IR 05000263/2020010

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Reissue - Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant - Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000263/2020010
ML21062A129
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/02/2021
From: Hironori Peterson
Region 3 Branch 3
To: Conboy T
Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
References
IR 2020010
Download: ML21062A129 (16)


Text

March 2, 2021

SUBJECT:

REISSUE - MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2020010

Dear Mr. Conboy:

In the inspection report sent to you dated January 13, 2021 (ML21013A422), the NRC had documented a minor violation associated with the failure to promptly correct Conditions Adverse to Quality, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. After a subsequent review of additional information provided by your staff, the NRC concluded that this violation was not warranted. As a result, the NRC has reissued the report in its entirety addressing the updated subject. None of these changes affected the overall technical aspect of the report.

On December 4, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. D. Barker, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available. No findings or violations were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Hironori Peterson, Chief Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000263 License No. DPR-22

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000263 License Number: DPR-22 Report Number: 05000263/2020010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-010-0032 Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Location: Monticello, MN Inspection Dates: November 16, 2020 to December 04, 2020 Inspectors: J. Draper, Health Physicist J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector N. Shah, Project Engineer J. Weigandt, Reactor Engineer Approved By: Hironori Peterson, Chief Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Monticello operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), regional inspectors were directed to begin telework. During this time regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site.

The inspection documented below was determined that the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be completed remotely.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 02.04)

(1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensees corrective action program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
  • Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the corrective action programs effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the Part 21 process.
  • Operating Experience, Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations processes for use of operating experience, audits and self-assessments.
  • Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Assessment 71152B Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Generally, issues were screened and evaluated consistent with the guidance in licensee procedure FP-PA-ARP-01, CAP Process, revision 58. However, the team did identify some examples where issues were either improperly handled or weaknesses in the CAP process; these are discussed in the appropriate subsection below.

Effectiveness of Problem Identification Overall, the station was effective at identifying issues at a low threshold and was properly entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) as required by station procedures.

During interviews, workers were familiar with how to enter issues into the CAP and stated that they were encouraged to use it to document issues. The team determined that the station was generally effective at identifying negative trends that could potentially impact nuclear safety. For the areas reviewed, the team did not identify any issues in the area of problem identification.

The team identified a missed opportunity to identify a potential generic station issue with configuration/status control during the performance and subsequent screening of apparent cause evaluation for CAP 501000045769, CV-1502 Demand Signal Went to 100%. This evaluation discussed a prior event documented in the Root Cause for CAP 5010000028365, AS-78, AS-79 Found Open. In both events, the cause was inappropriate configuration/status controls used during work activities by workers in maintenance (instrumentation and controls) and operations, respectively. The apparent cause did not address whether the occurrence of similar issues for similar causes potentially indicated a generic issue with configuration/status controls. In fact, the apparent cause simply documented the prior event with no evaluation of its applicability or influence. Since the corrective actions were limited to the specific work groups, based on its recurrence, there is a potential that more generic actions are needed. The licensee documented this issue as CAP item 501000046645.

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues In-depth reviews of a risk-informed sampling of condition reports (CRs), work orders (WOs),and root and apparent cause and condition evaluations were completed. The team determined that the licensee had established a low threshold for entering deficiencies into the CAP, that the issues were generally being appropriately prioritized and evaluated for resolution, and that corrective actions (CAs) were implemented to mitigate the future risk of issues occurring that could affect overall system operability and/or reliability.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in developing CAs that were appropriately focused to correct the identified problem and to address the root and contributing causes for significant conditions adverse to quality to preclude repetition. The licensee generally completed CAs in a timely manner and in accordance with procedural requirements commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. For NRC-identified issues, the team determined that the licensee generally assigned CAs that were effective and timely.

For issues identified as Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ), station procedure FP-PA-ARP-01, required that they be documented in the CAP and screened as either level "A, B or C" commensurate with level of evaluation needed to assess the issue. Those classified as level "C" were typically well understood and of low risk, and therefore required only a condition evaluation instead of a root or apparent cause evaluation. Regardless of the classification, each CAQ was required to have an associated corrective action assigned.

NRC regulation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, states that measures shall be established to ensure that Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ), such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. Attachment 8 to FP-PA-ARP-01, further clarified that corrective actions associated with CAQs, should be completed as soon as possible, not to exceed the next refueling outage. However, this requirement was only applied to "A" and "B" level CAPs; for CAQs associated with "C" level CAPs, the Attachment had no backstop for completing corrective actions, and they can be potentially postponed indefinitely. Some examples identified by the inspectors included CAP items 501000015382, Internal Flooding Concerns, and 501000035317, Essential Service Water Division II Insulated, not Per Calculation. Both CAPs documented issues with design documents for safety-related components. These issues were correctly classified as CAQs and screened as level "C" CAPs, as the issues were well understood and determined not to affect operability.

However, the team identified that the associated corrective actions had been extended several times due primarily to resource availability and remained open.

The team questioned whether the verbiage in FP-PA-ARP-01 resulted in inappropriate, disparate treatment for CAQs based on the CAP screening, which in this case, resulted in the above two CAQs remaining open for an extended period. Additionally, the associated extension justification focused primarily on the resource availability and not on the fact that these were still CAQs and if it still required timely closure. The inspectors noted a potential concern that this practice could result in licensee staff becoming desensitized to the need to promptly address CAQs. The licensee documented this issue as CAP item 501000046796.

No violations or findings were identified.

Assessment 71152B Assessment of Operating Experience and Self-Assessment and Audits Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance in the use of Operating Experience (OE) and Self-Assessments and Audits adequately supported nuclear safety.

Use of Operating Experience The licensee routinely screened industry and NRC OE information for station applicability.

Based on these initial screenings, the licensee-initiated actions in the CAP to fully evaluate the impact, if any, to the station. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented in a timely manner to prevent similar issues from occurring. Operating Experience lessons-learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations.

During the 5-year review of the Part 21 process, the team identified one example of a Part 21 report applicable to the station that was improperly reviewed. Specifically, CAP 501000031467, documented a Part 21 associated with Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) 19-2, issued in September 2019. This NSAL, documented an issue with Size 1 Freedom Series contactors failing to release/open when de-energized under certain conditions. Westinghouse had determined that Monticello had these contactors and recommended that an evaluation be performed to determine the site impact. During CAP screening, this issue was classified as a non-CAP item, meaning that it was not considered a CAQ. As a consequence, it was considered of low priority and assigned a due date of December 2020 to complete the evaluation. In the interim, no action was taken to determine if the contactors were used at Monticello, specifically in any safety-related application.

Subsequently, after prompting by the NRC, the licensee determined that the contactors were installed in safety-related equipment, but that the specific conditions described in the NSAL for inoperability, were not present; therefore, the contactors (and by extension, the affected equipment) were operable. Although the inspectors had no issues with the operability assessment, given that the NSAL potentially affected safety-related components at Monticello, it should have been classified as a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ), consistent with Attachment 5 to FP-PA-ARP-01, instead of a non-CAP item. The licensee documented the failure to properly screen and correct this issue as CAP item 5010000046791. Because there were no safety or operability concerns, the inspectors concluded that the failure to properly characterize and evaluate this issue was minor in nature.

Self-Assessments and Audits The inspectors reviewed several audits and self-assessments and deemed those sampled as thorough and intrusive with regards to following up with the issues that were identified through previous NRC inspections and in the self-assessments and fleet oversight audits.

Reviewed corrective actions for the identified issues were deemed reasonable and completed commensurate with their safety significance. The inspectors regarded licensee performance as adequately self-critical of their own performance and that performance-related issues were being identified through their self-assessment process.

Assessment 71152B Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment The team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, workers at the station expressed freedom to raise and enter safety concerns through any one of the various avenues available to them, and the team encountered no indications of chilling or retaliation. Finally, all plant personnel interviewed were aware of the Employee Concerns Program and expressed a willingness to use it as an avenue to raise concerns, if desired.

In addition, the team included questions on the topic of the ongoing extended COVID pandemic and the associated changes to plant staffing, including extended use of telework, to assess for any negative impacts on safety performance or overall safety culture both for the individuals and the organization. Employees consistently communicated the belief that sufficient competency, engagement, resources, and commitment exist at the station to maintain high performance standards at the site.

In July 2020, the licensee completed a safety culture assessment of the site. Overall, the licensee concluded that an appropriate environment existed for the raising and addressing of concerns and that workers felt comfortable using the various processes available. However, an issue was identified in the Program Engineering group, specifically that engineering management was ineffectively prioritizing work and that insufficient resources existed to handle the workload. As a result, there was a potential for certain activities, that may affect conditions adverse to quality, not being completed. The licensee had captured this issue in the CAP and developed an action plan to address it. Although it was too early to assess its effectiveness, the inspectors concluded that this plan appeared reasonable to address the concern.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On December 4, 2020, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. D. Barker, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71152B Corrective Action 500001552560 Service Water Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) 03/08/2017

Documents Pitting Detected in Line ESW1-3-H

500001552684 Service Water-Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) 03/09/2017

Pitting Detected in Line ESW1-3-H

501000000027 Elevation of High-Pressure Coolant Injection Trend 06/26/2017

501000006644 Target Sets Inspec URI Operator Action 12/21/2017

501000009060 Inadequate Security Search (NRC ID) 03/01/2018

501000010484 Steam Chase CAM Met ACMI Action Level 04/06/2018

501000012880 Steam Leak from Vlv Packing on AO-2-86C (ACE) 06/05/2018

501000014866 Security Manual AVBS Out of Alignment 07/26/2018

501000015382 Internal Flooding Calculation Details 08/08/2018

501000015405 DSC SVP Exam Additional Documents 08/14/2018

501000015691 Exam Control Adverse Trend (ACE) 08/15/2018

501000015701 U/I Watch Performed Under Exam Security 08/16/2018

501000015782 Environmental Qualification Cable Submergence 08/17/2018

Documentation Issue

501000016026 Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve Calculation Not Updated 08/23/2018

for Extended Power Uprate

501000016054 Incorrect Assumption in Operating Experience Evaluation 08/23/2018

501000016705 CST-103-1 / 104-1 Failed to Seat (ECE) 09/10/2018

501000018035 2018 PI&R--CE Did Not Document Extent of Condition 10/30/2018

501000018660 11 EDG Failed to Load (ECE) 10/15/2018

501000020085 Equipment Cause Evaluation: "C" Outboard Main Steam 11/16/2018

Isolation Valve Failed to Stroke

501000020222 Apparent Cause Evaluation: As Found Hydrogen Cooler 11/20/2018

Gasket Condition

501000020960 CE for the UPS-PAL-1 and 2 Recent Failures 12/11/2018

501000021275 Potential Part 21--OTBD MSIV 12/20/2018

501000022240 Equipment Cause Evaluation: P-25A Will Not Establish Flow 01/22/2019

501000022876 11-297 Incorrect Stroke Time Criteria 02/07/2019

501000022942 11 EDG Vent-Cocks Leaking 02/10/2019

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

501000023118 13 DG/52-710 Locked Out 02/13/2019

501000023534 V-EAC-14B Compressor Tripped During Swap 10/01/2019

501000023854 SW-21-1 & SW-22-1 Failed In-Service Test Testing 03/05/2019

501000024419 MR A(1) Determination Needed for Deferral 03/19/2019

501000025469 Drywell Dose Rates Significantly Higher 04/13/2019

501000025624 RHR DHR Hardening Issue Identified (ACE) 04/16/2019

501000026282 Past Operability Review: HPCI-14 Failed In-Service Test 04/24/2019

501000026577 Past Operability Review: Check Valve BF-14 Failed Testing 04/30/2019

501000026645 NOS: PT Indication on SR-27-2 Poppet 05/01/2019

501000026727 C.4-I (Plant Flooding) Entry (ACE) 05/22/2019

501000026921 Improperly Searched Employee Entered PA 05/06/2019

501000027212 Configuration Control Issues RFO29 05/10/2019

501000027329 Drywell Eq. Sump Alarms Coming In 05/13/2019

501000027374 1R29: 900# DW Inspection Results 05/13/2019

501000027548 Shutdown Safety Lessons Learned From ACE 05/17/2019

501000027548 Shutdown Safety (RCE) 0a

501000028099 50.59 Missed Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.46 06/04/2019

Report

501000028365 Drywell Isolation Downstream as 40 06/11/2019

501000028365 AS-78, AS-79 Found Open 06/11/2019

501000028661 #11 Recirc Pump Seal Pressure Trend 06/18/2019

501000029829 Scram Discharge Volume High Level Scram Channel B2 07/21/2019

501000029837 V-EAC-14B Compressor Trip on Startup (ECE) 07/21/2019

501000030237 CRDs Refurbished Without ASME XI RR Plan 07/31/2019

501000031306 NRC P21 Fisher Butterfly Valve Taper Pins 09/10/2019

501000031370 Otbd MSIV Spec Conflicts 08/30/2019

501000031467 Westinghouse NSP-19-48/NSAL-19-2 Contact 09/04/2019

501000031593 MO-2034 Actuator Grease Discrepancy 09/09/2019

501000032300 2019 MT Outage Readiness FSA Not Perform 09/24/2019

501000034409 Bearing Defects Developing, 11 CRD Pump (CA) 11/07/2019

501000034573 Apparent Cause Evaluation: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 11/12/2019

(RCIC) Isolation MO-2076 Times Out of Specification

501000034676 Apparent Cause Evaluation: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling 11/14/2019

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

(RCIC) Failed to Start During Component Testing

501000035317 Emergency Service Water Division II Insulated, Not Per 02/04/2019

Calculation

501000035427 NRC Part 21 with Monticello as Affected Plant 12/06/2019

501000037768 CR Received Unanticipated 13K028 Alarm 02/20/2020

501000040100 GEH SC 20-04 R0 Nameplate Discrepancy 06/25/2020

501000040114 Operating Permit Use Issue Identified (ACE) 04/29/2020

501000040138 Part 21 4KV-150/151-604-A Relay 05/04/2020

501000041066 Radioactive Shipment Not in Accordance with Manifest 05/27/2020

501000043571 Unexpected Response During ATWS Mod 08/06/2020

501000044981 Water Leak 962 RWPR RWCU Phase Sep Room 10/01/2020

501000045576 Downscale of NLO Must Perform Tasks 10/16/2020

501000045769 CV-1502 Demand Signal Went to 100 Percent 10/22/2020

501000046175 13 Batt. Pos. Post Bulging/Seal Leaks 11/05/2020

501000046204 LS-23-90/1 Leaking Steam 11/05/2020

501000046365 MO-3502 Diagnostic Test Follow-Up Items 11/13/2020

501000046402 Foreign Material Exclusion in 3 Cells of 13 Diesel Generator 11/13/2020

Battery

501000046495 Scope Addition to MT X-Ray Project 11/18/2020

501000046639 Part 21 SC 20-06 Rev 0 Issued 11/24/2020

601000000530 GE SIL No. 681 10/17/2018

601000000856 2020 NRC Part 21 Reports with Monticello Not Listed 02/05/2020

601000000911 GE SIL No. 684, Rev 0--Noble Chem TM Plating 04/14/2020

610000000546 Industry Operating Experience Evaluation: Flow Accelerated 07/02/2019

Corrosion Leak on Reactor Water Clean Up Missed by

Ultrasonic Examination (UT) Technique

610000000639 SIL 682 R0 Flow Induced Vibration Load 07/23/2019

610000000824 Limerick LER Multiple Trains of RHRSW Inoperable for 12/06/2019

Greater than Time Allowed by Technical Specifications due

to Pipe Corrosion

610000000851 GE SIL No. 683 Rev. 0 OP-Amp Board Polyur 12/20/2019

610000000868 Industry OE for Bolt Failure in ESW Pump 01/14/2020

610000000882 Industry Operating Experience Evaluation: Fermi Non-Cited 05/09/2020

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Violation 2020 Torus Coating Issues

610000000897 Industry Operating Experience Evaluation: Dresden 07/03/2020

Feedwater Nozzle

Corrective Action 501000046645 Missed Opportunity IN ACE Internal OE 11/23/2020

Documents 501000046784 PI&R Activity Closed Without Note 12/01/2020

Resulting from 501000046791 PI&R: GAP IN Severity & Timeliness: NSAL-19-2 11/30/2020

Inspection 501000046796 Observations of Potential GAP in FP-PA-ARP-01 12/01/2020

501000046823 PI&R: CAP Not Submitted to SRO Screening 12/02/2020

501000046844 Opportunity in CAP Formatting 12/03/2020

501000046845 Missed Tracking Assignment for Corrective Action 12/03/2020

501000046850 PI&R: Inconsistent Use of CAP Fields 12/03/2020

Miscellaneous Licensee Event Tso Manual Primary Containment Isolation Valves Found 06/11/2019

Report 05000- Open Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical

263/2019-002-00 Specifications

N/A Corrective Action Program Pre-Screening Meeting 11/18/2020

N/A Operating Experience Pre-Screening Meeting 11/18/2020

N/A Corrective Action Program Screening Meeting 11/19/2020

N/A Plant Heath Committee Meeting 11/20/2020

N/A Performance Assessment Review Board (PARB) Meeting 11/24/2020

NA Corrective Action Program Pre-Screening Meeting 11/30/2020

NA Corrective Action Program Screening Meeting 11/30/2020

Procedures 4AWI-05.04.03 Valve Packing 4

9111-05 Decay Heat Removal Hardening 1

9111-05 Decay Heat Removal Hardening 5

FP-E-P21-01 10 CFR Part 21 Evaluations 6

FP-E-SE-03 10CFR50.59 and 72.48 Processes 13

FP-G-DOC-04 Procedure Processing 40

FP-OP-OL-01 Operability/Functionality Determination 21

FP-OP-OL-01 Operability 22

FP-PA-ARP-01 CAP Process 58

FP-PA-EVAL-01 Evaluation Methods 6

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

FP-PA-OL-01 Operability 22

FP-PA-PAR-01 Performance Assessment Review Board and Performance 17

Assessment Oversight

FP-PA-SA-03 Snapshot Evaluation 8

FP-STND-NSC- Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Process 9

FP-T-SAT-71 NRC Exam Security Requirements 12

OWI-01.03 Operations Communications Standard 53

Self-Assessments Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment June/July 2020 07/23/2020

600000542411 Integrated Performance Monitoring: Operations 1st and 2nd 1

Quarter 2019

600000613359 Operations Dept. Excellence Summary - Oct. 2019 10/30/2019

606000000691 Snapshot Self-Assessment: 50.59 71111/17T 11/14/2019

606000000694 Snapshot Self-Assessment: External Flooding 11/14/2019

FP-PE-IMEP-01

606000000704 FSA: Outage Readiness 11/14/2019

606000000705 FSA: Electrical Safety Governance 07/17/2020

606000000859 2019 Corrective Action Quality Closure Self-Assessment 02/21/2019

606000001073 FSA: Problem Identification and Resolution at MNGP 11/13/2020

606000001092 INPO Plant Evaluation of Watts Bar 12/19/2020

606000001103 Self-Assessment on CAQ Work Orders 11/07/2019

A-CAP-MNGP- MNGP NOS Corrective Action Program Audit 2018 03/07/2018

2018-1

A-DES-MNGP- 2020 Nuclear Oversight Audit of Monticello Nuclear 07/16/2020

20-1 Generating Plant Design Control

A-MAINT-MNGP- Maintenance (Nuclear Oversight Audit Report) 07/11/2019

2019-1

A-PROG-MNGP- 2020 Nuclear Oversight Audit of Monticello Nuclear 03/27/2020

20-1 Generating Plant Programs (PROG)

MO-20-08 Employee Concern Issue Plan 11/23/2020

N/A Xcel Energy Survey: Safety Conscious Work Environment 07/23/2020

N/A Integrated Performance Monitoring: Engineering 3rd Quarter

2018

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

N/A Xcel Fleet: Engineering Department Excellence Summary March 2019

N/A Xcel Fleet: Engineering Department Excellence Summary March 2020

N/A Xcel Fleet: Engineering Department Excellence Summary January

20

N/A Xcel Fleet: Engineering Department Excellence Summary July 2020

N/A Integrated Performance Monitoring: Engineering 2nd Quarter

2019

NA Operations Dept. Excellence Summary - Aug 2020 08/04/2020

NA Operations Dept. Excellence Summary - Jan 2020 01/23/2020

NA Operations Dept. Excellence Summary - Apr 2020 04/27/2020

NA Operations Dept. Excellence Summary - Oct 2020 10/07/2020

13