IR 05000321/2005005

IR 05000321-05-005, 05000366-05-005; 10/01/2005-12/31/2005; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2, Quarterly Integrated Report

ML060240023
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	01/24/2006
From:	Widmann M NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To:	Sumner H Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-05-005
Download: ML060240023 (23)

Text

January 24, 2006Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.ATTN: Mr. H. L. SumnerVice President - Hatch ProjectP. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295SUBJECT:EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTIONREPORT 05000321/2005005 AND 05000366/2005005

Dear Mr. Sumner:

On December 31, 2005, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 5, 2006, with Mr. George Frederick and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of theNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/Malcolm T. Widmann, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos. 50-321, 50-366License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000321/2005005 and 05000366/2005005 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION IIDocket Nos.:50-321, 50-366 License Nos.:DPR-57 and NPF-5 Report Nos.:05000321/2005005 and 05000366/2005005 Licensee:Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility:Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Location:P.O. Box 2010Baxley, Georgia 31515Dates:October 1, 2005 - December 31, 2005 Inspectors:D. Simpkins, Senior (Sr.) Resident InspectorJ. Hickey, Resident Inspector M. Maymi, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R07)

L. Miller, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP1 and 1EP4)

J. Kreh, Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP1 and 4OA1)

G. MacDonald, Sr. Project Engineer (Sections 1R12 and 4OA2.2)

G. Kuzo, Sr. Health Physicist (Section 4OA5)AccompanyingPersonnel:R. Lewis, Reactor InspectorApproved by:Malcolm T. Widmann, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321/2005-005, 05000366/2005-005; 10/01/2005-12/31/2005; Edwin I. Hatch NuclearPlant, Units 1 and 2, quarterly integrated report.The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, a reactorinspector, a project engineer, a health physicist and emergency preparedness inspectors. The

NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors isdescribed in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July, 2000.A.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

None Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant StatusUnit 1 began the inspection period at approximately 95% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) due toan isolated Moisture/Separator Reheater 2 nd stage. The unit was returned to 100% RTP onOctober 10. On October 29, a main transformer fire resulted in a unit shutdown. The unit 1 was returned to service on November 15. Operation was restricted to about 86% RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.Unit 2 operated at or near 100% RTP during the inspection period, except for a brief loadreduction to 85% RTP due to a condensate pump motor cooling water leak.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weathera.Inspection ScopeSeasonal Readiness Review. The inspectors performed a seasonal review of licenseecold weather preparations. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures DI-OPS-36-0989, Cold Weather Checks, 52PM-MEL-005-0, Cold Weather C hecks, and walkeddown the completed portions of the procedures. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the Technical Specifications (TS), Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and drawings H-13395, H-23395 and H-24193 to verify the following three systems would remainoperable during peak low temperature winter months.*Fire Protection*Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)

• Unit 2 EDGsImminent Adverse Weather. The inspectors also reviewed licensee actions in responseto an electrical storm with high winds on December 5. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 34AB-Y22-002-0, Abnormal Phenomena, and walked down external plant areas to ensure debris and loose materials were controlled to limit missile hazards, especially near switchyards and safety-related equipment.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

2Enclosure1R04Equipment Alignmenta.Inspection ScopePartial Walkdowns. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following threesystems when the opposite trains were removed from service. The inspectors checkedsystem valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions toevaluate the operability of the opposite trains or components by comparing the positionlisted in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed arelisted in the Attachment.*EDGs 1A and 2A during 1B EDG maintenance*1A train of Plant Service Water (PSW) during 1D PSW Pump maintenance

• 2A EDG during 2C EDG surveillanceComplete System Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of thefollowing system. The inspectors performed a detailed check of valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability ofthe redundant trains or components by comparing the required position in the systemoperating procedure to the actual position. The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed control room logs to verify that alignment and equipment discrepancies were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.*Unit 1 Control Rod Drive (CRD) Systemb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protectiona.Inspection ScopeFire Area Tours.

The inspectors toured the following 12 risk significant plant areas toassess the material condition of the fire protection and detection equipment, verify fire protection equipment was not obstructed, and that transient combustibles were properlycontrolled. The inspectors reviewed the Fire Hazards Analysis drawings H-11846 and H-11847 to verify that the necessary fire fighting equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment, were in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.*Water Analysis Rooms*Low Pressure Coolant Injection Inverter Room

• Control Room

• Control Room Roof

• Unit 1 Reactor Water Cleanup Equipment Room 3Enclosure*Unit 1 EDG Area*Unit 1 4160 volt Switchgear Rooms

• Unit 2 EDG Area

• Unit 2 4160 volt Switchgear Rooms

• Intake Structure

• Railroad Airlock

• Service Water Valve PitsFire Drill Observation. The inspectors observed the response to the Unit 1 MainTransformer fire that occurred October 29, 2005. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 34AB-X43-001-1, Fire Procedure to verify proper response of the on-shift fire brigade. The inspectors checked proper use of protective clothing, self contained breathing apparatus, fire fighting equipment, fire pre-plans, proper fire fighting strategy, communications, and command and control.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measuresa.Inspection ScopeInternal Flooding.

The inspectors reviewed the FSAR and the individual plantexamination to determine the plant areas that were susceptible to internal floodingevents. The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the following five areas to determine potential sources of internal flooding, the condition of penetrations in the rooms, and the condition of the sumps in the rooms. *Unit 2 Loop A Residual Heat Removal (RHR)/Core Spray (CS) Di agonal*Unit 2 Loop B RHR/CS Di agonal*Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Diagonal

• Unit 2 High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) room

• Unit 2 CRD Diagonal

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performancea.Inspection ScopeBiennial Performance Review.

The inspectors reviewed inspection records, test results,and other documentation to ensure that heat exchanger (HX) deficiencies that couldmask or degrade performance were identified and corrected. The test procedures and records were also reviewed to verify that these were consistent with Generic Letter 4Enclosure89-13 licensee commitments, and industry guidelines. Risk significant heat exchangersreviewed included the EDG heat exchangers, control room air conditioning (A/C) units, and the HPCI and RCIC room coolers.The inspectors reviewed site and corporate HX program procedures, minimum flowrequirements, testing and cleaning frequencies, corrective maintenance and condition report history for all selected heat exchangers. In specific, the inspectors reviewed performance testing procedures, completed temperature effectiveness calculations and acceptance criteria, and performance monitoring trends for the HPCI and RCIC room coolers. For the EDG HXs (jacket coolant, lube oil, and scavenging air) performance monitoring temperature trends, work history log, EDG operability test records, inspectionand cleaning records, and eddy current test reports and plugging limits were reviewed.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed PSW and RHR Service Water pump motor coolerscompleted data collection procedures, and control room A/C units capacity verification completed procedures. These documents were reviewed to verify inspection methods were consistent with industry standards, HX design margins were being maintained, and performance of the HXs under the current maintenance frequency was adequate.The inspectors also assessed the general health of the PSW system through a reviewdocuments listed in the Attachment and discussions with the PSW system engineer. These documents were reviewed to verify the design basis was being maintained and to verify adequate PSW system performance under current preventive maintenance,inspections and frequencies.Condition reports (CRs) and corrective maintenance histories were reviewed forpotential common cause problems and problems which could affect systemperformance to verify the licensee was entering problems into the corrective action program and initiating appropriate corrective actions. In addition, the inspectors conducted a walk down of all selected HXs and major components for the PSW systemto assess general material condition and to identify any degraded conditions of selected components.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalificationa.Inspection ScopeResident Quarterly Observation.

The inspectors observed the performance of licenseesimulator scenario LT-SG-50904-03 which included an electrically failed open safety/relief valve, CRD flow control valve failure, Instrument Air header failure and ananticipated transient without scram. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0S, Procedure Use and Adherence, and DI-OPS-59-0896N, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory 5Enclosureoversight. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique of operator performanceto assess if the licensee-identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the critique results from previous training sessions to assess performance improvement.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectivenessa.Inspection ScopeQuarterly Resident Review.

The inspectors reviewed the following two maintenanceactivities associated with structures, systems, and components to assess the licensee'simplementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the characterization of failures and the appropriateness of the associated (a)(1) or (a)(2)classification. For the equipment issues identified below, the inspectors reviewed associated CRs, Maintenance Work Orders, Action Items, and the licensee's procedures for implementing the Maintenance Rule to verify equipment failures were being identified, properly assessed, and corrective actions established to return the equipment to a satisfactory condition.

Documents reviewed are listed in the

.*Unit 1 Main Transformer Fire and Reactor Trip*Unit 1 Remote Shutdown Panel Switch Failuresb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Controla.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the following five Plan of the Day (POD) documents listedbelow to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being

removed from service. The inspectors reviewed the risk assessment and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify they were completed in accordance with licensee procedure 90AC-OAM-002-0, Scheduling Maintenance, and 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors assessed if any increase in risk was promptly assessed and that appropriate risk management actions were implemented.*POD for Week of 10/1-7*POD for Week of 10/8-14

• POD for Week of 10/22-28 6Enclosure*POD for Week of 10/29-11/4*POD for Week of 11/26-12/2b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Operator Performance During Non-Routine Evolutions and Eventsa.Inspection ScopeFor the two events described below, the inspectors observed operator actions andreviewed operator logs and computer data to verify proper operator actions were taken.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. *Fire in the 2A Isophase Bus Duct Cooling Fan*Unit 1 Main Transformer Fire and Reactor Tripb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluationsa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the following four operability evaluations and compared theevaluations to t

he system requirements identified in the TS and the FSAR to ensureoperability was adequately a ssessed and the system or component remained availableto perform it's intended function. Also, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.*1C/1D start-up transformer (SUT) operation without forced cooling*Unit 2 EDG undervoltage relay circuit configuration

• Unit 1 RCIC Barometric Condenser Condensate Pump Failure

• Chemical Stability of Sodium Pentaborate Decahydrate at Elevated Temperaturesb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

7Enclosure1R16Operator Work-Aroundsa.Inspection ScopeCumulative Review. The inspectors reviewed conditions on both units that requiredcompensation by the operators (work-arounds) to assess the increase in plant risk due to the cumulative effects of all the items combined. The inspectors focused on the ability of operators to operate equipment affected by the workarounds during a plantevent. The inspectors also reviewed the Operations Burdens and Needs list to verify no actions that could be an operator workaround existed. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure DI-OPS-61-1196N, Control and Tracking of Operator Work-Arounds.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testinga.Inspection ScopeFor the following four post maintenance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test scope toverify the test demonstrated the work performed was completed correctly and the

affected equipment was functional and operable in accordance with TS requirements.

Following the maintenance activities, the inspectors reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the requiredsafety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.*Unit 2 RHR Air Release Valve 2E11F295A Preventive Maintenance*Unit 1 CRD Pump Suction Relief Valve 1C11F001B remove, test and re-install*Unit 2 RHR Service Water Pump 2E11C001C replacement*Unit 1 RHR Service Water Pump 1E11C001B replacementb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activitiesa.Inspection ScopeForced Outage.

The inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 forced outage schedule to verify thelicensees use of risk management techniques and incorporation of operating experience and past lessons learned. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the outage safety assessment to verify the licensee had developed contingency plans and these plans included sufficient equipment to maintain a defense-in-depth approach to safety. The inspectors routinely reviewed licensee procedure DI-OPS-57-0393N, Outage Safety 8EnclosureAssessment, to verify the licensee was correctly maintaining required equipment inservice in accordance with the overall outage safety assessment. During the forced outage, the inspectors monitored licensee control over the outage activities listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.*Plant cooldown to verify the cooldown rate did not exceed TS limits*One clearance to verify implementation of the clearance process and the associatedequipment was properly configured to support the function of the clearance*Outage risk assessment meeting

• TS and licensee procedures to verify mode change requirements were met

• Walkdown of the fire impacted areas to assess the potential for collateral damage

• Plant startup, heatup, and power ascension

• Shutdown Margin determination

• Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to forced outage activitiesb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testinga.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed licensee surveillance test procedures and either witnessed thetest or reviewed test records for the following five surveillances to determine if the scope

of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed these activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386N, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.Surveillance Tests*34SV-SUV-023-1, Jet Pump and Recirculation Flow Mismatch Operability*34SV-R43-001-2, Diesel Generator 2A Monthly Surveillance*34SV-C82-001-1, Remote Shutdown Panel Instrument ChecksIn-Service Tests*34SV-E11-001-2, Residual Heat Removal Pump OperabilityReactor Coolant System Leakage Tests*34SV-SUV-019-2, Surveillance Checksb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

9EnclosureCornerstone: Emergency Preparedness1EP1Exercise Evaluationa.Inspection ScopeAn in-office review of the exercise objectives and scenario submitted to the NRC wasconducted to determine if the exercise would test major elements of the emergency plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14). The onsite inspection consisted of the following review and assessment:*The adequacy of the licensee's performance in the biennial exercise was reviewedand assessed regarding the implementation of the risk-significant planning standards (RSPS) in 10 CFR 50.47 (b) (4), (5), (9), and (10), which are emergency classification, offsite notification, radiological assessment, and protective action recommendations, respectively.*The overall adequacy of the emergency response facilities with regard to NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities, and Emergency Plancommitments. The facilities assessed were the simulator, Technical Support Center,Operations Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility.*Other performance areas besides the RSPS, such as the emergency responseorganization's (ERO) recognition of abnormal plant conditions, command and control, intra- and inter-facility communications, prioritization of mitigation activities, utilizationof repair and field monitoring teams, interface with offsite agencies, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan and its implementing procedures.*Past performance issues from NRC inspection reports and FEMA exercise reports todetermine effectiveness of corrective actions as demonstrated during this exercise to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14).*The post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of its EROperformance during the exercise and to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.IV.F.2.g.Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1EP4 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changesa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors evaluated the associated 10 CFR 50.54(q) reviews associated with non-10Enclosureadministrative emergency plan changes, implementing procedures changes, and EALchanges. The revisions covered the period from August 2004 to June 2005. The current Emergency Plan is revision 21. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation andEvaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, and Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors, Revision 4, were also used as references. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1EP6Drill Evaluationa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed a licensed operator annual examination which the licenseecredited for the emergency preparedness Dr ill and Exercise Performance performanceindicator. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator to verify implementation of licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-006-0, Hatch Emergency Plan. The inspectors reviewed the classification of the simulated event to verify these activities were conducted in accordance with licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedure 73EIP-073-0, Onsite Emergency Notification, to verify the proper offsite notifications were made. The inspectors reviewed the post-exam critique to assess the licensee's effectiveness in identifying areas of improvement. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verificationa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the PIs listed below procedures for theperiod July 2004 to June 2005. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in and NEI 99-02, Revision 3, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines, Rev. 2 were used to verify the basis in reporting for each PI.

11EnclosureEmergency Preparedness Cornerstone*Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) *Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation*Alert and Notification System (ANS) ReliabilityThe inspectors reviewed of a sample of drill and event records to verify the accuracy ofthe PI data for DEP. The inspectors reviewed selected training records to verify the accuracy of the PI data for ERO drill participation for personnel assigned to keypositions in the ERO. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records of periodic system tests to verify the accuracy of the PI data for ANS reliability. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems.1Daily Condition Report ReviewAs required by NRC Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing the licensee's computerized database..2Annual Sample Reviewa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a detailed review of CRs listed in the Attachment for the Unit1 main transformer failure and fire to verify the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CRs against the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. The inspectors also performed walkdowns on portions of the electrical distribution system, interviewed personnel, andreviewed event data and evaluations to determine if the licensee identified all potentiallyaffected equipment and entered the issues into the site CAP for resolution.The licensee's evaluation of the effect of the Unit 1 main transformer fire and firefighting efforts on the site electrical distribution system was reviewed. ConditionReports were reviewed for classification, operability/reportability, extent of condition,apparent cause and adequacy of completed and proposed short term and long term corrective actions. The inspectors evaluated the CRs against the CAP requirements in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

12Enclosureb.Findings and ObservationsNo findings of significance were identified. The inspectors determined that the CRswere properly classified, described the observed conditions, and the corrective actions were appropriate and addressed the apparent causes. The inspectors observed that the licensee's data gathering efforts subsequent to the fire were not thoroughlycoordinated in that the local alarm indications were not captured. The local alarm panelwas de-energized during ground hunting efforts which reset the alarm data prior to documenting the status..3Semi-Annual Trend Reviewa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a review of the licensee's CAP and associated documents toidentify trends which could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspector's review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CR item screening discussed in section 4OA2.1, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspector's review nominally considered the six month period of July 2005 through December 2005, although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trendwarranted. Inspectors also reviewed several CRs associated with operabilitydeterminations which occurred during the period. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees two latest quarterly trend reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensee's trend reports were reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the requirements of the licensee's corrective action program as specified in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.b.Assessment and ObservationsNo findings of significance were identified. The inspectors compared the licenseeQuarterly Trend Report with the results of the inspectors' daily screening and did not identify any discrepancies or potential trends in the data that the licensee had failed toidentify. 4OA3Event Followup.1(Closed) LER 05000366/2004-002, Unplanned Group 2 Primary Containment IsolationSignal (PCIS) resulting from a Water Level Transient Following a Manual Reactor Scram

On September 25, 2004, a manual load reduction was in progress on Unit 2. The load reduction was in preparation to repair the 2L Safety Relief Valve. The reactor was manually scrammed at approximately 35% power in accordance with 34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown. Following the reactor scram reactor water level decreased to the Group 2 PCIS actuation setpoint. The licensee has revised the Normal Plant Shutdown procedure to informthe operators that a Group 2 PCIS actuation is expected following a manual scram. This 13Enclosurecondition was documented in CR 2004109411. No findings of significance were identified..2(Closed) LER 05000366/2005-003, Manual Reactor Scram Inserted in Response to ReactorWater Chemistry Event Caused by a Condenser Tube Leak: On May 23, 2005, Unit 2reactor water quality was degrading due to a failed condenser tube plug. The licensee reduced reactor power in accordance with 34GO-OPS-014-2, Fast Reactor Shutdown. Due to continued degrading reactor water quality, the reactor was manually scrammed at approximately 57% power. An expected Group 2 PCIS actuation occurred due to reactor water level shrinkage. Reactor water level was restored using the reactor feedwater pumps.

This condition was documented in CRs 2005105574 and 2005106318. No findings of significance were identified.4OA5Other.1(Closed) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/161, Transport of Control Rod Drive (CRD) in TypeA Packages: During a previous NRC inspection, the inspectors directly observedpreparation and shipment of CRDs in Type A packages. In addition, the inspectors reviewedand discussed previous vendor/site procedural guidance and shipping logs of CRDs in TypeA Packages with responsible staff. See NRC Inspection Report 0500321, 366/2005002 foradditional information on this previous inspection. All inspection activities of this TI have been completed.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitOn January 5, 2006, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. GeorgeFrederick and the other members of his staff who acknowledged the observations. The inspectors confirmed proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

J. Dixon, Health Physics Manager

S. Douglas, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support

G. Frederick, General Manager - Nuclear Plant

M. Googe, Maintenance Manager

J. Hammonds, Operations Manager

J. Lewis, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

D. Madison, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations

J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager

R. Varnadore, Engineering Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed05000366/2004-002LER Unplanned Group 2 PCIS resulting from a Water LevelTransient Following a Manual Reactor Scram (Section

4OA3.1)05000366/2005-003LER Manual Reactor Scram Inserted in Response to ReactorWater Chemistry Event Caused by a Condenser Tube

Leak (Section 4OA3.2)2515/161TITransport of Control Rod Drive (CRD) in Type A Packages (Section 4OA5.1)

Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentDrawings:

D-11001, H-11600, H-17113, H-16064, H-1606534AB-R43-001-1, Diesel Generator Recovery