IR 05000250/2006011
| ML063170075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/2006 |
| From: | Scott Freeman NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Stall J Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-06-011 | |
| Download: ML063170075 (32) | |
Text
ber 9, 2006
SUBJECT:
TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 050000250/2006011 AND 05000251/2006011
Dear Mr. Stall:
On September 29, 2006, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at your Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and 4. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on September 29, 2006 with Mr. Pearce and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (The Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott Freeman, Chief (Acting)
Engineering Branch No. 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000250/2006011 and 05000251/2006011
FP&L 2 c w/encl: County Manager T. O. Jones Metropolitan Dade County Site Vice President Electronic Mail Distribution Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company Craig Fugate, Director Electronic Mail Distribution Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs James Connolly Electronic Mail Distribution Licensing Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Curtis Ivy Florida Power and Light Company City Manager of Homestead Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution Michael O. Pearce Distribution w/encl: (See page 4)
Plant General Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution Mark Warner, Vice President Nuclear Operations Support Florida Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution Rajiv S. Kundalkar Vice President - Nuclear Engineering Florida Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution M. S. Ross, Managing Attorney Florida Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution Marjan Mashhadi, Senior Attorney Florida Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32304 William A. Passetti Bureau of Radiation Control Department of Health Electronic Mail Distribution
_________________________
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ C.Smith for/
NAME S. Freeman C. Smith W. Fowler R. Taylor M. Ernstes J.R.Reyes DATE 11/09/2006 11/08/2006 11/08/2006 11/08/2006 11/09/2006 11/08/2006 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 05000250, 05000251 License Nos.: DPR-31, DPR-41 Report Nos.: 05000250/2006011 and 05000251/2006011 Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company (FPL)
Facility: Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 & 4 Location: 9760 S. W. 344th Street Florida City, FL 33035 Dates: September 5 through 15, 2006 and September 25 through 29, 2006 Inspectors: C. Smith P. E. , Lead Inspector R. Taylor, Reactor Inspector R. Reyes, P. E. , Resident Inspector, Crystal River W. Fowler, Reactor Inspector J. Leivo, Contractor H, Campbell, Contractor Accompanied by: C. Even, Reactor Inspector (Trainee)
Approved by: S. Freeman, Chief (Acting)
Engineering Branch No. 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000250/2006011, 05000251/2006011; 09/5-15, 2006 and 09/25 - 29, 2006; Turkey Point
Nuclear Plant Units 3 and 4; Component Design Bases Inspection.
This inspection was conducted by a team of four NRC inspectors from the Region II office and two NRC contractors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None iii
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity
1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection
.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process
The team selected risk significant components and operator actions for review using information contained in the licensees Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). In general this included components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than two or a Birnbaum value greater than 1E-6. The sample selection included 19 components, 5 operator actions, and 10 operating experience items. Additionally, the team reviewed 8 modifications by performing activities identified in IP 71111.17, Permanent Plant Modifications, Section 02.02.a. and IP 71111.02, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments.
The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of the selected risk-significant components to verify that the design bases have been correctly implemented and maintained. This design margin assessment considered original design issues, margin reductions due to modification, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition issues. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components for detailed review. These included items such as failed performance test results, significant corrective action, repeated maintenance, Maintenance Rule (a)1 status, system health reports, industry operating experience, and licensee problem equipment lists. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in depth margins. An overall summary of the reviews performed and the specific inspection findings identified are included in the following sections of the report. A specific list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment to this report.
.2 Results of Detailed Reviews
.2.1 Detailed Component and System Reviews
.2.1.1 4160 Vac Buses 3B/4B
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the licensees voltage and load analysis calculations as well as degraded voltage protection calculations, to verify that selected equipment ratings would not be exceeded and that selected loads, including the intake cooling water (ICW) pump motors, would have adequate terminal voltage for transient and steady state design basis conditions, and would not experience premature protective trips. In addition, the team reviewed a sample of logic and elementary diagrams for protective relaying and circuit breaker control, to assess vulnerability to common cause failure under various design basis operating conditions, including load shedding and accident loading. This included selective review of supporting 125 Vdc control power for breaker controls, to determine if transfer switch ratings, protection, and testing were adequate. The team also reviewed functional testing of selected load shedding circuits, to verify that unacceptable failures would not be masked by inadequate testing.
The team reviewed a sample of preventive maintenance (PM) performed for selected 4160 Vac circuit breakers, as well as a sample of calibration and test records for the degraded voltage protection circuits, to verify equipment condition and performance.
The team also performed a visual external inspection of the switchgear, to assess the observable external material condition and potential vulnerability to hazards.
Additionally, the team performed a visual inspection of the circuit configuration for 125 Vdc automatic transfer switch 3S75, to assess overall material condition and vulnerability to common cause failure.
The team reviewed 4160 Vac system health reports and a sample of condition reports involving operating history, to confirm that the licensee was adequately addressing the conditions. This included a review of the history of grounds on the 125 Vdc support system. During review of the condition reports the team assessed the licensees consideration of apparent or root cause; extent of condition; and the appropriateness and timeliness of corrective actions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.2 Chilled Water Portion of Air Handling Unit (AHUs), 3B/4B, (3/4E244A),
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), design basis document (DBD), calculations, system health reports, work orders, condition reports (CRs), and PMs to verify that the heat ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system will be capable of performing its function as described in the UFSAR. The scope of the review included an evaluation of the system heat removal capabilities during normal and accident condition heat loads under current air and chilled water flow rates. The team also reviewed the control logic of the chilled water pumps and air handling units to verify that their operation was in accordance with design bases requirements.
The team performed system walkdowns to inspect the chilled water portion of the AHUs for potential water related degradation of the AHU safety-related electrical power supplies and motors. The inspection evaluated the effects due to condensation, pipe insulation, pipe leakage, drains, sump pumps and corrosion.
The team also reviewed system health reports and work orders for the 3E243B and 3E243A air handling units to ensure that corrosion and condensation were adequately addressed for the chilled water flex-hose flanges.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.3 Intake Cooling Water (ICW) Pump (4C)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design basis documentation to identify design requirements related to flow, developed head, net positive suction head (NPSH), vortex formation, minimum flow and runout protection for all ICW pump operating conditions. Design calculations and in-service and periodic test documentation and results for the pump were evaluated to verify that adequate margin was available and all design performance requirements were met for the various operating configurations. The team also reviewed maintenance, in-service testing (IST), corrective action, and design change history to assess the potential for component degradation and impact on design margins or performance. Additionally, the team performed independent uncertainty calculations for the instrumentation used in the IST pump procedures to verify instruments accuracy, and discussed heat exchanger testing as required by Generic Letter 89-13 with the system engineer.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.4 Intake Cooling Water (ICW) Pump Discharge Check Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design, installed orientation, and licensee actions developed for monitoring potential degradation of the check valves. The scope of the actions reviewed by the team included internal inspections as well as periodic in-service flow testing to demonstrate full open, closure, and allowable leakage verification. The team also reviewed maintenance history, condition reports (CRs), foreign material exclusion (FME) controls and design changes to assess the potential for flowpath obstruction and material degradation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.5 Traveling Screens
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the design and installed orientation of the traveling screens to verify that the traveling screens were being operated consistent with engineering directives and documents. The team also reviewed corrective maintenance records, calibration records, and work orders for the instruments used for determining acceptable operation of the traveling screens. The reviews were performed to assess the licensees actions completed for verifying and maintaining the reliability and availability of the components in the system. Additionally, the team inspected the intake structure to assess common failure modes that could render traveling water screens inoperable, The team reviewed the capability to prevent severe flow reduction or clogging of the ICW suction lines.
The team also reviewed the licensees specifications for sizing the thermal overload protection for the traveling screen drive motor, to confirm that the devices would protect the motors but not trip prematurely under design basis conditions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.6 Primary Water Pump 3B, (3P16B)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the UFSAR, piping and instrument diagrams, portions of the system DBD, work orders, and PMs to verify that primary water pump 3B had positive margin, and was capable of performing its design function as described in the UFSAR. During this review the team evaluated both the original and revised pump curves. Additionally, the team assessed the reliability of the pump by having discussions with the system engineer concerning the operating history of the pump, and pump problems that were identified and documented on CRs. The team also performed a walkdown and inspection of primary water pump 3B to verify the material condition of the component.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.7 Demineralized Water Storage Tank, (DWST), (T-61)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the technical design specification, UFSAR, DBD, Setpoint Document, and drawings including tank layout, piping and instrumentation diagram, and the volume/level tank curve, to verify that the design of the DWST satisfied design bases requirements with positive margin. The team performed independent vortex calculations and compared the results with the licensees calculations to verify the accuracy of the analyses completed by the licensee. Additionally, the team reviewed the calibration procedures for the level instruments on the demineralized water storage tank as well as the results of the last three completed calibrations to verify that the instruments were sufficiently accurate to perform their design function. The team also performed a walkdown with the system engineer to perform a visual inspection of the component and evaluate its material conditions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.8 Demineralized Water Degassification System Check Valves,(DWDS-3-013 & -4-013)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the purchase orders, technical specifications, and piping and instrumentation diagrams of demineralized water degassification system check valves to verify that the valves had adequate margin and were capable of performing their design function. The team also completed a field inspection of the DWST and performed a visual inspection of the check valves to evaluate the installation and material condition.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.9 Diesel Driven Standby Steam Generator Feedwater (DDSSGF) Pump, (P82B)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the original design specifications, and piping and instrumentation diagrams of the DDSSFG pump to verify that there was adequate margin to ensure operation of the pump in the event that the AFW system did not function properly.
Additionally, the team reviewed selected portions of the UFSAR to verify that licensing bases requirements were met by DDSSGF pumps. The team reviewed the control scheme and supporting DC control power for the diesel start and control circuits to verify that pump operation was consistent with licensing bases requirements. In addition the team reviewed a selection of work orders, the results of several pump surveillances. and a sample of preventive maintenance activities for the 24 Vdc support system to verify that the pump met performance requirements, and the reliability of the 24 Vdc support system was acceptable. The team completed a field inspection of the DDSSGF pump and its associated piping to evaluate the material condition of the installation.
The team also performed a non-intrusive visual inspection of observable portions of the battery and controls to verify that the material condition of the electrical support system was acceptable.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 0 Primary Water Storage Tank, (PWST) (3T2)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the technical design specification, UFSAR, DBD, Setpoint Document, and drawings including tank layout, piping and instrumentation diagram, and the volume/level tank curve, to verify that the design of the PWST satisfied design bases requirements with positive margin. The team reviewed selected portions of the tank level and inspection surveillance to verify that the results of these surveillance met acceptance requirements. Additionally, the team reviewed the calibration procedures for the level instruments on tanks 3T2 and 4T2, as well as the results of the last three completed calibrations to verify that the instruments were sufficiently accurate to perform their design function. The team also performed a visual inspection of the instrument configuration and material condition and its associated tubing, during a walkdown conducted with the system engineer.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 1 CVCS Flow Control Valve FCV-3-114A, (PW to BA Blender)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed selected portions of the DBD and piping and instrumentation diagrams to verify that FCV-3-114A had positive margin and was capable of performing its design function. The team also evaluated the reliability of FCV-3-114A by reviewing CRs, PMs and the results of several calibration procedures. Additionally, the team conducted discussions with the the system engineer concerning valve operating history and performance deficiencies.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 2 DC Equipment and Inverter Room Air Handling Units 16D, 16E
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the capability of air handling units 16D / 16E, and supplemental cooling configurations using portable fans, for maintaining ambient conditions below temperatures that could effect performance of the electrical equipment in the DC equipment and inverter rooms. Safety related equipment of interest located in these rooms included the vital bus inverters, batteries, chargers, and DC distribution equipment for both units. The team determined that for various scenarios, the licensees current design basis for maintaining the DC equipment and inverter room temperatures within operability limits relies upon a combination of installed HVAC units, portable fans, and manual actions. Manual actions include positioning the portable fans, opening doors, monitoring local temperatures, and tripping certain heat loads.
The teams review focused on: verifying the acceptability of a) the heat removal capability of the licensees supplemental cooling configuration (using portable fans),which the licensee credited for various failure scenarios involving loss or degradation of the permanently installed units; and b) the available thermal design margin for the inverters and inverter components, during the transient elevated room temperatures associated with this configuration.
The team reviewed the licensees heat transfer analyses that supported the permanent and supplemental cooling configurations, as well as the vendors ratings for the equipment and components located in these rooms. The team reviewed the major portions of the calculations that were used by the licensee in their operability determinations and discussed the base models of these calculations with the analyst who had originally performed the analysis. The team also reviewed the inverter vendors qualification test report, aging evaluations, and other supporting design documents.
The team performed a walkdown of these rooms to identify: specific equipment that could be affected adversely by elevated ambient temperatures; heat sources within the rooms; pathways for airflow, based on the positioning of portable fans and door configurations prescribed by the licensees governing off-normal operating procedure 0-ONOP-25.3, DC Equipment and Inverter Rooms Supplemental Cooling; and other considerations such as control of external doors potentially exposed to adverse weather conditions. The team also reviewed ambient temperature records from the licensees operating rounds for these rooms, and a sample of condition reports involving potential for elevated temperatures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 3 Boric Acid Storage Tank
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed a field walk down to verify that the installed configuration will support system function under accident conditions, and that it was consistent with plant drawings and design basis documents. Equipment environmental and seismic protections were evaluated against supporting documentation.
b Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 4 Non-Safety Diesel Powered Service Water (NSDPSW) Pump
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed vendor information and engineering calculations / tests, which provided the basis for establishing the time for placing the pump into service, The team also reviewed and evaluated the analyses for verification of the charging pump heatup assumptions. Additionally, the team reviewed calculations to verify that the NSDPSW pump would provide sufficient flow to the charging pumps. The team reviewed maintenance, corrective action, and design change history to assess the potential for component degradation and impact on design margins or performance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 5 RHR Relief Valve on RHR Cold Leg, (RV-4-706)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed both the original and revised design specifications of RHR Relief Valve RV-4-706, piping and instrument diagrams, the system DBD and relevant portions of the UFSAR to verify that the valve had positive margin to ensure performance of its design function. The team also conducted interviews with the system engineer to discuss the function and general condition of the valve. Additionally, the team reviewed selected work orders and completed maintenance procedures to provide confirmation of valve operability. The team performed walkdowns of RHR relief valve RV-4-706 to inspect component condition and system orientation.
b Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 6 High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) Recirculation Isolations Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the UFSAR, DBD, piping and instrument diagrams, MOV calculations and responses to GL 89-10 in order to verify that HHSI recirculation valves MOV-3/4-856A/B had positive margin and would be able to perform their safety-related functions during accident conditions. The team also reviewed the licensees electrical calculations to determine if adequate voltage would be provided to the MOV motor terminals under design basis conditions, and to verify that the thermal overload heater devices for the MOVs, were adequately sized to ensure that the devices would not trip prematurely under design basis conditions. The team reviewed the Motor Operated Valve Acceptance Test System (MOVATS) results, maintenance history and CRs to verify that valve performance was being monitored to identify degradation. The team reviewed and evaluated corrective actions completed for identified valve degradations to verify that problems were being identified and resolved at appropriate thresholds. The team also performed system walkdowns of the HHSI recirculation isolation valves to inspect environmental and component material condition. Finally, the team interviewed the system engineer and discussed overall history and performance of these valves.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 7 High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) Header Cross-tie Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the UFSAR, Safety Injection System DBD, Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Operating Procedures (OPs), CRs and mechanical calculations of the HHSI cross-tie valves, to verify that the cross-tie valves had positive margin and were capable of performing their safety-related functions. The team also reviewed the licensees electrical calculations to determine if adequate voltage would be provided to the motor operated valve (MOV) motor terminals under design basis conditions, and to verify that the thermal overload heater devices for the MOVs, were adequately sized to ensure that the devices would not trip prematurely under design basis conditions. The team performed walkdowns to verify the material condition of the installed valves and the valve position. Additionally, the team reviewed procedures used for changing the position of the cross-tie valves to verify its adequacy in addressing valve configurations during various plant conditions. Finally, the team interviewed the system engineer and discussed overall history and performance of these valves to determine the overall reliability of the component.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 8 RWST Blended Makeup Check Valve -366,
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed valve drawings, piping and instrument diagrams, EOPs and OPs to verify that the makeup path can function as described per the plants PSA and would not be impeded by other connecting system flowpaths back to the RWST. Additionally, the team reviewed documentation, including PSA analysis, calculations and operation logs to verify that the valve allows the assumed flow under normal and accident conditions.
The team also interviewed the system engineer and operations personnel to further address the condition and operability of the valve. The team completed field inspections to verify the material condition of the component and the system orientation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2.1.1 9 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter PT 3-445
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the loop diagrams and connection diagrams associated with PT 3-445, to confirm that the pressurizer pressure control loop satisfied design bases requirements. The team selectively reviewed the scaling, and instrument uncertainty and setpoint calculations for the pressurizer pressure control loop, to verify that assumptions and design inputs regarding process effects, instrument uncertainty, and process limits had been appropriately considered, and that appropriate statistical methodology had been used. The team also reviewed a sample of calibration results to verify that the instrument as-found values demonstrated that it was sufficiently accurate to perform its design function. The team evaluated the reliability of the instrument by reviewing a sample of condition reports prepared in connection with problems associated with this instrument.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Review of Low Margin Operator Actions
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed a margin assessment of a sample of risk significant, time critical operator actions. Where possible, margins were determined by the review of the assumed design basis, engineering modeling, and UFSAR stated response times and job performance times. For the selected operator actions, the team performed a walk through of associated Emergency Procedures, Abnormal Procedures, Annunciator Response Procedures, and other operations procedures with appropriate training personnel or plant operators to assess operator knowledge level, adequacy of procedures, and availability of special equipment when required.
For selected time critical operator actions performed by control room operators, the team observed operators perform these actions from the control room simulator, which included actions during scenarios for the loss of offsite power, station black out, and LOCA with loss of high head safety injection on the affected unit.
In the plant, the team verified that required staged equipment such as ladders, tool boxes, operator aids, keys, controlled procedures, and communications equipment were available to perform the operator actions in the field, and that field communications with the control room was adequate to complete the operator actions. Additionally, timeliness for time critical operator actions was verified by observing operators perform the applicable procedures on the respective components in the plant.
The following operator actions were reviewed:
- Place motor and diesel driven standby steam generator feed water into service
- Provide backup cooling to charging pumps
- Provide high head safety injection from the non-affected unit
- Install temporary fans for DC / Inverter Rooms
- Reset 4K-Volt lock out from main control room and locally
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Review of Industry Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed selected operating experience issues that had occurred at domestic and foreign nuclear facilities for applicability at Turkey Point. The team performed an independent applicability review and selected the following issues for detailed reviews:
- NRC Information Notice IN 2002-12, Submerged Safety Related Cables.
- IN 96-43, Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers.
- IN 96-46, Zinc Plating of Hardened Metal and Removal of Protective Coatings, Refurbished Circuit Breakers.
- IN 97-08, Potential Failures of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Components & SER 7-97, Operating Mechanism Problems in Medium Voltage Circuit Breakers.
- IN 98-038, Metal Clad Circuit Breaker Maintenance Issues Identified by NRC Inspections.
- IN 99-13, Insights from NRC Inspections of Low and Medium Voltage Circuit Breaker Maintenance Programs.
- CR 2005-3666, Crystal River Reportable Event - OE.
- NRC BULLETIN NO. 88-04, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss, May 5, 1988.
- NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 97-90: Use of Non-Conservative Acceptance Criteria in Pump Surveillance Tests.
- Responses and actions taken for, NRC Bulletin No. 89-02 "Stress Corrosion Cracking of High Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preloaded Bolting in Anchor Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves"
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Review of Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed 8 modifications of risk significant components in detail to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the components have not been degraded. The adequacy of design and post-modification testing of these modifications was reviewed by performing inspection activities identified in IP 71111.17, Permanent Plant Modifications, Section 02.02.a. Additionally, the team reviewed the modifications in accordance IP 71111.02, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments, to verify the licensee had appropriately evaluated the 10 CFR 50.59 applicability. The following modifications were reviewed.
- PC/M No.04-069, Overpower Delta -T, (OPDT) and Overtemperature DeltaT, (OTDT) Turbine Runback Elimination, Revision 0
- PC/M No.05-100, Unit 3 Main and Auxiliary Transformer Tap Changes, Revision 0
- PC/M No.94-020, Thermal Uprate Reactor Control and Protection System Scaling Diagram, Revision 1
- PC/M No.95-171, Thermal Uprate Setpoint Scaling, Revision 0
- PC/M No.04-103, Power Range Detector High Voltage Setting Change, Revision 0
- ECR 50485, Relocate Temperature Switch ITS09717B-VL, Rev. 4
- ECR 50176, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Strainer DPI Sensing Line Redesign, Rev. 2
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4AO6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On September 29, 2006, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Pearce, Turkey Point Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. An Unresolved Item (URI) was identified at the exit interview. The team returned all proprietary information examined to the licensee. No proprietary information is documented in the report.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- C. Bible, Director of Engineering
J . Connolly, Licensing Manager
- M. Crosby, Training Manager
- A. Dunstan, FP&L Engineering
- O. Hanek, Licensing Engineer
- D. Hoffman, Assistant Operating Manager
- F. McCain, Document Control
- M. Pearce, Plant Manager
- D. Poirier, Maintenance Manager
- W. Prevatt, Work Control Supervisor
- G. Warriver, Site Quality Manager
NRC ( attended exit interview)
- C. Ogle,Branch Chief, Engineering Branch No. 1, Division of Reactor Projects, RII
- S. Stewart, Senior Resident Inspector, Turkey Point
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
None