ML20127H405

Insp Repts 50-254/85-12 & 50-265/85-13 on 850401-0531.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint/Mods,Surveillance, Housekeeping,Procedures & Fire Protection

ML20127H405
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	06/12/1985
From:	Chrissotimos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127H345	List: IR 05000254/1985012 ML20127H343
References
TASK-1.A.2.1, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-2.K.3.16, TASK-2.K.3.21, TASK-2.K.3.24, TASK-2.K.3.35, TASK-TM 50-254-85-12, 50-265-85-13, NUDOCS 8506260323
Download: ML20127H405 (15)

See also: IR 05000401/2005031

Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-254/85012(DRP); 50-265/85013(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. OPR-29; DPR-30

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

Post Office Box 767

Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Namc: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL

Inspection Conducted: April 1 through May 31, 1985

Inspectors: A. L. Madison

A. D. Morrpngfello_

Approved By: is 41ii5s, M d f- B T

Reactor Projects Section 2C Date /

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on April 1 through May 31, 1985 (Reports No. 50-254/85012(DRP);

50-265/85013(DR))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannoun'ced inspection by the resident inspectors

of actions on previous inspections findings; operations; radiological controls;

maintenance / modifications; surveillance; housekeeping; procedures; fire

protection; emergency preparedness; security; quality assurance; quality

control; administration; routine reports; LER review; TMI items; regional

requests; Headquarters requests; and independent inspection. The inspection

involved a total of 542 inspector-hours onsite by two MRC inspectors,

including 50 inspector-hours onsite during offshifts. .

Results: No violations or deviations were identified. Minor areas of concern

were identified in operations surveillance, Quality Assurance, and procedures.

Overall, the licensee's performance has remained steady.

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DETAILS

. 1. Persons Contacted

• N. Kalivianakis, Superintendent

D. Bax, Assistant Superintendent for Maintenance

T. Lihou, Technical Staff Supervisor

R. Roby, Senior Operating Engineer

• N. Griser, Senior Quality Assurance Specialist

The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees,

including shift engineers and foremen, reactor operators, technical

staff personnel, and quality control personnel.

• Denotes those present at the exit interview on May 31, 1985.

2. Routine Inspection

The resident inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with

licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined

the areas stated in the inspection summary and accomplished the following

inspection modules:

37701 Facility Modifications

42700 Plant Procedures

61701 Surveillance

61726 Monthly maintenance observations

62703 Monthly maintenance observations

71707 Operational safety verification

71710 ESF system walkdown

71711 Review of plant operations

90713 Review of periodic and special

reports

92700 Onsite review of LERs

l 92701 TMI Action Items

92702 Onsite followup of Events

92703 IE Bulletin followup

92704 Headquarters Requests

92705 Regional requests

92706 Independent inspection

93702 Onsite followup of events

The inspectors verified that activities were accomplished in a timely

manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed

as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were

in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and

industry codes or standards; approvals were obtained prior to initiating

any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the

Ifmiting conditions for operation were met during normal operation and

while components or systems were removed from service; functional testing

and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning :omponents or

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systems to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and

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. review of test results were accomplished; quality control records and

logs were properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials, and

equipment were properly certified, calibrated, stored, and or maintained

as applicable; and adverse plant conditions including equipment

malfunctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards,. fluid leaks,

excessive vibrations, and personnel errors were addressed in a timely

manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by

appropriate management personnel.

Further, additional observations were made in the following areas:

a. Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Open Item 254/84-14-01 Improper Installation of Steam

. Jet. Air Ejector Valves. This item was addressed in IE Report

No. 254/85-02 and dispositioned as an example of an item of

noncompliance. As such, no further actions are required.on

this Open Item.

(Closed) Open Item 254/84-23-02 and 265/84-21-01 Revise QGP 2-4

" Shutdown From Power Operations To Hot Standby" and QOP 207-2'

" Declaring Rod Worth Minimizer Computer Inoperable." These

changes were required due to difficulties experienced on

October 25, 1984~and the scram that resulted on Unit 2. QGP 2-4

was revised to allow hot shutdown to include having the Main Steam

-Isolation Valves open and thus facilitate pressure control.

.QOP 207-2 was revised to eliminate the confusion experienced

by operators'on October 25, 1985. Both revisions were reviewed

by the resident inspectors and found to be acceptable. No further

actions are required.

(Closed) Open Item 265/84-10-01 JumperMo'dificationToStandby

Gas. Treatment System Heaters.. This item was= addressed.in IE

Report 265/85-02 and dispositioned as-an example of an item of

noncompliance. 'As such, no further actions are required on this

Open Item.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 254/85004-01 and 265/85004-02 High Pressure

Coolant Injection (HPCI) Room Coolers.

This item tracked resolution of the concern for HPCI room cooler fan

environmental qualification requirements. The room coolers must be

operable to ensure' operability and thus the concern. However, it

was determined that the postulated line break that would cause a

harsh environment for the fans is a HPCI line break. Therefore,

HPCI would be inoperable and there would be no need for the room

coolers. Since the normal environment for the fan is mild, this

equipment need not be environmentally qualified.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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b. Plant Operation

Unit 1 was in operation and Unit' 2 was shutdown for refueling at

the beginning of the report period. On May.7, 1985 two contractor

, employees were injured when an electrical cable they were using

came into contact with the Unit 2 345 Kilovolt power line, which

1- was providing offsite power to Unit 2. The Unit 2 auxiliary

transformer tripped, causing a loss of offsite power to Unit 2

. and a voltage transient on Unit 1. The voltage transient on Unit 1

caused the isolation of several feedwater heaters and a loss of air

to the feedwater~. regulating valve. The Unit 1 operator responded

to the loss of feedwater heaters by reducing recirculation flow,

_ thus. reducing power. However, the loss of air to the feedwater

. regulating valve prevented its automatic response and the reactor F

Lutomatically scrammed when reactor water level reached the scram

setpoint. ~During the event, the Emergency Notification System (ENS)

phones lost power. Recent changes due to the breakup of the AT & T ,

and also due to system upgrades (replacing old wires with fiber

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optics) have placed ENS in a configuration not in conformance with

p the licensee's response to IE Bulletin 80-15. The licensee agreed

to revise this response.

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At present the ENS phones receive power from the Instrumentation

Bus -:a very reliable source. However, as recent events point out,

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this power source can be lost. Therefore, a single source of power

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for this system is unsatisfactory. The licensee has committed.to

installing a new phone system which'will have a backup battery

supply. This backup battery will also supply the ENS phones.

Completion of these modifications will be tracked as an open' item

(254/85012-01(DRP) and 265/85013-01(DRP)).

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l Power was restored to Unit 2 by the 1/2 emergency diesel generator

and by a cross-tie to the Unit 1 auxiliary transformer. Repairs to

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i the transformer were completed May 8, 1985, and normal power was

restored to Unit 2.

Unit I remained shutdown to facilitate replacement of the station

i 125 volt batteries and modifications to the 1/2 emergency diesel

generator to comply with Appendix R commitments. Unit 1 returned

to power on May 17, 1985.

On May 22, 1985, while. performing the monthly operability test, the

1/2 diesel generator was declared inoperable due to a problem in the

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diesel ~ generator cooling water pump circuitry. A modification had

been performed on the 1/2 diesel generator to allow for switching

between power sources for the cooling water pump as part of

. Appendix R commitments. Panels were obtained from the Hatch Co.

of El Paso, Texas. 'These panels contained thermal overloads and a

fuse as an integral part of the circuitry. The problem with this

circuitry was that neither the fuse nor the thermal overloads were

annunciated in the control room. When these protective devices

operated, the control room did not know that the cooling water pump

had tripped.

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Later that day, while performing Core Spray logic tests, the Unit 2

diesel generator started as required but tripped'due to loss of

control power. An Unusual Event was declared. The 1/2 diesel

generator was tested and declared operable thus terminating the

Unusual Event. The Senior Resident Inspector questioned the

operability of the 1/2 diesel generator and the ifcensee responded

by jumpering out the thermal overload device and'the fuse.

The Hatch Co. panels containing thermal overloads was considered a

potentially generic item of concern and was forwarded to Region III

for action.

At 1800 on May 30, 1985 Unit 1 experienced a scram from approximately

100% power. A shift foreman was placing the Turbine Steam Chest

pressure instrument back in service which caused vibration on the

instrument rack. This rack also contained main steam line low

pressure instrumentation which, when shocked, caused a Group I

isolation and the Main Steam Isolation valve closure resulted in

a scram. During scram recovery, the unit experienced a second

scram. This came from low vessel level when the MSIV's were

reopened to reduce reactor pressure. No ECCS systems were called

upon and all systems operated as expected.

Both units were shutdown at the close of this report perioc'.

During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspectors walked down the

. accessible portions of the Core Spray Systems and the Residual Heat

Removal Systems and performed the applicable portions of Inspection

Procedure 71710 "ESF System Walkdown."

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No-violations or deviations were identified.

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c. Maintenance

The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Observed installation of Electrical Switchgear for Appendix R

modifications on Unit 2 emergency diesel generator.

(2) Observed and reviewed overhaul of Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant

Injection system turbine.

(3) Observed preparations for weld overlays on recirculation system

piping for Unic 2.

(4) Observed and reviewed installation and testing of Unit 2 Scrci-

Discharge Volume.

(5) Observed Mechanical Maintenance installing Temperature Control

Valve on RBCCW.

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(6) Observed Instrument Maintenance installing new control for

TCV on RBCCW.

(7) Observed Mechanical Maintenance repairing discharge valve of

Unit 2 CRD pump.

(8) Observed Instrument Mechanical repairing LLRT gauge (replacement

of diaphragm in pressure regulator).

(9) Observed Mechanical Maintenance and factory representatives

working on new Target Rock safety relief valve.

(10) Observed Mechanical Maintenance repairing TBCCW pump and

installation of same.

(11) Observed Electrical Maintenance installing new battery racks

for Unit 2 125 VDC.

(12) Observed in house leak rate test of one Electromatic Relief

Valve.

(13) Observed Mechanical Maintenance and factory representative

inspecting Unit 2 diesel generator.

During Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) of the Main Steam Isolation

Valves (MSIV) the 28 and 2D outboard MSIV's showed leakage in excess

of the allowable leakage. The resident inspector observed the MSIV

seats and disc after disassembly and they appeared to be free of any.

foreign matter and no cracks were visible on the surfaces. The 28

MSIV repairs consisted of lapping the main seat and disc and the

pilot valve seat and disc. This MSIV was retested and failed. The

process was repeated and the valve still failed. The main disc was

replaced and the valve passed the LLRT.

The 2D MSIV repairs consisted of lapping the main seat, pilot seat

and disc and replacement of the main disc. The valve was reassembled

and successfully tested.

d. Surveillance

The following activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Reviewed Reactor Vessel Low Low Water level functional test

Unit 2 and Unit 1

(2) Reviewed testing of newly installed analog trip system, Unit 2.

(3) Reviewed high drywell pressure functional test for Unit 2. l

(4) Observed preparations for and recovery from integrated leak l

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rate testing for Unit 2.

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(5) Observed Local Power Range Monitor calibrations on Unit 2.

(6) Observed one channel of Core Spray Logic testing on Unit 2.

(7) Observed rod scram timing on Unit 2.

(8) Observed 25% of RHR logic test on Unit 2.

(9) Observed 50% of Auto Start SBGTS tests on Unit 2.

(10) Observed Electrical Maintenance performing surveillance on

various EQ breakers.

On May 17, 1985, Unit 2 experienced a Group II isolation signal due

to surveillance activities. While 2A drywell radiation monitor was

inoperable for repair purposes, surveillance of the newly installed

analog trip system was performed. Again, on May 18, 1985 with the

2A drywell radiation monitor still inoperable for repair purposes,

surveillance was performed on high Drywell Pressure instrumentation

causing another Group II isolation. These unnecessary challenges of

plant safety systems could have been avoided with proper communication

and planning by the operations department. Operations personnel, by

being fully aware of plant and equipment status should be able to

foresee the results of surveillance testing and take actions to

prevent unnecessary safety system actuations. The inspectors

communicated this concern to licensee plant management and will

continue to observe this area for improvement.

e. Procedures Reviewed

The following procedures were reviewed:

QAP 200-13, Revision 10 Station Housekeeping Organization

,0AP 200-S2, Revision 1 Individual Housekeeping Surveillance

QAP 200-S3, Revision 1 Fire Protection and Housekeeping

Discrepancies

QAP 200-S4, Revision 1 Periodic Fire Inspection Report

QAP 200-S5, Revision 1 Housekeeping Inspection Report

QAP 200-S6, Revision 1 Housekeeping Inspection

QAP 200-T3, Revision 1 Housekeeping Zone Descriptions and

Designations

QAP 900-4, Revision 1 Traceability Tag Procedure

QAP 1900-3, Revision 15 Station Access Control

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'QAP 1900-T9, Revision :1

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Possession of a Firearm Within the'

Station Protected Area

QMP 800-21, Revision 1- Disassembly, Repair, and Reas'sembly of

Safety-Related Butterfly, Ball, and

Check Valves with Pneumatic or

' Hydraulic Actuators

QMP 800-S16, Revision 1- Safety-Related Butterfly, Ball, or

Check Valve and Actuator Checklist

QMP 800-T22, Revision 1 ' Butterfly, Ball and Check Valve Shaft

Scribe Orientation

QMP 100-S11', Revision 2 Request for'Limitorque Valve Torque

Switch Setpoint Change

QAP 900-5,. Revision 1 In-Plant Radiography--Required

Notifications and. Actions

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QAP 1900-10, Revision 10 Security Identification Badge / Key-Card

Assignment and Control

QFP 100-1, . Revision 11. Master Refueling Procedures

QFT 100-4, Revision 4 Refueling Interlock Check (Checklist

Included)

QMP 800-22, Revision 2 Target Rock Safety / Relief Valve Removal

and Installation

QMS 100-1, Revision 6 Monthly Fire Inspection

QMS'100-52, Revision 8 Unit 1 and Unit 2 "R" Area Monthly Fire

Inspection Check Sheet

f. Quality Assurance.

During a Quality Assurance (QA) audit in October, 1984,-it was

determined by the Licensee that the vendor of electrical switchgear,

Hatch Inc. of El Paso, Texas, had not submitted approved welding-

procedures and other documentation to assure quality. In April,

1985, acceptable' documentation was submitted. However,.a review-

by the on-site Q.A. manager identi'fied that while the' documentation

was for Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) the cabinets had actually

'been welded using Gas Metal Arc Welding (GMAW). Further-

investigation at the vendor's facility determined that Hatch, Inc.,

management personnel were unaware of the actual procedures >being .

used for arc welding in their shop.

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The licensee then reviewed the vendor's procedures for GMAW and

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contacted the four welders involved in cabinets supplied to Quad

Cities to certify them to GMAW standards. This involved

considerable effort in that two of the welders no longer worked

for Hatch. All four welders passed certification testing and

the procedures were found acceptable.

A sample of the cabinets had been " Shaker" tested by Wyle Labs and

found adequate for Seismic qualifications. All other cabinets at

Quad Cities Station were compared to these samples by drawing weld

maps and comparing weld dimensions. Further, vendor Quality Control

(QC) inspections were reviewed for adequacy (the QC inspector had

performed 100% inspection) and the QC inspector was interviewed by

the licensee to verify his qualifications.

Region III dispatched a specialist to review the licensee's

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actions and inspect the cabinet welds. The welds were found

adequate and the cabinets were released for use at the station.

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These particular cabinets were being installed as safety-related

and were required to meet seismic qualifications as part of

10 CFR 50 Appendix R upgrade modifications being made to the

emergency diesel generators.

The second problem is one of communications. These cabinets s,hould

have been placed on hold pending resolution of QA concerns. However,

due to lack of adequate communication, the personnel who performed

the receipt inspections for these cabinets were unaware of these

concerns. Thus the cabinets were accepted and installed.

Fortuitously, none of the cabinets were ever put into operation.

Formal mechanisms are in place to ensure proper communication of QA

concerns. Therefore, no specific corrective actions are required by

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the ifcensee. However, the licensee was cautioned by the resident

inspectors and agreed that better communication must be maintained

in the future.

No violations or deviations were identified.

g. Review of Review of Routine and Special Report

The inspectors reviewed the monthly performance report for Units 1

and 2 for the months of March and April, 1985.

No violations or deviations were identified.

h. LER Review

(1) (open) LER 85005, Revision 0 and Revision 1: Unit 1

Fuel Pool Monitor Trips.

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This report documents several spurious. trips of the 1A fuel

pool monitor caused by electronic noise. Difficulty in

isolating the cause of the noise accounted for the number

of spurious trips. Troubleshooting by the Instrument.

Maintenance department continues - as yet no specific cause

has been found. This LER will remain open pending satisfactory

repair of the monitor. ,

(2)- (open) LER 85012, Revision 0, Unit 1: 1A Fuel Pool Monitor

Trip.-

Refer to above LER

(3) (open) LER 85014, Revision 0, Unit 1: 1A Fuel Pool monitor

. Trip (refer to LER 85005).

(4) (closed) LER 85002, Revision 0, Unit 2: High Pressure Ccolant

Injection Inoperable.

On January 29, 1985, Unit 2 was operating at 100 percent

thermal power. At 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br /> it was discovered that the

High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System's Motor Gear

Unit.(MGU) failed to stay at its High Speed Stop. HPCI was

declared inoperable and the required Technical Specifications

surveillances were initiated. A jumper was placed on the

HPCI's MGU.* HPCI was then declared operable and HPCI

operability tests were performed. During these operability

tests, HPCI injection valve, M0 2-2301-8,.would not open when .

it was given an OPEN signal from the Control Room. HPCI was

declared inoperable again. At 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> a Generating Station

. Emergency Procedure (GSEP) Unusual Event was declared when the.

decision was made to shutdown.

The cause of the MGU failure was traced to a failed capacitor.

The cause of the valve failure was found to be a broken torque

switch. The problems were repaired and the GESEP Unusual Event-

was terminated at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> on January 30, 1985. No further

actions are required.

(5) (open) LER 85006, Revision-0, Unit 2: Main Steam Isolation

Valves (MSIV's) fail Local Leak Rate Tests (LLRT).

This report documents the failure of MSIV's A0-2-203-2B and D

to pass LLRT. -When the causes for failure have been determined-

and repairs have been completed, a supplemental report will be

issued. This LER will remain open pending receipt of that

supplemental. report.

(6) (open) LER 85008, Revision 0, Unit 2: Linear Indications on

. Reactor. Rec'irculation System Welds.

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This report documents the finding of crack indications during

normal In-Service Inspection (ISI). The cause is postulated

as being intergranular stress corrosion cracking. Further

analysis were performed and repairs (weld overlay) were

accomplished. A supplemental report will be issued after all

reviews are completed. This LER will remain open pending

receipt of that supplemental report.

(7) (closed) LER 85009, Revision 0, Unit 2: 2A Fuel Pool Radiation

Monitor Trip.

On March 20, 1985, Unit Two was shutdown for the End of Cycle

Seven Refueling and Maintenance Outage. At 0230 hours0.00266 days <br />0.0639 hours <br />3.80291e-4 weeks <br />8.7515e-5 months <br />, the 2A

Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor spiked above its trip setpoint

of 100 mr/ hour, isolating the Reactor Building Ventilation

starting the Standby Gas Treatment System. The 2A Fuel

Pool Radiation Monitor tripped because of the transfer of the

Steam Dryer from the Reactor cavity to the Dryer-Separator

storage pit. Radiation levels in the area around the Reactor

cavity were monitored continuously and were not excessive.

Since the Reactor Building Ventilation System and the Standby

Gas Treatment System performed as designed, the safety

consequences nf this occurrence were minimal.

The cause of this occurrence was procedural inadequacy.

Maintenance procedure QMP 300-3, Steam Dryer Removal, did

not require Maintenance Department personnel to notify

Operating Department personnel that they were beginning to

transfer the Steam Dryer. Because of this, Operating

Department personnel were not aware that the transfer was

in progress at the time of the trip. This resulted in an

unplanned actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (Standby

Gas Treatment System). Procedure QMP 300-3 has been revised.

No further actions are required.

(8) (closed) LER 85010, Revision 0, Unit 2: Reactor Scram and

Late Notification to NRC.

This event was discussed in Inspection Report 265/85007 and

was dispositioned as Violation. As such, no further action

is required.

(9) (open) LER 85019, P.evision 0, Unit 2: Leak Rate of All

Valves and Penetrations Exceed Technical Specifications.

This report documents that the combined leakage of all valves

and penetrations was found to be excessive during normal local

leak rate testing. Repairs and further testing was accomplished

and a supplemental report will be issued to document this upon

completion of all reviews. This LER will remain open pending

receipt of the supplemental report.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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1. TMI Action Items-

,  :(1) (closed) Item I.A.2.1 Upgrading of Reactor Operator and

i Senior Operator Training.

NRR has-issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated April 12,

f -1985 accepting the licensee's submittal to comply with this

requirement. The resident inspectors have verified that the

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licensee's program does correspond to this submittal. 'No

! further actions are required.

(2) (closed) Item II.B.4 Training For Mitigating Core Damage

NRR has issued a SER dated April 12, 1985 accepting the

licensee's submittal to comply with this requirement. The

resident inspectors have verified that the licensee's program

( does correspond to their submittal. No further actions are

required.

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l (3) (closed) Item II.K.3.16 Challenges and Failures of Relief

Valves

l- In a letter dated November 14, 1984, NRR accepted the licensee's

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proposed actions concerning this item. The resident inspectors

have confirmed that the licensee's program conforms to their

! submittal. No further actions are required.

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L (4) '(closed) Item II.K.3.21 Restart of Core Spray and Low Pressure

L - Coolant Injection Systems.

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l In~a letter dated October 26, 1984, NRR agreed that no

[ modifications were warranted for Quad Cities station in

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response to this item. No further actions are required.

(5) (closed) Item II.IK.3.24 Adequacy of Space Cooling for HPCI

and RCIC Systems. I

In a letter dated August 13, 1982, NRR found the licensee's .

submittal acceptable. The resident inspectors have verified

that the ifcensee's program complies with their submittel.

No further actions are required.

(6) (closed) Item II.IK.3.35 Effact of Loss of A-C Power on Pump

t Seals.

In a letter dated December 1, 1982, NRR agreed that no

m.odifications were warranted at Quad Cities station in

re'sponse to this item. No further actions are required.

No Violations or deviations were identified.

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J. Regional Requests

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(1) A problem was discovered at Byron station concerning the Main

~ Steam Isolation Valve actuators. A request was made to

determine if similar configurations existed at Quad Cities.

The resident inspectors confirmed that actuators similar to

those used at Byron were.not in use in-any applications at- ,

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Quad Cities station.

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(2) A request was received to inspect the licensees program

. concerning station. battery operation and maintenance. The

licensee's program was found to be acceptable with two minor

exceptions:

a) No' post-maintenance testing is performed after cell

jumpering or cell replacement. The ifcensee has agreed

to change their procedures to reflect this requirement.

b) ~ ~The station procedures for weekly and quarterly

< surveillances do not require the batteries to be on a

float charge as part of the initial' conditions. This has '

been a station practice in the past and the licensee,has

. agreed to change their procedures to reflect this '

requirement.

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L These procedure changes will be tracked as an Open Item

i (254/85012-02(DRP) and 265/85013-02(DRP)).

No' violations or deviations were identified.

k. Followup on Headquarters Requests

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(1) A request was received for information to support Regional >

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efforts in followup of Generic Letter 83-28. The requested

i information was promptly supplied. .

j' (2) A request was made of the resident inspectors to determine

i the' licensee's response to a recent safety issue concerning

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mispositioned control rods. The inspectors verified that

procedural requirements had been written'and implemented to

ensure that'a nuclear engineer was present during' scheduled

control rod movements, to identify the conditions under which

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the rod worth minimizer may be bypassed, to prohibit the use

. of scram timing equipment except for testing and emergencies,

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and to provide guidelines on the appropriate use of

" emergency-in" mode'of rod insertion and notch override switch-

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in continuous' withdrawal. The inspectors also verified that

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training had been provided for operators in the proper movement

. of. control' rods, the consequences of improper movement, the

consequences

of operating with a mispositioned rod, the

i. function of the Rod Worth Minimizer, and the scram test

l- switches.

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(3) A request was made to inspect the licensee's actions concerning

General Electric (GE) Service.Information Letter (SIL) No. 402

"Wetwell/Drywell Inerting."

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The concern was that introduction of cold nitrogen via the

inerting system could cause cracking in vent system piping.

A review and evaluation of the design of the Quad Cities

station inerting system determined that the potential for

introduction of cold nitrogen in to the suppression chamber

was minimal. The temperature of nitrogen entering containment

is monitored and alarms in the control room on a low

temperature of 50 degrees F.

A review of past performance determined that the inerting

system has been very reliable. Procedures were also found

to be adequate, however, precautions were added to alert

operators to the problems of introducing cold nitrogen into

the system.

In response to I.E.Bulletin 84-01 both Unit suppression

chamber vent header were visually inspected. No abnormalities

were found. ,

Additionally, leakage tests are performed during each refueling

outage and repairs are performed as necessary.

No violations or deviations were identified.

1. Independent Inspection

(1) A report from Wolf Creek station reported that a security

officer, acting in a data management capacity, had entered

a command into the security computer for an emergency

evacuation. He believed the computer would reject the

command. It did not. Subsequently, a trainee in another

location verified the command as authentic without being

fully cognizant of the results of his actions. This

resulted in unlocking doors in the protected and vital

areas. The security officer immediately recognized his

error but, did not know the cancellation code, resulting

in a delay in locked condition restoration.

A report of equipment at the Quad Cities station determined

that a similar event was possible. As a result, Security

personnel are being retrained on computer procedures.

Additionally, the licensee has had the practice of assigning

no trainees to computer console duty. All operators receive

40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of training first.

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(d) A report from South Texas Project identified fabrication

interference on sway struts manufactured by NPS Industries.

It was determined that similar struts suppifed by NPS

Industries were installed at Quad Cities station. However,

their freedom of movement was verified during installation

and during a reinspection in June, 1984.

Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the ifcensee, which

will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action

on the part of the NRC or ifcensee or both. The open items disclosed

during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs Ib and lj.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matter about which more information is required

in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of

noncompliance, or deviations. The unresolved item disclosed during

the inspection is discussed in Paragraph le.

5. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on May 31,

1985, and summariz i the scope and findings of the inspection activities.

.

The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the

inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the

inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such

documents / processes as proprietary.

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