NRC Generic Letter 1983-43
UNITED STATES VW ,NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 December 19, 1983 TO ALL LICENSEES
AND APPLICANTS
FOR OPERATING
POWER REACTORS AND HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION
PERMITS FOR POWER REACTORS Gentlemen:
Subject: Reporting Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Sections 50.72 and 50.73, and Standard Technical Specifications (Generic Letter No. 83-43 )Section 50.72 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations has recently been revised and will become effective January 1, 1984. A new Section 50.73 of Title 10 of the Code of the Federal Regulations has recently been added and it will also become effective January 1, 1984. Section 50.72 revises the immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors.The new Section 50.73 provides for a revised Licensee Event Report System.Copies of each of these sections to 10 CFR Part 50 are enclosed for your information.
Since paragraph (g) of Section 50.73 specifically states that: "the require-ments contained in this section replace all existing requirements for licensees to report 'Reportable Occurrences'
as defined in individual plant Technical Specifications," the reporting requirements incorporated into the "Admin-istrative Controls" section of your facility's technical specifications may require modification.
Also, the definition "Reportable Occurrence" may need to be replaced by a new term, "Reportable Event." We will make these changes in the current version of Standard Technical Specifications (STS) for all nuclear power reactor vendors and in the technical specifications for plants not yet licensed.Enclosed are model technical specification in STS format showing the revisions which you should make in the "Administrative Control" and "Definitions" sections of your facility's technical specifications to implement these regulation changes. Other conforming changes to your technical specifications will be required to reflect the revised reporting requirements.
For example, technical specifications requiring a Licensee Event Report rather than a Special Report for operating conditions where the specific activity limits of the reactor coolant are exceeded should be changed to reflect the need for a Special 8312190371
)
-2-Report rather than a Licensee Event Report within 30 days with the stated information requested in the requirements.
Some technical specifications currently require Special Reports or other routine reporting of events in lieu of a Licensee Event Report. Such reports are still required but the technical specification wording will need revision.
These changes, where applicable, should also be included in your amendment request to modify your technical specifications.
We will incorporate these changes, where applicable, in our next revision to the Standard Technical Specifications for all nuclear power reactor vendors.Because this change to the technical specifications is clarifying and made at the request of the Conmmission, you are not required to remit a license fee for the change.This request has been approved by OMB Clearance Number 3150-0011, which expires April 30, 1985.Sincerely, v-- CC, ( " Darrell .Ei enhut, irector Division of Licensing Enclosures:
1. Revisions to STS Reporting Requirements, in Section 1.0,"Definitions," and Section 6.0,"Administrative Controls" 2. Revised Section 10 CFR Part 50.72 3. New Section 10 CFR Part 50.73 X ., I ENCLOSURE REVISIONS
TO STS REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
IN SECTION 1.0, "DEFINITIONS" AND SECTION 6.0, "ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTROLS" 1.0 DEFINITIONS
Delete the term, "REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCE".
Add the term, "REPORTABLE
EVENT" with the following definition: "A REPORTABLE
EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50.6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTROLS 6.1 RESPONSIBILITY (No changes)6.2 ORGANIZATION (No changes)6.3 UNIT STAFF QUALIFICATIONS (No changes)6.4 TRAINING (No changes)6.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT 6.5.1 UNIT REVIEW GROUP (URG)6.5.1.6 RESPONSIBILITIES
Revise f. to read as follows: "Review of all REPORTABLE
EVENTS." 6.5.2 COMPANY NUCLEAR REVIEW AND AUDIT GROUP (CNRAG)6.5.2.7 REVIEW Revise g. to read as follows: "All REPORTABLE
EVENTS;" 6.6 REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCE
ACTION Revise title to read as follows: REPORTABLE
EVENT ACTION 6.6.1 Revise to read as follows: "The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE
EVENTS: a. The Commission shall be notified and a report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50, and b. Each REPORTABLE
EVENT shall be reviewed by the (URG), and the results of this review shall be submitted to the (CNRAG)and the (Vice President
-Nuclear Operations).
-2-6.7 SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION (No changes)6.8 PROCEDURES
AND PROGRAMS (No changes)6.9 REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
6.9.1 ROUTINE REPORTS (Delete "AND REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCES")
6.9.1.9 REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCES (Delete)6.9.1.10 PROMPT NOTIFICATION
WITH WRITTEN FOLLOWUP (Delete)6.9.1.11 THIRTY-DAY
WRITTEN REPORTS (Delete)6.9.1.12 RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR LIMIT REPORT (W Only)(Change to 6.9.1.9)6.10 RECORD RETENTION 6.10.1 Revise c. to read as follows: "All REPORTABLE
EVENTS;" 6.11 RADIATION
PROTECTION
PROGRAM (No changes)6.12 HIGH RADIATION
AREA (Optional) (No changes)6.13 PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) (No changes)6.14 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION
MANUAL (ODCM) (No changes)6.15 MAJOR CHANGES TO RADIOACTIVE
LIQUID, GASEOUS AND SOLID WASTE TREATMENT
SYSTEM (No changes)
C Federal Register / Vol. 48. No. 188 / Monday, August 29, 1983 / Rules and Regulations
39039------Part 20 of this chapter. The licensee shall send a copy of the report to each appropriate State agency that has authority over the particular well-drilling operation.
The report must contain the following information:
(1) Date of occurrence.
(2) A description of the irretrievable well-logging source involved.
including radionuclide.
quantity.
and chemical and physical form.(3) Surface location and identification of well.(4) Results of efforts to immobilize- and seal the source in place.(5) Depth of source.(6) Depth of the top of the cement plug.(7) Depth of the well.(8) Any other information (eg..warning statement)
contained on the permanent identification plaque.(9) Notifications made to State agencies.(10) A brief desciption of the- -attempted recovery efforts.(d) Any licensee or applicant for a license may apply to the Commission for approval of proposed procedures to abandon an irretrievable well-logging source in a manner not otherwise authojized in paragraph (a) of this section.PART 150-EXEMPTIONS
AND CONTINUED
REGULATORY
AUTHORITY
IN AGREEMENT
STATES AND IN OFFSHORE WATERS UNDER SECTION 274 7. The authority citation for Part 150 is revised to read as follows: Authotity Sectibn 161. 68 Stat. 948. as amended. a 274. 73 Stat. 688 (42 US.C.220. 22); sec. 201.88 Stat 1242. as -amended (42 U.S.C. 541) -- -.-a I Sections 150. 50.15 50.15a 50.31 1SO32 also issued under seas. ile(2) 81. 8 Stat. 923.935. as amended. secs 83. 84, 2 Stat. 3033.3039 (42 US.C. 2014e(2).
2111.2113.
2114).Section 1V014 also issued under sec. 53. 68 Stat. 90 as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073).Section 1517a also issued under sec. 22 68 Stat. O3 (42 US.C. 2152). Section 150.30 also issued under sec. 234. 83 Stat. 444 (42 U.S.C.For the purposes of sec. 223, 8 Stat 9S8 as amended (42 U.S.C 2273); I I 150.20b)(2)-(4)
and 15021 are issued under ae isib. 68 Stat.s8 as amended (42 U.IC.220 1fb)k. 1250.14 is issued under sec. 162 68 StaL 949. as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i));
and 11 150.16-150.19 and 150.20(b)(1)
are issued under sec.161o. 68 Stat. 9S. as amended (42 U.,S.C.2201(lo)).
§J Iso.3, 150.14, 15C.M5 150.15a, 150.30, 150.31, 1502.32 (Anmended]
9. In I 15020. the introductory text of paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows: 150.20 RecognitIon of Agreement State.Ucenes.(b] Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any specific license issued by an Agreement State to a person engaging in activities in a non-Agreement State or in offshore waters under the general licenses provided in this section, the general licenses provided in this section are subject to the provisions of if 30.7 (a) through (e), 30.14(d) and If 30.34, 30.41, and 30.51 to 30.63. inclusive, of Part 30 of this chapter; 1 40.7 (a) through (e) and J I 40.41. 40.51, 40.61, 40.63. inclusive, 40.71 and 40.81 of Part 40 of this chapter;and 1 70.7 (a) through (e) and I § 70.32.70.42. 70.51 to 70.56. inclusive, 70.60, 70.62, inclusive.
and 70.71 of Part 70 of this chapter; and to the provisions of Parts 19, 20, and 71 and Subpart B of Part 34 of this chapter. In addition, any person engaging in activities in non- -Agreement States or in offshore waters under the general licenses provided in this section:* * .0 .*Dated at Bethesda, Maryland.
this 2th day of August. 1983. .For the Nuclear Regulatory Comission.-ack W. Roa.Acting Executive Directorfor Operations.
JM Doc Ad3 Filed 45 am)BILsNG CODE 7690-01-U 10 CFR Part 50 Immediate Notification Requirements of Significant Events At Operating Nuclear Power Reactors AmE=CY. Nuclear Regulatory Comission.- -r a ot:Final eile. --Commission.
D.C. 20555;.Telephone
(301) 492-4973.SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATlOPC
1. Background On February 29, 1980. the Commission amended its regulations without prior notice and comment to require timely and accurate licensee reporting of information following significant events at operating nuclear power reactors (45 FR 13434). The purpose of the rule was to provide the Commission with immediate reporting of twelve types of'significant events where immediate Commission action to protect the public health and safety may be required or where the Commission needs accurate and timely information to respond to heightened public concern. Although the rule was made immediately effective.
comments were solicited.
Many commenters believed the rule was in some respects either vague and ambiguous or overly broad.After obtaining experience with notifications required by the rule. the Commission published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking on December21.
1981 (468R-;61894) and invited public commnent.
The, proposal was made to meet two objectives:
change 10 CFR 50.54 to implement Section 201 of the NRC's 1980 Fiscal Year Authorization Act and change 10 CFR 50.72 to more clearly specify the significant events requiring licensees to immediately notify NRC.The problems and issues which this rulemaking addresses and the solutions that it provides can be utinmarized in five broad areas: -2. AuthorizationActforays
--=Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory
- 'Commission Authorization Aect for:-Fiscal Year 1980 (Pub. L 96 295)provides: (a) Section 103 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:
f. Each license issued for a utilization facility under this section or section 1Q4b. shall require as a- -condition thereof that in case of any accident whicb could result in an unplanned release of quantities of fission products in excess of allowable limits for normal operation
--established by the Commission.
the licensee-7 shall immediately so notify the Commission.'
Violation of the condition prescribed by this subsection may, in the Commission's discretion.
constitute grounds for license revocation.
In accordance weth section 18r of this Act. the Commission shall promptly amend each license for a utilization facility issued under this section or section 104b.which is in effect on the date of enactment of this subsection to include the provisions
-required under this subsection.
SUmGARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations which require timely and accurate information from licensees following significant events at commercial nuclear power plants; Experience with-existing requirementi and public comments on a proposed revision of the rule indicate that the existing regulation should be amended to clarify reporting criteria and to require early reports only on those matters of value to the exerCise of the Commissiojis responsibilities.1>he amended regulation will clarify the list of reportable events and provide the Commission with more useful reports regarding the safety of operating nuclear power plants.EFFECTIVE
DATE: January 1.1984.FOR FURTthER INFORMAnION
CONTACO Eric W. Weiss, Office ofInspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
.* " i-394 Federal Register I Vol. 48, No. 168 / Monday. August 29. 1983 1 Rules and Regulations
.Ac.orgiy.
this rulemnakng includes an amendment to 10 CFR 50.S4 that would add an appropriate notification requirement as a condition in the operating license of each nuclear utilization facility licensed under section'C3 or 104b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended. 42 U.S.C. 2133. 2134b.These facilities generally are the commercal nuclear power facilities which produce electricity for public consurptio.
Research and test reactors are not subject to the license condition as they are licensed under section Ul4a.or 104c. of the Act. Under the amendment to 10 CFR 50.54. licensees.
fauling wder sections 103 or 104b. would be required.
as a condition of their respective operating licenses, to notify the NRC imediately of events specified in 10 CFR 50.Z Urnecessa,7 Reports Several categories of reports required by 3 50.72 are not useful to the NRC.Among these categories are reports of worker imy. smnall radioactive releases.
and msnor security problems.For example, reports are presently
, required if a worker onsite experience chest pai or another illness not related to radiation and is sent to a hospital for evaluation or if the vent stack monitor moves upw'd-a few percent yet radiation levels -.=ain 1000,0 times below tec!hnica specdfication limits; or if the security computer malfunctions for a few minutes.This rulemaking eliminates such reporting req-irements from 1 50.72 and in general clarifies and narrows the scope of reporting.
However.revision of Part 73 of the Commission's regulatons is necessary to resolve all problems with security reports. .?a TenniLokgy.
Phrasing.
ad eportiqg 77ieshol -.The various sections of 10 CFR 50 have different phrasin. terminology.
and thresholds in the reporting criteria.Even when no different meaning is intended a cbange in wording can cause This rulemaking has been carefully written to use terminology.
phrasing and reporting thresholds that are either identical to or similar to those In 1 50.whener possible.
Other conformin amend to Parts 20L 2L73. and in I 5055 and Apendix E of Part 50 are under development As a parallel activity to the preparation of I 50.72Z on July 28 I8 the Commission has published a Lcensme Event Report (LER) Rule I 50.73) which requires licensees for operating nuclear power plants to prepare detailed written reports for certain events (48 FR 33850).4. Coordination with Licensee s EmergencyPan The current scheme for licensees'
emergency plans includes four Emergency Classes. When the licensee declares one of the four Emergency Classes, it must report this to the Commission as required by I 50.72- The lowest of the four Emergency Classes.Notification of Unusual Event, has resulted in unnecessary emergency declarations.
Events that fall within the Unusual Event class have been neither emergencies in themselves nor precursors of more serious events that are emergencies.
Although changes to the definition of the Emergencl Classes are not being made in this ruemaking.
a new reporting scheme that would ultimately eliminate "Unusual Event' as an Emergency Class requiring notification can be adopted consistent with this rule.A proposed rulemaking which would redefine the Emergency Classes in I 50A7 is in preparation and may soon be published for public comment. This final rulemaking makes possible the elimination of "Unusual Event" as an emergency class without further amendment of 1 50.2 by including in the category of non-Emergencies the subcategory of "one-hour reports" 5. Vogue orAmbiiuous RepoatrW Criteria The reporting criteria in I 507 have been revised in order to clarify their scope and intent The criteria were revised for the proposed rule and in response to public comment The"Analysis of Comments" portionof this Federal Register notice describes in more detail specific examples of changes in wording intended to eliminate vagueness or ambiguity.
IL Analysis of Comments Twenty letters of comment were received in response to the Federal Register notice published on December 21, 1981 (48 FR 618943.1 Of the twenty letters of comment received.
the vast majority (15 of 20) were from utilities owning or operating nuclear power plants. Tbis Federal Register notice described the proposed revision of 10 CFR 50.7Z -Notification.
of Significznt Events." and 10 CFR 50.54. "Conditions of Licenses." A discussion of the more significant comments follows&Cocam ese doculeoU a are*ihbl fr public inspection nd copain for a let in lbel a.C Public Docamnt Room 1717 H street. K.W.Wasmotn. A.C 255 Conditions of Licenses (§ 50.54)A few commenters said that the"Commission already has the ability to enforce its regulations and does not need to incorporate the items as now proposed into conditions of license." The Commission has decided to promulgate the proposed revision of 1 50.54, "Conditions of Licenses." in order to satisfy the intent of Congress as expressed in Section 201 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980. This Act and its relationship to 1 50.54 are discussed in detail in the Federal Register notice for the proposed rule (46 FR 61894).Coordination With Other Reporting Requi.rerments (Finai Rule § 50.72)Seven commenters said that the NRC should coordinate the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 with other rules, with NUREG-0654. "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Plants." and with Regulatory Guide L16."Reporting of Operating Information
..." Many of these letters identified overlap. duplication.
and inconsistency among NRC's reporting requirements.
The Commission is making a concerted effo-t to ensure consistent and coordinated reporting requirements.
The requirements contained in the revision of 10 CFR 50.72 are being coordinated with revision of 1 50.73.§ 50.551e) Appendix E of Part 50,§ 20.402, § 73.7L and Part 2a.Citing 10 CFR 50.72 as a Basis for Notification (Final le H 50.72fa)[41)
A few commenters objected to citing 5s0.72 as a basis whenmaldng a telephone notification.
The letters of comment questioned the purpose. legal effect. and burden on the licensee.The Commission does not believe that it is an nnecessary burden for a --licensee to know and identify the basis for a telephone notification required by I 50.72. There have been many occasions when a licensee could Dot tell the NRC whether the telephone notification was being made in accordance with Technical Specifications.
10 CFR 50.72 some other..requirement, or was just a courtesy call Unless the licensee can identify the nature of the report, it is difficult for the NRC to know what significance the licensee attaches to the report. and it becomes more difficult for the NRC to respond quickly and properly to the event.
Federal Register .Vol. 48. No. 168 / Monday. August 29. 1983 / Rules and Regulations
- 39D41 I.7.'ec'A
- e S.h-tdoi.n (Final Rule f 50.72(bj.`
Jji))Several corpenters objected to the use of t.e term. "immediate shutdown." saying that Technical Specifications do not use such a term.The te= is used in some but not all Technice!
Specifications.
Consequently.
the Co-.=.ssion has revised the reporting criterion in question.
The final rule requires a report upon the initiation of apy nuclear power plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications.
Plant OperoLtng andEmergency Procedures (Fi."al Rule § 50.72(bJ(lffli))
Several commenters said that the reporting criteria should not make reference to plant operating and emergenty procedures because: a. It woud take operators too long to decide whether a plant condition was covered by the procedures, b. The procedures cover events that are not of concern to the NRM and c. The procedures valy from plant to plant Vl.flhe the pleat operating personnel should be familiar with plant procedures, it is true that procedures vary from plant to plant and cover events other than those which compromise plant safety. However, the wording of the reporting criteria has been mode-ed (R 50.72fb)(1)ii)
in the final rule) to narrow the reportable events to those that significantly compromise plant safety.Notwithstanding the fact that the procedures vary from plant to plant. the Commission has found that this criterion results in rNotifications indicative of serious events. The narrower.
more 6peClic wording will make it possible for plant operating personnel to Identify reportable events under their specific operating procedures.
Building Erocuotion (Final Rule f 50.772(bJ}(iiiJJ
Ten coarsnenters said that the proposed I 50.72(b)(6J[Wii)
regarding Zany accidental, unplanned or uncontrolled release resulting in evacuation of a building" was upclear and counterproductive in that it could cause reluctance to evacuate a building.Many of these commenters stated that the reporting of in-plant releases of radioactivity that require evacuation of individual rooms was inconsistent with the general thrust of the rule to require reporting of significant events. They ncled that minor spills, small gaseous wauste releases.
or the disturbance of cc-aminated particulate matter (e.g., dust) may all require the temporary evacuation of individual rooms until the airborne concentrations decrease or until respiratory protection devices are utilized.
They noted that these events are fairly cornmon and should not be reportable unless the required evacuation affects the entire facility or a major part of it.The Commission agrees. The wording of this criterion has been changed to include only those events which significantly hamper the ability of site personnel in performance of duties necessary for safe operation.
One commenter was concerned that events occurring on land owned by the utility adjacent to its plant might be reportable.
This is not the intent of this reporting requirement The NRC is concerned with the safely of plant and personnel on the uility's site and not with non-nuclear activities on land adjacent to the plant Explicit Threats (Final Rule§ 5a 72(bJ(1)(vi)J
A few commenters said that the intent of the term. 'ixplicitly threatens." was unclear. Those conmnenting wofidered what level of threat was L-vo'ved.
The term. "explicitly threatens. " has been deleted from the final rule. Instead. the final rule refers to "any event that poses an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant" HI 50.72(b)[1)[vi)]
and gives examples so that it is clear the Commission Is interested in real or actual threats as opposed to threats without credibility.
Notification Timing (Final Rule§ Sa 721b)[2))The commenters generally had two points to make regarding the timing of reports to the NRC. First. the comments supported notification of the NTRC after appropriate State or local agencies have beei notified.
Second.- two commenters requested a new four-to six-hour report category for events not warranting a report with one hour.Allowing more time for ceporting some non-Emergency events would lessen the impact of reporting on the individuals responsible for maintaining the plant in-a safe condition.
Limiting the extension of the deadline to four hours ensures that the report is made when the Information is fresh in the minds of those involved and that it is more likely to be made by those involved rather than by others on a later shifL ' t'Other,'more significant non-Emergency events and all declarations of an Emergency must continue to be reported within one hour. The one-hour deadline is necessary if the Commission is to fulfill its responsibilities during and following the most serious events occuring at operating nuclear power plants. A deadline shorter than one hour was not adopted because the Commission does not want to interfere with the operator's ability to deal with ar. accident or transient in the first few criical minutes.Therefore.
based on these comments and its experience.
the NRC has estabhIshed a "four-hour report." as was suggested.
Reactor Scrams (FinalRule
§ 50. 72(b)(2)fii))
Several cormmenters said that reactor sc-ams. particularly those scrams below power operation.
should not require notification of the NRC within one hour.In response to these comments.
the Commission had changed the reporting deadline to four hours. However, the Commission does not regard reactor scrams as "non-events," as stated in some letters of comment. Information related to reactor scrams has been useful in identifying safety-related problems.
The Commission agrees that four hours is an appropriate deadline for this reporting requirement because these events are not as important to immediate safety as are some other events.Radiooctive Release Threshold (Final Rule f 50..72 (b(2) (iv))Several commenters said that the threshold of 25% of allowable limits for radioactive releases was too low for one-hour reporting.
Based upon these comments and its experience.
the Commission has changed the threshold of reporting to those releases exceeding two times Part 20 concentrations when averaged over a period of one hour. This will eiminate reports of releases that represent negligible risk to the public.The Commimssion has found that low level radioactive releases below two times Part 20 concentrations do not. in themselves, warrant immediate radiological response.This paragraph requires the reporting of those events that cause an unplanned or uncontrolled release of a significant amount of radioactive material to offsite areas. Unplanned releases should occur infrequently;
however. when they occur.at least moderate defects have occurred in the safety design or operational control established to avoid their occurrence and. therefore, these events should be reported.PersonnelRodioactire Contanination (Final Rule 5 50.72(b)(2)f(v')
Several commenters objected to the use of vague terms such as "extensive
39042 Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 168 / Monday, August 29, 1983 / Rules and Regulations.
onsite conma'nation" and "'readily removed- in one of the reporting criteria of the proposed rule.Based on this comment, new criteria have been prepared that use more sneviflc terms. For examnle, one new c terion requires reporting of "Any event re-" .ng the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an olfsite medical facility for treatmenl." Experience with telephone notifications d~ade to tl.e NRC Operations Center suggests that this new criterion will be easily understood.
lL Paragraph-by-Paragraph Explanation of the Rule Padrcz,-ch
50. 72a) reflects some c~nsolda:
of language that was repeated in various subparagraphs of the proposed rule. In general, the intent and so^pe of this paragraph do not reflect any change from the proposed rule.Several titles were added to this and subsequent sections.
For example, paragraph
50.72.(b)
is titled -Non-Energency Events' and it has two subparagrap!s: (b)1). titled. 'One-Hour Reports" and (b)(2) "Four-Hour Reports.'
Tle events which have a one-hour deadline are those having the potential to escalate to ah Emergency C!ass. The fcu--hour deadline is expan-e_d in the analysis of paragraph Pamgrcph 50.72ob)(1)(i)(A)
requires reporting of -Me initiation of any miclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications." Although the intent and scope have not changed. the change in wording between the proposed and final rule is intended to clarify that prompt notification is, required once a shutdown is initiated.
In response to public comment. the term "immediate shutdown" that was used in the proposed rule is not used in the finl r-l .e. The term was vague and unfam=i-ar to those licensees who did not have Technical Specifications using the term.This reporng requirement is intended to capture those events for which Technical Specifications require the initiation of reactor shutdown.
This will provide the NRC with early warning of safety significant conditions serious enough to warrant shutdown of the plant.Parogrcph
5a02(Jb)(1)(fffB)
was added to be consistent with existing requirements in I 50.54(x) and the existing I 50.72(c) as published in the Federal Register on April 1,1983 (48 FR 13966) which require the licensee to notify the NRC Operations Center by telephone when the licensee departs from a license condition or technical specification.
Poaragrph
50.72(bffl)(ii), encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events and some events captured by proposed I 50.72(b)(1)
was added to provide for consistent, coordinated reporting requirements between this rule and 10 CFR 50.73 which has a sL-ni!ar provision.
Public comment suggested that there should be similarity of terminology.
phrasing.
and reporting thresholds between i 50.72 and I 50.73. The intent of this paragraph is to capture those events where the plant. including its principal safety barriers.
was seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition.
For example. small voids in svstems designed to remove heat from the reactor core which have been previously shown through analysis not to be safety significant need not be reported.However, the accumulation of voids that could inhibit the ability to adequately remove heat from the reactor core, particularly under natural circulation conditions, would constitute an unanalyzed condition and would be reportable.
In addition, voiding in instrument lines that results in an erroneous indication causing the operator to misunderstand the true condition of the plant is also an unanalyzed condition and should be reported.The Commission recognizes that the licensee may use engineering'judgment and experience to determine whether an unanalyzed condition existed. It is not intended that this paragraph apply to minor variations in individual parameters, or to problems concerning sirgle pieces of equipment.
For example, at any time, one or more safety-related components may be out of service due to testing, maintenance, or a fault that has not yet been repaired.
Any trivial single failure or minor error in performing surveillance tests could produce a situation in which two or more often unrelated.
safety-grade components are out-of-service.
- Technically, this is an unanalyzed condition.
However, these events should be reported only if they involve functionally related components or if they significantly compromise plant safety. When applying engineering judgement.
and there is a doubt regarding whether to report or not, the Commission's policy is that licensees should make the report.Finally, this paragraph also includes material (e.g.. metallurgical or chemical)problems that cause abnormal degradation of the principal safety barriers (I.e., the fuel cladding reactor coolant system pressure boundary.
or the containment).
Examples of this type of situation include: (a) Fuel cladding failures in the reactor. or in the storage pool. that exceed expected values. or that are unique or widespread.
or that are caused by unexpected factors, and would involve a release of significant quantities of fission products.(b) Cracks and breaks in the piping or reactor vessel (steel or prestressed concrete)
or major components in the primary coolant circuit that have safety relevance (steam generators.
reactor coolant pumps, valves, etc.).(c) Significant welding or material defects in the primary coolant system.(d) Serious temperature or pressure transients.(e) Loss of relief and/or safety valve functions during operation.(I) Loss of containment function or integrity including: (i) Containment leakage rates exceeding the authorized limits, (ii) Loss of containment isolation.
valve function during tests or operation, (iii) Loss of main steam isolationr valve function during test or operation.
or (iv) Loss of containment cooling capability.
--Parograph
50.72(b)(1)(il)
encompassing a portion of proposed 50.72(b)(2), was reworded to correspond to a similar provision of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii).
Making the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 5.3 similar in language increases the clarity of these rules and minimizes confusion.
The paragraph has also been reworded to make it clear that it applies only to acts of nature (e.g., tornadoes)
and external hazards (e.g., railroad tank car explosion).
References to acts of sabotage have been removed. since these are covered by 1 73.71. In addition, threats to personnel from internal hazards (e.g., radioactivity releases)
that hamper personnel in the performance of necessary duties are now covered by paragraph
50.72(b)(1)(vi).
This paragraph covers those events involving an actual -threat to the plant from an external condition or natural phenomenon.
and where the threat or damage challenges the ability of the plant to continue to operate in a safe manner (including the orderly shutdown and maintenance of shutdown conditions).
The licensee should decide if a phenomenon or condition actually threatens the plant.For example. a minor brush fire in a remote area of the site that is quickly controlled by fire filghting personnel and.as a result. did not present a threat to the plant should not be reported.However. a major forest fire. large-scale Federal Register / Vol. 48. No. 168 / Monday. August 29. 1983 / Rules and Regulations
39043 fozD.j or major earthquake that presents a clear threat to the plant should be reported.
As another example. an industrial or transportation accident wh~ich occurs near the site, creating a plant safety concern. should be repor:ed.PzrfcDcph A.,b(1)l'ivJ.
encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events. requires the reporting of those events that result in either automatic or manual actuation of the ECCS or would have resulted in activation of the ECCS if some component had not failed or an operalor action had not been taken.For example. if a valid ECCS signal were generated by plant conditions.
and the operator were to put all ECCS pu .-ps in pJ.l-to-lock.
though no ECCS discharge occurred.
the event would be reportable.
A "valid signal" refers to the actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for ECCS initiatioo.
Excluded from this reporting requirement would be those instances where instrument drift, spurious signals.hurnan error. cr other invalid signals caused actuation of the ECCS. However.such events may be reportable under other sections of the Commission's regulations based upon other details: in particular.
paragraph
50.72(b)(2)(ii)
requires a report within four hours if an EndIneered Safety Feature [ESF) is actuated.Experience with notifications made pursuant to 1 50.72 has shown that events involing ECCS discharge to the vessel are generally more serious than ESF actuations without discharge to the vessel. Based on this experience.
the Commission has made this reporting criterion a -One-Hour Report." Paragroph
50 72(b)(1J).
encompassing events previously classified as Unusual Events, covers-those events that would impair a licensee's ability to deal with an accident or emergency.
Notifying the NRC of these events may permit the NRC to take some compensating measures and to more completely assess the consequences of such a loss should it occur during an accident or emergency.
Examples of events that this criterion is intended to cover are those in which -any of the following are not available:
1. Safety parameter display system (SPDS).2. Emergency Response Facilities iERFs).I. Emergency communications facilities and equipment including the Emerge.cy Notification system (ENS).4. Public prompt Notification System-nIluding sirens.S. Plant monitors necessary for accident assessment.
Porogroph
50.72 (b/(Ifivi).
encompassing some portions of the proposed II 50.72(b) (2) and (6). has been revised to add the phrase."including fires, toxic gas releases.
or radioactive releases." This addition covers the -evacuation" portionof paragraph
5o.72(b116)(iii)
of the proposed rule. This change in wording for the final rule was made in response to public comments discussed above. , While paragraph
50.72(b(1)(liii)
of the final rule primarily captures acts of nature, paragraph
50.72[b)(1)(v)
captures other events. particularly acts by personneL
The Commission believes this arrangement of the reporting criteria in the final rule lends itself to more precise interpretion and is consistent with those pubic comments that requested closer coordination between the reporting requirements in this rule and other portions of the Commission's regulations.-
This provision requires reporting of events. particularly those.caused by acts of personnel which endanger the safety of the plant or interfere with personnel in performance of duties necessary for safe plant operations.
The licensee must exercise some judgment in reporting under this section.For example. a small fire on site that did not endanger any plant equipment and that did not and could not reasonably be expected to endanger the plant. is not reportable.
Parogroph
50.72fb)Jt)
of the proposed rule wos split into §50.72(b)(1Ifii)
and fSO.72Th/(2J(ij in the final rule in order to permit some type of reports to be.-made within four hours instead of one hour because these reports have less safety significance, In terms of their combined effect. the overall intent and scope of these paragraphs have not changed from those in the proposed rule.Since the types of events intended to be captured by this reporting requirement are similar to I SO.72(b)(I)fii).
except that the reactor is shut dowrn the reader should refer to the explanation of I 50.72(bJ)l)(ii)
for more details on intent.Paragraph
50.72(b)(2)
Although the reporting criteria contained in the subparagraphs of I n0.72(bJt2)
were in the proposed rule. in response to public'comment the Commission established this "Non-Emergency" category for those events with sliRhtly less urgency and less safety significance that may be reported within four hours instead of one hour.The Commission wants to obtain such reports from personnel who were on shift at the time of the event when this is possible.
because these personnel will have a better knowledge of the circumstances associated with the vent.Reports made within four hours of the event should make this possible while not imposing the more rigid one hour requirements.
The reporting requirement in porogroph
50.72(bJ(2J(i)
is similar to a requirement in 1 50.73. Moreover, except for referring to a shutdown reactor, this reporting requirement is also similar to the "One-Hour Report" in§ 50.72(b)(I)(ii).
However this paragraph applies to a reactor in shutdown condition.
Events within this requirement have less urgency and can be reported within four hours as a "Non-Emergency." Porograph
50.72(b)(2)(i) (proposed 50.72(b)(5))
is made a "Non-Emergency" in response to public comment. because the Commission agrees that the covered events generally have slightly less urgency and safety significance than those events included in the "One-Hour Reports." The intent and scope of this reporting requirement have not changed from the proposed rule. This paragraph is intended to capture events during which an ESF actuates.
either manually or automatically, or fails to actuate. ESFs are provided to mitigate the consequences of the event; therefore.
(1)they should work properly when called upon and (2) they should not be challenged unnecessarily.The Commission is interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the consequences of the event (whether or not the equipment performed properly)
and events -where an ESF operated unnecessarily.;-:.
'Actuation" of multichanmel ESF Actuation Systems is defined as actuation of enough channels to complete the minimum actuation logic.Therefore.
single channel actuations, whether caused by failures or otherwise.
are not reportable if they do not complete the mininum actuation logic.Operation of an ESF as part of a planned test or operational evolution need not be reported.However, if during the test Dr evolution the ESF actuates in a way that is not part of the planned procedure.
that actuation should be reported.
For example, if the normal reactor shutdown procedure requires that the control rods be inserted by a manual reactor trip. the reactor trip need not be reported.However. if conditions develop during the shutdown that require an automatic reactor trip, such a reactor trip should be reported.
The fact that the safety
39044 Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 168 / Monday, August 29. 1983 / Rules- and Regulations analysis assumes that an ESF will actuate automatically during an event does not eliminate the need to report that actuation.
Actuations that need not be reported are those initiated for reasons other then to mitigate the consec'..ences of an event (e.g.. at the discretion of the licensee as part of a planned procedure).
Parograph
50.72(b)2J(iii) (proposed 50.72[b)(4)J
has been revised and simplified.
The words "any instance of personal error, equipment failure, or discovery of design or procedural inadequacies" that appeared in the proposed rule have been replaced by the words "event or condition." This simplification in lan'g-.axe is intended to clarify what was a confusing phrase to many of those who commented on the proposed rule.Also ir. response to public comment. this reporting requirement is a "Non-Emergency" to be reported within four hours instead of within one hour...This paragraph is based on the assumption that safety-related systems and sagtures are intended to mitigate tle consequences of an accident.
While paragraph
5o 72(b)(2)(ii)
applies to actual demands for actuation of an ESF.paragraph
50.72(b)(2)(iii)
covers an event where a safety system could have failed to perform its intended function because of one or more personnel errors, inc!ding procedure violations;
equipment failures;
or design. analysis.fabrication.
construction, or procedural.
deficiencies.
The event should be reported regardless of the situation or condition that caused the structure or system to be unavailable.
This reporting requirement is similar to one contained in 1 50.73. thus reflecting public comment identifying the need for closer coordination of reporting requirements between 1 50.72 and 1 50.73.This paragraph includes those safety systems designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (e.g.containment isolation.
emergency filtration).
Hence. minor operational events such as valve packing leaks, which could be considered a lack of control of radioactive material, should not be reported under this paragraph.
System leaks or other similar events may. however, be reportable under other paragraphs.
This paragraph does not include those cases where a system or component is removed from service as part of a plarnned evolution.
in accordance with an appioved procedure.
and in accordance with the plant's Technical Specifications.
For example. if the licensee removes part of a system from service to perform maintenance.
and the Technical Specifications permit the resulting configuration.
and the system or component is returned to service within the time limit specified in the Technical Specifications, the action need not be reported under this paragraph.
However, if, while the component is out of service, the licensee identifies a condition that could have prevented the system from performing its intended function (e.g.. the licensee finds a set of relays that is wired incorrectly), that condition must be reported.It should be noted that there are a limited number of single-train systems that perform safety functions (e.g.. the High Pressure Coolant Injection System in BWRs). For such systems. loss of the single train would prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of that system and, therefore.
must be reported even though the plant Technical-Specifications may allow such a condition to exist for a specified length of time. Also, if a potentially serious human error is -made that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, but recoverv factors resulted in the error being corrected, the error is still reportable.
The Commission recognizes that the application of this and other paragraphs of this section involves a technical judgment by licensees.
In this case. a technical judgment must be made whether a failure or operator action that disabled one train of a safety system could have, but did not. affect a redundant train. If so, this would constitute an event that "could have prevented" the fulfillment of a safety function, and, accordingly.
must be reported.If a component fails by an apparently random mechanism.
it may or may not be reportable if the functionally redundant component could fail by the same mechanism.
To be reportable.
it is necessary that the failure constitute a condition where there is reasonable doubt that the functionally redundant train or channel would remain operational until it completed its safety function or is repaired.
For example, if a pump fails because of improper lubrication.
there is a reasonable expectation that the functionally redundarit pump, which was also improperly lubricated.
would have also failed before it completed its safety function, then the failure is reportable and the potential failure of the functionally redundant pump must be reported.Interaction between systems.particularly a safety system and a non-safety system is also included in this criterion.
For example. the Commission is increasingly concerned about the effect of a loss or degradation of what had been assumed to be nonessential inputs to safety systems. Therefore, this paragraph also includes those cases where a service (e.g.. heatirg.ventilation, and cooling) or input (e.g..compressed air) which is necessary for reliable or long-term operation of a safety system is lost or degraded.
Such loss or degradation is reportable.
if the proper fulfillment of the safety function is not or can not be assured. Failures that affect inputs or services to systems that have no safety function need not be reported.Finally. the Commission recognizes that the licensee has to decide when personnel actions co: d have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
For example. when an individual improperly operates or maintains a component.
tha person might conceivably have made the same error for all of the functionally redundant components (e.g. if an individual incorrectly calibrates one bistable amplifier in the Reactor Protection Svstem. that person could conceivably incorrectly calibrate all bistable amplifiers).
However, for an event to be reportable it is necessary that the actions actually affect or involve components in more than one train or channel of a safety system. and the result of the actions must be ur.dersirable from the perspective of pro tectirg the health and safety of the public. The components can be functionally redundant (e.g.. two pumps in different trains) or not functionally redundant (e.g.. the operator correctly stops a pump in Train "A" and. instead of shutting the pump discharge valve in Train "A.' he mistakenly shuts the pump discharge valve in Train "B'.Paragmphs
50.72(b)(2)(iv) (proposed 50.72(b](8))
has been changed to clarify the requirement to report releases of radioactive material.
The paragraph is similar to 1 20.403 but places a lower threshold for reporting events at commercial power reactors.
The lower threshold is based on the significance of the breakdown of the licensee's program necessary to have a release of this size.rather than on the significance of the impact of the actual release. The existing licensee radioactive material effluent release monitoring programs and their associated assessment capabilities are sufficient to satisfy the intent of 50.72(b)(2)(iv).
Based upon public comment and a reevaluation by the Commission staff.the reporting threshold has been changed from '25%- in the proposed rule to "2 times" in the final rnle and has Federal Register / Vol. 48. No. 168 / Monday. August 29. 1983 / Rules and Regulations
391145 bKen reclassified as a "Non-Erner.gency" tc be reported witLhin four hours instead of within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.Also this reporting requirement has been changed to make a more uniform recuirement by referring to specific re.lase cr.;er.a instead of referring only 7echnica:
S;ecifications that may vay so.ew hat among facilities.
his reporting requirement is intended to capture those events that may lead to an accident situation where significant amounts of radioactive material could be released from the facility.
Unplanned releases should occur infrequently:
however, if they occur at the levels specffied.
at least moderate defects have occurred in the safety design or cperational control established to avoid..ez occurrence and. therefore.
such events should be reported.Normal operating limits for-ad:oactive effluent releases are based on the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 which establishes maximum annual average concentration in unrestricted areas. This reporting requirement addresses concentrations averaged over a one hotr period and represents less than C.' % of the annual quantities of radioactive materials permitted to be released by 10 CFR Part 20..Farcgrmph
50.72(bJ(2)(r) (proposed rule 50.72[b)(7])
has three changes. The first eliminates the phrase "occurring onsate because it is implied by the s-^-e c' the rule. The second replaces injury involving radiation" with radioactively contaminated person.'This change was made because of the dMcu.= ty in defining injury due to rac.:ation.
and more importantly.
because 10 CFR Part 20 captures events involving radiation exposure.The third change. in response to public comment. was to make this reporting requirement a four-hour notification.
instead of one-hour notification.
This change was made because these events have sli,-htlv less safety significance than those required to be reported within one hour.Paragraph
50.72(bJt2J(viJ (not in proposed rule) besides covering some events such as release of radioactively contaminated tools or equipment to the pLi:.c that may warrent NRC attention.
&;so covers those events that would not otherwise warrant NRC attention except for the interest of the news media, other governmen!
agencies.
or the public. In termns of its effect on licensees, this is no: a new reporting requirement bec.ause the threshold for reporting int.-ies and radioact:ve release was much lower under the proposed rule...:. -:ericn. Wil capture those events previously reported under other criteria w!ken such events require the NRC to respond because of media or public attention.
Pa.-agraph
50.72(c) (proposed
50.72(c))has remained essentially unchanged from the proposed rule. except for addition of the title "Followup Notification" and some renumbering.
This paragraph is intended to provide the NRC with timely notification when an event becomes more serious or additional information or new analyses clarify an event.This paragraph also permits the NRC to maintain a continuous communications channel because of the need for continuing follow-up information or because of telecommunications problems.IV. Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this regulation.
The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the Rule as considered by the Commission.
A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspection and copying for a fee at the NTRC Public Document Room. 1717 H Street. NWV..Washington.
D.C. Single copies o! the analysis may be obtained from Eric W.Weiss, Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington.
D.C. 20555.Telephone
(301) 492-4973.V.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
The information collection requirements contained in this final rule have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act. Pub. L 96-511 (clearance number 3150-0011).
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, S U.S.C.-605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this regulation will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.This final rule affedn electric utilities that are dominant in their respective service areas and that own and operate nuclear utilization facilities licensed under sections 103 and 104b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended.The amendments clarify and modify presently existing notification requirements.
Accordingly, there is no new, significant economic impact on these licensees, nor do the affected licensees fall within-the scope of the definition of "smali entities" set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 Antitrust.
Classified information, Fire prevention.
Incorporation by reference.
Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty.Radiation protection.
Reactor siting crileria.
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, asamended.
and section 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code. the following amendments to Title'10, Chapter 1. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 are'published as a document subject to codification.
PART 50-DOMESTIC
UCENSING OF PRODUCTION
AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows: Authority:
Secs. 103.104.181.182.183.186.
189.68 Slat. 936. 937. 948.953. 95v4, 955.956. as amended. sec. 234. 83 Slat 1244. as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133. 2134. 2201. 2232. 2233. 2236.2239. 22R?2: secs. 201. 202.206.88 Stat. 124Z2 1244.1246.
as amended (42 US.C. 5841.5842, S840). unless otherwise noted.Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L 95-61., sec. 10.92 Slat. 2951 (42 U.S.C 58511.Sections 50.58. 50.91 and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L 97-4!5, 96 Slat. 20.3 (42 U.S.C.2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec.122 68 Stat. 939 142 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 0.80-50.8 also issued under sec. 184. 68 Stat.954. as amended 142 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).For the-purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958. as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273), If 50.10 (a). (b)..and (c). 50.44.50.40.50.48.50.54, and 50.80[a).are issued under sec. olb. 68 Stat. 948. as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)):
if 50.10 (b) and I(c and 50.54 are issued under sec. 161i. 68 S at. 949. as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i));
and 11 50.55(e).
50.59(b).
50.70,50.71,50.72, and 50.78 are issued under sec. 161o, 68 Stat. 950.as amended (4Z U.S.C. Z221(o)).2. A new paragaph (z) is added to§ 50.54 to read as follows:§ 50.54 Conditions of license.* * *
- a (z) Each licensee with a utilization facility licensed pursuant to sections 103 or 104b. of the Act shall immediately notify the NRC Operations Center of the occurrence of any event specified in§ 50.72 of this part.3. Section 50.72 is revised to read as follows:
3lV Nd .1 98. / R n Re g ai 39;346 Federal Register / Vol. 48. INo. 168 / Monday. August 29, 1983 / Rules and Regulations I5.72 I.nmediate notification equirements for operating nudear power reactori (a) Ge.neral Requirernents
' (1) Each nuclear power reactor under 5021(b)or I 50.22 of this part shall notify the N.rC Oe:aticns Center via the'er-e-ecv N'otification System of: '.}) T he Declaration of any of the 17--e-gency Classes specified in the'censees approved Emergency Plan; or-Iii) Of those non-Emergency events specified in paragraph (b) of ths section.(2) If the Emergency Notification System is inoperative, the licensee shall make the required notifications via-commerical telephone service. other dedicated telephone system, or any o he: rnethod which will ensure that a report is wade as soon as practical to the NRC Operations Center.'-'33 The :`censee shall notify the NRC inst~epia:eiv after notification of the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency Classes.(4) When makLing a report under pazagraph ta)(3) of this section. the licensee shall identify: (i) The Emergency Class declared:
or (ii) Either paragraph (b)(11 -One-Hour Report." or paragraph (b)(Z). "Four-Hour Report" as the paragraph of this section not finca ton of the Non-ergenry Event..[b) .7jon-EJergency Events. (1) One-HoulrReports.
If not reported as a declaration of an Emergency Class under par-agraph (a) of this section, the iicensee s-all notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence of any of the following-(i)(A) The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown reqtired by the plant's Technical Specifications.(B) Any deviation from the plant's Tec-.ncza' ,Specifications authorized ptrsuant to 1 50.54(x) of this part.[ii) Any event or condition during operation that results in the condition of the nuclear powerplant including its principal safety barriers.
being seriously degraded:
or results in the nuclear pcwe-pian:
being (A) In a unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety;(B) In a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant or Other reamiresnts for imedisate notification of te.t N7.C b) Lcensed operatr.1 nudcer power reactrs ame At, &ined elsewhere in thiis chapter. in p2cuiar. I t 20.403. i 50.3& and I 73.71.'.hese E-ergeuxy Classes am addressed in.~Ltnix E £ co thai parL CoULTerci;
telephone number of the NRC COp"etions Ceiter is (2) 951-0550.(C) In a condition not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.(iii) Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that poses an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power-plant or significantly hampers site personnel in the perfornance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the plant.(iv) Any event that results or should have resulted in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal.(v) Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or communications capability (e.g..significant portion of control room indication.
Emergency Notification System. or offsite notification system).(vi) Any event that poses an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear powerplant or signifidantly hampers site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nulcear powerplant including fires. toxic gas releases.
or radioactive releases.(2) Four-Hour Reports. If not reported under paragraphs (a) or (b)(1) of this section. the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases. within four hours of the occurrence of any of the following: (i) Any event. found while the reactor is shutdown, that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have resulted in the nuclear powerplant.
including its principal safety barriers.
being seriously degraded or being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety.*(ii) Any event or condition that results.m manual 6r automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature [ESFJ, including the Reactor Protectifn System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF.including the RPS. that results from and is part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported.(iii) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures cr systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.(B) Remove residual heat.(C) Control the release of radioactive materiaL or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.[iv)(A) Any airborne radioactive release that exceeds 2 times the applicable concentrations of the limits specified in Appendix B. Table II of Part 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas.when averaged over a time period of one hour.(B) Any liquid effluent release that exceeds 2 times the limiting combined Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) (see Note I of Appendix B to Part 20 of this chapter) at the point of entry into the receiving water (i.e.unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except tritium and dissolved noble gases. when averaged over a time period of one hour. (Immediate notifications made under this paragraph also satisfy the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2)and (b1(2) of 1 20.403 of Part 20 of this chapter.)(v) Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively cortaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.(vi) Any event or situation.
relaied-o the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other governrment agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an onsite fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.(c) Foi]owJp Notification.
With respect to the telephone notifications made under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section. in addition to making the required initial notification.
each licensee, shall during the course of the event (1) Immediarely report (i) any farther degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening plant conditions, including those that require the declaration of any of the Emergency Classes, if such a declaration has not been previously made, or (ii) any change from one Emergency Class to another, or (iii) a termination of the Emergency Class.(2) Immediately reporL (i) the results of ensuing evaluations or assessments of plant conditions, (ii) the effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, and (iii) information related to plant behavior that is not understood.
(3) Maintain an open. continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC.Dated: at Washington.
D.C. this 23d day of August. 198 For he Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel 1. Chik, Secretrcry of the Conm.mission.
ia DM o- Fiteda.-2M-f s* am]sILUO CODE 71504-o I a i I I i I
nQC Federal Register / Vol. 4a, No. 144 / Tuesday. July 26. i983 / Rules and Regulations
'p.,--decision on whether the order should be amended to lower the pooling standard in the manner proposed.
In the absence of a suspension.
costly and inefficient movements of producer milk would have to be make solely for the purpose of pooling the milk of dairy farmers who have historically supplied the fluid milk needs of the market.It is hereby found and determined that thirty days' notice of the effective date hereof is impractical, unnecessary and contrary to the public interest in that (a) This suspension is necessary to reflect current marketing conditions'and to maintain orderly marketing conditions in the marketing area in that without the suspension costly and inefficient movements of milk would have to be made solely for the purpose of pooling the milk of dairy farmers who.have historically supplied the fluid milk needs of the market.(b) This suspension does not require of persons affected substhntial or extensive preparation prior to the effective date; and .(c) The marketing problems that provide the basis for this suspension action were fully reviewed at a public hearing held on November 9-10. 1982.where all interested parties had an opportunity to be heard on this matter.Therefore.
good cause exists for making this order effective upon publication in the Federal Register.List of Subjects In 7 CFR Part 1131 Milk marketing orders. Milk. Dairy products.PART 1131-[AMENDED]
§ 1131.7 [Amendedl It is therefore ordered. That the aforesaid provisions in I 1131.7(c)
of the order are hereby suspended for the months of August and September
1983.Effective date: July 25. 1983.(Sme 1-19. 48 Stat. 3L as amended (7 U.S.C 01-674))Signed at Washington.
D.C. on: July22L 1983.C W. MCMMfan.Assistant Secretary.
Marketing and Inspection Service.IPR Doc 83-=W rFed 72- 4: &ml IULING COOD 3':o-a-u NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 20 and 50 Licensee Event Report System AnENCY Nuclear Regulatory Conrrniss ion.ACTOte: Final rule.SUMMARY. The Commission is amending its regulations to require the reporting of operational experience at nuclear power plants by establishing the Licensee Event Report (LER) system. The final rule is needed to codify the LER reporting requirements in order to establish a single set of requirements that apply to all operating nuclear power plants. The final rule applies only to licensees of commercial nuclear power plants. The final rule will change the requirements that define tihe events and situations that must be reported.and will define the information that must be provided in each report.EFFECTIVE
DATE: January 1,1984. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of January 1.1984.FOR FURTHER INFORMAT-ON
CONTACT
- Frederick J. Hebdon. Chief. Program Technology Branch. Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
D.C. 20555: Telephone
(301)492-4480.SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION:
1. Background On May 6.19 2Z the NRC published in the Federal Register (47 FR 19543)' a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would modify and codify the existing Licensee Event Report (LER) system.Interested persons were invited to submit written comments to the Secretary of the Commission by July 6, 1982. Numerous comments were received.
After consideration of the comments and other factors involved.the Commission has amended the proposed requirements published for public comment by clarifying the scope and content of the requirements.
particularly the criteria that define which operational events must be reported.The majority of the comments on the proposed rule- (1) Questioned the meaning and intent of the criteria that defined the events which must be reported.
(2) questioned the need for reporting certain specific types of events. and (3) questioned the need for certain Information that would be required to be Included in an LER.Sedtion 111 of this notice discusses the comments'
li rAore detail.'Copies of the docunents ar available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the Public Document Room at 1717 H Street NW. Washington.
D.C.U. Rulemaking initiation The Nuclear Plant Reliability Data (NPRD) system is a voluntary program for the reporting of reliability data by nuclear power plant licensees.
On January 30,1980 (45 FR 6793).' the NRC published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that described the NPRD system and invited public comment on an NRC plan to make it mandatory.
Forty-four letters were received in response to the advanced notice. These comments generally opposed making the NPRD system mandatory on the grounds that reporting of reliability data should not be made a regulatory rpquirement In December 1980 the Commission decided that the requirements for reporting of operational experience data needed major revision and approved the development of an Integrated Operational Experience Reporting (IOER) system. The IOER system would have combined.
modified.
and made mandatory the existing Licensee Event Report (LER) system and the NPRD system SECY 80-507 discusses the IOER system.As a result of the Commission's approval of the concept of an IOER system. the NRC published another advance notice on January 15, 1981 (46 FR 3541). This advance notice explained why the NRC needed operational experience data and described the deficiencies in the existing LER and NPRD systems.On June & 1981. the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)announced that because of its role as an active user of NPRDs data it would assume responsibility for management and funding of the NPRD system.Further, INPO decided to develop criteria that would be used in its management audits of member utilities to assess the adequacy of participation in the NPRD system.The two principal deficiencies that had previously made the NPRD system an inadequate source of reliability data were the inability of its committee management structure to provide the'necessary technical direction and a low level of participation by the utilities.
The commitments and actions by INPO provided a basis for confidence that'these two deficiencies would be corrected.
For example. centralizing the management and funding of NPRDS within INPO should overcome the previous difficulties associated with management by a committee and funding from several independent organizations.
Further. with INPO focusing upon a utility'.
participatidn in Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 144 / Tuesday, July 26, 1983 / Rules and Regulations
33851 NPRDS as a specific evaluation parameter during routine management and plant audit activities, the level of utility participation, and therefore, the quality and quantity of NPRDS data.should significantly increase.
However, the Commission will continue to have an active role in NPRDS by participating in an NPRDS User's Group. by periodically assessing the quality and quantity of information available from NPRDS, and by auditing the timely availability of the information to the NRC.Since there was a likelihood that NPRDS under INPO direction would meet the NRC's need for reliability data.it was no longer necessary to proceed with the IOERS. Hence, the collection of detailed technical-descriptions of significant events could be addressed in a separate rulemaking to modify and codify the existing LER reporting requirements.
See SECY 81-494 for additional details concerning IOERS.However, the Commission wishes to make It explicitly clear that it is relaxing the reporting requirements with the expectation that sufficient utility participation, cooperation, and support of the NPRD system will be forthcoming.
If the NPRD system does not become operational at a satisfactory level in a reasonable time, remedial action by the Commission in the form of additional rulemaking may become necessary.
On October 6, 1981, the NRC published an advanced notice (46 FR 49134) that deferred development of the IOER system and sought public comment on the scope and content of the LER system. Six comment letters were received in response to this ANPRM. All of the comments received were reviewed by the staff and were considered in the development of the proposed LER rule. See SECY 82-3 ' for additional details.This rule identifies the types of reactor events and problems that are believed to be significant and useful to the NRC in its effort to identify and resolve threats to public safety. It is designed to provide the information necessary for engineering studies of operational anomalies and trends and patterns analysis of operational occurrences.
The same information can also be used for other analytic procedures that will aid in identifying accident precursors.
The Commission believes that the NRC should continue to seek an improved operational data system that will maximize the value of operational data. The system should encompass and integrate operational data of events and problem sequences identified in this rule, NPRDS data, and such other information as is required for a comprehensive integrated analytically- versatile system.The Brookhaven Study. published as'BNL/NUREG
51609. NURE9/CI4
3206, discusses data collection and storage q procedures to support multivariate, multicase analysis.
While the range of reactor configurations in the U.S.ntftlear industry presents some methodological and interpretative problems, these difficulties should not ,be insurmountable.
The Commission believes that the NRC should have as a specific objective the development, demonstration, and implementation of an integrated system for collecting and analyzing operational data that will employ the predictive and analytical potential of multicase, multivariate analyses.
Accordingly, the staff has been directed to undertake the work necessary to develop and demonstrate such a cost-effective integrated system of operational data collection and analyses.If the design of the system demonstrates that such a system is feasible and cost-effective, development of the system to the point of initiating rule should be completed by July 1986.m. Analysis of Comments The Commission received forty-seven
(47] letters commenting on the proposed rule. Copies of those letters and a detailed analysis of the comments are available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street. NW., Washington, D.C. A number of the more substantive issues are discussed below.Licensee Resources Of particular concern to the Commission was the impact that the proposed rule would have on the resources used by licensees to prepare LERs. The Commission's-goal was to'assure thatthe scope of the rule would not increase the overall level of effort above that currently required to comply with the existing LER requirements.
Thirty letters of the 47 received contained comments on the overall acceptability of the proposed rule or commented directly on the question of scope and/or resources associated with the proposed rule. The views of the commenters can be characterized as follows: 1. Five commenters felt that the scope and level of effort would-be greatly expanded by the proposed rule.Estimates included an increase of 100 man-years for the entire industry, an increase of three times the current effort, and an increase of $100,000 and 2 man-years annually for each plant.2. Four commenters felt that the lev'el of effort would be increased but not significantly.
3. One commenter felt that the proposed rule would have a minimal effect on the level of effort required.4. Two commenters felt that the proposed rule would significantly reduce the number of LERs filed.5. Thirteen commenters endorsed the objective of improving LER reporting but felt that changes in the proposed rule were needed. These commenters did not directly address the resource issue.6. Five commenters endorsed the proposed rule and/or felt that it was a significant improvement over the existing reporting requirements.
Based on these comments and its own assessment of the impact of this rule, the Commission has concluded that the impact of this rule will be no greater than the impact of the existing LER requirements, and this rule will not place an unacceptable burden on the affected licensees.
Relationship Between the LER Rule (ff50.73)
and the Immediate Notification Rule (f 50.72)As a parallel activity to the preparation of £ 50.73, the Commission is amending its regulations (i 50.72)which require that licensees for nuclear power plants notify the NRC Operations Center of significant events that occur at their plants. On December 21, 1981, the Commission published in the Federal Register a proposed rule (48 FR 61894)that described the planned changes in§ 50.72.The Federal Register notice accompanying the proposed LER rule (i.e., 1 50.73) stated that additional changes anticipated to § 50.72 would be made but they would be "' l
- largely administrative and the revised 1 50.72 would not be significantly modified nor would it be published again for public comment." Several commenters disagreed with this conclusion.
The commenters did, however, agree with the Commission's position that inconsistencies and overlapping requirements between the two rules need to be eliminated.
The Commission has carefully reviewed the proposed requirements in the LER and Immediate Notification rules and has concluded that although changes to both have been made (largely in response to public comments)to clarify the intent of the rules, the original intent and scope have not been significantly changed. Therefore, the Commission has concluded that these two rules need not be published again for public comment.
N._" Federal Register / Vol.48. No. 144 / Tuesday, July 26, 1983 / Rules and Regulations
33832l_33852 Federal Register I Vo~~~~~~~~~~l.4,N.14IuedyJly2,18 RlsanRgutis Engineering Judgment In the Fderal Register notice that accompanied the proposed rule, the Commission stated that licensee's engineering judgment may be used to decide If an event Is reportable.
Several commenters expressed the belief that some wording should be added to the rule of reflect that the NRC will also use judgment in enforcement of this regulation where the licensee Is requested to use engineering judgment.The Commission believes that the LER rule adequately discusses the need for and application of the concept of"engineering judgment." The concept itself includes the recognition of the existence of a reasonable range of Interpretation regarding this rule, and consequently the Commission recognizes and hereby acknowledges the need for flexibility In enforcement actions associated with this rule. The Commission believes that this concept Is sufficiently clear and that additional explicit guidance is not necessary.
Reporting Schedul;In the Federal Register notice that accompanied the proposed rule, the.Commission stated that It had not yet decided if the reports should be submitted in fifteen days or thirty days following discovery of a reportable event Many commenters stated that the time frame for reporting LERs should not be less than thirty days after the discovery of a reportable event.One commenter estimated the impact of a requirement to submit a report-sooner than 30 days following discovery of a reportable event would be an increase of approximately
40 man years per year for the currently operating plants. In addition the commenter estimated that if a summary report were also required the reporting burden would increase an additional
12 man years for the currently operating plants.In response to these comments, the Commission has decided to require that LERs be submitted within 30 days of discovery of a reportable event or situation Reporting'of Reactor Tips Section 50.73ta)(1)
of the proposed rule (I 50.73(a)(2)[ivj of the final rule)required reporting of any event which results In an unplanned manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). Many commenters agreed that these events should be trended and analyzed.
but disagreed that they deserve to be singled out as events of special sig1ificance (i e., events reportable as LERs). They noted that reports of RPS actuations are already reported to the NRC In the Monthly Operating Status Report as well as telephoned to the NRC Operations Center.In addition.
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) analyzed the frequency o reactor scrams during a one-month period. This analysis indicated that an average of 55 reactor trips would bb reportable each month under the proposed rule. LNPO equated this to 80 additional LERs per year for all currently operating plants, or approximately
32 man-years of additional effort for all the currently operating plants based upon the assumption that each LER requires 100 man-hours of effort to prepare and analyze.The Comdission still believes that ESP actuations, including reactor trips, frequently era associated with significant plant transients and are indicative of events that are of safety sirniflcance.
In additioan.
if the ESF are being challenged during routine transients, that fact Is of safety significance and should be reported.In addition, the Commission does not agree with the estimate that each LER submitted for a routine reactor trip would require. on the average. 100 man-hours to prepare and analyze. Licensees are already required to make internal evaluation of and document significant events IIncluding reactor trips.Therefore.
the incremental impact of preparing and analyzing the LER should be significantly less than 100-man hours.In addition, the actual increase in burden would be offset by reductions in the burden of reporting less significant events that would no longer be reportable.
Coordination With Other Aeporting Requirements Several commenters noted. that the proposed rule did not appear to be coordinated with other existing reporting requirements, and that duplication of licensee effort might result. They recommended that LER reporting be consolidated to eliminate potentil duplication of other existing reporting requirements.
The Commission has reviewed existing NRC reporting requirements.(e.g., 10 CFR Parts 20 and 21, 1 50.55(e), I 50.72, 1 50.73, i 73.71, and NUREG-0854) And has attempted, to the extent practicable, to eliminate redundant reporting and to ensure that the various reporting~reqbtremcnts are consistent.
Many of the changes in the final LER rule are as a result of this effort. These changes resulted in extensive revisions in the wording of criteria contained in this rule. but did not change the original scope of intent of the requirements.
In addition In order to make the requirements in II 50.72 and 50.73 more compatible.
the order (i.e., numbering)
of the criteria In I 50.73 has been changed.The changes are noted In the discussion of each paragraph below.Finally, conforming amendments are being made to various sections of Parts 20 and 50 In order to reduce the redundancy in reporting requirements that apply to operating nuclear power plantL In generaL these amnendments will require that 1. Licensees that have an Emergency Notification System (ENS) make the reports required by the subject sections via the ENS. All other licensees will continue to make the reports to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.2 Written reports required by the subject sections be submitted to the NRC Document Control Desk in Washington.
D.C. with a copy to the appropriate Regional Offices.3. Holders of licenses to operate a nuclear power plant submit the written reports required by the subject sections In accordance with the procedures described in I 50.73(b).The criteria contained in the subject sections which define a reportable event have not been modified.Similar changes are also planned as part of curent activities to make more substantive changes to Part 21.I 50.55(e).
and 1 73.71.Nonconservative Interdependence Several commenters expressed difficulty in understanding the meaning of the phrase "nonconservative interdependence" as used in the proposed I 50.73(a)13).
The wording of I 50.73(a)(3) (I 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
of this final rule) has been changed to eliminate the phrase "non conservative interdependence" by specifically defining the types of events that should be reported.
The revised paragraph does not, however, change the intent of the original paragraph.
Sabotage and Threats of Violence Several commenters noted that the security-related reporting requirements of I 50.73(a)(B) (I 50.73(a)(2)(lii)
of this final rule)) were already contained In greater detail in 10 CFR 73.71. For Instance, 1 73.71 requires an act of sabotage to be reported Immediately, followed by a written report within 15 days. The proposed rule would have required an LER to be filed within 30 days. Although distribution of reports is somewhat different, redundant reporting Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 1-44 Tuesday, July 26. 1983 / Rules and Regulations
338,53 would have occurred.
The commenters recommended that the Commission ensure consistency between if 50.73 and 73.71.In response to these comments the Commission has deleted the reporting of sabotage and threats of violence from 1 50.73 because these situations are adequately covered by the reporting requirements contained in i 73.71.Evacuation of Rooms or Buildings Many commenters stated that the reporting of in-plant releases of radioactivity that require evacuation of individual rooms (l 50.73(a)(7)
in the proposed rule or (1 50.73(a)(2)(x)
of this final rule) was inconsistent with the general thrust of the rule to require reporting of significant events. They noted that minor spills, small gaseous waste releases, or the disturbance of contaminated particulate matter (e.g., dust) may all require the temporary evacuation of individual rooms until the airborne concentrations decrease or until respiratory protection devices are utilized.
They noted that these events are fairly common and should not be reportable unless the required evacuation affects the entire facility or a major portion thereof.In response to these comments the wording of this criterion
(1 50.73(a)(2)(x)
in the final rule) has been changed to significantly narrow the scope of the criterion to include only those events which significantly hamper the ability of site personnel to perform safety-related activities (e.g., evacuation of the main control room).Energy Industry Identification System Many commenters noted that the requirement to report the Energy Industry Identification System (EUS)component function identifier and system name of each component or system referred tG in the LER description would be a significant burden on the licensee.They suggested instead that the NPRDS component Identifiers be used in place of the EMIS component identifiers which are not yet widely used by the industry.The Commission continues to believe that EIS system names and component function identifiers are needed in order that LERs from different plants can be compared.
We do not., however, suggest that the EIIS identifiers be used throughout the plant, but only that they be added to the LER as it is written. A simple, inexpensive table could be used -to translate plant identifiers into equivalent EIIS identifiers.
The Commission considered the system and component identifiers used in NPRDS as an alternative.
It is our understanding, however, the NPRDS will soon adopt the EUS system titles, so a distinction should no longer exist. In addition.
LERs frequently include systems that are not included ih the scope of NPRDS (i.e.. an NPRDS system identification does not exist) while EUS, on the other hand. includes all of the systems commonly found in commercial nuclear power plants. Further, NPRDS includes only 39 component identifiers (e.g.. valve, pump). The Commission believes that this limited number does not provide a sufficiently detailed description of the component function involved.Function of Failed Components and Status of Redundant Components Many commenters said that information required in (I 50.73(b)(2) (vi)and (vii) of the proposed rule should not be a requirement in the LER. They argued that this information is readily available in documents previously submitted to the NRC by licensees and are available for reference.
The final rule (§ 50.73(b)(2)(i](G))
has been modified to narrow the scope of the information requested by the Commission.
While this general information may be available in licensee documents previously submitted to the NRC. the Commission believes that a general understanding of the event and its significance should be possible without reference to additional documentation which may not be readily or widely available.
particularly to the public.The Commission continues to believe that the licensee should prepare an LER in sufficient depth so that knowledgeable readers who are conversant with the design of commercial nuclear power plants, but are not familiar with the details of a particularplant.
can understand the general characteristics of the event (e.g..the cause. the significance, the corrective action). As suggested by the commenters, more detailed information to support engineering evaluations and case studies will be obtained.
as needed. directly from the previously submitted licensee documents.
Engineering Evaluationsr The overview discussion of the proposed rule contains the following statement: "If the NRC staff decides that the event was especially significant from the standpoint of safety. the staff may request that the licensee perform an engineering evaluation of the event and describe the results of that evaluation." Several commenters argued that the inclusion of the requirement that the licensee perform an engineering evaluation of certain events at the staff's request appeared unjustified and would add substantially to the burden of reporting.
They argued that the licensee should be required to submit only the specific additional information required for the necessary engineering evaluation rather than to perform the evaluation.
The rule has been modified to require only the submittal of any necessary additional information requested by the Commission in writing.IV. Specific Findings Overview of the LER System When this final LER rule becomes effective, the LER will be a detailed narrative description of potentially significant safety events. By describing in detail the event and the planned corrective action, it will provide the basis for the careful study of events or conditions that might lead to serious accidents.
If the NRC staff decides that the event was especially significant from the standpoint of safety, the staff may request that the licensee provide additional information and data associated with the event.The licensee will prepare an LER for those events or conditions that meet one or more of the criteria contained in I 50.73(a).
The criteria are based primarily on the nature, course, and consequences of the event. Therefore.
the final LER rule requires that events which meet the criteria are to be reported regardless of the plant operating mode or power level, and regardless of the safety significance of the components, systems. or structures involved.
In trying to develop criteria for the identification of events reportable as LERs, the Commission has concentrated on the potential consequences of the event as the measure of significance.
Therefore, the reporting criteria, in generaL do not specifically address classes of initiating events or causes of the event. For example, there is no requirement that all personnel errors be reported.
However, many reportable events will involve or have been initiated by personnel errors.Finally, it should be noted that licensees are permitted and encouraged to report any event that does not meet the criteria contained in 1 50.73(a), if the licensee believes that the event might be of safety significance, or of generic interest or concern. Reporting requirements aside, assurance of safe operation of all plants depends on accurate and complete reporting by each
33654 Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 144 / Tuesday, July 28, 1983 / Rules and Regulations licensee of all events having potential safety significance.
Paragraph- by-Parogroph Explanotion of the LEA Rule The significant provisions of the final LER rule are explained below. The explanation follows the order in the proposed rule.Paragraph
50.73(a)(2J(lv) (proposed paragraph
50.73(a)(1))
requires reporting of: "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), Including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported." This paragraph requires events to be reported whenever an ESF actuates either manually or automatically, regardless of plant status. It is based on the premise that the ESFa are provided to mitigate the consequences of a ignificant event and, therefore:
(1) They should work properly when called upon, and (2) they should not be challenged frequently or unnecessarily.
The Commission is interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the consequences (whether or not the equipment performed properly)
and events where an ESF operated unnecessarily."Actuation" of multichannel ESF Actuation Systems is defined as actuation of enough channels to complete the minimum actuation logic (i.e., activation of sufficient channels to cause activation of the ESF Actuation System), Therefore, single channel actuations, whether caused by failures or otherwise, are not reportable if they do not complete the minimum actuation logic.Operation of an ESF as part of a planned operational procedure or test (e.g., startup testing) need not be reported.
However, if during the planned operating procedure or test, the ESF actuates in a way that is not part of the planned procedure, that actuation must be reported.
For example, if the normal reactor shutdown procedure requires that the control rods be inserted by a manual reactor trip, the reactor trip need not be reported.
However, if conditions develop during the shutdown that require an automatic reactor trip, such a reactor trip must be reported.The fact that the safety analysis assumes that an ESF will actuate automatically during certain plant conditions does not eliminate the need to report that actuation.
Actuations that need not be reported are those initiated for reasons other than to mitigate the consequences of an event (e.g., at the discretion of the licenses ad part of a planned procedure or evolution).
Sections 50.73(a)(2) (v) and (vi)(proposed I 50.73(aJ(2)J
require reporting of:* * * * *(v) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (AJ Shut down the reactor and maintain It in a safe shutdown condition;(B) Remove residual heat, (C) Control the release of radioactive material;
or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.(vi) Events covered in paragraph (a)(2)(v)of this section may include one or more personnel errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies.
However, individual component failures need not be reported pursuant to this paragraph if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and available to perform the required safety function.The wording of this paragraph has been changed from the proposed rule to make it easier to read. The intent and scope of the paragraph have not been changed.The intent of this paragraph is to capture those events where there would have been a failure of a safety system to properly complete a safety function, regardless of when the failures were discovered or whether the system was needed at the time.This paragraph is also based on the assumption that safety-related systems and structures are intended to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
While I 50.73(a)(2)(iv)
of this final rule applies to actual actuations of an ESF, I 50.73(a)(2)(v)
of this final rule covers an event or condition where redundant structures, components, or trains of a safety system could have failed to perform their intended function because of: one or more personnel errors, including procedure violations;
equipment failures;
or design, analysis, fabrication, construction, or procedural deficiencies.
The event must be reported regardless of the situation or condition that caused thestructure or systems to be unavailable, and regardless of whether or not an alternate safety system could have been used to perform the safety function (e.g.. High Pressure Core Cooling failed, but feed-and-bleed or Low Pressure Core Cooling were available'to provide the safety function of,,core cooling).The applicability of this paragraph includes those safety systems designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (eg., containment Isolation, emergency filtration).
Hence, minor operational events Involving a specific component Such as valve packing leaks, which could be considerd a lack of control of radioactive material, should not be reported under this paragraph.
System leaks or other similar events may, however, be reportable under other paragraphs.
It should be noted that there are a limited number of single-train systems that perform safety functions (e.g.. the High Pressure Coolant Injection System in BWRs). For such systems, loss of the single train would prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of that system and, therefore, must be reported even though the plant Technical Specifications may allow such a condition to exist for a specified limited length of time.It should also be noted that, if a potentially serious human error is made that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, but recovery factors resulted in the error being corrected, the error Is still reportable.
The Commission recognizes that the application of this and other paragraphs of this section involves the use of engineering judgment on the part of licensees.
In this case, a technical judgment must be made whether a failure or operator action that did actually disable one train of a safety system, could have, but did not, affect a redundant train within the ESF system.If so, this would constitute an event that"could have prevented" the fulfillment of a safety function, and, accordingly, must be reported.If a component fails by an apparently random mechanism it may or may not be reportable if the functionally redundant component could fail by the same mechanism.
Reporting is required if the failure constitutes a condition where there is reasonable doubt that the functionally redundant train or channel would remain operational until it completed its safety function or is repaired.
For example, if a pump in one train of an ESF system fails because of improper lubrication, and engineering judgment indicates that there is a reasonable expectation that the functionally redundant pump in the other train, which was also improperly lubricated.
would have also failed before it completed its safety function, then the actual failure is reportable and the potential failure of the functionally redundant pump must be discussed in the LER.For safety systems that include three or more trains, the failure qf two or more trains should be reported if, in the Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 144 / Tuesday, July 26, 1983 / Rules and Regulations
33855 judgement of the licensee, the functional capability of the overall system was jeopardized.
Interaction between systems: particularly a safety system and a non-safety system, is also included in this criterion.
For example, the Commission is increasingly concerned about the effect of a loss or degradation of what had been assumed to be non-essential inputs to safety systems. Therefore, this paragraph also includes those cases where a service (e.g.. heating.ventilation, and cooling) or input (e.g., compressed air) which is necessary for reliable or long-term operation of a safety system is lost or degraded.
Such loss or degradation is reportable if the proper fulfillment of the safety function is not cannot be assured. Failures that affect inputs or services to systems that have no safety function need not be reported.Finally the Commission recognizes that the licensee may also use engineering judgment to decide when personnel actions could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
For example, when an individual improperly operates or maintains a component, he might conceivably have made the same error for all of the functionally redundant components (e.g., if he incorrectly calibrates one bistable amplifier in the Reactor Protection System, he could conceivably incorrectly calibrate all bistable amplifiers).
However, for an event to be reportable it is necessary that the actions actually affect or involve components in more than one train or channel of a safety system, and the result of the actions must be undesirable from the perspective of protecting the health and safety of the public. The components can be functionally redundant (e.g., two pumps in different trains) or not functionally redundant (e.g.. the operator correctly stops a pump in Train "A' and, instead of shutting the pump discharge valve in Train "A." he mistakenly shuts the pump discharge valve in Train "B").Section 50.73(a)(2)(vii} (proposed§ 50.73(a)(3))
requires the reporting of: "Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems or two independent trains channels or to become inoperable in a system designed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat.(C) Control the release of radioactive material:
or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident." This paragraph has been changed to clarify the intent of the phrase,"nonconservative interdependence."'
Numerous comment letters expressed difficulty in understanding what-this phrase meant; so the paragraph has been changed to be more specific.
The new paragraph is narrower in scope than the original paragraph because the term is specifically defined, but the basic intent is the same.This paragraph requires those events to be reported where a single cause produced a component or group of components to become inoperable in redundant or independent portions (i.e., trains or channels)
of one or more systems having a safety function.
These events can identify previously unrecognized common cause failures and systems interactions.
Such failures can be simultaneous failures which occur because of a single initiating cause (i.e.. the single cause or mechanism serves as a common input to the failures):
or the failures can be sequential (i.e., cascade failures), such as the case where a single component failure results in the failure of one or more additional components.
To be repotable, however, the event or failure must result in or involve the failure of independent portions of more than one train or channel in the same or different systems. For example, if a cause or condition caused components in Train "A" and "B" of a single system to become inoperable.
even if additional trains (e.g., Train."C")
were still available, the event must be reported.
In addition, if the cause or condition caused components in Train "A' of one system and in Train "B" of another system (i.e., a train that is assumed in the safety analysis to be independent)
to become inoperable, the event must be reported.
However, if a cause or condition caused components in Train"A" of one system and Train "A" of another system (i.e., trains that are not assumed in the safety analysis to be independent), the event need not be reported unless it meets one or more of the other criteria in this section.In addition, this paragraph does not include those cases where one train of a system or a component was removed from service as part of a planned evolution, in accordance with an approved procedure, and in accordance with the plant's Technical Specifications.
For example, if the licensee removes part of a system from service to perform maintenance, and the Technical Specifications permit the resulting configuration, and the system or component is returned to service within the time limit specified in the Technical Specifications.
the action need not be reported under this paragraph.
However, if, while the train or component is out of service. the licensee identifies a condition that could have prevented the whole system from performing its intended function (e.g., the licensee finds a set of relays that Is wired incorrectly), that condition must be reported.Section 50.73(a)(z)(i) (proposed£ 50.73(a)(4))
requires reporting of: "(A) The completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications or -"(B) Any operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications:
or"(C) Any deviation from the plant's Technical Specifications authorized pursuant to I 50.54(x) of this part." This paragraph has been reworded to more clearly define the events that must be reported.
In addition, the scope has been changed to require the reporting of events or conditions "prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications" rather than events where "a plant Technical Specification Action Statement is not met" This change accommodates plants that do not have requirements that are specifically defined as Action Statements.
This paragraph now requires events to be reported where the licensee is required to shut down the plant because the requirements of the-Technical Specifications were not met. For the purpose of this paragraph. "shutdown:'
is defined as the point in time where the* Technical Specifications require that the plant be in the first shutdown condition required by a Limiting Condition for Operation (e.g- hot standby (Mode 3) for PWRa with the Standard Technical Specifications).
If the condition is corrected before the time limit for being shut down (Leo, before completion of the shutdown), the event need not be reported.In addition.
If a condition that was prohibited by the Technical Specifications existed for a period of time longer than that permitted by the Technical Specifications, it must be reported even if the condition was not discovered until after the allowable time had elapsed and the condition was rectified immediately after discovery.
Section 50.73(a)(2)(ii) (proposed I 50.73(a)(5))
requires reporting of: "Any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers.being seriously degraded, or that resulted in the nuclear power plant being:
Fdrlu' al 12Iaclatar I Vnl. lB. No. 144 / Tuesday. July 28. 1983 / Rules and Regulationl GGARRA WWWWW ., ---- _- ---- --- , ---.I .------ __ -____"(A) In an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromised plant safety: "(3) In a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant; or'(C) In a condition not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures." This paragraph requires events to be reported where the plant, including Its principal safety barriers.
was seriously degraded or in an unanalyzed condition.
For example, small voids in systems designed to remove heat from the reactor core which have been previously shown through analysis not to be safety significant need not be reported.However, the accumulation of voids that could inhibit the ability to adequately remove heat from the reactor core, particularly under natural circulation conditions, would constitute an unanalyzed condition and must be reported.
In addition.
voiding in instrument lines that results in an erroneous indication causing the operator to significantly misunderstand the true condition of the plant is also an unanalyzed condition and must be reported.The Commission recognizes that the licensee may use engineering judgment and experience to determine whether an unanalyzed condition existed. It is not intended that this paragraph apply to minor variations in individual parameters, or to problems concerning single pieces of equipment.
For example, at any time, one or more safety-related components maj be out of service due to testing, maintenance, or a fault that has not yet been repaired.
Any trivial single failure or minor error in performing surveillance tests could produce a situation in which two or more often unrelated, safety-related components are out-of-service.
Technically, this is an unanalyzed condition.
However, these events should be reported only if they involve functionally related components or if they significantly compromise plant safety.Finally, this paragraph also includes material (e.g.. metallurgical, chemical)problems that cause abnormal degradation of the principal safety barriers (i.e.. the fuel cladding.
reactor coolant system pressure boundary, or the containment).
Additional examples of situations included in this paragraph are: (a) Fuel cladding failures in the reactor or in the storage pool, that exceed expected values, that are unique or widespread.
or that resulted from unexpected factors.(b) Reactor coolant radioactivity levels that exceeded Technical Specification limits for iodine spikes or.radioactivity levels Als BWR air ejector monitor that exceeded the Technical Speclication'
limits.(o) Cracks and breaks in piping, the reactor vessel, or major components in the primary coolant circuit that have safety relevance (steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, valves, etc.)(d) Significant welding or material defects in the primary coolant system.(e) Serious temperature or pressure transients (e.g.. transients that violate the plant's Technical Specifications).(I) Loss of relief and/Ior safety valve operability during test or operation (such that the number of operable valves or man-way closures is less than required by the Technical Specifications).(gi Loss of containment function or integrity (e:p., containment leakage rates exceeding the authorized limits).Section 50.73(a)(2)(iii) (proposed I 50.73(a)(3))
requires reporting of: "Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that posed aft actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant." This paragraph has been reworded to make it clear that it applies only to acts of nature (e.g., tornadoes)
and external hazards (e.g., railroad tank car explosion).
References to acts of sabotage have been removed because they are covered by 1 73.71. In addition, threats to personnel from internal hazards (e.g.. radioactivity releases)
are now covered by a separate paragraph (I 50.73(a)(2)(x)).
This paragraph requires those events to be reported where there is an actual threat to the plant from an external condition or natural phenomenon, and where the threat or damage challenges the ability of the plant to continue to operate in a safe manner (including the orderly shutdown and maintenance of shutdown conditions).
The licensee is to decide if a phenomenon or condition actually threatened the plant. For example, a minor brush fire in a remote area of the site that was quickly controlled by fire fighting personnel and, as a result, did not present a threat to the plant need not be reported.
However, a major forest fire, large-scale flood, or major earthquake that presents a clear threat to the plant must be reported.
Industrial or transportation accidents that octurred near the site and created a plant safety concern must also be reported.Section 50.73(a)(2)(x) (proposedl 50.73(a)(7))
requires reporting of: "Any event that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or siguificantly hampered sits personnel In the performance of duties necessary for the sate operation of the nuclear power plant including fires, toxic gas releaseso or radioactive releases." This paragraph has been reworded to Include physical hazards (internal to the plant) to personnel (e~g.. electrical firesn.In addition, In response to numerous comments, the scope has been narrowed so that the hazard must hamper the ability of site personnel to perform safety-related activities affecting plant safety.In-plant releases must be reported if they require evacuation of rooms or buildings containing systems important to safety and, as a result, the ability of the operators to perform necessary safety functions is significantly hampered.
Precautionary evacuations of rooms and buildings that subsequent evaluation determines were not required need not be reported.Proposed I 50.73(a)(8)
was Intended to capture an event that involved a controlled release of a significant amount of radioactive material to offsite areas. In addition, "significant" was based on the plant's Technical Specification limits for the release of radioactive material.
However, this section has been deleted because the reporting of these events is already required by I 50.73(a)(2)(1)
and I 20.405.Section 50.73(a)(2) (viii) and (ix)(proposed I 50.73(a)(9)]
require reporting of:* * * *(vili)(A)
Any airborne radioactivity release that exceeded 2 times the applicable concentrations of the limits specified in Table II of Appendix B to Part 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas, when averaged over a time period of one hour.(B) Any liquid effluent release that exceeded 2 times the limiting combined Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC)(see Note I of Appendix B to Part 20 of this chapter) at the point of entry into the receiving water (i.e., unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except tritium and dissolved noble gases, when averaged over a time period of one hour.(ix) Reports submitted to the Commission In accordance with paragraph (a)(2)(vill)
of this section also meet the effluent release reporting requirements of paragraph 20.405(a)(5)
of Part 20 of this chapter.* * *
- 0 Paragraph (viii) has been changed to clarify the requirements to report releases of radioactive material.
The paragraph is similar to § 20.405 but places a lower threshold for reporting events at commercial power reactors.The lower threshold is based on the significance of the breakdown of the Federal Register / V il. 48, No. 144 / Tuesday. July 25,1983 / Rules and Regulations
33857_ _ _licensee's program necessary to have a release of this size, rather than on the significance of the impact of the actual release.Reports of events covered by§ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
are to be made in lieu of reporting noble gas releases that exceed 10 times the instantaneous release rate, without averaging over a time period, as implied by the requirement of 5 20.405(a)(5).
Paragraph
50.73(b) describes the format and content of the LER. It requires that the licensee prepare the LER in sufficient depth so that knowledgeable readers conversant with the design of commercial nuclear power plants, but not familiar with the details of a particular plant, can understand the complete event (i.e., the cause of the event, the plant status before the event, and the sequence of occurrences during the event).Paragraph
50.73(b)(1)
requires that the licensee provide a brief abstract describing the major occurrences during the event, including all actual component or system failures that contributed to the event, all relevant operator errors or violations of procedures, and any significant corrective action taken or planned as a result of the event. This paragraph is needed to give LER data base users a brief description of the event in order to identify events of interest.Paragraph
50.73(b)(2)
requires that the licensee include in the LER a clear, specific narrative statement of exactly what happened during the entire event so that readers not familiar with the details of a particular plant can understand the event The licensee should emphasize how systems, components.
and operating personnel performed.
Specific hardware problems should not be covered in excessive detail. Characteristics of a plant that are unique and that influenced the event (favorably or unfavorably]
must be described.
The narrative must also describe the event from the perspective of the operator (e.g.. what the operator saw, did, perceived, understood, or misunderstood).
Paragraph
50.73(b)(3)
requires that the LER include a summary assessment of the actual and potential safety consequences and implications of the event. This assessment may be based on the conditions existing at the time of the event. The evaluation must be carried out to the extent necessary to fully assess the safety consequences and safety margins associated with the event. An assessment of the event under alternative conditions must be included if the incident would have been more severe (e.g., the plant would have been in a condition not analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report) under reasonable and credible alternative conditions, such as power level or operating mode. For example.'if an event occurred while the plant was at 15% power and the same'event could have occurred while the plant was at 100% power, and, as a result, the consequences would have been considerably more serious, the licensee must assess and report those consequences.
Paragraph
50.73(b)(4)
requires that the licensee describe in the LER any corrective actions planned as a result of the event that are known at the time the LER is submitted, including actions to reduce the probability of similar events occurring in the future. After the initial LER is submitted only substantial changes in the corrective action need be reported as a supplemental LER.Paragraph
50.73(c) authorizes the NRC staff to require the licensee to submit specific supplemental information beyond that required by § 50.73(b).
Such information may be required if the staff finds that supplemental material is necessary for complete understanding of an unusually complex or significant event. Such requests for supplemental information must be made in writing.and the licensee must submit the requested information as a supplement to the initial LER within a time period mutually agreed upon by the NRC staff and the licensee.Paragraph
50.73(f) gives the NRC's Executive Director for Operations the authority to grant case-by-case exemptions to the reporting requirements contained in the LER system. This exemption could be used to limit the collection of certain data in those cases where full participation would be unduly difficult because of a plant's unique design or circumstances.
Paragraph
50.73(g) states that the reporting requirements contained in 5 50.73 replace the reporting requirements in all nuclear power plant Technical Specifications that are typically associated with Reportable Occurrences.
The reporting requirements superseded by £ 50.73 are those contained in the Technical Specification sections that are usually titled "Prompt Notification with Written Followup" (Section 6.9.1.8) and "Thirty Day Written Reports" (Section 6.9.1.9).
The reporting requirements that have been superseded are also described in Regulatory Guide 1.16. Revision 4, "Reporting of Operating Information-Appendix A Technical Specification," Paragraph
2, "Reportable Occurrences." The special report typically described in Section 6.9.2"Special Reports" of the Technical Specifications are still required.V. Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis for this final rule.The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission.
A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspection and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room. 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington.
D.C. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Frederick J. Hebon. Chief, Program Technology Branch, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
D.C. 20555: Telephone
(301)492-4480.VI.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has submitted this rule to the Office of Management and Budget for such review as may be appropriate under the Paperwork Reduction Act. Pub. L 90-511. The date on which the reporting requirements of this rule become effective reflects inclusion of the 60-day period which the Act allows for such review.VII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
This final rule affects electric utilities that are dominant in their respective service areas and that own and operate nuclear utilization facilities licensed under sections 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The amendments clarify and modify presently existing notification requirements.
Accordingly, there is no new, significant economic impact on these licensees, nor do these licensees fall within the scope of the definition of"small entities" set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Business Size Standards set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.List of Subjects 10 CFR Part 20 Licensed material, Nuclear power plants and reactors.
Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
10 CFR PAR TS 50 Incorporation by reference, Antitrust, Classified information, Fire protection.
33OSS Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 144 I Tuesday, July 26, 1983 / Rules and Regulations Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation prote+/-tion, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50 are published as a document subject to codification.
PART 50-DOMESTIC
LICENSING
OF PRODUCTION
AND UTILIZATION
FACIUTIES 1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows: Authority:
Sacs. 103,104. 1, 182.183.188.
189, 61 Stat. 938, 937. 948, 953, 954, 95. 958 as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244. as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133. 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2238, 2239. 2282); sacs. 201 202. 206.8 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1248. as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5848). unless otherwise noted.Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L 95-.602, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851].Sections 50.58. 50.91 and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C.2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec.122, O8 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184. 68 Stat.854, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50-102 also issued under sec. 18S. 58 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2238).For the purposes of sec. 223. 58 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 7273). it 50.10 (a). (b), and (c), 50.44. 50.4e. 50.48. 50.54, and 50.30(a)are issued under sec. ebib, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b));
II 50.10( b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 16i. 88 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i));
and 1I 50.55(e).
50.59(b).
50.70, 50.71, 50.72. and 50.78 are issued under sec. 151o, 68 Stat. 950.as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).2. A new 1 50.73 is added to read as follows: I 50.73 Ucenso event report systemL (a) Reportable events. (1) The holder of an operating license for a nuclear power plant (licensee)
shall submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) for any event of the type described in this paragraph within 30 days after the discovery of the event. Unless otherwise specified in this section, the licensee shall report an event regardless of the plant mode or power level, and regardless of the significance of the structure, system, or component that initiated the event.(2) The licensee shall report: (i)(A) The completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications, or (B) Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications;
or (C] Any deviation from the plant's Technical Specifications authorized pursuant to I 50.54(x) of this part.(ii) Any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded, or that resulted in the nuclear power plant being: IA) In an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromised plant safety;pD) In a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant; or (C) In a condition not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.(iii) Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.(iv) Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineired Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported.(v) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition;(B) Remove residual heat (C) Control the release of radioactive material;
or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.(vi) Events covered in paragraph (a)(2)(v)
of this section may include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design.analysis, fabrication, construction.
and/or procedural inadequacies.
However, individual component failures need not be reported pursuant to this paragraph if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and available to perform the required safety function.(vii) Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed 'to: (AJ Shut down the reactor and maiutain it in aesafe shutdown condition;(Bj Remove residual heat;(C) Control the release of radioactive material;
or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.(viii)(A)
Any airborne radioactivity release that exceeded 2 times the applicable concentrations of the limits specified in Appendix B. Table 1 of Part 20 of this chapter in unrestricted areas.when averaged over a time period of one hour.(B) Any liquid effluent release that exceeded 2 times the limiting combined Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) (see Note 1 of Appendix B to Part 20 of this chapter) at the point of entry.into the receiving water (i.e., unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except tritium and dissolved noble gases, when averaged over a time period of one hour.(ix) Reports submitted to the Commission in accordance with paragraph (a)(2)(viii)
of this section also meet the effluent release reporting requirements of paragraph
20.405(a)(5)
of Part 20 of this chapter.(x) Any event that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant including fires, toxic gas releases, or radioactive releases.(b) Contents.
The Licensee Event Report shall contain: (1) A brief abstract describing the major occurrences during the event, including all component or system failures that contributed to the event and significant corrective action taken or planned to prevent recurrence.
(2)(i) A clear, specific, narrative description of what occurred so that knowledgeable readers conversant with the design of commercial nuclear power plants, but not familiar with the details of a particular plant, can understand the complete event.(ii) The narrative description must include the following specific information as appropriate for the particular event: (A) Plant operating conditions before the event.(B) Status of structures, components.
or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event and that contributed to the event.(C) Dates and approximate times of occurrences.(D) The cause of each component or system failure or personnel error, if known.(E) The failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component.
if known.(F) The Energy Industry Identification System component function identifier Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 144 / Tuesday. July 26. 1983 / Rules and Regulations
339 338-59 and system name of each component or system referred to in the LER.(1) The Energy Industry Identification System is defined in: IEEE Std 803-1983 (May 16, 1983) Recommended Practices for Unique Identification Plants and Related Facilities-Principles and Definitions.
(2) IEEE Std 803-1983 has been approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register.A notice of any changes made to the material incorporated by reference will be published in the Federal Register.Copies may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 345 East 47th Street. New York, NY 10017. A copy is available for inspection and copying for a fee at the Commission's Public Document Room.1717 H Street, NW'., Washington.
D.C.and at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L St. NW.. Washington.
D.C.(G) For failures of components with multiple functions, include a list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected.(H) For failure that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, an estimate of the elapsed time from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service.(I) The method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error.O)(1) Operator actions that affected the course of the event, including operator errors, procedural deficiencies, or both, that contributed to the evenL (2) For each personnel error, the licensee shall discuss: (i) Whether the error was a cognitive error (e.g., failure to recognize the actual plant condition, failure to realize which systems should be functioning, failure to recognize the true nature of the event) or a procedural error.(ii) Whether the error was contrary to an approved procedure, was a direct result of an error in an approved procedure, or was associated with an activity or task that was not covered by an approved procedure: (iii) Any unusual characteristics of the work location (e.g., heat, noise) that directly'contributed to the error, and (iv) The type of personnel involved (i.e., contractor personnel, utility-licensed operator.
utility nonlicensed operator, other utility personnel).(K) Automatically and manually initiated safety system responses.(L) The manufacturer and model number (or other identification)
of each component that failed during the event.(3) An assessment of the safety consequences and Implications of the event. This assessment must include the availability of other systems or components that could have performed the same function as the components and systems that failed during the event.(4) A description of any corrective actions planned as a result of the evernt including those to reduce the probability of similar events occurring in the Ruture.( 15) Reference to any previous similar events at the sameplant that are known to the licensee.(6) The name and telephone number of a person within the licensee's organization who is knowledgeable about the event and can provide additional information concerning the event and the plant's characteristics.(c) Supplemental information.
The Commission may require the licensee to sdbmit specific additional information beyond that required by paragraph (b)of this section if the Commission finds that supplemental material is necessary for complete understanding of an unusually complex or significant event.These requests for supplemental information will be made in writing and the licensee shall submit the requested information as a supplement to the initial LER.(d) Submission of reports. Licensee Event Reports must be prepared on Form NRC 366 and submitted within 30 days of discovery of a reportable event or situation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk. Washington, D.C. 20555.The licensee shall also submit an additional copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix A to Part 73 of this chapter.(e) Report legibility.
The reports and copies that licensees are required to submit to the Commission under the provisions of this section must be of sufficient quality to permit legible reproduction and micrographic processing.(f) Exemptions.
Upon written request from a licensee including adequate justification or at the initiation of the NRC staff, the NRC Executive Director for Operations may, by a letter to the licensee, grant exemptions to the reporting requirements under this.section.(g) Reportable occurrences.
The requirements contained in this section replace all existing requirements for licensees to report "Reportable Occurrences" as defined in individual plant Technical Specifications.
The following additional amendments are also made to Parts 20 and 50 of the regulations in this chapter.PART 20-STANDARDS
FOR PROTECTION
AGAINST RADIATION 3. In 520.402, paragraph (a) is revised;the introductory text of paragraph (b) is revised; and a new'paragraph (e) is added to read as follows: 120.402 Reports of thet or los of Ncensed matertaL (a)(1) Each licensee shall report to the Commission, by telephone, immediately after it determines that a loss or theft of licensed material has occurred in such quantities and under such circumstances that it appears to the licensee that a substantial hazard may result to persons in unrestricted areas.(2) Reports must be made as follows: (i) Licensees having an installed Emergency Notification System shall make the reports to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with I 50.72 of this chapter.(ii) All other licensees shall make reports to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix D of this part.(b) Each licensee who makes a report under paragraph (a) of this section shall.withing 30 days after learning of the loss or theft, make a report in writing to the US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control pesk. Washington.
D.C. 20555. with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix D of this part. The report shall include the following information:
- *
- 0 *(e) For holders of an operating license for a nuclear power plant. the events included in paragraph (b) of this section must be reported in accordance with the procedures described in £ 50.73 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (g) of this chapter and must include the information required in paragraph (b) of this section. Events reported in accordance with 1 50.73 of this chapter need not be reported by a duplicate report under paragraph (b) of this section.4. In 1 20.403, the introductory text of paragraphs (a) and (b) is revised, and paragraph (d) is revised to read as follows:{ 20A403 Notiflcatons of khldent.(a) Immediate notification.
Each licensee shall Immediately report any events involving byproduct, source, or special nuclear material possessed by the licensee that may have caused or threatens to cause: 0 *
- 0 0 (b) Twenty-four hour notification.
Each licensee shall within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery of the event, report any event involving licensed material possessed
-- i-' ---I '-.- D Ir.. AO MAL 1LA I Tu~sday. July 28. 1983 I Rules and Regulations l 338G0 Federal R~egiaier jT V0&. -ut, -0-d *- I u by the licenses that may have caused or threatens to cause:* * * * *(d) Reports made by licensees in response to the requirements of this section must be made as follows: (1) Licensees that have an installed Emergency Notification System shall make the reports required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with I 50.72 of this chapter.(2) All other licensees shall make the reports required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section by telephone and by telegram.
mailgram, or facsimile to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix D of this part.S. In 1 20.405, paragraphs (a) and (c)are revised, and new paragraphs (d) and (a) are added to read as follows: 1 20.405 Rept of ovexposurm and excessIve laels asnd concentrations.(a)(1) In addition to any notification required by I 20.403 of this part. each licensee shall make a report in writing concerning any one of the following types of incidents within 30 days of its occurrence: (i) Each exposure of an individual to radiation in excess of the applicable limits in I I 20.10 or 20.104(a)
of this part, or the license;(ii) Each exposure of an individual to radioactive material in excess of the applicable limits in II 20.103(a)(1), 20.103(a)(2), or 20.104(b)
of this part, or in the license;(iii) Levels of radiation or concentrations of radioactive material in a restricted area in excess of any other applicable limit in the license;(iv) Any incident for which notification is required by 1 20.403 of this part; or (v) Levels of radiation or concentrations of radioactive material (whether or not involving excessive exposure of any individual)
in an unrestricted area in excess of ten times any applicable limit set forth in this part or in the license.(2) Each report required under paragraph (a)(1) of this section must describe the extent of exposure of individuals to radiation or to radioactive material.
including: (I) Estimates of each individual's exposure as required by paragraph (b)of this section: (ii) Levels of radiation and concentrations of radioactive material involved;(iii) The cause of the exposure, levels or concentrations:
and (iv) Corrective steps taken or planned to prevent a recurrence.
- * * * *(c)(1) In addition to any notification required by 1 20.403 of this part, each licensee shall make a report in writing of levels of radiation or releases of radioactive material in excess of limits specified by 40 CFR Part 190."Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations," or in excess of license conditions related to compliance with 40 CFR Part 190.(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (c)(1) of this section must describe: (I) The extent of exposure of Individuals to radiation or to radioactive material;(II) Levels of radiation and concentrations of radioactive material involved-(Ill) The cause of the exposure, levels, or concentrations;
and (iv) Corrective steps Taken or planned to assure against a recurrence, including the schedule for achieving conformance with 40 CFR Part 190 and with associated license conditions.(d) For holders of an operating license for a nuclear power plant. the incidents included in paragraphs (a) or (c) of this section must be reported in accordance with the procedures described in paragraphs
50.73 (b), (c), (d). (e), and (g)of this chapter and must also include the information required by paragraphs (a)and (c) of this section. Incidents reported in accordance with I 50.73 of this chapter need not be reported by a duplicate report under paragraphs (a) or (c) of this section.(e) All other licensees who make reports under paragraphs (a) or (c) of this section shall, within 30 days after learning of the overexposure or excessive level or concentration, make a report in writing to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix D of this part.PART 50-DOMESTIC
UCENSING OF PRODUCTION
AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
6. In I 50.38, new paragraphs (c)t5)and (7) are added to read as follows: 150.36 FechnIcal spectlcattons.(B) Initial Notification.
Reports made to the Commission by licensees in response to the requirements of this section must be made as follows;(I) Licensees that have an installed Emergency Notification System shall make the initial notification to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 150.72 of this part.(Ii) All other licensees shall make the initial notification by telephone to the Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office listed in Appendix D, Part 20, of this chapter.(7) Written reports. Holders of an operating license for a nuclear power plant shall submit a written report to the Commission concerning the incidents Included In paragraphs (c) (1) and (2) of this section In accordance with the procedures described in 1 50.73 (b), (c), (d), (a), and (g) of this part. Incidents reported in accordance with 150.73 of this part need not also be reported under paragraphs (c) (1) or (2) of this section.Dated at Washington.
D.C. this 20th day of July 1983.For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. ChIlk, Secretary of the Commission.
JFR Do= SW l 7-2- :45 aml BILUNG CODS 759041t-DEPARTMENT
OF THE TREASURY Customs Service 19 CFR Part 134 (T.D. 83-1551 Customs Regulations Amendments Relating to Country of Origin Marking AGENCY: Customs Service, Treasury.ACTiON: Final rule.SUMMARY: This document amends the Customs Regulations to establish certification requirements for importers with respect to the country of origin marking of certain articles repacked in the United States after release from Customs custody. This change requires importers to certify to the district director having custody of the articles that: (a) If the importer does the repacking.
the new container must be marked in accordance with applicable law and regulations;
or (b) if the article is sold or transferred, the importer must notify the subsequent purchaser or repacker, in writing, at the time of sale or transfer, that any repacking of the article must conform to the marking requirements.
The purpose of this change is to ensure that an ultimate purchaser in the Unitea States is aware of the country of origin of the imported article.EFFECTtIE
OATE: October 24.1983.