ML080710399

Kewaunee, Response to NRC Supplemental Questions Regarding License Amendment Request 215, Modification of Internal Flooding Design Basis.

ML080710399
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	03/10/2008
From:	Bischof G T Dominion Energy Kewaunee
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
06-140E
Download: ML080710399 (27)

Text

Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.')1100 Dorninion Boulevard, GlenAllen,VA 2,0(,('March 10, 2008U.S.NuclearRegulatory CommissionAttention:DocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555 Dominion'SerialNo.06-140E KPS/UC/CDS:

R6DocketNo.50-305LicenseNo.DPR-43DOMINIONENERGYKEWAUNEINC.

KEWAUNEEPOWERSTATIO RESPONSETONRCSUPPLEENTALQUESTIONSREGARDINGLICENSE AMENDMENTREQUEST215.

'IMODIFICATIONOFINTERNAL FLOODING DESIGN BASIS"Pursuantto10CFR50.90,DominionEnergyKewaunee,Inc.(DEK)submittedarequestforapprovalofaproposedamendmenttotheKewauneePowerStation(KPS)UpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport(USAR)(reference1).TheproposedamendmentwouldclarifytheKPSdesigncriteriaassociatedwithinternalflooding.ThelicenseamendmentrequestwasfollowedbyseveraladditionalsubmittalswhichrespondedtoNRCrequestsforadditionalinformationonthistopic.TheresponseswereprovidedinlettersdatedApril17,2007 (reflerence2),May4,2007(reference3),September17,2007(reference4),andFebruary 1,2008(reference5).OnFebruary6,2008,atelephoneconferencewasheldbetweenmembersoftheNRCstaffandDEKonthissubject.Duringthetelephoneconference,theNRCstaffrequestedthatDEKprovideadditionalclarificationregardingtwooftheRAIresponsessubmittedinreference5.Subsequently,onFebruary 29,2008,twoadditionalquestionsregardingthissubmittalwerecommunicatedtoDEK.ThespecificquestionsandDEKresponsesareprovidedinAttachment1tothisletter.Thisresponsedoesnotchangetheconclusionsoftheno significant hazardsdeterminationassubmittedin rsference1.AcompletecopyofthissubmittalhasbeentransmittedtotheStateofWisconsinasrequiredby10CFR 50.91 (b)(1)..

SerialNo.06-140E ResponsetoNRC QuestionsonLAR215page2of4Ifyouhaveany questionsorrequire additional information, please contactMr.CraigSlyat(804)273-2784.Verytrulyyours, Vice President-Nuclear Engineering COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA))COUNTY OF HENRICO)The foregoing document was acknowledgedbeforeme,inandforthe County and Commonwealth aforesaid, todaybyGeraldT.Bischof,whoisVice President-Nuclear Engineering of Dominion Energy Kewaunee,Inc.Hehas affirmedbeforeme thatheis duly authorized to execute and the foregoing document in behalf of that Company,andthatthe statementsinthe documentaretruetothebestofhis knowledge and belief.VICKI L.HULL Notary PublIC eammon'HOlth o.vtfVInIa 1.oed c;omrmsatan bPI'" a 1....Acknowledgedbeforemethis

/aof(My Commission Expires:31,';;0/12';f.-1Iaa Notary Public ,2008.

SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRCQuestionsonLAR215page3of4

References:

1.LetterfromLeslieHartz (DEEK)toDocumentControlDesk,"License AmendmentRequest215-ModificationofInternalFloodingDesignBasis,"datedMarch17,2006(ADAMSAccession NO$.ML060760589).2.LetterfromE.S.Grecheck(DEK)toDocumentControlDesk,"ResponsetoNRCRequestforAdditionalInformationRegardingLicense AmendmentRequest215,ModificationofInternalFloodingDesignBasis,"datedApril17,2007(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML071080206).3.LetterfromG.T.Bischof(DEK)toDocumentControlDesk,"CorrectionofResponsetoNRCRequestforadditionalInformationRegardingLicense Amendment Request215,ModificationofInternalFloodingDesignBasis,"datedMay 4,2007.4.LetterfromG.T.Bischof(DEK)toDocumentControlDesk,"ResponsetoSecondNRCRequestforAdditionalInformationRegardingLicense Amendment Request 215, ModificationofInternalFloodingDesignBasis,"dated September17,2007(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML072640343).5.LetterfromG.T.Bischof(DEK)toDocumentControlDesk,"Responseto QuestionsRegardingLicenseAmendmentRequest215,'ModificationofInternalFloodingDesignBasis,'"datedFebruary 1,2008.Attachments:1.ResponsetoNRCSupplementalQuestionsRegardingKewauneeLicense AmendmentRequest215,"ModificationofInternalFloodingDesignBasis." 2.SimplifiedDrawingofServiceWaterPipingintheAreaoftheEmergencyDiesel Generator Rooms.3.ProposedRevisionstoMarked-upKewauneeUSARPagesIncludedinLAR215.

Commitmentsmadebythisletter:1.DEKwillensurethatallnon-Class 1/1*pipingthatisexcludedasapotentialfloodingsourceiscoveredbyaprogramthatprovidesreasonable,documented,andperiodic assurancethatthereisnosignificantcorrosion.Internalmonitoringhasnotbeen fully implementedatKPS.Implementationofthisprocesswilloccurbytheendof 2009.2.DEKcommitstoperformappropriaterecordreviewsandwalkdownsto identify anyadditionalcastironvalves thatmaybepresentinnon-Class 1/1*pipingevaluatedtomaintainitspressureboundaryduringaDBE.ThesewalkdownsandreviewswillbecompletedbyJune2,2008.

cc: Regional Administrator, Region III U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2443 Warrenville Road Suite 210Lisle,IL 60532-4352Mr.P.D.Milano U.S.Nuclear Regulatory CommissionMailStop08 C2 Washington,D.C.20555 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Kewaunee Power Station Public Service Commission of Wisconsin Electric DivisionP.O.Box 7854 Madison, WI 53707SerialNo.06-140E ResponsetoNRC QuestionsonLAR215page4of4 SerialNo.06-140E ATTACHMENT 1RESPONSETONRC

$UPPLEMENTALQUESTIONSREGARDING KEWAUNEE LICENSE AMENDMENTREQUEST215"MODIFICATION Of INTERNAL FLOODING DESIGN BASIS" KEWAUNEE POWER STATIONDOMINIONENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC.

SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRCQuestionsonLAR215Attachment1Page1of12toNRC Questions Regarding Kewaunee ulcense Amendment Request 215Pursuantto10CFR50.90,DominionEnergyKewaunee,Inc.(DEK)submittedarequestforapprovalofaproposedamendmenttotheKewauneePowerStation(KPS)UpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport(USAR)(reference1).TheproposedamendmentwouldclarifytheKPSdesigncriteriaassociatedwithinternalflooding.ThelicenseamendmentrequestwasfollowedbyseveraladditionalsubmittalswhichrespondedtoNRCrequestsforadditionalinformationonthistopic.TheresponseswereprovidedinlettersdatedApril17,2007 (rejerence2),May4,2007(reference3)September17,2007(reference4),andFebruary 1,2008(reference5).OnFebruary6,2008,atelephoneconferencewasheldbetweenmembersoftheNRCstaffandDEKonthissubject.Duringthetelephoneconference,theNRCstaffrequestedthatDEKprovideadditionalclarificationregardingtwooftheRAIresponsessubmittedinreference5.Specifically,clarificationwasrequestedregardingtheDEKresponsestoquestions3and6inreference5.Subsequently,onFebruary29,2007,twoadditionalquestionsregardingthissubmittalwerecommunicatedtoDEK.ThesequestionswerealsorelatedtotheRAIresponsesinreference5.Specifically,thesetwoquestionswererelatedtoquestion7inreference5.ThespecificquestionsandDEKresponsesareprovidedbelow.Thisresponsedoesnotchangetheconclusionsoftheno significant hazardsdeterminationassubmittedinreference1.Issue1-Clarification oftoQuestion3."Emergency Diesel Generator Room"Aresponsetothequestion abovewassubmittedonFebruary1,2008(reference5).Subsequently,duringthetelephonediscussiononFebruary6,2008,theNRCstaffrequestedthatadditionalinformationbeprovidedregardingDEKsresponsetothisquestion.TheNRCstaff requestedthatDEKdiscusstheeffectsoftheSWleakcurrentlydiscussedinKPS USAIRSection8.2.3.5inmoredetail.Specifically,theNRCstaffrequestedthatDEKprovideadiscussionofwhateffectthepostulatedleakwouldhaveonequipmentoperabilityandhowproceduresdirectoperatorstorespondtosuchaleak.ItisimportanttonotethatthediscussioninUSARsection8.2.3.5emanatesfromananswerprovidedtoahypotheticalquestion,beyonddesignbasisconsideration,thathadbeenraisedbytheAEC ElectricalBranchduringoriginallicensingofKewaunee.

The 1971AECquestion(reference9)focusedspecificallyontheeffectofarupture"ontheemergencypowersystems."Whilebeyondthescopeoftheoriginalquestion,the SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRC QuestionsonLAR215 Attachment 1Page2of12 presentquestionandresponsewillalsoaddressothersafetyrelated equipment thatcouldbeeffectedbythehypotheticalleak.

DEK ResponsetoIssue1 Background As discussedinreference8,theKewauneelicensingbasisdoesnotassumearuptureinthesafetyrelatedservicewaterlineeitherrunningthroughorinthe immediate vicinityofthe Emergency Diesel Generator(EDG)rooms.Thefollowing question was forwardedtoKewauneebythe AlEConSeptember23,1971(reference9): "Figure 1.2-1 oftheFSARshowsservicewaterlines eitherrunningthroughorintheimmediatevicinity of the emergency diesel generatorrooms.Provideananalysis of the effect of a rupture of one oftheseservicewaterlinesonthe emergency power systems." This questionwasfocusedspecificallyontheeffectofthehypotheticalrupture"on the emergencypowersystems."Inlate1971,Kewauneeprovidedthefollowingresponse (reference 10): "The rupture of aserviceweterlineinan Emergency Diesel GeneratorRoomcouldresultintheloss of the generatororthesafeguardsbusinthatroom.

AdministrativeoperationfromtheControlRoomofTypeIServiceWatervalvingwouldisolatethe breakand,ifrequired,realigntheServiceWatersuppliesthroughtheintactpipingfromtheoperatingServiceWaterPumps.

"Thisresponsealsofocused specificallyontheeffectofthehypotheticalrupture"onthe emergencypowersystems."Thisresponseiscontainedinsection8.2.3.5oftheKPSUSAR,Revision20.Thefollowingdiscussionassumesthattheruptureis significantenoughto necessitateservicewaterisolation.

Equipment affected directly by,theleak The equipment affected directly byahypotheticalservicewaterruptureinanEDGroom includestheEDGanditsassociatedsafeguardsbusintheEDGroom.

Thereisa possibilityofalossofoffsitepowerdependingonthesizeoftheleakandthelengthoftimeittakestorespondtotheleak.Thesupplybreakersfromthereserve auxiliary transformer(RAT),thetertiaryauxiliary transformer(TAT),andthemain auxiliary transformer(MAT)tothe4160V emergencysafeguardbusses1-5(servesAtrain equipment)and1-6(servesB trainequipment)arelocatedintheir corresponding EDGroom.The primary disconnectsfromtheRAT,TAT,andMATcouldbeshortedifthewaterlevelintheEDGroomreached approximately18inches.

SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRCQuestionsonLAR215Attachment1Page3of12IfthehypotheticalruptureofaservicewaterlineinanEDGroomcausedlossoftheEDGorsafeguardsbusinthatroomduetofloodingorspray,theequipmentinthatroomwouldbecomeINOPERABLEalongwiththeloadssuppliedbythebusinthat room.Equipmentthatisdeprived offlowduetotheleakandhowthisaffectstheoperabilityoftheeauipmentAsstatedintheresponsefrom 1971above,"AdministrativeoperationfromthecontrolroomofTypeIServiceWatervalvingwouldisolatethebreak..."ThiswouldbeaccomplishedbyclosureoftheappropriateAuxiliaryBuildingservicewaterheaderisolationvalve(SW-10AorSW-10B)orthemainservicewaterheaderisolationvalve(SW-3AorSW-3B)perprocedureOP-KW-AOP-SW-001,"AbnormalServiceWaterSystemOperation."TheservicewaterlinestotheEDGcoolingwaterheatexchangersbranchoffupstreamof SW-1 OA or SW-1OB.Therefore,servicewatertotheassociatedEDGwouldnotbeisolatedif thehypotheticalbreakoccurred.

SubsequentisolationofanAuxiliaryBuildingservicewaterheaderusingSW-10AorSW-10BwouldrenderallequipmentintheAuxiliary BuildingandsafeguardsalleyforthetrainthatreliesontheisolatedservicewatersupplyINOPERABLE.WithservicewaterflowavailabletobothEDGs,"theeffectofaruptureofoneoftheseservicewaterlinesontheernerqancypowersystems"islimitedtothedirecteffectdiscussedabove.Closureof theSW-10AorSW-10Bvalvewouldisolatetheauxiliarybuildingservicewatersupplytotherespectivetrainofequipment.Realignmentofservicewaterthroughintactpipingbyopeningtheservicewatermainheaderisolationvalves(SW-3AandSW-3B)couldbeaccomplishedifnecessary.IntheAEDGroom,thereareAtrainservicewaterlinesof24,20,16,6,and4inchesandaBtrainservicewaterlineof16inches.IntheBEDGroomthereareBtrainservicewaterlinesof20,6, and4inches.InthecasewhereaBservicewaterlinerupturedintheBEDGroomortheAservicewaterlinerupturedintheAEDGroom,splittingthemainservicewaterheaderswithvalvesSW-3AorSW-3BandturningofftheservicewaterpumpsfortheaffectedtrainwouldstoptheleakandleavetheunaffectedservicewatertrainfullyOPERABLE.Inthescenariosdiscussedabove,onetrainofservicewaterwouldbeintactandavailableforplantcoolingandshutdown.Emergencypowerwouldbeavailabletotheequipmentintheintacttrainexceptforthescenarioofthe"B"servicewaterlineruptureinthe"A"EDGroom.Inthatcasethe"B"EDGwouldremainoperable.However,noflowisavailabletothe"B"servicewatertrainequipmentdownstreamoftherupture.Inaddition,emergencypowerwouldnotbeavailabletothe"A"trainequipment.Therefore,equipmentdownstreamoftheruptureonthe"B"servicewatertrainandequipmentthatrelieson"A"trainservicewaterwouldbothbeconsidered SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRC QuestionsonLAR215 Attachment 1Page4of12INOPERABLE.Servicewaterwouldbeavailable,however,throughthe intact"A"servicewatertrainwiththe"B"servicewaterpumpsrunningonpowerfromthe"B"EDG.Inthisscenario,aTechnicalSpecificationrequiredshutdown sequencewouldbeenteredifaplanttriphadnotalreadyoccurred.The"B"chargingpump,turbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwater(TDAFW)pump,poweroperatedreliefvalves(PORYs),and"B"batterycharger,amongotherequipment,wouldbeoperableforcooldown.The"B"AFWpumpwouldbeavailableuntilthecondensatestoragetank(CST)emptiedanda"mixed"trainofcomponentcoolingusingthe"B"pumpand"A" componentcoolingheatexchangerwouldbeavailable.

Automatic and operator actions;necessary to mitigate the eventTheControlRoomoperatorswouldbemadeawareoftheeventbylossofoperating equipment, safeguardsalleyfloodlevelindicationand/orturbinebuildingsumplevelindication.Procedure OP-KW-AOP-SW-001,"AbnormalServiceWaterSystem Operation,"wouldbeentered basedontheseindications.Thisprocedurehasstepsthatwoulddirectoperatorsto:*Locallychecktheservicewatersystemforleaks.*Checksystemoperation and pressure.*Locallyisolateleaksifpossible.*IsolatetheAuxiliaryBuildingservicewaterheaderisolationvalve(SW-10Aor SW-1 OB)forthetraininquestion,ifnecessary.*Realignmentoftheservicewatersuppliesthroughtheoppositetrainpiping.Realignmentoftheservicewatersuppliesthroughtheoppositetrainpipingcanbe accomplishedbyopeningservicewaterheaderisolationvalves,SW-3AandSW-3B.(Note: SW-3AandSW-3Barenormallyopen,butisolateonlowservicewaterpressuretoseparatetheservicewater systemintotwo independenttrains.)Intheeventofa catastrophicfailureofaservicewaterlineinanEDGroom, SW-3AandSW-3Bwould automaticallyclose,isolatingtrainAandtrainBportionsofthemainservicewaterheaderfromeachother.Thefloodwaterwouldcausethesafeguardsbusinthe associatedEDGroomtotrip.Intheeventofalossofoffsitepower,Procedure E-O,"ReactorTriporSafetyInjection,"wouldbeenteredand,atstep4,atransitiontoES-0.1,"ReactorTripResponse,"wouldoccur.Atstep4ofES-0.1,chargingflowwouldbeestablishedperprocedure NOP-CYC-002,"ChargingandVolumeControl."Assumingalossof emergency safeguardsbus1-5, OP-KW-NOP-CYC-002containsaprecautionandlimitationto verify availabilityofachargingpumpsuctionflowpathpriortostartingachargingpump.

SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRCQuestionsonLAR215Attachment1Page5of12Theprecautionalsospecifiesthatautomaticswitchingofthechargingpumpsuctionisnotavailable.Althoughtheservicewaterpipesdiscussedabovearesafetyrelatedand deterministicallynotassumedtoruptureorleak,fromariskperspectivethereissomeprobabilitythatarandombreakorleakmightoccur.ThepotentialforarandomruptureorleakinaservicewaterlineintheEDGroomsismodeledinthecurrentPRAanalysisfortheplant.Themodelindicatesthatalargeruptureofthispipingisaveryunlikelyeventandthatthedominantriskposedtotheplantbytheseservicewaterlinesisthepotentialforasmallerleak thatcausessprayandsubsequentlossofemergencyswitchgearintheassociated EDGroom.AsaresultofthisrecentPRAmodeling,amodificationhasbeeninstalledtoreducetheriskassociatedwithsprayfromthemorelikelysmallerleaks.ThisresultsinasignificantreductionintheoverallriskposedbyaleakinaservicewaterlineinanEDGroom.Issue2-Clarification oftoQuestion6."Safe Shutdown"Question6oftheRAIresponse(reference5)readsasfollows:"SafeShutdown:Thelicenseehasstated thatKPSisaHotShutdownPlant.TheKPSTechnicalSpecifications(TSs)defineHotShutdown asfission power with a coreoperatinglimitsreport(COLR)-specifiedshutdownmarginandanaveragereactorcoolantsystemtemperature of 2 540 0F.TheStandardTechnicalSpecifications,andtheTSsforothersimilarageunits,definehotshutdown as Keff<0.99andaveragereactorcoolant systemtemperaturebetween,butnotincluding,200 0Fand 350 0F.Onthisbasis, providethefollowing:

a.Afloodingsafeshutdownequipmentlistinthe USAR.Ifnot,discusswhynot necessary.

b.AdescriptionaboutwhythelicenseebelievesKPSisahotshutdownplant.Addressthebasisforlimitingthescope ofprotectedsafety-relatedequipmenttothatrequiredforhotshutaown,consideringthattheNRCletterfromR.

C.De Young,NRC,to E.W.James, WPSC,datedSeptember26,1972, requested review of non-Category Iequipmentfailuresthatcouldadverselyaffectthe performance ofsafety-relatedequipmenteitherrequiredforsafe-shutdown of thefacilityortolimittheconsequences ofanaccident.TheresponsefromWisconsinPublicServiceCorporationdatedOctober 31, 1972, similarlyaddressessafety-relatedequipmenteitherrequiredforsafe-shutdown of thefacilityortolimittheconsequences ofanaccident.

SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRCQuestionsonLAR215 Attachment 1Page6of12 c.Forfloodingevents, a justification astowhythesafe shutdown condition after afloodingevent should notbedefined asanaveragereactor coolant system temperature of<350 0 F.d.Atimelimitforachievingcoldshutdownconditionsfollowing afloodingevent."AresponsetothequestionabovewassubmittedonFebruary1,2008(reference5).Subsequently,duringthetelephonediscussiononFebruary6,2008,theNRCstaffrequestedthatadditional informationbeprovidedregardingDEKsresponsetothis question.TheNRCstaffrequestedthatDEKprovideadditionaldiscussionforlimitingthescopeofequipmentthatneedstobeprotectedfromflooding(RAI6.babove).Specifically,theNRCstaffrequestedDEK'sbasisforlimitingthescopeofequipmentrequiredtobeprotectedfromfloodingtosafeshutdownequipmentwhilenotincludingotherClassIequipmentneededto"limittheconsequencesofanaccident." DEK ResponsetoIssue2OnSeptember26,1972theAECsentKewauneearequesttodetermine whether thefailureofanynon-CategoryI(seismic)equipment,particularlyinthecirculatingwatersystemandfireprotectionsystem,couldresultinacondition,suchasfloodingorthereleaseofchemicals,thatmightpotentiallyadverselyaffecttheperformanceofrelatedequipmentrequiredfor safeshutdownofthefacilityortolimitthe consequencesofanaccident(reference6).Recentresearchofinternal correspondence associatedwiththeoriginalKewauneereviewandresponsetothe1972letterindicatesthatpotentialfloodingoftheinternalcontainmentspraysystemandthesafetyinjectionsystemwereincludedinthe reviewofequipmentthatneededprotection.Thesesystemsarenotrequiredforsafeshutdown,butareusedtolimitthe consequences ofanaccident.Thesafetyinjectionsystemis,however,onDEK'sfloodingSafeShutdownEquipmentListandisprotected asanalternateborationpath.TheKewauneeresponsetotheAECwassubmittedonOctober31,1972(reference7).Theresponseindicatedthatthescopeofthereviewincludedanalysisoftheeffectsoffailureofnon-CategoryI(seismic)failuresontheperformanceofsafetyrelatedequipmentrequiredforsafeshutdownortolimittheconsequenceofanaccident.Insummary,thereviewactuallyconductedmatchedtherequestedscopeofthereviewandincludedtheeffectsoffailureofnon-CategoryI(seismic)failuresontheperformanceofsafetyrelatedequipmentrequiredforbothsafeshutdownandtolimittheconsequenceofanaccident.Basedontheabove,andinordertoensureanappropriatelyconservativeapproachforinternalfloodingconsistentwithcurrentrequlatoryguidanceassociatedwithother SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRCQuestionsonLAR215Attachment1Page7of12designbasisthreats(e.g.externalflooding,seismic,tornadomissiles),DEKmodifiesitspositionthatonlysafeshutdownequipmentneedstobeprotectedfromtheeffectsofinternalflooding.DEKproposesinsteadtosubstitutethepositionthatequipmenttobeprotectedfromtheeffectsoftloodinqincludes,"CategoryIequipmentneededforsafeshutdownofthereactororto limi!ttheconsequencesofanaccident."ConsistentwiththeoriginallicensingbasisofKewaunee,theterm"accident"ismeanttoconsideronlytheDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)identifiedinChapter14oftheUSAR.ItincludesthecreditedsafetyequipmentidentifiedinChapter14andthenecessarysupportequipmenttokeepthecreditedsafetyequipmentfunctional.Subsequenttoissuanceoftheoriginallicense, designbasiseventssuchasstationblackout(SBO)andAnticipatedTransientWithoutScram(ATWS)havebeenintroducedintothelicensingbasisoftheplantovertheyears.Eachhavecomewiththeirownspecificregulatoryrequirements,includingsafeshutdowncriteria,andwillnotbeaddedtothelistofcreditedDBAsafetyequipmentunlesstheyhavebeenincorporatedintotheChapter14DBAsintheUSAR.Also,asstatedinourOctober31,1972responseregardingpotentialinternalfloodingcausedbyalinefailureinthevicinityofengineeredsafetyequipment,"...becauseofsafetyequipmentredundancyanddesignarrangement,thefunctionalpurposeofthesafetyequipmentwouldnotbejeopardizedintheeventoffailureofanyoftheselines."ThiswasKewaunee'spositionin1972andisconsideredaspartofthecurrentlicensingbasistoday.ThisbasisissupportedbytheproposedcorrectiontoUSARSectionB.5thathasbeenmadepartofthisamendmentrequestviatheresponsetoquestionnumber5ofthethirdRAIresponseset(reference5).Thisexpandstheconsiderationofredundancyasitrelatestosafeshutdownequipmenttoincludethefunctionalpurposeofequipmentusedtolimittheconsequencesofanaccident.Thisdoesnotsupersedetheassumptionofadditionalsinglefailuresusedinaccidentanalyses;however,itisconsideredasanacceptableapproachforthedeterminationofprotectionrequirementswithregardtoaninternalfloodingevent.AcopyoftheproposedUSARchangesassociatedwiththispositionisprovidedinAttachment3.

SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRCQuestionsonLAR215 Attachment 1Page8of12Issue3-ClarificationofResppnseto Question 7,"Non-Seismic Class 1//*Pipinq,"Itemc,"Cast Iron Valves" Question l.coftheRAIresponse(reference5)readsasfollows:

c.CastIronvalves:i.Fornon-Class 1//*pipingevaluatedtomaintainitspressureboundaryduring aDBE,identifythenumber ofcastiron valves,theirassociatedsystem,andlocation.Additionally,describetheimportance ofthesecastironvalvesasa potentialfloodingsource.ii.Fornon-Class 1//*pipingevaluatedtomaintainitspressure boundary during aDBE,describehow primaryandsecondarystresseswerecombinedinthe evaluation ofthestressesincastiron valves.iii.Fornon-Class 1//*pipingevaluatedtomaintainitspressure boundary during aDBE,describewhythemethod of combining primaryandsecondarystressesisacceptableincastiron valves.iv.Fornon-Class 1/1*pipingevaluatedtomaintainitspressure boundary during aDBE,describethe acceptancecriteriaforstresslevelsinthecastironvalves ascomparedtothevalve's uWmatetensilestress (UTS).v.Fornon-Class 1//*pipingevaluatedtomaintainitspressure boundary during aDBE,provide ajustificationfortheallowedstresslevelsforcastironvalves.AresponsetothequestionabovewassubmittedonFebruary1,2008(reference5).Subsequently,onFebruary 29,2008,theNRCstaffrequestedthatadditionalinformationbeprovidedregardingDEKsresponsetothisquestion.Specifically,theNRCnotedthatDEKindicatedthatitwouldreplaceanyidentifiedcastironvalvesthatwouldbepotentialfloodingsources.However,DEKdidnotcommittolookforthesevalves.TheNRCwouldlikeaDEKcommitmenttolookforthesevalves.

DEK ResponsetoIssue3DEKcommitstoperformappropriaterecordreviewsandwalkdownstoidentifyanyadditionalcastironvalvesthatmaybepresentinnon-Class 1/1*pipingevaluatedtomaintainitspressureboundaryduringaDBE.ThesewalkdownsandreviewswillbecompletedbyJune 2,2008.

SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRCQuestionsonLAR215Attachment1 Page 9of12Issue4-ClarificationofResppnsetoQuestion7,"Non-Seismic Class 1/1*Piping."Itema,"Corrosion" Question l.aoftheRAIresponse(reference5)readsasfollows:

a.Corrosioni.Fornon-Class 1/1*pipJngthathasbeenevaluatedtomaintainitspressure boundary during ade$ignbasisearthquake (OBE),describeanyprograms,inspections,evaluations,orotherinvestigationsintocorrosiontoensurethattheassumed/requiredintegrityremains valid.ii.Forthenon-Class 1//*pipingevaluatedtomaintainitspressure boundary during a OBE,describeanyfutureactions plannedtoevaluateorassess corrosion.AresponsetothequestionabovewassubmittedonFebruary1,2008(reference5).Subsequently,onFebruary29,2008,theNRCstaffrequestedthatadditionalinformationbeprovidedregardingDEKsresponsetothisquestion.TheNRCnotedthatDEKidentifiedseveralprogramsthatmonitorcorrosioninsystemsthatarepotentialfloodingsources.However,itdoesnotappearthattheseprogramscoverallsystemsthatare potentialfloodingsources.TheNRCrequestedclarificationfromDEKthatallpipingthat isapotentialfloodingsourcehasbeencoveredbyaprogramthatprovidesassurancethereisnosignificantcorrosion.

DEK ResponsetoIssue4Inordertobeconsideredasapotentialfloodsource,non-Class 1/1*pipingmustbenormallywettedandlocatedinorhaveflowpathstoareasoftheplantthatcontainequipmentrequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplantortolimitthe consequencesofaDBA.Inorderforpipingtobeexcludedasapotentialfloodsource,itmustbedemonstratedthatthepipingwouldwithstandtheeffectsofaseismiceventwhilemaintainingitspressureboundaryintegrity.InQuestion l.aofreference5,theNRCstaffrequestedDEKto"...describeanyprograms,inspections,evaluations,orotherinvestigationsintocorrosiontoensurethat the assumed/requiredintegrityremainsvalid."Thereisnosingleprogramthat specificallyaddressescorrosioninallexcludedfloodsourcepipesegments.TheprogramsidentifiedintheDEKresponsetoQuestion l.aaddressedsome,butnotall,ofthecurrentlyexcludednon-Class 1/1*floodsourcepipesegments.However,corrosionintheremainingexcludedpipessqments(andanyfuturepipingwhichmaybeexcluded SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRCQuestionsonLAR215 Attachment 1Page10of12asafloodingsource)willbeaddressedbyfullimplementationofplantprogramsrelatedtolicenserenewal.Corrosioninthesepipingsegmentswillbemonitoredandaddressedbyacombinationofwalkdowns,maintenancedriveninspectionactivities,andtheKPScorrectiveactionprogram.Theseprogramsandtheirassociationwithcorrosionmonitoringareasfollows:

MonitoringofInternal SurfacesInternalcorrosionofpiping systemswillbebroadlyaddressedatKewauneebyfullimplementationoftheworkmanagementprocess.NuclearFleetAdministrativeProcedureWM-AA-100,"WorkManagement,"establishestheDominionnuclearfleet expectationsforhowworkisidentified,selected,planned,scheduled,executed,closedout,andcritiqued.Theworkorderprocessisimplementedbysurveillanceprocedures,preventiveandcorrectivemaintenanceprocedures,orotherroutinelyscheduledtaskstoensurethedetectionofagingeffectspriortothelossofcomponentintendedfunction.TherequirementsinWM-AA-100incorporatelicenserenewalcommitmentsforSurry,NorthAnna,andMillstonePowerStations.WM-AA-100containsexpectationsforconductingvisualinspectionsofmechanicalcomponentsduringworkactivitiesinordertoidentifyandmanageagingeffects.ThepersonnelperformingtheseinspectionsatKPSwillbetrainedandqualifiedtoperformtheseactivitiesinaccordancewiththegoverningprocedures.

WM-AA-100 alsoprovidesexpectationsforwhentoperformandhowtodocumenttheinspectionsofequipmentduringworkactivities.Thisincludestherequirementsfordocumentingmaintenanceperformedonplantequipmentandisapplicabletoallcorrectivemaintenance,troubleshooting,andpreventivemaintenance,testing,andmodificationinstallationactivities.Undertheprocess,corrosionmonitoringisaccomplishedbyabroadsamplingprocessversusadetailedline-by-lineinspectionprogram.Duetothe comprehensivescopeoftheworkorderprocess,the processprovidestheopportunitytovisuallyinspecttheinternalsurfacesofmanycomponentsconstructedoftypicalsystemmaterialsandexposedtotypicalsystemenvironments,includingstagnantlocations,duringpreventiveandcorrectivemaintenanceactivitiesonanongoingbasis.ThecombinationofpipingmaterialandwatersystemswhichcomprisethepotentialfloodsourcesatKewauneearetypicalandareboundedbythescopeoftheworkcontrolprocess.Theworkorderprocessalsoincludesapost-jobcritiquetodocumentas-foundequipmentconditionsandtoprovidetrendingofaging.Thegoverningprocedureshaveestablishedacceptancecriteria.AConditionReportisinitiatedwhentheestablishedacceptancecriteriaarenotmet.Theprocessesdescribedabovewereimplementedtomeetcommitments associatedwithlicenserenewalforother plantsintheDominionnuclearfleet.Currently,KPS SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRCQuestionsonLAR215Attachment1 Page 11of12doesnotfullyimplementtheprocessesdiscussedabove.KPShasnotyetsubmittedanapplicationforlicenserenewal,butplanstosubmitbytheendofthe3rdquarterof2008.KPSwillimplementtheseprocessesbytheendof2009.

MonitoringofExternal SurfacesExternalcorrosionofpipingsystemsisbroadlyaddressedatKewauneebytheuseofgeneralwalkdownsandinspectionsperformedbytheNuclearAuxiliaryOperators(NAOs)perGeneralNuclearProcedureGNP-03.30.02,"ConductofOperations."03.30.02providesalistofthegeneralinspectionstobeperformedduringoperatorrounds,andincludesspecificinspectiondetailsrelatedtomonitoringexcessive corrosion.SystemEngineersperformvisualinspectionsduringwalkdownsofplantsystemsandcomponentsduringbothnormaloperationandrefuelingoutages.DominionNuclearFleetGuidanceandReferenceDocumentER-AA-SYS-1002,"SystemEngineeringWalkdowns,"providesguidanceforSystemEngineerwalkdownsandachecklistofattributestobeobserved,includinginspectioncriteriarelatedtosystemaginganddegradation.Indicationsof

¢legradationidentifiedduringthesewalkdownsaredocumentedinthecorrective actionprograminaccordancewithFleetAdministrativeProcedurePI-KW-200,"CorrectiveAction." ConclusionDEKwillensurethatallnon-Class 1/1*pipingthatisexcludedasapotentialtroodingsourceiscoveredbyaprogramthatprovidesreasonable,documented,andperiodicassurancethereisnosignificantcorrosion.Themethodsforinternalandexternalcorrosionmonitoringdiscussedaboveaddressplantareascontainingequipmentrequiredforsafeshutdownortolimittheconsequencesofa DBA.Themethodsaregeneralenoughtoidentifysignificantcorrosionofanycomponentwithinthescopeoftheseinspections,walkdowns,andmaintenanceactivities.Inaddition,existingproceduressetexpectationstoidentifyanddocumentanyobservationofanabnormalordegradedplantconditionduringtheseactivities.InternalmonitoringhasnotbeenfullyimplementedatKPS.Fullimplementationofthisprocesswilloccurbytheendof2009.Accordingly,itisunlikelythatsignificantcorrosionofexcludedfloodsourceswillgoundetected.Basedontheabove,DEKbelievespipingsegmentsthathavebeenexcludedaspotentialfloodingsourcesare coweredorwillbecoveredinthefuturebyprogramsthatprovidereasonable,documented,andperiodicassurancethatthereisnosignificant corrosion.

SerialNo.06-140EResponsetoNRCQuestionsonLAR215Attachment1Page12of12

References:

1.LetterfromLeslieHartz(OEK)toDocumentControlDesk,"LicenseAmendmentRequest215-ModificationofInternalFloodingDesignBasis,"datedMarch17,2006.(ADAMSAccessionNos.ML060760589).2.Letterfrom E.S.Grecheck(DEK)toDocumentControlDesk,"ResponsetoNRCRequestforAdditionalInformationRegardingLicenseAmendmentRequest215,ModificationofInternalFloodingDesignBasis,"datedApril17,2007.(ADAMSAccessionNo.

ML071 080206).3.LetterfromG.

T.Bischof(DEK)toDocumentControlDesk,"CorrectionofResponsetoNRC RequestforadditionalInformationRegardingLicenseAmendmentRequest215,ModificationofInternalFloodingDesignBasis,"dated May 4,2007.4.LetterformG.T.Bischof(DEK)toDocumentControlDesk,"ResponsetoSecondNRCRequestforAdditionalInformationRegardingLicenseAmendmentRequest215,ModificationofInternalFloodingDesignBasis,"datedSeptember17,2007.(ADAMSAccessionNo.ML072640343).5.LetterfromG.T.Bischof(DEK)toDocumentControlDesk,"ResponsetoQuestionsRegardingLicenseAmendmentRequest215,'ModificationofInternalFloodingDesignBasis,'"datedFebruary1,2008.6.LetterforR.C.DeYoung(AEC)to E.W.James(WPSC),datedSeptember26, 1972.7.Letterfrom E.W.James(WPSC)toR.C.DeYoung(AEC),WPSReviewofCategoryI(Seismic)Equipment.8.Amendment NO.4totheKewauneePowerStationFacilityDescriptionandSafetyAnalysisReport(FDSAR)wassubmittedinaletterfromG.F.HrubeskyofWPStoDr.PeterAMorrisoftheAECDivisionofReactorLicensingonApril1,1968.9.FSARquestion(Q8.16)wasforwardedtoKewauneebytheAEConSeptember23,1971.10.December15,1971,KewauneeprovidedthefollowingresponseaspartofAmendmentNo.13totheFSAR.

SerialNo.06-140E ATTACHMENT 2 RESPONSETONRC SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS REGARDING KEWAUNEE LICENSE AMENDMENTREQUEST215"MODIFICATION OF INTERNAL FLOODING DESIGN BASIS" SIMPLIFIED DRAWINGOFSERVICE WATERPIPINGINTHE AREAOFTHE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS KEWAUNEE POWER STATIONDOMINIONENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC.

SerialNo.06-140EResponseto NRCQuestionsonLAR 215 Attachment 2Page1of1 SIMPLIFIED DRAWING OFSERVICEWATERPIPINGINTHEAREAOFTHE EMERGEN¢Y DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS ToSW Standpipe SW-Pump 182 SW-Pump 181ToTurbineBuildingLoads

---.:I ToSW Standpip.e SW-10B 24" SW*PulT'fl lA2 lAlToAuxiliaryBuildingLoads SerialNo.06-140E ATTACHMENT 3 RESPONSETONRC$UPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS REGARDING KEWAUNEE LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 215"MODIFICATION OF INTERNAL FLOODING DESIGN BASIS" PROPOSED REVISIONS,TO MARKED-UP KEWAUNEEUSARPAGES INCLUDEDINLAR215 KEWAUNEE POWER STATION DOMINION ENERGY KEWAUNEE, INC.

B.ll INTERNAL FLOODING 8.11.1GENERALDISCUSSION Internal floodingcanoccurasaresulta rupture ofapipeortankinasystem containingorconnectedtoa large volume ofwater.This sectiondoesnot address flooding from otherliquidssuchas chemicals ordieselfuelthatarestoredintanks.In these cases, cubiclesordikes contain liquidsduetofailure ofseismic components or spillage occurs remotefromany safety-related equipment.

Internal flooding resultingfromsources outside containment (otherthannatural phenomenon) was addressedinthe original licensing process for Kewaunee.Amendment17totheFSAR addressed internal floodingfroma postulated ruptureina servicewaterlineinthe vicinity ofthediesel generator rooms.Section 8.2.3.5 discusses the impact of this postulatedrupture.The postulated rupture ofaenergyline(HELB)thatalso includes flooding consequenceswasaddressedbyFSAR Amendment Nos.24,27,and28thatadded Appendix lOAtotheFSAR.

Appendix lOA provided detailed design criteria and assessments of potentialHELBevents.

Although the rupture ofaservicewaterpipewas addressedintheFSAR,thegeneral criteriaforthe evaluation of internal floodingfroma rupture ofapipeortankwasnot capturedintheFSAR.In2005, re-constitution of the design criteriaforinternal flooding was initiated in support of severalinternalflood protection modifications.

When the operating license for Kewauneewasissued,theAEC was pursuingtheissue of internal flooding for previously licensedplants.TheAEC developedaset of guidelinesforinternal flooding protection.

These guidelineswerenotsentto Kewaunee for consideration;however,the guidelines have been consideredinthe re-constitution oftheinternal flooding design criteria.Thissectionappliesonlytointernal flooding resultingfromthefailure ofanon-classIcomponentthatis below the criteria for high-energysystems.TheHELBdesigncriteriaisaddressedspecificallyinSection lOA.B.ll.2FLOODINGDESIGNCRITERIATheplantmust withstand the consequences of an internal floodingeventinsucha mannerthatitretains the capabilitytoachieveand maintain the reactorinasafe shutdown conditionandto limit the consequences of a designbasisaccigent.

Towardthisend,the design criteriaforinternal flooding evaluations are:(a)Only non-Class VI*pipeortanksare consideredtofailunlessspecificallyevaluatedtowithstand the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE).(b)Onlyfailuresin piping and branch runs exceeding1inchare considered.(c)Pipeandtankfailures assumethesingle most limitingfailureinanareaas determined by maximumfloodlevel calculatedinanarea.B.ll-l (d)Operatoractionsand designfeaturesare considered,butan additionalsinglefailureisnot.(e)Flooding is assumed coincidentwiththeloss of offsite power if it increases the consequences ofaflood.(f)Theeffects of water spraying, dripping, or splashing on sensitive equipmentaretobeconsideredinthe assessment of available equipment.

Kewaunee was licensedasahot shutdown plant, therefore, safe shutdown followinganinternalfloodis hot shutdown.Thereisno specific time requirementforthe reactor to achievecoldshutdown.

However, sufficient equipment must be protected to begin the cooldown processandreduceRCS temperaturetoor below350°Fwithin72hoursfollowinganinternalfloodingevent.TheSafeShutdown EquipmentListforinternal flooding is documented in Attachment 1 of Reference 34.Some non-Class I/I*pipeshavebeenexcludedfromconsiderationasafloodsourcebasedonevaluationstoverifythatthe pipes have reasonable assurance to sustain the combined effects ofadesignbasis earthquake and both pressure and deadweightloadingwithoutaloss of pressure boundaryfunction.This assurance is obtained from experience based evaluations and/or by bounding evaluations.

The criteria from ASME Section IIICodefor evaluationforlevelD loadingorfrom ASME Section III Appendix Fareusedto establish reasonable assurance against leakagefroma pressure boundary.Thefailure ofapipeortankis assumedasa result of DBE seismicloads.Onlyonepipeortank componentisassumedtofail.Thefailureis conservatively assumedtobetheworstcase (complete double-endedrupture)with respect to flooding potentialineacharea evaluated.

The consequences oflesserbreaks resulting in drippingorsprayarealso considered.

Multiplepipeortankfailuresarenot consideredintheanalysisforapipeortank rupture because the potential interactions,suchaspipewhiporjet impingement,arenot applicableforlinesthatarenot definedashigh-energylines.Asdiscussedin Section lOA, high-energylineswould consideradditionalfailuresasaconsequence oftheinitialrupture, if warranted.

Multiplefailuresresuiltingfrom seismic loadingsarealsonot considered as credible because ofthe robust design of non-Class I/I*piping.Specificevaluations of non-Class I/I*pipinginthe Class I portion of the Turbine Building basement (SafeguardsAlley)and portions of the Auxiliary Building have demonstratedthattheClass IIandClass III pipingintheseareasare capable of withstandingtheeffects ofaDBE withoutfailure.The pipingintheseareaswas installedtothesame standards used throughoutthestationforClassII,III, and III*piping.Operatoractionsanddesignfeaturesare consideredinthe evaluation of internalfloodingconsequences.Thedesignfeatures include level sensingdevicestoalert operatorstotakeaction,checkvalvesto prevent backflow through pipes, barriers to protect safety-related equipment (including existing walls,doors,dikes,etc.),and circulating water pumptripsto minimizefloodsources.

Operatoractionsin responsetocontrolroom indicationsarethe primary means of identificationandtermination of flooding sources.Flooding evaluationsassumea30 minute period for identification and isolation offloodingsourceswith the exception of a breakinthe Circulating Water expansion jointsandtherupture ofa20"ServiceWater headerinthe TurbineBuilding.An expansion jointfailurewouldbe alarmed almost immediatelyinthe B.11-2 ControlRoom.Low pressureintheSW header wouldcausealarmsandvalve re-alignment indicationsintheControlRoom.

If indications of excessive waterinthe TurbineBuildingarereceived,theControl Room operators are instructed by procedure to verifythatthe CirculatingWaterpumpshavetrippedand, if necessary, manuallytripthe pumps thus terminating an expansion joint failure floodingevent.The Circulating Water pump trip would occur with eitherscenario.For abnormal Service Water indicationsintheControl Room, operators are instructed by procedure to dispatch personnel to identifythefloodsourceandtoclosevalves isolating Service Waterinthe TurbineBuilding.TheCW pumptripcircuitryisnot creditedinthe evaluation of internal flooding resultingfroman expansion jointfailureorthe Service Water headerfailureinthe Turbine Building.Thetwo scenarios abovehavecritical operator response times oflessthan30 minutes.The operator responsetimesforthese manualactionshavebeen validatedinthe plantcontrolroomsimulator.Forfloodingsourcesinthe Turbine Building (otherthanthe Circulating Water expansion jointorthe 20" Service Water header)and sourcesinthe Auxiliary Building, specificsumpalarms would direct Control Room operators by procedure to dispatch operations personnel to identify and isolate any floodingsources.The significant, high-volumefloodsources identified by plant walkdowns were evaluated by tabletop discussion and isolation of the source was judgedtobe achievable withinthe minute period assumedintheflooding evaluations.

The tabletop validationswerebasedoninformation availableinthecontrol roomtoassistthe deployment of operations personnelintotheplantto identifyfloodsources.The validationeffortdidnot considertheuse of random searchestolocate flooding sources.Loss of offsite power(LOOP)is assumed unlesstheLOOPresultsinless limitingconsequence.Designfeaturesthatrelyon electric power to operate(suchassump pumps)areonly creditedforflood protection iftheyare poweredbysite emergency power sources.8.11.3 CLASS I EQUIPMENT PROTECTION The criteriaforClassI equipment protectionisstatedin Section B.5.a.ItstatesthatClassIitemsare protectedagainstdamagefromthe rupture ofapipeortank resulting in serious floodingtotheextentthattheClassIfunctionis impaired.Consistent withtheABC itemined flooding guidelifl:es, ([heClassI functions required following the rupture of a pipeortank whichresultsininternal floodingarethose functions necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown ofthe reactorandto limit the consequences ofadesignbasisaccident.For internalflooding,safe shutdownisdefinedasthe ability to bring the reactortohot shutdown, cooldownto350°F within72hoursand, ultimately,achievecoldshutdown.

Consistentwiththe original licensing basis of Kewaunee,theterm"design basis accident" is meant to consideronlythe Design Basis Accidfnts (DBAs)identified in Chapter 14 oftheUSAR.Itincludesthe credited safety equipment identified tin Chapter14andthe necessary support equipmenttokeepthe credited safety equipmentfunctional.The abilitytoachieveand maintainsafeshutdown-andtolimitthe consequences of a design basis acciAAnt demonstrates the effectiveness of the plantdesignandflood protection measures to protect necessaryClassI equipment.

The installed flood protection measures includedrainline check valves, floodingbarriers,levelalarms,anda circulatingwaterpumptrip.These measures provide additional protectiontotheoriginalplantdesignagainstflooddamage.Thecriteriafor B.11-3 protection ofClassI equipmenthasnotchanged, however,themeansby which to complywiththe criteria has becomemoreeffective.

The following criteriaspecifythedesignconsiderationsforthe protection ofnecessaryClassIequipmentfrominternal flooding events:*Separation for Redundancy:Asinglefailure of any postulatedinternalfloodingsource,asdefinedin 8.11.2,shallnotresultinloss of a function importanttothesafe shutdown oftheplant.Redundant equipment credited for maintainingasafe shutdownfunctionshallbeseparatedorprotectedtoassure safe shutdown capabilityinthe event of an internal flooding event.*AccessDoorsandAlarms:

Watertight barriers credited for protection from flooding of equipment importanttothesafe shutdown of the plantshallhaveallaccessdoorsor hatchesfittedwith reliable switchesandcircuitsthat provideanalarmintheControl Room whentheaccessisopen.

Sealed Water Passages: Passages or piping and other penetrations through walls ofafloodzone containing equipment requiring protectiontoassuretothesafe shutdown oftheplantshallbesealed against water leakagefromany postulated internal floodingsource,asdefinedin 8.11.2.Creditedsealsshall maintain their integrity during a Design Basis Earthquake.ClassI Watertight Structures:Walls,doors, panels, or other compartment closures credited to protect equipment importanttothesafe shutdown oftheplantfromdamageduetofloodingfromany postulated internal floodingsource,asdefinedin B.ll.2, will maintaintheirintegrityduringaDesign Basis Earthquake.WaterLevelAlarmsandTrips:

Plant areas containing a postulated internalfloodingsource,asdefinedin 8.11.2 whose rupture could resultinflood damage to equipment importanttothesafe shutdown oftheplantshallhavelevelalarmsand pumptrips(wherenecessary)thatalarmintheControlRoom.

Redundancy of switchesisrequired.

Critical pump(i.e.,high volumeflow,suchas condenser circulating water pumps)trip circuitsshouldmeettheIEEE279 criteriatotheextent practical.

These flooding criteriadonotspecifythatflood protection equipmentistobesafetyrelated.Flood protection equipmentisnot intended to mitigateanyaspect of a design basis accident.Therefore, consistentwiththe Kewaunee quality classificationcriteria,such equipmentdoesnotmeetthecriteriato be classifiedassafetyrelated.

B.

11.4 CONCLUSION

The abilitytocopewithinternal floodingfromthe rupture of a pipeortankis determinedperthecriteria provided in sections 8.11.2 and B.ll.3 above.Equipment requiredforthesafe shutdown ofthereactorandto limit the consequences of a design basis accident must be protectedfromtheflood consequences consistent with Section B.5.a.B.11-4 REFERENCES

-APPENDIX B1.Morris,Hansen,Holley,Biggs,Namyet,andMinami,"StructuralDesignforDynamicLoads",McGraw-HillCo.,Inc.,NewYork,19592.RAWiesemann,RETome,R.Salvatori,"UltimateStrengthCriteriatoEnsureNoLoss of Function ofPipingandVesselsUnderEarthquakeLoading",WCAP5890Rev1,October1967.3.GeorgeW.Housner,"Vibration ofStructuresInducedbySeismicWaves",ShockandVibrationHandbook,VolumeIII,McGraw-Hill,Inc.,NewYork,1961 4.E.L.Vogeding,"TopicalReport,SeismicTesting ofElectricalandControlEquipment",WCAP7817,December1971 5."ReportCoveringtheEffects ofaHighPressureTurbineRotorFractureandLowPressureTurbineDiscFracturesatDesignOverspeed",WestinghouseLTD,ReportB,E

&M.6.RCGwaltney,"MissileGenerationandProtectioninLight-Water-Coo1edPowerReactorPlants",ORNL-NSIC-22,September1968.7.J.N.Fox,"LikelihoodandConsequences ofTurbineOverspeedatthePointBeachNuclearPlant",WCAP7525,August19708.John A.Blume&Associates,Engineers,"KewauneeNuclearPowerPlant-EarthquakeAnalysis oftheReactor-Auxiliary-TurbineBuilding,JAB-PS-01,February 16,1971"(submittedaspart of Amendment No.9tothislicenseapplication)9.John A.Blume&Associates,Engineers,"KewauneeNuclearPower Plant-Earthquake Analysis: Reactor-Auxiliary-TurbineBuildingResponseAccelerationSpectra",JAB-PS-03,February16,1971(submittedasAmendment No.9tothislicenseapplication) 10."MethodologyforCalculatingthe Probability ofaMissileGenerationfromRupture ofaLowPressureTurbineDisc"-Revision1,datedJuly1980, Westinghouse11."Results of Probability Analyses ofDiscRuptureandMissile Generation"-Revision0,datedAugust1980,Westinghouse12."WPSKewauneeMissile Probabilities/Probability ofDiscRuptureandMissileGenerationDuetoStressCorrosion"-LettertoDCHintzfromPhilipE.MescherdatedAugust9,1982(Letter

1. PM-229-82)13.NRCSafetyEvaluationReport-LettertoERMathewsfromSAVargadatedOctober26,1981 (K-81-174)

B.11-5 REFERENCES

-APPENDIX B (cont'd)14.SupplementNo.1to GenericLetter(GL)87-02whichtransmitsSupplementalSafetyEvaluation Report No.2 (SSER No.2)onSQUG Generic Implementation Procedure, Revision2as corrected on February14,1992(GIP-2),datedMay22,199215.LetterfromH.

L.Thompson(NRC)to Licensees, Letter No.K-85-132datedJune 28,198516.NRCSER,SA Varga(NRC)toCW Giesler(WPS),LetterNo.K-84-61dated March16,198417.LetterfromC.R.

Steinhardt (WPSC)totheNRC DocumentControlDesk,dated September 17, 199218.Letterfrom C.R.Steinhardt (WPSC)totheNRC Document ControlDesk,dated February 18, 1993 19.Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG),"Generic Implementation Procedure(GIP)for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power PlantEquipment",Revision2as corrected February 14, 199220.LetterfromC.R.

Steinhardt (WPSC)totheNRC DocumentControlDesk,LetterNo.56,datedMay05,1989,"Criteria for Determining Continued Operability of Safety Related Piping Systems"21.LetterfromC.R.

Steinhardt (WPSC)totheNRC Document Control Desk, Letter No.NRC-96-016, dated February13,1996,"Response to Generic Letter 95-07"22.LetterfromC.R.

Steinhardt (WPSC)tothe NRC DocumentControlDesk,LetterNo.NRC-96-071datedJuly18,1996,"Response to Request for Additional Information

-Generic Letter 95-07"23.NRCSafety Evaluation Report of Licensee Response to Generic Letter95-07,A Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves", LettertoML Marchi (WPSC)fromR.J.Laufer(NRC),dated January13,1998 (K-98-008)24.LetterfromWOLong(NRC)toMLMarchi (WPSC),"Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant-Safety Evaluation ReportforUSIA-46 Program Implementation",LetterNo.K-98-47,datedApril14, 1998 25.Seismic Qualification UtilityGroup(SQUG),"Generic Implementation Procedure(GIP)for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power PlantEquipment",Revision3,May16,1997 26.Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No.3 (SSER No.3)onthe Review of Revision3tothe Generic Implementation Procedure for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power Plant EquipmentupdatedMay16,1977,(GIP-3),(TACNo.

M93624)B.11-6 REFERENCES

-APPENDIX B (cont'd)27.FSAR Amendment17dated May 12,1972fromE.W.James(WPS)toP.A.

Morris (AEC).28.FSAR Amendment24dated January24,1973fromE.W.James(WPS)toJ.F.

O'Leary (AEC).29.FSAR Amendment27dated March16,1973fromE.W.

James(WPS)toJ.F.

O'Leary (AEC).30.FSAR Amendment28datedApril13,1973fromE.W.

James(WPS)toJ.F.

O'Leary (AEC).31."Safety Evaluation of Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, Supplement2"datedJuly24,1972.

32.NUREG-0800, Standard ReviewPlanforthe Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear PowerReactors(LWR Edition)dated July 1981.33.Letter October31,1972toR.C.

DeYoung(NRC)fromE.W.James(WPS).

34.Calculation Xl 0072,"Safe Shutdown Assessment ofIntemal FloodinglevelsDuetoPostulatedPipeorTank Rupture." B.11-7