ML17309A655

Responds to NRC 990310 RAI Re Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment

ML17309A655
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	06/07/1999
From:	Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	Vissing G NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR TAC-M69449, NUDOCS 9906150159
Download: ML17309A655 (289)

Text

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

~89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649-0001 Roben C.Mecredy Vice President Nuclear Operating Group June 7, 1999 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Guy Vissing Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555-0001

Subject:

Response to RAI Regarding Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment (TAC No.M69449)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50/244

References:

A.Letter from Guy S.Vissing (NRC)to Dr.Robert C.Mecredy (RG&E)"Request f or Addit ional Inf ormation (RAI)Regarding the RE Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Summary Report on the Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, dated January 31, 1997" (TAC No.M69449), dated 3/10/99 B.Letter from Robert C.Mecredy (RG&E)to Document Control Desk (NRC), dated January 31, 1997t"Resolution of Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 and Generic Letter 88-20, Supplements 4 6 5".

Dear Mr.Vissing:

Enclosed are Rochester Gas Sc Electric's responses to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI), reference A.Very ruly yours,Enclosures Robert C.Mecredy xc: gr.Guy S.Vissing (mail stop 8C2)Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects-I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S.NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector J

RG&E Responses to NRC RAZ, 3/10/99 NRC RAZ a: Describe what reviews were performed to determine if any local operator actions required to safely shutdown the reactor(i.e., implement the SSEL)could be affected by potentially adverse environmental conditions (such as loss of lighting, excessive heat or humidity, or in-plant barriers resulting from the seismic event.Describe how the staffing was evaluated and describe the reviews which were conducted to ensure operators had adequate time and resources to respond to such events.RGSE Response a: During the SSEL development engineering personnel performed thorough plant walkdowns.

Those walkdowns identified several areas where seismic interactions could cause collateral damage which could complicate achieving, saf e shutdown.En the development of the SSEL the equipment outliers were characterized as Group A and Group B Outliers.Group A outliers consisted of equipment that could sustain a potential loss of function which normal proceduralized operator actions do not compensate for;Group B outliers consisted of equipment which could lose its preferred mode of operation or had the potential to mal-operate and require compersatory manual operator action-.The resolution process of the Group B outliers directly addressed the issues identified in this request for additional information.

RG&E developed a Group B outlier resolution plan which was chartered to examine: "The cumulative a f f ect of the losses of pre f erred modes of operation, and the subsequent manual operation of SSEL equipment, should be studied to examine the possibility of physical or procedural enhancements.

These studies may also include margin studies to aid in defining the priorities in which manual actions should be taken".An operations shift crew was detailed to work on the issue.The SSEL development engineer and the seismic engineer provided training delineating the SSEL development and the expected plant damage states.

The operations crew was then commissioned to perform plant walkdowns and table top discussions to validate the ability to achieve the desired equipment operations.

The engineering staff provided"analytical obstacles" that had to be defeated.These obstacles included: Debris fields Expected harsh environments Blocked/jammed doors Communication system failures Lighting failures Specifically the'operators were tasked to: 1)Verify the procedural set analyzed'n the SSEL was correct.2)Review the order in which equipment is operated and the time it takes to cascade to the SSEL equipment through procedural compliance.

3)Identify procedural weaknesses, i.e., identifying where doing things in the wrong sequence (from a priority standpoint) might lead to difficulties in achieving safe shutdown.4)Walkdown selected procedure steps.The walkdowns included time penalties incurred f rom working around earthquake induced damage.(i.e., block wall rubble, minor leaks, the need to use ladders, etc.)The outcome of the operator reviews revealed that the primary obstacle to achieving'safe shutdown was due to both direct and secondary damage incurred from intermediate building block wall failures'hen the operators were confronted with the plant damage state, (including potential hazardous environments) incurred from postulated failures in the building level which contains the steam'eader, they expected to experience delays which could hinder the achievement of safe shutdown.Accordingly, the impediments were resolved by per f orming an engineering modification to the affected wall panels which would preclude seismically-induced failure.Additionally the operators identified the need to provide additional procedural clarifications detailing expected seismically induced equipment losses and guidance as to how to mitigate those losses.The effects of the plant modifications along with the procedural enhancements were then reviewed to ensure that a normal operating shift compliment had sufficient resources and adequate time to achieve all actions necessary to safe shut down.The plant SSEL, revision 1, addresses.

the resolution of the Group A and Group B outliers and includes a description of how resolution was achieved.The table summarizing resolution of all USI A-46 outliers is provided in Enclosure 2.

NRC RAZ b: As part of the licensee's review, were any control room structures which could impact the operator's ability to respond to the seismic event identif ied?Such items might include but are not limited to: MCR ceiling tiles, non bolted cabinets, and non-restrained pieces of equipment (i.e., computer keyboards, monitors, stands, printers, etc.).Describe how each of these potential sources of interactions has been evaluated and describe the schedule for implementation of the final resolution.

NRC Response b: During the development of the Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)and subsequent SQUG walkdown of this equipment various seismic interactions were identified and resolved.The R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Control Room was determined to house ten major SSEL components.

Each component walkdown was documented in a Screening Evaluation Work Sheet (SEWS).A review of these SEWS revealed 7 out of the 10 components had at least one seismic interaction concern.These interactions included an unsecured cabinet, copier, step ladder, and air sampler.An unanchored

'ail box, miscellaneous storage cabinets, control room ceiling tiles, and adjacent masonry walls were also identified.

The seismic review team directed removal of identified seismic hazards, researched the control room ceiling evaluation, and documented the block wall qualifications.

The SRT confirmed hazard removal in July 1996 and documented equipment seismic acceptance on component SEWS.

NRC RAI c: Describe what reviews were performed to determine if any local operator actions were required to reposition"bad actor relays".For any such activities describe who adverse environmental conditions (such as loss of lighting, excessive heat or humidity, or in-plant barriers)resulting f rom the seismic event were analyzed and dispositioned.

Describe how staffing was evaluated and describe the xeviews which were conducted to ensure operators had adequate time and resources to respond to such events.RG&E Response c: RGEE performed a comprehensive evaluation of all relays associated with the SSEL (App.G of the January 31, 1997 submittal).

All relays which were defined as'low ruggedness'elays were modified or replaced, in accordance with the schedule provided in Enclosure 2.There are currently no'low ruggedness'elays associated with the Ginna Station safe shutdown methodology equipment, and therefore no local operator actions are credited for resetting such relays.

NRC RAI d: Describe which of the operator actions associated with resetting SSEL equipment affected by postulated relay chatter are considered to be routine and consistent with the skill of the craft.If not considered skill of the craft, what training and operational aids were developed to ensure the operators will perform the actions required to reset affected equipment?

RG6E Response d: As stated in response to RAI d, no local operator actions are credited for resetting relays in the Ginna Station safe shutdown methodology

.

NRC RAI e: Assume the alarms associated with the"bad actor relays" are expected to annunciate during the seismic event.Do the operators have to respond to those annunciators and review the annunciator response procedures associated with them for potential action?How would those additional actions impact the operators ability to implement the Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operating Procedures required to place the reactor in a safe shutdown condition?

RG&E Response e: This issue has previously been the subject of discussion between SQUG and the NRC, and has already been resolved.For completeness, we will summarize this resolution:

As described in EPRI Report NP-7148, Section 3.5.3, following an earthquake which causes a turbine and reactor trip, 50 to 100 or more alarms are expected to annunciate.

The operators will clearly be aware that the plant has tripped.Plant procedures and operator training require that operators response to the turbine trip and reactor scram by confirming the scram and trip and checking important levels, temperatures, pressures, flows, and electrical switching resulting from associated power transfers.

These confirmatory checks will take more than a minute to go through during which time the operators will be busy making these checks and not responding to specific alarms.The earthquake motion is assumed to last less than a minute and the causes of the spurious alarms will have gone away during this period while the operators are responding to the plant trip.As concluded in EPRI NP-7148, Section 3.5.3, p 3-12,"Accordingly, there appear to be no reasonable bases or evidence which would suggest that spurious alarms resulting from an earthquake may lead to abnormal operator responses.

Therefore, special operating procedures or relay evaluation actions to address potential spurious alarms are not considered warranted and relays af f ecting alarms need not be seismically adequate'~

" The NRC staff accepted the relay functionality review procedure summarized in GIP-2 and described in detail in EPRI NP-7148 (including the above conclusion) in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No.2 on GIP-2.Therefore, RGSE does not consider it necessary to perform any additional reviews of the effect spurious alarms caused by"low ruggedness" relays or other causes as a result of a seismic event.

NRC RAZ f: To the extent that Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operating Procedures were modified to provide plant staff with additional guidance on mitigating the A-46 Seismic Event, describe what training was required and provided to the licensed operators, non-licensed operators, and other plant.staff required to respond to such events.RGEE Response f: Only minimal changes were required for plant procedures to account for the effects of the A-46 Seismic Event.Because Ginna uses Alternative Shutdown post fire methodologies the RGEE staff was already familiar with ex-control room manipulations to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.The normal and abnormal operating procedures provided for all functional requirements necessary for post seismic safe shutdown.The SQUG driven procedure changes consisted of guidance steps added to procedure ER-SC.4, Earthquake Emergency Plan.For the most part, the additional guidance took the form of reminders-prompting the operators as to the expected worse case equipment losses and to the correct procedure and step which mitigates that loss.The procedure changes were reviewed by the Emergency Procedure Committee prior to submittal.

A training request (TWR 1998-0700)was included with the procedure change submittal.

The training department reviewed the change and determined tht read and acknowledge was the appropriate training method.To that end, the changes were reviewed by all operators, shift technical advisors and licensed instructors.

0 OUTLIER TABLE-INCLUDES AQS, GROUP B<Airy Rcv.4, 4/IS/99 DESCRIPTIOH Molor Conkd conbls C.O.Hand J Molor Conkd Cenbrs L and M REQUIRED FUN CTIOH Obhbde power>>ld dr cuit breakers plovld4 lsd¹ion OUTUER ISSUE These MCC'a aro Noor mounkrd and>>o 15 doop.Per the GIP anMCC naslbo 10 deep or be lop braced.A numb<

>n 10 deep Ihsl saw ground motion onlho ord<<ol the SOUG Rel<<ence St>>ckum (0.5 g ZPA).Since U>>n, Ihe dhlabsso hss been expanded.SutUdent evidence b svsibtAe lo domonsVslo capacity above 0 2 g.Ground Va br MCC's bw in s such as Iheso.Anchorage c¹cubgons wore p<<to/mod using knockdowll tadors br bw conaolo strength, ossonUal relays and unknown anchor type.The reductbns were 0.15 x 0.75 x 0 0~0.3 (base aaowsbb)and N>>resuN was a malgh ot 1.19 whkhb consldersbb considering N>>reducUon taken lo mod U>>GIP aN<<la.N>><<nbedment dopgr shoukt bo v<<led and a boN Ughk>>ss check made.Tho Nn¹report br EWR 2013 stela N>>IN>>anchorage Ior MCCMhas a tsdord sat x 10.RESOLUTIOH PLAHlSCHEDULE Fhakzo doaxnordation ol capacNy h 1991.CATS R05S24 Verily emlxxknenl and boN Ughlness dudng 1997 lokrokng odago.II nocess>>y kalA modgk¹bn durhg 1999 RFO.RESOI.UTIOH DOCUMEHTS SNA Anelysb 93C2709 C022 Revbod SEWS 9/30/90 wore I9701247 and 19701240 vorlod<<at>>dnl<<lb and torque STATUS Embedn>>nta and lorquos accoptstdo. Updated SEWS 3/17/90.OuWer ctoood.52/8YA 52/8YB 52/RTA 52/RT8 BUS 10 Rssdor Trip Breakers Tdp Roador and Reacbl Tdp Bypass Breakers Bus 10 SwNctlge>>tk>>10b adtscod ARB IRC10.The dssranco varies born 3/lPlo almost nN at exposed boN hoods.Bus 10 contains essonUal r obys so Oh conhgursUonb an htsrsdbn ouU>>r because ol N>>possibb lmpsd d U>>cstkl¹.The Roador Tdp breakers ION open (Raacbr'Tdp).They open onbss d DC power and bss ot MG setL Ho asckbb taNuro mode exbb kw UUO scenado.Bus 10 contak>>essenNal.chsUer senaRw relays.Tl>>concern b Ur¹rack lo rack Impacts c>>l cause relay chan<<.It b nol Nk¹y N>>t pdonUsl hUracts between Ihese est@>>ts.The reby cabhel b moulded at N>>ond ot BUS 10.BUS 10 b 100 bng, 50 deep, 70 IUgh and weighs about 150009.The leby cabhet ls 70 ION.24 deep and bng and weighs about 10009.Tt>>swNdlgear csbhot wiN nol dispbco much at aN abng Ks bng dimension and Iho rrNsy cabhel msy Impscl N bd wkh knb otloct.This b pul¹y a SQUG concern and oubkb ot N>>or'e barb.BCN cabhots bgoth<<dudng 1991 ro4olhg outage.CATS R05)I20 Need bU>>tusUtyhg acceptance (Dove WUsolvkN)F) PCR 997435 DACE 97423 Docxansntagon provided by'I 2/7/99 0 WNaon to FNzshsool>> OuWw cteood cola>>dod~wotdod cgp~ngbe.InstaN, ConUU¹~t I/gr.Upd¹ed SEWS 3/I 7/90.OutN<<C400ed OUTLIER TABLE-INCLUDES AM, GROUP 8 Rcv.4, 415/99 OESCRIP'TIOH Cunent LimNng Reacbls REQUIRED FUNCTION OUTUER ISSUE Two bliss.8>>SRT judged Q>>csbhots lo bo fakfy Qexibb I<8 Hr).Q>>lebre 1.5 x BS vs.Fbor spedrs wss used.The FRS exceeds 1.5 x BS.Hso.Ihe cabinet structure b quesbonsble due lo Ihe lsttbsd panelson the konl snd back.INTERQl ACCEPTASILITy Tho btticod (sknssr lo expanded rnolsi)pÃlob on Iho fmnt and back of rhe cabinets roquko additional anaiysb Io delormhe Ihe true cspacky ol tho cabinets, or Ihe sdditbn of skffonof S.Tho cspacky may nol qugo nleol 8>>current Rog.Gukb Ibor specks, bul woukf Ossify meal original design specks.RESOLUTIOH PLANISCNEOULE Perform arkQtbcud anslysb b dolormhe capscNy by snd of 1997.If modigcatbnb necessary Instal dudng I QQQ RFO CATS R05827 RESOLUTION DOCUKENTS S4A crdcrdagon No.92C2750C421 STATUS TEQOQA.I TE~I LT-50S RCS Loop A Ilot Leg Temp<<strxe Element RCS Loop B Cold Leg Temperature Ebmenl SIG A Wde Range Level Transmktsr RCS Hot Leg Temperature hdicatbn RCS Cold Leg T<<nperakxe hrgcason Requkedbr SG A Level Cables h BW trays Cabbs h BW Trays Cabbs in BW Trays Temperature hrgcsgon Is doskod lo monsoc cool down rates snd roscdr colo delta T's foc nskxsl drcubtbn.Shoukf bop A hdicabon be bat.loop lsmpocstures can be obtshodby msnusly resdhg 8>>rosbbnce ol other RTO's h 0>>RCS bop.The pcocess Invohies obtshhg ee proper measuring device.Iehg leads ln csbhets ln 0>>roby loom, takhg cesbtanc>>resdhgs and converlhg Ihose lo bmperstures. Hthough Ihb ls a fskfy sfmpb procedure snd hss been perlom>>dh Q>>pssL 8 b nol s See TEROQA-I OQ>>r wide range level kxfbatbn dovbes are avagsbb, bul Q>>y have power hterdepond<<xkes Q>>t may make them suscoplibb d oQ>>r slngb fsgules.Shoukl 8 be necessary, S!G h wkle range level can be obtshed by msnusyy losdhg Q>>curronl loop sssodsled wtsi bop LT-505.This Irwotves obtshhg Q>>proper messurhg oquiprnonl. ktgng leads In a cabhol h 8>>roby coom.taking a current measurement snd coclv<<thg Q>>t lo s bvol rosdhg.Although the process b slmpb, 8 b not a nonnsly ocoduco.P<<form addigonal anslysb d dotormhe cspadty of bbck wsQO.IPEEE anslysb showed adrstbnal capadty we4 above Q>>t reported durhg IE 801 I rosokrtbn. Procedure&be QnaQzed In 1997.If n~bagons sre nscess<<y, they wNbe perfom>>d durhg 199Q RFO.CATS R05828 See TE~1 CATS RO5828 Same as TE~I CATS R05829 Rosokrson d hdude lakhg manual rosdhg NR ThfTC provides CR kxgcNon hdd al no bad lave unN ready d uso RTD reargngL change SSEL-hdd HR d SSEL ER-SCA Rev.4 SSEL Rev.1 change SSEL-hdd HR lo SSEL, ER-SCA Rav.4 Cen use SAFW Qow snd pressurizer presa have akeady changed FR's d OQow use SAFW Qow le GIPed.hdd SAFW Flow d SSEL SSEL Rev.I 423rgg PCN.ER-SCA Rev.I signed 2I tgrgg SSEL Rav.1 SEWS cpdetea requksrL CCVF OuNec closed Oaw WQeon PCH.SSEL Rav.1, ER-SCA OuNer cdeed Oave WQeon SSEL Rev.1 OwNer cdeod OUTLIER TABLE-INCLUOES AQB, GROUP B Rcv.8, ALIIS/99 BTRTA BIRTB Be&cry Racks A and 8 DC Power Cols lack dose Qtthg spscors between ceKS snd K>>anchorage ol the racks hr norpr south bade does nol meal Iho GIP requkon>>nts The be&cry racks moot Ihe crsrent design basis lor seismic boding in borh horizontal dkectbns.A modi&cstion lo meal GIP cntens Is h the design process snd wlK be cornfNeted no bter Ihsn Ihe nexl refuothg outage (1997).CATS R05830 PCR 99743d Iralsped mods.1997.Need now mod.hr lerpsr battodos.Buylnp qusK&ed rake: hstaK h 99 RFQ.w.o.'e 19702770.19702771~ohmtcapy quapped lacks h 1999.Sewa PT468 SIG A Pressure Transmitter SIG Pressure Invesligstion ol bbck wsÃs hr tt>>IPEEE showed ddiibonsl msrgn above Ihsl evslusled durhp IE BuNsth 80.11.This anstysts shows thol the wsNs are scceptsbh hr the original design spedrs snd possibly for 9>>crsrent R.Gukh a.Same ss TE<OQA.I CATS R05831 QusiKy wsl 97f-Nl DACE-QQ4lf qus8&ed 0>>wa8 K>>rehro removhp 9>>hlersdbn Westhghouso CRN-1 Relay Demand i GERS hr a8 states The relays noot 9>>demand based on Ihe orighsl pround spedrs Induding in csbhel smptt&cstbnhr sK operslnp slates ol Ihe relays.Thefebre they meet oul crÃront desipn basis.Analyze cobhet b dolanoho PCR 997431 sdusl demand.K mod.roqukod.Instep In IQQ7 RFQ.CATS R05832 Door opener 11IQT.Updeled SEWS 11$8.C4Qec closed 42I350SA 42I3505A Westhgtrouse CRN-IRshy Westhghouse Size 2 DC Motor Starter InM4 V3504 A and MS 4 V3505A Cabinet ampk&cstion unknown.outKer K i 1.8 Tho lrNsys meet Iho demand based on 9>>EÃlghst ground Analyze csbklet lo dotormho PCR QM3f spedrs.hdudhg h cabhel amf~tbn for aK operspnp actual demand.Nmod.req'4 states ol Ihe retsys.Therehre they meal oui current hstsK ln IQQ7 RFQ.desipn basta.CATS R05&32 Requke lurp>>r analysts lo detormhe cabhel amph&colon. See Group 8 bebw waK ls Vstves sro Group 8 ouWers tbhck wa8)-soe rKscussbn hr Group 8 bobw and ln 9>>SSEL Report CATS R05838 W.O.I980IM3 Door esenor mode.Instaped 11$7.Updelod SEWS 11$8.Oufper chood KOIIDGA Kf X/DGB KO.A K4.8 AKsn Brarpey 200EOOZI A Relay POuer Brumr>>td 8739-In DGACP&83 A2 Relays DGBCP No Dais Need lo Invessgste -ekher pel dots.tost robrys~replace Detennh~~dm wkh relays ol known ruggedness. I~coopt or replace by 8>>ond ol K>>1997 RFQ Need lo Invesbgale -either gel data.Iesl relays or replace Detennhe cspsdty snd ekher wkh relays ol known ruggedness. replace by K>>end of 8>>1997 RFQ PCR 97432 Rebya rofNscod ,I II97.Updated relay oval.Shts 3I I yl98.DutKer dosed Relays replaced I IIQ7.Updated relay evsl Shts 3l1 yl98 Outger closed OUTLIER TABLE-INCLUDES A~, GROUP B Rcv.4, 4II5/99 OSR A OSR-8 VFX.I.A VFX-I.B VFX-2.A VFX-2.8 Alen Brscley 200E400ZIA Rdays Alen Brscley 200E300Z IA Relays Alen Bradley 200E300Z IA Redye CaMe Trays In Accc.Sdg.EI.253 CaMe Trays No Osis Hanger A834 does nol meal lhe Lhv'ted hndythal Review requkemend due lo Ue bendhg momenl devehped h Ihe hodzondl member sl Qe lop ol the hanger Rsl spans between Ite anchors.Need lo Inveslgsle -either gel data.leal rdsys or reptsce wlh rdsys ol known ruggechess. Need lo InvesUgale -erther gel data, leal rdays or repdca with rdsys of known ruggedness. Need lo InvesUgste -dther gel data.lest redye or replace wWr rdays of known ruggedness. Upon further hvesegsgon and Inspeclon by p.Zebroskl and S.AnsgnoNs 9 was judged Qurt even U Qrd hangar wss lo be removed (fsl j, Ihere was su%dent support provided by~hangers lo mahtsh Qe ccarent configurseon. Thd d an erdremdy congested area, wlh csbdkays brsnchhg snd dlopphg hh BUS Ie.Oetelmhe cspscly and dther accept or replace by 9>>end of the 1997 RFO Oelermhe cspsdty and elher sccepl or repdce by Ihe end of Ihe 1997 RFO Petennhe cspscly and eWer accept or repdce by 9>>end of Ihe 1997 RFO Fhslxe analysis and dther accepl or modify by Qe end ol ere 1997 RFO.CATS R05034 PCR 974I35 owG 33013-274e ohcE-974we Relays repdced 11IQ7.Updsdd rday evaL Shd 3IITIQe.Outgec dosed Rdays replaced 11I97.Updsdd redy eval.Shd 3ltylge.Outeec cheed Relays repdced t tl97.Updsisd rdsy eval.Stds 3l tylge.Outger cheed Suppod~nIINlcNnsnts Inetaled I II97.Ravded OSVS 4I3IQe.Ocdger dosed A82710 INT271 HOT CsMe Trays hhux.Sdg.El.271 CaMe Trays In InL Mdg.Chan Sde EI253 CaMe Trays In InL Sdg.Controled Sde E1271 Cable Trays In Inl Sdg.Contloaed Sde EI 271 12'cathe tray d supported on a bhck wae neld lo Ue Ird pool.Sock Wsl Problems and tray span~10'ue lo nisshg hortzontd suppon member CaNe were Inveslgaled as pit ol Qe bkck wal efhrt Csbds were Invesggded as part of 9>>bhck wal dhrt Cables were hvcrsUgsted as part of Ihe bhck wal effort See bhck wal clscceston In SSEL Report and Group 8 resok4on.CATS R05837 See bhck wal clscusslonh SSEL Report and Group 8 r esohthn.CATS R05937 See bkck wse discussion h SSEL Report and Group 8 resokrgon. CATS R05037 See bhck wsl discus shn h SSEL Report snd Group 8 resoLAon.CATS R05837 ER-SCA Rev.4 SSEL Rev.1 ER-SCA Rev.4 SSEL Rev.1 ER.SCA Rev.4 SSEL Rev.1 ER SCA Rev.4 SSEL Rev.1 Procedures Iretsled Oudter closed OUTLIER TABLE-INCLUDES A46, GROUP B Rcv.4, 4/1509 3410 3411 SrGAKB Abnosphoric relic!valves VaNe musl Group B rema@dosed.Opens on LOOP.Musl nol FO.NC and FC on loss ol OC or IA See above.See above.tB 218'R Sourh ot waNs 2I.3I.4l.5l See above.W.O.19801843 See above W.O.19801643 Fbr wsl elF Qne PCR 96022 OA.CE.96095 ER-SC.4 Rev.4 SSEL REv.1 Fbr wal elF Ine PCR 96422 DMX-98495 ER.SC.4 Rev.4 SSEL REv.1 Proceduree and mode.InslaQed OuWer cleeed Pressurlror Healer See above.See above.See above.CATS lO R06966 Procedrre chango: PuQ Qrse ER.SC.4 Rev.4 SSEL Rev.1 OUTLIER TABLE-INCLUDES A46, GROUP 8 Rcv.4, 4II5/99 INT218 CLEAN INT298 Ct.EAN INT293HO 1 4813 4814 4M4 4773 5735 5738 5737 S738 3504A 3505A Cable Trays in Inl.txdg.Chan Sde Eb.278 d 298 and Conko8ed Sde EL.293 Turbhe Bldg.SW botsthn Vahre Turbhe Sdg.SW bobdon Valve Ak Condi8onhg SW botathn Valve Turbhe Sdg.SW bobthn Vahr~Ak Corrdrgonk~ SW bolaSon Valra SIG A d 8 Bhwdown Sample botadon Valves SIG A d 8 Bhwdown botsthn Vires SIG A d 8 Slesm Supply Valves lo TDAFW Pump Csbh trays Servhe Water Isobtion NO.Musl Chse.(b8 dosed on hss of DCalA)NO.Musl Chse.(bd dosed on loss of DC a IA Loss ol psfeenrad mode ol opera8on.See SSEL Report for r0scusston and detads.AOV on 3I4 Ine.Vahres loo dexhb.Csbhs were hvesttgsted as part ot the bhck waa elhrt See above.SOUG hdushn rube hr Ass spectfy 1 or larger ine.The Qne b Iskly wed supfxxkxf verthaly, bul Ihe vshre can put s kxshnal had on Qra pipe trat shoukl be evahabd lo meet Ihe htent of Oo cavaaL Thb b s new SQUG crtterb-Ihe cunsnl dcense basb does nol hcfude any such Qmk on pipe frne size.Ptpe sksss.See above.See above.IB 278'4 South ol wsss 2I,3I.4I, SI See bhck wsd rascusshn In SSEL Report snd Group 8 rasokrtion. CATS R05837 W.O.19801843 P<<form Qme and modon skrr0ee~nd costlbene8t analysts h~vahsle posstbb ant tancenxrnts. Compbte sturdes by end ol 1097.CATS ID R05837 See above.CATS ID R05837 CATS ID R08988 W.O.108044S4 00 RFO See above.CATS ID RN988 See above.W.O.19801843 F Une drrI278'4 PCft08022 ER-SC.4 Rev.4 SSEL Rev.1 SW Fhw cal.tA%-00007 ER.SC.4 Rev.4 SSEL Rev.1 AP-SW.1 PCR 08052 Rev.1 DA.CE-00-108 Rev 1 DUF 000071 ER SC.4 Rev,4 SSEL Rev.1 Flx wad st F dne PCR 08-022 DA CE.08495 ER SC.4 Rev.4 SSEL REv.1 Pro ceduras Iretaded OufQer closed Cortrpbis 1218 r,":~I PCR fe052 Rev.1 hataded valve opershf SEWS updafad Ougbr closed. Attachment B Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 1 of 27 B.Fire It is unclear how room-to-room fire scenarios'were treated in the Ginna IPEEE analysis.Section 3.1 of the submittal indicates that fire areas were screened individually according to the FIVE[1]criteria (i.e, the area contains no Appendix R equipment, and a fire in the area would not cause a demand for safe shutdown)~This section also indicates that fire compartments were further screened if they had no credible potential for fire spreading to other fire compartments. While the submittal indicates that the qualitative screening conformed with Phase I, of the FIVE methodology, fire propagation potential between fire compartments is reviewed in the FIVE methodology during the Fire Compartment Interaction Analysis (FCIA)~The submittal does not indicate that the FIVE FCIA criteria were used to determine if fire propagation between fire zones was possible.The submittal does provide qualitative criteria for grouping plant locations, but it is unclear that this approach has adequately treated room-to-room fire scenarios. One of the cited criteria indicates that plant locations were grouped together when a physical barrier (not necessarily fire-rated) separates the subject locations from the rest of the plant and there is a significant time delay for fire propagation from the subject locations to other adjacent locations. In addition, the submittal indicates that one consideration for determining the importance of a location was whether it contains a sufficient amount of combustible material that, if ignited, could potentially propagate to adjacent zones.The basis for making these judgements is not provided.Further, it is not clear that the analysis has adequately considered the potential that active fire barrier elements (e.g., normally open fire doors, ventilation dampers, etc)might fail to activate, or that passive fire barriers (e.g., various fire barriers both rated and unrated and barrier penetration seals)might be challenged by local concentrations of flammable materials. Finally, it is not clear that the analysis has considered the potential for the spread of smoke and heat from one compartment to another in addition to the consideration of actual fire spread.Please clarify the bases used to assess the potential for cross-zone spreading of fire, heat, and smoke.Please provide an analysis for all fire areas of the effect on fire-induced core damage frequency (CDF)thatincludes consideration of the failure potential of active barrier components such as doors and dampers.Please provide an analysis of the potential for cross-zone fire propagation for high hazard areas such as the turbine building, diesel generator room, switchgear rooms, and lube oil storage areas thatincludes consideration of the potential to challenge passive fire barrier elements.I The requested information is contained in Appendices B (" Location Characteristics Table")and E (" Propagation Pathway Credibility Assessment")to the 1998 submittal. While these appendices were never submitted to the NRC, selections from these Appendices have been extracted and included as Attachment B.1 to accompany the discussion provided below.The appendices in their entirety can be provided if required by the NRC.. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 2 of 27 Appendix 8 develops a fire zone adjacency matrix for each fire zone to identify possible propagation pathways (Item 4 in the Location Characteristics Table[LCTj, e.g., as shown on page 8-3 of Attachment 8.1).Appendix E develops criteria to qualitatively screen the credibility of these propagation pathways (see Table E-2 beginning on page E-9 and its Supplement in Attachment 8.1 which lists the propagation scenarios developed for the initial fire zones).As an example, referring to Item 1 on page 8-3 of Appendix 8, there are two fire zones, ABB and ABM, within fire area ABBM.Six fire zones are listed as horizontally adjacent to these two zones in Item 4, along with the corresponding propagation pathways and barrier ratings.These are repeated in Table E-2 (see page E-9 of Appendix E), where they were evaluated with respect to fire propagation as discussed below.In the spatial interactions analysis, a propagation pathway was assumed to be credible if there is no automatic suppression system in the initial fire zone or in the adjacent fire zone AND at least one of the following criteria were satisfied: 1.There is a permanent opening between the fire zones;2.The fire duration of the combustible contents in the initial fire zone is greater than 75'/0 of the rating of the fire barrier (e.g., door, wall, etc.)separating the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zones.'he first criterion is conservative because it does not consider the actual amount of combustible inventory, the location of the fire source, and the separation distance between the fire source and combustibles in the adjacent location(s). The second criterion takes into consideration the potential failure of fire barriers (e.g., a fire door being left open), but requires a minimal amount of combustibles to provide a propagation path.The fire duration and barrier ratings for each fire zone are included under Items 2 and 4 in the LCT (see page 8-3).Table E-2 and Supplement indicate whether or not inter-zonal propagation satisfies Criterion 1 or 2, from above.'he FIVE FCIA permits screening out propagation between compartments, one of which may contain safe shutdown equipment, for~an of the following: 1.Boundary fire rating of at least two hours 2.Boundary fire rating of one hour with combustible loading in the exposing compartment <8E+4 BTU/ft'the Ginna IPEEE, by screening for 75/o of this combustible loading, employs a more stringent criterion of<6E+4 BTU/ft')3.Very low combustible loading (<2E+4 BTU/ft')in the exposing compartment, with automatic fire detection present 4.Very Iow combustible loading (<2E+4 BTU/ft')in both the exposing and exposed compartment (regardless of presence of automatic detection) 5.Presence of automatic fire suppression above combustibles in exposing compartment. The combustible inventory, listed under Item 2 in the LCT, denotes the maximum combustible loading within a fire zone allowed by procedure. In reality, the actual inventory may be less than the maximum allowable amount.The second criterion suggests that if the combustible inventory fire severity is less than 75'/o of the barrier rating, then there will not be a propagation pathway between fire zones.In order to have a fire propagation pathway if the fire duration is less than 75'/0 of the barrier, the barrier must fail due to random failure (fail before the rated time on demand).Table E-2 and Supplement indicate whether or not the potential fire duration exceeds 75'/0 of the barrier rating. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 3 of 27 For the fire areas which met one of the two propagation criteria, the analysis considered multi-level fire propagation between locations. Level-1 propagation involves one initial fire zone and fire zone(s)directly adjacent to it through a credible propagation pathway.Level-2 fire propagation involves one initial fire zone, the fire zone(s)directly adjacent to it, and the fire zone(s)that are adjacent to the Level-1 fire zone(s).At Level-2, the fire would have to propagate through two fire barriers, with the time required to burn through being at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (assuming each barrier is at least one-hour rated).The mean generic fire suppression time for most fires is 40 minutes (estimated by Sandia in Ref.5).A survey of past fire drills at Ginna indicates that the longest total duration of a drill was less than 50 minutes (see Table 3-12 of the 1998 submittal). It is reasonable, then, to assume that the longest response time at Ginna (regardless of the location)is less than 50 minutes.Therefore, it is expected that the fire brigade will start fire-fighting efforts at the initial fire zone and the Level-1 locations, and respond to the Level-2 locations to start cooling the pathways between Level-1 and Level-2 locations. Thus, the probability of a fire being allowed to propagate to Level-2 fire zones is negligible. As a result, all propagation scenarios involving Level-2 propagation or higher were also screened from the analysis.Table E-2 and Supplement of Appendix E (see Attachment B.1)summarize the analyses of the potential for inter-zonal fire propagation for all Ginna fire zones.Included among these are high hazard areas such as the turbine building (TB), diesel generator rooms (EDG1A/B), switchgear rooms (distributed among the auxiliary building[ABM and ABO), turbine building, and screen house[SH]), turbine lube oil storage area (TO), and hydrogen storage area (H2).Review of Table E-2 and Supplement indicates that fire propagation to/from these zones was not considered credible since: (1)they did not meet either of the two screening criteria;or (2)they met at least one of the criteria, but fire propagation was still considered not credible for other reasons (see Notes in Table E-2 and Supplement). 'he LCT from Appendix B (also in Attachment B.1[see, e.g., pp.B-3 through B-5 and B-48))includes the following information in greater detail for these zones: 2.3.4 Fire and smoke hazards, as obtained from review of the Ginna Station Appendix R program information (Item 2);Fire protection features, i.e., the fire detection and suppression capabilities (Item 3);Adjacent fire zones (Item 4);Potential key equipment and their associated basic event impacted by fire or smoke hazards (Item 5);Potential raceways (conduit and cable tray)and their associated equipment/basic events impacted by fire or smoke hazards, where the cable trays associated with the safety equipment were identified from a database relating cables and conduit to the equipment served (Item 6);Notes taken during the two spatial interactions walkdowns (Item 7).As reported in Section 3.9.2 of the 1998 submittal, active fire barrier components at Ginna consist of fire doors and dampers.There are also penetration seals, considered to be passive barriers.Fire doors are inspected and maintained through station procedure FPS-15,"Fire Door Identification, Inspection and Maintenance," on a quarterly basis.The Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 4 of 27 procedure also lists all the fire doors and their locations. To date, there have been no failures of fire doors that have not been promptly detected during these plant tours.Compensatory and corrective actions have been initiated as required.The accessible fire zones are also visited by plant personnel frequently (e.g., auxiliary operator and security rounds), and the plant personnel are trained to maintain fire doors closed.Therefore, it is unlikely that a fire door would be left open and uncorrected for an extended period of time.Engineering Work Request (EWR)4882 completed verification in 1991 that all plant fire dampers were installed and configured as designed (or provided for analyses where differences from qualified configurations existed).Fire damper operability is verified through station procedure PT-13.26,"Testing of Fire Dampers." Ten percent of the dampers are drop-tested yearly on a rotating basis so that all dampers are tested at least once every ten years.If any damper fails the drop test, an additional 10%are tested, for every failure.Fire dampers are inspected and maintained through station procedure M-103,"Inspection and Maintenance of Fire Dampers." Both procedures list all the fire dampers, their ratings, and their locations. Adherence to these procedures assures that all fire dampers are present as configured and reduces the likelihood of a failure upon demand.EWR 4941 completed verification in 1991 that all plant fire penetration seals were installed and configured as designed (or provided for analyses where differences from qualiTied configurations existed).A database was developed and each seal was associated with an industry fire test.This database is updated annually in accordance with station procedures FPS-2.1,"Control and Verification of UFSAR and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R Fire Barriers," and FPS-2.2,"Control and Verification of Non-UFSAR and Non-10CFR50Appendix R Fire Barriers." Visual inspections are performed every 18 months for the UFSAR/10CFR50 penetration seals under FPS-2.1 and every 36 months for the non-UFSAR/non-10CFR50 penetration seals under FPS-2.2.Adherence to these procedures assures that all fire penetration seals are present as configured and reduces the likelihood of a failure upon demand.In summary, the potential for inter-zonal spreading of fire, heat and smoke was assessed using criteria derived from the FIVE FCIA, but considered more conservative. For example, the"critical" combustible loading in the originating fire zone was reduced to 75%of the FIVE FCIA criterion. The potential for inter-zonal propagation was examined for the high hazard areas, individually the turbine building (TB), diesel generator rooms (EDG1A/8), switchgear rooms (distributed among the auxiliary building[ABM and ABO], turbine building, and screen house[SH]), turbine lube oil storage area (TO), and hydrogen storage area (H2).Fire propagation to/from these zones was not considered credible.This is further supported by the fire protection testing program described earlier. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 5 of 27 2.The Ginna fire IPEEE submittal indicates that cable vtirap was credited in the quantitative assessments, but the treatment that was given is not clear and may have led to"double counting" of suppression effectiveness. It is also not clear if this approach was used in the screening analyses as well.Section 3.3.4 (Assumption 2)indicates that"a probability of 0.15 was assigned to the failure of cable wrap to account for the probability that a fire is not suppressed within the one hour time frame associated with the fire rating of the cable wrap." This description implies that the modeling of the cable wrap failure implicitly credits fire suppression in the quantitative screening of fire zones that contain the wrap.In the detailed fire PRA evaluations, an additional independent credit for fire suppression efforts would result in double counting suppression efforts.Please indicate if fire suppression was credited in fire scenarios where cable wrap was independently credited as protecting critical cables.If there are any such scenarios, reevaluate the core damage frequency either (1)assuming that the 0.15 barrier failure probability fully credits suppression, or(2)assuming anindependent suppression credit and that the cable wrap fails with a probability of 1.0 for all fires lasting greater than one hour.Double-counting of cable wrap protection and fire suppression efforts did not occur in the IPEEE analysis.The factor of 0.15 is related to the failure to manually suppress the fire within the time that the cable wrap provides protection. The 0.15 cable wrap failure probability represents the conditional probability that longer term manual suppression efforts, using fire hoses or extinguishers, fail to extinguish the fire prior to the damage of wrapped cables.If this occurs, the cable wrap is assumed failed with a probability =1.0.In addition, if a fire area for which fire wrap was credited has insufficient combustible loading to support a fire duration of at least one hour, a 0.1 probability was assigned that such a loading might exist.If the fire area already had the sufficient loading, no adjustment was made.It is explicitly assumed that the installed fire sprinklers have failed to extinguish the fire (either automatic or manually actuated). The analysis, therefore, did not apply double credit for fire sprinkler protection and cable wrap protection. No significant dependencies were identified between the performance of manual suppression, using fire hoses or extinguishers, and the functioning of the installed fire sprinklers (including manual actuation of the sprinklers) as discussed in the response to RAI Question¹9, below.Therefore, no significant dependencies were identified to exist between the 0.15 cable wrap failure probability and the failure probability of installed fire sprinklers. Finally, as described in the response to RAI Question¹8 below, the Fire IPEEE was resolved with the fire suppression system specifically modeled.As shown in Section 9.6.3.4 of Attachment B.3 (and Table 9-18), cable wrap failures were not risk significant. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 6 of 27 3.The 19 fire zones remaining after the qualitative and quantitative screening phases of the Ginna fire assessment were subjected to further detailed evaluation including the analysis of fire propagation and suppression. Actual fire modeling using the FIVE methodology or other techniques was not performed. Instead, probabilities for fire propagation were assigned based primarily upon physical separation of equipment. However, it is not clear upon what basis these judgements were made.For example, in the analysis of the Auxiliary Building Operating Level (ABO, Page 3-14)"a 0.01 probability was assigned that a fire occurring in the vicinity would disable both CCW pumps, and a 0.99 probability was assigned that one CCW pump, in addition to one AC power electrical division, would be disabled." It is not clear that this assumption is well founded.The submittal states the two CCW pumps are located within nine feet of each other, and that there are cables in conduits in the area.Presumably, loss of the cables may lead to loss of the second pump.Further, the fact that the fire source appears to be the CCW pumps themselves, there would be a significant potential for large fires to occur.Given a large fire, nine feet of spatial separation would likely not prevent thermal damage to the second pump, its power cables, or its control cables.This is one specific example where the assumed damage probabilities may be optimistic. For other fire areas, from the description of fire scenarios presented in the submittal, it appears that fires that are not suppressed were assumed to damage all the equipment in a fire zone.If the fire was suppressed, some level of damage was assumed to occur, and it appears that in many cases suppressed fires were assumed to damage just one electrical division.The submittal states that this is conservative since for many fire scenarios only a portion of components relying on the electrical division would be disabled.In general, this approach is acceptable if the critical set of components and cables are relatively far apart, and therefore, it will take a long time for a fire to damage them.On the other hand, if the key cables and components are close together, critical damage may occur before successful suppression. Please provide a general description ofhow the fire damage assumed for each of the fire scenarios considered in the detailed analyses was determined. Include a description of the criteria used to determine the radius of the damage caused by suppressed fires and the timing of component damage.Also indicate to what extent the actual location of critical cables and components was verified and considered in the damage assessment. For suppressed fires,indicateif any time was assumed for the suppression of the fire andif this timeimpacted the assumed damage.For each fire scenario, the potential fire sources and critical cables and equipment were carefully examined.Fires were assumed to fail all equipment and cables in a fire zone unless the fire was suppressed or physical separation or barriers existed (i.e., a detailed analysis was performed). The grounds upon which physical separation, barriers and fire suppression were credited in these detailed analyses as well as the justification for the extent of damage assumed, including considerations of timing and damage radii, are provided in the following discussion. The discussion is presented in two parts: (1)postulation of damage to one electrical division for scenarios in which fire suppression succeeds, and (2)use of physical separation or barriers as justification for limiting damage of a zone's contents. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 7 of 27 1.Postulation of Dama e to One Electrical Division for Scenarios in which Fire Su ression Succeeds.Justification for postulating damage to one AC electrical train for scenarios in which fire suppression succeeds is provided as follows.Cables-Fire suppression credited for the protection of plant cables consisted of the automatic actuation of sprinklers as well as manual actuation of the sprinklers in the event that automatic actuation fails.For instances in which automatic actuation succeeds, sprinkler protection is postulated to commence prior to significant cable damage since the sprinkler head fuses melt at a temperature well below the damage and ignition temperatures'of the cable insulation. Similarly, the successful manual actuation of sprinklers was postulated to commence prior to significant cable damage.A failure probability of 0.01 was assigned for the manual actuation when automatic actuation failed to reflect the potential delay of actuation prior to significant cable damage.This value takes into consideration the close proximity of the sprinkler actuators to the control room (within a two-minute response from the time a smoke alarm is received). On this basis, fires were postulated to fail only the contents of one cable tray for scenarios in which sprinkler protection is successful. By examining the inventories of cables routed in each cable tray in the applicable zones, the conditional core damage probabilities (CCDPs)associated with such damage were found to be bounded by the CCDP for the loss of one AC electrical train.b.Equipment-Fire zones containing multiple equipment trains were also evaluated. Fire zone ABB (auxiliary building basement)-Sprinkler protection is provided for cables installed in the safety injection (Sl)pump area.Although fire scenarios in this area could disable both Sl pump trains, the loss of Sl in conjunction with the loss of cables for any cable tray in ABB results in CCDPs which are bounded by the CCDP for the loss of an entire AC power train.The assumption, therefore, for the loss of one AC power train is conservative. Fire zone ABM (auxiliary building mezzanine) -The only PSA-related components consist of two electrical buses that belong to a single AC power train, which was then assumed to fail.Fires igniting within the electrical bus cabinets were assumed not to damage cables in surrounding cable trays since flames would be contained within the sealed cabinets for a time sufficient for suppression to commence (that is, for the sprinkler head fuses to melt).Likewise, fires occurring outside of the buses were judged not to be capable of damaging the electrical buses prior to initiation of suppression. Therefore, no credible fire scenario was identified which could damage the electrical buses and cables belonging to the opposite AC power train.The assumption for the loss of one AC power train is therefore valid. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 8 of 27 Fire zone AHR (air handling room)-The loss of all PSA-related components would cause only a reactor trip.In conjunction with the postulated loss of one cable tray, the CCDP for reactor trip is bounded by that for the loss of one AC power train.iv.Fire zone BR1A or BR18 (battery room A or 8)-The loss of all PSA-related components would cause the loss of only one AC power train, which was then assumed to fail.V.Fire zone IBN-1 (intermediate building north)-The loss of AFW Pumps A and B is credible.However, due to the multiple sources of feedwater not impacted by the fire (i.e., turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, standby auxiliary feedwater pumps C and D, and main feedwater pumps A and 8), the loss of one AC power train assumed for the scenario is bounding.Use of Ph sical Se aration or Barriers as Justification for Partial Dama e of a Zone's Contents.As discussed in the 1998 IPEEE submittal and expanded upon where pertinent here, physical separation rationales were used in the detailed fire modeling for five fire zones.Auxiliary Building Operating Level (ABO)-Due to the nine-foot separation between the component cooling pumps installed in zone ABO, and a lack of intervening fixed combustibles (all cables in the area are routed in, conduit), a 0.01 probability was assigned that a fire occurring in the vicinity would disable both CCW pumps.This probability was based on the following considerations: Since no intervening fixed combustibles exist between the two CCW pumps (control and power cables associated with each pump penetrate the floor from below directly adjacent to the pump they serve, and therefore do not travel near the other pump)and no fixed combustibles are installed in the broad vicinity of the pumps, two sources of combustion must be considered: (1)the potential for the ignition of one CCW pump to damage the second CCW pump and (2)the potential for a transient combustible fire to damage both pumps.The ignition of one CCW pump was judged not to have the potential to cause damage to the second CCW pump based on the following grounds: No combustible material is installed on the outer surface of the pumps (all cables are installed in conduits)and therefore ignition of the second pump is not likely.The pumps are installed in a large, open area and therefore the heat from the ignited pump would be dissipated. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 9 of 27 The pump motors are relatively small, and therefore the heat generated by the ignition of one pump would be limited.The only lubricant utilized for the pumps is grease located within sealed gear boxes.This significantly reduces the likelihood for leakage of combustible material to the exterior of the pump, which eliminates the potential for a large pump lubricant spill, and also reduces the likelihood for combustion of lubricant of the second pump.A significant transient combustible fire was judged to be the only credible fire source that could disable both pumps.A very conservative apportionment of 0.01 of the total'fire initiation frequency for the zone was assigned for the occurrence of a transient fire failing both CCW pumps on the basis that: Transient combustibles comprise only one category of ignition sources present in the zone.The 0.01 factor addresses, in part, the probability that a transient combustible fire initiates the fire scenario (rather than some other ignition source), and that the fire occurs in the vicinity of the pumps (the pump area occupies less than three percent of the total floor area).Transient combustibles would normally be in this area only during pump maintenance. The 0.01 factor also addresses, in part, the likelihood that the presence of significant transient combustibles within the vicinity of the pumps (such as a solvent spill)would not be detected within a relatively short period of time by the maintenance personnel, security personnel during hourly rounds, or plant operators during shift rounds.IV The Fire IPEEE was re-solved assuming that the CCW pumps always failed during a fire on the Auxiliary Building Operating Level (see response to RAI Question¹8).For this case, the fire CDF only increased by 8.8E-07/yr. This limited increase is due to the small potential for the need for CCW in the short term.While CCW would be required to support RHR cooling, the plant can remain on AFW for a long period of time.Also, there is no real scenario by which a fire at this location could create a PORV LOCA requiring RHR in the shortterm. b.Turbine Building Basement (TB-1)-Cables that supply offsite power to the 480V safeguards Buses 17 and 18 are routed in the turbine building basement near, and parallel to, the eastern wall.A review was performed of the location of potential fire sources.Most fire sources are not located near the cable runs.The primary fire source, the turbine lube oil reservoir and associated equipment, is located at the opposite end of the turbine building and is protected by a fire suppression system.Major lube oil piping Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 10 of 27 is also encased inside a guard pipe to collect leakage.The major portions of the hydrogen seal oil system are located toward the center of the turbine building, inside an enclosure with automatic fire doors and a fire suppression system.The most significant fire sources near the 480V safeguards bus cable runs are two of the condensate booster pumps and the four air compressors. Based on this arrangement of significant fire sources in the zone, a seven percent likelihood was assigned that fires occurring in TB-1 will be in the proximity of the offsite power cables supplying Buses 17 and 18, or will be of sufficient magnitude to propagate to that portion of the zone.The cables supplying Buses 14 and 16 are also located near, and parallel to, the east wall of fire zone TB-1 and travel a total distance of only ten feet within the zone.One of the condensate booster pumps is located near these cables.The cables supplying Buses 17 and 18 are located more than 20 feet from those supplying Buses 14 and 16.Based on this arrangement, a three percent likelihood was assigned that fires occurring in TB-1 will damage the offsite power cables supplying Buses 14 and 16 in addition to those supplying Buses 17 and 18.All other fires occurring in the zone were postulated not to damage the offsite power cables.The justification for the use of the three percent and seven percent values is as follows.An area extending 10 feet on either side of the cable runs would comprise a little less than eight percent of the turbine building basement area.Based roughly on these physical dimensions, a ten percent likelihood was assigned that fires occurring in TB-1 would be in the proximity of these cables, and cause damage to them.The most critical length for failing all four safeguards buses, below the 4kV Buses 12A and 12B, comprises about 20 percent of this cable run length.Therefore, the ten percent was further divided into seven percent for the cables to the safeguards Buses 17 and 18, and three percent to cables for all four safeguards buses, including Buses 14 and 16.Reactor Containment Mezzanine (RC-2)-Fires with sufficient intensity to damage equipment located in RC-2, other than those involving ignition of combustibles related to a reactor coolant pump (RCP), were postulated to damage all equipment in the zone, with the exception that RCS circulation was assumed to remain functional. This exception was made on the basis that no credible fire scenario was identified that could disable RCS forced circulation (i.e., both RCPs)and natural circulation (i.e., the pressurizer heaters and both shroud fans).Significant separation was identified between cables associated with these systems.In particular, the power and control cables for RCP A travel through the northwest quadrant of containment and those for RCP B travel through the southeast quadrant and are located over sixty feet apart.The pressurizer heater cables are located 24 feet from RCP B cables at the nearest point and over sixty feet from RCP A cables.The shroud fan control and power cables are located in close vicinity of RCP A cables but not those of RCP B cables.Therefore, for calculational purposes, RCP A and the shroud fans were arbitrarily selected as surviving this fire scenario. I Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 11 of 27 Auxiliary Building Basement Level (ABB)-The auxiliary building basement was divided into three sections for the purpose of defining fire scenarios (the charging room is its own separate zone).The division was based on walkdown observations, cable routing, and examinations of plant layout drawings.The safety injection pump area contains most of the electrical cables present in ABB;unsuppressed fires occurring in this area were conservatively assumed to damage all equipment and cables in this area.Propagation of fire from rooms in the northern part to the adjacent safety injection and charging pump rooms was judged not to be credible based on the presence of relatively few combustibles and the enclosure of these northern rooms by concrete walls.iii.In the RHR pump area, the vital equipment and cables installed in this area are separated from the adjacent safety injection pump area by approximately 40 feet, and the RWST occupies most of the space at the interface of the two areas.Propagation of fire from this area to the adjacent Sl pump area was judged not to be credible.Screen House Operating Level (SH-2)-The PSA-related equipment installed in the screen house operating level consists of two 480-VAC safeguards Buses 17 and 18, and the four service water (SW)pumps.No electrical cables are installed on the operating floor;therefore, consideration of cable-related fires was not necessary. Buses 17 and 18 are installed end-to-end (note: the cabinets are not installed back-to-back -the short ends of the cabinets are adjacent). 'abinet fires that are significant enough to damage more than two bus compartments were assumed to disable both buses, which results in a loss of all SW.Cabinet fires that do not disable more than two bus compartments result in the loss of no more than two SW pumps;therefore, two SW pumps were conservatively assumed to be unavailable for such fires.For fire scenarios which involve the SW pumps (installed on the operating level), no credible fire scenario was identified that would disable more than two SW pumps.No intervening combustibles are installed between the SW pumps (only the pump'motors are present on this floor;no cables are present)and only one fixed combustible (a diesel-driven fire pump)is installed within 20 feet of the pumps.Therefore, three sources of combustion were considered to be credible: (1)the potential for the ignition of one SW pump to damage other SW pumps, (2)the potential for the diesel-driven fire pump to damage the SW pumps, and (3)the potential for a transient combustible fire to damage the pumps. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 12 of 27 1.SW pump fire-The ignition of one SW pump was judged not to have the potential to cause damage to other SW pumps because: No combustible material is installed on the outer surface of the pumps;therefore, ignition of the other pumps is not likely.Damage of other SW pumps would require radiative or convective heat transfer.The SW pumps are installed in a large, open area and therefore the heat from the ignited pump would be dissipated. Only the SW pump motors are present on the operating level.Lubricant utilized for the pump motors is a small quantity of grease located within sealed bearings.This significantly reduces the likelihood for leakage of combustible material to the exterior of the pump, which eliminates the potential for a large pump lubricant spill, and reduces the likelihood for combustion of lubricant for neighboring SW pumps.Diesel fire pump fire-Two of the SW pumps are installed at distances of 8 and 16 feet from the diesel-driven fire pump (with the other two at 24 and 32 feet).A berm is installed to collect diesel fuel if spillage occurs and direct the spill to an outside sump.Therefore, a fire involving the diesel fuel (if no spraying of the fuel occurs)would be relatively confined.Conservatively, two SW pumps were postulated to be disabled because of the distance involved.Transient combustible fire-For the analysis, transient combustible fires were judged to be capable of damaging no more than two SW pumps.The bases for this are the same reasons described for the CCW pump in Section 2.a of this same response above (e.g., the pump area occupies less than 5%of the total floor area;transient combustibles would only be in the area during pump maintenance). A sensitivity analysis was performed for the assumption that only two of the four SW pumps were impacted by a fire on the Screenhouse operating floor.A 0.001 probability was assigned that a fire would impact all four pumps on the following basis: Each SW pump occupies less than 5%of the total floor area The SW pumps are installed with a centerline separation of eight feet The only fixed combustible is diesel fuel oil which would have to spray 32 feet to reach all four SW pumps Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 13 of 27~Transient combustibles would normally only be in the area during maintenance activities with personnel located nearby.There are also routine walk-throughs by security and plant operators. The results of the sensitivity analysis indicate that the CDF only increases by 1.50E-7/yr. This is due to the fact that Ginna Station can shutdown without SW and has procedures in place to do so.Basically, the plant can utilize the city water supply to plant hydrants to cool the DGs and provide a suction source to SAFW.This city water source has already been shown to be risk significant as described in Section 9.6.3.2 of Attachment B.3 (see response to RAI Question 48).Since there is sufficient basis to justify not assuming the loss of all 4 SW pumps, and the risk consequences are minimal using a conservati've scenario probability of 0.001, this analysis is considered acceptable. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 14 of 27 Transient combustible fires were not analyzed separately in the Ginna fire assessment. The submittal states that during the development of the fire frequencies, transient combustibles were grouped with the type of component that was primarily damaged by or exposed to the fire.Thus, the submittal states that the impact and consequences of transient combustible fires are accounted for in the modeled component fires, and no separate evaluation of transient fires was necessary. Based on the limited descripfion in the submiffal, it is unclear if the methodology accounts for transient fires at all crifical locafions in the plant.Specifically, it is unclear if a portion of the frequency of transient fires was accounted for in the evaluation of cable fires.Please provide a more defailed description of how the transient fire frequency was includedin the analysisincluding a description of how the frequency was parfifioned and the types of components assumed damaged or exposed to the fransient fires.If cables were notin the list of components damaged or exposed to the transient fires, provide a separate assessment of transient induced fire scenarios involving cables'in the unscreened fire zones containing cables.Appendices C (" Component/Location-Based Fire Ignition Frequency")and D (" Fire Frequency Apportionment")to the 1998 submittal detail the development of the fire ignition frequencies for the Ginna fire zones.Included in this process are fires due to transient combustibles, as extracted from the PLG generic fire database (proprietary). While these appendices were never submitted to the NRC, selected portions of Appendices C and D have been extracted and included as Attachment B.2 to supplement the response to this que'stion. The appendices in their entirety can be provided to the NRC if required.There were 230 fire incidents retained from the PLG generic fire database for applicability as generic fires for Ginna.Of these 230, six (2.6%)could definitively be attributed to the presence of transient combustibles: ¹s 66, 73, 75, 77, 113, and 114 listed in Table C-2 of Appendix C (see Attachment B.2).Three of these occurred in the auxiliary building, and one each in the control room, diesel generator room, and turbine building, of other plants.These six fires were included among those assigned to their respective locations when generic fire frequencies were estimated for the Bayesian prior distribution. These priors were subsequently combined with the Ginna-speciTic likelihood to yield the posterior fire ignition frequencies. The extracted portions of Appendix C in Attachment B.2 discuss the treatment of the generic data prior to frequency analysis (e.g., grouping, assignment of unidentified plant events).Of the 14 fire events identified at Ginna Station as being applicable to the analysis (see Table C-3 in Attachment B.2), two (¹2-relay room and¹13-turbine building basement), could be attributed to transient combustibles. As shown in Table C-4 (¹s 48 and 72), both of these were included among the plant-specific fires used in the Bayesian likelihood to generate the posterior fire frequency for these zones.Appendix D (see Attachment B.2)describes the frequency apportionment technique based on combustibles within each fire zone, including the table with the final assigned frequencies by zone and combustible. Tables D-1 and D-2 in Attachment B.2 indicate that cable fires were apportioned for nearly every fire zone, including the five (auxiliary building, control room, diesel generator room, turbine building, and relay room, and their respective Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 15 of 27 sub-zones) mentioned above as specific sites of previous transient combustible fires at Ginna and other plants.Section 3.5 of the 1998 submittal discusses the types of components assumed to be damaged by or exposed to fire effects.These consist of power, control, and instrumentation cables (including hot shorting); and all equipment modeled in the internal events PSA except for the following: piping, tanks, check valves, and manual valves.The areas in which transient fires have historically occurred, either at Ginna or other plants, and in which transient fires were included among the Ginna ignition frequencies, possess all the types of equipment susceptible to fire effects as listed above.Therefore, these same types of components were assumed to be damaged by or exposed to the effects of transient combustible fires.Consequently, the frequency of transient fires from other plants and from Ginna is included in the fire frequencies for the various Ginna areas.Furthermore, the potential for transient fires was specifically evaluated in the fire scenarios where detailed analyses of critical locations were performed. Examples are discussed in the response to RAI Question¹3.For all other areas, it was assumed that a fire affected all equipment within the area.Thus, there would be no additional effect on CDF from a transient fire in these areas.Finally, Section 9.6.3.1 of Attachment 8.3 indicates that only four fire initiators had high Risk Achievement Worth values,(i.e., RAW~10)with a Fussell-Vesely value<0.05 (i.e., these initiators do not contribute significantly to the CDF now, but would do so if they were assumed to occur more frequently). a.FIDG1B10 (Fire in the DG Room B Cable Vault)-This room is normally closed off and requires a"confined space entry" permit to enter.Consequently, this area would not be expected to normally contain any transient combustibles. FIOCR3-3 (Fire in the Control Room Which Only Fails One Electrical Train)-This area is always manned.Transient combustibles would normally be present during maintenance activities when even more personnel are in the Control Room.Since a generic transient combustible fire in this room was already assigned as discussed above, no further consideration is required.c.FIOOABO1 (Fire in the Auxiliary Building Operating Level)-A generic transient combustible fire was already assigned to this area as discussed above.The issue of a transient combustible failing both trains of CCW is described in the response to RAI Question¹3.FIOOAHR1 (Fire in the Air Handling Room)-This secured area only contains an air handling unit and MCC.Traffic in this area is limited to personnel working in or touring the room.Therefore, transient combustibles would only be present during maintenance activities for which personnel would be in the room.Consequently, further consideration of transient combustibles would not be expected to offer any more risk insights. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 16 of 27 Two fire zones (IBM-1 and IBS-1)are identified in the submittal which are not listed as being either qualitatively or quantitatively screened.Since the results of a detailed fire PRA evaluation for these fire zones are also not given in the submittal, the importance of these two fire zones is unknown.Pleaseindicateif these two fire zones were screened orsubjected to a detailed fire scenario evaluation. Provide descriptions for any fire scenarios modeled for these fire zones and list the estimated core damage frequencies. Table 3-2 in the 1998 submittal,"Fire Areas and Fire Zones of Ginna Nuclear Power Plant," lists the 64 fire zones subjected to the Phase 1 qualitative screening. Both IBN-1 and IBS-1 are included, as parts of the Intermediate Building (IB)and ABI fire area.Table 3-4,"Frequency Allocation for Ginna," indicates the 48.fire zones which survived qualitative screening in Phase 1.Both IBN-1 and IBS-1 are indicated as survivors, for which a fire ignition frequency was estimated. Table 3-6,"Quantitative Screening Results," indicates the 29 fire zones for which conservative estimates of their contribution to CDF fell below the Phase 2 quantitative screening cut-off threshold of 1E-6/yr.IBS-1 is included, with its CDF of 9.9E-8/yr. IBN-1 is not, since it survived for detailed evaluation in Phase 3.Table 3-9,"Quantification Summary for Phase 3 Fire Scenarios," lists all scenarios subjected to detailed CDF evaluation, with their final CDF results.Zone IBN-1 is included, with three scenarios IBN-1-1, IBN-1-2, and IBN-1-3, and CDF estimates of 1.3E-8/yr, 6.2E-8/yr, and 2.1E-6/yr, respectively. The Comments column in Table 3-9 summarizes each of these scenarios. Table 3-10,"Phase 3 Fire Analysis Results Sorted by Contribution," indicates that fire zone IBN-1 contributes 3%to the overall fire CDF.Also, evaluations of both of these fire zones are described in the new fire results provided in Attachment B.3 (see response to RAI Question iti8).These results indicate slightly smaller contributions to CDF based on more detailed evaluation of required operator actions. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 17 of 27 6.NUREG-1407 [2], Section 4.2 and Appendix C, and GL 88-20, Supplement 4[3], request that documentation be submitted with the IPEEE submittal with regard to the FRSS[4]issues, including the basis and assumptions used to address these issues, and a discussion of the findings and conclusions. NUREG-1407 also requests that evaluation results and potential improvements be specifically highlighted. Control system interactions involving a combination of fire-induced failures and high probability random equipment failures were identified in the FRSS as potential contributors to fire risk.The issue of control systems interactions is associated primarily with the potential that a fire in the plant (e.g., the INCR)might lead to potential control systems vulnerabilities. Given a fire in the plant, the likely sources of control systems interactions are between the control room, the remote shutdown panel, and shutdown systems.Specific areas that have been identified as requiring attention in the resolution of this issue include:(a)Electrical independence of the remote shutdown control systems: The primary concern of control systems interactions occurs at plants that do not provide independent remote shutdown control systems.The electrical independence of the remote shutdown panel and the evaluation of the level of indication and control of remote shutdown control and monitoring circuits need to be assessed.(b)Loss of control equipment or power before transfer: The potential for loss of control power for certain control circuits as a result of hot shorts and/or blown fuses before transferring control from the MCR to remote shutdown locations needs to be assessed.(c)Spurious actuation of components leading to component damage, loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), or interfacing systems LOCA: The spurious actuation of one or more safety-related to safe-shutdown-related components as a result of fire-induced cable faults, hot shorts, or component failures leading to component damage, LOCA, or interfacing systems LOCA, prior to taking control from the remote shutdown panel, needs to be assessed.This assessment also needs to include the spurious starting and running of pumps as well as the spurious repositioning of valves.It does appear that the assessment has included this aspect of the concern.(d)Total loss of system function: The potential for total loss of system function as a result of fire-induced redundant component failures or electrical distribution system (power source)failure needs to be addressed. Please describe your remote shutdown capabi%ty, including the nature and location of the shutdown station(s), as well as the types of control actions which can be taken from the remote panel(s).Describe how your procedures provide for transfer of control to the remote shutdown station(s). Provide an evaluation of whether loss of control power could occur prior to transferring control to the remote shutdown location andidentify the risk contribution of these types of failures (if these failures are screened, please provide the basis for the screening). Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 18 of 27 Safe shutdown is normally accomplished from the Control Room by utilizing the safe shutdown equipment along with other available equipment. The plant EOPs are used in these instances. Some operator actions are typically required to be taken outside the Control Room for shutdown and would also be expected as a result of fires in specific fire areas.This is the preferred shutdown method and is defined as"normal safe shutdown." If there is a fire in any fire area which has the potential to interfere with performing shutdown activities from the Control Room, the operators will proceed to the alternative shutdown stations as directed by Procedure AP-CR.1 (which is a"direct" entry procedure) and the ER.FIRE series of procedures. For five Ginna Station fire areas, compliance with the provisions of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R cannot be effectively or economically achieved due to the existing plant configuration (i.e., shutdown in these areas cannot be effectively performed from the control room).These areas are: 2.3.4 5.Control Complex (CC)a.Control Room (CR)b.Relay Room (RR)c.Air Handling Room (AHR)Cable Tunnel (CT)Auxiliary Building Basement/Mezzanine (ABBM)Battery Room A (BR1A)Battery Room 8 (BR1B)For these areas, RG8 E has determined that the appropriate technical approach necessary to comply with Section III.G of Appendix R is to provide an alternative shutdown capability per the provisions of Section III.G.3.The alternative shutdown method establishes a coordinated series of operational and procedural manipulations of existing redundant safe shutdown systems.This method provides independent control stations for the equipment and systems normally controlled from the Control Room.The alternative shutdown method provides an additional means to ensure safe shutdown of the Ginna plant in the event of an unmitigated fire in any of these five fire areas of concern.Two types of alternative shutdown stations have been designated: 1.Primary Shutdown Stations-stations that would be manned continuously and provided with the necessary instrumentation and support functions to meet safe shutdown performance goals;and 2.Support Stations-stations with staffing requirements of a transient nature.These are discussed below.Staffing requirements impose a constraint on the location and features of the remote shutdown stations.The Code of Federal Regulations and Ginna Station procedures and Technical Specifications require that at least seven operators and a Shift Technical Advisor Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 19 of 27 (STA)be assigned to each operating crew when in Modes 1 through 4.Since two operators are assigned to the fire brigade and would not be available for the first hour, only five operators and the STA remain for plant shutdown.For fires requiring ex-control room activities, these five operators and the STA are typically dedicated as follows: Head Control Operator (HCO)-responsible for establishing auxiliary feedwater flow to at least one steam generator and monitoring associated process variables. Control Operator (CO)-responsible for assuring makeup and pressure control of the reactor coolant system and isolating secondary systems.3.Control Room Foreman (CRF)-responsible for tripping and manually loading equipment of480V buses in the Screenhouse building and monitoring turbine-driven AFW.4.Auxiliary Operator (AO)-responsible for assisting the STA in establishing on-site power, verification of closure of pressure boundary and spurious operation valves, and assisting other operators in stabilizing the plant.5.Shift Technical Advisor (STA)-responsible for assuring the availability of on-site power, starting the DGs, and assisting the HCO in stabilizing the plant.6.Shift Supervisor (SS)-responsible for stripping some DC electrical loads and maintaining oversight. The HCO and the CO are assigned to Primary Shutdown Stations when not performing other duties in support of their prime functions. The Auxiliary Operator acts as a"rover" for the first hour.The STA and CRF are initially assigned to a Support Station and, upon completion of required actions, report back to the SS.These five operators and the STA would be augmented at the end of the first hour by the operators recalled as part of the accident recovery team.For a fire in any plant area, all required safe shutdown functions can be achieved and maintained either by use of protected plant equipment operated from the Control Room in the normal mode, or by the operation of required equipment from a designated Primary Shutdown or Support Station.For the majority of fires, safe shutdown can be accomplished from the Control Room.However, for the five specified fire areas, shutdown from the Control Room may not be possible.Because of this, certain remote plant locations have been designated as Primary Shutdown or Support Stations.These locations contain the necessary control and instrumentation to achieve and maintain the required safe shutdown functions. A fire at these locations does not impair the achievement and maintenance of safe shutdown from the Control Room.These locations and the capabilities they provide are described as follows.1.Char in Pum Room Prima Station-Auxilia Buildin Basement a.Transfer switch to isolate control circuits of Charging Pump A Bus 14 power breakers from fire; Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 20 of 27 b.Independent VCT level and pressurizer level indication to local indicator panel;c.Independent Appendix R DC power source for the local indicators panel;d.Local start/stop switches to operate Charging Pump A from this location.2.Auxilia Feedwater Pum Area Prima Station-Intermediate Buildin North b.C.d.Independent RCS loop temperature', steam generator level, steam generator pressure, turbine-driven AFW flow, pressurizer pressure and level indication; Independent Appendix R DC power source for the local indicator panel;Local operation of TDAFW pump DC lube oil pump;Local source range monitor hookup.b.Local operation of DG A feeder breaker (52/EG1A1) and isolation of DC control power to control circuit;Local operation of Bus 12 feeder breaker (Bus 14 480V feed from 4160V distribution); Transfer switch to isolate the control power to Bus 14 and supply Charging Pump A control circuit with alternative DC power;Manual stripping of all non-safe shutdown loads.Diesel Generator Area Su ort Station a.Transfer switches to isolate required Control Room control circuits (for DG A);b.Alternative local DG A start/stop speed and voltage control;c.Alternative DG A diagnostic instrumentation. 480V AC Bus 14 Su ort Station-Auxilia Buildin Batte Rooms A and B Su ort Station Operation of breakers at Main Fuse Cabinets A and B, and Main DC Distribution Panels A and B to: a.b.C.d.Verify required power supply to Turbine Building DC Distribution Panel;Verify required power supply to Auxiliary Building Distribution Panels A and B;Verify required power supply to DG A and B DC Distribution Panels;Align TSC diesel generator DC power supply to Main Fuse Cabinet A and/or B for long-term DC supply if necessary; Isolate DC control power to potential spurious operation components. Motor Control Centers C and D Su ort Station-Auxilia Buildin Isolate motive power to potential spurious operation components. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 21 of 27 7.480V AC Bus 18 Su ort Station-Screenhouse b.Local operation of DG A feeder breaker (52/EG1A2) and isolation of DC control power to control circuit;Local operation of Bus 12 feeder breaker (Bus 18 480V feed from 4160V distribution) and isolation of DC control power to control circuit;Local operation of the feeder breaker for Service Water pump A and isolation of DC control power to control circuits.Valve Locations Various valves must be checked and verified closed in order to ensure primary system integrity and to preclude spurious operation of these valves affecting the achievement and maintenance of safe shutdown.These valves are listed in the ER-FIRE procedures. Other valves located in the specific safe shutdown flow path for a particular safe shutdown system are verified open or closed by the operator before the operation of the system.All valves that must be verified open or closed, either to ensure normal system operation or to prevent a spurious operation, will have their associated power breakers (AC or DC)shut off prior to the manual operation. Fire-induced failures (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground)postulated to cause loss of control power prior to transferral to the remote shutdown location will not prevent operation nor cause mal-operation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method.Such loss of control power or post-fire mal-operation is prevented by: 1.Isolation/transfer switches which electrically isolate the alternative shutdown circuits from the fire areas of concern;2.The de-energization of unnecessary DC and AC control and power circuits at various distribution panels and buses;3.The isolation of instrument air supply to potential spurious operation solenoid valves;4.The provisions for alternative shutdown electrical power from sources which will be electrically protected and coordinated; 5.The separation of the alternative shutdown circuits from the fire areas of concern by rated fire barriers and penetration seals.Operator actions that must take place locally in the event of Control Room evacuation to prevent core damage from fire were identified. The ER.FIRE series of procedures were previously developed to guide the operators during alternative shutdown operations. These procedures are entered directly from AP-CR.1 or in parallel to the EOPs.The fire procedures are as follows: 1.ER-FIRE.1-Alternate Shutdown for Control Complex Fire Response to Fire IPEEE Questions 2.ER-FIRE.2-Alternate Shutdown for Cable Tunnel Fire Page 22 of 27 3.ER-FIRE.3-Alternate Shutdown for Auxiliary Building Basement/Mezzanine Fire 4.ER-FIRE.4-Alternate Shutdown for Battery Room A Fire 5.ER-FIRE.5-Alternate Shutdown for Battery Room B Fire The procedures were reviewed as part of the Fire IPEEE with specific human events added to the fault tree models to reflect each action (see response to RAI Question¹8).The importances of these human actions are described in Section 9.6.3.2 of Attachment 8.3.As is evident from this attachment, several of th'e ER-FIRE activities were identified as being of high or medium risk significance. The ability of the Primary Stations to provide necessary indication to perform the above actions was also specifically modeled, i.e., failure of power or indication to the Stations was assumed to prevent the operator action with a probability =1.The cumulative contribution to the overall fire CDF from failure to locally perform these human actions is to increase the CDF by a factor of 11.3.(If all these failures are assumed not to occur[i.e., failure probability =0], the CDF is reduced by 9.5%.) Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 23 of 27 7.The submittal indicates that the"automatic fire detection and suppression systems at Ginna were assumed to be installed per design specifications, following the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)and NRC guidelines." The submittal also states that fire protection systems were assumed to be maintained regularly and that generic failure rates were used in the analysis.It is not clear that these assumptions were verified.Piease verify that the automatic fire suppression systems at Ginna are, in fact, designed and maintained according to NFPA sfandards. Ginna Station's fire protection systems were installed during three different periods: (1)with the original plant systems from 1966 to 1969, (2)beginning in 1979 with upgrades related to 10CFR50 Appendix A as a result of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), and (3)finishing in 1985 with 10CFR50 Appendix R upgrades.Original plant fire suppression systems were designed utilizing codes and engineering judgement applicable in the 1966-1969 time frame.SEP-related suppression systems were designed by an A/E firm (Gilbert/Commonwealth, as per RG&E Engineering Work Request[EWR]1833)using applicable NFPA codes beginning in 1979 for guidance and engineering judgement regarding the hazards to be protected. Plant fire detection and annunciation systems were designedby RG&E engineering personnel utilizing applicable NFPA codes for guidance and engineering judgement, as documented in EWR 1832.NRC SER's dated 2/14/79, 12/17/80, 2/6/81 and 6/22/81 document acceptability of installed systems and other plant fire protection features with respect to General Design Criterion 3.Appendix R suppression systems were designed by an A/E firm (Gilbert/Commonwealth, as per RG8E EWR 4139)using NFPA codes applicable in 1985 for guidance and engineering judgement regarding the hazards to be protected for additional areas identified to require improved capability. Additional plant detection and annunciation systems were designed by RG8 E engineering personnel utilizing applicable NFPA codes for guidance and engineering judgement, as documented in EWR 4176.Separate NRC SER's dated 2/27/85 and 3/21/85 document acceptability of these installed systems and general compliance with III.G and III.L of Appendix R to 10CFR50.Plant fire protection systems are regularly tested and maintained as required by the applicable sections of the Ginna Station Technical Requirements Manual (i.e., tests previously required by technical specifications) and plant procedures. Data on the operation of plant suppression and detection systems are included in analysis DA-ME-97-081 which reviewed six years of plant performance history, in order to justify extended surveillance intervals. This was reviewed and accepted by NRC reviewers. Therefore, due to the vintage of Ginna Station, the fire suppression systems were not designed to NFPA standards; however, as they have been modified, they have used NFPA standards for guidance.These systems, and their testing program, have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC as documented above.As such, the impact of the assumption on the IPEEE as documented in the 1998 submittal is considered neglible. 0 Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 24 of 27 8.The Ginna fire IPEEE submittal identifies one plant improvement planned for implementation and five additional plant modifications that were being considered. It is not clear if these improvements and modification were credited in the analysis, and whether or not the changes have been, or will be, implemented. Please provide the currenf sfafus of these planned and proposed planf modifications andindicafe whefher or nof the changes have been creditedin fhe analysis.As discussed in Section 6 of the 1998 submittal, the following plant modification was planned and, therefore, credited in the analysis: "Fuses will be installed on control circuits routed in the screen house associated with the functioning of 4160 VAC circuit breakers 52/1 7SS and 52/1 8SS.The fuses will be designed to open if grounding occurs, as is postulated to occur for screen house fires, permitting the overcurrent protection function associated with circuit breakers 52/17SS and 52/18SS to remain intact." This modification was implemented on March 4, 1999, with the installation of two fuses in series each with the two circuit breakers, namely fuses FUMCB/XSH1-N and FUMCB/XSH1-P for 52/18SS, and fuses FUMCB/XSH2-N and FUMCB/XSH2-P for 52/1 7SS.The 1998 submittal also documented five additional plant modifications that were under consideration. In response to several NRC questions, and the desirability to incorporate the Fire IPEEE into the Ginna Station Risk Monitor (i.e., EOOS), the fire analysis was re-performed. This re-analysis maintained the previous fire frequencies and consequences (i.e., assumed fire-induced failures), but added models of the fire suppression systems and modeled required operator actions in more detail.The results of this re-analysis are presented in Attachment B.3.As shown in Sections 11.6.2 and 11.6.3 (see Attachment B.3), no vulnerabilities were identified, and none of the five plant modiTications identified in the 1998 submittal remain under consideration. The basis for eliminating the need for these plant modifications was primarily removing unnecessary conservatism and appropriately crediting existing procedural actions.As such, no plant modifications are under consideration. A procedural enhancement as discussed in Attachment B.3 was identiTied for commercial considerations only and is not required based on risk insights. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 25 of 27 9.Both manual actuation of automatic fire suppression systems and manual fire suppression were modeled for selected fire scenarios in the Ginna fire assessment. In some scenarios, failure of automatic fire suppression, failure to manually initiate automatic suppression systems, and failure to manually suppress the fire were modeled.The submittal does not address the potential for dependent failure of both automatic and manual suppression systems (e.g., common mode failures related to a common water source)~Pleaseindicateif dependent failures between the automatic and manual suppression systems were consideredin the assignment of the suppression probabilities. Also indicate if dependencies between the failure of personnel to manually initiate an automatic suppression system and failure of personnel to manually suppress a fire were considered. Indicate if dependent failures that would cause the failure of an automatic suppression system to actuate and also prevent manually initiating the system were consideredin the analysis.The potential for dependent failures of systems and operator dependencies were considered and evaluated for the IPEEE.The discussion is presented in three parts: (1)considerations of potential dependencies between automatic and manual suppression systems, (2)considerations of potential dependencies between the failure of personnel to manually initiate automatic suppression systems and the failure of personnel to manually suppress a fire, and (3)considerations of potential dependencies between faults that cause automatic actuation to fail that would also prevent manual initiation of the system.1.No significant dependencies were found to exist between manual suppression efforts and installed suppression systems at Ginna Station.Although manual suppression efforts may utilize the fire water system, which is shared by the installed fire sprinklers, the unavailability of fire water was found to be insignificant relative to the failures of manual suppression and the fire sprinkler unavailability. Fire water is supplied to the plant from three independent and redundant sources: city water provides one source (for plant hydrants), a diesel-driven fire pump supplying lake water provides a second source, and a motor-driven fire pump supplying lake water provides a third source (the pumps have independent suction lines, and actuation mechanisms). The diesel-driven and motor-driven fire pumps, and their actuation systems, were specifically modelled, while the city water system was not.However, there are no dependencies between the plant fire pumps and city water system that could be impacted by a fire.Additionally, many fires can be suppressed manually using extinguishers (in fact, the experience data indicates most fires are manually suppressed with extinguishers). This provides diverse equipment for fire suppression. Smoke sensors that alert operators of the presence of fire operate independently of installed suppression systems.Due to the presence of multiple fire brigade personnel that dispatch in response to plant fires and the significant differences in the actions associated with manually initiating the installed fire sprinklers from the control room and manually suppressing the fire, no signiTicant dependencies were judged to exist between these two actions.Note that modeling of manual actuation of the fire sprinkler system was included for"early" suppression (within a few minutes), while other manual Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 26 of 27 suppression efforts are longer term, again providing a basis for independence. Additionally, failure of smoke sensors, which would constitute a common cause failure of fire brigade dispatch, was examined.The smoke sensor circuits are designed such that a break in the circuit, or failure of a sensor, would not impact the remaining circuits and sensors.Also, such a failure will trigger an alarm indicating a circuit failure.Therefore, failure of the smoke sensors is significantly less likely than the combined failure probability for manual actuation of the sprinklers and manual suppression. Finally, a review of the results presented in Attachment B.3 (see Section 9.6.3.4)shows that only failures of the fire brigade to extinguish a fire in the Control and Battery Rooms were of medium risk significance (none were high).These two rooms have no installed suppression system.3.Dependencies between the automatic sprinkler actuation system and the manual sprinkler actuation system were addressed by only allowing recovery of automatic actuation failures (i.e., start circuitry) vs.hardware failures of the diesel-driven and motor-driven fire pumps or sprinkler deluge valves.That is, the PSA explicitly modeled the manual actuation recoveries and accounted for any dependencies with the automatic actuation systems within the fault tree logic.It should be noted that the model did not specifically model the ability to cross-connect the city water system to the onsite system as this was assumed to be included within the human failure probability to extinguish the fire as discussed in the response to RAI Question¹1. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions References Page 27 of 27 1.EPRI,"Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE)," EPRI TR-100370, April 1992.2.J.Chen, et al.,"Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE)for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," NUREG-1407, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1991.3."Independent Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE)for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities -10CFR 50.54(f)," Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement No.4, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1991.4.J.Lambright, et al.,"Fire Risk Scoping Study: Investigation of Nuclear Power Plant Fire Risk, Including Previously Unaddressed Issues," NUREG/CR-5508, prepared for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1989.5."User's Guide for a Personal-Computer-Based Nuclear Power Plant Fire Data Base," NUREG/CR-4586, prepared for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1986. Response to Fire IPEEE Questions ATTACHMENT B.I EXTRACTS FROM APPENDICES B AND E TO THE I998 SUBMITTAL B.Location Characteristics Table All relevant plant information was assembled into a relational database using the software Microsoft ACCESS.The computer database imported existing plant information provided by the Ginna plant personnel and related each piece of plant information to the fire area and fire zones defined in this analysis.The information was then summarized into a set of location characteristics tables (LCT)for subsequent analyses.'n LCT was developed for each fire area within the control area of Ginna.Each LCT contains 7 items: Fire Area Description. This section describes the fire zones within each fire area, the location and the floor area covered by the fire area.Fire/Smoke Hazards in this Fire Area.The information contained in this section was obtained from review of the Ginna Station Appendix R program information. This section provides an estimate of the normal inventory of in-site and transient fire and smoke hazards.An estimate of the fire severity (in hours)is also included.The fire severity was obtained by dividing the fire loadings by the heat rate for Standard Exposure Fire (80,000 BTU/ft'-hr) established by the National Fire Protection Association. Fire Protection Features in this Fire Area.This section describes the fire detection and suppression capabilities equipped in the fire area.This includes the primary and backup sup'pression system and the barrier rating of the fire area.The information included in this section was obtained from Reference 11 (Tier 1).Fire Zone'Adjacent to the Fire Zones in this Fire Area.This section lists the adjacent fire zones to the fire zones within the fire area.The adjacency information is essential in the development of fire propagation scenarios. Potential Key Equipment and their Associated Basic Event Impacted by Fire/Smoke Hazards in this Fire Area.This section includes a list of plant components, within each fire zone in the fire area, that can be affected by fire and smoke hazards and whose failure can lead to an initiating event, or can impact the accident mitigation systems.Some of the components included in this section also act as fire ignition sources and fire hazards.Thus, each component was categorized to a component type for identification purpose.This information is also used in the consideration of the fire frequency apportionment analysis (see Appendix D).P:11 686'AGE.B.DOC/oc B-1 0 B-.Location Characteristics Table 6.Potential Raceway (Conduit and Cable Tray)and their Associated Equipment/Basic Event Impacted by Fire/Smoke Hazards in this Fire Area.This section provides a list of raceways in each of the zones in the fire area, Failure of the raceway can lead to the loss of the intended function of plant components (that are not within the fire zone)whose failure can lead to an initiating event, or can impact the accident mitigation systems.The cable trays associated with the safety equipment were identified from a database relating cables and conduit to the equipment served.This database resides at the Electrical Engineering Department of the Ginna Station and contains all cable tray information related to the Appendix R and fire PRA programs.The fire zone location of each cable tray was then identified by looking up the identification number of the cable trays and finding the fire zone location from the cable routing diagrams.7.Walkdown Notes.This section includes the notes taken during the two spatial interactions walkdowns. PA1886%GE-B.DOCIoc B-2 LOCATION CKQU).CTERISTICS TABLE~~FlRE AREA: ABBM 1.FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA:'IRE ZONE ELEV (FT.)FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION I BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ, FT.)ABB 23S 8 AUXILIARY BUILDING BASEMENT LEVEL 9590 ABM 253'UXILIARY BUILDING MEZZANINE LEVEL 10570 2.FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU)FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)AB8 8.150 22.819 6.1 min.17.1 min.3.FIRE PROTECTION FEATUIKS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES AB8 Smoke deiersors Preackon sprinkfers, manual I Smoke deleorors Manual 4.FIRE ZONE(S)ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S)IN THIS FIRE AREA: j FIRE ZONE ADJACENT FIRE ZONE PATHWAY PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)ABB AB8 AB8 ASM ASM CHG RC-1 IBS4I RC-2 68-1 IBS.1 WALUOPEN WALL WALL WALL WALL 5.POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC AFFECTED'VENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION I ABB 1108 AB8 111 ABB 1120 AB8 313 I ABB 52/CSP1A ABB 52/CSP18 ABB 52/RHRP1A ABB 52/RHRP1A ABB 52/RHRP18 ABB 52/RHRP18!AB8 52/SIP 1 A ABB 52/SIP1A ABB 52/SIPI8 I ABB 52/SIP I 8 AB8 52/SIP I CI ABB 52/SIP 1 C2 AB8 624 AB8 625 ABB 8508 AB8 856 AB8 657A AB8 6578 ABB 8570 ABB 860A ABB 6608 CVAVP01108 CVAVP00111 CVAVC0112C CVMVX 0031 3 CSMPFSI02A CSMPF S1028 RRMPFAC01A RHMPFACOIA RHMPFAC018 RRMPFAC018 SNPFSIOIA SRMPFSIOIA SNPFSI018 SRMPFSIOI 8 SNPFS101C SRMPF SIOIC RRAVF00624 RRAVF00625 RRMVP0850A RRMVP06508 RHMVK00656 RRMVP0657A RRMVP 08578 RRMVP0657C CSMVP0660A CSMVP06608 AOV 1108 IN UNE FROM BA BLENDER TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION FAILS TO OPEN (STDBY: AOV 111 IN LINE FROM RMW PUMPS TO BA BLENDER FAILS TO OPEN (STANDBY)AIR.OPERATED VALVE 112C FAILS TO CLOSE MOV 313 Fels to Close CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP PSI02A FAILS TO RUN (IN JECTION)CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP PSI028 FAILS TO RUM (IN JECTION)MOTOR.DRIVEN PUMP PACOIA FAILS TO RUM (RECIRC)RHR PUMPA(PACOIA) FAILSTO RUN RHR PUMP 8 (PACOI 8)FAILS TO RUN MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP PACOI8 FAILS TO RUN (RECIRC)PSOI A FAILS TO RUM PSIOI A FAILS TO RUN PSI018 FAILS TO RUN PS/018 FAILS TO RUN PSI01C FAILS TO RUN PSIOI C FAILS TO RUN FAILURE OF AOV 624 TO THROTTLE FLOW FAILURE OF AOV 625 TO THROTTLE FLOW MOTORS)PE RATE 0 VALVE 850A FAILS TO OPEN (RECIRC)MOTORAPERATED VALVE 6508 FAILS TO OPEN (RECIRC)MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE 856 TRANSFERS CLOSED (INJECTION) MOTORS)PERATED VALVE 00656 PALS TO CLOSE (STANDBY)MOV 657A FAILS TO OPEN MOV 8578 FAILS TO OPEN MOV 857C FAILS TO OPEN MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 660A FAILS TO OPEN ON DEMAND (INJECTION) MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 6608 FAILS TO OPEN ON DEMAND (INJECTION) P816361RCE B.I.DOC/cc B-3 9/lb/93 12;IO;06 PM LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ABBM~AB8 860C CSMVP0660C ABB 860D CSMVP06600 ABB MOTOR OPERATEO VALVE 6600 FAlLS TO OPEN ON DEMAND (INJECTION) MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 8600 FAILS TO OPEN ON DEMAND (INJECTION) MOTOR OPERATEO VALVE 896A FAILS TO CLOSE ON DEMAND (RECIRCULATION) AB8 ABM I ABM ABM ABM LT.920 LT-921 4615 4616 4735 52/16 52/I 6SS 52/COP I 8 52/CF18 C RMVZ06968 CSLTLLT920 CSLTLLT921 SWMVC04615 SvvMVC04616 SWMVC04735 ACCBD16118 ACT1FSST16 ACCBN16168 ACC BN1613C MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 8968 FAILS TO CLOSE ON DEMAND (RECIRCULATION) RWST LEVEL TRAN SMllTER LT.920 FAII.S LOW RWST LEVEL TRANSMllTER LT.921 FAILS LOW Soniice Water Header Isoladon MOV 4615 Fafs To Cisse On Demand Service Water Header Isola don MOV 4616 Pals To Close On Demand Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4735 Fels To Close On Demand Ac BREAKER 52/16 (BUS16/118) FAILS TO OPERATE Fauk on 4160/480 VAC Bus 16 supply Transformer PXABSS016 Ac BREAKER 52/COP 18 (8 US 16/168)FAILS TO OPEN Ac BREAKER 52/CFI 8 (BUS16/13C) FAILS TO OPEN ABii 52ICF1C ACCBN1614A Ac BREAKER 52/CFIC (BUS16/14A) FAILS TO OPEN ABM ABM i ABM i ABM I ABM 52/CHPI 8 52/CHPI C 52/EG181 52/MCCD 52/MCCD 52/SFPPB ACCBN16158 ACCBN1615C ACCBD1611C DCCFRA188P ACCBRMCC ID ACCBN1617A Ac BREAKER 52/CHPI 8 (BUS16/158) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/CHP1C (BUS16/15C) FAILS TO OPEN OGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG181 (BUS16/I 1c)FAILS TO OPERATE Fuse FUDCPDPA8018/2P Fails Opon (To MCC D)460 VAC MCCD Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/MCCO (8VS1 6/I 60)Trans/ors Open)Ac BREAKER 52/SFPPB (BUS16/17A) FA!LS TO OPEN ASM 738A 7388 617 83/I 6 9704A CCMVP0738A CCMVP07358 CCMVK00617 DCREBBUSIB AFMVX9704A MOTOR4)PERATED VALVE 736A FAlLS TO OPEN MOTORS)P ERAT ED VALVE 7388 FAILS TO OPEN MOTOR4)P VALVE 817 TRAHSFERS CLOSED RELAY 83E/16 (BVS 16 Oc THROWOVF R)FAILS TO OEENERGIZE Motor operated valve 9704A fals to dose ABM ABM ABM ABM ABM ABM ABM I I ABM I ABM ABM ABM ABM ABM ABM I ABM ABM ABM ABM i ABM 97048 ACPDPAB10 ACPDPA811 ACPDPA812 ACPDPA813 BATP1 8 BUS16UV BUS16UV BUS16UV BUS16UV BUS16UV BUS16UV BUS16UV BVS16UV BUS16VV BUS16UV BUS16UV BUS16UV BUS16UV BVS16UV 8US16UV BUS16UV BUS16UV BUS16W BUS16VV BUS'l6UV BUS16UV BU S16UV BUS16UV BUS16UV BUS16UV AF MVX97048 AC82FOAB10 ACB2FOA811 AC82FOA812 AC82FOA813 CVMPAPCH38 UVREEOX316 WLCOBX46A UVLCDBX56A UVREEOX616 WLC D BX66A WLCDBX16A UVLCDX316A WLCOX416A WLCDX516A UVLCDX61 6A AFCTR78616 UVREEOX216 WLCOBX616 AFCTR07616 UVLCO BX36A UVREEOX116 UVREKOX416 WCFR16FV2 UVRE E BX316 UVREEBX216 WLCDBX316 UVLCDOX418 UVREEBX116 WREEBX516 UVLCDBX116 Motor operated valve 97048 fails lo doss LOCAL FAULT ON 460 VAC DIST PANEL ACPDPA810 TO PRZR PROPOR HEATER GROUP A1 LOCAL FAULT ON 460 VAC DIST PANEL ACPDPA811 TO PRZR PROPOR HEATER GROUP A2 LOCAL FAULT ON 490 VAC DIST PANEL ACPDPA812 TO PRZR BACKUP HEATER GROUP 81 LOCAL FAULT ON 490 VAC DIST PANEL ACPDPAB13 TO PRZR BACKUP HEATER GROUP 82 BORIC ACID MOTOR4)RIVEN PUMP PCH038 FAILS TO START Relay 27X3/16 faits lo energize RELAY 278X4/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL RELAY 278X5/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY<<2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Relay 27X6/16 fa¹s to energize RELAY 278X6/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY<<2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL RELAY 27BXI/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL RELAY 27X3/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY Nl)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL RElAY 27X4/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY Nl)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL RELAY 27XS/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY NI)GENERATES A SPURtOUS SIGNAL RELAY 27X6/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY<<1)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL CONTACT 27BX6/16 (3A)TRANSFERS OPEN Relay 27X2/16 fails to energize Relay 278x6/I 6 drtver (Hea\5'stk Assembly¹2)fails to energize CONTACT 27X6/16 (~)TRANSFERS OPEN RELAY 278X3/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Retsy 27XI/16 fels lo onorgize BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X4I16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Fuss N2 (FUARBI RC16/2 P)fails open (retay cabinet)Relay 278X3/I 6 faits lo oner gee Relay 27BX2/16 fails to energ'ce Relay 27BX3/I 6 driver (Heal Sink Assembly¹2)has to energce Relay 27x4/16 drive (Heal sink Assembly<<I)fails to energize Relay 278X1/16 fess lo energce Relay 278X5/I 6 lails to energcs Relay 278XI/I 6 driver (Heat Sink Assembly¹2)fails lo energize'I 4 P016¹NIICE.B I.DOC/oc B-4 9/Zz/9¹)2: lgi07 PM r.ocarroz CH~CxEIUSxrcS max,E UVRE EBX616 FIRE AREA:;ABBM ABM BUS16UV Retay 27BXB/I 6 fails to energize ABM BUS16UV ABM BUS16UV ABM BUS16UV ABLI BUS16W ABM BUS16VV ABM BUS16UV ABM BVS16UV ABM BUS16UV ABM BUS16UV ABM BVS16W ABM BVS16W ABM BVS16W ABM BVS16UV ABM BVS16UV ABM BVS16UV ABM BVS16W ABM BVS16UV ABM BUS16UV ABM BUS16W ABM BUS16UV ABM BUS16VV ABM BUS16UV ABM DCPDPA8018/02 ABM DCPDPABOIB/04 ABM DCPDPABOI8/05 ABM DCPDPCB038/19 ASM LT.112 ABM LT-139 ABM MCCJ ABM MCCM ABM PT-945 ABM PT.946 WLCOOX616 UVLCDOX516 WLCDOX316 WLCDBX516 UVLC DOX116 UVCFR16F U3 WLCDBX416 UVRE KBX316 UVLC D BX216 UVLC DOX216 UVLCOX116A WREKOX116 WREKBX616 VVREEBX416 UVREKBX416 UVREKBX116 VVREKOX616 WRE KOX516 UVRE EOX416 UVREKOX316 UVRE EOX516 UVREKBX516 DCCSRA1 BBX DCCF RA1 8 DN OCCFRA18EN DCBDFAUXDB CVLTD00112 CVLTD00139 ACCBRMCC1 J ACCBRMCC1M ES PTD PT945 ESPTDPT946 Relay 27X6/16 driver (Heat Sink Assembly¹I)fais to energize Relay 27XS/16 driver (Heat Sink Assembly<<I)tails to energize Relay 27X3/16 driver (Heat Sink Assembly<<1)fails to energize Relay 278X5/18 driver (Heat Sink Assembly¹2)faits to energize Rotay 27XI/18 drive (Heal Sink Assembly<<1)fails lo energize Fuse¹3 (F VARBIRC16/3-N) fails open (relay cabinel)Relay 278X4l16 driver (Heat Sink Assembly¹2)tails to energize BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27BX3/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Relay 27BX2/I 8 driver (Heat Sink Assembly¹2)Ms to energtze Relay 27X2/1 6 drive (Host Sink Assembly¹I)tails to enorfjize RELAY 27X1/I 6 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹1)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS 16 VNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X1/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RElAY 27BX6/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Relay 278X4/16 fails to energize BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X4/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X1/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 16 VNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X6l16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27XS/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Relay 27X4/16 tais to energize BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X3/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Relay 27XS/16 tais to energize BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278XS/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Disconnoa Swikcn OCPDPABOI 8/02 Transfers Open (To MCC 0)Fuse FUDCPDPABOI8/4N Fai/s Open (To Bus 18-Normal)Fuse FUDCPDPABOI BISH Fais Open (To Bus 14-Emergency) Auxiliary Building DC Distribution Panel 8 (DCPDABOI 8)Local Faut VOLUME CONTROL TANK (VCT)LEVEL TRAN SMITTER LT-112 FAILS TO RESPOND VOLUME CONTROL TANK (VCT)LEVEL TRAN SMITTER LT.139 FAILS TO RESPOND 480 VAC MCCJ Feoder C'rcuit Breaker 52/MCCJ (MCCO/OSIcK) Transfers Open 480 VAC MCCM Foeder Circuit Breaker 52/MCCM (MCCO/1 50)Transfers Open CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE TRAN SMllTER PT-945 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE TRANSMllTER PT-946 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND 6.POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS)AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE RACEWAY AFFECTED EQUIPMENT AFFECTED CABLE FUNCTION BASIC EVENT AFFECTED BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AB8 00702 AB8 C0702 AB8 C0702 AB8 C0703 BSOA P 480 VAC POWER RRMVPOBSOA MOTORS)PERATED VALVE 850A FAILS TO OPEN[RECIRC)85CA P 460 VAC POWER RRMVROBSOA MOTORS)P VALVE 850A TRANSFERS OPEN[RECIRCULATION) BSCA P 480 VAC POWER RHMVR0850A MOTOR-OP VAI.VE 850A TRANSFERS OPEN (INJECTtON) 850A C 125 VOC CONTROL RRMVPOBSOA MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE 850A FAILS TO OPEN (RECIRC)C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVR0850A MOTOR4)P VALVE BSOA TRANSFERS OPEN[RECIRCULATION) AB8 C0703 AB8 C0735 BSOA C 125 VDC CONTROL RHMVR0850A MOTOR4)P VALVE 850A TRANSFERS OPEN (INJECTION[ 857A P 480 VAC POWER RHMVR0857A MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE 857ATRANSFERS OPEN 857A P 480 VAC POWER RRMVP0857A MOV 857A FAlLS TO OPEN AB8 C0735 857A P 480 VAC POWER RRMVR0857A MOTORS)PERATED VALVE 857A TRANSFERS OPEN 857A C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVP0857A MOV 857A FAILS TO OPEN AB8 CO/36 857A C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVR0857A MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE 857A TRANSFERS OPEN 657A C 125 VDC CONTROL RHMVR0657A MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE 857A TRANSFERS OPEN I'.llaz6IRGE 8 I.DOC/oc 8-5 gr)5/gf/I itigi07 PM Pages B-6 through B-47 are similar and not included to reduce paper volume. r.ocaYrON CIA CYmrSYrcS mar,K FIRE AREA: I ABM R3408 I ABM R3408 I ASM R3408 ABM R34$0 ABM R3412 ABM R3414 ABM R3689 ASM R3689 ABBM PT429 PT429 PT429 LT426 FT465 FT474 LT-921 LT-921 I ALARM/IND/CONT I ALARM/IND/CONT I ALARM/IND/CONT I INDICATION I RPS CHANNEL 2 (WHITE)I RPS CHANNEL 3 (BI.UE)ESPTDPT429 PRESSURIZER LOWPRESSURETRANSMITTER PT429 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND i EXPTLPT429 PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT429 FAILS LOW RCPTLPT429 PRESSURE TRANSMllTER PT429 FAILS LOW LT426 PRZR LVL XMTR i ESFTD00465 STEAM GENERATOR A FLOW TRANSMITTER FT 465 FAILS TO RESPOND I ESFTD00474 SG 8 STEAM FLOWTRANSMITTER FT474 FAILS j TO RESPOND CSLTDLT921 RWST LEVEL TRANSMffTER LT-921 FAILS TO RESPOND 1 CSLTLLT921 RWST LEVEL TRANSM(ITER LT-921 FAILS LOW I ABM R3969 t ABhl R3971 I ASM R3973 TE41081 LT427 PT430 RCLYDLM427 INSTRUMENT LOOP CURRENT REPEATFR LM 427 FAILS TO RESPOND I ALARM/IND/CONT I ALARM/IND/CONT ESPTDPT430 PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE TRANShliTTER PT430 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND C TE41081 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT FOR LOOP B COLD LEG I ASM R3973 ABM R3973 ASM R4086 ASM R4068, PT430 PT430 LT428A PT4208 I ALARM/IND/CONT I ALARhMND/CONT I INDICATION EXPTLPT430 PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE TRAN SM/ITER PT430 FAILS LOW RCPTLPT430 PRESSURE TRANSMllTER PT430 FAILS LOW LT428A PRZR LVL WIDE RANGE.XMTR PT4208 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER REACTOR COOLANT I SYSTEM INST LOOP 4208 I ABM R4360 P ABM R4369 ASM SAC0212A ASM SAC0212A ABM SAC0212A ABM SAC02$28 ABM SAC02$28 ABM SAC0214 ABM SAC0214 LT.505 LT.507 86198 86198 86198 86198 593 86168 C 125 VDC CONTROL RC<9$Spurious ope6ny olRCS head vent if kt corlunctiet with SVW90?C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP86198 SOLENOID VALVE 86198 FAILS TO OPEN C 125 VDC CONTROL RCREB451AX RELAY PC451.X FAILS TO DEZNERGIZE C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP86198 SOLENOID VALVE 86198 FAILS TO OPEN C 125 VDC CONTROL RCRE8451AX RELAY PC45$.X FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE C 125 VDC CONTROL RC493 Spurious openiny of RCS head vent if in cojjuncten with SV492?C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP86168 SOLENOID VALVE 86168 FAILS TO OPEN LT-505 STEAM GENERATOR EMSOIA WIDE RANGE I LEVEL TRANSMITTER C LT407 STEAM GENERATOR EMSOI8 WIDE RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTER ABM SAC 0216 ABM SAC0216 591 C 125 VDC CONTROL C 125 VDC CONTROL RC491 Spurkxus openiny of RCS head vent it in conjunction with SV.5907 RC-593 Sptukus openksy of RCS head vent 8 in conjunct'en vrith SV-592?7.SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWN NOTES: FIRE ZONE ABB ABM WALKDOWN NOTES~3 51 pumps about 6'enter@enter (pheos A2.A3).2 CS pumps about S'eecreenter. about ly'rom 51 pumps (phao Ae).Coeol panels south of 31 pumps (pleto AS).3 MOVs west of RWST on ehcr side of eoncrcte wall and I small pump (photo Ad).2 SFP cooling pumps near west stahwetl (phoe A7).RHR pueps in pit below, thh kvcl near wet stahwell with 5 cher pumps.PCs stored in rack jet ouuide charging pump cubicle.4/2/98 WD Sl peep abks in conduit.There 4 some rash in ans.Charging pumps in separatc cubkde with fire rated barricn.Heat racing on thc piping to Sl and cbg.No signitiaat combuwibles between RHR arcs on west cnd, and Sl wa.so fire In IIHR arcs unlikely to spread.Conduits to RHR room and pumps are very stpwatc.2 SW MOVs (9701 A, 970I8)ncw west sairwell, 3'pan (pheo AS).3 CCW MOVs (73SA, 73SB, 8 l7)southwcn of RWST, 6'part (photo Ap).4 CCW MOVs just teuidc conuinmcnt. west of RWST (photo A IO).2 MOVs (S97, 89S)cwt of RWST.3'pan (phao A I I).2 SW MOVs near south wall, southeast of RWST (pheo AI2).Eery to cable tunnel (phaos A13, A l4).Cabl>>rays near ast stauwell, Cf II I (wrapped)and CT I I 0 (not wrapped)(phceo AI5).MCC IM, Bus l6.MCC ID.DC power abincts.2 small pumps near cwt stairwell. 4/2/PS WD Rotc thw the line listed on the fisc Response Phn diagram as H2 Is aciualty N2.At the Cf exit.there h a'smoke banicr (wbkh is sieyar to a fire banier, but is not qualified). and the cables we sprayed for about 6'.There are spray shicMs on thc MCC and bus 16.The charcoal fdtcr unit h 5'rom bus ld, and is totally cncloscd with fire suppression. Thc mini-purge AOV CIV has no local operator, but has lire wrap above the valve.Stalnvcyt betwccn (toes have fue water sprays to prcv<<e lire spread bcrween f)ours.I".IldgdtRGB B.I.DDC/oc r B-48 9/21/yg l2:$0:23 PM LOCATION CHAIR CTEMSTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ABI 1.FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA: I FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.)FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ.FT.)IBN4 I IBN.1 IBN.2 271'UXILIARY BUILDING OPERATING LEVEL INTERMEDIATE BUILDING SUB.BASEMENT NORTH 253'INTERMEDIATE BUILDING BASEMENT LEVEL NORTH 278 4 INTERMEDIATE BUILDING MEZZANINE LEVEL NORTH IB IB IB 12740 3570 3570 I ION 3 298'INTERMEDIATE BUILDING UPPER LEVEL NORTH 315'INTERMEDIATE BUILDING TOP LEVEL NORTH IB IB 3570 I IBS4 IBS.1 IBS.2 23T 271'NTERMEDIATE BUILDING SVB BASEMENT SOUTH INTERMEDIATE BUILDING BASEMENT LEVEL SOUTH 9/TERMEDIATE BUILDING MEZZANINE LEVEL SOUTH IB IB IB 2325 232$2385 IBS.3 293'NTERMEDIATE BUILDING TOP LEVEL SOUTH IB 2325 N2 271'ITROGEN STORAGE BUILDING NS 430 2.FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU)FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)6.700[I 8N4 0 5.Omit IB N.l I s IBM.2 IBM.3 I~IBNA I IBS4 189-1 I 8 9.2 IBS4 N2 74,286 1,214 4.693 12,340 20.470 4.101 55.7 mrk 0.9 mn.3.5 mh.9.3 mia 15.6 m'n.15.4 m'n.3.1 mitk 3.FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES I ABO I IBN4 I IBM-1 IBN.2 IBN4 ISN'T IBS4 IBS.1 IBS-2 IBS4 Smoke deteaore 4.HM ZONE(S)ADJACENT TO THE~i ZONE(S)IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE ADJACENT FIRE ZONE PATHWAY PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)ABO ABO AB0 IBN4 IBN4 IBN 1 IBN.I IBN.1 PBI666IRCE 8 I.DOC/oe RC.3 98-2 IBS 2 IBS4 RC-1 IBS.I CT RC-2 B-50 WALL WALL WALL WALL WALL OPEN WALL OPEN WALL WALL 9/28/96 l2:IO:23 PM LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ABI IBN.I IBN.I TG.1 WALUDOOR WALUD OCR IBM.1 IBM.2 SB.IH6 None WALUDOOR 1864)IBS4)IBS 1 IBS 1 185-1'BS-1 IBS.1 IBS.2 IBS-2 IBS 2 IBS.2 1864 IBM4)RC 1 IBN'I RC-2 SB.IHS 681 IBM.2 ABO RCQ 682 OPEN WALL WALL OPEN WALL WALL WALUDOOR WALI.OPEN WALL WALL WALL OPEN AGO WALL N2 3 5.POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: AGO 350 AGO, 4734 CVMVN03350 SWMVC04 734 FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC AFFECTED EVENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION MOTOR%PE RATED VALVE 350 FAILS TO OPEN Sonics Water Header Isolation MOV 4734 Fails To Close On Demand ABO 52/14 ABO 52/I4SS ABO 52/ABEF IG ABO 52/CCPIA ABO 52/CCP1A ABO 52/CCPI 8 ABO 52/CFIA ABO 52CFIO ABO 52CHPIA ABO 52/EGIA1 AGO 52/MCCC ABO 52/MCCC ABO 52/MCCC ABO 63/14 ABO 6$MCCC AGO 9704A ABO BATP I A AGO BATPI A ABO GATP I 8 ABO BUS14UV ACCBD14168 ACT1FSST14 ACC 8 N1421A CCMPFPUMPA ACCBN1423A CCMPFPUMPB ACCBN1423C ACCBN1420C ACC 8 N14238 ACCBD1416C DCCFR422NR DCCFRA1ABN ACCBRMCCI C DCREBBUS14 DCREE66MCC ACCBRML10A CVMPAPCH3A CVMPAPCH3A CVMPAPCH38 UVREKOX614 AC BREAKER 52/14 (BUS14/188) FAILS TO OPERATE Feud On 4160 I 460 VAC Bus 14 supply Transformer PXABSS014" AC BREAKER 52/ABEF1G (BUS14/21A) FAILS TO OPEN MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP PACO2A FAILS TO RUM AC BREAKER 52/CCP'IA (8US14/23A) FAILS TO OPEN MOTOR47RIVEN PUMP PACO28 FAILS TO RUN AC BREAKER 52/CF1A (BUS14/23C) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/CF1D (BUS14/20C) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52ICHP1A (BUS14/238) FAILS TO OPEN DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EGIA1 (BUS14/I BC)FAlLS TO CLOSE FUSE FUBUS14/2243 FAILS OPEN (RECIRCULATION) Fuse FUDCPDPABOIA/2N Faib Open (To MCC C)4mvAc MCCC Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/MCCC (GUSI4/22C) T/ansfors Open RELAY 636/14 (BUS 14 DC THROV/OVER) FAlLS TO DEENERGIZE RELAY 66/MCCC FAILS TO ENERGIZE BREAKER 52/9704A MCCL POS I J TRANSFERS OPEN BORIC ACID MOTORNRIVEMPUMP PCH03A FAlLS TO START BORIC ACID MOTORS)RIVEN PUMP PCH03A FAILS TO START BORIC ACID MOTORS)RIVEN PUMP PC H038 FAILS TO START BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X6/14 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABO BUS14UV'REEOX414 Relay 27X4/14 fails lo energize ABO BUS14UV ABO BUS14UV ABO BUS14UV ABO BUS14UV ABO BUS14UV ABO BUS14W ABO BUS14UV ABO GUS14W ABO BUS14UV ABO BUS14UV UVREEBX514 WREEOX314 UVREEBX114 WREEOX214 UVRE 6 BX314 UVREEBX414 UVREEOX514 UVREEBX614 UVRE KOX114 UVRE KOX314.Relay 27BXS/14 fats lo energize Relay 27X3/14 laBs lo energize Relay 276XI/14 fads to energize Relay 27X2/14 faas lo enorgce Relay 278X3/I 4 fails lo energize Relay 278X4/14 lads to energize Relay 27X5/14 fails to energiZO Relay 278X6/14 fails to enorpco BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27XI/I 4 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X3/14 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Phldd61RGE.B I.DOC/oc B-5)g/26/gd 12;10:24 PM e FIRE AREA: ABO BUS14UV ABO BUS14W UVLC OX514A UVREKBX114 RELAY 27X5/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹I)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X1/14 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED LOCATION CHAjRACTERISTICS TABLE ABI ABO ABO ABO BUS1<<W BUS14UV BUS14UV BUS14W 8US14UV BUS14UV BOS14OV BUS14UV UVI.CDOX214 AFCTR78614 AFCTR70614 UVREKDX414 UVREKBX614 uvLc ogx314 UVLC014 5<<2 UVREKBX314 Relay 27X2/I 4 driver (Heal Sink Assembly<<I)tails to energize CONTACT 278X6/I 4 TRANSFERS OPEN CONTACT 27X6/14 (1-2)TRANSFERS OPEN BUS 14 UNDE RVOLTAGE RElAY 27X4/I 4 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RE(AY 278X6/I 4 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Relay 27x3/14 diver (Hast sink Assembly¹I)fails lo energize BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH¹2 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL BUS 14 UNDE RVOLTAGE RE(AY 278X3/I 4 TRANSFERS TO EN ERG tZED AB0 BUS14UV 8US14UV BUS14UV BUS14W BUS'14UV BUS14UV Bus14uv AiiD BUSI4W BUS14UV UVCFR14FU3 OVREEOX614 UVLCOOX1 14 WLC DOX514 UVREKBX514 WLCDBX214 UVLCOBX34A WLCDBX314 UVLCOBX14A .Fuse<<3 (F UARA1RC14/3-N) fails open (relay cabinet)Relay 27x6/14 fah to energize Relay 27xl/14 driver (Hast Sink Assembly¹1)fails lo energize Relay 27XS/14 driver (Heat Sink Assembly¹1)fails lo energize BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RE(AY 278X5/14 TRAN SF ERS TO ENERGIZED Relay 278X2/1 4 driver (Hast Sink Assembly¹2)fsiis to oner gtte RELAY 278X3/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Relay 278X3/14 driver (Heal Sink Assembly¹2)faas lo energize RELAY 278X1/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL i ABO ABO ABO ABO ABO ABO ABO ABO ABO ABO ABO ABO ABO IBN I IBM.1 I8M.1 IBN.I ISN 1 BUS14UV BUS14UV BUS14UV BUS14UV BUS14W BUS14uv BUS14UV BUS14W BUS14UV BUS14uv BUS14UV BUS14UV BUS14W Bustcw BUS14UV BUS14UV Bus14uv BUS14UV BUS14UV DCPDPAB01A/02 DCPDPA801A/04 DCPDPAB01A/05 DCPDPC803A/19 MCCH MCCL PIO617 RMWP1ARMWP1A RMWP I 8 TAFPACOP TAFPACOP 4007 4008 4013 4027 UVLCOX614A UVLCOOX414 UVLC 0 8X114 WREKBX414 WREKOX514 UVLCDX414A UVLC D BX614 UVLCDX314A WREEBX214 UVLCDOX614 uvLcox114A WLC 014 S<<1 UVCFR14FU2 UVREEOX114 UVLCDBX64A UVLCOBX54A UVLCOBX514 UVLCDBX44A UVLCDBX414 DCCSRA1ABX DCCFRA1ADM DCCFRA1AEN DCBDFAUXDA ACCBRMCC1H ACCBRMCC11. CCPCOPC617 CVMPFPCHSA CVMPFPCHSA CVMPF PC H68 CVMPFPCH88 ACCBRPOL10 ACCBRPOL10 AF MV004007 AF MV004006 SWMVP04013 SWMVP 04027 SWMVP04028 RELAY 27X6/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹1)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Relay 27X4/14 driver (Heat Sink Assembly<<1)fails to energize Relay 278XI/I 4 driver (Heal Sink Assembly¹2)fails to energize BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RElAY 278X4/I 4 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BOS 14 ONDERVOLTAGE RE(AY 27XS/14 TRANSFERS TO FNERGIZED RELAY 27X4/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹1)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Relay 278X6/14 driver (Heal Sink Assemb/y¹2)fails to energize RELAY 27X3/1 4 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹1)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Relay 27BXZ/I 4 fels lo energize ReLvy 27X6/1 4 driver (Heat Sink Assembly¹I)fsib to energize RELAY 27X1/14 DRtVER (HEAT SINK ASS EMB'LY¹1)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH¹1 FAlLS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL Fuse<<2 (FUARAI Rc f 4/2+)fats open (relay cabinet)Relay 27X1/14 faih to energize RELAY 278X6/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY<<2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL RElAY 27BXS/1 4 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Relay 278XS/I 4 driver (Hest Sink Assembly<<2)fails lo energize RElAY 278X4/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹2)GEHERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Relay 278X4/I 4 driver (Heat Sink Assombly<<2)faits lo energize D'sccnnect Swlch DCPDPA801 A/02 Transfors Open (To MCC C)Fuse FUDCPDPA801A/4N Fails Open (To Bus 14-Norma/)Fuse FUDCPOPABOI/VSM Fats Open (To Bus 16-Emergency) Aux/I ary Buikl'ng OC Distribution Panel A (DCPDPABOIA) Local Fauk 480 VAC MCCH Feeder Cucuit Breaker 52/MCCH (MCCC/05MM) Transfers Open 460VAC MCCL Feeder Cyciiit Breaker 52/MCCL (MCCC/113) Transfers Open PRESSURE INDICATING COMTROLLER PS4117 FAILS TO RESPOND Motor~i pump PCHOSA (RMU Pump A)faits lo run MotcrMIvan pump PCH08A (RMU Pump A)fails lo n<<I Motor~pump PCH068 (RMU Pump 8)fags to nst Motor~i pump PCHOSB (RMU Pump 8)fess to nat AC BREAKER MCCC/02H TRANSFERS OPEN AC BREAKER MCCC/02H T/IANSFERS OPEN Motor operated valve 4007 tails lo I/vottta flow Motor operated valve 4008 tails to I/vottle liow Motor operated valve 4013 fazs lo open Meter operated valve 4027 tais to open Motor operated valve 4028 fats lo open~r~~'I I".'ll 6161RCE 8 I, DOC/oc a-sr 9/zsrga Izil(kts PM LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: I 8N.I 4324 j IBM.l 4324 ABl SWSVP04 324 Sc¹enoid valve 4324 fath lo open SWPSR02094 D/ferentbl pressure swlch DPS.2094 fels lo respond IBN 1 IBN.1 IBN.1 IBN I IBN-1 t I 8N.I!IBM.1 j tBN.1 IBN.I ISN.1 IBN.1 IBN I IBN.1 1 I IBM-1 IBM.1 IBN.1 IBN.1 IBN.1 I 8N.I I 8N.1 IBN I IBM 1 IBN.I IBM.1 IBN I 4325 4326 4326 4614 4733 52/MAFP I A 52/MAFP18 FT-2001 PTAS PTAS PT<78 PT<78 PTAS PT<82 PT<82 PT<83 SWPSR02084 SWSVP04 325 SWPSR02085 SWSVP 04326 SWMVC04614 SWMVC 04663 SWMVC 04664 SWMVC04 733 AFMPF PAF I A AFMPFPAFI 8 IAAVK05392 AFFTDF200$ AFFTDFT2002 ESPTDPT468 EXPTLPT468 ESPTDPT469 EXPTLPT469 ESPTDPT478 EXPTLPT478 EXPTLPT479 ESPTDPT479 ESPTDPT482 EXPTLPT482 ESPTDPT483 EXPTLPT483 Dfferenthl pressure switch DPS 2084 fels to respond Solenoid vahe 4325 faih to open Dtfferendal pressure switch DPS.2085 fels to respond Solenoid vahe 4328 lails lo open Senrice Water Header Isolation MOV 461 4 Faib To Cbse On Demand Senrice Water Header Isolation MOV 4663 Faih To Cbse On Demand Senrice Water Header Isolation MOV 4664 Faih To Close On Demand Service Water Header Iso'Iaticn MOV 4733 Faib To Cbse On Demand AFWMotcr4)rivsn Pump 1A fath to nst AFW Motcr4)riven Pump 18 fels to nst AlR4)PERATED VALVE 5392 TRANSFER CLOSED Rcw tarlsrtlitler FT 2001 fels to respcnd Fbw transmitter FT.2002 fels lo respond SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT~FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT~FAILS LOW SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PTAS FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMllTER PT~S FAILS LOW SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<78 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT&78 FAILS LOW SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<79 FAILS LOW SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PTAS FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<82 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<82 FAILS LOW SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT&83 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PTAS FAILS LOW Sl TRAIN A EXREKOOOC1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL MASTER RELAY C1 SPURIOUSLY ENERGIZES IBM-1 IBN.2 IBN.2 IBN.2 IBM-2 IBM.2 IBN-2 IBS.2 IBS-2 IBS.2 IBS-2 TAOP 3410 3411 35t6 3517 PT.948 PT.S49 PT.950 DCCSRT1 BNX MSRVP03410 MSRVP03411 MSMVP3504A MSMVP3505A MSAVXIL)516 MSAVX03517 ESPTDPTS47 ESPTDPT948 ESPTDPTS49 ESPTDPT950 Disconnect Svvtch DCPDPTB01 8/I 3 Transfers Open po TDAFW Pump Oi Pump)ARV 3410 FAILS TO OPEN{STANDBY)ASt4)P ERATE0 VALVE 3411 FAILS TO OPEN (ARV A)lA¹cr operated valve 3504A fels to open Motor operated valve 3505A faih to open MSIV 3516 Faib to Close MSIV3517 Faib to Close CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-947 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-948 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITfER PT-S49 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-950 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND 6.POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS)AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE RACEWAY AFFECTED EQUIPMENT AFFECTED CABLE FUNCT)ON BASIC EVENT AFFECTED BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AB0'BO AH 00201 9632A P 120 VAC POWER SWAVN9632A Ale)PERATEO VALVE 9632A FAILS TO OPEN C 120 VAC CONTROI.SWAVN9632A Ale)PERATED VALVE 9632A FAILS TO OPEN C 120 VAC CONTROL SVAVN9632A Ale)PERATED VALVE 9632A FAILS TO OPEN AHC0219 P 480 VAC POWER HVMFFAFFIA MOTOR4)RIVENFANAFFOIA FAILS TO RUN AB0 AHC0220 C0544 0 120 VAC CONTROL HVMFFAFF1A MOTOM>RIVEN FAN AFFOIA FAILS TO RUN BATP1A C 125 VDC CONTROL CVMPAPCH3A BORIC ACID MOTORS)RIVEN PUMP PCH03A FAILS TO START AB0 I AB0 t AB0)AGO CO546 BATP1A BATP I A BATP1A TAP PAC OP P 480 VAC POWER C 125 VDC CONTROl.C 125 VDC CONTROL P 480 VAC POWER CVMPAPCH3A BORIC ACID MOTOR-DRIVENPUMP PCH03A FAILS TO START CVMPAPCH3A BORIC ACID MOTOR.DRIVEN PUMP PCH03A FAILS TO START CVMPAPCH3A BORIC ACID MOTOR.DRIVEN PUMP PCH03A FAILS TO START ACCBRPOLI0 AC BREAKER MCCC/02H TRANSFERS OPEN PB16SNIcGE.B I.DOC/oc B-53 S/25/Sa 12: 10:24 PM 0 LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FXRE AREA: I ABO C0591 i ABO Ciiii I ABO C0644 ABI TAFPACQP CVTA1.BYCA I IND/125 VDC CONTROL P 460 VAC POWEIl P 480 VAC POWER ACCBRPOLIO IBT6FCVTA2 DCBCFOOOOA AC BREAKER MCCC/02H TRANSFERS OPEN tr>>trument Bus B (IBPDPCBBW) Cor>>tant Votlage Transformer CVTAI Fs9s Battery Charger A (BYCA)No Output ABO C0687 MCCH P 480 VAC POWER DCCFRC3ACN Fuse FUDCPDPCB03A/CN Fails Open (To MCC H)!ABO C0687 ABO CO690 ABO C0690 MCCH 516 516 P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER ACCBRMCCIH RCMVPQ0516 RCMVKQ0516 480 VAC MCCH Feeder Ckctit Breaker 52/MCCH (MCCC/05MM) T/ar>>fora Open MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE 516 FAILS TO OPEN MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE 516 TRANSFERS CLOSED ABO CQ692 ABQ CQ692 ABO CQ694 516 516 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVK00516 MOTO R4)PE RATED VALVE 518 FAILS TO OPEN MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE 51 6 TRANSFERS CLOSED MOTOR47PERATED VALVE 516 FAILS TO OPEN 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVKQQ516 MOTOR43PERATED VALVE 516 TRANSFERS CLOSEDAB0 CQ697 ABO CO697 ABO CQ698 ABO C0698 ABO CQ699 AGO C0702 ABO C0702 ABO C0702 ABO C0703 ABO C0703 ABO C0703 ABO C0704 AGO C0704 ABO C0704 ABO COT07 AGO C0708 ABO C0710 ABO C0713 ABO C0713 ABO C0713A ABO C0713A ABO COT t5 ABO C0715 ABO C0717 ABO C0717 4616 4616 4616 4616 4616 4007 4007 720 720 720 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04618 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVK04616 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVK04818 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04616 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVK04616 C 125 VDC CONTRO!.'WMVC04816 P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER RHMVR0850A P 480 VAC POWER C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVR0850A C 125 VDC CONTROL RHMVR0850A C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVP0850A C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVP0850A C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVR0850A P 480 VAC POWER AF MVD04007 C 125 VDC CONTROt.AFMVD04007 C 125 VDC CONTROL AFMVD04007 P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQ00720 P 480 VAC POWER RCS-720 P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQ00720 P 480 VAC POWER RCS.720 C 125 VDC CONTROl.RRMVQ00720 C 125 VDC CONTROL'RCS.720 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVQ00720 C 125 VDC CQNTROL RCS.720 C 125 VDC CONTROL RHMVR0850A Selvhe Water Header Itohtion MOV 4616 Fess To Close On Demand Service Water Header isolation MOV 461 6 Transfers Chsod Se/vhe Water Header Isotsthn MOV 481 8 Transfers Ck>>ed Servhe Water Header lactation MQV 461 8 Fails To Chse On Domsnd Service Water Header Itokttian MOV 461 6 Transfers Ck>>ed Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4616 Fails To Close On Der/land MOTOR 47PERATEO VALVE 850A FAILS TO OPEN[RECIRC)MOTOR47P VALVE 850A TRANSFERS OPEN[INJECTION] MOTOR47P VALVE 850A TRANSFERS OPEN[RECIRCULATION) MOTOR47P VALVE 850A TRANSFERS OPEN[RECIRCULATION] MOTORNP VALVE 850A TRANSFERS OPEN[INJECTION) MOTO RAPE RATED VALVE 850A FAILS TO OPEN[RECIRC)MOTOR47P VALVE 850ATRANSFERS OPEN[INJECTION] MOTORAPERATED VALVE 85CA FAlLS TO OPEN[RECIRC)'MOTOR47P VALVE 850A TRANSFERS OPEN (RECIRCULATION) Motor operated valve 4007 faib to th/ottle Qow Motor operated valve 4007 fails to th/ottte now Motor operated vshe 4007 fails to throttle fhw MOV 720 FAILS TO OPEN ISLOCA evaluation MOV 720 FAILS TO OPEN ISLOCA evaluation MQV 720 FAILS TO OPEN ISLOCA evsk/sthn MOV 720 FAILS TO OPEN ISLOCA ovaiuathn ABO C0720 ABO C0720 P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER RCS 700 RRMVQOQTOQ ISLOCA ovahstion MOV 700 FAILS TO OPEN ABO C0720A ABO C072QA ABQ C0722 ABO C0722 ABO CQ724 ABO CQT24 P 480 VAC POWER RCS.700 P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQQQT QO C 125 VDC CONTROL'RMVQQOTOO C 125 VDC CONTROL RCS 700 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVQQO700 RCS 700 C 125 VDC CONTROL ISLOCA evaluation MQV 700 FAILS TO OPEN MOV 700 FAILS TO OPEN ISLOCA evaluation MOV 700 FAILS TO OPEN ISLOCA evaiuathn~7[": I'/~.I P816SChltCE B-I.DOC/oc [)-54 9/JS/98>>:10:25 PM Pages B-55 through B-80 are similar and not included to reduce paper volume. t LOCATION CHAI&.CTERISTICS TABLE RE AREA:~IBN.2 G11 89 ABI 3517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 MSIV 3517 Fags to Close IBM 2 G1191 IBN.2 G 1192 IBM-2 G1193 IBN 2 G1194 IBM.2 G1195 IBN-2 G1197 IBN.2 G1 198 IBN-2 G1199 IBM.2 G 1200 I 8N-2 G1201 3517 3517 3517 3517 3517 351 6 3516 3516 3516 3516 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03516 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03516 C 125 VDC CONTROl MSAVX03516 C 12$VDC CONTROI.MSAVX03$16 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03516 MSIV 351 7 Falis to Cbse MSIV 351?Fails to Close MSIV 3517 Faib to Close MSIV 3517 Fags to Close MSIV 3517 Fails to Cbse MSIV 351 6 Fails to Close MSIV 3516 Faih to Cbse MSIV3516Faits to Close MSIV 3516 Fails lo Close MSIV 351 6 Faiis to Cbse IBN-2 R1279A IBN.2 R1279A IBN4 E0032 PT<68 PT~B C 125 VOC CONTROI/POWER ESPTDPT488 EXP TLPT468 SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMllTER PT<88 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<68 FAlLS LOW Motor operated valve 3505A fels to open IBS 1 C0472 IBS I C0473 IBS I G0339 IBS.1 l0642 LT-2022A 52IABEFIG INDICATION AFLTD2022A C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN1421A 52/CTP 0 120 VAC CONTROL AFMPFPCD04 52/CTP C 125 VDC CONTROL AFMPFPCD04 Condensate Transfer Pump PCD04 fails to tun Ccndensate Transfer Pump PCD04 fails lo run Condensate Storage Tank A level ttansmber LT-2022A fags to respond AC BREAKER 52/ABEFIG(BUSI421A) FAILS TO OPEN I 8S.1 R0940 I 8S.1 R0984 IBS 1 R3178 PT-947 5737 I AIARhMNOIC 0NT I ANALOG SIGNAL ESPTDPT948 ESPTDPT947 MSAVX05737 CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE TRAN SMIITER PT-948 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT.947 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND AOV5737 Fagsto Close I BS.1 R3176 I 8S.1 R3183 I 8S-1 R3183 IBS 1 R3184 i 8S.1 R31 85 IBS.1 R3186 IBS 1 R3187 IBS I R3188 IBS I R3189 IBS.1 R3192 IBS 1 R3192 IBS.I R3193 IBS 1 R3193 IBS.I R3194 IBS 1 R3194 I 8S.1 R3194 I 8S-1 R3194 IBS.I R3520 IBS.1 R3521 5736 573$5735 5736 5736 5736 5737 5738 5735 5736 5735 5736 5737 5738 LT-2022A LT-20228 MSAVX05738 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX0573$ C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX05736 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX05735 C 12$VDC CONTROL MSAVX05735 C 12$VDC CONTROL MSAVX05735 C 125 VDC CONTROI.MSAVX05736 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX05736 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX05736 MSAVX05737 MSAVX05738 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX0$735 C 12$VDC CONTROL MSAVX05736 C 125 VDC CONTROI.MSAVX05735 C 125 VDC CONTROI.MSAVX05736 C 125 VDC CONIROI.MSAVX05737 C 125 VDC CONTROt.MSAVX05738 AFLTD2022A AF LTD 20228 AOV 5738 Fails to Cbse AOV 5735 Faih to Cbse AOV 5736 Fats lo Cbse AOV 5735 Fats lo Close AOV 5735 FaiB to Close AOV 5735 Fats to Close.AOV 5736 Fats to Cbse AOV 5738 Fags to Close AOV 5736 Fails to Close AOV 5737 Fags to Close AOV 5738 Fags to Close AOV 5735 Fails to Cbse AOV 5736 Fails lo Cbse AOV 5735 Fails lo Close AOV 5736 Faib to Close AOV 5737 Frets to Close AOV 5738 Fats to Cbse condensate storage Tank A level transmkter LT-2022A fats lo respond Condensate Storage Tantt 8 ktvet uansmber LT-20228 fals to tespond IBS.2 L0642 I 8S.2 L0643 52/AB8F I G 52/AB 8F I G C 125 VDC CONTROI.C 12$VDC CONTROL ACCBN1421A ACCBN1421A AC BREAKER 52/ABEFIG (BUS1421A) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/ABEF IG (BUS1421A) FAILS TO OPEN 7.SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWN NOTES: FIRE ZONE WALKDOWN NOTES ABO 2 RMW pumps, I monitor tank pump, 2 WCT pumps ncv south wall (photo AI6).MCC IC near east stairwell (photo AI7).Boric acid tntttfet pumps ln cubicle with gntiag above.MCC IE near nonh wall.But!4 can of RWST.Waur cunain at suinvcll to ABM.4nlgg WD But l4 it fcd frets level below.Standby AFW cables in conduit above bus and MCCs.Charging swapover de power twhch is in the Bus l4.ABO 2 CCW pumps jun south of middt>>of toom (photos A I, Alt).Containmcte penetration cooling fast jun west of RWST (photo Alp).Water curtain st ttakwelt to ABht~entgg WD CCW pump ctblcsnre in coaduh coming up from Aeor below.and very separated from any othet cables or fire sources.Some protective clothing stored about l2'way.p tt666IRGE B-I,DOC/oc B-81 gngtpg I2:tg:35 PM LOCATION CHARACTEMSTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ABI ABO Typical smoke detector (photo A20)appmximatcly l2'IS'p from Roor.Spent foci pool.I 4/2/98 Wo 02 and H2 lines For rtcombiners are separated from all ssfmy cquipmcnt and nor a ptoblem for lire.IBN4 IBN I t t I IBN 2 enegwo did not walkdown.No safety eriYical equipmcnt, except TDAFW lube oil piping, which would not be damaged by Cire I T-D AFW PumP.2 M D AFW PumPs (photo By), 8'pan, about 30'rom T-D AFW pump.2 A/C chiller wast pumps (Photo BS).3'Part.2 A/C chitkrs (Photo B6).S'pat.Several MOVs.Reactor trip breakers at north wall In norrhcast eomcr of building.CRD M4)acts in nonheast corner of building.4/2/98 WD large Aood drain to ensure fire sprinkkr wsta would not carne Bond.Sprin'klcrs over TDAFW and associated lube oil.Some Instr.Cables wrapped near cable tunnel area.SigniCicant amount of cabk.MG sets and cabinets and Rx trip breakers are bciow cridcal cabks.but the deluge system k in cabks.Rod control eabineu have spray shield 2'ver top, which would also tend m shieM cables as if ln a tray with a bonom.Cables arc about 6'bove spray shield.and ceiling k about IS'igher.Mini purge CIV OK (AOV.no manual operator). Hl lines are not Cilkd to H2 recomblner eonuol panel.and are in a area separated by block wall from AFW pumps.Main rxcam header, main taeam valves, safety valves, T.D AFW pump MOVs.IBN 3 (IBNC 4/2/98 WD Atmos.relief valves and MSIVs not by Cue sources.ARV is AOV.but with manual operator as well.Block vaive is manual.TDP steam supply valve are MOV.H2 piping in southwest k separated by block wall, and k not valved in during normal opetadon.cneg wo not walked down, No sa(ety cnYieal cquipmem.4neg wo not walked down.No eritkal safety equipment for Cire ipeee.IBS4)4/2/98 WD iot wal'kcd down.No critical safmy cquipmerx for Cire ipeee IBS.I 4/2/98 WD H2 lines are not lilted to H2 recomb'mer control panel.and are in a arcs sepamtcd by block wall from AFW pumps.IBS.2 IBS.3 Ng 4/2/98 WD H2 lines are valved ouh and are In a vea separated by block wall from renh arcs, 2 Intermediate buiMing exhaust fans, 3 auxiliary buiMing exhaust fans, containmcnt purg<<supply fans.P:t1686tRGB B.I.DOC/oc B-82 pngeg l2:IOt35 FM LOCATION CH~czzmSnCS mar,E FIRE AREA: EDGlA 1.FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA: , FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.)FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION I BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ.FT)EDGIA4 244'DIESEL GENERATOR 1A CABLE VAULT EDGIA-1 I 253'DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1A DG 1265 EOG1A-X 244'DIESEL GENERATOR CABlE AREA DG 2.FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE (EDG1A4 I EOGIA-1 COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU)42 mich 45.2 min.FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)3.FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA: (FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES EGG IA4 EDGI A-1 FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES 4.PIRE ZONE(S)ADJACENT TO THE PIRE ZONE(S)IN THIS FIRE AREA: I FIRE ZONE!EDGIA4 EDG I A.l EDG1A.1 EGG I A.l EDG I A-X ADJACENT FIRE ZONE EDGI A-1 EDGI 8-I TO TB I EDG1A4 PATHWAY OPEN WALL WALL WALUDOOR PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)EDGI A4 EDGI A-X FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC BASIC EVENT AFFECTED EVENT DESCRIPTION

EOG1A.1 ADFOI A I HVMCNDDOIA OG A ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATED DAMPER AODOIA FAILS TO OPEN 5.POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA

EDG1A.1 ADF018 (EOG1A.1 DCPOPC803A/07

'OG'IA.1 DCPOPDGOIA/03 HVM CN D D018 DCBDFOGOOA DCCSROIACX OG A ROOM FAN AIR OPERATED DAhlPER AOD018 FAILS TO OPEN DrG OC Distributen Panel A (DCPDPDGOIA) Local Fault Disccnnecl switch DGP DPDG01 A/03 Transfers open ITo D/G A-NormaI)I EOG1A-1 OCPOPDGOIA/03 DCCFRDIACP Puce F UDC POP DGO I A/3P Faaa Open (TO D/G A-NOnnat)EOG1A-1 DCPDPOG01/V03 EDG1A.1 DCPDPDGOI A/04 EDG1A-1 DTPIA EDG1A.1 DTPIA EDG1A-1 KDG01A DCCFRDIACN DCCSRDIADX ACRERDTPIA ACRERDTP1A DGDGF0001A Fuse F UDCPDPDGO I A/3N Fats Open (To D/G A-Normal)Disconnect Switch DCPDPDGOIAN4 Translers Open ITo D/G 8-Emergency) STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/DTPIA TRANSFERS TO DE.ENERGIZED STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/DTP1A TRANSFERS TO OE.ENERGIZED DIESEL GENERATOR KOG01A FAILS TO RUN I'.POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS)AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE RACEWAY AFFECTED EQUIPMENT AFFECTED CABLE FUNCTION BASIC EVENT AFFECTED BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION EDGI A4 C1933-DTPIA C 125 VOC CONTROL ACRERDTPI A STARTING CIRCUIT4IEIAY 42/DTPIA TRANSFERS TO OE.ENERGIZED EGG IA4 C1940 ADF01A C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDDOIA OG A ROOM FAN AIR4)PERATEO DAMPER ADDOIA FAI'LS TO OPEN EOGIA4 C1944 ADFOIB C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDDO I 8 OG A ROOM FAN AIR-OPERATEO DAMPER ADD018 FAILS TO OPEN i EDGIA4 I C1952 4670 C 12$VDC CONTROL SWMVK04670 Service Water Header Isolafion MOV 4670 Trans/ers ClosedEOG I A4 C19$2 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROl SWMVC04670 Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4670 Fails To Close On Demand P 480 VAC POWER i EOGIA4 I\C1954 SWMVC04609 Service water Header Isolation hlov 4609 Fels To Close On Demand EDGIA4 C5075 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL swMvK04670 service water Header Isolaten Mov 4670 Translers Closed PnldadtRGE B-l.DOC/oc B-323 9PI/rga I7 3v 23 Pal FIRE AREA: I EDGIA4 C5075 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04670 Seniice Water Header Isolation MQV 4670 Fess To Close On Demand LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE EDGlA~ED G I A4 C5076 I , EDGIA4 E0018 L EDG I A4 E001 8 EDGIA4 E0018 EDGI A4 E001 9 EDG1A4 E0019 I EDGIA4 E0019 I EDGIA4 E0020 FOG IA4 E0020 EDGIA4 E0022 C MISC CONTROL DCPDPDGOI8/04 P 125 VOC POWER SWMVC04609 OCCFRD1 BOP DCPDPDGOI 8/04 P 125 VDC POWER OCCFRDIBDN DCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VOC POWER DCCSRDIACX OCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCFRDIACN OCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VOC POWER OCCFRDIACP OCPDPCB03A/07 C 125 VDC POWER DCBDFDGCDA OCPDPCB03A/07 C 125 VDC POWER DCCFRC3AGN DCPDPCB03A/03 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSRC3ACX DCPDPDGO'IB/04 P 125 VDC POWER OCCSRDIBDX seniice water Header Isolation Mov 4609 Faas To Close On Demand t Fuse F VDCPDPDG018/4P Fels Open (To 0/G A~Emergency) Fuse FUDCPOPDGOI 8/4N Fails Open (To 0/G A-Emergency) Disconnect swacn ocpDpoGOIB/04 T/ansfers Open (To 0/G A-Emergency) I DiSCOnneCt Switon OCP DP DGOI A/03 Trana/era I Open (To D/G A~Normal)Fuse FUDCPDPDGOIA/3N Fails Open (To 0/G A-Nonnat)Fuse FUDCPOPOGOIA/3P Fails Open(yo D/G A~Normal)0/G OC Dist/ibution Panel A (DCP DP DGOI A)Local Fa&Fuse FVDCPDPC803A/GN Fails Open (To 0/G OC i Distnbution Panel A)Disconnect Switch DCpDpC803A/03 Transfers Open (To MCC H)EGG IA4 E0022 EDG I A4 E0022 MCCH MCCH P 125 VOC POWER OCCFRC3ACN P 125 VDC POWER ACCBRMCCIH Fuse FUDCPDPC803A/CN Fails Open (To hlCC H)480 VAC MCCH Feeder Circu'4 Breaher 52/MCCH (MCCC/05MM) Transfe/s Open i EDGIA4 L0318 I I EDGIA4 L0318 52/EGI Al 52/EGIA1 P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER ACREKEGIA1 ACCBD1418C DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RELAY 18CXI/EG1AI TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EGIAI (BVS14/I BC)FAII.S TO CLOSE I EDGIA4 L0320 52/EGIA1 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBO1418C DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG1A1 (BUS14/I BC)FAILS TO CLOSE i EDGI A4 L0320 I I<<EOGIA4 L0508 EGG I A4 L0508 EGG IA4 L0508 EDGIA4 L0509 EDGIA 0 L0530 ED GI A4 L0531 52/EG 1A1 52/EG1AI 52/EGIA1 52/EGIA2 52/EGI A2 KDGOI A KDGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL P480VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER C 125VDC CONTROL I IND/125 VDC CONTROL I ALARIWIND/CONT ACREKEGIAI ACCBD1418C ACREKEGIA1 ACCBO1831C ACCBD1831C OGDGFOCOIA DGDGFOCOI A DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BVS 14 CLOSED RELAY 18CX1/EGIA1 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EGIA1 (BUS14/18C) FAILS TO CLOSE DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RElAY 18CX1/EGIA1 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED AC BREAKER 52/EG1A2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE AC BREAKER 52/EGlA2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN i EDGIA4 L0532!EDGIA-0 L0536 EGG I A.O L0537 KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A 0 120 VAC CONTROL DGDGFOCOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGOGF000'IA C 125 VOC CONTROL OGOGFOOOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN I EDGIA4 L0541 EOGIA4 L0545 EDG IA4 L0546 l tEDGIA4 L0547 ED G I A.O L0550 KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER I METERING/RELAYIN G OGOGF0001A DGDGF0001A OGDGF0001 A DGDGFCOOIA DGDGFC001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUM DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVM DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TQ RUN EDGIA4 L0554 KDGOIA I DGDGF0001A I/IETERING/RELAYIN G DIESEL GENERATOR KDGQIA FAILS TQ RUN EDGIA4 L0555 EGG I A4 L0560 EOGIA4 L0561 KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A P 120 VAC POWER I METERING/R ELAYIN G I hlETERING/RELAYIN G DGDGF0001A DGDGF0001A DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVM DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TQ RUN EDGIA4 L0562 KDGO I A I OGDGFOCOIA METERING/RELAYIN G DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN P:ttearitRCE 8 I.DOC/oc i)-324 9/28/98 l2:33:24 Phl. LOCATION CHAIR.CTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: EDGIA4 L0563 i!EDG'IA4 L0564 L0565 EOGIA4 1.0752 EDGlA KDGOI A KOGOI A KDGOIA 52/IHI 8 I METERINGIRFLAYIN ~G I METERING/RHAYIN G I METERING/RELAYIN G CONTROL DGOGF0001A OGOGF000tA DGDGF0001A ACC 8 N1727A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RVN DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUM AC BREAKER 52/IHI 8 (BUS17/27A) FAILS TO OPEN EDGIA4 L0754 EDGIA4 L0760 EDGIA4 L0762 52/IH1D 52/IHI A 52/IHI C CONTROL ACCBN17278,, CONTROL ACCBN18298 C AC C BN1829A AC BREAKER 52/tH)D (BUS17/278) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER$2/lHIA (BUS18/29A) FAtLS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/IHIC (BUS18/298) FAILS TO OPEN EDG IA4 L0778 52/17SS CONTROL.ACT1FSST17 Fautt On 4160/4$0 VAC Bua 17 suppttr Transformer PXSHSS017 EDG1A4 L0779 EOG1A4 L0837 EDGI A.O L0837A ED GIA4 L0836 EOGLA4 L0836A EOGIA4 L08388 BOG I A4 L0838C 52/18SS KQGOI A KDGOI A KOGOI A KOG01A KDGOI A KDGOI A CONTRQL ACTI F SST I 8 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A C 120 VAC CONTROUPOWER OGDGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DGDGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A C 120 VAC CONTROL DGDGF0001A Fat/3 On 4160/480 VAC Bus 18 supply Transformer PXSHSS018 DIES'El.G'ENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVN DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EOGIA4 L0850 KDGOI A I INDICATIOM DGOGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EOGIA4 L0851 EOG IA4 L0658 EOGI A.I C0667 EDG1A 1 C0687 EOGIA-1 C1927 EDG1A-I C1927 EDGIA.1 C1932 KOGOI A KOGO IA MCCH MCCH OTPIA KDG0IA DTPI A C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGFCCOIA C 12S VDC CONTROL DGDGFIXOIA P 480 VAC POWER DCCFRC3ACN C 125 VDC CONTAOL ACRERDTP1A C 12S VDC CONTROL OGOGF0001A C 12$VDC CONTROL ACRERDTPIA P 480 VAC POWER ACCBRMCCIH OIFSEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUM DIESEL GENFRATOR KDG01 A FAILS TO RUN Fuse FUDCPOPC803A/CN Fails Open (To MCC H)480 VAC MCCH Feeder Crcrit Breaker 52/MCCH (MCCC/05MM) Transfers Open STARTING CIRCUIT RHAY 42/DTPI A TRANSFERS TO DE ENERGIZED DIESEL GENERATOR KOG01*FAlt.S TO RUN STARTING CIRCUIT RHAY 42/DTPIA TRANSFERS TO DE.ENERGIZED BOG I A.I C1933 EOGIA.I C1938 EDGI A.I C1939 EDG1A 1 C1940 EOGIA.1 C1941 EDGI A.I C1941 DTP I A AOFOI A ADFOI A ADFOIA ADFOIA ADF018 C 125 VDC CONTAOL P 460 VAC POWER C 125 VOC CONTROL C 125 VDC CONTROL P 125 VOC POWER P 125 VOC POWER ACRERDTPIA HVMCNDDOIA HVM CNO DO I A HVMCNDDOIA HVMCNDD01A HVMCNOD018 STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/OTPIA TRANSFERS TO DE.ENERGIZED 0 G A ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATED DAMPER ADDOIA FAILS TO OPEN DGA ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATEO DAMPER ADDOIA FAILS TO OPEN DG A ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATED DAMPER ADDOIA FAILS TO OPEN DG A ADO M FAN AIR.OFF RATED DAMPER ADDOIA FAILS TO OPEN OG A ROOM FAN AtR.OPERATEO DAMPER ADD018 FAILS TO OPEN EDGI A.I C1942 EOGI A.I C1943 I EOG1A.I C1944 ADF018 ADFOI 8 ADF018 P 480 VAC POWER P 12$VDC POWER HVMCNDD018 HVMCNDOOI 8 C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDD018 DG A ROOM FAN AIR OPERATED DAMPER ADDOI 8 FAILS TO OPEN OG A ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATED DAMPER ADD018 FAlLS TO OPEN CGA ROOM FAN AIR OPERATED DAMPER ADDOI 8 FAILS TO OP EN-BOG IA.I C1949 KOGOIA I ALARM DGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EOG1A.1 C'I950 4670 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04670 Serv'ce Water Header lsolMicn MQv 4670 Fa8s To Cfose On Demand EDGIA-I EDGIA.I I C1 950 C1951 4670 4670 P 480 VAC POWER C 125 VOC CONTROt.SWMVK04670 SeNtce Water Header lsoladcn MQV 4670 Transfers Cfosed I Service Water Header fsobdcn MQV 4670 T/ans/ers Closed EOG I A-I C1951 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04670 Service Water Header Isotation MOV 4670 Fails To Close On Demand EDG'IA.I EOGIA-1 C19$2 C1952 4670 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL$WMVK 046 70 C 125 VOC CONTROL SWMVC04670 Senrice Water Header Isolabon Mov 4670 Trans/ers Closed senrice water Header lso!alon Mov 4670 Faas To Close On Demand PntbftbtttGB 8 I.DQC/oc B-325 9/!S/98 12/)7/24 PM F IRE AREA: EOGiA i Ciiii P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04609 service water Header IsoLsten Mov 4609 Faas To Close On Demand LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE EDG1A EDGIA 1 C1956 I EDGIA.I C3603 I ADFOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL SVIMVC04609 C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDDOIA Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4609 Fa>IS To Close On Demand DG A ROOM FAN AIR-OPERATED DAMPER AD DO I A FAILS TO OPEN EDGIA.I C3606 I ADFOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNODOIA DG A ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATED DAMPER ADDOI A FAILS TO OPEN EDGI A.I C5075 I EDGI A.I 05075 I j EDGI A I C5076 EDGI A-I 05343 EDGIA.I C5343A j EDGIA.I 053438 i EDGIA I C5343C~EDGI A.I C53430 ED GI A I C5343E EDGIA.I C5343F EDGIA I C5343G EDGI A.I C5343H 4670 4670 KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVK04670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04670 C MISC CONTROL SWIitVC04609 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGFOCOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGFOCOIA C 125 VDC CONTROI.OGDGFCOOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGFC001A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A 0 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGFCCOIA Service Water Header Isoladcn MOV 4670 Trans/ers C/osed Service Water Header Isotaticn MQV 4670 Fails To Cosa On Demand Service Water Header lactation MOV 4609 Fess To Close On Demand DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAlLS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAlLS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAlLS TO RUN~DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAtLS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAtLS TO RUN I EDG I A.I 053433 KDGOI A C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGF0001A OIFSEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EOGI A-1 C5345 EDGI A.I C5345A EDG I A.1 053458 EDGIA 1 05346 EDGI A-I C5346A EOGI A-I 053468 KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOIA i KDG01 A KDGOIA KDG01 A C 125 VOC CONTROL OGDGFCCOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGFOCOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN I DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN I DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOI A FAILS TO RUN EDGI A.I E0018 EDGIA.I E0018 ED GI A.I E0018 E0G1A.I E0019 ED GI A I E0019 EDGIA I E0019 EDGIA I E0020 r EDGI A-I E0020~EDGIA.I E0022 EDGIA.I E0022 j I EDGIA-I E0022 EDGIA.I E0088 EDGIA.I L0318 DCPOPDG01 8/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCFRDI BDN DCPDPOGOIBI04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSRDIBDX DCPDPDGOI8/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCFRDIBDP DCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCSROIACX OCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCF RD IACN DCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VDC POWER OCCFRDIACP DCPDPCB03A/07 C 125 VDC POWER DCBDFDGCQA DCPDPCB03A/03 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSRC3ACX MCCH MCCH P 125 VOC POWER ACCBRMCCIH P 125 VDC POWER DCCFRC3ACN DCPDPDGOIA/04 C 125 VOC POWER OCCSRDIAOX 52/EGI AI P 480 VAC POWER ACCBD1418C DC('DPCB03A/07 C 125 VDC POWER OCCFRC3AGN Fuse FUDC POP DGOI 8/4N Fails Open (To D/G A-Emergency) Disconnect Switch OCPDPDG018/04 Transfers Open (To 0/G A-Emergency) Fuse F UDCPDPDGOI8/4P Fags Open (To D/G A-Emergency) Disconnect Swkch DCP DPOGOIA/03 Transfers Open (To D/G A-Normal)Fuse FUDCPDPDGOIA/3N Fails Open (To D/G A~Normal)Fuse FUDCPDPDGOIA/3P Fails Open (To 0/G A-Nonnat)Fuse FUOCPOPC803A/GN Fails Open (To 0/G DC D>>tnbuten Panol A)D/G OC Distrhuticn Panel A (DCPDPDGOI A)Local Fautt Disconnect Sun',ch DCPDPCB03A/03 Trans/ers Open j (To MCC H)480 VAC MCCH Feeder Cacus Breather 52/MCCH (MCCC/05MM) Transfers Open Fuse FUDCPDPC803A/CN Fails Open (To MCC H)Disconnect SwkchOCPDPDGOIA/04 Trar>>fera Open (To D/G 8-Emergency) OG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EGIAI (BUS14/18C) FAILS TO CLOSE ED GI A.I L0318 ED GI A.I L0320 j FDG'IA.I L0320~EDGI A I L0508 l EDGIA I L0508 52/EGI AI 52/EG I Al 52/EGI Al 52/EGI A I 52/EGIAI P 480 VAC POWER C 125 VDC CONTROL C 125 VDC CONTROl.P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER ACREKEG1AI ACREKEGIAI ACCBD1418C ACREKEGIAI ACCBD1418C DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RELAY 18CXI/EGIAI TRANSFERS TO l ENERGIZED OG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RE(AY 18CXI/EGIAI TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG1AI (8US14/18C) FAILS TO CLOSE!DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RELAY 18CXI/EGIAI TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52IEGIAI (BUS14/16C) FAILS TO CLOSE P01686IRGE B-I.DQC/oc B-326 sns/96 12 32:25 P<< r.oem<ON Cm m crEMSrrCs mar.E FIRE AREA: EDGI A.l L0508 EDGI A-1 L0509 I EDG1A 52/EGIA2 52/EG IA2 P 480 VAC POWER C 125 VDC CONTROL ACC801831C ACC801831C AC BREAKER 52/EGIA2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE AC BREAKER 52/EG'IA2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE EDG1A-1 L0530 EDGI A-I L0531 I EDGlA 1 Los32 EDG I A-I L0533 (EDG1A.I L0534 EDGI A.l L0534A<-I EDGI A.1 L0536 I ED G I A'I L0537 EDG1A.I L0541 KDG01 A KDGOI A KDG01 A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDG01 A KDG0 I A KDGO I A I IND/125 VDC CONTROL I ALARM/INDI C 0 NT OGDGFOC01A DGOGFOCOIA 0 120 VAC CONTROL OGOGFOCOI A C 120 VAC CONTROt.DGDGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A I MISC CONTROL DGDGF000)A C 125 VOC CONTROL DGOGFOCOIA P 480 VAC POWER DGDGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUM DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVM DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN~I DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUM DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUM DIESEL GENFRATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDG1A-I L0550 EDG1 A-1 L0554 I I EDGI A.l L0555 EDG1A-I L0560 ED G I A.I L0561 ED G I A-I L0562 EDGI A.I L0752 ED G1A.1 L0754 EDG1A.I L0760 EDG1A.I L0762 EDGIA-1 L0778 KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KOGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A 52/IHI 8 52/IH ID 52/IHI A 52/IHI 0 52/1768 I METERING/RElAYIN G I METERING/RELAYIH G P 120 VAC POWER I MFTERlNG/RELAYIN G I METERING/REtAYIN G I METERING/REIAYIN G CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL DGOG F000 IA DGDGF0001A DGDGF0001A DGDGF0001A DGDGF0001A OGDGF0001A ACCBN1727A ACCBN17278 ACCBNI829A ACCBN18298 ACTIFSST17 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN AC BREAKER 52/IH18 (BUS17/27A) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/IHI0 (BUS17/278) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/IHIA (BUS18/29A) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/IHIC (BUS18/298) FAILS TO OPEN Fault On 4160/480 VAC Bus 17 supply Transformer PXSHSS017 EDG IA-1 L0779 52/18SS CONTROL ACTIFSST18 Fault On 4160/480 vAC Bus 18 supply Trans/armer PXSHSS018 EDGIA.1 L0781 EDGIA-I L0783 EDG1A-I L0837 EDG I A I L0837A EDGIA.I L0838 EDGIA.I L0838A EDG I A-I L08388 EDG1A-I L0838C EDG1A.1 L0839 KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDG01A KDG01A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOI A KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGOGF0001A C 125 VDC COMTROL DGOGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A C 120 VAC CONTROVPOWER DGOGF0001A 0 125 VDC CONTROL C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DGDGF0001A C 120 VAC CONTROL OGOGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGOGF0001A C 125 VOC CONTROL OGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOG01A FAILS TO RUM DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN I DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUH i EDGlA.I L0839C KOGOI A EGG I A-1 L08390-KDGOIA EDG IA.1 L0839A KDGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGOGF0001A C 120 VAC CONTROL DGDGF0001A P 120 VAC POWER OGOGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUM (DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAII.S TO RUH I DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUH[EDGIA.1 L0839E KDGOI A P 120 VAC POWER DGDGFOCOI A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDGI A.I L0841 EDG1A.I L0650 EDGIA.l L0851 j EDG1A.1 L0858 KDGOI A KOGOI A KDGO I A KDGOI A P 125 VDC POWER I INDICATION DGDGFOCOIA DGDGFOCOIA C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGF0001A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVH DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN I DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDGI A.X C0687 EDGI A.X C0687 MCCH MCCH P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER ACCBRMCCIH OCCFRC3ACN 480 VAC MCCH Feeder Cire<it Brea'ker 52/MCCH (MCCC/05MM) Transfers Open Fuse FVDCPDPC803A/CN F ass Open (To MCC H)A EDGI A.X C1952 EDGI A.X 01952 PBI686IIIGE 8 I,DOC/oc 4670 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVK04670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04670 B 317 San<lee Water Header Isolauon Mov 4670 Transfers Closed Serves Water Header Isola<en MOV 4670 Fels To Close On Demand I 9/28/98 l!:32: 5 Pat FIRE AREA: EDGIA X C5075 aoCmrox cHAmn'amSxrcs vmr.z EDG1A 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04670 Senrice Water Header lsotatkut MOV 4670 Fade To Close On Demand ED G I A.X C5075 I 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVK04670 Sen/ice Water Header IsoIation MOV 4670 Trans/ers Closed EDGIA.X C5076 E0G1A.X E0018 EOG1A-X E0018 C MISC CONTROL SWMVC04609 Senrice Water Header Isation MOV 4609 Fags To Close On Demand DCPDPDGOIB/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCFROIBDP Fuse FUDCPDPDGOI8/4P Fails Open (To 0/G A-Emergency) DCPDPDG018/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCFROIBDN Fuse FUDCPDPDGOI8/4N Foils Open (To 0/G A-Emergency) EDG1A.X E0018 I EDGIA X E0020 DCPDPDG018/04 P 125VDC POWER DCPDPC803A/07 C 125 VDC POWER OCCSRDI BOX Ooccnnect Swgch DCPDPDGOIBI04 Transfers Open (To 0/G A-Emergency) OCBDFDGOOA D/G DC Dist/gtutionPanel A(OCPDPDG01A) Local Fautt l EDG1 A X E0020 I EDG1A X E0022 DCPDPCB03A/07 C 125 VOC POWER OCCFRC3AGN Fuse FUDCPDPC803AIGN Fels Open(To 0/G OC~Dist/ktut'cn Panel A)DCPDPCB03A/03 P 125 VDC POWER OCCSRC3ACX Otsconnect Swrtch DCPDPCB03A/03 Transfers Open (To MCC H))EDG1A.X E0022 MCCH P 125 VDC POWER ACCBRMCCIH 480 VAC MCCH Feeder Ci/erat Breaker 52/MCCH I (MCCCI05MM) T/andre/s Open EGG I A.X E0022 I EDGIA X L0318 EOGI A X L0318 EDG1 A X L0320 EOG1A X L0320 EDGIA X L0554 MCCH 52/EG1AI 52/EGIA1 52/EGIAI 52/EGIA1 KDGOI A P 125 VDC POWER P 460 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER C 125 VDC CONTROL C 125 VOC CONTROL I METERING/RELAYIN G DCCFRC3ACN Fuse FUDCPOPC803A/CNFails Open(ToMCC H)ACCBD1418C OG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG1A1 (BUS14/18C) FAI(.S TO CLOSE ACREKEG1A1 DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RELAY 18CX1/EGIA1 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ACREKEG1A1 DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RELAY 18CXI/EG1A1 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ACCBD1418C OG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EGIA1 (BUS14/18C) FAILS TO CLOSE DGDGFOOOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN 7.SPATIAL iNTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWN NOTES: FIRE ZONE EDGIA.O Stated companmcet below diesel generator room.WALKDOWN NOTES EDGIA I D.G fuel oil transfer pump.fire water Ieokup for cooling DN.4/2/gg WD Coctsiru cmc/g local control panel sod App.R locker.8 OG docs net bsw similar control panel.aod msy not bc as easy to sun If control room Is cvscustcd. Fully spriuklcrcd ar<<a.Eitbcr DG can be switched to citbcr bancry.Pttl6161RGE 8 I,DOC/oc B.328 9/78/gg 12:31835 Pal LOCATION CHAIU).CTERISTICS TABLE t FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.)FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION I EDG10.0 EDG10.1 244'DIESEL GENERATOR 10 CABLE VAULT 253'DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 10 FIRE AREA:*, EDG13 1.FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA: BUILDING DG DG FLOOR AREA (SQ.FT.)1265 2.FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU)FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)" EDG10O I (EOG18.1 77.099 42 mirk 57.6 min.3.FIRE PROTECTION FEATURE IN THIS FIRE AREA: j FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTIOH FEATURES EDGIBO EDG10 1 FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES 4.FIRE ZONE(S)ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S)IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE EDGI BO EDGI B-I EDG10 I ADJACENT FIRE ZONE EDGI 0 I EDGIA.l TB 1 PATHWAY OPEN WALL WALUDOQR PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC BASIC EVENT AFFECTED EVENT DESCRIPTION SWMVC04670 ACCBR00103 Senrice Water Header Isolagon MOV 4670 Fals To Close On Demand AC BREAKER52/EG103 TRANSFERS OPEN EOG18.1 4670 EDGI8 I 52/EG183 5.POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: EDG10 1 ADF02A)EDGIB 1 ADF020 EDGI8-I DCPOPC8030/16 EDG10.1 DCPDPDG010$ 3 EOG10-1 DCPDPDG010/03 EDG18.1 OCPDPDGOIB/03 HVMCNDD02A HVMCNDD020 DCBDFDGOOB DCCFRD1BCN OCCFROIBCP DCCSRO18CX DG ROOM 0 FAN 01 AIR.OPERATEO DAMPER ADD02A FAILS TO OPEN OG 0 ROOM FAN 02 AIR OPERATEO DAMPER AOD028 FAILS TO OPEN 0/G DC Oistnbution Panel 8 (DCPDPOG01 8)Local part(Fuse FUDCPDPDG010/3N Farts Open (To D/G 8-Normal)Fuse FUDCPDP 0G010/3P Fade Open (To D/G 8-Normal)Disconnect Switch DCP DPDG018/03 T/ans/ers Open (To D/G 0-Normal)j EOG10 I OCPOPDGOI8/04 DCCFRDIBDN Fuse FUDCPOPDG010/4N Fails Open (To D/G A-Emergency) 'DG10.1 DCPDPDG010/04 DCCFRDIBDP Fuse F UDCPOPDGOI 8/4P Fels Open (To D/G A-Emergency) EDGI 0-1 DCPDPDG010/04 EDG18.1 DTP18 EDG10.1 OTP10)EDG10-I KOG018 OCCSROIBDX ACRERDTPIB ACRERDTPIB OGDGF00010 D'tconnect swdch ocPDP DG01 8/04 Transfers open (To 0/G A-Emergency) STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/DTPI0 TRANSFERS TO DE.ENERGIZED STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/DTPI 0 TRANSFERS TO OE-ENERGIZED DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TQ RUN 6.POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS)AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE RACEWAY EQUIPMENT CABLE BASIC EVENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AFFECTED AFFECTED FUNCTION AFFECTED EGG ISO C1049 MCC J P 480 VAC POWER ACCBRMCC1J 480VACMCCJ Feeder Cgcuil Breaker 52/MCCJ (MCCO/05KK) Transfers Open EOGI BO I C1955 C 125 vDG cQNTROL SWMVC04609 Senrice water Header IsotatktnMOV 4609 Fails To Close On Demand EOG I BO C1990 ADF02A C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDD02A OG ROOM 8 FAN 01 AIR-OPERATEO DAMPER r ADD02A FAILS TO OPEN EOGI BO C1994 ADF028 C 125 VOC CONTROL HVMCNDD028 OG 0 ROOM FAN 82 AIR.OPERATED DAMPER ADO020 FAILS TO OPEN I EDG ISO C1997 KOG010 OGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN EGG ISO EOG10O C2005 4760 4780 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04760 SenriCe Water Header ISOtatrcnMQV 4760 Fada TO Close Qn Demand C 125 VOC CONTROL SWMVC047IO Senrice water Header Isolation MOV 4760 Fags To Close On Demand Pt tledQRQE B.I.DQC/rc B-329 9/ld/9d 12:32:26 PM FIRE AREA: I EDGIBO E0018 I DCPOPDG018I04 P 125 VOC POWER OCCFRO18DN Fuse F VDCPDPDGOIBI4N Fails Open (To D/G A-Emergency) LOCATION CHMU.CTERISTICS TABLE EDG18 EDG184 E0018 EDG184 E0016 (EDG18O E0030 I EDG184 E0030 EDGI BO E0068 EDG18O E0089 EDG18O E0069 I EDG184 E0069 I OCPDPDG018/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSROIBDX DCPOPOG018/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCFRO1BDP DCPDPCB03A/11 C 125 VDC POWER DCCFRC3ALN DCPDPCB03A/11 C 125 VDC POWER DCBDFSCRNA OCPDPDGOIA/04 C 125 VDC POWER DCCSRDIADX DCPDPDGOI BI03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCSRDIBCX OCPDPDG018/03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCFROIBCN OCPDPDGQI8/03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCFRD18CP sconnrect swsch ocpDpDG018$ 4 Transfers Open (To OIG A-Emergency) Fuse F VDCPDPOG018I4P Fails Open (To O/G A-Emergency) Fuse FUOCPDPC803A/LN Foils Open (To Screen House OC Oisvbutkvt Panel A)Screen House OC Oisvibution Panel lA (DCPOPSHOIA) Local Fautt Disconnect Switch DCPDPDGOIA/04 T/ans/ers Open (To D/G 8-Emergency) Disconnect Switch DCPDpDG018/03 Transfers Open (To 0/G 8~Normal)1 FuSe FUDCPDPDG018/3N Faila Open (TO D/G 8-Normal)Fuse FUDCPDPDGOI 8/JP Fess Open (To D/G 8-~Normal)EDGI BO E0090 OCPDPC8039/16 C 125 VDC CDNTROUPOWER OCBDFOGOCB D/G DC Distribution Panel 8 (DCPDPDG018) Local Fautl EDG184 E0090 EDGI 84 E0091 EDGI 84 E0091 C 125 VOC CDNTROUPOWER ACCBRMCC1J DCPDPC8038/16 C 125 VDC OCCFRC38RN CDNTROUPOWER OCPDPC8038/ol C 125 VDC DCCFRC38DN CONTROUPOWER Fuse FUDCPDPCB038/RN Fags Open (To D/G OC Disvibution Panel 8)Fuse FUDCPDPCB038/DN Fa Is Open (To MCC J)480 VAC MCCJ Feeder Circtat Breaker 52/MCC J (M 0 CD/05KK)T/ansfers Open EGG 1 84 E0127 DCPDPC8028/05 I MISC POWER OCBDF SCRNB Screen Hcuse OC Distnbution Panel 18 (DCPDPSH018)LocalFautt EDGI 84 F0127 EDGI 84 L0180 EDG184 LOIBO EDG184 L0166 52/I 6 C 125 VOC CONTROL ACCBD16118 52I16 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00016 52/EG181 P 460 VAC POWER ACCBD1611C OCPDPC8028/05 I MISC POWER'CCFRC28EN Fuse FUDCPOPC8028/5N Faas Open (To Screen House DC Obtribution Panel 8)AC BREAKER 52/16 (BUS16/118) FAILS TO OPERATE 460 VAC Bus 16 Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/16 (BUS16/118) Transfers open OGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG181 (BUS16/11C) FAII.S TO OPERATE EDGI 84 L0166 EDG184 L0190 EDG184 LOIBO 52/EG181 52/EG181 52/EG181 P 460 VAC POWER C 125 VDC CONTROL C 125 VDC CONTROL ACREKEG181 ACCBD1611C ACREKEG181 OG 8 SUPPLY BREAKER TO BVS 16 CLOSED RELAY 11XC1/EG181 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED DGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG181 (BUS16II I C)FAILS TO OPERATE DG 8 SUPPLY BREAKER TO BVS 16 CLOSED RELAY 11XC1/FG181 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED FDG18O L0429 EDG184 L0429 EDG184 L0429 52/17 52/17 52/17 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00017 C 125 VOC CONTROL DCCFRSI BGN C 125 VDC CONTRQI.OCCFRSIAAN 480 VAC Bus 17 Feeder Circuit Broaker 52/17 (BVS17/258) Transfers open Fuse F UOCPDPSH018//N Fa7s Open (To Bus 17~Norma 8 Fuse FUDCPDPSH01A/IN Fails Open (To Bus 17-Emergency) EDG184 L0429 52/17 C 125 VDC CONTROL.ACCBD17258 AC BREAKER 5V17 (BUS17/258) FAILS TO OPERATE EOG184 L0429 EDG184 L0432 52/8717-16 52/EG182 P 460 VAC POWER ACCBD1725C C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR17 16 Breaker 52/bl17-1 6 Vans/era open DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (BUS17/25C) FAILS TO OPERATE EDG184 L0432 EOGI BO L0432A EDG ISO L0432A!ED G18O L0432A EDG184 L0432A EDGIBO L0434 EDG184 L0435 SVEGI 83 52/EG181 52/EG181 52/EG182 52/EG183 52/EG182 52/EG182 P 460 VAC POWER P 460 VAC POWER P 460 VAC POWER P 460 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER C125VDC POWER C 125 VDC POWER ACCBRC0183 ACREKEG181 ACCBD1611C ACCBD1725C ACCBR00183 ACCBD1725C ACC801725C AC BREAKER 52/EG183 TRANSFERS OPEN OG 8 SUPPLY BREAKER TD BUS 16 CLOSED RELAY 11XC1/EG181 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED DGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG181 (BVS16/11C) FAILS TO OPERATE DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (BVS17/25C) FAILS TO OPERATE AC BREAKER 52/EG183 TRANSFERS OPEN OG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (BUS17/25C) FAILS TO OPERATE DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (BUS17/25C) FAILS TO OPERATE EDGI 84 L0446 I ED G18 4 L0462 52/MCC1 G2 52/SWP)8 ACCBN1726C C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMPFSW018 AC BREAKER 52/MCCIG2 (BVS17/26C) FAILS TO OPEN San ice water pump pswolB Fails To Run For The r Requved Mission Trna (P81666IRCE B-l.DDC/oc 8-330 9/26/N 12 32 26 Pal X<'IRE AREA: EDG184 L0462 I 52/SWPI0 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN1727C AC BREAKER 52/SWPI 8 (BUS17/27C) FAILS TO OPEN LOCATION CHARACTEMSTICS TABLE EDG1B EDG184 Loser i EOG184 L0463 EDG'I 84 L0463 EDG184 L0463 EDG I 84 L0466 52/SWP I 0 52/SWP I 0 52/SWP ID 52/SWP ID 52/SWP ID I ALARM/125 VDC CONTROL I ALARM/125 VDC CONTROL I ALARM/125 VDC CONTROL I ALARM/125 VDC CONTROL C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMPFSW010 ACCBN1727C ACCBN1727D SWMPFSW01D ACCBN1727D Seniice Water Pump PSW018 Fails To Run For The Requi ed Missk/n Time AC BREAKER 52/SWPI 8 (BUS17/27C) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/SWPID (BVS17/27D) FAILS TO OPEN Service Water Pump PSW010 Fails To Run For The Requ'red M'idion Time AC BREAKER 52/SWPID (BUS17/270) FAILS TO OPEN EDG184 L0466 (ED G1 8 4 L0469 EDG104 L0472 52/SWPID 52/BT17-18 52/14 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMPFSW010 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR17 16 C'125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00014 Service Water Pump PSW010 Fails To Run For The Requied Mission Time Bniaker 52/bt17.18 transfers open 480 VAC Bus 14 Feeder Circu'I Breaker 52/14 (BUS14/168) Trans/ers open I EOG104 L0472 i 52/14 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBD'l4168 AC BREAKER 52/14 (BUS14/188) FAILS TO OPERATE EDG184 L0472 EDG184 L0463 EDG10 0 L0463 52/BT17-18 52/SWP I A 52/SWP1A C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR17 18 C 125 VDC CONTROt.ACCBN18290 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMPFSW01A Breaker 52/bl17.18 lransfe/s open AC BREAKER 52/SWPIA (BUS16/290) FAILS TO OPEN Service Water Pump PSW01A Fats To Run For Tho Required Mission Time EDG184 L0464 EDG104 L0484 EDG184 L0484 EDG104 L0464 52/SWPI A 52/SWPIA 52/SWP I C 52/SWP I C I AlARM/120 VAC CONTROL I AlARM/120 VAC COMTROL IAlARM/120VAC CONTROL I AlARM/120 VAC CONTROL SWMP F SW01 A ACCBN1829C ACCBN1829D SWMPFSVtOIC Seniice Water Pump PSWOIA Fails To Run For The Requied Mission Time AC BREAKER 52/SWPI A (BUS18/290) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/SWPIC (BUS18/29D) FAILS TO!OPEN Service Water Pump P SW01 0 Fats To Run For The Requied Mission Tine EDG184 L0467 52/SWP1 0 0 125 VDC CONTROL SWMPFSViOIC Service Water Pump PSW01 0 Fails To Run For The Required Mission Tine EDG184 L0487 EDG184 L0499 EDG184 L0504 52/SWP1 0 52/MCC1GI 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL C 125 VDC COHTROL C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN18290 ACCBN1830C ACCBD18318 AC BREAKER 52/SWPIC (BUS18/290) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/MCCIGI (BUS16/30C) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/16 (BUS18/318) FAILS TO OPERATE EDG184 L0504 EDG184 L0504 EDG184 L0505 EDG184 L0505 EOG104 L0505 52/18 52/18 52/18 52/18 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00018 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBD18318 C 125 VDC COHTROL ACCBR00018 C 125 VDC CONTROL DCCFRS18FN C 125 VDC CONTROL DCCFRS10FN 460 VAC Bus 18 Feeder Circus Breaker 52/18 (0 US 18/318)Transfers open Fuse FUDCPDPSH018/6N Fails Open (To Bus 16-Emergency) AC BREAKER 52/18 (BUSI0/310) FAILS TO OPERATE 480 VAC Bus 18 Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/18 (BUS18/310) Trans/ers open Fuse FUDCPDPSHOI0/6N Fats Open (To Bus 18-Emergency) EDG104 L0510 52/EG1A2 C 125 VDC POWER ACCBD1831C AC BREAKER 52/EG1A2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE EDG104 t 0570 j EDG184 L0571 EDG104 L0572 EGG!84 t.0576 EOGI 8.O L057/EDG184 L0579 EDG184 L0562 KDG018 KDGOI 8 KOG010 KDGOI 8 KOG010 KDGO I 0 KDG010 I MISC CONTROL I MISC CONTROL DGDGF00010 DGDGFC0010 P 460 VAC POWER OGDGF00010 C 120 VAC CONTROL DGDGFC0010 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGFC0010 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGFCC018 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAlLS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RVN DIESEL GENERATOILKDGOI0 FAII.S TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI 8 FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI 8 FAILS TO RUN EDG184 L0563 EDG184 L0565 EDGI8 0 L0566 EDG184 L0567 EDG184 L0590 EDG18.0 L0591 KDG018 KDGOI 0 KDG018 KDG010 KDG010 P 480 VAC POWER P 460 VAC POWER P 460 VAC POWER P 460 VAC POWER I METEAING/RELAYIN G I METERING/AEIAYIN G DGDGFCC010 DGDGFCC010 DGDGFCC010 DGDGF00010 DGDGFCC010 DGDGFC0010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI0 FAILS TO AUN DIESEL GFNERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN DIFSEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RVN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RVH PnledQRGE 8 I.DOC/oc B-33)9/26/93 12:32:26 PM FIRE AREA: EGG I 84I L0592 KDG018 I METERING/RELAYIN G DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE EDG18 EOGI M L0593 EDGI 84I L0594 EDGI 84I L0600 EDG184I L0602 I i~EDG I 847 LC603 KDG018 KDG018 KDG018 KDGOI 8 I METERING/RELAYIN G I METERING/RELAYIN G I METERING/RELAYIM G I METERING/RELAYIN G I METERING/RE LAYIN G DGDGF00018 DGDGF00018 DGDGF00018 OGDGF00018 DGDGF00018 OI SEL GFMERATOR KOG018 FAtLS TQ RUM DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUM DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI 8 FAlLS TQ RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI8 FAILS TO RUM EDGI 841 L0604 KDG018 k I METERING/RELAY IN G OG DG F00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KOG018 FAILS TO RUN EDG1841 L0605 I KDG018 I METERING/RE LAYIN G DGOGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KOG018 FAILS TO RUN EDGI 84I L0765 EDGI Ba L0767 KOG018 KOG018 C 125 VOC CONTROL OGDGF00018 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGFCOOI8 OiESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUM DIF SEL GENERATOR KDGOI 8 FAILS TQ RUN EDGI 841 L0854 EDGI841 L0854 L LIT 2051A UT.2051 A NSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMENTATION OGPSL2051A OGPSH2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A FAILS, NDICATING FALSE LOW LEVEL IN TDG048 PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A.2 FAILS.INDICATING FALSE HIGH LEVEL IN TDG048 EDGI84I L0855 KDG018 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN I EDG1 841 L0855 LIT-2051A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGPSL2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A FAILS, INDICATING FALSE LOW LEVEL IN TDG048 EDGI 841 L0655 EDGI 84I L0656 EDG184I L0656 UT.205 1 A KDG018 LIT 2051A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGPSH2051A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGPSH2051A C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGF00018 PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A.2 FAILS.INDICATING FALSE HIGH LEVEL IM TDG048 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGDI 8 FAILS TQ RUN PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A.2 FAILS.INDICATING FALSE HIGH LEVEL IM TPG048 EDG184I L0656 LIT.2051A C 125 VDC CONTROL DG PS L2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A FAILS.NOICATIMG FALSE LOW LEVEL IM TDG048 I EDGI 8%M0089 EDGI 841 M0108 FDG18.1 C104S EDG18-1 C1950 EDGI 8-1 C1950 EDGI8 I C1951 I EDGIB I C1951 EDGI 8 I C1955 EDGI 8 I CI S56 EDGI 8.1 C1977 I EDGI 8 1 C1962 52II BSS 52I1766 MCCJ 4670 4670 4670 4670 DTP18 OTP I 8 M 4160 VAC POWER ACTIFSSTI8 M 4160 VAC POWER ACT IF SST17 P 460 VAC POWER SWMVK04670 P 460 VAC POWER SWMVC 04670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04670 C 125 VOC CONTROL SWMVK04670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04609 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04609 C ACREROTPI8 C 125 VOC CONTROL ACREROTPI 8 P 460 VAC POWER ACCBRMCCI J Fault On 4160/460 VAC Bus 18 supply Transformer PXSHSS018 Fault On 4160/460 VAC Bus 17 supply Trans/ormer PXSHSS017 480 VAC MCCJ Feeder Crcua Breaker 52/MCCJ (MCCD/05KK) Transfers Open Senrice Water Header lsoiadcn MQV 4670 Trans/ers Qosed Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4670 Fails To Qose On Demand SenriCe Wale/Header ISOtatiOn MOV 4670 Faila TO Qose On Demand Service Water Header Iso/alen MOV 4670 Transters Cbsed SenriCe Water Header ISOIadcn MQV 4609 Faila TO Qose On Demand Service Water Header Isolation MQV 4609 Faits To Close On Demand STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/OTPI 8 TRANSFERS TO DE EAERG12ED STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/OTPI 8 TRANSFERS TO OE ENERGIZED EDGI 8-1 C1986 EDG18.1 CI SSS EDGI 8 1 C1990 4 EDGIB I I C1991 EDGI 8 I C1991 ADF02A ADF02A ADF02A ADF02A ADF028 P 460 VAC POWER C 125 VOC CONTROL C 125 VDC CONTROL P 125VOC POWER P 125 VDC POWER HVMCNDD02A HVMCNDO02A HVMCNDD02A HVMCNDD02A HVMCNDD028 DG ROOM 8 FAM 81 AIR.OPERATED DAMPER ADD02A FAILS TO OPEN OG ROOM 8 FAN 81 AIR4)PERATEO DAMPER ADIX2A FAILS TO OPEN DG ROOM 8 FAN 81 AIR.OPERATED DAMPER ADD02A FAILS TO OPEN OG ROOM 8 FAM 81 AIR OPERATEO DAMPER ADD02A FAII.S TQ OPEN DG 8 ROOM FAN 82 AIR-OPERATED DAMPER ADD028 FAII.S TQ OPEN PAI684IRGE 8 I.DDC/oc 8-332 9/l SISS ll:31:27 PM ~~~~~~I~~~~'~"~'~~1'~~Ir~~~~~~~'~~~~~'~'~~~'~~'ii~~'~~~'~~~'~~~~'~+~~~~1~~~'~~~~~~1~~t~~1~~;~~1~~~~~~~.'~~~~~1~~~~'~'~~:~~'~~~~~~1 1~~~~~~~~~~~'~~~~~~1~~~~~~~~~~~'~~~~I~~~~~1~~~~~~1~~~~~~~I~I 1~I~~~~~'~~~'~'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'1~'1~~i'd~~~~~~~'~~~~~~~1~1~~~~~1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1~1~~~~)~1~~\~~~I~~~~~~1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~~i~~~~~~~1~~~~~'~~~~1~~~~'.~'~~~'1~~~i~~'~~'~~~~1'~'~~'~~~~~~~'I~'~~1~~il~~~~~'1 C~~'l'i*'~'1~~'~'~~'~~'~~~'~~'.~~"~1 1~~'~~~~~~~1~~~~1~~'~~1'~~'a~1~~0~'~1~'~'~~~~1~~~1~1~~~~1~~~~1 4~~~~*~~'~1~1'~~~~~~~~~~~~~ FIRE AREA: ED G10.1 ID160 52/16 C 125 VDC CONTROL AGCBR00016 460 VAC Bus 16 Feeder Cvcuil Breaker 52/16 (BUS16/110) Transters open X,OCAYroN CH~m.nmarSnCS maaE EDG13 EDG10.1 L0168 EDGI 0 I L0186 I EDG18.1 L0190 52/EGI 8l 52/EG101 52/EG101 P 460 VAC POWER P 460 VAC POWER C 125 VDC CONTROL ACREKEG101 ACCBD1611C ACC 8 D1611C DG 0 SVPPI.Y BREAKER TO BVS 16 CLOSED RELAY I IXCI/EG181 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED DGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG101 (BUS16/I IC)FAILS TO OPERATE OGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG101 (BUS16/I IC)FAILS TO OPERATE EDG10.1 L0190 E0G10.1 L0429 EDG10.1 L0429)~EDG18.1 L0429 EDG'18.1 L0429 EDGI 8-I L0429 52/EGI BI 52/17 52/17 52/17 52/17 52/0T17.16 G 125 VDC CONTROL ACREKEG101 C 125 VDC CONTROL, ACCBR00017 6 125 VDC CONTROL.DCCFRSIAAN C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBD17258 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGCFRSIBGN C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR17 16 DG 0 SUPPLY BREAKER TO BVS 16 CLOSED RELAY 11XGIIEGIBI TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED r 460 VAC Bus 17 Feeder Circuit Brea'ker 52/17 (BUS17/250) Transters open I Fuse FUDGPDPSHOIA/INFagsOpen(ToBus17-Emergency) I AC BREAKER 52/17 (BVS17/250) FAILS TO OPERATE Fuse FVDGPDPSH018/7N Fails Open (To Bus 17-Normal]I Breaker 52/OIL 7-I 6 uansfers open I EDGI 0-1 L0432 EDG10-1 L0432 EDGI 0-1 L0432A EDG10.1 L0432A 52/EG182 52IEGI 83 52/EG101 52/EG I 0 1 P 460 VAC POWER P 460 VAC POWER P 460 VAC POWER P 460 VAC POWER ACCBD1725C ACGBR00183 ACCBD1611C ACREKEG101 DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG102 (BUS17/25C) FAlLS TO OPERATE AC BREAKER 52/EG183 TRANSFERS OPEN DGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG101 (BUS16/I IG)FAILS TO OPERATE I DG 0 SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 16 CLOSED RELAY I IXCI/EGI BI TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZEDEDGI0-I L0432A EDGI 8-1 L0432A EDGI B-I L0434 EDGI 0 I L0446 52/EG182 52IEG183 52/EGI 02 52/MCCI G2 P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER C 125 VDC POWER ACCBD1725C ACCBR00\83 ACCBD17250 C ACCBM1726C DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG102 (BUS17/25C) FAILS TO OPERATE AC BREAKER 52/EG183 TRANSFERS OPEN DG 0 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG102 (BUS17/25C) FAILS TO OPERATE AC BREAKER 52/MCC1G2 (BUS17/26C) FAILS TO OPEN EDG10.1 L0463 EDG10.1 L0463 EDGI0 I L0463 EDG10.1 L0463 52/SWP10 52/SWPI 0 52/SWP 1 0 52ISWP I 0 I ALARM/125 VDC CONTROL I ALARM/125 VDC CONTROL I ALARM/125 VDC CONTROL I ALARM/125 VDC CONTROL SWMPF SW018 ACCBN1727C SWMPF SW010 ACCBN1727D Seriice Water Pump PSW010 Faas To Run For The Required Mission Tune AC BREAKER 52/SWPI 0 (BVS17/270) FAILS TO OPEN Service Water pump pSWOIO Faas To Run For The Required MBsion Tene AC BREAKER 52/SWPID (BUS17/27D) FAILS TO OPEN EDG10 I L0499 ED G I B-I L0504 EDG10.1 L0504 52/MGG161 52/16 52/16 C 12S VDC CONTROL ACCBN1630C G 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00016 6 125 VDC CONTROL DCCFRSI BFN AC BREAKER 52IMCCIG1 (BUS16I306) FAILS TO OPEN Fuse FUDCPDPSH010/6M Fairs Open (To Bus 16-Emergency) 480 VAC Bus 16 Feeder Queue Breaker 52/16 (BUSI6/310) Transters open EDG10.1 L0504 52/I 6 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACC 8 D16310 AC BREAKER 52/16 (BUS16/310) FAILS TO OPERATE EDGI 0 I L0505 52/16 6 125 VDC CONTROL DCCFRSI BFN Fuse FUDCPDPSH010/GN Fels Open(To Bus 18~Emergency) EDGI 0-I L0505 EDG10.1 L0505 I 52/18 52/16 C 125 VDC CONTROL G 125 VOC CONTROL ACC 0 R00016 ACGBD16310 460 VAC Bus 16 Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/I 6 (BVS16/3(0)Transters open AC BREAKER 52/16 (BVSI6/310) FAILS TO OPERATE EDG18 I L0570 I MISC CONTROL-DGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI 0 FAILS TO RVM EDG10.1 L0571 KD6010 I MISC CONTROL DGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN EDG18 1 L0572 EDGI 8 I L0573 FD610 1 L0574 EGG I 0 I L0576 EGG I 0 I L0577 EDG18.1 L0579 EDG10.1 L0561 EDGI 8 I L0562 EDG10.1 L0584 KDG010 KD6018 KD6018 KD6010 KD6010 KDGO I 0 KD6010 KD6010 KDGOI 8 C 120VAC CONTROL DGDGF00010 I h'IISC CONTROL OGDGF00010 P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER DGDGF00010 DGDGF00010 DGDGF00018 C 125 VDC CONTROl.DGDGF00018 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF00018 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF00018 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RVN DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI 0 FAILS TQ RVM DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAlLS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAlLS TQ RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TQ RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUM DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIB FAILS TO RVM DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIB FAILS TO RUM DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI0 FAILS TO RUN P;115SQRCE 0 I.DQC/oc)3-334 9/23/93 11:32KT7 Phl LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE I<'IRK ARE<A: 'DG18 I~ED G18.1 L0590 KDG018 I METERING/RELAYLN G OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KOG018 FAILS TO RUN EDGI 8 1 L0594 EDG18 1 L0595 EDG18 1 L0600 EDG18.1 1.0601 I KDG018 KDG018 KDGOI 8 KDG018 I METERING/RELAYIN G P 120 VAC POWER I METERING/RELAYIN G I METERING/RELAYIN G DGDGFOCOI 8 DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOI 8 FAILS TO RUN OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN OGDGFC0018 DIESEL GENERATOR KOG018 FAiLS TO RUN EDG18.1 L0602 c EDG18.1 L0765 EDG18 1 L0767 EDG18.1 L0654 EDG18.1 L0654 EDG18-1 L0855 KDG018 KDG018 KDG018 LIT-205<A UT-2051 A KDG018 I METERING/RELAYIN OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUM C 125 VDC CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION PISTRUMENTATION DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG019 FAILS TO RUN OGPSH2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A-2 FAILS, INDICATING FALSE HIGH LEVEL IN TOG049 I DGPSL2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A FAILS.INDICATING FALSE LOW LEVEL IN TOG048 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAlLS TO RUM G C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KOG018 FAILS TO RUN r ED G18.1 L0655 LIT.2051A C 125 VOC CONTROI.DGPSH2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A-2 FAILS.INDICATING FALSE HIGH LEVEL IN TDG048 i EDG18'1 L0655 j EDG18 1 L0856 LIT-2051A KDG018 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGPSL2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A FAILS.INDICATING FALSE LOW LEVEL IN TOG048 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN EDG18.1 L0656 LIT.205<A/C 125 VOC CONTROL DGPSH2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A.2 FAILS, INDICATING FALSE HIGH LEVEL IM TDG048 ED G18.1 L0656 I I EDG18.1 M0069 I EOGIB 1 M0106 LIT-2051A 52/1855 52/1 758 C 125 VDC CONTROI.OGPSL2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A FAlLS.INDICATING FALSE LOW LEVEL IN TDG048 M 4160 VAC POWER ACT1FSST18 Fauk On 4160/460 VAC Bus 18 supply Transformer PXSHSS016 h'I 4160 VAC POWER ACT1FSST17 Fautl On 4160/460 VAC Bus 17 supply Trans/armer PXSHSS017 7.SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWN NOTES: FIRE ZONE EDGI 841 Seakd companmen< below diesel gcncra<or room.WALKDOWN NOTES 5DG I 8.l D G foci oil<ramfcr pump.Fire wa<cr hookup for cooling D.G.4/2/98 V/D sec no<ca for DG A room.PAI686<RCE 8.1.DOC/oc B.335 9/28/98 1202:28 Phl LOCATION Cm,mCYKmsxrCS Ymr.z FIRE AREA: H2 1.FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA: t FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.)FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ.FT.)H2 2$tt 6 HYDROGEN STORAGE ROOM HS 2.FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE H2 14.846 COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU)11.1/nba FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)3.FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES H2 FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES 4 FIRE ZONE(S)ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S)IN THIS FIRE AREA: I FIRE ZONE j H2 ADJACENT FIRE ZONE TO TB-1 PATHWAY WALL WALL PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)5.POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: , 6.POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS)AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPiMENT/BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: 7.SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWN NOTES: WALKDOWN NOTES FIRE ZONE H2 Adjacent to turbine oil stcra8e room.2 DG foci oil stora8c tanks (6000 8at tons each)unde/8round bettwu bydroien sin/abc area.4/2/98 WD no safety critical equipment PhldIQRGE 0 I.DOC/uc B-336 9/28/98 12:22:28 Phl LOCATION CHAIR CTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: 'C 1.FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA: I FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.)FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ.FT.)RC.1 RC.2 235EACTOR CONTAINMENT BASEMENT 253EACTOR CONTAINMENT MEZZANINE RC RC 8825 8825 RCQ 74'6 278'REACTION CONTAINMENT OPERATING LEVEL RC 8825 2.FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE c RC I RC-2 23,187 5,731 3.182 COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU)17.4 mi/L 4.3 miA.2.4 mn.FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)3.FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES RC-1 RC.2 RC.3 FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES 4.I<'IRE ZONE(S)ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S)IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE RC.1 RC.l RC-1 RC-2 RC.2 RC-2 RC4 RCO ADJACENT FIRE ZONE ABB IBN47 1864I IBM.1 IBS-1 AGO IBM.2 IBS.2 PATHWAY WALL WALL WALL WALL WALL WALL WALL WALL WALL PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)5.POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC AFFECTED EVENT RC-1 294 BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AIR43PERATED VALVE 294 TRANSFER CLOSED RC-1 392A RC-1 52/CFIC RC.1 52/CFIC Rc.l 52/CF10 RC-I 52/CF1D RC-1 700 RC.1 701 RC.I 720 RC I 721 RC.l 852A RC.l 8528 RC.I PT-452 RC-2 52/CF IA CVRVP0392A HVMCP05876 HVMCP05874 HVMCC05875 HVMC K05877 R RMV000700 R RMV000701 R RMV000720 RRMV000721 RHMV00852A RHMV008528 RCBINPC452 HVMF FACFBA aovrrv392a fails lo reseve to res AIR47PERATED DAMPER 5876 FAILS TO OPEN (CONTAINMENTI AIR47PERATED DAMPER 5874 FAILS TO OPEN (CONTAINMENTI AIR OPERATED DAMPER 5875 FAILS TO CLOSE AIR.OP DAMPER 5877 TRANSFERS CLOSED MOV 700 FAILS TO OPEN MOV 701 FAII.S TO OPEN MOV 720 FAI'LS TO OPEN MOV 721 FAILS TO OPEN MOV 852A FAILS TO OPEN MOV 8528 FAILS TO OPEN ALARM PCW2 FAILS TO OPERATE ON DEMAND MOTOR4)RIVEN FAN ACFBA FAILS TO RUN (CONTAINMENTI RC-2 52/RCPI8 RC-2 8620A RCMPFRCPIB IASVP 8620A RC-2 52/RCP I A RCMPFRCPIA REACTOR COOLANT PUMP PRCOIA FAILS TO RUN REACTOR COOLANT PUMP PRCOI 8 FAILS TO RUN SOLENOID VALVE 8620A FAILS TO OPEN RC.2 86208 RC.2 LTA27 RC.2 LT&28 RC 2 LT.934 IASVP86208 RCLYDLM427 RCLYDLM428 SILTHLT934 SOLENOID VALVE 86208 FAILS TO OPEN INSTRUMENT LOOP CURRENT REPEATER LM<27 FAILS TO RESPOND INSTRUMENT LOOP CURRENT REPEATER LM<28 FAlLS TO RESPOND LEVEL TRANSMITf ER LT-934 FAILS HIGH P Llbd6CRGE 8 I.DOC/oc B-337 9/dd/98 12 32 dd PM LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: RC RC 2 RC.2 RC.2 RC 2 RC.2 RC-2 RC 2 RC.2 RC.3 RC4 RC-3 RC-3 RC-3 RC4 RC-3 RCC RC-3 RC4 RCQ RC-3 RC-3 RCQ RC-3 RC-3 RC-3 RC.3 RC4 RC.3 RC 3 LT 935 LT-938 LT.939 F7<29 F7<31 PT449 431A 4318 515 516 86128 861 6A 861 68 8619A 86198 CRSFIA CRSFI 8 F7<74 F7<75 LT<61 LT<62 LT463 LT<71 LT472 LT473 SILTHLT935 S ILTHLT%8 S ILTHLT939 RRPTHP T420 RCPTLPT429 RCPTLPT430 RCPTLPT431 RCPTLPT449 RCAVN0431A RCAVN0431B RCMVP00515 RCMVP00516 IAPVK8612A IAPVK8612 B IASVP 861 6A IASVP8616B IASVP8619A IASVP86198 HVMFFACFSA HVMFFACF58 ESFTD00464 ESFTD00465 ESFTD00474 ESFTO00475 MF LTD00461 MF LTO00462 MF LTD00463 MFLTD00471 MFLTD00472 MF LTD00473 LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT.935 FAILS HIGH LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-938 FAILS HIGH LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-939 FAILS HIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<20 FAILS HIGH PRESSURE TRANSMIITER PT<29 FAILS LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<30 FAILS LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<31 FAILS LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<49 FAILS LOW AIR-OPERATED VALVE PCV<3IA FAILS TO OPEN AIR43PERATED VALVE PCVP318 FAILS TO OPEN MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 515 FAILS TO OPEN MOTOR47PERATEO VALVE 516 FAlLS TO OPEN PRESSURE CONTROL VLV 8612A TRANSFERS CLOSED PRESSURE CONTROL VLV 8612B TRANSFERS CLOSED SOLENOID VALVE 8616A FAILS TO OPEN SOLENOID VALVF 86168 FAILS TO OPEN SOLENOID VALVE 8619A FAILS TO OPEN SOLENOID VALVE 86198 FAILS TO OPEN CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN A FAILS TO RUN CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN B FAILS TO RUN STEAM GENERATOR A FLOW TRANSMITTER FT<64 FAILS TO RESPOND STEAM GENERATOR A FLOWTRANSMllTER FT<65 FAILS TO RESPOND SG 6 STEAM FLOW TRANShtlTTER F7<74 FAILS TO RESPOND SG B STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTER F7<75 FAlLS TO RESPOND Level transmitter LT<61 fails to respond Level transmitter LTe62 fails to respond Level transminer LT<63 fails to respond Level transmitter LTA71 fails to respond Level transmitter LTA72 faih to respond Level transmilter LT<73 faiIS tO reapOnd 6.POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS)AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE RACEWAY AFFECTED EQUIPMENT AFFECTED CABLE FUNCTION BASIC EVENT AFFECTED BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION RC.1 C0714 P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQ00720 MOV 720 FAILS TO OPEN RC.1 RC.1 C0714 C0716 P 480 VAC POWER C 125 VDC CONTROL RCS-720 ISLOCA evaluation RCS-720 ISLOCA evaa/ation RC.1 C0716 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVQ00720 MOV 720 FAILS TO OPEN RC.l RC 1 C0721 C0721 P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQ007CO MOV 700 FAILS TO OPEN RCS-700 ISLOCA evaluation RC.1 RC-1 C0723 00723 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVQ00700 MOV 700 FAlLS TO OPEN C 125 VDC CONTROL RCS-700 ISLOCA evas/ation RC1 C0729 852A P 480 VAC POWER RHMVQ0852A MOV 852A FAILS TO OPEN RC.1 C0731 852A C 125 VDC CONTROL RHMVQ0852A MOV 852A FAILS TO OPEN RC.I RC 1 C0741 C074\878A 878A P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER SIXVR0878A MOV 878A TRANSFERS OPEN SRXVR0878A MOV878A TRANSFERS OPEN RC.1 RC 1 C0743 C0743 878A 878A C 125 VDC CONTROL SIXVR0878A MOV 878A TRANSFERS OPEN C 125 VDC CONTROL SRXVR0878A MOV878ATRANSFERS OPEN RC-1 RC I C0748 C0748 8780 878C P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER SIXVR0878C MOV 8780 TRANSFERS OPEN SRXVR0878C MOV 878C TRANSFERS OPEN RC.1 RC 1 878C 878C C 125 VDC CONTROL SIXVR0878C MOV 878C TRANSFERS OPEN C 125 VOC CONTROL SRXVR0878C MOV 878C TRANSFERS OPEN RC 1 RC-1 C1080 C1080 721 721 P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER RCS.721 ISLOCA evatuation RRMVQ00721 MOV 721 FAILS TO OPEN RC-I RC-I C1082 C1082 721 721 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVQC0721 MOV 721 FAILS TO OPEN C 125 VDC CONTROL RCS.721 ISLOCA evaluation PAIMQRGE 9 I.DOC/oc 8-338 9/la/98 12:37:29 Pht Pages B-339 through B-350 are similar and not included to reduce paper volume. LOCATION CHAIR CTERISTICS TABLE RE AREA:;RC RC-2 R3594 RC-2 R3595 RC-2 R3596 RC-2 R3597 RC.2 R3596 RC-2 R3599 RC 2 R3968 RC-2 R3970 RC 2 R3972 RC-2 R3972 593 591 591 TE-11081 LT<27 PT~PT<30 RC.592 RC-592 P RC<93 RC493 P RC491 C 125 VDC CONTROL RC491 C TE<1081 RCLYDLM427 EXPTLPT430 C ESPTDPT430 Spulous opening of RCS head vent 8 in conjunction with SV493?Spurious opening of RCS head vent if st conjunction with SVC93?Spurious operwrg of RCS head vent if in conjunction with SV<92?Spurious opening of RCS head ventÃat conjunction whh SV492?Spurious openhg of RCS head vent if in conjunction wah SV<907 Spurious openng of RCS head vent if ln con(unction with SVW90?TEMPERATURE ELEMENT FOR LOOP 8 COLD LEG INSTRUMENT LOOP CURRENT REPEATER LM.427 FAILS TO RESPOND PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER F7<30 FA!LS LOW PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<30 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND RC.2 R3972 RC.2 R3993 RC 2 R4081 PT<30 TE~B I LT~I INDICATION RCPTLPT430 TE40981 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PRO FAILS LOW LOOP 8 HOTLEGTEMPELEMENT STEAM GENERATOR EMSOIA LEVEL WIDE RANGE APPENDIX R TRANSM(ITER RC-2 R4085 LT<26A C 125 VDC CONTROL LT<28A PRZR LVL WIDE RANGE-XMTR RC-2 R4087 RC.2 R4295 RC.2 R4298 PT<208 LT.504 LTD?I A(ARM/IND/CONT C LT 504 LT-507 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER REACTOR COO(ANT SYSTEM INST LOOP 4208 STEAM GENERATOR EM SOIA WIDE RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTER STEAM GENERATOR EMS018 WIDE RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTER RC-2 SAC0201A 8619A C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP8619A SOLENOID VALVE 8619A FAILS TO OPEN RC.2 SAC02018 8619A IASVP 861 9A SOLENOID VALVE 8619A FAILS TO OPEN RC-2 SAC0202A 86198 IASVP86198 SOLENOID VALVE 86198 FAILS TO OPEN RC.2 SAC0202A 86198 C RCRE8451AX RELAY PC~I.X FAlLS TO DE.ENERGIZE RC.2 SAC02028 86198 RCRE8451AX RELAY P~SI-X FAILS TO DE ENERGIZE RC-2 SAC02028 86198 IASVP86198 SOLFNOID VALVE 88198 FAILS TO OPEN RC-2 SAC0205A 6816A C IASVP8616A SOLENOID VALVE 8616A FAlLS TO OPEN RC-2 SAC0206A 86168 IASVP86168 SOLENOID VALVE 88168 FAILS TO OPEN RC-2 SAI0101 RC.2 SAO102 PT<50 PT<51 RC-2 6/N)103 PT<52 I RPS CHANNEL 3 (BLUE)I RPS CHANNEL 2 (WHITE)IRPS CHANNEL 1 (REO)RCBINPC450 RCBINPC45'(RC 8 INPC 452 ALARM PCA50 FAILS TO OPERATE ON DEMAND ALARM PC<51 FAILS TO OPERATE ON DEMAND ALARM PC<52 FAILS TO OPERATE ON DEMAND RC4 C0691 RC4 C0691 RCQ C0691A RC4 C0691A 516 516 516 516 P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER RCMVK00516 RCMVP00516 RCMVK00516 RCMVP00516 MOTORS)PERATEO VALVE 516 TRANSFERS CLOSED MOTORS)PERATEO VALVE 516 FAILS TO OPEN MOTORNPERATED VAI.VE 516 TRANSFERS CLOSED MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE 516 FAILS TO OPEN RC3 CC693 516 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVK00516 MOTORS)PERATED VALVE 516 FAILS TO OPEN MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE 516 TRANSFERS CLOSED RC4 CC693A 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVK00516 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 516 TRANSFERS CLOSED RC4 C0693A 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00516 MOTORAPERATED VALVE 516 FAILS TO OPEN R~C1057 RCG C1057 R~C1057A RCQ C1057A RCQ C1059 515 515 515 515 515 P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER P 480 VAC POWER C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00515 RCMVK00515 RCMVKC0515 RCMVP00515 RCMVK00515 MOTORPERATED VALVE 515 FAILS TO OPEN MOTORS)PERATED VALVE 515 TRANSFERS CLOSED MOTORPERATED VALVE 515 TRANSFERS CLOSED MOTORS)PE RATED VALVE 515 FAILS TO OPEN MOTORNPERATEO VALVE 515 TRANSFERS CLOSED RCD C1059 RCQ C1059A lhlldtdtROE.B I.DOC/oc 515 515 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVK00515 B-351 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00515 MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE 515 FAILS TO OPEN MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 515 TRANSFERS CLOSED 9/23/93)2132133 PM LOCATION CHAIR CTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ': RC RC4 C1059A 515 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00515 MOTORS)PERATED VALVE 515 FAILS TO OPEN CRSFI8 P 480 VAC POWER HVMF FACF 5 8 CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN 8 FAILS TO RUN RCQ L0082A CRSF I 8 P 480 VAC POWER HVMFFACF58 CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN 8 FAILS TO RUM RO0 L0093 RC4 L0093A CRSFIA P 480 VAC POWER HVMFFACFSA CRSF IA P 480 VAC POWER HVMF FACF5A CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN A FAILS TO RUN CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN A FAlLS TO RUN RO0 l0343 52/CF1A 0125VDCCONTROL HVMFFACFBA RC4 (0343 52/CF I A C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN1423C RC4 l0346 52/CFI A C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMFFACFBA RC4 L0346 52/CF1A C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN1423C RC4 L0360 52/CF1D C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN14200 RC4 L0360 52/CF10 0 125 VDC CONTROL HVMFFACF80 MOTORS)RIVEN FAN ACFBA FAILS TO RUN (CONTAINMENT) AC BREAKER 52/CF I A (BUS14/230) FAILS TO OPEN MOTORS)RIVEN FAN ACFBA FAILS TO RUN (COMTAINMEMT) AC BREAKER 52/CF1A (BUS14/230) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/CFID (BUS14/200) FAILS TO OPEN MOTOR.DRIVEN FAN ACF8D FAILS TO RUM (CONTAINMENT) RC 3 L0360 52/CF)D C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCK05877 AIR OP DAMPER 5877 TRANSFERS CLOSED RC 3 R0872 FT~I ALARM/IND/CONT 8SFTD00464 STEAM GENERATOR A FLOW TRANSMITTER FT 464 FAILS TO RESPOND RC 3 R0878 LT~t I ALARM/IND/CONT MFLTD00461 Level transrnittor LT<61 fails lo rospond RC4 R0916 FT~I ALARM/IND/CONT ESFT000465 STEAM GENERATOR A FLOW TRANSMITTER FT 465 FAILS TO RESPOND RC4 R0965 RC4 R1014 RC4 R1018 LTD?1 I ANALOG SIGNAL MFLTD00471 LTD I ANALOG SIGNAL MF LTD00462 LTwt63 I ANALOG SIGNAL MFLTD00463 Level transmkter LT~2 fake to respond Level transmitter LT~fats to respond Level I/ansmkter LTD?1 lais to respcnd RC4 R3592 550 P RC-590 RC4 R3593 590 P RC490 RC-3 R3594 592 P RC492 RC-3 R3596 593 P RC493 RC-3 R3597 593 C RC493 RC4 R3598 591 P RC491 R04 R3599 591 C 125 VDC CONTROL RC491 RCQ SAC0201A C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP8619A RC-3 R3595 592 P RC492 Spacious opening of RCS head vent if n cortunctkn wkh SV.591'?Sptnous openng of RCS head vent if in conjunseion with SV491?Spudous openng of RCS head vent if in coskunction wkh SV493?spacious opening of Rcs head vase if n oonjunctkn wkh SV493?Sptnous openng of RCS head venl 8 n conjunctksn with SV492?SPurious openng of RCS head vent if n conjunction with SV.592?Spurous openng of RCS head vere if n conjunction with SV4M?of RCS head vent if n conjunction with SV490?SOLENOID VALVE 8619A FAILS TO OPEN RC-3 SAC02018 8619A IASVP8619A SOLENOID VALVE 8619A FAlLS TO OPEN RC4 SAC0201C 86'l9A C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP8619A RC4 SAC0202A 86198 C RCREB451AX SOLENOID VALVE 8619A FAILS TO OPEN REIAY PCMI.X FAII.S TO DE-ENERGIZE RC-3 SAC0202A RC.3 SAC02028 RCQ SAC02028 RC4 SAC02020 RC4 SAC0202C RC4 SAC0203 RC4 SAC0204 86198 8619 B 86198 86198 861SB IASVP86198 IASVP86198 C RCRE8451AX C IASVP86198 RC RE 8451AX IASVP86208 SOLENOID VALVE 86198 FAILS TO OPEN SOLENOID VALVE 861SB FAILS TO OPEN REIAY PC<51.X FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE SOLENOID VALVE 86198 FAILS TO OPEN RELAY PC<51-X FAlLS TO OE-ENERGIZE SOLENOID VALVE 8620A FAllS TO OPEN SOLENOID VALVE 86208 FAILS TO OPEN RC4 SAC0205A 8616A C IASVP8616A RCQ SAC02058 8616A C IASVP8616A SOLENOID VALVE 8616A FAILS TO OPEN SOLENOID VALVE 8616A FAILS TO OPEN RC4 SAC0206A RC4 SAC02068 86168 86168 IASVP 861 68 IASVPI6168 SOLENOID VALVE 86168 FAILS TO OPEN SOLENOID VALVE 86168 FAILS TO OPEN 7.SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWN NOTES: FIRE ZONE RC.I in/Ss wD did ne cnicr conuinmeat fnr fire walkdown INALKDOWN NOTES RC.2 RC-3 4/2/SS WD did ne enter conssinmcnt fer fisc wal'kdown. RGE suff need sbas PORVs and block valve cables sse all In eondvis.and are soecd separately. ineS WD did nnt enter consstnmcnt for fisc walkdown PhldbdtRGE 8-1.0OC/cc B-352 9/ld/Sk lih37434 PM LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA:: SH 1.FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.)FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION I BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ.FT.)SH.1 SH2 243CREEN HOUSE BASEMENT LEVEL SCREEN HOUSE OPERAT9/G LEVEL SH 2.FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU)FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)SH.1 SH.2 9,106 6.8 mn.5.8 a'sL 3.FIRE PROTECTION FEATUI&S IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE SH.1 SH-2 FIRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES 4.IttE ZONE(S)ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S)IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE SH-1 SH.2 ADJACENT FIRE ZONE SH 2 SH.l PATHWAY STAIRWELL STAIRWELL PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)5.POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC AFFECTED EVENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION SH 1 4609 SH 1 4780 SH 1 52/17 SH.I 52/1'7 SH.1 52/17 SH-1 52/1768 SH.I 52/I 8 SH.1 52/I 8 SH.1 52/185 S SH.1 52/EG1A2 SH 1 52/EG182 SH-1 52/IHIA SH.1 52/I HI 8 SH.I 52/IHI 0 SWMVC04 609 SWMVC04760 DCCFRS1AAN ACCBD17258 DCCFRS18GN ACT1FSST17 DCCFRS18FN ACCBD18318 ACT1FSST18 ACCBO1831C ACCBD1725C ACCBI41829A ACC 8 N1727A ACCBN18298 Service Water Header isolation MOV 4M9 Fails To Close On Demand Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4780 Fails To Close On Demand Fuse FUDCPDPSHOIA/IN Fa1s Open (To Bus 17-Emergency) AC BREAKER 52/17 (BUS17/258) FAILS TO OPERATE Fuse FUOCPDPSH018//N Fails Open (To Bus 17-Normal)Fautt On 4160/480 VAC Bus 17 supply Transformer PXSHSS017 Fuse FUDCPDPSH018/6M Faih Open (To Bus 18-Emergency) AC BREAKER 52/I 8 (BUS18/318) FAILS TO OPERATE Fault On 4160/480 VAC Bus 18 supply Transformer PXSHSS018 AC BREAKER 52/EGIA2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (8US17/25C) FAILS TO OPERATE AC BREAKER 524HIA (BUS18/29A) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/IHI8 (BUS17/27A) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/IH1C (BUSI8/298) FAILS TO OPEN SH-1 52/IHID ACCBN17278 SH-I 52/MCC1G1 ACCBN1830C SH.1 52/MCC1G2 ACCBN1726C SH.1$2/SWP I A SWMPF SYRIA SH 1 52/SWP I A ACCBN1829C SH.1 52/SWP I 8 ACCBN1727C SH.1 52/SWP I 0 SWMPF SW01 C SH-1 52/SWP I C AC C 8 M18290 SH-1 52/SWP ID SWMPFSWO I D SH I 52/SWP ID ACCBM1727D SH.1 52/SWPI 8 SWMPFSWOI B AC BREAKER 52/IHID (BUS17/278) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/MCC1Gl (BUSI8/30C) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/MCC1G2 (BUSI7/26C) FAILS TO OPEN Service Water Pump PSWDIA Faas To Run For The Required Mhsion limo AC BREAKER 52/SWPI A (BUS18/29C) FAILS TO OPEN Service'Water Pump PSW01 8 Fess To Rtn For The Reqvged Mission limo AC BREAKER 52/SWPI 8 (BUS17/27C) FAILS TO OPEN Service Water Pump PSW01 0 Faas To Run For lho Required Mission Time AC BREAKER 52/SWPlC (BUS18/29D) FAILS TO OPEN Service Water Pump PSWOID Fails To Run For Tho Reqvgod Mission Time AC BREAKER 52/SWP I D (8US17/27 D)FAILS TO OPEN SH.I 83/17 SH.I 83/18 SH.I OCPDPC8028/05 DCREBBUS17 DCREBBUS18 DCBDFSCRMB RELAY 83E/17 (BUS 17 DC THROWOVER) FAII.S TO DEEMERGIZE RELAY 83E/18 (BUS 18 DC THROWOVER) FAlLS TO DEEMERGIZE Screen House DC Distnbution Panel 18 (DCPDPSH018) Local F avtt SH I OCPDPC803A/11 OCBDFSCRNA SH.l DCPDPSHOIA/02 DCCFRSIABN SH I DCPDPSHOIA/04 'CCFRSIADN Screen House DC Distnbuten Panel 1A (DCPDPSHOIA) Local Fautl Fuse FUDCPDPSHOIA/2N Fels Open (To Bus 18-Normal)Fuse FUDcpDpSHOIA/4M Fess Open(To Bus 18~Norm, Bus 17-Emorg UV Ctrl Cab)PRI636IRGE 8 I.DOC/oc B-359 9/2565 12O2:36 PM LOCATION CHAIMCTERISTICS TABLE RE AREA: SH SH-I SH 1 SH.I SH.1 SH-l SH.1 SH.2 SH-2 SH-2 SH.2 SH2 SH.2 SH 2 SH.2 SH2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH-2 SH.2 SH-2 SH.2 SH.2 SH 2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH-2 SH 2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 DCPDPSHOIA04 DCPDPSHOI 8/06 DCPDPSHOI 8/07 DCPDPSH018/08 OCPDPSHOI 8/08 DCPDPSHOIB/08 52/I 7 52/17 52/17 52/17SS 52/I 8 52/I 8SS 52/EG IA2 52/EG182 52hHIA 52/lHI 8 52/IHI 0 52/IHI D 52/MCC1GI 52/M 0 0 I G2 52/SWPI A 52/SWPI A 52/SWP I 8 52/SWP I 8 52/SWPI 0 52/SWPIC 52/SWP ID 52/SWP ID N/17 83/I 8 BUS17UV BVS17UV BVS17UV BUS17W BVS17UV BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17W BUS17UV BUS17W BUS17W BUS17UV BUS17UV BVS17UV BUS17W BUS17UV BUS17W BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17VV BVS17UV BUS17W BVS17W DCCFRSIADP DCCSRSIBFX OCCSRSIBGX DOC FR S18HP DCCFRSIBHN OCCSRSI BHX SWMVC04 780 ACCBD17258 DCCFRS1AAN DCCFRSI BGN ACTIFSST17 DCCFRSIBFN ACCBD18318 ACT1FSST18 ACCBD1831C ACC801725C ACCBN1829A ACCBN1727A ACCBN18298 ACCBN17278 ACCBNI NOD ACCBN1726C SWMPFSWO I A ACCBN1829C ACCBN1727C SWMPFSWOI8 SVAIPFSW010 ACCBN18290 SWMPF SW01D ACCBN1727D DCREBBUS17 OCREBBUS18 UVRE KOX117 UVRER278D7 UVRER27817 UVLCD17L81 UVLCDOX317 UVREKBX217 UVLC DOX217 UVREKBX117 UVREKOX317 UVLCDOX1 17 UVLCD17L82 WLCOBX117 UVREKBX317 UVRE KOX217 UVCFR17FU6 WLCDBX27A UVCFR17FU3 UVLCDBX217 WLCDBX17A UVRE E BX217 UVRE R27 017 UVCFR17F US UVLCOBX317 Fuse F VOCPDPSHOI A/4P Fails Open (To Bus 18-Noon, Bus 17 Emery W Ctrl Cab)Diccnnez Switch OCPDPSHOI 8/06 Transfers Open (To Bus 18-Emergency) Disconnect Switch DCPDPSH01 8/07 Transfers Open (To Bus 17-Norma0 Fuse FUDCPDPSHOI 8/BP Fade Open (To Bus 17-Noon, Bus 18-Emery W Ctrl Cab)Fuse FUDCPDPSHOI 8/8N Fa'Is OPen (To Bus 17-Norm, Bus 18-Emorg W Ct/I Cab)scuxonnerz switch DcpDpsHOI 8/08 T/ans/o/s open (To Bus 17-Norm Uv ctrl cab)Service water Header Isotaticn MOV 4609 Fels To Close On Demand Senrice Water Header Isohgon MOV 4780 Fails To Close On Demand AC BREAKER 52/17 (BVS17/258) FAILS TO OPERATE Fuse FUDCPDPSHOI/VIN Fels Open (To Bus 17-Emergency) Fuse FUDCPDPSHOI 8/7N Fade Open (To Bus 17-Normal)Fav/IOn4160/480VAC Bvs 17 supplyTrans/ormer PXSHSS017 Fuse FVDCPDPSHOI 8/6N Fails Open (To Bus 18-Emergency) AC BREAKER 52/I 8 (BU8 I 8/3 I 8)FAILS TO OPERATE Fault On 4160/480 VAC Bus 18 supply Transformer PXSHSS018 AC BREAKER 52/EG1A2 (BVS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (BUS17/25C) FAILS TO OPERATE AC BREAKER 52/IHIA (8US18/29A) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/IHI 8 (BUS17/27A) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/IHIC (BUS18/298) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/IHID (BUS17/278) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/M 0 0 I G 1 (8 US18/30C)FAII.S TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/MCC1G2 (BUS17/260) FAll.S TO OPEN Service Water Pump PSW01A Fails To Rtst For The Requked Missicn Time AC BREAKER 52/SWPI A (BUS18/29C) FAILS TO OPEN AC BREAKER 52/SWPI8 (BUS17/27C) FAILS TO OPEN Senrice Water Pump PSW018 Fade To Rtst For The Required Mission Time Service Water Pump PSWOIC Fade To RNt For The Required Misskrn Time AC BREAKER 52/SWPIC (BUS18/29D) FAILS TO OPEN Senrice Water Pump PSW010 Faiis To RNt For The Requked Musion Timo AC BREAKER 52/SWPI0 (BUS17/270) FAILS TO OPEN REIAY NE/17 (BUS 17 DC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DEENERGIZE REtAY 83E/18 (BUS 18 DC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DE ENERGIZE BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RElAY 27XI/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27D/8/17 TRANSFERS TO OE ENERGIZED BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278/17 TRANSFERS TO OE.ENERGIZED BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL LOGIC BOARD tl FA!LS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL Relay 27X3/17 driver (Heat Sink Assembly t 1)fails to energize BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27BX2/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Retay 27X2/17 driver (Heat Sink Assembly t I)fade to enorgize BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X1/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 17 UNOERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X3/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Relay 27X1/17 driver (Heal Sink Assembly tl)fels to enegizo BVS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL LOGIC BOARD t2 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL Relay 278xl/17 driver (Hoal sink Assenbly t2)/&is to energizo BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X3/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X2I17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Fuse t6 (FUAR82CC17/64t) fabs open (control cabinet)RELAY 278X2/17 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY t2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Fuse t3 (FUAR82RC1 7/3-N)fails open (relay cabktet)Relay 278X2/17 driver (Heat Sink Assembly t2)fade to energize RELAY 27BX1/17 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY t2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Retay 278X2/17 fats lo energize BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 270/17 TRANSFERS TO OE ENERGIZE0 Fuse s5 (FUARB2cc17/S.p) fails open (convol cabine)Relay 27 BX3/I 7 driver (Heat Sink Assenbly t2)fails to energize P016161RGE 8-1.0OC/oc B-360 9/dd/9d 12:32:$6 PM IRK AREA:~ASH SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH-2 SH-2 SH2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH 2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH-2 SH-2 SH-2 SH.2 SH2 SH.2 SH-2 SH2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH 2 SH.2 SH2 SIt.2 SH-2 SH 2 SH2 SH2 SH2 SH-2 SH.2 SH.2 SH-2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH.2 SH-2 SH.2 SH2 SH.2 BUS17VV BUS17UV 8US17UV BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17UV BUS17W 8US17UV BUS17UV BUS18UV BVS18UV BUS18UV'US18UV GVS18UV BUS18UV BUS18W BUS18UV BUS18UV BUS18UV BUS18UV BUS18UV BUS18VV BVS18UV BUS18UV BUS18W BUS18UV 8US18UV BUS18UV G(IS18UV BUS18UV 8US18W BUS18UV BUS18UV BUS I BUY BUS18W BUS18UV BUS18UV BVS18UV Bt/S18UV GUS18UV BUS18UV BUS18UV BUS18UV BVS18UV GVS18UV BUS18UV BUS18UV UVREEBX117 WREEOX317 UVRE EOX217 UVRE E BX317 UVREEOX117 UVRU827817 UVCF R17F V2 UVRU827D17 UVLC D BX37A UVLCDX117A UVLCDX217A UVLC017S¹1 UVRV82'7017 WLC017S<<2 WLCDX317A WRU8278D7 WRER02717 UVC FR18F VS UVCFR18FUS UVLC018LBI UVC FR18F V3 WLCDOX218 UVLC018LBZ UVLCD I BS¹1 UVLCD18$<<2 UVLCDOX118 UVLCDOX318 UVCFR18F V2 UVLCD BX1 8A UVRER27018 UVRV 827 8 D8 WRU 827018 WLCD BX118 UVRER27818 WREEBX318 UVLCDX218A WLCDX118A WR ER02718 UVLCDBX28A UVRV827818 UVLCDBX318 UVLCDBX218 UVLCDX318A UVREEGX218 UVREEBX118 UVREEOX318 UVREEOX118 WREEOX218 UVLCD BX38A UVREKBX318 WREKBX218 UVREKBX118 UVRE KOX318 UVRE KOX218 UVREKOX118 Relay 27BX1/17 faih to energize Relay 27X3/17 fails to energize Rohy 27X2/17 fails lo energize Rolay 27BX3/1 7 fails lo energize Relay 27X1/17 flails lo energce Undervottage relay 278/I 7 fads lo doenorgize Fuss¹2 (F UARB2RC17/2-P) /ah open (relay cabnel)Unde/voltage relay 27D/17 faih to doenergizo RELAY 27BX3/17 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL RELAY 27X1/17 DRNER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹1)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL RELAY 27X2/17 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY<<I)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS 17 VNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH¹1 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL Unde/voltage relay 27/17 fails to doenergize BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH¹2 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL RELAY 27X3/17 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹I)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Undervokago foley 27D/8/17 tails to de~nergize BUS 17 VNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27/17 TRANSFERS TO DE ENERGIZED Fuse¹8 (F VARA2CC18/B.N) fails open (control cabinet)Fuse¹5 (FUARA2cc18IS-P) fails open (control cabinet)BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL LOGIC BOARD¹1 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL Fuse¹3 (FUARA2RC1 ~)faih open (relay cabinet)Relay 27X2/18 driver (Heat Sink Assembly<<I) faih to energize BUS 18 UNDERVOt.TAGE CONTROL LOGIC BOARD¹2 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH¹I FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH¹2 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL Relay 27X1/1 8 driver (Heat Shk Assembly¹I)fats lo energhs Rehy 27x3/I 8 driver (Heat sink Assembly<<1)fmh lo energcs Fuse¹2 (FUARA2RC18/2 P)fads open(relay cabhel)RELAY 278X1/18 ORNER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 270/18 TRANSFERS TO DE-ENERGIZED Undervotage relay 270/8/1 8 fazs to energize Undervokage relay 27/18 fails to deans/gee Relay 278x1/1 8 driver (Heat sink Assembly¹2)fails lo energize BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278/18 TRANSFERS TO DE-ENERGIZED Relay 278X3/I 8 faih to energize RElAY 27X2/18 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹1)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL RELAY 27X1/18 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹I)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27/18 TRANSFERS TO DE-ENERGIZED RELAY 278X2/18 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Undervoitage relay 278/18 foils to doenelgtse Relay 278x3/1 8 driver (Heat sirA Assembly<<2)fats lo energize Relay 27BX2/18 driver (Heat Sink Assembly<<2)faih lo onergize RELAY 27X3/I 8 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹1)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Relay 27GX2/I 8 tails lo anodize Relay 278Xt/I 8 fad s lo enorg'ze Rolay 27X3/18 fath lo onergize Relay 27X1/18 fags to energize Relay 27X2/18 fails lo energize RELAY 27BX3/18 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY¹2)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X3/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X2/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27BX1/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 18 UNOERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X3/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X2/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS 18 VNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27XI/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGtZED SH.2 BVS18UV VVRER27GD8 GUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27D/8/I8 TRANSFERS TO DE.ENERGIZED POIsd61RGE B.I.DOC/oc 8-361 9/ld/9d l2:33:36 PM 4 LOCATION CHAIMCTEMSTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: '.SH SH-2 BUS I BUY SH.2 DCPDPC8028J05 SH.2 DCPDPC803A/11 SH-2 DCPDPSHOIA/01 UVRU 827 D18 DCBDFSCRNB DCBDFSCRltA DCCSRS1AAX Undervoaage relay 270/18 lails to d~nergize Screen House DC Distnbvtion Panel 18 (DCPDPSH018) Local Fault screen House Dc Distnbution panel 1A(DcpDpsHOIA) Local Faua Disconnett Switch OCPDPSHOIAI01 Transfers Open (To Bus 17~Emergency) SH-2 DCPDPSHOIAI02 DCCFRS1ABM SH-2 DCPDPSHOIA/02 OCCSRS1ABX i'sconnoct Switch DCPDPSHOIA/02 Transfers Open (To Bus 18-Normag Fuse FVDCPDPSH01A/2N Fafs Open (To Bus 18-Normal)SH-2 DCPDPSHOIA/04 DCCFRS1AON Fuse FUDCPOPSH01A/4N Pals Open (To Bus 18-Ncnn, Bus 17-Emery W CVI Cab)SH-2 OCPDPSH01A/04 SH-2 DCPDPSH01A$ 4 SH-2 DCPDPSHOIBI06 SH-2 DCPDPSH018/07 DC CSRS1ADX DCCFRS1ADP DCCSRS18FX OCCSRS18GX Disconnett Svntch DCPDPSHOIA/04 Transfers OPen (To Bus 18 and 17 UV Ctrl Cab)Fuse FUDCPDPSHOIA/4P Fafs Open(To Bus 18.Norm, Bvs 17-Emerg W Ctrl Cab)Disconnect Switch DCPDPSH018/06 Transfers Open (To Bus 18-Emergency) i'sconnect Switch DCPDPSHOIBI07 Trans/ers Open (To Bus 17-Normal)SH-2 DCPDPSH018/08 DCCSRS18HX SH.2 DCPDPSHOIBI08 OCCFRS18HM SH-2 FUARA2CC18/11.P UVCFR7FU11 SH.2 FUARA2CC18/12 N UVCFR7F U12 SH.2 FVAR82CC17/11 P WCFR8FU11 SH.2 OCPDPSH018/08 DCCFRS1BHP Disconnect Switch DCPDPSH018/08 Trar>>fera Open (To Bus 17-Norm UV Ctrl Cab)Fuse FUDC PDPSH01 BIBP Fails Open (To Bus 17-Norm.Bus 18-Em erg W Ctrl Cab)Fuse FVDCPDPSH01 8/BN Fags Open (To Bus 17-Norm.Bus 18-Emorg W Girl Cab)Fuse N11 (FUARA2CC18/11 P)fails oPen Fuse N12 (F VARA2CC1 8/12 N)faits cpen Fuse N11 (FVARB2CC17/11.P) fails open SH.2 FUAR82CC17/12 N UVCFRBFU12 Fuse N12 (FUARB2CC17/12.N) farls open 6.POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS)AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE RACEWAY AFFECTED EQUIPMENT AFFECTED CABLE FUNCTION BASIC EVENT AFFECTED BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION SH I C1954 4609 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04609 Servce Water Header iso!aden MOV 4609 Fags To Close On Demand SH 1 01955 4609 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04609 Service Water Heador Isolation MOV 4609 Fa9s To Close On Demand SH.l C2004 4780 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04780 Service Water Header lsohthn MOV 4780 Fails To Close On Domand SH 1 C2005 4780 c 125 vDc coNTRol.swMvc04780 service water Header Isolation Mov 4780 Faas To Ck>>e On Demand SH-1 E0030 OCPDPC803A/11 C 125 VDC POWER OCBDFSCRNA Screen House OC Oistnbvtion Panel 1A (DCPDPSHOIA) Local Fault SH 1 E0030 DCPDPCB03A/11 C 125 VDC POWER OCCFRC3ALN ~.Fuse FUDCPDPC803A/LN Faih Open (To Screen Hcvse DC Dhtr9rution Panol A)SH 1 E0031 83/17 C 125 VDC DCREBBUS17 RELAY 83E/17 (BUS 17 OC THROWOVER) FAlLS CONTROUPOWER TO DEENERGIZE SH-1 E0031 DCPDPSH01A/01 C 125 VDC DCCSRS1AAX D'sconect Swgch OCPOPSHOIA/01 Transfers OPen CONTROUPOWER (To Bus 17-Emergency) SH-1 E0031A 83/I 7 P 125 VDC POWER DCREBBUS17 RElAY 83E/17 (BUS 17 DC THROWOVER) FAILS TO OEEMERGIZE SH.1 E0031A DCPDPSH018/07 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSRS18GX D'cconect Switch DCPDPSH018/07 Transfers OPen (To Busty-Ncrmag SH-I E0127 OCPDPCB028/05 I MISC POWER DCCFRC28EN Fuse FUDCPDPC8028/5M Fails Open(To Screen Hcuso DC Olstrbution Panol 8)SH.I E0127 DCPDPC8028/05 I MISC POWER DCBDFSCRNB Scroen House DC Distribution Panel 18 (DCPDPSHOI8) Local Fault SH.1 E0159 83/'I 8 P 125 VDC POWER DCREBBUS18 RELAY 83BI8 (BUS 18 OC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DEENERGIZE SH 1 E0159 DCPDPSHO'IB/06 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSRS18FX Disconnect Switch DCPDPSHOI8/06 Transfers OPen (To Bus 18-Emergency) SH I E0160 83/18 C DCREBBUSI 8 RELAY 83B18 (BVS 18 DC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DEENERGIZE SH 1 E0160 DCPDPSHOIA/02 C OCCSRS1ABX Ohconnect Switch OCpOpsH01A/02 Transfers Open (To Bus 18-Normal)SH.1 E0160 DCPDPSHOIA/02 C OCCFRS1ABN Fuse FUDCPDPSHOIA/2N Fags Open (To Bus 18-Normal)SH-1 E0270 BUS17UV P 125 VDC POWER VVLCOTLBZA BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL LOGIC BOARD N2 GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH.I E0270 BUS17UV P 125 VDC POWER INREK17298 RELAY 29.8 IN BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CIRCUIT TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH I E0270 8US17UV P 125 VDC POWER UVREKBX117 BUS 17 UMDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X1/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH.1 E0270 BUS17UV P 125 VDC POWER UVLCOT217A RELAY 27X2/17 DRIVER(HEAT SINKASSEMBLY Nl)GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL PAINRGE 8 I.DOC/oc B-362 9/78/98 I2/37:37 PM Pages B-363 through B-392 are similar and not included to reduce paper volume. LOCATION CHAIU CTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA:!SH SH 2 L0763 52/SWP I A C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN1829C AC BREAKER 52/SWPIA(BUS18/29C) FAlLS TO OPEN SH.2 L0763 52/SWP I A C 125 VOC CONTROL SWMPFSWDIA Service Water Pump PSWDIA Fels To Run For The Required Musion Time SH.2 L0764 52/SWPI 0 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN18290 AC BREAKER 5VSWPI C (BUS18/290) FAILS TO OPEN SH.2 L0764 52/SWPI 0 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMPFSWDIC Service Water Pump PSWDI C Fags To Run For The Required Musion I one SH.2 L0767 52/MCCIGI C 125 VDC POWER ACCBN1830C AC BREAKER 52/MCCIGI (BUS18/30C) FAILS TO OPEN SH 2 L0769 52/18 0 125 VDC CONTROL DCCFRSIBFN Fuse FVDCPDPSH018/6N Fags Open (To Bus 18-Emer0oncy) SH-2 L0769 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00018 480 VAC Bus 18 Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/18 (BUS18/318) Transfers open SH-2 L0769 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBD18318 AC BREAKER 52/18 (BVS18/318) FAILS TO OPERATE SH-2 L0778 52/1768 CONTROL ACTIFSST17 Fnt/IOn4160/480VACBus17supplyTrans/onner PXSHSS017 SH.2 L0779 52/I BSS CONTROL ACT1FSSTIB Feuit On 4160/480VAC Bus 18 supply Transteemer PXSHSS018 SH-2 L0781 KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN SH-2 L0783 SH-2 L0785 SH-2 L0787 KDGOI A KDG018 KDGOI 8 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOG01A FAlLS TO RUN C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN 7.SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWN NOTES: FIRE ZONE SH I Cable uay>>(photo 83).WALKOOWN NOTES SH2 SH2 4/2/96 WD Incoming cables all come through cast wall.There 8 an auto water deluge system.There are no signifiant fire soutca, but thcrc arc a few (sns with hot water heating coih.They would be very unlikely to be able to sun a fire in the aabl.5 dacctors noted.Small pumps (sump and hypoehlotite) in narby room.but very linis huervening combustibla. Atro has 6 wetded, rod hung naursl gas line coming in (rom ovutde, and going up to boiler on Boor above.4 SW pumps.8'pan (photos Bl, 82).I dicscl fue pump with 200 gatkot diatl fvel unk.I avsiliay boikr.I M D tire pump about 20'rom diael tuc pomp, Bus lg shout 20'chhtd SW pumps (photo Bl).4/2/98 WD Qosedheadsprtnklersystcmhtghup ovctSW pumps.Fvcloilunkand DG fire pumpsrelndgtedaa,wtthovuidc sump.Bus lyand lghavesprayshieldson openings.Natural gas line (rom below to house hcaung boiler.Mod Is being made m ender boikr m prcvcnt seismic lmeraaiots. 2 circulating water pumps, 2 propane heaters.3 uavcl ling scream.4/2/98 WD Not really scparai>>from scnenhovtc cast.but no significant lntcrvcnkg combustibles. Salamander portable haters not anchored, bvt have 6't'tkx conduit for natural gas svpply.Fixed natural gas piping sppcan well supponed.Not a problem for SW pumps or ss(try equipmcm.PRIdgdtRGS B.I.DOC/oc B-393 9/Ig/pg 12:32:eg Pht LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: I YB 1.FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.)FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION l BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ.FT.)TB.1FP 253'" TURBINE BUILDING BASEMENT LEVEL FEEDPUMP ROOM TB TB.I 253'" TURBINE BUILDING BASEMENT LEVEL TB 30370 T8.2 784 27 1'URBINE BUILDING ME2ZANINE LEVEt.269 6" TURBINE BUILDING OPERATING LEVEL TB 2.FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE TB-IFP 17,691 T8.1 COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU)13.4 ma.48.4 mi/L FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)T82 TBG 6,590 16,500 4.9 m'n.12.4 min.3.FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE TB 1FP TB-1 T82 FIRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES 4.FIRE ZONE(S)ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S)IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE TB-1F P TB-1FP T8.1 TB-1 TB-1 T8.1 TB 1 TB 1 T8-1 T8-1 TB-2 TB-2 TB-2 T8.2 T8.2 T8.3 T8-3 ADJACENT FIRE ZONE 68.1 EDGtA.1 EDG18.1 TO BR1A BR18 CT IGN 1 S8.1 S8.2 TSC.1N TSC IM TSC.I 8 IBN 2 IBN4 PATHWAY WALUDOOR WALL WALUDOOR WALUDOOR WALL WALUDOOR WALL WALL WALL WALUDOOR WALUDOOR WALUDOOR WALUDOOR WALL WALL WALUDOOR WALUDOOR WALUDOOR PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)5.POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC AFFECTED EVENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION T8.1 4613 TB 1 52/CP1A T8-1 52/CP18 T8-1 52/CP1C T8-1 52/CTP T8.1 52/IAC I A T8.1 52/IAC18 TB 1 52/IAC1C PhlaastftGE 8 I.DOC/oc SWMV 004613 Cond 1A Cond 18 Ccnd 1C AFMPFPCD04 IAAMF C02A IAAMF C028 IAAMF C02C Savice Water Iteader Isolation MOV 4613 Fails To Close On Demand Condensate 1A Condensate 18 Condensate 10 Condensate Transfer Pump PCD04 foR to run INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR A (CIA02A)FAILS TO RUN INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR 8 (CIA028)FAILS TO RUN AIR COMPRESSOR CIA02C FAILS TO RUN B-394 9/2S/93 Ih32:43 7M LOCATION CHAIMCTERISTICS TABLE TB-1 TB 1 ACPDPT802 AC84FPT802 IAAMACSA03 FIRE AREA:!TB TB-1 52/SAC IAAMFCSA02 SERVICE/dR AIR COMPRESSOR CSA02 FAILS TO RUN Local Fault on 120 vAc power Distribuuon panel AcpDpTB02 AIR COMPRESSOR CSA03 FAILS TO START T8.1 T8.1 T8.1FP TB-1FP T8.2 TB-2 T8.2 TB 2 T8.2 T8.2 TB 2 T8.2 TB-2 TB.2 TB-2 TB 2 TB-2 TB-2 T8-2 TB-2 T8-2 T8.2 TB-2 T8.2 T8.2 T84 T84 DCPDPT8018 TAOP 52/FWPI A 52/FWP18 3976 3977 4269 4270 52/11A 52l118 52l13SS 52/1558 52/BTA.A 52/BTB.B 52/M CGA 52/MCCB 63/13 63/15 ACPDPT807 AKA028 BUS11A/11 BUS11AW BUS11AUV BVS11AUV BUS11AUV BUS11AUV BUS118UV BUS118UV BUS118W BUS118UV BUS118UV MFPXA AUX RELAYS MFPXB AUX RElAYS TURB TRIP AUX RELAYS TURB TRIP AUX RElAYS TURB TRIP AVX RELAYS DCBDFTBPNL DCCSRT18NX MFMPFFW1A MFMPFFWIB MFW3976 MFW3977 MFW 4269 MFW 4270 ACCBDS211A ACCBD52118 ACT1FSST13 'CTI FSST15 ACC8028TAA ACCBD28TBB ACCBRMCC1A ACCBRMCC18 DCREBBUS13 DCREBBUS15 AC84FPT807 ACCBRM807H UVCFRA112N UVRU 81/11A UVCFRA111P UVRU82/11A WRUEX111A WRUEX211A UVRUB2/118 VVRUB1/118 UVCF R8211P UVRUEX1118 VVRUEX2118 AC CTNFWPA1 ACCTNFWPA2 MSPSD34AST MSPSD33AST MSPSD35AST Turbine Bcakfot9 Dc 0'tnriutj'on panel (Dc pDpT8018)Local F stat Dnconnect Swift OCPDPT8018/13 Transfers Open (To TDAFW Pump Oa Pump)MFW Pump A fsis to not MFW Pump 8 fels lo run Makt Feedwater Main Feedwater Loss cf Main F oeciwater Loss of Makt Foedwater 4160 VAC Circu3 Breaker 52/11A (BUS11A/10) Fails To Open on Demand 4160 VAC Bus 118 Feeder Circuit Brea'ker 52l118 (BUS118/22) Fels to OPen Fault On 4160/460 VAC bus 13 supply Trsnsfoaner PXTBSS013 Fault On 4160/460 VAC Bus 15 supply Transformer PXTBSS015 4160 VAC Bus 11A/Bus 12A Tie Breaker 52/BTA A (BUS11N11) Fels to Close 4160 VAC Bus 118 Bus 128 Tie Breaker 52/BTB-B (BUS118/21) Foils To Close 460 VAC MCCA Feeder Ckcuil Breaker 52/MCCA(BVS13/INB) Transfers Open 460 VAC MCCB Feeder Ckcuit Breaker 52/MCCB (BUSISN4A) Transfers Open RElAY 63E/13 (BVS 13 OC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DEENERGIZE RELAY 83E/tS (BUS 15 OC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DEENERGIZE Local Fat/t On 120 VAC Power Obtrattafon Panel ACPDPT807 AC CIRCUIT BREAKER MCCB//H TRANSF ERS OPEN (TO BAT RM HEATER AKA28)DC FUSE FUBUSI(H1IUVZN FAILS BUS 11A UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27 1/I 1A FAILS TO OEENERGIZE ON DEMAND DC FUSE FUBUS11A/1'IUVIP FAILS BUS 11A UN DERVOt.TAG E RELAY 27.2/1 1A FAILS TO 0 EENERGIZE ON DEMlWD BUS 11A UN DE RVOLTAGE AUXILIARY REIAY 27XI/1 1A FAILS TO ENERGIZE ON DEMAND BUS 11A UNDERVOLTAGE AUXILIARY RELAY 27X2/11A FAILS TO ENERGIZE ON DEMAND BUS 118 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27-2/118 FAILS TO OEENERGIZE ON DEMAND BUS 118 VNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27 1/1 18 FAILS TO OE ENERGIZE ON DEMAND DC FUSE FUBUS118/21UVIP FAILS BUS 118 UNDERVOI.TAGE AUXILIARY RELAY 27XI/118 FAILS TO ENERGIZE ON DEMAND BUS 118 UNDERVOLTAGE AUXILIARY RELAY 27X2/118 FAILS TO ENERGIZE ON DEMAND MFW PUMP 1A BREAKER AUX CONTACT 11.12 FAILS TO CLOSE ON PUMP TRIP MFW PUMP 1A BREAKER AUX CONTACT 19.20 FAILS TO CLOSE PRESSURE SWITCH 634/AST FAILS TO RESPOND PRESSURE SWITCH 630/AST FAILS TO RESPOND PRESSURE SWITCH 63-5/AST FAlLS TO RESPOND 6.POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS)AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE RACEWAY AFFECTED EQUIPMENT CABLE BASIC EVENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AFFECTED FUNCTION" AFFECTED C0273 3977 P 460 VAC POWER MFW 3977 Main Feedwster TB I C0274 C0275 3977 3977 C 125 VDC CONTROL MFW 3977 Main Foedwater C 125 VDC CONTROI.h'IFW 3977 Main Foodwater T8.1 C0471 52/CTP P 460 VAC POWER AFMPFPCD04 Condensate Transfer Pump PCD04 fab Io run CVTA2 P 460 VAC POWER IBT6FCVT18 Instrument Bus 0 (IBPDPCBDY) Constant Voas9e Transformer CVTA2 Fels IBPDPCBOY P 460 VAC POWER l884FBUslD 120 vAc Instnroent Bus 0 (IBPDPGBDYI Bus Faults TB I TB I 3976 3976 P 460 VAC POWER MFW3976 Main Feedwatsr C 125 VDC CONTROL MFW 3976 Main FOedwater TB.I C0695 4613 P 460 VAC POWER swMvc04613 sevico water Header Isotat'en Mov 4613 Faas To Close On Demand P:L161QIIGE 8 I.DOC/oc B-395 9/7 a/95 I2:32:46 PM Pages B-396 through B-404 are similar and not included to reduce paper volume. s LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: I TB T8.2 R0770 4270 C 125 VOC CONTROL MFW4270 Loss of Ma'n Feedwater TB 2 R0771 TB-2 R0782 TB 2 R0782 T8.2 R0763 4270 4269 4270 4269 C 125 VDC CONTROL MFW4270'oss of Man Feedwater C 125 VDC POWER MFW 4269 Loss ot Ma'n Feedwater C 125 VDC POWER MFW 4270 Loss of Man Feedwaier C 125 VDC POWER MFW 4269 Loss ol Man Feedwater T8.2 R0832 T8.2 R0852 PT<85 PT<86 I RPS CHANNEL 2 (WHITE)I ANALOG SIGNAL PT&85 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER TURBINE 1ST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMflTER TURBINE 1ST STAGE T84 G0084A'2SV TB4 G0091A TB-3 G0084A 3544 c 125 voc coNTR0L Msszc03544 Main steam stop valve Lims swah 33/3544 Pass To Close On Demand C 125 VDC CONTROL MSRTD062SV Turbkte Stop Valves Tuner Relay 62SV Fails On Demand C 125 VOC CONTROL MSSZC03545 Ma'n Steam Step Valve Lknh Switctt 330545 Fags To Ctose On Demand 7.SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS Vf ALKDOWN NOTES: FIRE 20NE TB IFP Fccdwvcr pumps.each with Its own oil tank (Photo 84).4/2/pg WD Enckucd arcs.Lube oil on FW pump 8 scaled.WALKOOWN NOTES"lB.I 3 IA comprcssots. scniice air compressor. IA dryers, all near cast wall.3 condensatc pumps just nonhcast of main condensci B.an6s wo H2 line from H2 storage trawls to gcncnhor area.bui is rxx ckssc tocriYical safety cctuipmcnt. CriYical cables aho travel S to N along Eastern pan olbuilding."IB.I Several small pumps including vaamm priming pumps.MCC lb.an/ss wo Tutbine lube oil vca (center.west)has fire water syvcrn.and is diked.Portable IA compressor ouuide Nonh side ol bldg, with whcch blocked and long flex line.TB.I 3 aedcnsam booster pumps about ls'pvt.4/2/9S WD H2 scat oil unk in enclosure wkh I hr walls, and roll down Brc doon.and fire water system.SE corner has cables lor main buses on Iloa above.TSC mbsncry A and 8 manual throwovtr switch 8 by stsinwcll in SE comet.5-G blowdown flash ianL and pump.4/2/PS WD H2 In<<y!inders 8 kiw conccntradon fot calibration. only one restraining chain per cylinder.T8.2 Condcmate beaten.4n/98 wo Hs cylindca and H2 haisrd area by gcncrator area.No significant safety cquipmcnt around.EH system (pumps and rescrvoii). 4/2/pg WD turbine lube oil arcs has lire water proteaion. T8.2 Bus I I~bus l2, bus l3, bus 15, MCC IB.an/98 wo Incoming ofBke power is enclosed ln vccl'box conduip for explosion proteaion, Main stcam header.Fcedwaicr rcguhiing valves near south wall.an/ps wo Fire waits pracef on for lube oh lm'ide guvd pipe (tod hung-seems OIO.Generator and exciter.HP turbine, 2 I.P mibincs.I".'ll dgdtRGE.B-I.DOC/oc B-405 sng/pg 11:32:52 PM LOCATION CHARACTEMSTICS TABLE I TO 253'TI/RENE OIL STORAGE ROOM 2.FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE AREA: 'O 1.FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA:!FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.)FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION BUILDING TO FLOOR AREA (SQ.FT.)1760 I FIRE ZONE TO 1,886.364 COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU)23.6 hra.FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)3.FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE TO RRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES 4.FIRE ZONE(S)ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S)W THIS FIRE AREA: FIRE ZONE TO TO ADJACENT FIRE ZONE EDG1A-1 PATHWAY WALL WALUOOOR PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)5.POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: 6.POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS)AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S)IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA: 7.SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWN NOTES: WALKDOWN NOTES FIRE ZONE To As nonheasr wall of su/bine buiMiag, berwecn diesel building and hydrogen are/age vea.Turbine lube oil srorage sank.4/2/Pg WD did nor waltdown.3 hr l>re raring.Fully spriaklered. P lldgNRGE 8 I.DOC/oc B-407 S/22/93 l2:32:52 PM E.rROr<GAr>ON rxrHWm mED>Sjr.i'SSESSMENT The spatial interactions analysis conservatively assumes that the occurrence frequency of both the localized scenario and propagation scenario(s) developed from a fire zone are equal to the fire occurrence frequency apportioned to that fire zone.Furthermore, the localized scenarios assume that any fire occurring within a fire zone will damage all components and raceways within that fire zone.These are obviously conservative assumptions because the fire occurrence frequency apportioned to a fire zone accounts for all fires initiated by the fire sources within the fire zone.Thus, the sum of the occurrence frequencies of the localized and propagation scenarios developed for a fire zone should be equal to the fire occurrence frequency apportioned to that fire zone.Also, only a very small fraction of fires initiated in a given location will have energy significant enough to damage all components and raceways within the location without being detected or controlled before the damage occurs.f For propagation scenarios, if one assumes that any fire occurring within a fire zone can propagate in all directions to the adjacent fire zones, there can be an enormous, unmanageable number of propagation scenarios developed. Since not all fire propagation pathways are credible, the spatial interactions analysis considers only propagation scenarios that involve credible propagation pathways.The fire zone adjacency matrix was first developed to identify possible propagation pathways (see the Location Characteristics Tables, Appendix A).Screening criteria were developed to qualitatively screen the credibility of potential propagation pathways.Propagation scenarios were then developed for pathways that satisfy the screening criteria.The scenario table lists the propagation scenarios developed for the initial fire zones.This appendix presents the evaluation of the credibility of propagation pathways.The screening criteria are first described. Justifications to the screening criteria are then provided.I E.1 PROPAGATION CRITERIA In the spatial interactions analysis, a propagation pathway was assumed to be credible only if one of the following criteria were satisfied: 1.There is a permanent opening between the fire zones, and there is no automatic suppression system in the initial fire zone or in the adjacent fire zone.The fire duration of the combustible contents in the initial fire zone is greater than 75%of the rating of the fire barrier (e.g., door, wall, etc.)separating the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zones, and there is no automatic fire suppression system.PA1686iRge-E.docjoc E.Propagation Pathway Crerlibilihg Assessment The first criterion is obviously conservative because it does not consider the actual amount of combustible inventory, the location of the fire source, the presence of automatic fire suppression system, and the separation distance between the fire source and combustibles in the adjacent location(s). The second criterion takes into consideration the failure of fire barriers;e.g., fire door being left open.The fire duration and barrier ratings for each fire zone are taken from Reference E-1 and are summarized in the Location Characteristics Tables.E.2 COMBUSTIBLE INVENTORY AND PIRE BARRIER FAILURE RATE The combustible inventory denotes the maximum allowable combustible loading within a fire zone.In reality, the actual inventory may be less than the maximum allowable amount.The second criterion suggests that if the combustible inventory fire severity is less than 75%of the barrier rating, then there will not be a propagation pathway between fire zones.In order to have a fire propagation pathway if the fire duration is less than 75%of the barrier, the barrier must fail due to random failure (fail before the rated time on demand).The generic industry failure rate for fire barriers is approximately 10'er y'ear.There are approximately 81 rated fire doors and 2,540 fire seals at the Ginna site (see Appendix F).To date, there have been no failures of Fire Doors, Fire Dampers or Penetration Seals that have not been promptly detected during plant tours.Compensatory and corrective actions have been prompt and appropriate for the circumstance. The accessible fire zones are visited by plant personnel frequently and the plant personnel are trained to operate the fire door correctly. It is very unlikely that a fire door would be left open and uncorrected for an extended period of time.Using an average mean exposure time of a fire door of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> that a door is left open, and an average failure rate of 1.0E-03 per door-yr, the unavailability of a fire door is estimated to be less than 5.0E-07.Thus, fire propagation via fire barriers due to random failures is insignificant. E,3 FIRE BARRIER RATING AND FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM The second criterion suggests that, if the fire duration of the combustible contents in the initial fire zone is less than 75%of the rating of the barrier (e.g., door, wall, etc.)separating the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zones, fire propagation from the initial fire zone to its adjacent fire zones is not credible.This assumption is valid for the same reason presented in Section E.2.If the fire duration of the combustible contents in the initial fire zone is greater than 75%of the rating of the fire barrier (e.g., door, wall, etc.)separating the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zones and there is an automatic fire suppression system at either side of the barrier, fire propagation between the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zones is also not credible.PA16861Rge-E.doc/oc E-2 E.Propagation Patlrtoay Credibility Assessment For locations where the combustible loading fire severity is greater than 75%of the barrier rating (or the total rating), the presence of an automatic fire suppression (and plant personnel) would detect the initiation of any fire within the barrier's rated time (for most locations, it is at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />).The actuation of the automatic fire suppression system (although it may not suppress the fire)would alarm the operators such that manual suppression efforts and recovery actions can be initiated in a timely manner.Thus, the chance that a fire with sufficient energy to damage multiple cable trains (or components) is left undetected (directly or indirectly via other instruments) and uncontrolled for a period longer than the barrier rating (typically, longer than an hour)is incredible. Therefore, the second criterion is valid for propagation pathway screening during the spatial interactions analysis.E.4 LEVEL OP PROPAGATION PATHS The analysis considered fire propagation between locations for more than one level.(Level 1 propagation involves one initial fire zone and fire zone(s)directly adjacent to it through a credible propagation pathway.A level two fire propagation involves one initial fire zone, the fire zone(s)directly adjacent to it, and the fire zone(s)that are adjacent to the level one fire zone(s).No scenarios were identified that could be considered two-level propagation scenarios. In order for a fire to initiate at the initial fire zone and propagate to level two fire zones, the fire will have to propagate through two fire barriers.The time required to burn through two fire barriers will be at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (assuming each barrier is at least one hour-rated). The mean generic fire suppression time for most fires is 40 minutes (estimated by Sandia).A survey of past fire drills at Ginna is shown in Table E-1.This indicates that the longest total duration of a drill was less than 50 minutes.It is reasonable then, to assume that the longest response time at Ginna (regardless of the location)is less than 50 minutes*.Therefore, it is expected that the fire brigade will start fire-fighting efforts at the initial fire zone and the Level 1 locations, and response to the Level 2 locations to start cooling the pathways between Level 1 and Level 2 locations. Thus, the probability of a fire allowed to propagated to Level 2 fire zones is negligible. As a result, all propagation scenarios involving Level 2 propagation or higher were also screened from the analysis.E.5 EVALUATION OI: PATHWAY CREDIBILITY Table E-2 presented in this Appendix summarizes the results of the propagation pathway credibility evaluation and contains 12 columns: 1.Fire Zone.This column lists the fire zones that survived the preliminary screening. 2.Fire Severity (Hours).This column denotes the fire severity (in terms of fire duration)of the fire zone.This information is taken from the Fire Hazard Analysis.3.Primary Suppression Type.This column denotes whether an automatic fire suppression system exists in the initial fire zone.This information is taken from the Fire Hazard Analysis." Drill is considered to be terminated when the fire is extinguished and the crew is ready to fight another fire.P:t1686tRge-E.docloc E-3 E.Propagation Patlnoay Credibilihj Assessment 4.Suppression Actuation Method.This column indicates whether the fire suppression system actuation is automatic or manual.5.Adjacent Fire Zone.This column lists the fire zone adjacent to the initial fire zone.6.Barrier.This column gives information about the type of structure that separates the adjacent fire zones.7.Barrier Rating.This column describes the barrier rating of the pathway separating the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zone.This information is taken from the Fire Hazard Analysis.Permanent Opening.This column denotes whether there is a permanent opening between the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zone.This information is taken from the Fire Hazard Analysis, plant drawings and walkdown notes.9.Fire Duration 2 Rating*0.75. This column evaluates whether the fire severity (listed in Column 2)is less than or equal to 75%of the barrier rating (listed in Column 5).10.Auto FSS Exists.This column states whether there is automatic fire suppression system in either the initial fire zone or the adjacent fire zone.12.Criterion 1.This column evaluates whether screening criterion 1 (see Section E.1)is satisfied. Criterion 2.This column evaluates whether screening criterion 2 (see Section E.1)is satisfied. 13.Localized Fire.This column evaluates whether there is a credible propagation pathway between the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zone.The column shows"YES" if either Column 11 or 12 contains a"TRUE".14.Notes.This column contains additional notes about the propagation pathway.~~J P&1686%ge-E.docloc E-4 E.Propngntion Pnthtvny Credibilihg Assessment E,6 REFERENCES 1.Ginna Station Fire Combustible Loading Analysis, DA-ME-98-004, Revision 0, April 3, 1998 P:51686ERge-E.docfoc E-5 Table E-1 Ginna Fire Drills F..Propagation Pallnoay Credibility Ass nt No.Date Location Type*27-Jul-97 EDG1A P Time of Alarm 18:14 Time Drill Completed 18:21 Duration Minutes None Weaknesses Other Notes 14-Jun-97 TY-??12-Jun-97 TB-1 P S 10:40 17:47.11:27 18:02 47 15 Communication difficult with radios Communications, Captain Main Feedwater pump did not have turnout gear room on 4 3-Jun-97 IBN-0 S 17:34 17:52 18 Communication difficult Main Feed pump room due to poor transmission, supply/storage area did not shut door to Main Feed pump room 24-May-97 IBN-0 S 10:06 10:21 15 Communications, Turnout Main Feedwater pump gear usage'rusty'oom 19-May-97 14-May-97 IBN-0 IBN-0 P P 17:37 19:05 17:48 19:17 12 None SCBAs make communications a problem East of MDAFWPs 10 9-May-97 IBM-0 19-Mar-97 TSC-IS S 14-Mar-97 TSC-IS S 21:05 21:36 1:28 21:19 21:48 1:39 14 12 Hose reel rewinding None Proper checking of adjacent rooms for fire spreading and damage Diesel room Diesel room P.." age-E.dodoc Table E-1 Ginna Fire Drills (Continued) E.Propagation Patlnuay Credibility Ass irt No.12 13 14 15 Date Location Type*9-Mar-97 TSC-IS P 22-Feb-97 TSC-IS S 21-Feb-97 TSC-IS S 15-Feb-97 TSC-IS P 1-Feb-97 TSC-IS S Time of Alarm 11:32 8:52 3:37 10:42 9:36 Time Drill Completed 11:43 9:05 3:49 10:58 9:49 Duration Minutes 13 12 16 13 Weaknesses Captain should stay father away from fire Captain too close to scene without gear Radio communication problem None Captain didn't stand clear of area Other Notes Diesel room Diesel room Diesel room Diesel room Diesel room 16 10-Jan-97 SB-1 S 1:33 1:42 None 17 22-Dec-'6 SB-1 S 20:40 20:48 None 19-Dec-96 SB-1 S~4:40 4:48 Captain slow to shut overhead door Personal lockers 19 15-Dec-96=SB-1 18:49 19:06 17 Should have run hose line, PCN submitted for communications 20 8-Dec-96 SB-1 S 13:05 13:24 19 Captain too involved;communications need to be better 21 22 2-Dec-96 26-Nov-96 SB-1 SB-1 S S 16:13 16:43 16:29 16:53 16 10 Could have ventilated a little sooner Took too much time to open personnel locker Personal lockers PAi 686Nge-E.doctoc E-7 Table E-1 Ginna Fire Drills (Continued) E.Propagation Pattnvay Credibility As ent No.Date Location ape*Time of Alarm Time Drill Completed Duration Minutes Weaknesses .Other Notes 23 24 25 26 27 29-Sep-96 26-Sep-96 25-Sep-96 14-Sep-96 13-Sep-96 SH-2 SH-2 SH-2 SH-2 SH-2 S S S 12:57 3:54 17:16 17:49 3:36 13:04 4:08 17:26 17:58 3:45 14 10 None None None None None"D" Service water pump"D" Service water pump SW Pump Area"C" Service water pump 28 25-JUI-95 EDG1A S 8:57 9:10 13 Brigade did not bring enough equipment to scene*P Preannounced S Surprise P::='-~6'.E.doctoc E.Propagation Pattccva ji Crerlibility Ass nt Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Fire Zone Fire Severity (Hours)Primary Suppression Type Suppression Actuation Method Adjacent Fire Zone Barrier Fire Barrier Duration Rating Permanent>0.75*(Hours)Opening Rating Auto FSS Exists Criterion Criterion Localized 1 2 Fire-Notes ABB V'.75 I Preaclion spcinklers Auto CHG Wall/Open 3 TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE ABB ABB 0.75 0.75 P reaction sprinklers Preaction sprinkle rs Auto Auto IBS-0 RC-1 Waii Wail FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE ABM 0.75 Preaction sprinklers Auto IBS-1 Wail FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE ABM ABM ABO ABO ABO ABO ABO 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Preaction sprinklers Preaction sprinklers None None None None None Auto Auto N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A RC-2 SB-1 IBS-2 RC-3 SAF SB-2 Waii Waii Waii Wall Wali Wall Waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE'ALSE FALSE 3-FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Notes: 7.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.8.Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.9.Fire barrier is a block wall and a door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.10.No additional icnpacts due to propagation of fire.11.Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls.The ceain combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil.Pcopagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible. 12.The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump coom door.Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible. P t1686%ge-E.doc/oc E-9 0 E.Propagatio/r Patinvay Creriibi!ity Ass eat Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued) Fire Zone IBN-1 IBN-1 IBN-1 IBN-1 IBN-1 IBN-1 IBN-2 IBM-2 IBN-2 Fire Severity (Hours)1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 Primary Suppression Type Predction sprinklers P reaction sprinklers Preaction sprinklers Preaclion sprinklers Preaction sprinklers P reaction sprirtklers P reaction sprinklers Preaction sprinklers Preaclion sprinklers Suppression Actuation Method Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Adjacent Fire Zone CT IBS-1 RC-2 SB-1 SB-1HS TB-1 IBS-2 RC-3 SB-2 Barrier Wall Wall/Door Wall Wall/Door Wall/Door Wall/Door Wail/Door Wali Wali Fire Barrier Duration Rating Permanent>0.75 (Hours)Opening Rating FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Auto FSS Criterion Exists 1 TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE Criterion 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Localized Fire Notes TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE Notes: 1.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.2.Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.i 3.Fire barrier is a block wall and a door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation ot the combustibles from the barrier.4.No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.5.Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls.The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil.Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible. 6.The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door.Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible. r'age-E.doc/oc I E.Propagation Patlrtvay Crerlibility Asse eat Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued) Fire Zone IBN-2 IBN-3 IBN-3 IBN-4 IBS-1 IBS-1 IBS-1 IBS-1 IBS-1 IBS-2 IBS-2 IBS-2 Fire Severity (Hours)0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75.0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75~0.75 Primary Suppression Type I Preaction sprinklers P reaction sprinklers Preaction sprinklers P reaction sprinklers None None None None None None None None Suppression Actuation Method Auto Auto Auto Auto N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NIA N/A Adjacent Fire Zone TB-2 IBS-3 TB-3 TB-3 ABM IBN-1 RC-2 SB-1HS SB-1WT ABO IBN-2 RC-3 Barrier Wall Wall/Door Wali Wall Wail Wall/Door Wall Wall/Door Wall Wali Wall/Door Wall Barrier Rating (Hours)0-Fire Duration Permanent>0.75*Opening Rating FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE Auto FSS Criterion Criterion Exists 2 TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE Localized Fire TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE Notes Notes: 1.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.2.Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.3.Fire barrier is a block watl and a door that is not lire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.4.No additional impac/s due to propagation of fire.5.Charging pump room is almost completely enctosed by concrete walls.The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oik Propagation out of the charging pump roomis assumed to be incredible. 6.The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door.Fire propagation is assuined to be incredible. P:t1686tRge-E.doc/oc E-11 E.Propagation Patlnvay Credibility Asses tent Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued) Fire Zone Fire.Severity (Hours)Primary Suppression Type Suppression Adjacent Actuation Fire Method Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hours)Permanent Opening Fire Duration Auto>0.75'SS Rating Exists Criterion Criterion Localized 2 Fire Notes IBS-2 IBS-3 IBS-3 N2 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.75 i None None None None N/A N/A NIA N/A SB-2 IBN-3 RC-3 ABO TB-1 Wall Wall/Door Wali Wall Wali/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TSC-1N 0.75 TSC-1N 0.75 TSC-1 S 0.75 TSC-1S 0.75 TSC-1S 0.75 8R1A 0.75 8R1A 0.75 TSC-1M 0.75 TSC-1M 0.75 TSC-1M 0.75 None None N/A N/A TB-2 TSC-1N TSC-1S TB-2 TSC-1M RR TB-2 TSC-1M AHR BR18 Wall Waii Wall/Door Wall/Door Wall Waii Waii Walt/Door Wali Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FAI SE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Notes: 1.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.2.Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.3.Fire barrier is a block waII and a door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.4, No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.5.Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls.The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil.Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible. 6.The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door.Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible. f,'age-E.doc/oc V A E.Propngntioa Pntlnvny Credibility Ass at Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued) Fire Zone Fire Severity (Hours)Primary Suppression Type Suppression Adjacent Actuation Fire Method Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hours)Permanent Opening Fire Duration Auto>0.75'SS Rating Exists Criterion Criterion Localized 1 2 Fire Notes BR1A BR1B BR1B BR1B-CV AHR AHR AHR 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.50 1.50 1.50 Nohe None None Auto Water Spray Auto Water Spray Auto Water Spray N/A N/A N/A Auto Auto Auto TB-1'R1A TB-1 BR1B BR1A CT TB-1 Wall Wall/Door Wail Concrete floor Waii Smoke Barrier Watt FALSE FALSE FALSE FAI SE FALSE FAI SE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE BRRM CR-3 RR 1.50 0.75 3.00 None None Auto Halon Systems, Manual Sprinkler N/A N/A RR TB-3 Auto, Manual BRRM Wall/Door Wall/Door Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE-FALSE TRUE Notes: 1.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.2.Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.3.Fire barrier is a block wail and a door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles froin the barrier.4.No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.5.Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls.The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil.Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible. 6.The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door.Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible. P.0686%ge-E.doc/oc E-13 E.Propagation Paflnuay Credibility As eat Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued) Fire Zone Fire Severity (Hours)Primary Suppression Type Suppression Adjacent Actuation Fire Method Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hours)Permanent Opening Fire Duration Auto>0.75*FSS Rating Exists Criterion Criterion Localized 1 2 Fire Notes RR RR 3.00 3.00 Auto Halon Systems, Manual Sprinkler Auto Halon Systems, Manual Sprinkter Auto, Manual Auto,Manual RRA TB-2 Wali Waii FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FAI SE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE RR 3.00 Auto Halon Systems, Manual Sprinkler Auto, Manual TSC-1S Watt FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE RRA CHG CT CT CT EDG1A-1 0.00 0.75 3.75 3.75 3.?5 0.75 Manual CO2 Auto Deluge Auto Deluge Auto Deluge Manual Auto Auto Auto RR ABB AHR IBN-1 TB-1 EDG18-1 Waii Wall/Open 3 Smoke Barrier Wall Waii Waii FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE'ALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE-TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Notes: 1.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.2.Fire barrier is a b'lock wall and locked door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.3.Fire barrier is a block we'll and a door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.4.No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.5.Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls.The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil.Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible. 6.The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door.Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible. P"-" tQRge-E.docloc E.Propagation Patlnuny Credibility As nt Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant(Continued) Fire Zone EDG1A-0 EDG1A-1 Fire Severity (Hours)0.75 Primary Suppression Type Suppression Actuation Method Adjacent Fire Zone Barrier EDG1A-1 Steel Hatch TB-1 Wall/Door Fire Barrier Duration Auto Rating Permanent>0.75*FSS (Hours)Opening Rating Exists FALSE FALSE FALSE Criterion Criterion 1 2 FALSE FALSE Localized Fire TRUE TRUE Notes EDG1A-1 0.75 TO-1 waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE EDG18-1 EDG18-0 EDG18-0 EDG18-1 H2 1.50 1.50 0.75 Auto Water Spray Auto Water Spray Auto Auto EDG1A-1 Wali EDG1A-X Wall TB-1 Wall/Door TB-1 Wall EDG18-1 Steel Hatch FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE H2 RC-1 RC-1 0.75 0.75 0.75 TO-1 ABB IBM-0 waii waii wali FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE Notes: 1.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.2.Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.3.Fire barrier is a block w/II and a door that is not fire rated.However, propagationis assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.4.No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.5.Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls.The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil.Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible. 6.The nearest coinbustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door.Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible. PA1686tRge.E.doc/oc E-15 E.Propagafion Paflnvay Credibility As nt Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued) Fire Zone RC-1 RC-2 RC-2 RC-2 RC-3 RC-3 RC-3 Fire Severity (Hours)0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Primary Suppression Type Suppression Actuation Method Adjacent Fire Zone IBS-0 ABM IBN-1 IBS-1 ABO IBN-2 IBS-2 Barrier waii waii wati wati waii watt wait Fire Barrier Duration Rating Permanent>0.75'Hours)Opening Rating FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Auto FSS Criterion Exists 1 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Criterion 2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE Localized Fire TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE Notes SAF SB-1 SB-1 0.75 0.75 0.75 Dry chemical, CO2, Water Dry chemical, CO2, Water Manual Manual ABO ABM wag wati IBM-1 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE SB-1 0.75 Dry chemical, CO2, Water Manual IBS-1 waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE SB-1 0.75 Dry chemical, CO2, Water Manual SB-1HS Wall/Door FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE Notes: 1.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.2.Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.3.Fire barrier is a block w/lt and a door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be lncredibte due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.4.No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.5.Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls.The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil.Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible. 6.The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automalic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door.Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible. P-'age-E.doc/oc E.Propagation Patinvay Credibility Asse ut Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant(Continued) Fire Zone Fire Severity (Hours)Primary Suppression Type Suppression Adjacent Actuation Fire Method Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hours)Permanent Opening Fire Duration Auto>0.75*FSS Rating Exists Criterion Criterion Localized 1 2 Fire Notes SB-1 SB-1 SB-1 SB-1HS SB-1HS SB-1HS SB-1WT SB-2 SB-2 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.50 1.50 Dry chdmical, CO2, Water Dry chemical, CO2, Water Dry chemical, CO2, Water Ory chemical, CO2 Ory chemical, CO2 Dry chemical~CO/Dry chemical Dry chemical, CO2, Water Dry chemical, CO2, Water Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual SB-1WT TB-1 TB-1FP IBN-1 IBS-1 SB-1 SB-1 IBN-2 IBS-2 Wall/Door Wall/Door Wali Wall/Door Waii Wall/Door Open Walt/Door Wail FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FAI SE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Notes: The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.2.Fire barrier is a block wail and tocked door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.3.Fire barrier is a block wail and a door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.4.No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.6.Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls.The main combustible in the charging room Is oit and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oik Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible. 6.The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door.Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible. P:ii1686%ge-E.doc/oc E-17 E.Propngntion Pntlitvny Creitibility Ass it Table E-2 Fire Propagation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued) Fire Zone Fire Severity (Hours)Primary Suppression Type Suppression Adjacent Actuation Fire Method Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hours)Fire Duration Permanent>0.75'pening Rating Auto FSS Criterion Exists 1 Criterion 2 Localized Fire Notes SB-2 1.50 Dry chemical, CO2, Water Manual T8-2 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE SH-1 0.75 Auto Sprinklers Auto SH-2 Stairwell TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 TB-1 TB-1 TB-1 TB-1 TB-1 TB-1 TB-1 TB-1 TB-1 TB-1 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 AHR AVT BR1A BR18 CT EDG1A-1 EDG18-1 H2 IBM-1 S8-1 TO-1 watt Wall/Door Wail Wali waii Wall/Door Wall/Door Wali Wall/Door Wall/Door Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FAI SE FALSE FAl SE FALSE FAI SE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE Notes: 1.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.2.Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.3.Fire barrier is a block waif and a door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.4.No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.6.Charging pump room is atmost completely enclosed by concrete walls.The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil.Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible. 6.The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door.Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible. P:-'"age-E.doc/oc \ E.Propagation Patlnuay Credibility Asses tt Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant(ContinLted) Fire Zone Fire Severity (Hours)Primary Suppression Adjacent Suppression Actuation Fire Type Method Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hours)Fire Duration Permanent>0.75'pening Rating Auto FSS Criterion Criterion Exists 1 2 Localized Fire Notes TB-1 TB-1FP TB-1FP TB-2 TB-2 TB-2 TB-2 TB-2 TB-2 TB-3 TB-3 1.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Partial coverage over lube oil cooler Dry chemical, CO2 Dry chemical, CO2 Auto Water Spray Manual Manual Auto TB-1FP SB-1 TB-1 IBN-2 RR SB-2 TSC-1M TSC-1N TSC-1S CR-3 IBN-3 Wall/Door 0 Wall Watt/Door Walt/Door Waii Wall/Door Wati Walt/Door Wall Wall/Door Wall/Door FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE-FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE Notes: 1.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.2.Fire barrier is a block wail and locked door that is not fire rated.8owever, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.3.Fire barrier is a block vrallbnd a door that is not fire rated.8owever, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.4.No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.5.Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls.The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil.Propagation out of the charging pump roomis assumed to be incredible. 6.The nearest combustible material is the lube oit for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door.Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible. P t1686tRge-E.doc/oc E-19 E.Propagation Patlnuay Crerlibilihg Asse t Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued) Fire Zone Fire Severity (Hours)Primary Suppression Type Suppression Adjacent Actuation Fire Method Zone Barrier Barrier Rating Permanent (Hours)Opening Fire Duration Auto>075'SS Rating Exists Criterion Criterion Localized 2 Fire Notes TO TO TO TY-E TY-W TY-W 23.60 23.60 23.60 Preaclion Sprinklers Preaction Sprinklers Preaction Sprinklers Auto Water Spray Auto Water Spray Auto Water Spray Auto Water Spray Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto Auto EDG1A-1 H2 TB-1 RR TY-W RR TY-E Wall Waii Wall/Door Wali Wall Waii Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE-FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE Notes: 1.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.2.Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.3.Fire barrier is a block wall and a door that is not fire rated.However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.4.No additional iinpacts due to propagation ot fire.5.Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls.The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oiL Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible. 6.The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooter which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door.Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible. F.'6tRge-E.doctoc Table E-c, pplement Fire Propagation Table for Ginna Nuclear Plant-Vertically Adjacent Fire Zones Fire Zone Fire Sever-ity (Hrs)Primary Suppres-sion Type I Suppres-sion Actuation Method Adjacent Fire Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hrs)Per-manent Open-ing Fire Dura-tion)0.75>>Rating Auto FSS Exists Cri-terion 1 Cri-terion 2 Local-Ized Fire Notes ABB 0.75 Pre-action Sprinkle rs Auto.i ABM ABB Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Unrated Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE A ABM ABO AHR BR1A BR1B 0.75 0.75 1.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 Pre-action Sprinklers Ndne Auto Water Spray None None I None Auto N/A Auto N/A N/A N/A ABO CHG ABM BRRM RR TSC-1M TSC-1N TSC-1S RR RR BR18-CV Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Zone-Specific Unrated Unrated TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE D,E E.S-1 Fire Zone Fire Sever-ity (Hrs)Primary Suppres-sion Type Suppres-sion Actuation Method Adjacent Fire Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hrs)Per-manent Open-ing Fire Dura-tion>0.75~Rating Auto FSS Exists Cri-terion Cri-terion 2 Local-Ized Fire Notes BR18-CV BR18 Floor/Ceiling Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE D,E 8RRM 1.50 None I N/A AHR CR-3 Floor/Ceiling Zone-Specific FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE CHG 0.75 ABM Floor/Ceiling 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CR-3 0.75 None N/A BRRM RR Floor/Ceiling Zone-Specific FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE C,F ED G1A-0 0.75 ED G1A-1 0.75 EDG1A-X EDG18-0 0.75 EDG18-1 1.50 Auto Water Spray Auto EDG1A-1 EDG1A-0 EDG1A-X EDG1A-1 EDG18-1 EDG18-0 Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Unrated TRUE TRUE Unrated TRUE FALSE TRUE Unrated TRUE TRUE Unrated TRUE TRUE Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE O,Z O,Z P,Z P,Z IBN-0 IBN-1 IBN-2 0.00 1.50 0.75 I Pre-action Sprinklers Pre-action Sprinkiers Auto Auto IBN-1 IBN-0 IBN-2 IBN-1 IBN-3 Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Unrated TRUE FALSE Unrated TRUE TRUE Unrated TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE G,H G Fire Zone Fire Sever-ity (Hrs)Primary Suppres-sion Type Suppres-sion Actuation Method Adjacent Fire Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hrs)Per-manent Open-Irlg Fire Dura-tion>0.75~Rating Auto FSS Exists Cri-terion Cri-terion 2 Local-ized Fire Notes IBN-3 0.75 Pre-action Sprinklers Auto IBN-2 Floor/Ceiling Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE J,K IBNQ 0.75 Pre-action Sprinkle rs Auto IBN-3 Floor/Ceiling Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE JK IBS-O 0.00 IBS-1 Floor/Ceiling Unrated TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE L,X IBS-1 IBS-2 0.75 0.75 None None N/A N/A IBS-0 IBS-2 IBS-1 IBS-3 Floor/Ceiling floor/Ceiling Unrated Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE-TRUE FALSE FALSE L,Z M,Z M,Z N,Z IBS-3 RC-1 RC-2 RC-3 RR 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 3.00 None Auto Halon Systems, Manual Sprinkler N/A Auto, Manual IBS-2 RC-2 RC-1 RC-3 RC-2 AHR BR1A BR18 CR-3 Floor/Ceiling None None None Floor/Ceiling Unrated N/A N/A N/A Zone-specific Zone-specific TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE N,Z FALSE I FALSE I FALSE I TRUE C TRUE TRUE C F E.S-3 "I Fire Zone Fire Sever-ity (Hrs)Primary Suppres-sion Type Suppres-sion Actuation Method Adjacent Fire Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hrs)Per-manent Open-ing Fire Dura-tion>0.75~Rating Auto FSS Exists Cri-terion 1 Cri-terion 2 Local-=ized Fire Notes SB-1 0.75 Auto Water Spray, Dry Chemical, CO~, Water Auto, Manual SB-2 Floor/Ceiling Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE SB-1HS 0.75 Auto Water Spray, Dry Chemical, CO~Auto, Manual SB-2 Floor/Ceiling Unrated FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE SB-1WT (CST Area)SB-1WT (Non-CST Area)0.75 Auto Water Spray, Dry Chemical Aut 0, Manual SB-2 (CST Area)SB-2 (Non-.CST Area)None Floor/Ceiling N/A TRUE Unrated FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE-SB-2 1.50 Auto Water Spray, Dry Chemical, CO~, Water Auto, Manual SB-1 SB-1HS Floor/Ceiling Unrated TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE SB-2 (CST Area)SB-2 (Non-CST Area)1.50 Auto Water Spray, Dry Chemical, CO~, Water Auto, Manual SB-1WT (CST Area)SB-1WT (Non-CST Area)None Floor/Ceiling N/A TRUE Unrated FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE E.S-4 0 Fire Zone Fire Sever-ity (Hrs)Primary Suppres-sion Type Suppres-sion Actuation Method Adjacent Fire Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hrs)Per-manent Open-.ing Fire Dura-tion)0.75>>Rating Auto FSS Exists Cri-terion 1 Cri-terion 2 Local-ized Fire Notes SH-1 (Circ W Area)0.75 SH-2 (Circ W Area)None N/A TRUE i, TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE SH-1 (SW Area)Auto Sprinklers Auto SH-2 (SW Area)Floor/Ceiling Zone-specific TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE C,T SH-2 (Circ W Area)0.75 SH-1 (Circ W Area)None NIA TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE SH-2 (SW Area)Auto Sprinklers Auto SH-1 (SW Area)Floor/Ceiling Zone-specific TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE C,T TB-1 TB-1FP TB-2 TB-3 TSC-1M TSC-1N 1.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Dry Chemical, CO~Manual TB-2 TB-2 TB-1 TB-1FP TB-3 TB-2 AVT AVT Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling'loor/Ceiling Floor/Ceiling Unrated TRUE Unrated FALSE TRUE Unrated FALSE TRUE Unrated TRUE Unrated FALSE Unrated FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE U,V,I U,W,I U,W,r E.S-S Fire Zone Fire Sever-ity (Hrs)Primary Suppres-sion Type Suppres-sion Actuation Method Adjacent Fire Zone Barrier Barrier Rating (Hrs)Per-manent Open-ing Fire Dura-tion)0.75~Rating Auto FSS Exists.Cri-terion 1 Cri-terion 2 Local-ized Notes Fire TSC-1S 0.75 AVT Floor/Ceiling Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE NOTES A.There are two stairways and a 120-ft'pen hatch connecting zones ABB, ABM, and ABO.AII three pathways are protected by close-spaced, closed-head sprinklers at the ceiling of zone ABM.B.Although zone ABO has no automatic suppression system per se, the only pathways to zone ABM are protected (see Note A), so downward fire propagation is not deemed credible.C.The fire resistance of the floor/ceiling has been analyzed under the Ginna Fire Protection Program as sufficient for the fire duration based on the zone-specific combustible loading.D.The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete structures. E.Zone BR1B-CV has very limited access to air flow, which would preclude any significant fire development inside the zone.F.A stairway connecting zones CR-3 and RR is enclosed in a 2-hr, fire-rated vestibule with 2-hr, fire-rated doors at the zone RR level (there is also a non-fire-rated vestibule and door at the zone CR-3 level).G.There is a stairway and two 3.1-ft'rating-covered manholes connecting zones IBN-0 and IBN-1..H.Zone IBN-0 has no combustibles. Only a transient fire could occur, which is assumed to be of insufficient intensity or duration to propagate to zone I4N-1, especially since the latter is protected by pre-action sprinklers. I.There is a stairway connecting zones IBN-1 and IBN-2.J.There are two stairways connecting zones IBN-2, IBN-3, and IBN-4, one of which is enclosed in a non-fire rated vestibule with non-fire-rated doors.K.There is a 92-ft'rating-covered equipment access hatch connecting zones IBN-3 and IBN-4.L.There is a stairway and 3.1-ft'rating-covered manhole connecting zones IBS-0 and IBS-1.Combustibles and safety critical equipment are not located near the stairway or manhole.M.There are two stairways connecting zones IBS-1 and IBS-2.Combustibles and safety critical equipment are not located near the stairways. N.There is a stairway connecting zones IBS-2 and IBS-3.Combustibles and safety critical equipment are not located near the stairway.O.There is a 7.1-ft'teel-plate-covered manhole connecting zones EDG1A-0 and EDG1A-1.This is sealed so as to prevent spread of the types of fires which could possibly propagate, i.e., oil spill fires and cable fires.The DG area is bermed to contain oil spills, while cables are not located nea(the hatch.There is a 7.1-ft'teel-plate-covered manhole connecting zones EDG1B-0 and EDG1B-1.This is sealed so as to prevent spread of the types of fires which could possibly propagate, i.e., oil spill fires and cable fires.The DG area is bermed to contain oil spills, while cables are not located near the hatch.Q R S There are two stairways connecting zones SB-1 and SB-2, each of which is enclosed in a vestibule with a 1.5-hr, fire-rated door.An open grating connects the CST Areas of zones SB1-WT and SB-2.Open spaces connect the Circ W Areas of zones SH-1 and SH-2.E.S-6 0 ere is a stairway connecting the SW Areas of zones SH-1 and U.There are four stairways and an elevator shaft connecting zones TB-1, TB-2, and TB-3.One of the stairways is enclosed in a vestibule with 1.5-hr, fire-rated doors.The elevator shaft is enclosed with non-fire-rated doors.V.There are a 42.4-ft'rating-covered heater drain pump withdrawal hatch, 128-ft'rating-covered condensate pump withdrawal hatch, and 6390-ft'f open space and grating connecting zones TB-1 and TB-2.W.There is a 940-ft'pen access hatch connecting zones TB-2 and TB-3.X.Zone IBS-0 has no combustibles. Only a transient fire could occur, which is assumed to be of insufficient intensity or duration to propagate to zone IBS-1.Y.Zones AVT, TSC-1M, TSC-1N, and TSC-1S do not contain safety critical equipment. Z.The concrete floor/ceiling is considered sufficient to prevent spread of the types of fires which could possibly propagate, i.e., oil spill fires and cable fires.I.No additional impact due to propagation of fire.E.S-7 Response to Fire IPEEE Questions ATTACHMENT B.2 EXTRACTS FROM APPENDICES C AND D TO THE 1998 SUBMITTAL C.Component/Location Based Fire Ignition I'requency A quantitative screening process is perfoimed during the scenario analysis phase of the internal plant hazards analysis.The screening process applies numerical criteria to determine the relative risk significance of each hazard scenario.If it is determined that a scenario is insignificant compared with these numerical screening criteria, that scenario is removed from further consideration in the PSA models.Therefore, it is important that the hazard occurrence frequencies that are assessed during this step of the piocess satisfy the following objectives. im The hazard scenario frequency must consistently account for generic industry data and any plant-specific experience for the type of hazard that is being evaluated in the type of location that is being modeled.a The hazard scenario frequency must provide a conservative upper bound for the actual frequency of more detailed event scenarios that may eventually be developed for the location.In other words, the total scenario frequency may be consistently subdivided to more realistically represent any specific event scenario in the location, if it is necessary to develop more detailed models for the location.The industry event data are combined with actual plant-specific experience through a two-stage Bayesian analysis that forms the basis for the hazard frequency assessment. The generic data for the internal fire frequency assessment are collected from a variety of sources.For example, the PLG proprietary database for fire events provides the generic input for the assessment of fire event frequencies. This database contains summaries of more than 750 fire events that occurred at U.S.nuclear power plants through the end of 1993.These event summaries are derived from U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)Licensee Event Report (LER)data, American Nuclear Insurer data, and plant-specific data that have been collected by PLG du'ring its previous PSA studies.The generic fire event database for the Ginna analyses was limited to events that occurred between January 1, 1980, and December 31, 1992.The starting date for this database period accounts for substantial improvements in fire protection systems and personnel awareness that may affect the applicability of pre-1980 data for current analyses.The end date accounts for the fact that the PLG database contains a number of fire events that were reported in 1993, but it may not be complete for that year.C.1 Pire Event Categories Three general types of fire event categories were defined for these analyses.Two of these classifications may be characterized broadly as"location-type" categories and"equipment-type" categories. The third general classiTication applies to control room p:E1 666%ge-C.docloc C-1 C.Component/Location Based Fire Ignition Freqnenag fires.Generic and plant-specific fire events were assigned to these categories according to the type of location in which they occurred or the type of equipment that was affected by the fire.C.l.l Location Fire Categories It is generally most reasonable to use location-type data for large areas that contain a variety of mechanical equipment. The composite fire event data account for the types of equipment (e.g., pump motors, valves, oil systems, etc.)that are typically found in these areas.The data also account generally for the types of operating, testing, and maintenance activities that occur around mechanical equipment, the possible presence of transient combustibles associated with these activities, and the general amount of personnel traffic in large open areas of the plant.The following four location-type classifications were used for the Ginna database.h a Containment-Other than RCP Fires.This category includes fires that occur inside the Containment, except for fires that are directly associated with the reactor coolant pumps or their oil systems.This category excludes fires that occur in electrical switchgear, motor control centers, control cabinets, and cables inside the Containment. These fire events are classified separately in the database, and they are allocated to specific locations inside the Containment that contain these types of equipment. No high voltage switchgear or motor control centers are located inside the Containment. a Auxiliary Building-Radwaste.This category includes fires that occur in Auxiliary Building and Intermediate Building areas that contain primarily solid, liquid, or gaseous radioactive waste handling systems.It also includes generic fire events that have occurred in similar equipment areas, even though the facilities are outside the plant auxiliary building.This category excludes fires that occur in electrical switchgear, motor control centers, control cabinets, and cables in radioactive waste handling areas.im Auxiliary Building-Other than Radwaste.This category includes fires that occur in Auxiliary Building and Intermediate Building areas that contain primarily safety-related mechanical equipment. This category excludes Auxiliary Building fire events that have occurred in areas that contain solid, liquid, or gaseous radioactive waste handling systems.This category excludes fires that occur in electrical switchgear, motor control centers, control cabinets, and cables in the Auxiliary Building.im Turbine Building-Other.This category includes fires that occur in the Turbine Building, except for fires that are directly associated with the main turbines, the turbine oil systems, the main generators, or the generator hydrogen systems.The Ginna main feedwater pumps are motor-driven. Therefore, this category excludes generic fire events that have occurred in main feedwater pump turbine oil systems.P:51686ERge.c.docloc C-2 C.Contponent/Location Based Fire Ignition Freqnenc1g This category excludes fires that occur in electrical switchgear, motor control centers, control cabinets, and cables in the Turbine Building.a Screenhouse. This category includes fires that occur in the screenhouse at Ginna.It includes generic fire events that have occurred in similar equipment as at Ginna, service water pumps and traveling screens, circulating water pumps, diesel-driven and motor-driven fire water pumps and auxiliary boilers, even though such equipment may not be with service water pumps.This category excludes fires that occur in electrical switchgear, motor control centers, control cabinets, and cables in areas around such equipment. C.Z.2 Equipment Fire Categories It is generally most reasonable to use equipment-type data for the following types of locations. Locations that contain only a single type of relatively unique mechanical component; e.g., diesel generators, ventilation units, motor-generators, etc.2.Locations that contain equipment that represents a unique hazard source or that has unique operational considerations; e.g., reactor coolant pumps, main turbine-generator, etc.3.Locations that contain electrical equipment, instrumentation and control cabinets, and cables The following 16 equipment-type classifications were used for the Ginna database.Ii Containment -Reactor Coolant Pumps.This category includes fires that are directly associated with the reactor coolant pumps or their oil systems.Ii Turbine/Generator. This category includes fires that are directly associated with the main turbines, the turbine oil systems, the main generators, or the generator hydrogen systems.Diesel Generator Sets.This category includes fires that occur in emergency diesel generators. The category includes fires that affect the diesel engine;fires in lubrication, fuel, cooling, and control systems that are mounted on the engine skid or that are typically located in the diesel generator room;and fires that affect the generator or exciter.This category excludes fires that occur in local control cabinets and fires that affect the diesel generator output circuit breaker.Control cabinet fires are included in the Logic Cabinet category to account for the types of equipment and control circuits that are typically located in these cabinets.Circuit breaker fires are included in one of the switchgear fire event categories, depending on the specific voltage.P:51686ERge-c.docfoc C-3 C.Con>ponent/Location Based Fire ignition Freqnency HVAC Chiller.This category includes fires that occur in ventilation system chiller units.The category includes fires that affect the compressor, expansion valves, lubrication systems, refrigeration equipment, and local controls that are typically mounted on the chiller package or skid.HVAC Fan.This category includes fires that occur in ventilation system fans.No distinction'is made to account for the size of the fan or the specific type of drive;e.g., direct drive, belts, fluid coupling, etc.Motor-Generator Sets.This category includes fires that occur in motor-generator sets, rotating inverters, and similar types of electro-mechanical converters. The category includes fires that affect the motor, generator, voltage regulator, lubrication equipment, cooling equipment, and local controls that are typically mounted on the unit.Battery Charger/Inverter.This category includes fires that occur in battery chargers and static inverters. No distinction is made to account for the AC voltage, the DC voltage, or the specific design of the unit.The category includes fires that affect the converter circuits, input circuit breakers, output circuit breakers, power monitoring and control circuits, and other components that are typically mounted inside the battery charger or inverter cabinet.Battery.This category includes fires that occur in emergency power system batteries. No distinction is made to account for the specific type of battery or its voltage.Transformer -High Voltage.This category includes fires that occur in high voltage offsite power transformers. These transformers provide connections from the in-plant buses to the switchyard or to other offsite power supplies.They are typically located outside the plant buildings. Examples include main power transformers, auxiliary power transformers, startup transformers, etc.No distinction is made to account for the specific primary and secondary voltages or the transformer design;e.g., oil-cooled, gas-cooled, air-cooled, etc.Transformer -Low Voltage.This category includes fires that occur in intermediate voltage station service transformers. These transformers provide connections from the high voltage buses (e.g., 4.16kV)to the low voltage buses (e.g., 480V)in the plant electric power systems.They are typically located inside the plant buildings. No distinction is made to account for the specific primary and secondary voltages or the transformer design.Transformer -Instrument Power.This category includes fires that occur in large control power transformers and regulated voltage transformers; e.g., SOLA transformers. No distinction is made to account for the specific primary and secondary voltages or the transformer design.P:K1686%ge-c.dodoc C-4 C.Component/Location Based Fire Ignition Freqnenag This category excludes fires that occur in low voltage transformers (e.g., 220V and below)for power, control, and monitoring circuits that are typically located inside switchgear cubicles, instrumentation power supplies, control cabinets, etc.Fires that affect these types of transformers are included in the respective categories for switchgear, motor control centers, logic cabinets, etc., depending on the location of the fire event.a Switchgear -Above 480V.This category includes fires that occur in high voltage switchgear (e.g., 4.16kV)that is located inside the plant buildings. No distinction is made between safety-related and non-safety electrical systems.This category is designated"Above 480V" for this analysis to account for the actual voltages at Ginna.How'ever, in practice, the category includes fires that occur in any switchgear with a nominal voltage rating that is higher than approximately 800V.The category includes fires that occur in the switchgear buswork, circuit breakers, instrumentation, control, and protection circuits that are typically mounted inside the switchgear cubicles.This category excludes high voltage switchgear fires that occur in the plant switchyard or in other offsite electrical facilities because the environment, personnel traffic, testing and maintenance programs, housekeeping controls, etc.may be much different for these facilities, compared with the in-plant electrical systems.~Switchgear -480V and Below.This category includes fires that occur in intermediate voltage switchgear (e.g., 480V)that is located inside the plant buildings. No distinction is made between safety-related and non-safety electrical systems.This category is designated "480V and Below" for this analysis to account for the actual voltages at Ginna.However, in practice, the category includes fires that occur in any switchgear with a nominal voltage rating that is less than approximately 800V.The category includes fires that occur in the switchgear buswork, circuit breakers, instrumentation, control, and'protection circuits that are typically mounted inside the switchgear cubicles.This category excludes fires that occur in motor control centers, vital AC instrument power buses, low voltage AC distribution panels (e.g., 220V and below), and DC buses.This distinction accounts for the lower power ratings of these panels and differences in the designs, duty cycles, and operating characteristics of the associated circuit breakers.Motor Control Center.This category includes fires that occur in motor control centers.For this analysis, the category also includes fires that occur in vital AC instrument power buses, low voltage AC distribution panels (e.g., 220V and below), and DC buses.Logic Cabinet.This category includes fires that occur in instrumentation, control, and protection cabinets.No distinction is made to account for the specific types of circuits that are contained in the cabinet (e.g., relays, solid state electronics, etc.), the location of the cabinet (except as noted below), or whether the circuits are safety-related or non-safety. p:i1686%ge-o.doctoc C-5 ~, C.Component/Location Based Fire Ignition Frequency This category excludes cabinet fires that occur in main, auxiliary, or emergency control rooms.These cabinet fires are included in the Control Room category.This distinction is made to account for differences in the normal occupancy and administrative controls that may apply for control room cabinets, compared with cabinets in other plant locations. Ii Cable.This category includes fires that damage electrical cables.No distinction is made to separately account for fires that affect instrumentation, control, or power cables.Fire events are included in this category if the cables or their terminations were the source of fire ignition or if cable damage was the primary impact from an exposure fire;e.g., welding sparks that ignite cable insulation in an open tray.Fire events are excluded from this category if cable damage was consequential to a fire that is assigned to another equipment category;e.g., pump motor fires, switchgear fires, cabinet fires, main generator hydrogen fires, etc.C.1.3 Control Room Fires 8ecause of its unique features, continuous occupancy, and strict administrative controls, a separate category is defined for fires that occur in main, auxiliary, or emergency control rooms.This category includes all fires that occur in plant control rooms, regardless of the cause or specific type of panel that is affected.C.2 Classification of Generic Event Data The first step of the fire frequency assessment involves a thorough review of the industry experience data to develop a"specialized generic database" for Ginna.This database accounts for design features of the plant that is being evaluated, the scope of the PSA models, and characteristics of the specific hazard scenarios that have been defined for the analysis.1 The PLG database contains a total of 484 fire events during the 13-year period from 1980 through 1992.These events were screened first to select only those events that apply to the Ginna plant design, the types of locations that are included in the PSA fire analyses, and the scope of the PSA models.This screening was based on observations made by the spatial interactions analyst during the plant walkdowns and on the analyst's understanding of Ginna operating procedures and practices. The following general considerations were used to determine which events from the industry data do not apply for this analysis.The Ginna plant has been operating for several years.Therefore, a fire event was removed from the generic database if the event occurred during plant construction or during pre-commercial startup testing activities. Table C-1 lists the Ginna plant locations that were retained after qualitative examination during the spatial interactions analyses.A fire event was removed from the database if the event occurred in a location that is not relevant to the Ginna analyses or if the event was uniquely PA1 686Ãge.c.doc/oc C-6 C.Co/nponent//Location Bnseci Fire Ignition Fre/inenng associated with a type of component that is not installed at Ginna.Examples of the location screening criterion include fires in office areas, warehouses, machine shops, cooling towers, switchyard facilities (except for relevant transformers), other fires outside of the plant protected area, etc.Event reports are included in the PLG generic database to satisfy several possible applications. The criteria for adding a particular event to the database are usually much broader than the criteria that apply for a particular plant-specific analysis.For example, some events in the database are included for studies that examine precursor events, studies that confirm analytical models for fire ignition and growth, etc.An event was removed from the database for this study if the event description clearly indicates that no actual fire was present, and no automatic or manual extinguishing actions were required.Examples of these types of events include overheated pump bearings, small amounts of smoke from oil films or foreign material on hot piping or other surfaces (with no indication of pooling or ignition), electrical faults and short circuits that do not ignite any material, etc.An event was removed from the database if the cause for the event was associated with a plant design feature that does not apply to Ginna.An example of this type of event includes fires that have occurred in the main condenser offgas systems for some boiling water reactors.a A few events were screened out according to miscellaneous criteria such as reported degradation or cracking of cable insulation, duplicate event reports, etc.A total of 230 events remained in the database after this first level of screening. These events were judged to be relevant to the Ginna plant design, the locations and types of equipment that were identified in the spatial interactions analyses, and the specific scope of the fire analyses.These events were next classified into the 22 fire event categories that are described in Section C.1.There are a few plant-specific design features and PSA modeling issues that must be considered during the categorization of the events.The most important of these considerations are summarized below.Equipment for the Ginna boric acid recycle systems and radioactive waste processing systems is distributed throughout several areas of the Auxiliary Building.These systems are more clearly separated from safety-related equipment areas in many newer U.S.plants.Fire events that occur in boric acid recycle systems and radioactive waste processing systems are retained in the Ginna database because these events may occur in locations that also contain PSA equipment. However, these events are classified separately to account for the actual distribution of this equipment among the Ginna Auxiliary Building locations. The Ginna plant has motor-driven main feedwater pumps.Fire events that occur in the Electro-Hydraulic oil systems for turbine-driven main PA1686<Rge-c.doc/oc C.-7 0 C.Component/Location Baserl Fire Ignition Frequency feedwater pumps are not relevant for the Ginna main feedwater related fire analyses.x Diesel-driven and motor-driven fire pump related events and events related to auxiliary boilers have been assigned to the screen house category.In practice, different hazard frequencies may apply for a particular plant location during-power operation and during shutdown.There are many reasons for this difference. Experience has shown that the causes for some events may be closely associated with equipment operating conditions or with personnel activities that apply uniquely to a specific plant operating mode.For example, hydrogen fires that are caused by electrical faults in the main generator are very unlikely when the plant is shut down.Fires that are caused by welding and cutting work inside the Containment are very unlikely when the plant is operating at power.Fires that are caused by electrical faults in normally energized switchgear may occur at any time.However, switchgear fires that are caused by personnel errors during periodic testing, inspection, or maintenance activities may be most likely during shutdown.To develop a comprehensive database that applies consistently for the Ginna model, each generic event must also be examined to determine whether its cause was uniquely associated with a specific plant operating mode.Thus, each event is assigned to one of the following categories. Power Operation Only (P).The causes for these events are uniquely associated with equipment operating conditions or personnel activities that apply primarily during plant power operation. x Anytime (A).The causes for these events may occur at any time, regardless of the plant operating mode.The event classifications are based on the normal equipment operating conditions, testing and inspection programs, and maintenance practices at Ginna.For example, if an equipment fire occurred during shutdown at Plant X, but it is concluded that the same cause applies during all operating modes at Ginna, the event is, assigned to the Anytime (A)category.W The product from this step of the frequency assessment process is a specialized generic database.This database contains only the hazard event summaries that are relevant for the plant that is being modeled, for the specific operating conditions that are being evaluated. This database is presented in Table C-2.The table summarizes the 230 fire events that were retained in the Ginna specialized generic database and their final classifications.. The actual plant identities and occurrence dates have been omitted to protect the proprietary nature of this information; However, consistent plant designation codes are used to provide an indication of the observed plant-to-plant variability in the generic experience. PA1686<Rge.c.dodoc C-8 C.Component/Location Based Fire Ignition Freqneunf C.3 Treatment of Unidentified Plant Events Each nuclear power plant site contains one to several reactor units.For this analysis, it is assumed that the frequency of internal hazards may vary considerably from site-to-site, but not from unit-to-unit at a particular site.An exception to this assumption may be made for sites at which there are known to be significant differences between the units.This assumption is based on the belief that much of the observed variability in hazard occurrence rates may be caused by differences in plant design, operating and maintenance practices, and plant management policies.A two-stage Bayesian analysis is performed to combine the industry data with actual experience from the plant that is being studied.The first stage of this analysis develops a generic frequency distribution for each hazard that consistently accounts for the observed site-to-site variability in the industry experience data.The second stage updates this generic frequency to account specifically for the actual historical experience at Ginna.In order to account for the observed site-to-site variability in the industry experience data properly, it is necessary to have detailed information about the specific site at which each event has occurred.For example, site X has had N1 fire events of Type A in X1 years;site Y has had N2 fire events of Type A in Y1 years;etc.Unfortunately, some of the industry data sources do not identify the specific sites at which these events have occurred.A small number of events in the PLG database'are related to plants that are not identified. Based on their descriptions, these event summaries document valid fires that have occurred at some plants and not duplicates of events at"identified plants".At first, it may seem most conservative to assign an unidentified event either to the"worst plant" or to the"best plant" from the generic population. In this context, the"worst plant" is the plant that has had the la'rgest number of occurrences in the smallest number of years, and the"best plant" is the plant that has had no other occurrences in the largest number of years.However, this may actually introduce undesired optimism when the second stage of the Bayesian update is performed. For example, suppose that the plant being evaluated (e.g., Ginna)has had no fires in a particular event category.'he second stage of the updating process will then numerically discount the generic evidence from any plant that has a relatively high frequency of fires.The amount of numerical reduction depends on the quantity of plant-specific data and the difference between the plant-specific and generic experience. Thus, in this case, assignment of the unidentified event to the"worst plant" will actually give that event less weight in the final results from the second stage update, compared with assignment of the event to the"best plant" or the"average plant".In practice, it has been determined that it is usually most conservative to assign each unidentified event to a plant that meets the following criteria.a The plant has had no other events in the category that is being evaluated. a The total plant operating years are approximately equal to the average of the generic plant population. p51666%ge-o.docloc C-9 C.Coniponent/Location Based Fire Ignition Freqnenng This process was used for assignment of all unidentified plant events during the Ginna updates.C.4 Development of Frequencies for Power Operation The numerical results from a PSA are typically presented as an occurrence frequency for the undesired event.Care must be used during the hazard frequency analyses to ensure that the initiating frequency for each event scenario is quantified consistently with other events that are analyzed in the PSA models, whether it is a frequency per calendar year or a frequency per year of power operation. Generic events for these analyses are classified into the two operational categories; i.e., Power Operation Only (P), and Anytime (A).The total initiating event frequency for the Ginna model should account for all events that can occur only during power operation, plus a fraction of the events that can occur at any time.The appropriate weighting fractions for the Anytime events are determined by the Ginna average plant availability factor.Suppose that the following data are available for a particular type of event at generic Plant X.Category Power Only (P)Shutdown Only (S)Anytime (A)Number of Events Experience (mode years)2 ,8+2=10 To develop a frequency that is consistent with the format of the overall PSA results, the.appropriate initiating event frequency for the Ginna models is determined by the answer to the following question: During the$0 years of experience at Plant X how many events have occurred during power operation? The answer to this question is the sum of the sum of the events that have occurred during power (category P)and the fraction of the events from category A that would occur during power 1+(8/10)*2=2.6 events The corresponding initiating event frequency is: 2.6/8=0.31 events per year of power operation P:516864Rge-c.docloc C-l 0 C.Component/Location Based Fire Igntion Fry/nency The following steps were used to quantify the fire event frequencies: For each category (location or component), fire frequencies were developed for the generic population of nuclear sites.The frequencies were developed for the two groups, Power Only (P), and Anytime (A).These two frequencies were defined per calendar year.An average availability factor (a)of 0.7 was used to define a total generic fire frequency for each component or location category according to the expression: P/[N*a]+A/N Where N is the number of calendar years for the data.Perform the first stage of the Bayesian update with the generic plant data from Step 1.For Ginna, count the total number of events that have actually occurred during plant power operation. The number of years corresponding to this time was multiplied by the average Ginna availability factor of 0.8.Perform the second stage of the Bayesian update with the generic prior distribution from Step 2 and the plant-specific data from Step 3.Use the results from this step as the Ginna fire events frequencies. C.5 Plant-Specific Fire Event Data and Frequencies Plant-specific fire event data for the Ginna study were compiled from the Ginna Internal Fire Brigade reports.All reports from 1979 through mid 1997 (18.5 years)were examined.The events were screened to determine which events apply to the fire event categories and plant locations being considered for the fire analysis.For example, the fires that occurred in the office areas, workshops, locations outside the plant protected area are not relevant for these analyses.Events were also screened out if the reports document only smoke from overheated pump bearings or other mechanical equipment, small quantities of smoke from foreign materials on hot surfaces, or other events with no indication of flames or evidence of fire damage.This is the same criterion used to screen the generic fire events database.However, these types of events were retained in the database if the reports document actuation of automatic suppression systems or manual extinguishing actions.Table C-3 summarizes the 14 fire events that were retained in the plant-specific database for power conditions. The table also lists the relevant Ginna category for each event.Initiating event frequencies for each fire category were quantified through the two-stage Bayesian updating process.The total Ginna operating experience used is 14.8 power operation years.Step 3 of the Ginna fire event frequency quantification process p:51686ERge.C.doc/oc C-11 C.Component/Location Based Fire Ignition Frertnenng developed plant-specific evidence for each fire event category, based on the events listed in Table C-3 and the 14.8-year operating time.This evidence was then input to the second stage of the Bayesian updates to quantify the final initiating event frequency for each fire category according to Step 4 of the process.Table C-4 lists the plant-specific evidence, the generic mean frequency from Step 2, and the final updated frequency distribution from Step 4 for each fire event category.p:51686(Rge-o.docloc C-1 2 Only relevant pages from C-13 through C-60 are included to reduce paper volume. C.Corupoirerrt/Location Based Fiie Table C-2 Generic Fire Events Applicable to the Ginna Station Fire PRA (Continued) r Frequency ID 65 Operation Site-Unit Mode Incident Date 5/16/87 Fire Location Reactor Building Cause Electrical Failure Fire Fire Initiators Initiators (Equipment)(Fuel)Camera Event Description An underwater TV camera was placed into a plastic bag while the lights were still hot and ignited bag and insulation. Category Aux Bldg-Other Applicability 66 67 HN HN Power Operation 11/15/90 10/28/91 Reactor Building Welding&Culling Personnel Error Torch: Fan Construction Material Insulation During welding, sparks fell and ignited dry-up rags.While an electrician was troubleshooting a problem with a cooling fan for power supply (1C11-PSY6), the fan shorted to the frame.This caused visible smoke and flame.The fire was quickly extinguished with a portable Halon extinguisher. Aux Bldg-Other Low Power Cabinet 68 Power Operation 6/11/92 Turbine Building Spontaneous Unknown Combustion Oil Extensive report available. Large issue is what was the ignition source.Turbine Bldg.-Other 69 70 HO Cold Shutdown 4/15/80 11/26/80 Reactor Building?Diesel Generator Electrical Failure Component Failure Circuit Breaker Diesel Generator Oil The RCS Bus/Generator"A", 2C71S001A, experienced a logic power failure, causing a reactor half scram on the"A" channel.The"A" channel was placed in the trip condition per Tech.Specs.The redundant"B" RPS was operable.The cause was an open circuit o Cylinder in the emergency diesel generator failed under testing.The heat ignited the fuel oil.The generator was removed from service and the fire extinguished. Low Power Cabinet Diesel Generator A Notes Applicability: A-Anytime/P-During Power Only P."t1686%e 'c/oc I C-28 C.C p t/L t on Based Fire I Table C-2 Generic Fire Events Applicable to the Ginna Station Fire PRA (Continued) Frequency ID Operation Incident Site-Unit Mode Date Fire Location Cause Fire Initiators (Equipment) Fire Initiators (Fuel)Event Description Category Applicability 71 HO 2/1/81 Diesel Generator Building Personnnel Error?Diesel Generator Insulation The insulation on the diesel generator was oil soaked.It ignited when the generator was started.Diesel Generator 72 HO 7/22/83 Turbine Building Component Failure Feed Pump Turbine Oil Oil had leaked into the insulation Turbine Bldg.around the turbine.The heat from-the turbine apparently ignited the Turbine/Gener oil.ator 73 74 HO HO 10/26/83 9/19/84 Diesel Generator Room Diesel Generator Building Defective Procedure Component Failure Diesel Generator Turbocharger Oil Oil Maintenance had replaced oil filter and left some oil on the ground which caught fire later.CO2 extinguished. During the running of a diesel generator, oil was noticed to be leaking from the turbocharger. The oil was near the exhaust manifold.The oil ignited, but was extinguished. Diesel Generator Diesel Generator 75 HO 4/23/90 Turbine Building Personnel Error Waste Cigarette was thrown into trash drum which then ignited.Extinguished with water from a drinking fountain.Turbine Bldg.-Other 76 77 HO HO 8/29/90 5/16/91 Diesel Generator Building Control Room Component Failure Electrical Failure Turbocharger Relay Solvent Leak of Glycol antifreeze from a small coolant jacket for a turbocharger. The coolant dropped onto the hot exhaust manifold.Suppressed with CO2.Piece of damaged phone jack fell on relay causing it to short.Diesel Generator Control Room Notes Applicability: A-Anytime/P -During Power Only P;t1 686'Nge-C.doc/oc C-29 C.Coniponent/Location Based Fire Ig Freqnenag Table C-2 Generic Fire Events Applicable to the Ginna Station Fire PRA (Continued) ID Operation Site-Unit Mode Incident Date Fire Location Cause Fire Fire initiators Initiators (Equipment)(Fuel)Event Description Category Applicability KQ Power Operation 4/13/86 Tranformer Electrical Yard Failure Transformer On 4/13/86 at 1107 with unit 2 at 72%power and Unit 3 shutdown, containment isolations occurred on both Units when the No.3 Startup Source was deenergized. The No.3 Startup Source was deenergized when the 3435 breaker opened because a fire involving t Transformer-Hi Voltage 112 113 RK Refueling Outage Power Operation 5/5/80 2/24/81 Trubine Building Reactor Building Electrical Failure, Component Failure Personnel Error Generator Insulation Fire involving generator exciter cubicle located in the DGB.Discovered while conducting 24-hour performance test.A fire occurred in the reactor building.The fire was ignited by welding sparks falling on foam rubber that a contractor had placed to prevent pipes from contacting temporary thermal shielding installed for the welding operation. The fire burned for app Diesel Generator Aux Bldg-Other 114 RK Power Operation (95%Power)6/15/81 Reactor Building Welding and Torch Cutting Construction Materials (Foam Rubber)A Class'A'ire (Foam Rubber)occurred above the Yardway rack on the 51 ft level in the reactor Building.The fire was ignited by welding sparks falling on the foam rubber that a contractor had emplaced.The fire burned for-2 minutes before it was iden Aux Bldg-Olher Notes Applicability: A-Anytime/P -During Power Only PAt686N.oc/oc C-38~:;l C.Coinponent/Location Based Fire.lg Table C-3 Fire Events at Ginna Station Fire Applicable to the Fire PRA reqnency No.Operation Mode Power Operation Power Operation (100%)Power Operation (100%)Power Operation Power Operation Incident Date 5/5/92 2/23/81 2/25/83 7/31/91 12/29/80 Fire Location Aux.Bldg.Top floor-.North East Comer Relay Room Relay Room MCC A Breaker Cubicle Cause Temporary heat trace connection wires exposed to plastic danger flag in immediate vicinity of exposed wires caught fire and spread to the insulation Welding Overhead Transformer Fire Electrical Failure Event Summary At 21:45, operator discovered fire in insulation in Aux.Bldg.Top floor North East corner.The fire was extinguished with CO2 by 21:47.Smoldering rag in Relay Room.Removed to Exterior of Building.Room Aired Out.First alarm received on S-08 (Relay Room)in the control room.Personnel responded to find smoke in the relay room and fire on backup transformer for the plant computer.The second alarm and auto actuation occurred shortly after.All personnel exited t An electrical fault in an ESF undervoltage cabinet resulted in burned insulation. Fire in the MCC A Breaker Cubicle Event Category Aux Bldg-Other Logic and Low Power Cabinet Logic and Low Power Cabinet Logic and Low Power Cabinet MCC Power Operation 9/22/88 MCC B Position 1M"B" EH pump tripped.Smell of smoke-noticed at MCC B.Fire called off.Operator opened breaker and opened door and removed fuses.Fire secured.MCC p:51686%ge.C.doctoc C-61 C.Couiponeut/Location Baserl Fire I Table C-3 Fire Events at Ginna Station Fire Applicable to the Fire PRA (Continued) FrequetlcJl Operation No.Mode Incident Date Fire Location Cause Event Summary Event Category 7 Power Operation 2/18/97"B" MG Set Failed bearing in"B" MG Fire alarm sounded at 01:45, and fire brigade Motor Generator set.responded. Fire was out at 01:50, the cause Set was a failed bearing in the"B" MG set Power Operation 9 Power Operation (100%)10 Power Operation 11 Power Operation 12 Power Operation 12/25/96 4/11/79 1/7/81 8/4/87 8/27/87 Screenhou se around SW pump area Main Transforme r Main Feed Pump Room Turbine Plant Sample Rack Turbine Building Intermediat e level Short circuit in"C" SWP breaker Electrical Short Dirty, clogged fan causing it to burn up.Dirty Motor Operator heard fire alarm, and found light smoke at"C" Service Water pump breaker cubicle.There was a short circuit in the"C" SW pump that caused a fire in the breaker.At approximately 10:45 a.m.on April 11, 1979, a fire call was announced at the main control board, it was the main transformer. The fire Brigade responded, the sprinkler system cut in, and also the Ontario Fire Department responded (with two trucks and Smoking fire water storage tank booster pump motor.Operator discovered smoke coming from turbine sample rack upon opening cabinet.A 15 Ib CO2 extinguisher was used to put out the fire.After fire was out, the fire source was found to be the cooling fan in the base of the cabinet.Security guard found secondary sample sink chiller pump motor burning up and reported the fire.Fire brigade responded and secured power to the pump.Smoke began to dissipate. Swtichg ear-480V and Below Transformer above 4.16kv Turbine Building-Other Turbine Building-Other Turbine Building-Other PA1686N~iootoc C.Coniponcnt/Location Based Fire Ign Freqnenag Table C-3 Fire Events at Ginna Station Fire Applicable to the Fire PRA (Continued) No.13 14 Operation Mode Power Operation Power Operation Incident Date 4/6/91 5/2/91 Fire Location Turbine Building basement outside main feed PulllP i OOill Turbine Building Cause Faulty welder's lead or overloaded welding machine Faulty solenoid on the crane or overloaded crane.Event Summary At 15:23 control room was reported that a fire had been extinguished. A welder's lead irisulation had started to burn.The welder had used a 5 lb.CO2 extinguisher to extinguish the fire.Fire was reported to the control room.Fire brigade responded, power was secured to turbine building crane.Fire went out.Event Category Turbine Building-Other Turbine Building-Other pA1686Nge-o.doctoc C-63 C.Component/Location Based Fire/i Frertnenng Table C-4 Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment No.Description No.of Events Power-Years Mean 5th%ile Median Posterior 95th%ile 10 12 14 Aux Bldg-Other Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior Aux Bldg-Other Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior Aux.Bldg.-Other Fire Frequency-Power-Prior Aux.Bldg.-Other Fire Frequency-Power Aux Bldg-Rad Waste Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior Aux Bldg-Rad Waste Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior Aux Bldg.-Rad,Waste Fire Frequency-Power-Prior Aux Bldg.-Rad-Waste Fire Frequency-Power Battery Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior Battery Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior Battery Fire Frequency-Power-Prior Battery Fire Frequency-Power Battery Charger/Inverter Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior Battery Charger Inverter Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 14.8 14.8 14.8 1.61E-02 3.02E-03-2.03E-02 2.78E-02 3.14E-03 2.25E-03 6.42E-03 5.60E-03 1.19E-03 6.23E-04 2.08E-03 1.92E-03 5.89E-03 6.77E-03 1.28E-03 1.69E-04 2.97E-03 5.78E-03 2.18E-04 2.51E-04 1.01E-03 9.86E-04 3.69E-05-3.22E-05 1.98E-04'l.97E-04 2.71E-04 5.60E-04 9.57E-03 5.20E-02 1.51E-03 1.16E-02 1.45E-02 5.40E-02 1.94E-02 7.88E-02 1.47E-03 1.20E-02 1.32E-03 7.16E-03 3.92E-03 1.88E-02 3.67E-03 1.61E-02 4.10E-04 4.41E-03 2.07E-04 2.18E-03 1.01E-03 6.84E-03 9.80E-04 6.33E-03 2.71E-03 2.21E-02 3.82E-03 2.85E-02 PA16868oi- 'octoc f C-64 C.Coniponent/Location Baserl'Fire,ig~ Freqnenag Table C-4 Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment (Continued) No.Description No.of Events Power-Years Mean 5th%ile Median Posterior 95th%ile 15 16 17 Battery Charger/Inverter Fire Frequency-Power-Prior Battery Charger/lnverter Fire Frequency-Power Cable Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior 14.8 1.55E-02 2.35E-03 1.28E-02 2.16E-03 5.56E-03 1.47E-04 1.03E-02 4.74E-02 8.79E-03 3.78E-02 1.97E-03 2.07E-02 18 Cable Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 2.46E-03 1.53E-04 1.25E-03 7.68E-03 19 20 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Cable Fire Frequency-Power-Prior Cable Fire Frequency-Power Control Room Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior Control Room Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior Control Room Fire Frequency-Power-Prior Control Room Fire Frequency-Power Containment -Other Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior Containment -Other Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior Containment -Other Fire Frequency-Power-Prior Containment-Other Fire Frequency-Power Containment -RCP Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior 14.8 14.8 14.8 9.22E-03 9.80E-04 7.02E-03 9.52E-04 3.04E-03 1.02E-04 2.07E-03 5.82E-05 6.03E-03 5.82E-04 5.12E-03 5.40E-04 8.02E-03 1.19E-03 7.23E-03 1.23E-03 1.84E-02 4.69E-03 1.58E-02 4.47E-03 8.03E-03 1.17E-03 4.78E-03 2.64E-02 4.27E-03 2.11E-02 1.21E-03 1.20E-02 7.96E-04 8.06E-03 3.49E-03 2.05E-02 3.34E-03 1.61E-02 5.17E-03 2.27E-02 4.97E-03 1.91E-02 1.44E-02 4.33E-02 1.30E-02 3.53E-02 5.07E-03 2.31E-02 pA1686%ge-C.docjoc C-65 Table C-4 C C p t/L t'd F'F q Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment(Continued) No.Description 30 Containment -RCP Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 31 Containment -RCP Fire Frequency-Power-Prior 32 Containment -RCP Fire Frequency-Power 33 Diesel Generator Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior 34 Diesel Generator Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 35 Diesel Generator Fire Frequency-Power-Prior 36 Diesel Generator Fire Frequency-Power 37 HVAC/Chiller Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior 38 HVAC/Chiller Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 39 HVAC/Chiller Fire Frequency-Power-Prior 40 HVAC/Chiller Fire Frequency-Power 41.HVAC/Fans Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior 42 HVAC/Fans Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 43 HVAC/Fans Fire Frequency-Power-Prior 44 HVAC/Fans Fire Frequency-Power 45 Low Power Cabinet Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior No.of Events Power-Years 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 Mean 8.06E-03 1.95E-02 1.63E-02 3.50E-02 1.11E-02 5.05E-02 3.19E-02 2.55E-03 4.63E-04 3.21E-03 3.04E-03 1.77E-03 4.63E-04 2.42E-03 2.31E-03 2.43E-02 Posterior 5th%ile Median 1.19E-03 5.17E-03 8.17E-03 3.49E-02 6.58E-03 2.43E-02 1.1 9E-04 1.36E-03 1.23E-05 1.48E-04 2.65E-04 1.69E-03 2.59E-04 1.64E-03 5.41E-05 7.38E-04 1.23E-05 1.48E-04 1.92E-04 1.43E-03 1.85E-04 1.38E-03 7.40E-04 1.10E-02 4.88E-03 1.47E-02 4.71E-03 1.33E-02 2.06E-03 1.94E-02 1.09E-03 5.89E-03 95th%ile 2.28E-02 4.80E-02 3.70E-02 1.39E-01 3.73E-02 1.60E-01 8.28E-02 9.45E-03 1.77E-03 1.22E-02 1.19E-02 7.18E-03 1.77E-03 8.27E-03 7.78E-03 1.06E-01 PA1686%o<~octoc C-66 C.Coinponent/Location Based Fire 1g~Frer/nency Table C-4 Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment (Continued) No.Description No.of Events Power-Years Mean 5th%ile Median Posterior 95th%ile 46 Low Power Cabinet Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 47 Low Power Cabinet Fire Frequency-Power-Prior 48 Low Power Cabinet Fire Frequency-Power 49 MCC Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior 50 MCC Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 51 MCC Fire Frequency-Power-Prior 52 MCC Fire Frequency-Power 53 Motor Generator Set Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior 54 Motor Generator Set Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 55 Motor Generator Set Fire Frequency-Power-Prior 56 Motor Generator Set Fire Frequency-Power 57 Screen House Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior 58 Screen House Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 59 Screen House Fite Frequency-Power-Prior 60 Screen House Fire Frequency-Power 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 5.52E-03 3.22E-02 1.13E-01 8.36E-03 2.81E-03 1.21E-02 4.78E-02 2.75E-03 4.45E-04 3.38E-03 8.60E-03 6.75E-03 1.86E-03 9.38E-03 7.66E-03 1.57E-04 2.60E-03 3.04E-02 2.29E-04 1.42E-04 1.16E-03 7.10E-03 1.19E-04 1.25E-05 2.61E-04 9.14E-04 3.78E-04 1.40E-04 1.19E-03 1.14E-03 1.80E-03 2.1 3E-02 1.29E-03 1.24E-02 1.35E-04 1.72E-03 1.62E-03 1.21E-02 5.82E-03 2.31E-02 3.16E-03 2.34E-02 9.93E-04 5.99E-03 5.58E-03 2.82E-02 5.11E-03 2.24E-02 1.73E-02 1.04E-01 9.28E-02 1.94E-01 3.08E-03 2.59E-02 1.34E-03 1.01E-02 6.24E-03 3.95E-02 3.57E-02 1.28E-01 pA1666%ge-C.docloc C-67 C.Component/Location Based Fire Ig Freqnenag Table CP Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment (Continued) No.61 62 63 64 65 67 68 69 70 72 Description Switchgear -Above 480v Fire Frequency-Anytime I-Pnor Switchgear -Above 480v Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior Switchgear -Above 480v Fire Frequency-Power-Prior Switchgear -Above 480v Fire Frequency-Power Switchgear -480v 8 Below Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior Switchgear -480v 8 Below Fire Frequency-Power Only-Switchgear -480v 8 Below Fire Frequency-Power-Prior Switchgear -480v 8 Below Fire Frequency-Power Turbine Bldg-Other Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior Turbine Bldg-Other Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior Turbine Bldg-Other Fire Frequency-Power-Prior Turbine Bldg-Other Fire Frequency-Power No.of Events Power-Years 14.8 14.8 14.8 Mean 1.38E-02 3.11E-03 1.79E-02 1.17E-02 1.21E-02 3.24E-03 1.68E-02 2.66E-02 7.88E-03 1.16E-02 2.47E-02 1.45E-01 Posterior 5th%ile Median 4.84E-04 4.92E-03 1.42E-04 1.41E-03 1.69E-03 8.76E-03 1.57E-03 7.76E-03 2.48E-04 3.41E-03 1.40E-04 1.43E-03 1.33E-03 7.70E-03 7.30E-04 6.53E-03 3.47E-03 1.61E-02 6.05E-02 1.50E-01 3.49E-03 1.69E-02 3.76E-04 3.19E-03 95th%ile 4.85E-02 1.23E-02 5.71E-02 3.51E-02 4.41E-02 1.29E-02 5.52E-02 7.86E-02 3.05E-02 3.83E-02 7.81E-02 2.19E-01 P 31686%9+Žoetoc C-68 e C.Co>uponenf/Location Baserl Fire Eg Table C-4 Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment (Continued) reguenny No.Description No.of Events Power-Years Mean 5th%ile Median Posterior 95th%ile 73 Turbine Bldg-Turbine/Generator Fire Frequency-I Anytime-Prior 3.68E-03 5.06E-04 2.10E-03 1.16E-02 74 Turbine Bldg-Turbine/Generator Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 2.08E-02 1.90E-03 1.35E-02 6.70E-02 75 Turbine Bldg-Turbine/Generator Fire Frequency-Power-Prior 76 Turbine Bldg-Turbine/Generator Fire Frequency-Power 77 Transformer-Hi Voltage Fire Frequency-Anytime-Prior 78 Transformer -Hi Voltage Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 79 Transformer -Hi Voltage Fire Frequency-Power-Prior 80 Transformer-Hi Voltage Fire Frequency-Power 81 Transformer -Instrument Fire Frequency-Anytime-Pnor 82 Transformer -Instrument Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior 83 Transformer -Instrument Fire Frequency-Power-Prior 84 Transformer -Instrument Fire Frequency-Power 14.8 14.8 14.8 3.31E-02 5.24E-03 2.35E-02 4.49E-03 1.83E-02 1.67E-03 3.04E-03 3.85E-04 2.26E-02 4.10E-03 2.98E-02 6.87E-03 6.12E-03 3.01E-04 3.03E-03 3.86E-04 1.05E-02 1.56E-03 8.04E-03 1.49E-03 2.25E-02 9.31E-02 1.87E-02 5.96E-02 1.28E-02 5.34E-02 1.64E-03 9.21E-03 1.62E-02 5.93E-02 2.27E-02 7.67E-02 2.05E-03 2.04E-02 1.64E-03 9.06E-03 5.77E-03 2.99E-02 5.43E-03 2.33E-02 P:51686Nge-c.docfoc C-69 0 Table C-4 C.Con3ponent/Location Based Fire Ig Freqnency Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment (Continued) No.Description No.of Events Power-Years Mean 5th%ile Median Posterior 95th%ile 85 86 87 88 Transformer -Lo Voltage Fire Frequency-Anytime-Pnor Transformer-Lo Voltage Fire Frequency-Power Only-Prior Transformer -Lo Voltage Fire Frequency-Power-Prior Transformer -Lo Voltage Fire Frequency-Power 14.8 4.33E-03 3.57E-04 3.04E-03 3.85E-04 8.60E-03 1.66E-03 7.29E-03 1.60E-03 2.00E-03 1.54E-02 1.64E-03 9.21E-03 5.53E-03 2.32E-02 5.1 5E-03 2.03E-02 C-70 3 J D.Fire Freqnennf Apporlionnient D.Pire Prequency Apportionment Location-based scenarios developed for a fire zone in the spatial interactions analysis phase of the analysis describe all possible fire events that can occur in the fire zone and conservatively assume that each fire event can damage all components within the fire zone..Thus, all fire initiators within a fire zone must be accounted for.Since more than one component type that can initiate a fire may be found in a fire zone, the fire initiation for a fire zone must account for the composite nature of the fire hazards.The primary fire initiation frequency for each fire zone was then assumed to be the sum of the component-based ignition frequency of the components found in the fire zone, except for'hose locations whose total fire frequencies are determined through data analysis.D.1 Frequency Apportionment of a Category of Components The component-based fire frequencies obtained for the fire occurrence frequency of each component category must be apportioned to different plant locations to correctly reflect the variety of the component categories and the actual inventory of the components, in situ fuel sources, and the personnel activities at the fire zone.The primary objective of the fire frequency apportionment was to develop a reasonable estimate for the hazard frequency that consistently accounts for the actual configuration of equipment in each location.For example, the plant-specific mean fire occurrence frequency for the component category"battery-related fires" is assessed to be 1.92E-03 per year.This frequency stands for the estimated fire frequency from all battery-contributed fire events throughout the entire unit.To utilize this frequency, it must be systematically apportioned to different plant areas that contain batteries. [Note that the term"battery" is referred to banks of battery cells similar to those commonly found in a battery room.Fires related to small-sized backup batteries frequently found in control cabinets (e.g., control cabinet fires)are included as cabinet-related fire events instead of battery-related fire events.]One method is to count all batteries in the plant and to apportion the fire frequency of battery component category to these areas proportionally. Another method is to assign a relative weighing factor to locations with battery banks.A weighing factor would be developed for each component type in each plant location of interest.The factor, which is based on inventory count, observations of the plant walkdown team, and the judgment of the plant personnel and analysts, is the relative fraction of the quantity of a particular component type in a location to the total quantity of such components found in the plant.The LCTs (Appendix B)present a cross-reference table between the fire zories and the population of the fire initiating components in the plant.For the countable equipment (e.g., pump), the entries would be the component count of the equipment type.For human error-related events, the entries are an activity level assigned through observations during walkdowns. For cable-related events, the entries are the estimated weighting factor of cable occupancy. P:51686Nge-o.doc/oc D-1 D.Fire Freqnenng Apportion>nent D.2 Development of Frequencies for Locations with Multiple Hazard Sources ln some locations, it is necessary to combine data for various types of hazards to develop the best possible frequency estimate for a particular scenario.These cases often apply to locations that contain combinations of mechanical equipment, electrical equipment, control cabinets, cables, etc.These combinations may result from a specific design feature of the plant that is being evaluated, or they may be a byproduct of the manner in which the fire frequencies have been defined.For example (not Ginna), an air compressor may be located in an open corner of a large cable spreading room.The air compressor may not be important for the PSA models.The estimated frequency for fire events in this location must account for the composite nature of the fire hazards, that is cables as well as the compressor. It is unreasonable to develop a fire occurrence frequency that is based only on"cable spreading room" fire events, even though the PSA impacts are derived only from failures of the cables.These situations are addressed by developing a composite hazard frequency that accounts for the types of equipment and the relative density of equipment in each location.For example, a composite fire frequency would be developed for the cable spreading room by adding a fraction of the"turbine building air compressor" fire event frequency data to the"cable spreading room" fire event frequency data.The fractions are often based on general observations from the plant walkdown and the personal experience and judgment of the fire analysis experts.In the specific case of Ginna, an equipment location database is also available. D.3 Allocation of Pire Event Categories to Ginna Plant Locations This step of the spatial interactions analysis allocates the 22 fire event categories among the 47 Ginna plant locations (generic information was used for the diesel/generator fuel tank area in the yard).These allocations are derived from notes and information collected during the plant walkdowns, the cable routing database (Reference D.l)and the fire response plan drawings (Reference D.2).In some cases, the assigned percentages are very approximate. However, they provide a method to consistently allocate the fire event frequency data among the plant locations in a manner that accounts for the types, quantities, and distribution of equipment among these areas.Three general considerations were used as the bases for these allocations. Specific types of equipment in the location Relative amount of each equipment type, compared with all other locations Relative size of the location, compared with all other similar locations The third consideration was used primarily for large, open areas in the Containment, Auxiliary Building, and Turbine Building.The following simple example illustrates the basic elements of this allocation process.Suppose that Plant X contains only three locations. The spatial interactions walkdown has documented the following equipment inventories in each location.P:$1686Nge-o.doc/oc .D-2 D.Fire Frertuenaf A pportionnient Location 1: Location 2: 2 pumps, 1 motor control center, 25%of the cables.two 480V buses, 4 motor control centers, 45%of the cables.Location 3: 3 pumps, 30%of the cables.Thus, Plant X contains a total of 5 pumps, 5 motor control centers, two 480V buses, and cables.The percentage of cables in each location is gener'ally based on the walkdown analyst's notes and approximate estimates.(For the Ginna Station, the amount of cable in the fire zones was available from Reference D.3).The following table summarizes how this information is used to allocate the relevant fire event categories among these locations. Event Category for Plant X Auxiliary Building-Other Switchgear -480V and Below Motor Control Center Cable Location 1 0.40 0.20 0.25 Location 2 1.00 0.80 0.45 Location 3 0.60 0.30 Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 In this example, the Auxiliary Building-Other allocations are based only on the total inventory of similarly sized pumps in each location.However, the analyst may subjectively adjust these percentages if Location 1 also contains a storage area, if Location 2 has substantially higher personnel traffic, etc.Based on these allocations, the total fire frequency for Location 1 is the sum of 40%of the Auxiliary Building-Other fire frequency, plus 20%of the Motor Control Center fire frequency, plus 25%of the Cable fire frequency. This process accounts for the specific types and quantities of equipment in each location.The resulting composite fire frequencies are appropriately weighted combinations that account for the plant-specific distribution of equipment and numerical differences in the fire event frequencies for each type of equipment. To arrive at a finalized count of equipment at any location, the total equipment at the plant was apportioned amongst the locations. Exercises similar to the above were conducted for the mechanical equipment, MCCs, and logic cabinets.As far as possible, References D.1 and D.2 were used to determine the components in the fire zones and supplemented by the walkdown observations. Larger components were given a twice the weight of the smaller components. The fractions used and the basis for the fractions (equipment coupt)for each fire zone and each type of equipment is shown in4he Table D-1.In addition to the actual equipment and material count, adjustment is made for fires caused by human errors.For example, the H~storage room and the turbine oil storage rooms have no mechanical equipment, no MCCs or cables.However, they do contain combustible material that may ignite due to human error.To account for these types of events, we consult the generic fire database.The auxiliary building fires in the generic database total 16 out of which, 5 were caused due to human error.Therefore, 5/16ths of P:41686iRge-o.docloc D-3 D.Fire Freeze>i'pportionn>eut the fire total frequency in the auxiliary building was assigned as human error related fires.This frequency was again apportioned among the fire zones in the auxiliary building.The bases for these fractions, once again, depend on the observations during plant walkdown, noticing activity levels in different locations of the building.Added to this is the analyst's judgment about how much other activity is involved during normal plant operation with actions such as maintenance and testing of equipment. The fire frequencies for each of the 47 Ginna locations were developed using the described apportioning techniques. The final fire frequency for each location is shown in Table D-2 0.4 References 1.Ginna Station Cable Routing Database, Microsoft Access Database, CABLETRK.MDB, June 1998.2.Ginna Station Fire Response Drawings, Nos.33013-2540 through 33013-2581. 3.Ginna Station Fire Combustible Loading Analysis, DA-ME-98-004, Revision 0, April 3, 1998.PA16861Rge.o.docloc D-4 CR tee tkokert Rrtosekekr Taoto 0 I Fln tr INRC ASCIICIGDRtOrttnttrRRRSCIGOn vknrt OA4sg Ra4 Wa ale Sneerl Hwae elk I tnrsr oak 4$ueu Seruloru Seetrtoear SIN llelut Gerwrsur Ssl HVAC tees HCAC Ctelen tnesledeel tooh tnaaiernn 14141 1 Orot~ON 1 145 I I Nat 10 r05.1 I I CNG 12 Sar I I ld~la SO INS~5$4 lwt II, 54.2 I I arlR ll ORIA I 4414 20 IRNCV I ORRN CR O'I tl 1 IAI (OGIOO COGI0~COGINR 21 RC I RC.S RGS lt Rll 5N 4~1 15C lu~I ISC IN~$15C IS nz n nke IK I OS ed IO~I AVI 011 021 00$0 2 00 001 002 01 doe 001 0 or 052~0 ed 0421 0 DIS 001$0 41I 0 011 0 0 la 0'I~0 011 001~0 Cdl 0 011 0 ddt 4 111 ODIS 0011 0 ODO 0 012 Odlt 0 III 001$0 CKR 0 I OS 001O DNO OI DOS 011 011 011 0 ca dCO an 001 004 001 002 002 0CI ddt~00 011 012 0C4 001 0 01 0 Io 001 001 001 0 01 001 011 I CO 0lt 0 11 02$02$02$~00 011 Se$22 CSD lollsl 24~I tie$CO 24S$11 101 SSIII2~'ll~tll$2 1st I$2 nt'I 11211 2 I~21 e Ill Iso 242e.1$$20~I 1 I SSD~\t 1 Sld, I I$10,11~CO III,S 5 11 Itd~IS It 2DS Cdl llt 4522e 24 452 4$0 2454IIIS 10 000 2244t ll Sl\el\re Salle ll~~2$Srn 11'I et$54522 22 I le sdt 14 eaa 2INOSI 200 140 alt IN 11$2t seo 25$Std~11 I,SIO~I I~I.$$2 11~00~00 I ODD 100~CO 10 I CO~00 100 I 00~CO Siss ln~ekaor wk det cask tt~5 Ca Itw Intwerl Arrwesnnnn Tohto 0.2 Fro oe Attocctton Ior Gtnn4 477 tha540 Rsd.fho Z<<w Watts s<<477 rtrnu Sj CharSelt twrner Scott Calle tl ate Censrator Susen Hevse o<<e 4 Prohctton Cattnats Swhchceu 1405 Swhchce u Low Hot<<t Garwrltor Sa HVAC fans HVAC Chiotrs Trlnst<<soot Trsnstorwer Truntonaor tnatneoeln Tusl 10~I ON I 5 tof 4XI I SI f41 I ltf4$I 415 2 lef42 I SIE4$I 2CE42 5 tsf 42 I SIE4$I$754$~COE4$$2Sf41 0IE44 14 444 ref 4$5 SCE44 21E44 ll 4l S 1$54O~17240 I COE4Q 21$E42 I 41E41 14 44 I 04544 0 asf 44 I SOE44 I~44 I SOE44 I SCE44 2$4544 0 47540 I tnfcO 4.72542~.ISE41 5$15451 IOE4$5 Stf co l 24 CSCf471 224 4$0lt 41~.IIE4$22424$224241 22454S'l.l I E42 4 4754O 4 4754O 0 COE4$2$154$5 5IE4$0 4024O I 4 45 IC 4$242 44 I 2254$004&0$1254$2 SCE42 I Ilf 42 02 4$~I 4$~I 41 SS SIS SS IVII sn\tt SlIE4l 5 44544 I 0424O 0 40544 4 2tfnO 0 4OE44~2754$04ECO 5 44$4\E4$2 4154$141~07 44 01 I 0154$I Cn 2 Ct 2$EOOIA I ll E OSIS I I 2CE42 4~754$2 SIE4O 2 IOE4$$1 4$$$E4$5~~7$4O 5 Sn I s Irn as ISC Iu ISC IN~1 I SC~40 IV 04CE44 427 4$0$CE41 I$5547 2 5IE42 4 227 4$2$1 E4O 227 4$~54 los 4$I 44E4$I 042 44 2 OOE4XI l.224E4O I CCE4O 2 HAS 2 SSE4$2 SIE4$~I 542 4 4754$0~IEXO S$754$I 01544 al 4a 2 41544 5$7E4$107 44 I 41242~~IIE42 2~lolf41 2 0154O Sll 41$2754$Sl 5154$2 240 2 42 2 2CE44~SIE42~OE42 total 274542 I olWO I 21E42$11242 I OINK 2@%42 I 45541 I COE41~14E4Xt 1.1 I I 17542 2 0 4$2$1f41$1 I 07542 0~~oasntnea oat new D.Fire Freqnenag Apportionntcnt Notes: 1.Rad waste equally distributed over the three floors of the aux building 2.3 out of 16 events in aux building-other category (generic database)involve charging pumps 3.5 out of 16 events in aux building-other category (generic database)involve human error initiated fires.4.Mechanical equipment count of the three levels in the aux building, intermediate building, service building, and standby aux feedwater pump room (except fans)ABB 5 small and 11 large pumps or other components ABM 2 small compressors ABO 7 small and 2 large pumps or other components IBN-1 5 small and 3 large pumps or other components IBN-2 no mechanical components IBN-3 no mechanical components IBN-4 no mechanical components IBS-1 1 small pump IBS-2 no mechanical components I BS-3 no mechanical components SAF 2 large pumps I 5.2.5 of the 8 events in the turbine building-other (generic database)involve human error initiated fires.Mechanical equipment (except fans)count and human error is assigned as follows: H2 no mechanical equipment, 5%of human error frequency TO no mechanical equipment, 5%of human error frequency TB-1FP 1 small and 2 large pumps and 10%of human error frequency':51686ERge D.docloc D-7 D.Fire Freqnenng A pportion~nent TB-1 14 small and 10 large pumps and 40%of human error frequency TB-2 9 small pumps and 20%of human error frequency TB-3 no mechanical equipment, 20%of human error frequency 7.A count of the HVAC fans (total 87)is as follows: ABB-1 ABM-2 ABO-3 AHR AVT 7 CR 1 EDG1A-1 2 EDG1B-1 2 IBN-1 1 IBN-2 IBM-3 IBS-1 IBS-3 RC-1 RC-2 RR SB-1 SB-1WT 1 SB-2 6 SH-2 I TB-1 6 TB-1FP 1 P:$1686>Rge-o.dooloc D-8 D.Fire Frertnenag Apportionment TB-2 TSC-1M TSC-1N 8.A count of the low power cabinets (total 116)is as follows: ABB-1 ABM-2 ABO-3 AHR BR1A BR1B BRRM IBN-1 IBN-2 IBS-1 IBS-2 RR 10 68 SAF SH-2 SH-1 P:51686'Ago-o.docloc D 9 Response to Fire IPEEE Questions ATTACHMENT B.3 EXTRACTS FROM SECTION 9.6 (INTERNAL FIRE RESULTS)AND 11.6 (

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSION)

OF THE GINNA PSA r.ocAYrON Cm,IU nmarSxrCS vox,E FIRE AREA:Phl6265RCE B L.DOC/oc 8-406 9/22IN l2:22;S2 Phl GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 9-1 9.0 9.6 LEVEL 1 RESULTS Internal Fire Results Similar to the internal events PSA, the internal fire results were assessed with respect to sensitivities and importance measures.The results are summarized below.9.6.1 Internal Fire Results The total core damage frequency (CDF)due to internal fire is 3.3E-5/yr.

The listing of the top 50 (and ties)of the final cutsets is shown in Table 9-14 (note-these account for 43%of the CDF due to internal fire).A summary of the fire scenarios contributing at least 5.0%to the fire CDF is provided below.9.6.1.1 Control Room Fires Among the final cut sets, the largest contribution to the fire CDF (19.8%)comes from ignition of a fire in the Control Room's main control board and any two electrical cabinets that subsequently requires Control Room evacuation due to a significant loss of instrumentation and control (FIOCR3-1 and FACR-MCB).

Thirty-five cabinets are installed in the Control Room in addition to the main control board cabinets.The total ignition frequency for a fire in the Control Room of 5.1E-3/yr (Ref.164)was apportioned such that I/50~of the frequency was assigned for the ignition of any one cabinet and 15/50~'f the frequency was assigned for the ignition of the main control board cabinets, based on the relative sizes of each.The ignition frequency is therefore (15/50+2/50)*(5.1E-3/yr)

=1.7E-3/yr.

This is considered to be a transient which does not result in conditions for Safety Injection (SI)(AAAATRAN SIN), nor does it cause a station blackout (NOSBO).Since there is no automatic suppression in the Control Room (FSAASUPPXX), only manual suppression by the Fire Brigade is possible.This is assumed to fail with a probability'f 0.03 (FSHFDCR-3-X).

Each of the dominant cut sets leading to core damage includesone of the following:

Non-fire-induced failure of the Technical Support Center (TSC)Diesel Generator (DG)to start or run (DGDGATSCXX or DGDGFTSCXX);

Unavailability of the turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW)Pump due to: (1)its train being out for test and maintenance (AFTMOTDAFW), (2)failure to correctly restore its train to service after test and maintenance (AFHFLTDAFW), or (3)non-fire-induced failures of its components (AFMMOTDAF W);Spurious opening of SG A Blowdown Isolation AOV 5738 due to hot shorting of its control cable (MSHSF05738) while the TDAFW train injection line to SG B is out of service for test and maintenance (AFTMTDAFWB);

Any of the following fire-induced human errors: Failure to locally open discharge MOV 3996 from and steam supply MOV 3505A to the TDAFW Pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (FSHFDAFWXX);

Failure to align TSC DC power supply to Battery B for the TDAFW pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (FSHFDDCPWR);

Failure to locally operate PORV 430, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (FSHFDPORVS);

S GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION I PAGE 9-2 Failure to employ alternate AFW/Steam Generator (SG)instrumentation aAer Control Room indication has been lost (FSHFDCROM2);

Failure to find alternative cooldown paths (specifically the TDAFW steam lines)(FSHFDREC03), aAer non-fire-induced failure of nitrogen bottles to supply SG A Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV)3411 (MSMMN2BOTA).

9.6.1.2 Turbine Building Fires The next largest contribution among the final cut sets to the fire CDF (14.7%)arises from ignition of fires in the Turbine Building, at specific locations on the Mezzanine and Basement Levels.These are discussed below.The larger contribution (9.6%)from fires in the Turbine Building arises from ignition of a fire in Bus Cabinet 11A/12A or 11B/12B at the Mezzanine Level (FIOTB2-1 and FATB-2-2).

The total ignition frequency for these cabinets is 1.2E-2/yr (Ref.164).There is no automatic suppression, and manual suppression, even if successful, was assumed not to extinguish the fire within the affected cabinet in time to prevent accident progression (FSAASUPPOK).

This is followed by a loss of AC Train A (ACTRAINA) as a direct result of the fire.These particular events lead to two sets of scenarios characterized by: (1)a transient without station blackout (NOSBO), but with a small LOCA (SLO);and (2)a transient with station blackout (SBO).Each set is discussed below.Transients without Station Blackout, but with a Small LOCA.In these scenarios, a small LOCA occurs after the loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)(as supplied by AC Buses 11 and 12)when PORV 430 fails to reseat after steam relief(RCRZT00430) and its motor-operated block valve (516)has no AC power.The dominant cut sets leading to core damage include coincident events among the following:

Unavailability of RHR train B due to its being out of service for test or maintenance (RHTMOOOOOB);

Non-fire-induced failure to open of MOV 738B to supply Component Cooling Water (CCW)to Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Heat Exchanger (HX)B (CCMM00738 8);Human mispositioning of CCW throttling isolation valve 780B on the outlet side of RHR.HX B (CCHFL0780B).

Transients with Station Blackout.In this scenario, the loss of all offsite power following the reactor trip (ACLOPRTALL) causes loss of AC Train B (ACTRAINB) when the fire forces an interlocked feeder breaker to Bus 16 to fail to open, thereby preventing DG B from connecting to Bus 16.With the assumed unavailability of the TDAFW train due to its being out for test and maintenance (AFTMOTDAFW), core damage results.

GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 9-3 The smaller contribution (5.1%)from fires in the Turbine Building arises from ignition of a fire in the vicinity of the power supply cables to AC Buses 14, 16, 17, or 18 at the Basement Level (FIOTB1-1 and FATB-1-1).

The total ignition frequency for combustibles in this location is 1.4E-3/yr (Ref.164).This is considered to be a transient initiating event which does not result in conditions for SI (AAAATRANSIN), but involves a station blackout (SBO).Non-fire-induced failure of DG A to run (DGDGF0001A) occurs.(As above, the fire itself forces an interlocked feeder breaker to Bus 16 to fail to open, which prevents DG B from connecting to Bus 16.)Although automatic suppression is available(Suppression Systems S24 through S27), the one in the immediate vicinity of the fire is assumed to fail (FSAASUPPXX).

This is assumed to fail power cables to the affected AC bus from DG B.Each of the dominant cut sets leading to core damage includes failure of one of the following automatic sprinkler systems, specifically the one in the immediate vicinity of the fire: 1.Spray S24 (Turbine Condenser Pit vicinity)(FSXXXTR768);

2.Spray S25 (Generator Hydrogen Seal vicinity)(FSXXXTR769);

3.Spray S26 (Turbine Island vicinity)(FSXXXTR770);

4.Spray S27 (Main Turbine Oil Reservoir vicinity)(FSXXXTR771).

9.6.1.3 Battery Room Fires The next largest contribution among the final cut sets to the fire CDF (11.8%)arises from ignition of fires in Battery Rooms A and B (FIBR1A-3 and FABR1A;FIBRIB-3 and FIBR1B).Each room contains batteries, battery chargers, inverters, cables, and transformers.

The total ignition frequency for each room is 6.9E-3/yr (Ref.164), assuming fire can occur in any one of these combustibles.

Since there is no automatic suppression in the Battery Rooms (FSAASUPPXX), only manual suppression by the Fire Brigade is possible.This is assumed to fail with a probability of 0.03 (FSHFDBR1A3 and FSHFDBR1B3).

It is further assumed that the fire has spread beyond its initial source (probability

=0.1)prior to suppression (FSASPROP01).

Each Battery Room is discussed separately below.Battery Room A.Fire in this room, which contributes 6.8%to the fire CDF, is considered to be a transient which does not result in conditions for Sl (AAAATRANSIN), nor does it cause a station blackout (NOSBO).Each of the dominant cut sets leading to core damage includes one of the following:

Non-fire-induced failure of the TSC DG to start or run (DGDGATSCXX or DGDGFTSCXX);

Unavailability of the TDAFW Pump due to: (1)its train being out for test and maintenance (AFTMOTDAFW), or (2)non-fire-induced failures of its components (AFMMOTDAFW);

Human failure to align TSC DC power supply to Battery B for the TDAFW pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (FSHFDDCPWR).

GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION I PAGE 9-4 b.Salary Room B.Fire in this room, which contributes 5.0%to the fire CDF, is considered to be a transient which induces a station blackout (SBO).The fire itself fails AC Train B.Each of the dominant cut sets leading to core damage includes one of the following which prevents AC Train A from being powered: l.2.Unavailability of DG A due to test or maintenance (DGTM00001A);

Loss of AC Motor Control Center (MCC)H when feeder circuit breaker 52/MCCH transfers open due to a cable wrap failure (ACWPFMCC1H) that occurs once the fire duration reaches one hour (FSAAFIREIH);

Loss of AC MCC H when disconnect switch,DCPDPCB03A/03 transfers open due to a cable wrap failure (DCWPFC3ACX) that occurs once the fire duration reaches one hour (FSAAFIRE I H).9.6.2 Internal Fire Sensitivity AnalysisAs described in Section 9.3.1, sensitivity analyses were performed for eight types of basic events within the internal events PSA models (i.e., human errors, test and maintenance, common cause failures, initiating events, MOVs, AOVs, DGs, and pumps).Since the fire analysis used the same fault tree models and event trees as the internal events PSA, only the new basic events need to be assessed.Also, every cut set contains a similar fire initiating event(vs.the internal events PSA which addressed LOCAs, steam line breaks, reactor trips).As such, no sensitivity was performed on the fire initiators.

Therefore, of the eight basic event types, only human errors were considered.

However, another category, hot-short-induced failures, was also addressed.

Both are discussed below.9.6.2.1 Human Errors Two sensitivity studies were performed with respect to human errors.First, all human errors were set to"false" (i.e., all were assumed to be performed successfully).

As a result, the fire CDF decreased by 69%to a value of 1.0E-S/yr, indicating a large sensitivity of the accident sequences to human reliability failure rates.The decreases in the contributions from the dominant scenarios were as follows.For the dominant Control Room fires (FIOCR3-1 and FACR-MCB), the contribution to fire CDF dropped by 99.2%.This indicates that these Control Room fire scenarios essentially are totally dependent on successful human intervention.

This is evident from the description in Section 9.6.1.1.Nearly all Control Room fire scenarios are conditional upon failure of manual suppression (FSHFDCR-3-X).

For the dominant Turbine Building fires (FIOTB2-1 and FATB-2-2;FIOTB1-1 and FATH-1-1), the contribution to fire CDF dropped by 30.5%.Therefore, the dependence of these Turbine Building fire scenarios upon successful human intervention was much less pronounced that those for the Control Room, as one might expect.For the Turbine Building Mezzanine fires, recall from Section 9.6.1.2 that manual suppression, even if successful, was assumed not to extinguish the fire in time to prevent accident progression (FSAASUPPOK).

For the Turbine Building Basement fires, only automatic suppression was available, and this was assumed to fail (FSAASUPPXX).

GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 9-5 For the dominant Battery Room fires (FIBR1A-3 and FABR1A;FIBR1B-3 and FIBR1B), the contribution to fire CDF dropped by 87.2%, nearly as much as for the Control Room.As for the Control Room, most Battery Room fire scenarios (see Section 9.6.1.3)are conditional upon failure of manual suppression (FSHFDBRIA3 and FSHFDBR1B3) since no automatic suppression exists.The second sensitivity study on human errors involved setting all human errors to"true," equivalent to assuming that humans always erred.The fire CDF increased by a factor of 1.48E+4 to a value of 0.494/year as a result.This indicates that successful human intervention is very important to prevent core damage from fires and that humans are considered to be highly reliable in performing the required actions.9.6.2.2 Hot-Short-Induced FailuresThe sensitivity of the fire CDF to spurious energization/de-energization of control and power cables due to hot shorting was also assessed in a manner similar to that for human errors.When all hot short failures were set to"false" (i.e., assuming no hot shorts occurred), the fire CDF decreased by only 6.0%to a value of 3.15E-5/yr.

The effect on the dominant accident scenarios was similarly small.This indicates that hot-short-induced failures are a small contributor to the fire CDF.A review of Section 9.6.1 indicates only one contribution among the dominant scenarios, that arising from MSHSF05738 for the Control Room fires.When all hot short failures were set to"true," equivalent to assuming that they always occurred, the fire CDF increased by 61%to a value of 5.41E-S/yr.

This relatively modest increase indicates, again, that hot shorts are a small contributor to the fire CDF, but that their conditional probability of occurrence (many assumed to be 0.1)is already fairly high.9.6.2.3 Internal Fire Truncation Limit Evaluation As a final sensitivity study, the truncation limit was evaluated with respect to its impact on the final results.This was performed by generating Figure 9-14 which shows the contribution of the cut sets in each"decade" (e.g., 1E-6/yr, 1E-7/yr, etc.)to the final fire CDF.Figure 9-14 indicates that the CDF contained in each decade initially rises, peaking at 1.11E-5/yr in the third decade (1E-7/yr to 1E-8/yr), then decreases rapidly over the last two decades.The cut sets whose frequencies are>1E-9/yr contribute over 93%to the final CDF.Also, as noted on the figure, over 76%of the total number of cut sets have frequencies in the last decade (1E-9/yr to 1E-10/yr);

however, these contribute less than 7%to the final CDF.Consequently, further reduction of the truncation limit should not significantly impact the CDF estimation.

9.6.3 Importance Analysis As described in Section 9.3.2, two types of importance measures were generated for most basic events contained in the final cutsets: (1)Fussell-Vesely (F-V), and (2)Risk Achievement Worth (RAW).These importance measures were combined as follows: a.If the F-V value is z 0.05 at the system level (z 0.005 at the component level)and the RAW a 10 at the system level (a 2 at the component level), then the system or component will be identified as being"high" risk significant.

GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 9-6 b.If the F-V value is z 0.05 at the system level (z 0.005 at the component level)or the RAW a 10 at the system level (a 2 at the component level), then the system or component will be identified as being"medium" risk significant.

c.If the F-V value is<0.05 at the system level (<0.005 at the component level)and the RAW<10 at the system level (<2 at the component level), then the system or component will be identified as being"low" risk significant.

The F-V and RAW importance measures were generated for fire initiating events, human errors, test and maintenance activities, fire modeling assumptions, and on a system and component basis.Each of these is described below in detail.Included within these discussions is a reference to a table and figure containing the specific F-V and RAW values.The table is self-explanatory; however, additional information with respect to the figure is necessary to ensure correct interpretation.

In order to provide a visual depiction of the risk profile associated with various events modeled within the Ginna Station PSA, the F-V and RAW importance measures were plotted against one another.In this manner, it can be easily identified which events are ofhigher risk than others.For example, all human error F-V and RAW values plotted are on Figure 9-16.A"cross-hair" was provided on the figure for F-V values equal to 0.005 (vertical line)and RAW values equal to 2 (horizontal line).Any event to the left of the F-V.line or below the RAW line is not risk significant with respect to that specific importance measure.However, an event to the left of the F-V line but above the RAW line is risk significant with respect to RAW only.Similarly, an event to the~ri ht of the F-V line but below the RAW line is risk significant with respect to F-V only (e.g., FSHFDREC03).

Events which are to the right of the F-V line and above the RAW line are risk significant with respect to both importance measures (e.g., FSHFDDCPWR).

In summary, an event in the upper left hand corner or lower right hand corner is of medium risk significance.

An event in the upper right hand corner is of high risk significance while events in the lower left hand corner are of low risk significance.

Further insights can also be obtained by which"corner" a given event is in as described below: An event in the upper left hand corner is generally of high reliability; consequently, the event did not contribute significantly to the final CDF.However, if the component were to fail, the impact on the final CDF would be significant.

Typically, this corner contains passive components, highly redundant systems, or events which are easily performed by operators.

An event in the lower right hand corner is typically of lower reliability than is justified by the fault tree model.That is, the event contributes to the final CDF;however, if the event were assumed to always fail, it is not expected to further affect the final results.Generally, this is due to the fact that the event's failure probability is already close to 1.0 such that increasing its value to 1.0 would not have much of an effect on the CDF.It should be noted that an event's failure probability may have been a conservative value selected by the PSA analyst due to limited data and is not necessarily reflective of the specific component history.If so, this is noted in the descriptive text below.

0 GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION I PAGE 9-7 c.An event in the upper right hand corner contributes significantly to the final results and would significantly affect the CDF if it were assumed to always fail.Therefore, this event is very important with respect to the risk profile.d.An event in the lower left hand corner does not contribute to the final result, and even if it were assumed to fail with a probability of 1.0, would not significantly impact the CDF.9.6.3.1 Internal Fire Initiating Events The importance measures for the internal fire initiating events are listed in Table 9-15 and displayed in Figure 9-15.The following three events are of high importance:

Fire in Zone CR-3 (Control Room)Fire in Zone BR1A (Battery Room A)Fire in Zone TB1-1 (Turbine Building Basement)Each contributed a 5.0%to the fire CDF (F-V a 0.05), as discussed in Section 9.6.1;and if the initiator were assumed to be"true," it would raise the fire CDF by a factor a 10 (RAW a 10).Two events are of medium importance based on an F-V value a 0.05: a.FIOTB2-1 Fire in Zone TB2-1 (Turbine Building Mezzanine) b.FIBR1B-3 Fire in Zone BR1B (Battery Room B)Both were discussed in Section 9.6.1.Four events are of medium importance based on a RAW value a 10: a.FIDG1B10 b.FIOCR3-3 c.FIOOABO I d.FIOOAHRI Fire in Zone EDGIB-0 (DG Room B Cable Vault)Fire in Zone CR-3 (Control Room)(Fails Division A only)Fire in Zone ABO (Auxiliary Building Operating Level)Fire in Zone AHR (Air Handling Room)While none of these contributes at least 5.0%to the fire CDF, each, if assumed to be"true," would increase the fire CDF by a factor of at least 10.These could be of concern if the combustible loadings, and therefore the fire ignition frequencies, in the zones were to increase, e.g., via presence of transient combustibles.

9.6.3.2 Human Errors The importance measures for the human errors are listed in Table 9-16 and displayed in Figure 9-16.Excluded are the following two groups of"human errors:" a.Latent human errors associated with test and maintenance activities, which have been included with the test and maintenance activities in Section 9.6.3.3.

GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 9-8 b.Failures to manually suppress fires, which have been included with the modeling assumptions in Section 9.6.4.4.For the human errors included in this section, the following 11 events are of high importance:

g.AFHFDALTTD h.FSHFDCROM1 J~k RCHFDRHRSB AFHFDBLOWD SWHFDSTART a.FSHFDCROM2 b.FSHFDDCPWR c.AFHFDSAFWX d.FSHFDPORVS e.AFHFD CITY W f.FSHFDAFWXX Failure to employ alternate AFW/SG instrumentation aAer Control Room indication has been lost Failure to align TSC DC power supply to Battery B for the TDAFW pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures Failure to correctly align Standby AFW (SAFW)Failure to locally operate PORV 430, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures Failure to use city fire water for SAFW, per Procedure ER-AFW.1 Failure to locally open discharge MOV 3996 from and steam supply MOV 3505A to the TDAFW Pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures Failure to provide cooling to the TDAFW pump lube oil from the diesel-driven Fire Service Water (SW)pump Failure to use alternate instrumentation for natural circulation when Control Room indication is lost Failure to rapidly depressurize the primary system to the level for initiating RHR, or failure to use AFW in the long term Failure to isolate SG blowdown locally Failure to start a SW pump.Each contributed a 0.5%to the fire CDF (F-V a 0.005);and if the event were assumed to be"true," it would raise the fire CDF by a factor a 2 (RAW a 2).Four actions ([a],[b],[d], and[f])were discussed in Section 9.6.1.Four of the other human errors appear in ([e]and[g])or near ([c]in 852 and[i]in 857)the top 50 cut sets.Of the remaining three human errors, FSHFDCROM1 appears in cut sets containing several different initiators; SWHFDSTART appears in cut sets where the initiator is a fire in the West Transformer Yard;and AFHFDBLOWD appears in cut sets similar to those discussed in Section 9.6.1.1 resulting from Control Room fire initiator FIOCR3-1, where an SG blowdown isolation AOV spuriously opens due to a hot short (in this case, AOV 5737 instead of AOV 5738).Finally, all actions but[d]and[k]are directly tied to AFW or SAFW.All human errors of medium importance arose solely due to an F-V value a 0.005.None had RAW values a 2 (other than the ones of high importance).

The six human errors of medium importance are as follows: RCHFDPLOCA b.FSHFDREC03 c.DGHFDCITYW Failure to close the block valve corresponding to an open PORV within three minutes Failure to find alternative cooldown paths (specifically the TDAFW steam lines)(discussed in Section 9.6.1.1)Failure to connect city water to DG cooling per Procedure ER-DG (appearing in the top 50 cut sets)

GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION I PAGE 9-9 d.CVHFDSUCTN e.HVHFDSAFWB FSHFDDGAXY Failure to locally open the suction line from the Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST)to the charging pumps upon loss of Instrument Air (IA)(appearing in the top 50 cut sets)Failure to recover cooling to the SAFW Room for long-term protection of the SAF W pumps (appearing in cut sets containing the initiator FIDG1B10, discussed in Section 9.6.3.1)Failure to strip Bus 18 loads and locally close the breaker for DG A, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (appearing in cut set 861 containing initiator FIBRI B-3, discussed in Section 9.6.1.3).9.6.3.3 Test and Maintenance Activities The importance measures for the unavailabilities due to test and maintenance activities are listed in Table 9-17 and displayed in Figure 9-17.Note that these include latent human errors associated with test and maintenance activities, as discussed in Section 9.6.3.2.The following eight events are of high importance:

a.AFTMOTDAFW b.RHTM00000B c.AFTMMAFSGB d.AFHFLTDAFW e.DGTM00001A CCHFL0780B g.AFHFLOAFWB h.AFHFLSAF WB Unavailability of the TDAFW Pump due to its train being out for test and maintenance Unavailability of RHR train B due to its being out of service for test or maintenance Unavailability of motor-driven AFW Train B to SG B due to its being out of service for test or maintenance Failure to correctly restore the TDAFW pump train to service after test and maintenance Unavailability of DG A due to test or maintenance.

Human mispositioning of CCW throttling isolation valve 780B on the outlet side of RHR HX B Failure to restore AFW Motor-Driven Pump Train B to service after test and maintenance Failure to restore SAFW Pump Train D to service aAer test and maintenance.

Each contributed a 0.5%to the fire CDF (F-V a 0.005);and if the event were assumed to be"true," it would raise the fire CDF by a factor a 2 (RAW a 2).Five of the events ([a],[b],[d],[e], and[f])were discussed in Section 9.6.1.AFTMMAFSGB appears in the cut sets among the top 50 which result from a fire in the Auxiliary Building Basement.These cut sets also contain the event AFMMOTDAFW, discussed in Section 9.6.1.1, and represent similar types of scenarios.

AFHFLOAFWB and AFHFLSAFWB appear in cut sets containing different initiators.

These cut sets also contain either of the events AFMMOTDAFW or AFTMOTDAFW, discussed in Section 9.6.1.1, and represent similar types of scenarios.

GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 9-10 All unavailabi1ities due to test and maintenance activities of medium importance arose solely due to an F-V value a 0.005.None had RAW values x 2 (other than the ones of high importance).

The seven of medium importance are as follows: a.AFTMTDAFWB b.CVTMCHPMPA c.AFTMTDAFWA d.DGTM00001B e.AFTMSAFSGB f.AFTMSAFSGA g.AFTMMAFSGA Unavailability of the TDAFW train injection line to SG B due to it being out of service for test and maintenance (discussed in Section 9.6.1.1)Unavailability of Charging Pump A due to test and maintenance Unavailability of the TDAFW train injection line to SG A due to it being out of service for test and maintenance (appearing in cut sets containing FIOTB2-1, discussed in Section 9.6.1.2)Unavailability of DG B due to test or maintenance (appearing in cut sets containing several different initiators)

Unavailability of SAFW Train D injection line to SG B due to it being out of service for test and maintenance (appearing with its sister event AFTMSAFSGA in cut sets containing several different initiators)

Unavailability of SAFW Train C injection line to SG A due to it being out of service for test and maintenance (appearing with its sister event AFTMSAFSGB in cut sets containing several different initiators)

Unavailability of motor-driven AFW Train A to SG A due to its being out of service for test or maintenance (appearing in cut sets containing the initiator FIOBR1B-3, discussed in Section 9.6.1.3).Observe that RHTMOOOOOB and DGTM00001A are of high importance, while their counterparts RHTMOOOOA and DGTM00001B are of low and medium importance, respectively.

The differences arise from the difference between initiating events.For fires in the West Transformer Yard (FIOOTYW1), there is a direct loss of offsite power.If DG B is unavailable (including its being out of service for test and maintenance, DGTM00001B), core damage results if RHR Train A is also unavailable (including its being out of service for test and maintenance, RHTMOOOOOA).

Likewise, if DG A is unavailable (including its being out of service for test and maintenance, DGTM00001A), core damage results if RHR Train B is also unavailable (including its being out of service for test and maintenance, RHTMOOOOOB).

Thus, equal contributions to the fire CDF arise from the four events due to fire in the West Transformer Yard.However, contributions from RHTMOOOOB and DGTM00001A also arise from fires on the Turbine Building Mezzanine Level (FIOTB2-1) and fires in Battery Room B (FIOBR1B-3), respectively due to the consequences of these fires (see Section 9.6.1).Since both of these fire initiators are ofhigh importance (see Section 9.6.3.1), the contributions to the fire CDF from RHTMOOOOB and DGTM00001A are increased over those from their counterparts RHTMOOOOA and DGTM00001B.

Thus, their importances become high.

GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 9-11 9.6.3.4 Modeling Assumptions The importance measures for the modeling assumptions are listed in Table 9-18 and displayed in Figure 9-18.Note that these include failures to manually suppress fires, as discussed in Section 9.6.3.2.None of the modeling assumptions are of high importance.

There are eight of medium importance, solely due to an F-V value a 0.05.None had RAW values a 10.The eight modeling assumptions of medium importance are as follows: a.FSHFDCR-3-X b.FACR-MCB c.FSASPROP01 d.FADIVA e.FATB-2-2 FSHFDBR1A3 g.FABR1A h.FALOSP-R Failure of the Fire Brigade to manual suppress a Control Room fire Tag representing equipment assumed failed by ignition of a fire in the Control Room's main control board and any two electrical cabinets that subsequently requires Control Room evacuation due to a significant loss of instrumentation and control Tag representing assumption that fire spread beyond its initial source prior to suppression Tag representing equipment assumed failed by loss of AC Electric Power Division A due to fire Tag representing equipment assumed failed by ignition of a fire in Bus Cabinet 11A/12A or 11B/12B at the Turbine Building Mezzanine Level Failure of the Fire Brigade to manual suppress a fire in Battery Room A Tag representing equipment assumed to be failed by ignition of a fire in Battery Rooms A Tag representing equipment assumed to be failed by a recoverable loss of offsite power due to a fire.All of the above are discussed in Section 9.6.1 except for[d]and[h].The tagging event FADIVA appears in cut sets containing several different initiators and appears in the top 50 cut sets.The tagging event FALOSP-R appears in cut sets resulting from a fire in the West Transformer Yard (FIOOTYWI), which has been discussed in the previous section.9.6.3.5 Systems The importance measures for the systems are listed in Table 9-19 and displayed in Figure 9-19.The following nine systems are of high importance:

a.FSW b.AC c.AFW d.CCW e.DG SAFW g.RC h.RHR Fire Service Water AC Power Auxiliary Feedwater Component Cooling Water Diesel Generator Standby AFW Reactor Coolant Residual Heat Removal i.SW Service Water

GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 9-12 Each contributed 2 5.0%to the fire CDF (F-V z 0.05);and if the all the events associated with they system were assumed to be"true," it would raise the fire CDF by a factor a 10 (RAW a 10).A review of Section 9.6.1 indicates that initiators, tags, flags, and events associated with all nine of these systems except SAFW and SW are directly mentioned among the dominant scenarios.

Similar items from the SAFW and SW systems appear in (SAFW)or near (SW, in cut set 853)the top 50 cut sets, as well as being discussed in Sections 9.6.3.2 and 9.6.3.3.The front-line systems FSW, AFW, SAFW, RC, and RHR serve either to mitigate the fire or reduce the likelihood of resulting core damage.The support systems AC, CCW, DG, and SW provide required functions, such as electric power or component cooling, to these and other critical front-line systems.All systems of medium importance arose solely due to a RAW value z 10.None had F-V values z 0.05 (other than the ones of high importance).

The seven of medium importance are as follows: a.b.C.d.e.f.DC IB HVAC ESFAS MS UV CVCS 125-VDC Power 120-VAC Instrument Bus Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning Engineered Safeguards Features Actuation Main Steam Undervoltage Chemical Volume and Control.These are characteristically reliable and redundant systems, requiring minimal human action for their operation.

9.6.3.6 Components I The importance measures for the components are listed in Table 9-20 and displayed in Figure 9-20.The following 21 components are of high importance:

a.b.C.d.e.f.AFMMOTDAFW DGDGFTSCXX RCRZT00430 AFMMSAFWPD SWCXXSUCTN.

FSXXXTR803 g.RCRZT0431C h.AFCCAFWSTR m.ACMMMCC01D i.FSDGAPFP01 j.DGDGFASCXX DGMMASTART 1.CCMM00738B Non-fire-induced failure of the TDAFW pump Non-fire-induced failure of the TSC DG to run Non-fire-induced failure of PORV 430 to reseat after steam relief Non-fire-induced failure of SAFW Pump Train D Non-fire-induced total failure of common SW/FSW suction Non-fir-induced failure of the Relay Room Halon Suppression System (S08)Non-fire-induced failure of PORV 431C to reseat after steam relief Non-fire-induced common cause failure (CCF)of all three AFW pumps to start Non-fir-induced failure of the diesel-driven FSW pump to start Non-fire-induced failure of the TSC DG to start Non-fir-induced failure of DG A to start due Non-fir-induced failure to open of MOV 738B to supply CCW to RHR HXB Non-fir-induced failure of MCC D GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 9-13 q.r.s.t.u.AFMMMDFP1B RHMMACO I BA DGCCOOORUN TLCCFMATWS DGCCOSTART n.AFMMSGBINJ o.DGMMBRKR14 p.TLCCFBRKRF Non-fire-induced failure of AFW Train B injection line to SG B Non-fire-induced failure of DG A supply breaker to Bus 14 to close Non-fire-induced failure to SCRAM due to electrical failure of the Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs)Non-fire-induced failure of motor-driven AFW Pump Train B Non-fire-induced failure of the RHR Pump B to start Non-fire-induced CCF ofboth DGs to run Non-fire-induced failure to SCRAM due to mechanical failures Non-fire-induced CCF of both DGs to start.Each contributed a 0.5%to the fire CDF (F-V a 0.005);and, if the event were assumed to be"true," it would raise the fire CDF by a factor a 2 (RAW a 2).Several ([a],[b],[c],[j], and 1])were discussed in Section 9.6.1.All of the remaining, except the two related to SCRAM failures ([p]and[t]), are associated with systems of high importance as discussed in Section 9.6.3.5.TLCCFBRKRF and TLCCFMATWS are pertinent to ATWS scenarios, one of which appears as cut set¹59, another as cut set¹76.The ATWS events are caused by electrical and mechanical failures to trip the reactor following a loss of offsite power with fire-induced failures of the PORVs to provide necessary primary system relief.

Cutsets with Descriptions Report@FIRE1=3.34E-05 Inputs Description Rate Exposure Probability FIOCR3-1 AAAATRANSIN DGDGFTSCXX FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSHFDCR-3-X NOSBO FZOOORC3 AAAATRANSIN FARC-3 FSAASUPPOK FSCORR0003 FSH FDCROi~l2 NOSBO FIOCR3-1 AAAATRANSIN AFTHOTDAFW FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSHFDCR-3-X NOSBO FIOTB2-1 ACTRAINA FATB-2-2 FSAASUPPOK NOSBO RCHVD00516N RCRZT00430 RHTHOOOOOB SLO TLSTRANS FIOCR3-1 AAAATRANSIN AFHMOTDAFW FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSHFDCR-3-X NOSBO Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions TSC biesel Generator fails to run 1.25E-03 CR-HCB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone RC-3 FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions RC-3 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A CORRECTION FACTOR FOR RECOVERY OF CONTROL ROOM INDICATION FOR CNMT FIRE Ops fail to use alternate AFW/SG instrumentation when Control Room indication NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SZ Conditions TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance CR-MGB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 1 and 2)Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)TB-2-2 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Motor-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief 5.00E-03 ,TRAIN B OOS FOR MAINTENANCE SMALL LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT TAGGING EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUENCES Fire, in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2)FLAG I-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SZ Conditions Failure of TDAFW pump train components CR-MCB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room NO STATiON BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 0.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 los0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.53E-06 1.338-06 1.06E-06 7.26E-07 6.47E-07 C: I CAF TA-WWEWFIRESIFIRESENS.

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s Description Rate Exposure Probability 10 FIBR1A-3 AAAATRANSIN DGDGFTSCXX FABRlA FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDBRIA3 NOSBO FIOCR3-1 AAAATRANS IN FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSHFDAFWXX FSHFDCR-3-X NOSBO FIOCR3-1 AAAATRANSIN FACR-tjCB FSAASUPPXX FSHFDCR-3-X FSHFDDCPWR NOSBO FIOCR3-1 AAAATRANSIN FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSHFDCR-3-X FSHFDPORVS NOSBO FIOTB1-5 ACAZDLOSPl ACLOPNOSI2 ACLOPRTALL ACTRAINA ACTRAINB DGTtj00001A FATB-1-3 FSAASUPPOK SBO FIBRIA-3 AAAATRANSIN AFTMOTDAFW FABRlA FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDBR1A3 IBAABUSCMX NOSBO 03 8 of ation)Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions TSC Diesel Generator fails to run 1.25E-BRlA Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BRlA-3 NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1'nd 2)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions CR-MCB Tag FLAG'-Fire Suppression fails HCO fails to locally open MOV 3996 and MOV 3505A per Attach 3 of ER-FIRE Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions CR-MCB Tag FLAG-Pire Suppression fails Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room Failure to align TSC DC supply to Battery B for TDAFW pump per Attachment NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions CR-MCB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room Operators/I&C fail to perform ER-FIRE.1 Attachment 9 (PORV 430 local oper NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 5)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TESTING OR MAINTENANCE TB-1-3 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions TDAFWI Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance BR1A Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BR1A-3 FLAG-Instrument Bus C on Normal Supply NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 0.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 ER-FO.O 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.0-0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 O.l 0.0 1.0 1.0 6.21E-07 5.10E-07 5.10E-07 5.10E-07 4.42E-07 4.31E-07 C: tCAF7A-WWEWFIRES\FIRESENS.CUT Page 2

Description Rate Exposure Probability 12 13 15 16 FIOTB2-3 ACAZDLOSP1 ACLOPNOSI2 ACLOPRTALL ACTRAINA ACTRAINB AFTt40TDAFW FATB-2-3 FSAASUPPOK SBO FIOCR3-3 AAAATRANSIN DGDGFTSCXX FACR-HCB FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDCR-3-X NOSBO FIOTB2-1 ACTRAINA CCMM00738B FATB-2-2 FSAASUPPOK NOSBO RCHVD00516N RCRZT00430 SLO TLSTRANS FIBR1A-3 AAAATRANSIN AFHt40TDAFW FABR1A FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDBR1A3 IBAABUSCHX NOSBO FIOCR3-1 AAAATRANSIN FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSHFDCR-3-X FSHPDCROM2 NOSBO Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 3)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance TB-2-3 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A STATiON BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3)FLAG i-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions TSC Diesel Generator fails to run 1.25E-03 CR-HCB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire pxopagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 1 and 2)Failuxe of AC Train A (tagging event)HOV 738B PAILS TO OPEN TB-2-2 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Motor-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief 5.00E-03 SMALIn, LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT TAGGING EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUENCES Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions Failure of TDAPW pump train components BR1A Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BR1A-3 FLAG-Instrument Bus C on Normal Supply NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions CR-MCB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room Ops fail to use alternate AFW/SG instrumentation when Control Room indication NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1'.0 0.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 los0.0 1.0 3.31E-07 3.06E-07 2.70E-07 2.63E-07 2.55E-07 C: tCAF TA-WtNEWFI RES lFIRESENS.

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In s Description Rate Exposure Probability 17 18 19 20 21 FZOCR3-1 AAAATRANS IN DGDGATSCXX FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSHFDCR-3-X NOSBO FIOCR3-3 AAAATRANSIN AFTMOTDAFW FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDCR-3-X NOSBO FIBR1A-3 AAAATRANSIN FABR1A FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDBRlA3 FSHFDDCPWR NOSBO FIOTB1-3 ACTRAINA FAD IVA FSAASUPPOK NOSBO RCMVD00516N RCRZT00430 RHTMOOOOOB SLO TLSTIVglS FIBR1B-3 ACAZDLOSPl ACTRAINA ACTRAINB DGTM00001A FABR1B FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDBRZB3 SBO Fire.in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions TSC Diesel Generator fails to START 4.88E-03 CR-f<CB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fixe in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance CR-MCB Tag FLAG~Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions BR1A Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BR1A-3 Failure to align TSC DC supply to Battery B for TDAFW pump per Attachment 8 NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone TB-1 (Scenario 3 and 4)Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)DIVA Tag FLAG 4 Fire Suppression successful or N/A NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Motor-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief 5.00E-03 TRAIN B OOS FOR t4AINTENANCE SMALL LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT TAGGING EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUENCES Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TESTING OR ttAINTENANCE BRlB Tag FLAG-Fixe Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Blrigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BR1B-3 STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 of ER-FO.O 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.O 1.0 O.l 0.0 1.0 2.49E-07 2.12E-07 2.07E-07 1.93E-07 1.84E-07 C:tCAF TA-WINEWFIRESIRRESENS.CUT Page 4

tr s Description Rate Exposure Probability 22 23 25 FIOTB2-3 ACAZDLOSP1 ACLOPNOSI2 ACLOPRTALL ACTRAINA ACTRAINB AFMMOTDAFW FATB-2-3 FSAASUPPOK SBO SBOCORR007 FIOOORR3 AAAATRANSIN DGDGFTSCXX FARRX FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDRROOH FSXXXTR803 NOSBO FIOTB1-5 ACAZDLOSP1 ACLOPNOSI2 ACLOPRTALL ACTRAINA ACTRAINB DGHFDCITYW FATB-1-3 FSAASUPPOK SBO UVBUS17 UVBUS18 FIOTB2-1 ACTRAINA CCHFL0780B FATB-2-2 FSAASUPPOK NOSBO RCMVD00516N RCRZT00430 SLO TLS TRANS OW MORE TIME Conditions 1.25E-03 1.00E-03 5.00E-03 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 3)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)Failure of TDAFW pump train components TB-2-3 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT SBO CORRECTION FACTOR II7-TDAFW RUN FAILURES DURING SBO ALL Fire'in Zone RR (Scenario 3)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI TSC Diesel Generator fails to run RR Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually extinguish fire in relay room Relay Room Halon System S08 Inoperable NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 5)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)Operators fail to connect city water to DG cooling per ER-DG TB-1-3 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event UV on Bus 18 Tagging Event Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 1 and 2)Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)CCW THROTTLING VALVE 780B HISPOSITIONED TB-2-2 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Motor-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief SMALL LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT TAGGI)IG EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUENCES 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.1 1.0 24.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 24.0 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.O 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.78E-07 1.77E-07 1.76E-07 1.74E-07 C:tCAF7A-WWEWFIRES)FIRESENS.CUT Page 5

s Description Rate Exposure Probability 26 27 28 29 30 FIDG1B10 AAAATRANSIN AFHFDCITYW AFTHOTDAFW FAEDG1B-0 FSAASUPPOK NOSBO UVBUS17 UVBUS18 FIOCR3-1 AAAATRANSIN AFHFLTDAFW FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSHFDCR-3-X NOSBO FIOTB2-1 ACTRAINA FATB-2-2 FSAASUPPOK NOSBO RCHVD00516N RCRZT00430 RHHHAC01BA SLO TLS TRANS FIOCR3-1 AAAATRANSIN FACR'-HCB FSAASUPPXX FSHFDCR-3-X FSHFDREC03 MSMHN2BOTA NOSBO FIOTB1-5 ACAZDLOSP1 ACLOPNOSI2 ACLOPRTALL ACTRAINA ACTRAINB DGDGF0001A FATB-1-3 FSAASUPPOK SBO SBOCORR006 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.O 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 OFFSITE PWR0.3 5.00E-03 1.25E-03 Fire in Zone EDG1B-0 FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions Operators fail to use city fire water for SAFW per ER-AFW.1 TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance EDG1B-0 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event UV on Bus 18 Tagging Event Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions Faildre to restore TDAFW pump train to service post test/maintenance CR-MCB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 1 and 2)Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)TB-2-2 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Motor-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief RHR PUMP B (PAColB)FAILS TO START SHALL LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT TAGGING EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUFNCES Fire fn Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions CR-HCB Tag/FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room Failure to find alternative cooldown paths (TDAFW steam lines)NITROGEN BOTTLES FAIL TO SUPPLY ARV 3411 NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 5)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FA1LS TO RUN TB-1-9 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT SBO CORRECTION FACTOR tt6-DG RUN TIME FAILURES ALLOW)1 HR TO RESTORE 1.71E-07 1.53E-07 1.48E-07 1.46E-07 1.32E-07 C tCAFTA-WWEWFIREStFIRESENS.CUT Page 6

Description Rate Exposure Probability 31 32 33 35 FIOCR3-3 AAAATRANSIN AFMMOTDAFW FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDCR-3-X NOSBO FIOOORR3 AAAATRANSIN AFTMOTDAFW FARRX FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDRROOM FSXXXTR803 NOSBO FIOOABB1 AAAATRANSXN ACTRAINA AFMHOTDAFW AFt 1MSAFWPD AFTMHAFSGB FADXVA FSAASUPPOK NOSBO FIOCR3-1 AAAATRANSIN AFTHTDAFWB FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSHFDCR-3-X MSHSF05738 NOSBO FIOOABO1 ACAZDLOSP1 ACCORR0003 ACHSF00016 ACTRAINA ACTRAINB AFTMOTDAFW CCAACCPMPB FAABO FSAASUPPOK SBO SFAARPAC7B 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 24.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 1.00E-03 to transfe0.1pen 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions Failure of TDAFW pump train components CR-HCB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial'source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone RR (Scenario 3)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance RR Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually extinguish fire in relay room Relay Room Ha)on System S08 Inoperable NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone ABB (Scenario 1 and 2)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of TDAFW pump train components Failure of SAFW Pump 1D Train MOTOR DRIVEN AFW TRAIN B TO B S/G O.O.S DUE TO T/M DIVA Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire jn Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2)FLAG-Transient Xnitiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions TDAFW Pump Train injection line to S/G B out-of-service for maintenance CR-MCB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room Hot short causes AOV 5738 to fail to close NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone ABO (Scenario 1 and 2)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour CORRECTION FACTOR FOR RECOVERY OF HOT SHORT LOOP EVENTS Hot short causes 480 VAC Bus 16 feeder circuit breaker 52/16 (BUS16/11B)

Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance FLAG]CCW PUMP B IS ALXGNED TO RUN ABO Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT FLAG-SFP Pump B Running 1.29E-07 1.23E-07 1.14E-07 1.13E-07 1.11E-07 C: tCAF TA-WWEWFIRES tFIRESENS.

CUT IF F I Description Rate Exposure Probability 36 37 38 39 FIBRlB-3 ACAZDLOSP1 ACTRAINA ACTRAINB ACWPFMCC1H FABR1B FSAAFIRElH FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDBRlB3 SBO FIBR1B-3 ACAZDLOSP1 ACTRAINA ACTRAINB DCWPFC3ACX FABR1B FSAAFIRE1H FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDBRIB3 SBO FIOSH2-1 ACHSF00014 ACTRAINA FASH-2-R FSAASUPPOK NOSBO RCMVD00516N RCRZT00430 RHTMOOOOOB SLO TLSTRANS FIOTB2-1 ACAZDLOSP1 ACLOPNOSI2 ACLOPRTALL ACTRAINA ACTRAINB AFTMOTDAFW FATB-2-2 FSAASUPPOK SBO 1.10E-07 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 t0.2ra 1.0 O.l 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 (Mccc/osMM) nsfer open 1.10E-07 open (to MCC 0.2 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.09E-07)to transfeo.lpen 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.O 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.00E-03 1.07E-07 Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)Cable wrap failure causes 480 VAC MCCH feeder circuit breaker 52/MCCH BR1B Tag FLAG-Special multiplier to indicate fire duration>1 hr (prob~O.l)FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BRlB-3 STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT Fire u.n Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)Cable wrap failure causes disconnect switch DCPDPCB03A/03 to transfers BR1B Tag FLAG-Special multiplier to indicate fire duration>1 hr (prob=0.1)FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BR1B-3 STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone SH-2 (Scenario 1 and 2)Hot short causes 480 VAC Bus 14 feeder circuit breaker 52/14 (BUS14/18B Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)SH-2-R Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT'-Motox-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief TRAIN B OOS FOR MAINTENANCE SMALL LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT TAGGING EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUENCES Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 1 and 2)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance TB-2-2 Tag FLAG$Fire Suppression successful or N/A STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT C tCAF7A-WWEWFIRESU IRESENS.CUT Page 8

tr s Description Rate Exposure Probability 40 4l42 FIOTB2-3 ACAZDLOSP1 ACLOPNOSI2 ACLOPRTALL ACTRAINA ACTRAINB AFHFDALTTD FATB-2"3 FSAASUPPOK SBO UVBUS17 UVBUS18 FIDGlB10 AAAATRANSIN AFHFDCITYW AFMMOTDAFW FAEDG1B-0 FSAASUPPOK NOSBO UVBUS17 UVBUS18 FIOOABB3 AAAATRANS IN CVAACHPMPB CVAACHPMPC CVTMCHPMPA FAABB-3 FSAASUPPXX FSHFDAUXBB FSXXXTR746 NOSBO FIOCR3-3 AAAATRANSIN FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDAFWXX FSHFDCR-3-X NOSBO FIOCR3-3 AAAATRANSIN FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDCR-3-X FSHFDDCPWR NOSBO Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 3)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)OPERATORS FAIL TO PROVIDE COOLING TO TDAFW LUBE OIL FROM D1ESEL FIRE PUMP TB-2-3 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event UV oh Bus 18 Tagging Event Fire in Zone EDGIB-0 FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions Operators fail to use city fire water for SAFW per ER-AFW.1 Failure of TDAFW pump train components EDG1B-0 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event UV on Bus 18 Tagging Event Fire in Zone ABB (Scenario 3 and 4)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions FLAG-CHARGING PUMP B RUNNING FLAG-CHARGING PUMP C RUNNING TEST OR MAINTENANCE RENDERS CHARGING PUMP A UNAVAILABLE ABB-3', Tag FLAG'-Fire Suppression fails Fire Brigade fail to manually extinguish fire in Aux Bldg Basement Sprinkler S01 Inoperable (Aux Bldg Basement Cable Trays-SI Pump)l.OOE-03 NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions CR-MCB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source HCO fails to locally open MOV 3996 and MOV 3505A per Attach 3 of ER-FIRE Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions CR-MCh Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room Failure to align TSC DC supply to Battery B for TDAFW pump per Attachment 8 NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.1 1.0 1.0 0.0 24.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 of ER-FO.O 1.0 1.06E-07 1.05E-07 1.03E-07 1.02E-07 1.02E-07 C:tCAF TA-WtNEWFIREStFIRESENS.CUT Page 9

s Description Rate Exposure Probability 45 FIOCR3-3 AAAATRANSIN FACR-MCB FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDCR-3-X FSHFDPORVS NOSBO FIOOABB3 AAAATRANSIN CVHFDSUCTN FAABB-3 FSAASUPPXX FSHFDAUXBB FSXXXTR746 NOSBO FIBRIA-3 AAAATRANSIN DGDGATSCXX FABR1A FSAASUPPXX FSASPROP01 FSHFDBR1A3 NOSBO FIOTB1-1 ACAZDLOSP1 ACTRAINA ACTRAINB DGDGF0001A FATB-1-1 FSAASUPPXX FSXXXTR768 SBO SBOCORR006 FIO'gBl-l.

ACAZDLOSP1 ACTRAINA ACTRAINB DGDGF0001A FATB-1-1 FSAASUPPXX FSXXXTR769 SBO SBOCORR006 1.00E-03 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions CR-MCB Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room Operators/IRC fail to perform,ER-FIRE.1 Attachment 9 (PORV 430 local operation)

NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone ABB (Scenario 3 and 4)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions Operators Fail to Manually Open Suction Line Upon Loss of IA ABB-9 Tag FLAG.-.Fire Suppression fails Fire Brigade fail to manually extinguish fire in Aux Bldg Basement Sprinkler Sol Inoperable (Aux Bldg Basement Cable Trays-SI Pump)1.OOE-03 NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone BRlA (Scenario 3 and 4)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions TSC Diesel Generator fails to START 4.88E-03 BR1A Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Fire propagates beyond initial source Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BRlA-3 NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT Fire in Zone TB-1 (Scenariol and 2)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within.l Hour Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-03 TB-1-1 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Spray S24 Inoperable (Turbine Condenser Pit)STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT SBO CORRECTION FACTOR t)6-DG RUN TIME FAILURES ALLOW)1 HR TO RESTORE OFFSITE Fire in Zone TB-1 (Scenariol and 2)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-03 TB-1-1 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Sprayf S25 Inoperable (Generator Hydrogen Seal)1.00E-03 STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT SBO CORRECTION FACTOR tt6-DG RUN TIME FAILURES ALLOW)1 HR TO RESTORE OFFSITE 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 24.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 PWR0.3 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 PWR0.3 1.02E-07 1.02E-07 1.01E-07 8.95E-08 8.95E-08 C:tCAF TA-WWEWFIREStFIRESENS.CUT Page 10 50 51 52 53 In s FIOTB1-1 ACAZDLOSPl ACTRAINA ACTRAINB DGDGF0001A FATB-1-1 FSAASUPPXX FSXXXTR770 SBO SBOCORR006 FIOTB1-1 ACAZDLOSP1 ACTRAINA ACTRAINB DGDGF0001A FATB-1-1 FSAASUPPXX FSXXXTR771 SBO SBOCORR006 FIDGlB10 AAAATRANSIN AFHFDSAFWX AFTHOTDAFW FAEDG1B-0 FSAASUPPOK NOSBO UVBUS17 UVBUS18 FXOOORR6 AAAATRANSIN ACTRAINA AFHMSAFWPD FADIVA FSAASUPPOK NOSBO SWCXXSUCTN FIOTB1-5 ACAZDLOSPl ACLOPNOSI2 ACLOPRTALL ACTRAINA ACTRAINB DGHHASTART FATB-1-3 FSAASUPPOK SBO Description Fire in Zone TB-1 (Scenariol and 2)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN TB-1-1 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression fails Sprinkler S26 Inoperable (Turbine Island)STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT SBO CORRECTION FACTOR tt6-DG RUN TIME FAILURES ALLOW Fire in Zone TB-1 (Scenariol and 2)Failu're to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN TB-1-1 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppx'ession fails Spray S27 Inoperable (Main Turbine Oil Reservoir)

STATXON BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT SBO CORRECTION FACTOR N6-DG RUN TIME FAILURES ALLOW Fixe in Zone EDG1B-0 FLAG-Txansient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result OPERATORS FAIL TO CORRECTLY ALIGN SAFW TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance EDG1B-0 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGXNG EVENT UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event UV on Bus 18 Tagging Event Fire in Zone RR (Scenario 6)FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result Failure of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of SAFW Pump 1D Train DIVA Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT TOTAL FAILURE OF COMMON SW/FIRE WATER SUCTION Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 5)Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip, Failuxte of AC Train A (tagging event)Failure of Train B (tagging event)FAXLURES OF D/G A TO START TB-1-3 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT Rate Exposure 1.25E-03 1.00E-03 1 HR TO RESTORE OFFSITE 1.25E-03 1.00E-03 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 PWR0.3 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 1.0 24.0 1.0 in SI Conditions in SI Conditions 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.O 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1 HR TO RESTORE OFFSITE PWR0.3 Probability 8.95E-08*8.95E-OS 8.90E-OS 8.76E-08 8.71E-OS C:tCAF TA-WINEWFIREStFIRESENS.CUT Page 11 e

¹I s Description Rate Exposure Probability 55 FIDG1B10 AAAATRANSIN AFTrlOTDAFW FAEDG1B-0 FSAASUPPOK FSHFDCRON2 NOSBO UVBUS17 UVBUS18 Fire in Zone EDG1B-0 FLAG-Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance EDG1B-0 Tag FLAG-Fire Suppression successful or N/A Ops fail to use alternate AFW/SG instrumentation when Control Room indication NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event UV on Bus 18 Tagging Event 0.0 8.57E-08 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 loso.o 1.0 1.0 1.O Report Summary: Filename: C:>CAFTA-VNNEWFIRES(FIRESENS.CUT Print date: 6/18/99 2:47 PM Not sorted Printed the first 55 C:tCAF TA-WWEWFIREStFIRESENS.

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GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 11-1 1 1.0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSION 11.6 Internal Fire Summary The final calculated CDF due to internal fires for Ginna Station is 3.338E-05/yr.

Figure 11-4 illustrates how each location contributes to this value.Over 80%of the contribution arises from three locations:

(1)Control Building (42.4%), (2)Turbine Building (25.5%), and (3)Auxiliary Building (12.2%).Fires in these locations and significant human errors and systems are described below.Control Buildin The Control Building includes the Control Room, Battery Rooms, Relay Room, and Air Handling Room.Section 9.6.1 discussed the dominant scenarios arising from fires in the Control and Battery Rooms.When all possible Control Room fire scenarios are considered, the total contribution to the fire CDF for the Control Room becomes 23.8%.The largest single contribution (19.8%)arises from ignition of a fire in the Control Room's main control board and any two electrical cabinets that subsequently requires Control Room evacuation due to a significant loss of instrumentation and control.When all possible Battery Room fire scenarios are considered, the total contribution to the fire CDF for the Battery Room becomes 11.8%.The largest single contribution (6.8%)arises from ignition of a fire in Battery Room A.When all possible Relay Room fire scenarios are considered, the total contribution to the fire CDF for the Relay Room becomes 6.4%.The largest single contribution (3.0%)arises from ignition of a fire in any of the Relay Room electrical cabinets, assumed to damage all associated cables and equipment and necessitate Control Room evacuation.

The contribution from the Air Handling Room fire scenarios is minimal (0.4%).Turbine Buildin The Turbine Building contains three levels-Basement, Mezzanine, and Operating Levels.Section 9.6.1.2 discussed the dominant scenarios arising from fires at the Basement and Mezzanine Levels.When all possible Turbine Building fire scenarios are considered, the tofal contribution to the CDF for the Turbine Building becomes 25.5%, with 13.8%arising from fires on the Mezzanine Level and 11.7%from fires on the Basement Level.There is essentially no contribution from fires on the Operating Level.The largest single contributions arise from ignition of a fire in 4160V Bus 11A/12A or 11B/12B at the Mezzanine Level (9.6%)and ignition of a fire in the vicinity of the power supply cables to 480V Buses 14, 16, 17, or 18 at the Basement Level (5.1%).Auxilia Buildin The Auxiliary Building contains three levels-Basement, Mezzanine, and Operating Levels.When all possible Auxiliary Building fire scenarios are considered, the total contribution to the CDF for the Auxiliary Building becomes 12.2%, with 5.7%arising from fires on the Basement Level, 3.6%arising from fires on the Mezzanine Level, and 2.9%from fires on the Operating Level.The largest single contribution from a Basement Level fire (3.0%)arises from ignition of a fire in an electrical cabinet in the vicinity of the Safety Injection (SI)pumps, disabling all three SI pumps.The largest single contribution from a Mezzanine Level fire (2.2%)arises from ignition of a fire in cables which 0

GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 11-2 interface with the Cable Tunnel, all of which are assumed to be vital.The largest single contribution from an Operating Level fire (2.8%)arises from ignition of a fire in components located near Component Cooling Water (CCW)or Reactor Makeup Water (RMW)equipment, disabling both CCW pumps and the RMW equipment.

Human Errors As discussed in Section 9.6.3.2, the human errors contributing the most to the fire CDF are the following (contributions included in parentheses):

C.d.e.f.Failure to employ alternate AFW/SG instrumentation after Control Room indication has been lost (13.1%)Failure to align TSC DC power supply to Battery B for the TDAFW pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (3.6%)Failure to correctly align Standby AFW (SAFW)(3.0%)Failure to locally operate PORV 430, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (2.2%)Failure to use city fire water for SAFW, per Procedure ER-AFW.1 (2.2%)Failure to locally open discharge MOV 3996 from and steam supply MOV 3505A to the TDAFW Pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (2.2%).All but action[d]are directly tied to operation of AFW or SAFW.~Sstems As discussed in Section 9.6.3.5, the systems contributing the most to the fire CDF are: (1)Fire Service Water (FSW)(58.7%), (2)AC Power (52.4%), and (3)AFW (37.1%).Each of these three systems also had the potential to increase the fire CDF by a factor>2500 if all equipment associated with the system were assumed to be failed (Risk Achievement Worth).Two of these (FSW and AFW)are front-line systems which serve either to mitigate the fire or reduce the likelihood of resulting core damage.The third (AC Power)is a support system which provides required electric power to these and other critical front-line systems.1 1.6.1 Unique and Important Safety Features The internal events PSA identified three attributes that helped to reduce the calculated CDF at Ginna Station: a.Standby Auxiliary Feedwater (SAP W)System;b.Limited requirements for ventilation due to"open" building design;c.Service Water (SW)System design (i.e., common header for all four SW pumps).As shown in Section 9.6.3.5, both the SAF W and SW systems are considered of high importance with respect to the fire CDF.SAFW serves as a backup to normal AFW to provide decay heat removal, and is located in a separate building.This design attribution was shown to be very important with respect to fire mitigation due to the potential of a fire to fail all three AFW pumps located in the Intermediate Building.SW is a GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 11-3 support system which provides required component cooling to critical front-line systems.Although all four SW pumps are located in a common area of the Screenhouse, no credible fire scenario was identified that would disable more than two SW pumps because: (1)no intervening combustibles are installed between the SW pumps (only the pump motors are present on this floor;no cables are present);(2)the SW pumps are installed with a centerline separation of eight feet;and (3)only one fixed combustible (a diesel-driven fire pump)is installed within 20 feet of the pumps.Furthermore, Ginna Station can shutdown without SW for non-LOCA scenarios and has procedures in place to do so.Basically, the plant can utilize the city water supply to plant hydrants to cool the DGs and provide a suction source to SAFW.The ability to perform these actions was identified as being of high risk-significance.

The design of the SW system utilizing a single header was not a significant consideration for fire-related risk.The lack of a need for ventilation is based on the limited use of compartments or rooms to protect and separate various equipment trains.This, in turn, created fire issues since multiple trains could be affected by the same fire.However, location-specific suppression systems help to reduce the likelihood of a fire growing large enough to affect multiple trains.In the end, no specific vulnerability was discovered with respect to this"open" design.1 1.6.2 Vulnerabilities One of the major objectives of Generic Letter 88-20 (Ref.7)was to identify potential plant vulnerabilities.

Using the definition of vulnerability provided in the internal events PSA (Section 11.0), no items were identified as vulnerable due to the effects of fire.However, the PSA did identify a fire scenario in the DG B Vault (fire zone EDG1B-O), located beneath the DG B Room, in which both trains of AC electric power could be affected.Basically, a worst-case fire could fail the B electrical train (Buses 16 and 17)and fail offsite power and all control power to Bus 18 of the A electrical train (DG A would still remain available).

This, in turn, would result in the loss of all SW.While the scenario was not risk-significant due to the low ignition frequency of a fire in this location and the available plant procedures to handle a loss of SW, ACTION Report 99-948 was generated to evaluate the scenario.The result of the ACTION Report was to recommend consideration of procedural changes to instruct plant personnel to manually close the required Bus 18 breakers to prevent leaving the plant in a Station Blackout condition.

These procedural changes are being evaluated on the basis of commercial considerations and not as a defined vulnerability.

They are expected to be implemented by November 1999.11.6.3 Changes Made to the Facility Based on the insights obtained from the internal fire evaluation, no changes have been made to or proposed for Ginna Station.

GINNA STATION PSA FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT REVISION 1 PAGE 11-4 FIGURE 11K.CONTRIBUTIONS TO FIRE CDF BY LOCATION Intermediate Building 12%Control Building 42.2%Cable Tunnel 0.8%Tech Sup port Center 0.1%Screenhouse 3 1%Containment 43%DG Rooms r~4 6%Transformer Yard 58%Auxiliary Building 12 2%Turbine Building 255