ML21033B008
| ML21033B008 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/22/2021 |
| From: | NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL3 |
| To: | |
| Robert kuntz-NRR/DORL 301-415-3753 | |
| References | |
| NRC-1328 | |
| Download: ML21033B008 (57) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board RE Charpy Testing for PRWs Docket Number: (n/a)
Location: teleconference Date: Friday, January 22, 2021 Work Order No.: NRC-1328 Pages 1-56 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + + + + +
4 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 5 CONFERENCE CALL 6 RE 7 CHARPY TESTING FOR PWRs 8 + + + + +
9 FRIDAY 10 JANUARY 22, 2021 11 + + + + +
12 The conference call convened at 10:30 13 a.m. EST, Gregory Bowman, Chairperson of the 14 Petition Review Board, presiding.
15 16 PETITIONER: THOMAS SAPORITO 17 18 PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS 19 GREGORY BOWMAN, Deputy Director 20 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 21 ROBERT KUNTZ, Petition Manager for 2.206 22 petition 23 ROBERT CARPENTER, Senior Attorney, Office of 24 General Counsel 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2 1 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF 2 PERRY BUCKBERG, Petition Coordinator, 3 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 4 HIPO GONZALEZ, Chief of the Vessels &
5 Internals Branch, Office of Nuclear 6 Reactor Regulation 7 ALLEN HISER, Ph.D., Senior Technical Advisor 8 for License Renewal Aging Management, 9 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 10 NATE JORDAN, Backup Petition Coordinator, 11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 12 JENNY TOBIN, Project Manager, Office of 13 Nuclear Reactor Regulation 14 ON YEE, Materials Engineer, Office of Nuclear 15 Reactor Regulation 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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3 1 T-A-B-L-E O-F C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S 2 Welcome and Introductions 3 Rob Kuntz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 Introductory Remarks 5 Gregory Bowman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6 Presentation by the Petitioner 7 Thomas Saporito . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8 Opportunity for Questions and Answers . . . . . . 54 9 Adjournment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 10:31 a.m.
3 MR. KUNTZ: The meeting is being recorded 4 by the NRC Ops Center and will be transcribed by a 5 court reporter and the transcripts will become a 6 supplement to the petitions. The transcript will also 7 be made publicly available.
8 Before we start I'd like to thank everyone 9 for attending this meeting. The purpose of today's 10 meeting is to provide the Petitioner, Nuclear Energy 11 Oversight Project, an opportunity to address the 12 Petition Review Board regarding the petitions related 13 to Charpy testing for all pressurized water reactors 14 and at -- specifically at the Beaver Valley Power 15 Station Unit 2.
16 My name is Rob Kuntz and I'm a senior 17 project manager in the Division of Operating Reactor 18 Licensing in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
19 I'm also a petition manager for these petitions.
20 The PRB typically consists a chairman, 21 who's usually a manager at the senior executive 22 service level at the NRC. It has a petition manager 23 and includes a petition coordinator. Other members of 24 the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on the 25 concept of the information in the petition request.
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5 1 The PRB chairman is Gregory Bowman, Deputy 2 Director in the Division of Risk Assessment in the 3 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
4 This is a Category 1 meeting. The public 5 is invited to observe this meeting and will have an 6 opportunity to communicate with the NRC after the 7 business portion, but before the meeting is adjourned.
8 This does not preclude the Licensee from responding to 9 questions if they choose to do so.
10 There are three categories of NRC public 11 meetings. More detailed information of these meetings 12 can be found on the NRC public website, www.nrc.gov.
13 As a public meeting, there will be no 14 safeguards or official use-only information discussed.
15 As part of the PRB's review of these petitions, 16 Nuclear Energy Oversight Project has requested this 17 opportunity to address the PRB.
18 This meeting is scheduled to begin at 19 10:30 and end at 11:30 Eastern. After introductory 20 remarks, we will allow Nuclear Energy Oversight 21 Project to address the Board followed by a brief 22 question and answer phase.
23 I'd like to open this meeting with 24 introductions. To better facilitate introductions 25 over the phone of the list of people registered for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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6 1 today's meeting, I will read each person's name on the 2 list. When you hear your name, please acknowledge you 3 are on the phone and clearly state your name, your 4 position, and the office or organization you work for 5 so we have the information for the record.
6 Again my name is Rob Kuntz and I am a 7 senior project manager in the Division of Operating 8 Reactor Licensing.
9 So let me start with the NRC staff.
10 Gregory Bowman?
11 MR. BOWMAN: Yes, this is Greg Bowman.
12 I'm the Deputy Director of the Division of Risk 13 Assessment and the PRB Chair.
15 MR. YEE: This is On Yee, materials 16 engineer, Division of New and Renewed Licenses.
17 MR. KUNTZ: Allen Hiser?
18 DR. HISER: Allen Hiser, Senior Technical 19 Advisor in the Division of New and Renewed Licenses.
20 MR. KUNTZ: Hipo Gonzalez?
21 MR. GONZALEZ: Hipo Gonzalez, and I'm the 22 Chief for the Vessels and Internals Branch in NRR.
23 MR. KUNTZ: Robert Carpenter?
24 MR. CARPENTER: Yes, Robert Carpenter, 25 Office of the General Counsel, NRC.
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7 1 MR. KUNTZ: Perry Buckberger -- Buckberg?
2 MR. BUCKBERG: Hi, this is Perry Buckberg 3 and I'm a senior project manager in Nuclear Reactor 4 Regulation and I'm the Agency 2.206 petition 5 coordinator. Thanks.
6 MR. KUNTZ: Jenny Tobin?
7 MS. TOBIN: Jenny Tobin, also DORL project 8 manager specifically for Beaver Valley.
9 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Is there any other 10 members of the NRC staff on the line that would like 11 to introduce themselves?
12 MR. JORDAN: Yes, this is Nate Jordan, 13 project manager, Division of Operating Reactor 14 Licensing and I also serve as the Agency's backup 15 2.206 petition coordinator.
16 MR. KUNTZ: Thanks, Nate, anyone else?
17 Okay. Hearing none, at this point I'll 18 turn it over to the Petitioner, Mr. Thomas Saporito.
19 MR. SAPORITO: Good afternoon. This is 20 Thomas Saporito. I'm the Executive Director for the 21 Nuclear Energy Oversight Project. We're a licensed 22 corporation based in the State of Florida.
23 On this date, January 22nd, 2021, the 24 Nuclear Energy Oversight Project filed a January 22nd, 25 2021 supplement to its 10 CFR 2.206 petitions dated NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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8 1 October 31st, 2020 and November 6th, 2020 for Charpy 2 testing.
3 MR. KUNTZ: Mr. Saporito --
4 MR. SAPORITO: You have a copy -- yes, 5 sir?
6 MR. KUNTZ: Mr. Saporito, we're just going 7 through introductions now. We'll come back to your 8 presentation.
9 MR. SAPORITO: Oh, okay.
10 MR. KUNTZ: Yeah, can we finish the --
11 we'll finish the introductions.
12 Was there anyone else from Nuclear Energy 13 Oversight Project that you'd like to introduce today?
14 MR. SAPORITO: No, sir.
15 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Thank you; next 16 Licensee Energy Harbor. Is Phil Lashley on the phone?
17 MR. LASHLEY: Phil Lashley is on the call.
18 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Matthew Snyder?
19 (No audible response.)
20 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Eric Perez?
21 (No audible response.)
22 MR. KUNTZ: Was there anyone else from 23 Energy Harbor on that would like to introduce 24 themselves?
25 MR. McMULLEN: Yes, Ken McMullen, nuclear NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 engineer with Energy Harbor's Fleet Licensing Group.
2 MR. KUNTZ: Thank you, anyone else from 3 Energy Harbor?
4 Okay. Hearing none, State of 5 Pennsylvania, Lawrence Winker, are you on?
6 MR. WINKER: Yes, I'm on. Yes, I'm with 7 the State of Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation 8 Protection, and I'm assigned to the Beaver Valley 9 Plant.
10 MR. KUNTZ: Thank you, Mr. Winker.
11 Members of EPRI; I'm sorry, is there 12 anyone else from the State of Pennsylvania on that 13 would like to introduce themselves?
14 Okay, hearing none, EPRI. Is Steven 15 Williams on?
16 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, I'm Steven Williams 17 from Electric Power Research Institute. I'm a 18 principal lead, technical lead in the Boiling Water 19 Reactor Vessels and Internals Program.
20 MR. KUNTZ: Thank you. Nathan Palm?
21 (No audible response.)
22 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Bob Carpenter, are you 23 on, or Carter, I'm sorry, Bob Carter?
24 (No audible response.)
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10 1 of the public --
2 PARTICIPANT: Neither of those will be on 3 the call.
4 MR. KUNTZ: Okay, great, is there any 5 other members of the public on the line that would 6 like to introduce themselves at this time?
7 Okay. Hearing none, I'd like to emphasize 8 that we each need to speak clearly and loudly to make 9 sure that the court reporter can accurately transcribe 10 this meeting. If you do have something that you would 11 like to say, please first state your name for the 12 record.
13 For those dialing into the meeting, please 14 remember to mute your phones to minimize any 15 background noise or distractions. If you do not have 16 a mute button, this can be done by pressing *6. To 17 un-mute, press *6 again. Thank you.
18 The agenda for today's meeting after this 19 introduction is for the Petitioner, Mr. Saporito, to 20 provide new information to the PRB for the PRB to 21 consider in the petition's acceptability for review or 22 final assessment. After the Petitioner's presentation 23 we will enter a brief question and answer phase.
24 At this time I'll turn the meeting over 25 the PRB Chair, Mr. Greg Bowman.
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11 1 MR. BOWMAN: Thanks, Rob.
2 I'd like to welcome everyone to this 3 meeting, which as Rob mentioned, is regarding 2.206 4 petitions submitted by Nuclear Energy Oversight 5 Project. I'd like to share first some background on 6 our process.
7 So Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code 8 of Federal Regulations describes the petition process.
9 It's the primary mechanism for the public to request 10 enforcement action by the NRC related to NRC licensees 11 or licensed activities. Depending on the results of 12 our evaluation of a petition, the NRC could modify, 13 suspend, or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any 14 other enforcement action.
15 The guidance that we use to disposition 16 2.206 petition requests is found in Management 17 Directive 8.11, which is publicly available and can be 18 found on our website.
19 For the purpose of today's meeting, as Rob 20 discussed, is to give the Petitioner an opportunity to 21 provide any relevant additional information on the 22 petitions after having received the PRB's initial 23 assessment back in December.
24 Just a couple of kind of ground rules:
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12 1 for the Petitioner or members of the public to 2 question or examine the PRB on the merits or the 3 issues presented in the Petitioner's request. It's 4 really focused on obtaining information from the 5 Petitioner to help us make a decision.
6 During the question and answer phase of 7 the meeting, the NRC staff may ask clarifying 8 questions of the Petitioner or the Licensee, and the 9 Petitioner or Licensee can ask the PRB questions about 10 the 2.206 process in general.
11 We will not be making any decisions 12 regarding the merits of the petition at this meeting.
13 Following the meeting we'll conduct internal 14 deliberations, and the outcome of those deliberations 15 will be provided to the Petitioner in a letter.
16 I'd like to summarize the scope of the 17 petitions under consideration and our activity to 18 date. The Nuclear Energy Oversight Project submitted 19 petitions to the NRC on October 31st and November 8th, 20 2020. The October 31st petition requested that the 21 NRC take action under 10 CFR 2.206 to issue an 22 immediate shutdown order to pressurized water reactor 23 licensees until those licensees provide first an 24 updated safety analysis of the degree of reactor 25 pressure vessel embrittlement; second a detailed NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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13 1 description of the methodology used to provide the 2 updated safety analysis; and third, a statement of 3 full compliance with NRC regulations.
4 The November 8th petition requested that 5 the NRC take action under 10 CFR 2.206 to deny and 6 refuse the assertions made by Energy Harbor Nuclear 7 Corporation in its letter dated October 28th, 2020 8 related to the testing of capsule Y at Beaver Valley.
9 The petition also requested that the NRC issue a 10 confirmatory order requiring the use of a specific 11 impact test machine, issue an order to require the 12 identification of the striker used by Energy Harbor to 13 test capsule Y, and issue an order requiring Energy 14 Harbor to identify any outside contractor used to 15 perform Charpy testing on capsule Y.
16 On December 21st, the petition manager, 17 Rob, contacted the Petitioner to provide the PRB's 18 initial assessment, which is that the petitions don't 19 meet the criteria in Management Directive 8.11 for 20 evaluation. At that time, the petition manager also 21 offered the Petitioner the opportunity to address the 22 PRB to clarify or supplement the petition in response 23 to our initial assessment. As I mentioned earlier, 24 that's why we're here today.
25 Rob mentioned this, but I'll reinforce.
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14 1 When you speak -- if anybody needs to speak up during 2 the meeting, please make sure you identify yourself 3 and your organization if you make any remarks to help 4 us with the transcript.
5 With that, I'll turn things over to Mr.
6 Saporito to provide any information you believe the 7 PRB should consider as part of the petition. Mr.
8 Saporito, we ask you to try to limit your presentation 9 to about 30 minutes if possible, just so that we have 10 plenty of time to ask questions or get any additional 11 information we need to support our deliberations. So 12 with that, I'll turn things over to you, Mr. Saporito.
13 MR. SAPORITO: Well, just for the record 14 I did ask -- request for one hour to make my 15 presentation.
16 Nonetheless, January 22nd, 2021, this 17 date, today I filed a supplement to the January 22nd, 18 2021 -- or excuse me, to the 10 CFR 2.206 petitions 19 dated October 31st, 2020 and November 8th, 2020 20 regarding the Charpy testing. In that supplemental 21 petition I indicated a date of November 6th. It 22 should have been November 8th, so you could correct 23 that when you read your copy.
24 Okay. So the supplement petition 25 requested the following enforcement action:
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15 1 For the NRC to issue a confirmatory order 2 requiring licensees to state and affirm under oath how 3 the general public could realistically evacuate during 4 a declared emergency, loss of coolant accident, or 5 LOCA, stemming from a fractured nuclear reactor vessel 6 melted reactor core as a direct or indirect result of 7 a pressurized thermal shock event or from degradation 8 from damage of the nuclear reactor vessel from the 9 effects on neutron fluence.
10 And that the NRC issue a confirmatory 11 order requiring licensees to perform a one-time 12 inspection of the continuous circumferential 13 transition cone closure weld on each steam generator, 14 essential 100 percent examination coverage of each 15 weld, employing non-destructive radiographic testing.
16 And that the NRC issue a classified 17 information requiring the licensees to perform a one-18 time inspection of the reactor vessel extended 19 beltline region of the reactor vessel's shell material 20 including welds, heat-affected zones, and plate or 21 forgings adjacent to the beltline region employing 22 non-destructive radiographic testing.
23 And that the NRC issue a confirmatory 24 order requiring the licensees to modify and reduce 25 nuclear reactor's pressure temperature limits within NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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16 1 the licensee's respective plant technical 2 specification to limit full power operation of their 3 nuclear reactors to no more than 80 percent, to limit 4 the amount of reactor vessel damage, due to neutron 5 fluence during the period of extended operation.
6 And that the NRC issue a confirmatory 7 order to licensees that submit Charpy testing data to 8 the NRC obtained from another nuclear reactor vessel 9 surveillance capsule as part of the NRC Participant 10 Program, as representative of data showing the degree 11 of neutron fluence damage, or embrittlement, to the 12 licensee's plant-specific reactor vessel, to affirm 13 under oath that the capsule data fully complies with 14 Section I.3 limitations, Subsections 1-3 of NRC 15 Regulatory Guide dated May 1988, Revision 2, 16 accordingly.
17 And the basis and justification for these 18 requests:
19 In a 10 CFR 2.206 petition dated October 20 31st, 2020, Petitioners contended that the current 21 methodology used by NRC licensees to determine the 22 degree of embrittlement of pressurized nuclear reactor 23 vessels is not sufficient to protect the health and 24 safety of the public and the environment.
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17 1 Program utilized by NRC licensees in sharing 2 pressurized nuclear reactor vessel capsule sample data 3 does not provide sufficient and reliable data to 4 determine the degree of embrittlement of the 5 licensees' pressurized nuclear reactor vessel.
6 And that the current pressurized nuclear 7 reactor vessel surveillance programs utilized by NRC 8 licensees does not provide sufficient and reliable 9 data to the NRC in determining the degree of 10 embrittlement of a licensee's pressurized nuclear 11 reactor vessel.
12 And that PWROG-18068, use of direct 13 fracture toughness for evaluation of reactor pressure 14 vessel integrity, is a more accurate methodology to 15 determine the degradation and degree of embrittlement 16 of a pressurized nuclear reactor vessel.
17 In a 10 CFR 2.206 petition dated November 18 8th, 2020, petitioners averred that:
19 The NRC cannot accept or rely on the data 20 provided by the licensee regarding reactor vessel 21 capsule Y analysis report WCAP-18558-NP because the 22 licensee failed to identify the model number of the 23 Instron Impulse system which the Charpy machine 24 striker was instrumented with.
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18 1 data provided by the licensee regarding the reactor 2 vessel capsule Y analysis report WCAP-18558-NP because 3 the licensee obtained data on the Beaver Valley Power 4 Station Unit No. 2, BVPS-2, reactor vessel capsule Y 5 using an outdated Charpy test machine which is 6 apparently no longer manufactured and has been since 7 replaced by the vendor with more accurate Charpy test 8 machines which do not involve interpretation of an 9 analog gauge by a human, and which newer machines 10 employ a digital display that can be directly linked 11 to a personal computer and connected to a Tinius 12 Olsen's Horizon software.
13 On December 21st, 2020 the NRC Petition 14 Review Board provided an initial assessment of the 15 October 31st, 2020 and November 8th, 2020 petitions.
16 With respect to the October 31st, 2020 petition, the 17 Petition Review Board stated that:
18 Instrument Charpy testing is not necessary 19 to demonstrate compliance with regulations or to 20 assessment embrittlement of the reactor pressure 21 vessel consistent with guidance in Regulatory Guide 22 1099, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel 23 Materials, Revision 2, ADAMS Accession No.
24 ML031430205.
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19 1 of integrated surveillance programs in lieu of plant-2 specific surveillance programs and ensures that the 3 representative materials chosen for the surveillance 4 for an reactor pressure vessel are irradiated in one 5 or more other reactors that have similar design and 6 operating features to permit accurate comparisons of 7 the predicted amount of radiation damage. Other 8 factors such as transient behavior during reactor 9 trips raised in the petition have no discernible 10 impact on the ability of surveillance specimens from 11 one plant to provide relevant data to assess radiation 12 embrittlement of another plant, since the elastic 13 deformation of the reactor pressure vessel steel due 14 to such evolutions does not affect the degree of 15 embrittlement.
16 And it went onto to say that since reactor 17 pressure vessel fluence calculations explicitly 18 consider the actual plant operating history, the 19 additional neutron fluence from a power uprate or 20 license renewal is incorporated in the plant-specific 21 calculations.
22 The PRB stated with respect to direct 23 fracture toughness measurements as referenced in 24 PWROG-18068 -- the NRC PRB stated that the addition of 25 these requirements would not have a corresponding NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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20 1 benefit to public health and safety.
2 With respect to the November 8th, 2020 3 petition the PRB stated in part that:
4 The use of manual reading of data provides 5 sufficiently accurate readings of the absorbed energy 6 to fracture the surveillance specimens consistent with 7 the pertinent consensus codes and standards to 8 adequately assess the condition of the reactor 9 pressure vessel.
10 And that the use of instrumented Charpy 11 testing apparatuses are capable of providing the data 12 necessary to adequately assess reactor pressure vessel 13 embrittlement; however, the mandatory use of these 14 apparatuses is beyond the current regulations.
15 And that given that the NRC's regulatory 16 framework relies on consensus codes and standards, it 17 is not necessary for the staff to require the use of 18 the most up-to-date apparatus to perform instrumented 19 Charpy testing.
20 On this date, January 22nd, 2021, 21 Petitioners state in further support of the requested 22 NRC enforcement action that:
23 The NRC Petition Review Board's initial 24 response dated December 21st, 2020 to the 25 aforementioned petitions appears to be:
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21 1 (1) A fraud on the American people with 2 respect to the NRC's acceptance of the licensees' 3 submittal of data purported to represent the degree of 4 embrittlement of pressurized reactor vessels due to 5 damage caused by neutron fluence.
6 (2) A waste of taxpayer funds appropriated 7 by the United States Congress to the Nuclear 8 Regulatory Commission with respect to the expenditure 9 of NRC resources in rubber stamping license extensions 10 of nuclear reactors up to 80 years and 40 years beyond 11 their original safety design basis and apparently in 12 collusion with its licensees to continue the operation 13 of the NRC and its federal employees as an ongoing 14 federal agency to regulate the nuclear power industry:
15 (3) a gross abuse of authority and power 16 by the NRC in granting license extensions up to 80 17 years in direct violation of the NRC's congressional 18 mandate to protect the health and safety of the public 19 and to protect the environment from the catastrophic 20 effects from a serious nuclear loss of coolant 21 accident caused by a cracked reactor vessel damaged 22 and embrittled by neutron fluence during extended 23 power operations beyond the reactor vessel's original 24 40-year safety design basis.
25 United States government agencies have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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22 1 colluded with private sector industries in the past, 2 and have mislead the public regarding safety, which 3 resulted in deaths.
4 The United States Federal Aviation 5 Administration colluded with Boeing.
6 On September 16th, 2020 the chair of the 7 House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 8 Peter DeFazio, and chair of the Subcommittee on 9 Aviation Rick Larsen released the Committee's final 10 report on the Boeing 737 MAX. This report prepared by 11 majority staff lays out the serious flaws and missteps 12 in the design, development, and certification of the 13 aircraft, which entered commercial service in 2017 14 before suffering two deadly crashes within five months 15 of each other that killed a total of 346 people, 16 including eight Americans. The Committee's 238-page 17 report, which points to repeated and serious failures 18 by both the Boeing Company and the Federal Aviation 19 Administration, contains five central themes and 20 includes more than six dozen investigative findings.
21 These themes include:
22 Production pressures that jeopardized the 23 safety of the flying public. There was tremendous 24 financial pressure on Boeing and the 737 MAX Program 25 to compete with Airbus' new A320neo aircraft. Among NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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23 1 other things this pressure resulted in extensive 2 efforts to cut costs, maintain the 737 MAX Program 3 schedule, and avoid slowing the 737 MAX production 4 line.
5 Second, the faulty design and performance 6 assumptions. Boeing made fundamentally faulty 7 assumptions about critical technologies on the 737 8 MAX, and most notably the MCAS system, the software 9 designed to automatically push the airplane's nose 10 down in certain conditions. Boeing also expected that 11 pilots, who were largely unaware MCAS existed, would 12 be able to mitigate any potential malfunction.
13 And third, culture of concealment. Boeing 14 withheld crucial information from the FAA, its 15 customers, and 737 MAX pilots, including internal test 16 data that revealed it took a Boeing test pilot more 17 than 10 second to diagnose and respond to un-commanded 18 MCAS activation in a flight simulator, a condition the 19 pilot described as catastrophic. Federal guidelines 20 assume pilots will respond to this condition within 21 four seconds.
22 In another town the National Highway 23 Traffic Safety Administration colluded with the auto 24 industry.
25 On June 2nd, 2005, the National Highway NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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24 1 Traffic Administration, NHTSA, estimates that airbags 2 installed in automobiles have saved some 10,000 lives 3 as of January 2004. A just-released study by a 4 statistician at the University of Georgia however 5 casts doubt on that assertion. In fact, said UGA 6 statistics professor Mary C. Meyer, a new analysis of 7 existing data indicates that, controlling for other 8 factors, airbags are actually associated with slightly 9 increased probability of death in accidents.
10 NHTSA recorded 238 deaths due to airbags 11 between 1990 and 2002 according to information about 12 these deaths on their website, said Meyer. They all 13 occurred at very low speeds with injuries that could 14 not have been caused by anything else. But is it 15 reasonable to conclude that airbags cause death only 16 at very low speeds? It seems more likely that they 17 also cause deaths at high speeds, but these are 18 attributed to the crash.
19 The National Highway Traffic Safety 20 Administration estimates that airbags installed in 21 automobiles have saved some 10,000 lives as of January 22 2004. A just -- excuse me.
23 When we -- that was an unintended repeat 24 of the same verbiage.
25 When we look at the random sample of all NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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25 1 accidents we find that airbags are associated with 2 increased risk of death, she said, and this increase 3 is due to more deaths with airbags in low-speed 4 crashes and no seat belts. However, if we limit the 5 data set to include only collisions in which a 6 fatality occurred, we get a significantly reduced risk 7 of death due to airbags.
8 By way of analogy Meyer explained it this 9 way: If you look at people who have some types of 10 cancer, you will see that those who get radiation 11 treatment have a better chance of surviving than those 12 who don't. However, radiation is inherently dangerous 13 and could actually cause cancer. If you give everyone 14 radiation treatments, whether they have cancer or not, 15 you will probably find an increased risk of death in 16 the general population.
17 Making everyone have airbags and then 18 verifying the effectiveness of using only fatal 19 crashes is like making everyone get radiation and then 20 estimating the lives saved by looking only at people 21 who have cancer. Overall, there will be more deaths 22 if everyone is given radiation, but in the cancer 23 subset, radiation will be effective.
24 The new study directly contradicts 25 assertions about airbag safety on the NHTSA website, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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26 1 said Meyer. The correct analysis is important to 2 obtain now because in only a few years there will be 3 virtually no cars on the road without airbags. We are 4 confident that our analysis better reflect the actual 5 effectiveness of airbags in general than earlier 6 studies. The evidence shows that airbags do more harm 7 than good.
8 And thirdly, the United States Atomic 9 Energy Commission colluded with the General Electric 10 Company and the nuclear industry.
11 In a March 26th, 2013 publication, Arnie 12 Gundersen, a former nuclear engineer, stated that, 13 dismissing pleas from citizen groups in local United 14 States communities where General Electric's Fukushima-15 style reactors operate and ignoring expert testimony 16 from independent nuclear engineers, the NRC voted 17 earlier this month against a plan to require utility 18 owners to upgrade nuclear plant filtering systems with 19 vents, or radiation scrubbers, intended to reduce but 20 not eliminate radiation levels when the vents are 21 opened in a severe accident.
22 The nuclear industry's congressional 23 allies fought the proposal. Safety gains should be 24 significant enough to outweigh the additional costs to 25 be paid by the industry, said Representative John NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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27 1 Shimkus, chairman of the Energy and Commerce 2 Subcommittee. While Senator Barbara Boxer, in a 3 letter sent to the NRC last month, wrote, the tens of 4 millions of Americans who live near the affected 5 reactors located in 15 states could not face 6 additional delays.
7 This is not just a Fukushima-Daiichi 8 issue. The issues in the United States are in some 9 ways much worse, warned Arnie Gundersen, a week before 10 the vote was taken in the kickoff presentation at a 11 symposium on the Fukushima disaster held in mid-March 12 at the New York Academy of Sciences in New York City.
13 It was sponsored by the Helen Caldicott Foundation and 14 Physicians for Social Responsibility.
15 Gundersen is a former nuclear industry 16 engineer turned whistleblower and his ongoing reports 17 over the last two years on the Fukushima-Daiichi in 18 Japan repeatedly raise warnings about the GE reactors 19 and their vulnerability to accidents. The main 20 difference between the United States and Japan -- and 21 the Japanese GE plants is the extreme amount of 22 highly-radioactive spent fuel stored in reactor spent 23 fuel pools which are located five stories above the 24 reactors. The U.S. spent fuel pools in the GE's 25 Fukushima-style reactors each contain more irradiated NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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28 1 fuel than the total in all four reactor pools at the 2 Fukushima plant.
3 Following the initial news reports of 4 explosions at the Fukushima plant inside the GE 5 reactor containment buildings, stories quickly 6 appeared reporting that the federal nuclear safety 7 regulators who licensed the reactors knew about their 8 design flaws but did not stop GE from selling them.
9 Scientists in the United States recognized in 1965 10 that this Mark 1 had design flaws, Gundersen said, but 11 GE threatened to pull out of the commercial reactor 12 business if forced to make costly design changes.
13 Gundersen recalled a comment by Glenn Seaborg, 14 chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1961 to 15 1971, who said in an interview years later, I didn't 16 think that we had the power to stop them. Think about 17 that, said Gundersen. This is the United States 18 government. It didn't have the power to stop General 19 Electric's faulty design in 1966.
20 At the time GE and Westinghouse were in 21 fierce competition for top place in the new commercial 22 reactor industry. GE was willing to take a loss on 23 sales of its Mark 1 boiling water reactor, and it did.
24 GE lost millions, Gundersen said. Our people 25 understood this was a game with massive stakes, and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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29 1 that if we didn't force the utility industry to put 2 these stations on line, we'd end up with nothing, a GE 3 VP told Fortune Magazine in an interview in 1970.
4 Atomic Energy Commission documents reveal 5 that federal safety experts recommended banning the 6 Mark 1's pressure suppression containment system and 7 cited its vulnerability to an explosion that would 8 follow a loss of coolant accident. The concerns were 9 dismissed by Joseph Hendrie, then the AEC's top safety 10 regulator, who was later appointed NRC chairman. In 11 a 1972 memo Hendrie thought such an action could well 12 be the end of nuclear power and would create more 13 turmoil than I can stand thinking about. So the 14 turmoil that Hendrie chose to avoid in 1972 became the 15 turmoil that Japan suffered 40 years later, Gundersen 16 said.
17 Now, today, the NRC amends the reactor 18 Vessel Material Surveillance Program requirements for 19 commercial light water reactors.
20 On December 29th, 2020 the NRC finalized 21 and amended the Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance 22 Program requirements for commercial light water 23 reactor. See Federal Register Volume 85, Issue 249.
24 In so doing the NRC appears to have significantly 25 increased the risk to public health and safety by:
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30 1 (1) Eliminating the testing of certain 2 specimen materials inside capsules placed within the 3 pressurized nuclear reactor vessels by licensees.
4 (2) By extending the reporting time 5 requirements for the test results of the specimen 6 material of the capsules by licensees.
7 (3) By eliminating the requirement for 8 licensees to include or test heat-affected zone 9 specimens as part of the Reactor Vessel Material 10 Surveillance Program.
11 (4) By revising Appendix H to 10 CFR, Part 12 50 to make optional the requirement to include or 13 evaluate temperature monitors as part of the Reactor 14 Vessel Material Surveillance Program.
15 Petitioners note here that the NRC's new 16 rules apply to extended operation of pressurized 17 nuclear reactors for up to 80 years, and that the NRC 18 is actively working with the nuclear industry to 19 extend operations to 100 years.
20 Petitioners challenged these rule changes 21 by submitting comments to the NRC via the NRC website 22 for such public participation. However, the NRC never 23 contacted Petitioners regarding their opposition 24 views, but instead simply ignored Petitioner's safety 25 concerns related to the NRC's rule changes, and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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31 1 adopted the changes nonetheless.
2 Petitioners aver here that the NRC, acting 3 in concert with the nuclear industry, finalized the 4 Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program 5 requirements for pressurized nuclear reactor vessels 6 to:
7 (1) Allow the nuclear industry to continue 8 to operate old nuclear reactors which were originally 9 constructed with only a 40-year safety design basis.
10 (2) To protect and ensure numerous NRC 11 jobs that depend on the nuclear industry's continued 12 operation of old pressurized nuclear reactors.
13 Petitioners contend that the NRC's actions in 14 finalizing the new rule for the Reactor Vessel 15 Material Surveillance Program requirements jeopardize 16 public health and safety, and that the NRC appears to 17 have colluded with the nuclear industry for the 18 economic benefit of its licensees and for the 19 longevity benefit of NRC jobs and the NRC's existence 20 as a federal agency.
21 To the extent that the NRC appears to have 22 engaged in misconduct in violation of its own policies 23 and mission statement and congressional mandate as 24 described immediately above, Petitioners request that 25 the NRC Petition Review Board provide the NRC Office NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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32 1 of the Inspector General with a copy of the record 2 transcript of this teleconference call and any and all 3 other documents, notes, emails and other 4 communications and correspondence by the NRC related 5 to this matter, in accordance with NRC policy at MD 6 7.4, Reporting Suspected Wrongdoing and Processing OIG 7 Referrals. See Appendix B - Guide for Processing 10 8 CFR 2.206 Petition, at page 1,Section I.B.3.
9 Petitioners note here for the public 10 record that the NRC Office of the Inspector General 11 has opened up an allegation under A 21 08848 with 12 respect to the subject matter of 2.206, Pressurized 13 Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Issue. Therefore, any 14 assistance on the part of the NRC in assisting the 15 Office of the Inspector General in its open 16 investigation in this matter will serve to further 17 protect the health and safety of the public and to 18 protect the environment and is appreciated.
19 At this time I'm going to provide 20 clarification and further basis and justification for 21 these petitions, including the supplement.
22 As a threshold matter, the Atomic Energy 23 Act of 1954, as amended, authorizes the NRC to issue 24 operating licenses to nuclear plant operators and also 25 authorizes renewal of expired operating licenses and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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33 1 states in relevant part that: Each such license shall 2 be issued for a specific period as determined by the 3 Commission, depending on the type of activity to be 4 licensed, but not exceeding 40 years from the 5 authorization to commence operations, and may be 6 renewed upon the expiration of such period. See 42 7 United States Code at Part 2133(c).
8 Petitioners contend here that the NRC 9 appears to have violated the Atomic Energy Act in 10 renewing operating licenses for extended power 11 operations of its licensees before the expiration of 12 the prior period. To the extent that the NRC's 13 actions in granting its licensees extended power 14 operational licenses before the expiration of the 15 prior period, the extended power operational licenses 16 are not valid. Therefore, Petitioners request that 17 the NRC issue a confirmatory order requiring all 18 licensees who were granted extended power operational 19 licenses by the NRC before the expiration of the prior 20 period to immediately shut down their respective 21 nuclear reactors.
22 Common sense shows that NRC regulations 23 relied upon by the NRC licensees such as the Florida 24 Power & Light Company in the early 1970s, who were 25 granted operating licenses for the Turkey Point NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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34 1 Nuclear Plant Units 3 and 4, employed highly-2 qualified, degreed nuclear engineers who complied with 3 the NRC Regulatory Guides at that time with respect to 4 estimating or guesstimating the expected amount of 5 damage to the nuclear reactor vessel due to neutron 6 fluence for the original 40-year safety design basis 7 of the reactor vessel.
8 Subsequently, NRC nuclear engineers 9 reviewed FPL's license amendment requests and 10 estimated neutron fluence damage to the reactor 11 vessel, or embrittlement, and issued two operating 12 licensees for a 40-year period of operation. As the 13 years passed, the American people through innovation 14 discovered and developed other means to generate 15 electric power, and generally opposed nuclear power 16 operation. Petitioners aver here that the NRC and the 17 nuclear industry feared the end of the nuclear power 18 in the United States was at hand and therefore the 19 NRC, in concert with the nuclear industry, made a 20 decision to grant operating license extensions up to 21 80 years and 40 years beyond the original safety 22 design basis for nuclear reactors.
23 To the extent that both the licensee's 24 nuclear engineers and those of the NRC who originally 25 justified operations of pressurized reactor vessels NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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35 1 for only 40 years due to concerns of the degree of 2 embrittlement of reactor vessel from neutron fluence 3 can now somehow contend via estimates and guesstimates 4 using vague formulas with assumptions about the amount 5 of error in the calculations of neutron fluence in the 6 NRC regulations strains all reasonable thinking.
7 Rather, it appears that the NRC, in concert with the 8 nuclear industry, are working together to extend 9 operations of pressurized reactor vessels up to 80 10 years and possibly 100 years in the United States at 11 the expense of public health and safety.
12 This becomes even more evident in 13 reviewing numerous licensee applications for extended 14 operations where it appears that the NRC accepts a 15 cookie cutter generic type of application requiring 16 both pressurized reactor vessels and boiling water 17 reactor to respond to various technical questions 18 using the very same application instead of the NRC 19 having two separate applications. To the extent that 20 the NRC and its licensees can somehow look an 21 additional 40 years into the future and issue an 22 Environmental Impact Statement as part of a licensee's 23 application for extended power operations is well 24 beyond belief and absolutely not realistic. It 25 appears to be fraud.
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36 1 Petitioners further contend here that the 2 licensed operations of a pressurized reactor vessel 3 with 200 miles or less of Washington, D.C. in extended 4 power operations beyond the pressurized reactor 5 vessel's original 40-year safety design represents an 6 unwarranted and unacceptable risk to the national 7 security and common defense of the United States of 8 America. For this reason standing alone, the NRC 9 should issue a classified information requiring 10 licensees of such located pressurized reactor vessels 11 to immediately shut down.
12 Licensee emergency plans are not 13 sufficient to protect the health and safety of the 14 public during a declared general emergency due to a 15 loss of coolant accident, or LOCA, stemming from a 16 fractured nuclear reactor vessel and resulting core 17 meltdown caused by a damaged reactor vessel from the 18 effects of neutron fluence which caused the reactor 19 vessel to fracture during a reactor trip and 20 subsequent pressurized thermal shock event. Indeed, 21 the Fukushima nuclear disaster and reactor core 22 meltdowns resulted in massive evacuations, and the 23 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 24 recommended that the public in Japan be evacuated in 25 a 100-mile radius of the damaged nuclear reactors and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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37 1 not the 50-mile radius currently embraced in licensee 2 evacuation plans in the United States.
3 The NRC must require its licensees to 4 perform a one-time inspection of the continuous 5 circumstantial -- circumferential transition cone 6 closure weld on each steam generator, essential 100 7 percent examination covers of each weld, employing 8 radiographic testing, and this is required to protect 9 the health and safety of the public during a 60-year 10 or 80-year period extended power operations of 11 pressurized reactor vessels.
12 The failure of this weld would absolutely 13 result in a major nuclear loss of coolant accident 14 which would kill and harm millions of Americans in the 15 United States. Radiographic testing is the only 16 reliable method of testing and examination to ensure 17 that no cracks or voids exist in the weld.
18 Radiographic testing (1) provides an extremely 19 accurate permanent record; and (2) is very sensitive 20 and can expose cracks and voids where other testing 21 methods cannot.
22 Therefore it is imperative that licensees 23 perform radiographic testing on these areas of their 24 respective reactor vessels to protect the health and 25 safety of the public during extended power operations.
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38 1 The failure of licensees to conduct such radiographic 2 testing is not a sufficient reason to justify extended 3 power operations for 60 years or 80 years, because 4 Charpy testing of reactor vessel capsule materials is 5 not sufficient or reliable in determining the degree 6 of neutron damage to the reactor vessel over a 60-year 7 or 80-year period of extended power operations.
8 The NRC must require licensees to perform 9 a one-time inspection of the reactor vessel extended 10 beltline region of the reactor vessel shell material 11 including welds, heat-affected, and plate or forgings 12 adjacent to the beltline region employing non-13 destructive radiographic testing. The failure of this 14 weld would absolutely result in a major loss of 15 coolant accident which would kill and harm millions of 16 Americans in the United States. Radiographic testing 17 is the only reliable method of testing and examination 18 to ensure that no cracks or voids exist in the weld.
19 Therefore, it is imperative that licensees 20 perform radiographic testing on these areas of their 21 respective reactor vessels to protect the health and 22 safety of the public. Failure of the licensees to 23 conduct such testing is not sufficient reason to 24 justify power operations for 60 years or 80 years, 25 because Charpy testing of reactor vessel capsule NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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39 1 materials is not sufficient nor reliable in 2 determining the degree of neutron damage to the 3 reactor vessel over a 60-year or 80-year period of 4 extended power operations.
5 Moreover, the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, 6 Revision 2, May 1988, at paragraph B.3 states that:
7 The definition of reactor vessel beltline 8 given in Paragraph II.F of the Appendix G requires 9 identification of the region of the reactor vessel 10 that are predicted to experience sufficient neutron 11 radiation embrittlement to be considered in the 12 selection of the most limiting material. Paragraphs 13 III.A and IV.A.1 specify the additional test 14 requirements for beltline materials that supplement 15 the requirements for reactor vessel materials 16 generally.
17 Thus, it is imperative that licensees 18 perform a one-time inspection of the reactor vessel 19 extended beltline region of the reactor vessel shell 20 material including welds, heat-affected, and plate 21 forgings adjacent to the beltline region employing 22 non-destructive radiographic testing.
23 In addition, a modification to each 24 licensee's nuclear reactor pressure-temperature limits 25 within the licensee's respective plant technical NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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40 1 specifications to limit full-power operation of their 2 nuclear reactors to no more than 80 percent is 3 required to limit the amount of reactor vessel damage 4 due to neutron fluence during the period of extended 5 operations. This is true because both the licensees 6 and the NRC are simply guessing about the amount of 7 damage or embrittlement to the reactor vessel -- will 8 be sustained due to neutron fluence during the period 9 of extended power operations. Thus, the described 10 operational modifications will serve to protect the 11 public -- the health and safety of the public.
12 One characteristic of the reactor vessel 13 steels is that their material properties change as a 14 function of temperature and neutron irradiation. The 15 primary property of interest for the purposes of 16 reactor vessel integrity is the fracture toughness of 17 the reactor vessel material. Extensive experimental 18 work determined that Charpy impact tests, which 19 measure the amount of energy required to fail a small 20 material specimen, can be correlated to changes in 21 fracture toughness of the material. Thus, the Charpy 22 impact specimens from the beltline materials; i.e.,
23 base metal, weld metal, and heated-affected zone, 24 became the standard to assess the change in fracture 25 toughness in ferric steels. The fracture toughness of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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41 1 reactor vessel materials decreases with decreasing 2 temperature and with increasing irradiation from the 3 reactor. See Federal Register Volume 85, No, 192, 4 Friday, October 2nd, 2020.
5 Petitioners aver here that while Charpy 6 impact testing was used on pressurized reactor vessel 7 capsule samples for up to a 40-year period of 8 operation, Charpy impact testing is not sufficient to 9 ascertain the amount of damage or embrittlement 10 sustained by a pressurized reactor vessel from neutron 11 fluence over a 60 or 80-year or 100-year period of 12 extended power operations.
13 The Army Materials and Mechanics Research 14 Center, or AMMRC, managed a program for many years on 15 the certification of Charpy impact machines. What is 16 evident is that each model machine possesses its own 17 characteristic weaknesses which, unless controlled, 18 can easily result in erroneously high test values. It 19 is estimated that approximately half of the machines 20 in use today are producing values well in excess of 21 the limits set in Army specifications; that is, plus 22 or minus five percent or one foot-pound, whichever is 23 greater.
24 Since most discrepancies either slow down 25 the pendulum or result in absorptional losses, the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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42 1 value recorded includes energy not expended in 2 fracturing the specimen, thus creating a false sense 3 of security for the investigator or design engineer.
4 See N. Fahey, F-A-H-E-Y, The Charpy Impact Test - Its 5 Accuracy and Factors Affecting Test Results, in Impact 6 Testing Metals, ed. D. Driscoll, in parentheses, (West 7 Conshohocken -- it's spelled C-O-N-S-H-O-H-O-C-K-E-N 8 -- PA; ASTM International, 1970), close parentheses, 9 76-92.
10 Petitioner further aver that while Charpy 11 impact tests are useful in the analysis and prediction 12 of the behaviors of different materials under impact 13 stresses or dynamic loading, such tests cannot 14 directly predict the reaction of a material to real 15 life loading. Instead, results can only be used for 16 comparison purposes. Like hardness tests, impact 17 tests do not result in a number that definitively 18 describes the material's toughness. Instead, impact 19 tests yield comparative data which is interpreted in 20 combination with an analysis of the broken surfaces of 21 the test specimens themselves. The performance of a 22 specimen in a Charpy impact test is however influenced 23 by many factors beyond material composition and 24 temperature such as yield strength and ductility and 25 placement and size and shape of the notches and strain NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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43 1 rate and a fracture mechanism. All affect the 2 performance of a sample.
3 When as many of the factors are held 4 constant as possible, the results of the impact test 5 reflect the toughness of the material, although even 6 then, values found are useful only to compare to other 7 results and not as a simply defined property that can 8 be stated universally as a single value. See E59 9 Laboratory Report, submitted October 21, 2008, 10 Department of Engineering, Swarthmore College.
11 Moreover, dynamic tests such as the Charpy 12 impact test yield information regarding energy 13 absorbed in breaking the test piece. This approach is 14 useful in comparing materials but gives virtually no 15 information regarding intrinsic properties of the 16 material such as fracture toughness. See January 17 14th, 1977, Department of Defense, Australian Defense 18 Scientific Service Materials Research Laboratories, 19 Maribyrnong, spelled M-A-R-I-B-Y-R-N-O-N-G, Victoria.
20 Thus, Petitioners aver here that Charpy 21 impact testing is not sufficient, it is not 22 dispositive, and cannot be relied upon by licensees or 23 the NRC to determine the neutron damage or 24 embrittlement to a pressurized reactor vessel due to 25 neutron fluence. Moreover, as referenced in the 2.206 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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44 1 petitions plant-specific loading, i.e. reactor trips, 2 directly challenge the integrity of the pressurized 3 reactor vessel and should be considered by licensees 4 in assessing the degree of pressurized reactor vessel 5 embrittlement, especially when licensees engage in the 6 NRC Reactor Capsule Surveillance Data Sharing Program.
7 This is true because every time that a 8 nuclear reactor vessel trips off-line, a pressurized 9 thermal shock event occurs where safety injection 10 pumps induce -- introduce cool water directly into the 11 extremely hot reactor vessel. During the pressurized 12 thermal shock event, the integrity of the reactor 13 vessel is challenged. Each time that the integrity of 14 the reactor vessel is challenged by a pressurized 15 thermal shock event, the reactor vessel material 16 contracts due to the introduction of the cool water.
17 Thus, the integrity of a reactor vessel may fail 18 during a pressurized thermal shock event, depending on 19 how embrittled the reactor vessel has become due to 20 neutron fluence during extended power operations.
21 As stated earlier, both licensee nuclear 22 engineers and NRC nuclear engineers originally 23 believed that the integrity of a reactor vessel could 24 only be maintained over the reactor vessel's original 25 40-year safety design basis. Thus, the NRC and its NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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45 1 licensees are engaged in an experiment, at the expense 2 of public health and safety, to see just how long the 3 integrity of a reactor vessel can be maintained during 4 extended power operations up to 80 years.
5 Petitioners further contend that the test 6 capsule data provided to the NRC by licensees who are 7 part of the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program where 8 capsule Charpy test data are taken from one nuclear 9 reactor vessel is submitted to the NRC as 10 representative of the amount of neutron damage to the 11 reactor vessel of another reactor vessel is not 12 sufficient to accurately determine the amount of 13 neutron damage or embrittlement of the latter reactor 14 vessel.
15 First, there is no single test location 16 authorized by the NRC or utilized by licensees where 17 Charpy impact testing is performed. Therefore, the 18 testing performed by one vendor can widely vary in 19 accuracy from another vendor depending on the testing 20 facility's equipment, testing procedures, 21 qualifications of employees conducting the tests, 22 human interpretation of the test results, gravity 23 effects on the testing machine, the vintage of the 24 testing machine, the placement of the specimen in the 25 testing machine, the machining of the v-notch in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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46 1 test specimen, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
2 Second, as stated earlier, Charpy testing 3 should only be used for comparative analysis and 4 cannot be relied upon by licensees to represent the 5 degree of embrittlement of their respective reactor 6 vessels. This is true regardless of the tolerance 7 allowed in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 8 1988.
9 To the extent that licensees submit Charpy 10 tests results to the NRC for test results of capsule 11 test samples taken from another reactor vessel and not 12 their plant-specific reactor vessel, the data 13 submitted to the NRC is further erroneous and not 14 representative of the degree of embrittlement of the 15 licensee's plant-specific reactor vessel. This is 16 true because the placement of the test capsule inside 17 the reactor vessel, the distance that the capsule is 18 placed from the reactor vessel wall, the height of 19 placement, the operational history of the reactor 20 vessel, the exact properties of the reactor vessel 21 material, et cetera, results in different neutron 22 fluence data obtained from one reactor vessel to 23 another.
24 Third, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 25 2, May 1988, states in part that:
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47 1 The calculative procedures given in 2 Regulatory Position 1.1 of this guide are not the same 3 as those given in the Pressurized Thermal Shock rule 4 at Part 50.61, Fracture Toughness Requirements for 5 Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events, 6 of 10 CFR Part 50, for calculating RT, subset PTS, the 7 reference temperature that is to be compared to the 8 screening criteria given in the rule. The information 9 on which this Revision 2 is based may also affect the 10 basis for the Pressurized Thermal Shock rule. The 11 staff is presently considering whether to propose a 12 change to Part 50.61.
13 Petitioners contend here that licensees 14 who are operating pressurized reactor vessels, nuclear 15 reactors, in extended power operations beyond the 16 pressurized reactor vessel's original 40-year safety 17 design basis and who justified in their respective 18 license amendment requests for extended power 19 operations by referencing and relying on and using the 20 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 1988, are 21 conducting licensed operations of nuclear reactors in 22 violation of NRC regulations and requirements in 10 23 CFR Part 50 and Part 50.61. This is true because NRC 24 Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 1988 contains 25 information on which Revision 2 is based that may also NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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48 1 affect the basis for the Pressurized Thermal Shock 2 rule.
3 Therefore, pressurized reactor vessels 4 that are operating in extended power operations may 5 experience a pressurized thermal shock event that 6 causes the reactor vessel to crack. Such an event 7 would result in a loss of coolant accident causing the 8 affected licensee to declare a general emergency 9 nuclear accident. To the extent that licensees are 10 only required to evacuate a 10-mile area around the 11 nuclear facility, the loss of coolant accident would 12 kill thousands of people.
13 Furthermore, such a nuclear accident would 14 result in a complete core meltdown and a resultant 15 explosion destroying the containment building due to 16 a buildup of hydrogen released into the containment 17 building. The plume of radioactive particles released 18 into the environment would travel with the prevailing 19 winds and would permanently contaminate areas, for 20 example, Washington, D.C., causing the permanent 21 evacuation in the nation's capital.
22 Petitioners contend that extended power 23 operations of existing pressurized reactor vessels 24 represent an unwarranted risk to the national security 25 and common defense of the United States and to the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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49 1 health and safety of the public, and that the NRC 2 should issue a confirmatory order requiring the 3 immediate shut down of all pressurized reactor vessels 4 currently operating in extended power operations.
5 Fourth, for the reasons stated above, 6 Charpy testing is not sufficient to justify extended 7 power operations for 60 years or 80 years or 100 years 8 to ascertain the degree of embrittlement of each 9 licensee's plant-specific reactor vessel as required 10 in the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 11 1988, and that Revision 2 cannot be relied upon by 12 licensees to justify extended power operations of 13 pressurized reactor vessels for the reasons previously 14 stated above.
15 Fifth, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 16 2, May 1988 at page 2, Surveillance Data Available, 17 states in part that:
18 When two or more credible surveillance 19 data sets, as defined in the discussion, become 20 available from the reactor in question, they may be 21 used to determine the adjusted reference temperature 22 and the Charpy upper-shelf energy of the beltline 23 materials as described in Regulatory Position 2.1 and 24 2.2, respectively.
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50 1 Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 1988 requires 2 NRC licensees to submit Charpy test data from 3 pressurized reactor vessel capsule samples taken from 4 their plant-specific pressurized reactor vessels and 5 that licensees are not authorized to submit Charpy 6 data from another pressurized reactor vessel employed 7 in the NRC Participant Reactor Vessel Surveillance 8 Program.
9 Sixth, Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, 10 May 1988, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel 11 Materials, provides for the use of two substantially 12 different methods for determining through-wall fluence 13 in nuclear reactor pressure vessels. One method is a 14 generic attenuation curve based on a simplistic 15 exponential decay equation. Partly due to the 16 simplicity of its application, the generic attenuation 17 method is predominantly used for licensing 18 calculation. However, it has a limitation in that at 19 -- in increasing distance away from the core beltline, 20 it becomes increasing less accurate, because it cannot 21 account for neutron streaming effects in the cavity 22 region surrounding the pressure vessel.
23 The other attenuation method is based on 24 a displacement per atom, or dpa, calculation specific 25 to the reactor vessel structure. The dpa method NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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51 1 provides a more accurate representation of fluence 2 attenuation through the reactor vessel, PRV, wall at 3 all elevations of the pressurized reactor vessel 4 because it does account for neutron streaming in the 5 cavity region. A requirement for using the dpa 6 method, however, is an accurate flux solution through 7 the reactor pressure vessel wall. This requirement 8 has limited the use of traditional transport methods 9 such as discrete ordinates and that are limited by 10 their treatment of cavity regions; i.e., air, outside 11 the pressure vessel wall.
12 TransWare Enterprises, under the 13 sponsorship of EPRI and BWRVIP, has developed an 14 advanced three-dimensional transport methodology 15 capable of producing fully converged flux solutions 16 throughout the entire reactor system, including the 17 cavity region and primary shield structures. This 18 methodology provides an accurate and reliable 19 determination of through-wall fluence in boiling water 20 reactors and pressurized water reactor pressure 21 vessels, thus allowing the dpa method to become -- to 22 be implemented with high reliability. Using this 23 advanced 3-D methodology, this paper presents 24 comparisons of the generic and dpa attenuation methods 25 at critical locations in both BWR and PWR pressure NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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52 1 vessel walls. See Comparison of Regulatory Guide 2 1.99, Fluence Attenuation Methods, April 2012, Journal 3 of ASTM International, 9(4):104028.
4 Thus Petitioners aver here that the NRC 5 should require its licensees to use the above 6 described dpa method to more accurately represent the 7 fluence attenuation through the reactor pressure 8 vessel wall at all elevations of the pressurized 9 reactor vessel because it accounts for neutron 10 streaming in the cavity region and therefore provides 11 more accurate and more meaningful data to the NRC 12 about the degree of reactor vessel embrittlement due 13 to the damage sustained from neutron fluence.
14 Conclusion. For all the above-stated 15 reasons the NRC should take the requested enforcement 16 action against its licensees as requested above and as 17 requested in the earlier 2.206 petitions to protect 18 the health and safety of the public and to protect the 19 environment. Petitioners once again urge the NRC to 20 issue a confirmatory order to all PRV licensees 21 requiring the immediate shut down of all pressurized 22 nuclear reactors which are currently operating in 23 extended power operation in America.
24 That completes my dissertation. I'll be 25 open to any questions that anyone might have.
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53 1 MR. BOWMAN: Okay. Yeah, this is Greg 2 Bowman, the PRB Chair. I would ask -- we're hearing 3 a lot of background noise, and so if you're on the 4 line and not speaking, if you'd please mute yourself, 5 that would help cut down some of the distraction.
6 So, thank you, Mr. Saporito, for your 7 presentation. I know it's been a little bit over on 8 time, but we definitely appreciate hearing your 9 perspectives. I'll note -- you went through the 10 supplement, but I'll note that we just kind of 11 received it this morning. I don't believe any of us 12 had a chance to really kind of review and digest it, 13 but we will certainly do so as part of our 14 deliberations. I'll also offer that we'll share the 15 information related to the petition, including the 16 transcript of this meeting when it's ready, to the 17 Inspector General as you requested. So thank you 18 again.
19 And with that, I'll turn things back over 20 to Rob, our petition manager, to get into the Q&A.
21 MR. KUNTZ: Great. Thanks, Greg.
22 This is Rob Kuntz with the Nuclear 23 Regulatory Commission. And as we stated at the 24 opening we will now enter the question and answer 25 phase of the meeting.
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54 1 So at this time does anyone on the PRB 2 have any questions for Mr. Saporito?
3 Okay. Hearing none, I'll ask now if 4 anyone from the Licensee, Energy Harbor, has any 5 questions for the PRB related to the issues raised in 6 the petition?
7 Okay. Hearing none, I'll ask the 8 Petitioner or the Licensee if they have any questions 9 for the NRC staff about the 2.206 petition process.
10 Okay. So before I conclude the meeting, 11 at this time, any members of the public may provide 12 feedback regarding the 2.206 petition process.
13 However, as stated at the opening, the purpose of this 14 meeting is not to provide an opportunity for the 15 Petitioner or public to question or examine the PRB 16 regarding the merits of the petition request.
17 So at this point are there any members of 18 the public that would like to ask any questions of the 19 NRC staff related to the 2.206 process?
20 Okay. Hearing none, before we complete 21 does the court reporter need any additional 22 information for the meeting transcript?
23 Okay. I don't hear anything.
24 (Simultaneous speaking.)
25 MR. KUNTZ: Yes, go ahead.
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55 1 COURT REPORTER: Yes. I'm sorry, sir. I 2 needed to get off mute. I was hoping you could spell 3 On Yee, Mr. Hipo Gonzalez, and Jenny Tobin's names.
4 MR. YEE: This is On Yee. The first name 5 is spelled O-N. Last name is spelled Y-E-E.
6 And for Hipo Gonzalez, his first name is 7 spelled H-I-P-O. And last name is spelled G-O-N-Z-A-8 L-E-Z.
9 MR. KUNTZ: Jenny, can you provide --
10 MR. YEE: And Jenny Tobin is Jenny, and 11 the last name is spelled T-O-B-I-N.
12 COURT REPORTER: Okay. Thank you very 13 much.
14 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Was that all you 15 needed?
16 COURT REPORTER: Yes, sir. That is all 17 the questions I could think of.
18 MR. KUNTZ: Great. Thank you.
19 So the NRC, we want to encourage the 20 participants outside the NRC to provide public meeting 21 feedback to the NRC via the NRC public meeting website 22 or you could provide it to me. My name is Robert 23 Kuntz. And you can provide that at 24 robert.kuntz@nrc.gov.
25 Okay. So with that, this meeting is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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56 1 concluded and we'll be terminating the phone 2 connection. Thank you.
3 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 4 off the record at 11:39 a.m.)
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