05000237/FIN-2011005-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Control Rod Blade Disengages from Lifting Tool and Drops Over Reactor Core into an Empty Cell |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1 was self-revealed when a control rod blade (CRB) disengaged from the lifting tool and gravity fell into an empty cell in the reactor core. The immediate actions taken by licensee personnel were to return equipment to a safe configuration and stop work. The finding was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, had the performance deficiency not been corrected and a similar event happened again the CRB could potentially tip over and fall over fuel assemblies rather than on an empty cell. The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The inspectors determined this finding did not meet the definition of Loss of Control as stated in Table 1 of Appendix G. In addition, using Checklist 7, Boiling Water Reactor Refueling Operations with RCS Level >23, contained in Attachment 1, the inspectors determined that the finding did not require a Phase 2 or Phase 3 analysis based on the criteria established on the checklist. Specifically, 1) the finding did not increase the likelihood of a loss of RCS inventory or RCS level instrumentation 2) the finding did not degrade the licensees ability to terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory when needed and 3) the finding did not degrade the licensees ability to recover decay heat removal once it is lost. The issue did not need a quantitative assessment and screened as Green. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices, because the licensee staff did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety was supported. |
| Site: | Dresden  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000237/2011005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Langstaff T Briley T Go A Shaikh B Kemker C Phillips D Lords D Melendez _Colon F Ramirez J Cameron J Corujo_Sandin M Bielby P Smagacz R Jicklin |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Dresden - IR 05000237/2011005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Dresden) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Dresden)
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