
| Site: | Byron  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000454/2012002 Section 1R18 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Garmoe B Bartlett B Jose C Thompson E Duncan E Sanchez _Santiago J Cassidy J Dalzell J Robbins R N |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Byron) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Byron)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||