ML20127C981
| ML20127C981 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1985 |
| From: | Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127C954 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-85-18, NUDOCS 8506240084 | |
| Download: ML20127C981 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000409/2005031
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
o
Report No. 50-346/85018(DRP)
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3
Licensee: Toledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, Ohio 43652
Facility Name: Davis-Besse 1
Inspection At: Oak Harbor, OH
Inspection Conducted: April 9.through May 31, 1985
Enforcement Conference: May 24, 1985
Inspectors: W. Rogers
D. Kosloff
M. Ring
M.YO /,[13 /8E
Approved By: IP N. Jackiw, Chief
Projects Section 28 Date
Inspection Summary
Inspection on April 9 through May 31, 1985 (Report No. 50-346/85018(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Special inspection of the circumstances surrounding three
events: removal of the security and fire protection computer from service
without the shift supervisor being informed; exceeding the thermal power for
the reactor coolant flow available and having one channel of the reactor
protection system set lower than the allowable setpoint; and the discovery of
a non-licensed operator asleep while implementing a condition of the license.
The inspection involved 27 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: Three items of noncompliance were identified (failure to notify
appropriate personnel that fire detection equipment was removed from service;
failure to perform the action statements of Technical Specification 3.2.5
associated with reactor power and reactor protection system setpoints; and
failure to properly implement a condition of the license associated with
operation of the startup feedwater pump).
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DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
T. Murray, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Mission
S. Quennoz, Plant Manager
W. O' Conner, Operations Superintendent
L. Simon, Operations Supervisor
J. Lingenfelter, Technical Superintendent
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees, including
members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and
health physics staff.
Enforcement Conference on May 24, 1985
Toledo Edison Personnel
R. Crouse, Vice President, Nuclear Mission
T. Murray, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Mission
S. Quennoz, Plant Manager
R. Peters, Nuclear Licensing Manager
NRC Personnel
J. Keppler, Administrator, Region III
C. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
W. Shafer, Chief, Projects Branch 2
I. Jackiw, Chief, Projects Section 2B
W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Kosloff, Resident Inspector
M. Ring, Reacto.' Inspector
M. McCormick-Barger, Reactor Inspector
B. Berson, Legal Counsel
W. Schultz, Enforcement Coordinator
2. Inoperable Fire Protection Computer
While reviewing the unit log on April 9, 1985 the inspector noted that
the security and fire protection computer had been shutdown for
maintenance from 0915 to 1120 and the Shift Supervisor had no knowledge
of the shutdown. The Toledo Edison Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual
(NQAM) Section 14.0 requires that the plant manager establishes and
maintains a program in which the operating status of equipment is known
at all times. Section 14.1.1.1 of the NQAM further requires that the
shift supervisor grant permission to release equipment or systems for
maintenance or test. Failure to inform the shift supervisor of the
! equipment status at all times is considered a violation (346/85018-01).
l A discussion of the occurrence with the shift supervisor revealed that
although he had been informed that the security and fire protection
computer was to be shutdown for maintenance that morning he was not
notified at the time the computer was actually shutdown. He established
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fire watch patrols in accordance with existing plant procedures after
his independent discovery that the computer had been shutdown. During
the enforcement conference the licensee stated that the areas in question
were being patrolled due to fire protection equipment other than the fire
detectors being out of service. The licensee further stated that the
security supervisor has been designated as the individual to inform the
shift supervisor when the computer is taken out of service.
3. Inaccurate Reactor Power Measurements
The limiting condition for operation of Technical Specification 3.2.5
requires reactor coolant flow to be equal to or greater than a specific
value. The action statement associated with this limiting condition
requires that, within four hours, reactor power be reduced by 2% for
every 1% that flow is less than the given value. From approximately 1720
on April 19, 1985 until approximately 0220 on April 20, 1985 thermal
power was approximately 98%. At this time the limit for thermal power
was between 96.42% and 95.8%. Failure to maintain proper reactor power
for the indicated reactor coolant flow is considered an item of
noncompliance (346/85018-02). The events surrounding this condition are
discussed in Inspection Report No. 85009. During the enforcement confer-
ence the licensee confirmed that for approximately twelve hours one of the
four reactor power indicators was set less than actual reactor power by
2.2% during the same time period in question. This indicator provides
an input to the Reactor Protection System (RPS). These examples were the
result of the licensee's failure to recognize that a feedwater flow
indicator that had failed a week before provided an input to the computer
heat balance calculation which is the standard by which the reactor power
indicators are calibrated and which is the operators' primary indication
of reactor thermal power.
4. Startup Feedwater Pump Piping Monitoring
While touring the startup feedwater pump / auxiliary feedwater pump
(SUFP/AFWP) area on April 24, 1985 at approximately 1210 the inspector
! observed that the only other person in the room was a sleeping
non-licensed operator. The plant was in hot standby and the SUFP was in
operation. Paragraph 2.C.(3)(t) of the facility's operating license
requires that the licensee station an individual in the SUFP/AFWP area
during operation of the SUFP to monitor the SUFP/ turbine plant cooling
water (TPCW) piping status in the room. In the event of SUFP/TPCW pipe
leakage the operator is to trip the SUFP locally or notify the control
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room to trip the SUFP, and isolate the SUFP/TPCW piping. Failure to
properly monitor the SUFP/TPCW piping status is considered an item of
noncompliance (346/85018-03). Subsequently, another licensee employee
entered the room and awakened the operator in the presence of the
inspector. The inspector notified the operator's supervisors of the
occurrence. The licensee took disciplinary action against the sleeping
individual.
5. Enforcement Conference
An Enforcement Conference was held on May 24, 1985 in the NRC Region III
office to discuss the circumstances surrounding the violations identified
during the inspection that was initiated on April 9, 1985.
The meeting was opened by Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator. He
described in general terms the violations that were identified during the
inspection. The licensee representatives were informed that individually
the three violations were not cause for serious concern; however, more
importantly there was an apparent overall breakdown in communication
between site and corporate management as well as between corporate
managers. The licensee representatives admitted they did not learn of
the violations in a timely manner and were not directly involved in the
corrective actions that were taken. The plant manager described
corrective actions that had been taken to resolve each of the violations.
The NRC staff concluded that these actions addressed the specific problems
but did not adequately deal with the root cause which was lack of manage-
ment oversight and communication. The licensee representatives expressed
their concern, said they understood the problem and would take immediate
steps to ensure that Davis-Besse management would become more involved in
plant operation.
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