ML17059A504

From kanterella
Revision as of 21:55, 29 June 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Nine Mile Point - Unit 2 Safety Evaluation Summary Rept 1994.
ML17059A504
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1994
From:
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17059A503 List:
References
NMP2L-1504, NUDOCS 9411020168
Download: ML17059A504 (138)
v • d • e


Text

Enclosure toNIVIP2L1504NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION SUMMARYREPORT1994DocketNo.50-410LicenseNo.NPF-6994110201b8 941028PDRADOCK05000410KPDR

~~,

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage1of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-162Rev.0L1Mod.PN2Y87lVIX100 Figures11.5-2,11.5-2a,11.5-6,11.5-6aDigitalRadiation Monitoring System(DBMS)DeleteGaseousFlowControlBoardsDescription ofChange:Revision0ofthissafetyevaluation evaluated achangeto21gaseousprocessradiation monitors.

Revision1ofthissafetyevaluation reducedthescopeofthismodification to4gaseousprocessradiation monitors.

Thismodification replacedtheautomatic flowcontrolvalvesandtheirassociated flowcontrolprintedcircuitboardswithmanualflowcontrolvalves.Thechangesapplytothefollowing digitalradiation monitoring system(DRIVIS)monitors:

2GTS-CAB105 2OFG-CAB13A 2OFG-CAB13B 2HVW-CAB196

'afetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification increases theoperability andreliability oftheDRMSsystembyeliminating theautomatic sampleflowcontrolvalvesandtheirassociated printedcircuitboards(onfourmonitors) andreplacing themwithhandcontrolvalves.Themodulated sampleflowhasbeendetermined nottoberequiredandtobeacontributing factoringenerating spuriousalarms.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage2of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:88-009Mod.PN2Y86MX165 9.5-42;Tables8.3-1Sh25,8.3-5Sh5;Figures8.3-10,9.5-40aSystem:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:HPCSDieselAirStartSystemReplacement ofPetterDieselThismodification replacedanonsafety-related diesel-driven motorintheDivisionIIIdieselairstartsystemwithanonsafety-related electricmotor.Thismodification alsoprovidedanewpowerfeedbetween2NHS-!VICC008 andEGA-MST004.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theaircompressors anddrivemotorsthatsupplyairtotheairstartsystemdonotprovideasafetyfunctionandwillnotimpactthesafeoperation oftheHPCSdiesel.Duetothecurrentfailuresassociated withthedieseldrivemotor,thismodification willincreaseairsystemreliability.

Basedontheevaluatio'n performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage3of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:89-001Rev.2L3SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0132-90, SC2-0091-93 USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Figures9.3-1E,9.3-1FInstrument AirCappingofIASDrainandTestValvesAssemblies onADSAccumulators Description ofChange:Revision1toSafetyEvaluation 89-001wasreportedinJune1990.Revision2addressed Temporary Modification 89-006Baspermanent.

Thus,thedrainvalveassemblies fortheADSaccumulators 2IAS"TK34 throughTK38,theassociated instrument linedrainvalveassemblies for2IAS"TK32 throughTK38,andthetestvalveassemblies insideprimarycontainment fortheIASsupplyheaderstotheADSaccumulators, willbepermanently maintained withsealweldedplugsorcaps.Revision3returnedvalves2IAS"V190, 193,653,654totheiroriginaldesignconfiguration.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thevalveassemblies notedabovewerefoundtobeleakingexcessively duringsurveillance testN2-IAS-ADS-R106.

Temporary Modification 89-006Brevisedthevalveassemblies byeitherremoving/cutting thepipenippleandcapdownstream ofthesecondrootvalve,andsealweldingaplugtothesecondrootvalve,orremoving/cutting thesecondrootvalveandsealweldingacaptothenippleofthefirstrootvalve.ThedrainvalvessealedbyTemporary Modification 89-006Bwillbeleftasisastheyarenotrequiredfordepressurizing thetanksandinstrument lines.Thepressuretransmitter ventsareusedforthispurpose.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport,Page4of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-006Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0450-91 9.4-3,9.4-4;Figures9.4-1c,9.4-5Sh6ControlBuildingAirConditioning (HVC)ControlRoom/Relay RoomSmokeRemoval-Electrical Disabling of2HVC-HVU1 Description ofChange:Revision0ofSafetyEvaluation 89-006wasreportedinJune1990.Revision1addresses thedesignchangethatmadeTemporary Modification 89-057permanent.

Thepowerleadstomakeupairunit2HVC-HVU1 wereliftedfrom2NHS-MCC007 CUB7Bandthebreakerleftintheoffposition.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangemodifiesthecontrolbuildingsmokeremovaloperation.

Failureofsafety-related air-operated damper2HVC"AOD142 (failopen)withtheinadvertent operation ofmakeupairunit2HVC-HVU1 createsapotential foroutsideairtobeintroduced intothecontrolroomduringanaccident.

Toprecludetheinadvertent operation oftheunit,thepowerleadcableislifteduntilsuchtimeasneeded.Thereisnoimpactonsafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.ThereisnoTechnical Specification impact.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage5of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:89-010Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0072-93 Figure11.4-1bSolidRadioactive WasteRemovalof2WSS-RV320 Revision0ofSafetyEvaluation 89-010wasreportedinJune1990.Revision1addresses Temporary Modification 89-010asapermanent modification.

Thischangedeletedathermalreliefvalveinthesuctionpipingatthewasteconcentrate transferpumpwhichisintheevaporator bottomshandlingsystem.Whenthissystemwasoperating andbeingflushed,thethermalreliefvalvecausedoperational problems.

Thismodification removedthethermalreliefvalve,andaddedablankflangewhichmaintains systemintegrity withoutjeopardizing systemoperation.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangeenhancestheintegrity andperformance oftheevaporator bottomshandlingsystem.Whenthissystemwasoperational andbeingflushed,theflushingpressures wereliftingthethermalreliefvalveandthevalvewasnotreseating.

Currently, thesystemisusedonaninfrequent basisforshortperiodsoftime.Additionally, whenthesystemisnonoperational itisdrainedofprocessfluid,therefore precluding thesystemconfiguration thatwouldrequireathermalreliefvalveinthepumpsuction.Sinceathermalreliefvalveisnotrequiredandthepressureintegrity ofthesystemismaintained, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage6of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-047Rev.2L3Mod.PN2Y89MX038 Figures9.3-9cthru9.3-9e,9.3-12g,9.3-13Sh1,9.3-16Sh5,6,8,9System:TitleofChange:FloorDrainSumpsReplacement ofMiscellaneous CannedSumpPumpsDescription ofChange:Aspreviously reportedinOctober1991,Revision1ofSafetyEvaluation 89-047addressed thereplacement of57existingfloordrainsumppumpswithstandardoff-the-shelf submersible pumps.USARRevisions 3and4includedchangestoreflectthoseportionsofthemodification whichhadbeencompleted.

Revision3ofSafetyEvaluation 89-047addresses adecreaseinthescopeofthemodification from57to55sumppumps.USARRevision7reflectsthecompletion ofModification PN2Y89MX038.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Asdescribed intheOctober1991SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport,theequipment involv'ed inthismodification servesnosafety-related

function, anditsoperation orfailuretooperatedoesnotaffectsafety-related equipment.

Thefunctionoftheexistingfloordrainsystemandtheparameters underwhichitoperatesarenotchanged.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage7of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:90-021EDC2E10032Figure9.2-2Sh11ServiceWaterSystem(SWP)Revisionof2SWP"TE145ARB QACategoryThischangerevisedUSARFigure9.2-2Sheet11tochangetheQAcategorydesignation fortemperature elements2SWP"TE145ALB fromQACategoryItonon-QACategoryI.Thiswasaccomplished bychangingtheasterisk(")intheequipment marknumbertoadash(-)(i.e.,thenewdesignation is2SWP-TE145ARB).

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Temperature elements2SWP-TE145ALB areconnected tonondivisional (black)cablestoprovideservicewaterloopA8cBdischarge temperature inputstotheplantcomputer.

Theydonotserveanysafety-related function.

Theassociated thermowells 2SWP"TW145ASB aresafetyrelatedonlytoprovideapressureboundaryontheSWPsystempiping.Thismodification isadocumentation onlychangeanddoesnotadversely affecttheSWPsystemoritsabilitytosupportplantoperation.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage8of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:90-048Rev.354Mod.PN2Y89MX085 3.6A-34,3.6A-35,3.6A-36,Tables1.9-1Sh2,20,21,3.6A-1Sh1thru5,3.6A-2thru3.6A-71,3.9B-2xSh2,4,6A.9-3,6A.9-5,6A.9-6;Figures3.6A-12thru3.6A-49,6A.9-1,6A.9-3System:Feedwater (FWS),MainSteam(MSS),ReactorWaterCleanup(WCS),ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS),ServiceWater(SWP)TitleofChange:Description ofChange:NMP2SnubberReduction Revision2ofSafetyEvaluation 90-048wasreportedinOctober1991.Revisions 3and4provideadditional evaluation oftheNMP2snubberreduction program.Thesnubberreduction modification programreducesthenumberofmechanical'nubbers onNMP2safetyandnonsafety-related pipingsystemsbyreanalyzing thepipingsystemsforsnubberremovalorsnubberreplacement withstruts.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Duetofailureratesassociated withsnubbers, snubberremovalresultsinpipingsystemsthataremorereliable.

Otherbenefitsoftheprogramincludereducedlong-term maintenance, inspection andtestrequirements.

TheUSARisbeingupdatedtoreflectrevisedanalysiscriteriaandanalysisresults.NMP2Technical Specifications areunaffected.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage9of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:90-126Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC1-0187-91 N/ATechnical SupportCenterEmergency Ventilation SystemTitleofChange:Description ofChange:TSCMD-3HVACDamperTemporary Modification 5316consisted ofde-energizing thedampermotoractuatorandmechanically restraining damper212-41(MD-3)atapositionforaflowrateof3000cfma10%.Thischangewasevaluated underSafetyEvaluation 90-054,Rev.0,andreportedtotheNRCin1992.Thischange(SC1-0187-91) permanently de-energizes thedampermotoractuatorandmechanically retiresdamper212-41inafixedopenposition.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisdesignchangeisconsistent withtheapplicable systemdesignandqualityrequirements.

Basedonanalysisandperformance testing,thischangedoesnotaffecttheabilityoftheTechnical SupportCenterHVACsystemtoperformwithinitsdesignbasis.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage10of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:90-311Rev.0L1Mod.PN2Y88MX133 N/AMaterialHandling-RadwasteRadwasteCCTVCameraReplacement TheoriginalCCTVsysteminstalled intheradwastebuildingrequiredextensive repairsandmaintenance.

Theoriginalequipment becameobsoleteandspare/repair partswerenotavailable withoutspecialtoolingbythemanufacturer.

TheoriginalCCTVsystemwasreplacedwithanewsystem.Revision0alsoevaluated theadditionofaboom-mounted camera/channel tobeinstalled inthetruckbay.However,aftertheoriginalcamerasystemwasreplaced, itwasdetermined thattheadditional boom-mounted camerawasnotneeded.Revision1deletestheevaluation foranadditional camera.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheCCTVsystemintheradwastebuildingispassiveinnature.Thissystemallowsremotemonitoring ofprocesshandlingfromacentrallocation.

TheradwasteCCTVsystemisnonsafety relatedandtherearenoseismicorenvironmental requirements fortheinstallation.

Thenewequipment isinstalled tothesamestandards astheoriginalequipment.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage11of136SafetyEvaluation No.:IImplementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:91-074Rev.3EDC2M10304AFigure5.4-16bReactorWaterCleanupandControlRodDrive-Hydraulic TitleofChange:Description ofChange:CRDtoRWCUPumpsPipingInstallation Thischangeinstalled anewsourceofpumpsealinjection watertotheRWCUpumps.Theoriginalsourceofsealinjection waterwasfromtheRWCUpumpdischarge whilethenewsourceistakenfromtheCRDpumpdischarge.

Thisprovidesbettermechanical sealperformance fortheRWCUpumps.Theoriginalsealinjection sourcecanbevalvedinforRWCUpumpoperation whentheCRDpumpsarenotoperating.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepipinginstalled isseismically supported androutedsoasnottoimpactanyequipment requiredforsafeoperation andshutdownofthereactor.Theimpactofunmonitored flowintotheRWCUsystemhasbeenevaluated anddetermined tobeboundedbyexistinganalyses.

TheflowremovedfromtheCRDsystemwillnotadversely impactthesystem'sabilitytorechargethescramaccumulators.

Thesafetyclassification, design,performance, andreliability oftheCRDandRWCUpumpsarenotdegradedbythischange.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage12of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:91-076Mod.PN2Y89MX138 Figures1.2-15Sh2,9.5-6EnergyManagement System(EMS)InstallEIVISRemoteTerminalUnit(RTU)Thismodification installed anenergymanagement system(EMS)remoteterminalunit(RTU)atUnit2.TheRTUprovidesdataacquisition andtransferofthecurrentstatusoftheUnit2electricsystemtoadigitized databaseattheEMScontrolcenter.TheEIVISRTUpanel(2CEC-PNL817) housesthenecessary equipment toprovidesignalconditioning andtransmission ofdataviaadedicated phonelinetosystempowercontrol.Aninterface panel(2CEC-PNL816) wasinstalled tohousethenecessary relays,transducers andtestdevicesfortheincomingplantsignals.CableswereroutedfrompanelsP802,P805,P808andP869toobtainthestationgenerator andtransformer status.Theauxiliary relaysmultiplythecontactsforthe115-kVand345-kVmodification statusfromP852andP868.Allcableswereterminated firsttotestdevicestoallowforisolation duringmaintenance andtestingactivities.

Allconnections totheRTUaremadefromthispanel.Interface panelP816andRTUpanelP817havebeenlocatedonpanelmodule2CEC"APF733 inthelowercontrolroomel~288'-6".SafetyEvaluation Summary:EMSpanelsP816andP817willbeinstalled inaseismicCategoryIstructure.

Thepanelshavebeenclassified as04,whosefunctionisnotrequiredduringorfollowing aseismicevent,butwhosefailurecouldimpactthefunctionofasafety-related component.

Thepanelshavebeenseismically mountedinaccordance withRegulatory Guide1.29topreventthisoccurrence.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage13of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-085Procedures N2-OP-100A 5.N2-OP-100B Table4-1Sh3MaterialHandlingSystem(IVIHS)ReplacetheAlarmLightSystemwithAdministrative ControlsfortheEmergency DieselGenerator Cranes,2IVIHS-CRN2, 3,and4Description ofChange:Thedieselgenerator cranes'larm lightsystemreferenced intheUSARwasomittedfromplantdesignconfiguration.

Thefunctionofthealarmlightsystemwastoalertoperators whenthecranewasoutofitsstoredposition.

Theonlytimewhenthecraneloadisallowedtobeoversafety-related equipment wouldbewhenthedieselgenerator isdeclaredinoperative.

Thisisbasedoncalculation MS-1917whichseismically qualifies thecranesinthestoredpositiononly.Intheabsenceofthisalarmlightsystem,theoperators placeamarkuptagonthedisconnect switchforeachofthedieselgenerator cranes,asameansofcontrolling theuseandmovementofthecranesduringplantoperation.

Inadditiontothismeansofcontrolforthesecranes,operational procedures N2-OP-100A andN2-OP-100B havebeenrevisedtoincludeaprecautionary statement ontheuseofthesecranes.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theadministrative controlfortheuseofthedieselgenerator cranesisanacceptable andeffective meansofreplacing thealarmlightsystem.Thischangeinvolvesanalternative methodforthecontrolofthestoredpositionofthenonsafety-related dieselgenerator craneswhiletheplantisinthenormaloperating mode(withthedieselgenerators operable).

Thealternative methodforthecontrolofthestoredpositionofthecranesprovidesadequateassurance thattheoperability oftheemergency dieselgenerators willnotbeadversely affectedduringaseismicevent.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage14of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-086Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0256-91 Figure11.5-3dServiceWaterDeleteSolenoidValvesfromLiquidDRMSCabinetsDescription ofChange:Thisdesignchangeremovedsolenoidvalvesoriginally installed ontheliquidmonitoring skidstofacilitate anautomatic purgefeature.Theremovalofthesolenoidvalveseliminates flowrestrictions associated withlowflowproblems.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposeddeletionofthesolenoidvalvesdoesnotaltertheoperating designbasisorpostaccident monitoring requirements evaluated intheUSAR.Following deletionofthesolenoidvalves,theliquidmonitoring skidswillcontinuetomeetsystemdesignpressure, flowandtemperature requirements.

Thechangewillnotaffectthesafeoperation ofthesystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage15of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitfeofChange:Description ofChange:91-096Rev.1L3EDC2M10135Table3.9A-12Sh3;Figure9.3-20bNitrogenSystem(GSN)Deletionof2GSN"RV32A/B andRV34A/BThischangedeletedvalves2GSN"RV32A/BandRV34A/Bfromthenitrogensystem.Inordertodeletethesevalves,valves2GSN"V71A/B andV72A/Bwerelockedopensothatoverpressure protection couldbemaintained by2IASASV19A/B.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Withdeletionof2GSN"RV32A/BandRV34A/B,thischangewillmaintainoverpressure protection oftheautomatic depressurization systemN~supplylinesthroughvalve2IAS"SV19A/Bwithvalves2GSN"V71A/BandV72A/Blockedopen.Deletionofvalves2GSN"RV32A/B andRV34A/Bwillreducethenumberofvalvesrequiring in-service testingandeliminate valvesthatcouldhavepotential forproblemsinthefuture.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage16of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-003Calculation 2-SQ-007Table3.10A-1Containment Monitoring System(CMS)ReviseUSARTable3.10A-1forResistance Temperature Detectors (RTDs)ofCMSSystemDescription ofChange:Investigation revealedthatthedynamictestingperformed oncertainRTDssuppliedbyPYCO,underDesignSpecification C-041D,didnotreflectfieldinstalled conditions.

ThesubjectRTDsweretestedwiththermowells butwereinstalled withoutthem.Thissafetyevaluation evaluated theinstalled condition oftheRTDs.SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThesafetyfunctionoftheRTDsinthecontainment monitoring systemistomonitorthedrywellandsuppression chamberairandsuppression pooltemperatures, andprovideanalogsignalstothecontrolroomplantcomputerand"recorder, whichinturnprovidesahightemperature alarm.ThesubjectRTDs,whichwerediscovered installed withoutthermowells, havesubsequently beendynamically qualified bysupplementing theoriginaltestreportwithananalysis.

Theanalysisdemonstrates thatthesubjectRTDscanperformtheirintendedsafetyfunctionwhensubjected tothepostulated seismicandhydrodynamic loads.ThedetailsoftheanalysisareprovidedinNIVlP2Calculation 2-SQ-007.

Nodesignorfieldmodification isrequiredasaresultoftheanalysis.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage17of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-011Rev.1N2-OP-48Auxiliary BoilerSystemN/AServiceWater(SWP)andFireProtection-Water(FPW)TitleofChange:Alternate CoolingWaterSupplytoAuxiliary BoilerCirculating PumpSealCoolersandSampleCoolersDescription ofChange:Thisprocedure changepermitted theinstallation ofatemporary firehosefromfirehosereel2FPW-FHR32 toservicewatersystemdrainvalve2SWP-V1011 inordertosupplythesealandsamplecoolersoftheauxiliary boilercirculating pumpswhilethenormalsupplyofservicewaterwasisolatedduringRefueling Outage2.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thistemporary alteration willhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orcapability tokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdowncondition.

Theportionofservicewaterwhichnormallysuppliesthecoolingwaterandtheservicewaterisolation valveshallbothbeadministratively controlled byaprocedure.

Fireprotection capabilities arenotdegradedatanytime,becausesystempressureandflowwillbemaintained inthefireprotection systemwhilethisprocedure isineffect.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage18of136SafetyEvaluation No.:92-035Rev.1Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0098-92 9.5-62,9.5-63;Figures9.5-52b,10.1-3h,10.1-4dSystem:1TitleofChange:MainSteamandAuxiliary BoilerSystemsPermanent Removalof2lVISS-IVIOV19A

&.2IVISS-MOV19B Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangewasinitiated todocumentandprovideengineering direction forthepermanent removalofvalves2MSS-MOV19A and2MSS-MOV19B.

Theirfunctionwastoprovideisolation betweenthemainsteamandauxiliary boilersystems.Thesubjectvalveswerenormallyclosedandwereneverusedforproviding blanketing steamtotheirrespective moistureseparator reheaters duringstartup,heatupandplantcooldown.

Theinletandoutletpipingshallremaininstalled butcapped.Cables/interlock wiringwillberemovedasrequired.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orcapability tokeeptheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage19of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:92-037Rev.1,3Ec4Mod.PN2Y91MX005 9.4-50,9.4-53,9.4-56,10.4-17,10.4-18;Table9.4-1Sh4;Figures1.2-1,2.4-1,10.4-7d,10.4-7j,10.4-7k,10.4-7ISystem:TitleofChange:Circulating WaterSystem(CWS)CWSChemicalInjection andAnalysisFacilityDescription ofChange:Thismodification involvedconstruction ofanewfacilityforthestorageandinjection ofsulfuricacid,scaledispersant andcoppercorrosion inhibitor.

Thefacilityalsoincludesalaboratory tobeusedfortheanalysisofcirculating water,microbiology, anddieseloil.TheoriginalCWSacidinjection system,whichwasnotinuse,hasbeenabandoned inplace.Thetemporary CWSchemicalinjection system,whichwasusedtoinjectthechemicalintothecirculating water,hasalsobeendiscontinued.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification providesapermanent, reliableandwell-controlled CWSchemicaladditionsystem.Thissystemisnotrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant,andanyrealistic accidents/failures thatmaybeassociated withthischangewillnotadversely affectthedesignfunctionofanysafety-related structure, systemorcomponent.

Thechangedoesnotadversely impactsafeoperation and/orshutdownoftheplant.Afailureoftheinjection systemcouldimpactplantefficiency overaperiodoftime.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage20of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-045Rev.2LDCR2-93-UFS-170 9.1-32;Table9.1-4Sh2MHRAcceptability ofCAVSPANGantry/Manlift atNMP2Description ofChange:InanefforttoimproveALARAandimproveoutageefficiency, NMPCOperations purchased theCAVSPANsystemforrefueling outagereactorcavityandstoragepooldecontamination.

TheCAVSPANisareactorrefueling cavity-spanning gantry,designedbyAppliedRadiological

Controls, Inc.(ARC)andusedforsuspending workcagesinsupportofdecontaminating thereactorcavityandinternalstoragepool.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheCAVSPANwasreviewedperUSARAppendix9C"ControlofHeavyLoads"criteriaforacceptability foruseoverthereactorcavity.Basedonthisreview,itwasdetermined thattheCAVSPANwasacceptable foruseviatheseismicexception evaluation performed.

TheuseoftheCAVSPANsystemfordecontamination ofthereactorcavityandstoragepoolisanalternate methodfromthemethoddescribed inUSARSection9.14.2.7,whichdescribes theuseofthedecontamination platformforthesepurposes.

Thischangeincorporates adescription ofthealternate decontamination methodintoSection9.14.2.7.Thetemporary changeindecontamination technique forthereactorcavityandstoragepool,asdescribed inthisevaluation, willnotaffectnuclearsafety.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation

.SummaryReportPage21of136SafetyEvaluation No.:implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-047N/AN/ANRCEmergency Telecommunications System(ETS)TitleofChange:Reflection ofNRC/ETSUpgradeintheSiteEmergency PlanDescription ofChange:GenericLetter91-14directedlicensees toassistinimplementing anupgradetotheNRC'sEmergency Telecommunications System(ETS).Thisincludedreplacement oftheENS(redphone)withamorereliablephonesystem.Thisreplacement wasreflected intheSiteEmergency Plan(SEP),whichpreviously described theENSasadedicated phone(hotline) thatringsattheNRCOperations Centerwhenpickedup.Thenewphonerequiresdialinga10-digitnumberlistedonthephoneinstrument.

(Controlroomshavespeeddialcapabilities.)

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Replacement oftheENSwillenhancethereliability oftheENSandotherphonesinthesystembyutilizing theFederalTelecommunication Systems(FTS)2000network.ThischangetotheSEPwillnotaffectthesafeoperation orsafeshutdownofeitherUnit1orUnit2.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage22of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:92-051Rev.2N/A13.2-26System:TideofChange:N/AModification ofFireBrigadeContinuing TrainingDescription ofChange:TheannualFireBrigadetrainingconsisting of40hoursemergency corecoolingsystem(ECCS)and40hourselectrical distribution courseshasbeeneliminated.

FireBrigademembersstillreceivetrainingonECCSandelectrical distribution inordertomeettherequirements of10CFR50AppendixR.Brigademembersmeettherequirements bytakingIntroduction toBoilingWaterReactors(BWR),ECCS,andElectrical Distribution withintwoyearsofemployment.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thecontinued trainingprogramforFireBrigademembersdoesnotaffecttheabilityoftheBrigadetosuppressafire.BrigademembersstillreceivetrainingonECCSandelectrical distribution inordertomeettherequirements of10CFR50AppendixR.Removingthe80hoursofECCSandelectrical distribution continual trainingwillbringtheNineMilePointFireBrigadetrainingprograminlinewiththeindustryforplantswithadedicated firedepartment, whilemaintaining 10CFR50AppendixRcompliance.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage23of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-055Rev.2N/AFigures1.2-1,2.4-1,9.2-8a,9.5-1bN/ADemolition ofPresent"AreaComplex"BuildingandConstruction ofSwing/Unit TwoOperations BuildingDescription ofChange:TheUnit2operations buildingwasconstructed wheretheareacomplexbuildingwaslocated.Theareacomplexbuildingwasdemolished andthelandusedfortheinstallation oftheUnit2operations building.

Thischangeconsolidates operating activities fromvarioustemporary facilities.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theconstruction activityoftheUnit2operations buildingdoesnotimpactthepertinent licensing issuesevaluated intheUSARthatareassociated withhydrologic engineering.

Thepertinent issuesareflooding, localintenseprecipitation (probable maximumprecipitation),

andtheimpactontheairintakeaccidentX/0(CHi/0),theatmospheric dispersion coefficient.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage24of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:92-069SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0294-92 Figure9.2-17b-Condensate MakeupandTransfer/RemoveReliefValve2CNS-RV133 Thissimpledesignchangeremovedreliefvalve2CNS-RV133.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:IThissimpledesignchangewillnotimpactthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Thecondensate storagefacilitycondensate makeupanddrawoffsystemisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortosupporttheoperation ofanynuclearsafetysystem.Engineering evaluation indicates thatnopiping,components orequipment willbeoverpressurized bytheremovalofreliefvalve2CNS-RV133.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage25of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-072Rev.2N2-SOP-01, 02and03NIAStationBlackoutStationBlackout(Complete LossofAcPower)Description ofChange:Revision1ofthissafetyevaluation wasreportedOctober29,1993.Revision2ofthissafetyevaluation reflectsachangeforRCICroomhightemperature isolation bypass"fromtwohourstotwentyminutes"inaccordance withNMPCCalculation ES-268"RCICPump/Turbine RoomHeatAnalysisDuringStationBlackout."

SafetyEvaluation Summary:NUMARC87-00andRegulatory Guide1.155specifythestationblackout(SBO)durationthatplantsshouldbecapableofwithstanding.

Basedonareviewoftheonsiteandoffsitepowerdistribution systemsatNMP2,theplantmustmeeta4-hourcapability, withatargetemergency dieselgenerator reliability of0.975maintained.

ThereviewoftheNlVIP2SBOcapabilities addressed thefollowing:

~Thecorecoolingcapability ofinstalled systems.~Thesupportsystems(i.e.,pneumatic suppliesandstationbatteries).

Theavailability ofinstrumentation andcontrolstomonitorandcarryoutrequiredoperatoractions.~Potential limitations thatmayresultfromtheheatupofcertainareasoftheplantduringtheevent.Theresultsofthisanalysisshowthatwithcertainspecificoperatoractions,NMP2canoperatelongerthan4hourswithoutjeopardizing corecoolingorthecontainment capability.

Operatoractionsneededtoachievethiscapability include SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage26of136SafetyEvaluation No.:92-072Rev.2(cont'd.)

SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)

sheddingofnonessential batteryloads,maintaining manualRClCflowcontrolandthebypassing ofcertainRClCisolation logics.Theseactionsareaddressed intheSpecialOperating Procedures (N2-SOP-01, 02and03).Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage27of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-073SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0310-92 Figure10.1-6cReactorFeedPumpSealWater(FWP)ReactorFeedPumpSealWaterInstrumentation (FWPSystem)Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeaddedflowandtemperature monitoring instrumentation tothereactorfeedpumpsealwaterlines.Thisinstrumentation allowssealdegradation tobemonitored andallowssealreplacement asaplannedevolution andnotadramaticfailurewithresultant feedwater systemtransients.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theadditionoftemperature andflowinstrumentation tomonitorreactorfeedpumpsealwaterwillprovidegreaterreliability ofthenonsafety-related pumpsbyallowingmonitoring oftheseal'scondition inordertopreventpumpseal'*degradation fromadversely affecting pumpoperation.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage28of136SafetyEvaluation No.:implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-082SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0143-92 Figures9.2-3a,9.2-3gReactorBuildingClosedLoopCooling-CCPAdditionofVacuumBreakerstoExpansion TankOverflowLinesDescription ofChange:ThissimpledesignchangeaddedvacuumbreakerstotheoverflowlinesfromCCPexpansion tanks2CCP-TK1and2CCP-TK2.

Thiswasdonetopreventnegativepressureintheexpansion tanks,duetoflowintheoverflowlines,fromcausingspuriousalarmsand/ortripsoftheCCPpumps.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissimpledesignchangeenhancesthereliability oftheCCPsystemwhichhasnosafety-related functions.

TiesoftheCCPsystemtosafety-related components orsystemsareunaffected bythischange.Existingevaluations forspraying=and floodingenvelopanysprayingwhichcouldresultfromtheadditionofthevacuumbreakers.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage29of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:92-084SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0122-91 Figure11.2-1bRadioactive LiquidWasteSystemAddAirFilter2LWS-FLT3 Thissimpledesignchangeaddedairfilter2LWS-FLT3 upstreamof2LWS-SOV'1 69.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissimpledesignchangewillenhancethesystemreliability.

Theradioactive liquidwastesystemisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortosupporttheoperation ofanynuclearsafetysystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage30of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-088Rev.1N/A8.2-24,8.3-40bN/AAllowtheUseofCalculated VoltagesforACMOVStartingDescription ofChange:Thischangeallowstheuseofcalculated minimummotorstartingvoltagesforsafety-related valves.Thesevoltagesareusedindetermining ifthevalvecandevelopsufficient torquetooperateunderdesignconditions.

Calculation EC-154determines thestartingvoltageavailable atthemotorterminalforeachvalveintheGL89-10programunderdegradedvoltageconditions.

Thestartingpointforthecalculation isthesteadystatedegradedvoltagerelaysetpointfromCalculation EC-136.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theuseofthecalculated degradedvoltageisacceptable becausethemotorwillhavethisvoltageavailable undertheworstpossiblevoltageconditions.

Theuseofthesteadystatedegradedvoltagerelaysetpointtodetermine thevoltageavailable atthemotorterminals forstartingisconservative.

Ifthevoltagegoesbelowthesetpointofthedegradedvoltagerelay,thedieselgenerator forthatdivisionwouldstart.Thedieselgenerator wouldthensupplytheClass1Eloads.Calculation EC-154showsthatwhensuppliedfromthedieselgenerators, theMOVswouldhaveatleastasmuchvoltageavailable ascalculated fortheoffsitesource.Therefore, itisacceptable tousethecalculated minimummotorstartingvoltagetodetermine ifthevalvecandevelopsufficient torquetooperateunderdesignconditions.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage31of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-091DER2-92-0-0865, EDC2M00266Figure10.1-6eZincInjection Passivation System(ZIP)As-BuiltUpdate,TheAdditionofZincInjection Passivation SystemComponents Description ofChange:ProblemReportPR-08590andDER2-92-0-0865 statedthattheflush/vent connections locatedonboththesuctionanddischarge sideofzincinjection feedpumps2ZIP-P1AandP1B(2ZIP-SKD1) didnotappearonPAID6E.Inaddition, thesightflowglassesonthesuctionsidewerenotshown.Thecomponents beingaddedareoriginalsystemcomponents inadvertently leftoffthesystemP&ID.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisdocumentation changewillhavenoimpactonsafeoperation orsafeshutdownconditions.

Nophysicalchangesarebeingmadetothenonsafety-relatedZIPsystem.TheZIPsystemwillcontinuetofunctionasdesigned.

Documentation isenhancedbyproviding NMPCcomponent identification numbers.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation Summary'eport Page32of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-002SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0003-93

'igure5.4-9cReactorCoreIsolation CoolingSystem(ICS)DeletionofRCICTestLineThischangeisrelatedtothereactorcoreisolation coolingsystem(ICS).Duetorepeatedpinholeleakageattheteeconnection totestline2-ICS-750-65-2, thislinehasbeeneliminated.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisreview,whichincludedtheeffectsofthechangeonthesystem'soperability, reliability, maintainability, structural integrity, andsysteminteractions hasfoundthatthedeletionofthesubjectlinewillimprovethesystem'sreliability withoutcausinganysignificant safetyoroperability issues.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage33of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-005Rev.061N/A12.5-1,12.5-2;Tables1.8-2Sh3,9A.3-15;Figures1.2-1,2.4-1,9.5-1b,9A.3-1,12.3-3,12.3-18,12.3-36,12.3-51System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:IN/ANewUnit2AccessControlBuildingTheUnit2accesscontrolbuildingwasconstructed wheretheradiation protection trailer(74)waslocatedinsidetheprotected area,southoftheUnit2reactorbuildingandsouthauxiliary bayroof.Thebuildingwasconstructed tofacilitate implementation ofthesingle-point controlofentryintotherestricted area,enhancing theradiation protection measureatUnit2.Thebuildingisasingle-story, nonsafety-related structure consisting ofaslabongradeandhasatotalareaofapproximately 14,000squarefeet.Thisbuilding-providesofficefacilities forupto75personnel.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepertinent safetyissuesidentified inthissafetyevaluation areflooding, theimpactonthecontrolroomfreshairintake,radiological atmospheric dispersion coefficient, and,impact ofconstruction andbuildingloadsontheDiv.3ductbankEDB-922.Itcanbeconcluded, baseduponanalysis, thattheconstruction oftheUnit2accesscontrolbuildingdoesnotimpactthepertinent licensing issuesevaluated intheUnit1UFSARortheUnit2USAR.Revision0of,thesafetyevaluation addressed changestothefacilityasdescribed intheUnit2USAR.'Revision 1tothesafetyevaluation expandedthescopeandevaluation toaddresschangestothefacilityasdescribed intheUnit1UFSAR.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage34of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-010Rev.2Mod.PN2Y92MX003 9C.8-5;Tables3-1,3-2Sh3,3-4,4-1Sh2;Figure5-1System:TitleofChange:SRVRemovalPhaseIIIDescription ofChange:Thefollowing arechangesthathavebeenimplemented bythismodification:

1.Extendedthemonorailatel.305'-9n theprimarycontainment by4'-3"~~Thebusbarthatservicesthismonorailwasalsoincreased inlengthby4I3ff2.Theuseofanalternate craneinlieuofexistingcrane2MRH-CRN65 isnowallowed.Thealternate craneisanelectrical trolleyandchainhoistcranedesignated ascrane2MHR-CRN65X.

3.Amonorailsystemwasinstalled outsideofthenorthhatchwaytoservicethe261'loorelevation, andconsistsofa4-tonchain-operated trolleyandhoistcrane.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theimprovements beingmadebythismodification totheremovalandreplacement processoftheSRVsdonotaffectanysafety-related systems.Theextension ofthemonorailatel.305'-9"andtheuseofalternate crane2MHR-CRN65X intheprimarycontainment arebothconsidered andincludedintherevisedHeavyLoadAnalysis.

Theinstallation ofbothcraneandmonorailinthesecondary containment meetstherequirements oftheseismicevaluation ofnonsafety-related components insafety-related areas,anddoesnotaffectthesafetyandreliability ofNMP2.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage35of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:93-019SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0004-93 Figures9.2-1L,9.5-52a,9.5-52cAuxiliary BoilerSystem(ABM),ServiceWaterSystem(SWP)TitleofChange:Installation ofChesterton Mechanical Sealson2ABM-P1A&P1BDescription ofChange:DER2-92-3456 describes failureswhichoccurredtothepreviousmechanical sealsmanufactured byJohnCrane.Withthepreviousdesign,degradedsealwaterpassedthroughthesealfaces,scoringthesurfaceanddamagingtheseal,thuscausingsealfailure.Also,duringhotstandbyconditions, thewaterdrainedtotheboilerraisingthewaterlevelaboveacceptable limits.Toincreasesystemreliability, anewsealmanufactured byChesterton, designedwithanoutersealwatercoolingjacket,wasinstalled.

Thecoolingwaterisisolatedfromthesealfacescircumventing intrusion offoreignmaterial.

Newsealcoolingwaterinletandoutletpipingwasalsoinstalled.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orcapability toshutdownorkeeptheplantina'safeshutdowncondition.

TheABMsystemandtheaffectedportionoftheSWPpipingareclassified asnonsafety related,andarenotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperation ofthereactorsafetyfeatures.

TheABMandSWPwillcontinuetoperformtheirfunctionasdescribed inUSARSections9.5.10and9.2.1.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage36of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-020SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0049-93 Table9.4-4Sh4,5RadwasteBuildingVentilation RadwasteControlRoomNoiseImprovement Thisdesignchangewasrequiredtoreduceexcessive noiseintheradwastecontrolroom.Underthismodification, theexisting7.5hpreturn/exhaust airfans(2HVW-FN12Aand2HVW-FN12B) werereplacedwithnew3.0hpfans.Thenewsmallerfanshaveacapacitytoprovide10,700cfmat1200rpm.Thedrivesheaveandbeltonairhandlingunits2HVW-ACU2A and2HVW-ACU2B mayalsohavetobereplacedtoreducethespeedofsupplyairfanstoapproximately.1400 rpmifthedesiredspeedisnotachievedbyadjusting themotorbaseplate.

Thisisnecessary toprovideabalancedairflowbetweenthesupplyairandtheexhaustairside.Thenewfanmotorsarepoweredusingappropriately sizedmotorstartersandoverloadheaterstoprovidepropercircuitprotection.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisdesignchangewillimproveenvironmental workingconditions intheradwastecontrolroombyreducingnoiselevels.Theproposedchangedoesnotaffectorinvolveanysafety-related equipment intheplant.Allchangesunderthismodification areassociated withthenonsafety-related equipment.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage37of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-022SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0261-91 Figures11.3-1b,11.5-2Offgas(OFG)Offgas/DRMS ProcessFlowElement/Transmitter(s)

Replacement Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangereplacedthe6-52.5scfmrangeoffgasprocessflowelement/transmitter unitswithsimilarunitscapableofmonitoring flowovera15-150scfmrangeofprocessflow(aswellasproviding localindication).

Therequiredchangestotheoffgascabinetmicroprocessors toproperlycommunicate withthereplacement unitsisalsoincludedinthischange.USARFigures11.3-1band11.5-2havebeenrevisedtoshowtheflowtransmitters asflowindicating transmitters.

Additionally, USARFigure11.3-1bwascorrected toshowtheas-builtlocations fortheflowelements(whichwerephysically relocated fromtheoffgascharcoalabsorbertank(s)roomtoalowerelevation, inJune1986byStone5Webster;changepackagenoticeCPM-Y152).

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftheproposedchangeshasdete'rmined thattheimplementation ofthischangewillimprovetheoffgassystem'sreliability/

operability withoutcausinganysignificant safetyoroperability issues.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage38of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo;:USARAffectedPages:93-023Mod.PN2Y92MX004 1.2-31,9.3-2thru9.3-6,9.3-8thru9.3-10;Tables8.3-1Sh31,8.3-2Sh30,9A.3-6Sh6;Figures1.2-19Sh2,1.2-23Sh1,8.3-1,9.2-1n,9.2-3b,9.2-3g,9.3-1athru9.3-1c,9.3-2Sh1,2,5,12,13,9.3-3a,9.3-3c,9.3%,9.3-10g,12.3-14,12.3-47System:Instrument AirSystem(IAS),ServiceAirSystem(SAS),BreakingAirSystem(AAS)TitleofChange:Description ofChange:IASUpgradeThismodification upgradedtheexistinginstrument airsystem(IAS)byreplacing theexistingcompressors anddraintrapsandreplacing thecarbonsteelpiping,betweenthecompressors anddryerswithstainless steelpipe.Otherimprovements included:

relocation ofthepressuresensorforpressureindicator 2IAS-PI101 fromitspositionupstreamoftheIASprefilters toapointdownstream oftheIASairreceivertanks;providedatie-intothebreathing airsystem(AAS);providedameanstorepressurize theserviceairsystem(SAS)gradually afteraSASsystemoutage;andinstalled anewsupplylinefromtheIASsystemfortheSASsystemdownstream fromtheIASdryers.Theseimprovements reducedmoisturecarryover, improvedairquality,increased compressor availability, reducedsystemmaintenance, eliminated theneedtoupgrademajorcomponents intheAASsystem,andimprovedserviceairqualityandsystemdesign.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification improvestheIASsystembyproviding additional capacitytomeetcompressed airrequirements.

TheSASsystemisimprovedbytheadditionofasecondtapfromIASthatsuppliesdrycompressed airtotheSASsystem.Also,provision ismadetogradually repressurize theSASsystemafteraSASsystemoutage.TheAASremainsfunctional withnochangestocapacityorpressure.

TheAAScompressor isdeletedandtheIASsuppliessufficient airtotheAASsystemtoallowittofunctionasdesigned.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage39of136SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)93-023(cont'd.)

ThelASprovidesairtobothsafety-related andnonsafety-related components.

However,thesystemisnotconsidered asafety-related controlairsystemsinceallofthesafety-related components thatitsuppliesperformtheirsafetyfunctions withoutairorareprovidedwithsafety-related accumulators capableofsupplying therequiredquantities ofair.TheSASandAASareusedonlyfornonsafety-relatedequipment andcomponents duringnormalplantoperation.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage40of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-027Rev.1N2-FHP-14 9.1-23,9.1-41FNRLowerorRemoveFuel-Preparation MachineFull-Up-Stops Description ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation addresses thetemporary changeofthepositionoffuelpreparation machine(FPM)full-up-stops.

Thischangereducesthetime/exposure spentduringthetransferofnewfueltothespentfuelpool.Additionally, thisreducesthepotential forpersonalcontamination andplantcontamination.

Itisdesirable toloadnewfuelassemblies intothespentfuelpoolusingaFPMtoavoidcontamination ofthecrane.Thisisaccomplished bytransferring afuelassemblyfromthenewfuelinspection standtoaFPM.Thein-useFPMhasitsfull-up-stops set(orremoved)suchthatanewfuelassemblyloadedintoitscarriagehasitsbailhandleabovethespentfuelpoolwaterlevel.(Positive stoppingoftheFPIVIcarriageisperformed bytheendstopsontherollerchainmechanism).

Afterthecraneisdisconnected fromthenewfuelassembly, whichissittingintheFPM,theassemblywillbetransferred bytherefueling platformtoitstemporary storagelocationinthespentfuelstoragerack.Whenallthenewfuelhasbeenloadedintothespentfuelpool,theFPMmechanical stopsshallberepositioned intheiroriginallocation.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepurposeofthemechanical stopsistopreventthecarriageontheFPIVIfromliftingafuelassembly, channel,orbundletoaheightwherewatershielding islessthan7ft.abovethefuelbundle,channel,orassembly.

Themechanical stopsshouldonlypreventtheliftingofanirradiated fuelassemblyorbundletoaheightwherewatershielding islessthan7ft.aboveafuelbundleorassembly-not newunirradiated fuel.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage41of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:93-028SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0085-93 11.3-6;Figures11.3-1a,11.3-1bOffgasSystem(OFG)TitleofChange:RetireOffgasFlowSwitches2OFG-FS17A/B and2OFG-FS140 Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangedefeatedthecontrol,alarm,andannunciation functions offlowswitches2OFG-FS17A/B and2OFG-FS140, whichhaveahistoryofspuriously de-energizing hydrogenanalyzers 2OFG-AT16A/B and2OFG-AT115.

ThischangemadeTemporary Modification 89-053permanent.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theseflowswitchesarenotutilizedinthedetermination ofhydrogenanalyzeroperability requiredperTechnical Specification 3.3.7.10.

Thecircuitry toberemovedwillnotimpactanysafety-related or0-related equipment, norwillithaveanyadverseimpactonanyplanteffluents ortheeffluentmonitoring capabilities oftheenvironmental protection plan..Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage42of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-029SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0086-93 Figures9.3-3a,9.3-4Breathing AirSystem(AAS)RemovalofValve2AAS-SOV125 Thissimpledesignchangeremovedvalve2AAS-SOV125 fromtheclosedloopcoolingsubsystem fortheAASaircompressor.

Removalofthevalveallowscoolingtocirculate throughthecompressor atalltimesinlieuofonlywhenthecompressor isrunningasperoriginaldesign.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewofthischange,whichincludedtheeffectsofthechangeonthesystem'soperability, maintainability, structural integrity, andsysteminteractions, hasfoundthattheimplementation ofthischangewillnotadversely impacttheAASsystemorcauseanysignificant safetyoroperability issues,whileatthesametimereducingmaintenance associated withthevalve.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage43of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-030SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0434-91 Figure9.4-23Sh2HotWaterHeating(HVH)Expansion Tank2HVH-TK1LevelChangeforMakeupControlDescription ofChange:ThissimpledesignchangemadeTemporary Modification 88-231apermanent changetotheplant.Thechangeinvolvedtheadditionofajumperwireinlocalpanel2CES-IPNL203 (intheturbinebuilding) todefeattheswitchforthelowerlevelfloatoflevelswitch2HVH-LS114.

Thelevelswitchcontrolsthehotwaterheatingexpansion tanklevelcontrolband,anddefeating thelowerfloatswitchresultedinnarrowing thebandtotheupperswitchtripandresetdifferential.

Thischangereducedtheexcessive usageofnitrogengasinthetankduetothepreviouswideband(12inches)causingthereliefvalvetolift.Thiswouldresultfromthemakeuppumprefilling thetankwaterandcompressing thenitrogenenoughtoliftthereliefduringnormalsystemmakeupcycle.Thenarrowbandimplemented bytheTemporary Modification jumperadditionhasbeenproven(byfunctional testingofthehotwatermakeup)toreducetheexcessive nitrogenusage.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftheproposedchangetomakeTemporary Modification 88-231permanent wasperformed anddocumented intheanalysissectionofthesafetyevaluation.

Thereview,whichincludedoperability, availability, constructability andpotential systeminteractions hasdetermined thatthischangewillimprovethehotwaterheatingsystemoperation (byreducingtheexcessive usageofnitrogen) withoutcausinganysignificant safetyoroperability issues.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage44of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-032SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0084-93 Figure9.2-6aMakeupWaterSystemPermanent MakeupWaterSystemConnection forthePortableDemineralizer Description ofChange:Temporary Modification 87-2008controlled installation fortheuseoftheportabledemineralizer asprovidedwithintheecolochem trailer.Thetemporary modification alsodescribed hoseconnections tovalve2WTS-V261 andanewconnection installed upstreamofvalve2MWS-V42.

Temporary Modification 87-2008isbeing,cleared.Thissimpledesignchangemadepermanent thenewhoseconnections withisolation andsamplevalves,andrevisestheaffecteddrawingsaccordingly.

Theuseofthedemineralizer trailerandintermittent attachment ofthehosestoboththemakeupwaterandwatertreatingsystemswillnowbeprocedurally controlled asdescribed inN2-OP-15.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orcapability toshutdownorkeeptheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.

Themakeupwatersystemisclassified asnonsafety related,andisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperation ofthereactorsafetyfeatures.

Themakeupwatersystemwillcontinuetoperformitsfunctionasdescribed inSections9.2.3oftheUSAR.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage45of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:93-035N2-SOP-03 N/AServiceWaterSystem6OffsiteReserveAcPowerTitleofChange:ServiceWaterSystemDivisional Separation Associated with2SWP"MOVGOA/B, 3A/B,19A/B,93A/8,and599and2SWP"FV47A/BandFV54A/BDuringaLossofOffsitePowerDescription ofChange:N2-SOP-03 Sections1.3and2.3allowoperatoractiontooverrideopenservicewatervalves2SWP"MOVSOA/B, 3A/B,19A/B,93A/B,and599,and2SWP"FV47A/BandFV54A/Bduringalossofoffsitepower(LOOP).SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation istojustifyoverriding theservicewatersystemdivisional separation isolation valves2SWPMOV50A/B, 3A/B,19A/B,93A/Band599,and2SWP"FV47A/BandFV54A/BduringaLOOP.Thesevalvesarebeingoverridden open,duringaLOOP,tominimizetheplanttransient thatwouldresultifservicewaterremainsisolatedtothebalanceofplantsystems.Theplanttransient thatwouldresultifservicewaterremainedisolatedtothebalanceisdescribed inUSARSection15.2.6,LossofAcPower.Subsequent operatoractionisacceptable forrealigning theservicewatersystemintheeventaloss-of-coolant accidentoralossofanemergency dieselgenerator occurs.Theseactionsmaintaintheservicewatersystemanditsabilitytoperformitssafetyfunctions.

Thejustification fortheseactionsis:1)theyarethesafestactionsfortheplant,2)theapplicable Technical Specifications LimitingConditions forOperation 3.0.3and3.8.1.1.f areimplemented, and3)aplantshutdowniscommenced ontheinitiating event.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage46of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-038Rev.0,1L2SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0287-92 8.3-42a,8.3-70RCICInstallShortingBarsinLieuofOverloadHeatersforDcMotor-Operated ValvesDescription ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeinstalled shortingbarsinthethermaloverloadheater(TOL)circuitsforthedcIVlOVsintheGL89-10program.ThetripcontactsoftheTOLarebypassedbyanautomatic safetysignalorformanualoperation byholdingtheswitchintheoperateposition.

Althoughtheoverloadheater'stripcontactsarebypassed, theoverloadheaterphysically remainsinthepowercircuit.Thisincreases thevoltagedropfromthepowersourcetothevalvemotor.Replacing theTOLswithshortingbarswillalsoremovetheresistance oftheTOLsfromthepowercircuit.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Replacing theTOLswithshortingbarswillensurethatsufficient voltagewillbeavailable atthedcMOVsasshowninelectrical calculation disposition EC-154-01C.

Asaprecautionary measureforvalveprotection, thevalve'sstroketimewillbemonitored duringperiodictesting.Afteranymaintenance onthevalves,appropriate postmaintenance testingwillbeperformed.

Ifitisshownthatthemotoroperatorwassubjected toanoverloadcondition, thenprocedures willrequirethatitbeanalyzedforoperability.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage47of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-046Mod.PN2Y91MX027 Figures5.4-13d,5.4-13eResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)AddValvestoRHSCondensing LinesThismodification installed manualisolation valves(onevalveineachloop)intheRHSsteamcondensing supplylinesbetweentheloopheatexchanger andthepressurecontrolvalvesPV21A(B).

ThischangewasmadeduringtheR-3refueloutage.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheproposedchangetotheRHSsteamcondensing supplylineswillenhancethesysteminthefollowing ways:Theinstallation ofthemanualisolation valveswilleliminate theneedtoin-optherespective loopheatexchanger duringvalveseatleakagetest(VSLT)andmaintenance ofthelinevalves.Thetimepreviously requiredtodrainandrefilltheheatexchangers willbesaved.2.Havingbothloopheatexchangers available duringVSLTofoneloopincreases theoperator's flexibility byallowinguseofbothshutdowncoolingloops.3.Maintenance canbeperformed onsupplylinevalvesmuchmoreeasilyandmanremexposurerates,willbelower.Installation ofnewsupportsand/orremovalofsnubberswillbeperformed inaccordance withallapplicable procedures, codes,andcriteriaestablished inSafetyEvaluation 90-048(NMP2SnubberReduction Modification Program).

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage48of136SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)93-046(cont'd.)

Theproposedchangeissafetyrelated;however,therewillbenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.TheRHSsystemdesignbasesspecified inUSARSection5.4.7.1,andthefunctional designbasisofthereactorsteamcondensing modespecified inUSARSection5.4.7.1,willnotbechanged.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage49of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-047SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0070-92 5.4-36,6.3-15;Figures5.4-13a,5.4-13b,6.3-7aSystem:ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS),LowPressureCoreSpray(CSL)TitleofChange:ValveModification toPreventPressureLockingDescription ofChange:ThischangeaddedsmallborepipingtothreevalvesintheRHSsystemandonevalveintheCSLsystem.Thispipingpreventsbonnetpressurelockinginthesevalves.ThesechangesweremadeduringtheR-3refueloutage.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedchangetovalves2RHS"MOV24A, 24B,24Cand2CSL"MOV104willallowthesevalvestoperformtheirintendeddesignfunctions.

Theproposedchangesaremadetosafety-related components.

Asentenceisaddedtothevalves'escription toindicatethatthevalveshavebeenmodifiedtopreventbonnetpressurelocking.Basedontheevaluation performedit isconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage50of136SafetyEvaluation No.:93-048implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:N/A9A.3-53bCarbonDioxideFireProtection SystemElimination ofPuffTestRequirements Thischangeremovedtherequirement toperformaflowtest(commonly knownasa"puff"test)aspartoftheCO,systemfunctional test.Removalofthispartofthefunctional testisincompliance withNFPA12,CarbonDioxideExtinguishing Systems.SafetyEvaluation Summary:NFPACode12-1993,Section1-10,doesnotsuggestthataCO~systemnozzlepufftestbeperformed atregularintervals aspartofasystemfunctional test.NMP1performed thisflow,orpuff,testevery6monthsasaconservative actioninfunctional testingoftheCO~system.Additionally, thesystemsareroutinely (monthly) visuallyinspected asdescribed inNFPA12,Section1-10.3A.Thesefunctional testsandmonthlyvisualinspections providesufficient systemoperability checks.Todate,pufftestinghasfoundnosystemnozzleorpipingtobeblocked.Theremovalofthepufftestremainsincompliance withNFPAcodeswhichareappropriate perNRCBranchTechnical Position(BTP)CMEB9.5-1,positionC.6.a.Thischangedoesnotchangethereliability ofthecarbondioxideextinguishing systemortheabilitytoachieveandmaintainsafeshutdownintheeventofafire.Nofieldworkisrequiredasaresultofthischange,andnooperability concernsorprocedures areaffected.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage51of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-050SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0033-93 5.4-25,Table6.2-56Sh2,3,4,5,6,7,11CCP,DFR,ICS,RHSGearSetChangesforVariousMotorOperatedValve(MOV)Actuators Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangechangedoperatorgearsetsofsafety-related MOVstoprovideasufficient thrustwindowtousethevalveoperation testandevaluation system(VOTES)diagnostic equipment fortestingofMOVswithinthescopeofNMP2'sGenericLetter(GL)89-10program.Asaresultofoperatorgearsetchanges,valveclosurestroketimeshavebeenincreased.

Areviewofmechanical, radiation protection andengineering safeguard calculations ensuredthatthesehigherstroketimesdonotadversely impactplantsafety.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissimpledesignchangeinstallsnewoperatorgearsetsinsafety-related MOVstoaccommodate GL89-10testing.ThiswillensurethattheMOVswillperformtheirintendedsafetyfunctions duringand/orfollowing designbasisaccidents.

Actuatorsizingcalculations performed duringdesignbasisreviewsinaccordance withtheGL89-10programverifythattheMOVswillnotoperateoutsideoftheirdesignortestinglimitsduetooperatorgearsetchanges.Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoadverseeffectonthesafeoperation orshutdown'of theplant.Postinstallation MOVstroketimetestinginaccordance withsiteprocedures willverifyvalveoperability.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage52of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-051SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0096-93 Figures5.1-2a,7.7-8ReactorVesselInstrumentation (ISC)EnhancedMonitoring ofRPVLevelInstrument Reference LegsDescription ofChange:Thischangeprovidedfortwoadditional analogRPVlevelsignalstotheEmergency ResponseFacility(ERF)computersystemfromchannelsCandDofthenarrowrangeseriesofvesselinstruments.

Thesetwosignals,alongwiththetwoexistingchannelAandBsignalsinthesystem,allowoperations tobettermonitor,asrequiredperNRCBulletin93-03,fordiscrepancies, inaccuracies ornotchinginRPVlevelindications causedbydegassing intheinstruments'eference legswhenthevesselisdepressurizing.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThelevelsignalsprovidedtotheERFcomputerbythischangeareeitherelectrically isolatedfromtheirsafety-related sourceorwillhavenoadverseloadingeffectonthetrips,isolation functions oftheirassociated components, orcircuits.

Theproposedchangewillnotimpactanysystemsorcomponents important forsafetyofthefacilitynorwillthischangehaveanyimpactontheplant'seffluents oreffluentmonitoring capabilities.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage53of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-052Rev.1N/A1.10-139, 1.10-140ICS,RHS,GTSDeletionofHeliumLeakTestPreviously, thereactorcoreisolation cooling(RCIC),residualheatremoval(RHR),andstandbygastreatment (GTS)systemsoutsidetheprimarycontainment wereleaktestedbyhelium.TheRCICandRHRheliumtestswerereplacedbyasystemwalkdown/inspection forleaksduringsystemoperational orhydrostatic testing.TheGTSsystemheliumleaktestwasmodifiedtotestonlytheportionofthesystemwhichoperatesatpositivepressure.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheNMP2commitment providedforleaktestingeitherbyphysicaltestingorsystemwalkdownforleaksduringoperation testing.Thewalkdownalternative, however,islimitedtoliquidsystemsonly.Therefore, RCICandRHRaretestedusinghelium.Byredefining ourcommitment forthesteamportionofthesystem,itispossibletodeletetheheliumtestandusevisualinspection forleaksasavalidmethodforleakdetection forRCICandRHRsystems.ThebulkoftheGTSsystemoperatesundervacuum,andintegrity ofthisportionofthesystemisindirectly verifiedbytheGTSsurveillance tests(drawdown andin-leakage).

Therefore, theheliumleaktestingisnotrequiredfortheportionofthesystemwhichoperatesundervacuum.However,leakdetection (visualinspection withaleakdetection agent)fortheportionoftheGTSsystemwhichoperatesatpositivepressureisrequiredtomeettheexistingcommitment.

Thischangemeetsthecurrentregulatory requirement.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage54of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-053N2-PM-W3N/AMainTurbineAlternate MethodofPerforming theMainTurbineMechanical Overspeed TripTestDescription ofChange:Thisprocedure changeallowstheuseofarigexternaltothefrontstandardtosprayturbineoilintotheconcentric ringofthemechanical overspeed device.Thisisbeingperformed tocompensate forabrokenoillinetothenozzleoftheoiltriplocatedinthefrontstandard.

Thischangealsoalteredthefrequency ofthetestfromweeklytobi-monthly.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theuseofthisrigperformsthefunctionofsprayingtheoilintotheringasadequately asthenormalmethod.Thefrequency forperformance ofthiswaschangedfromweeklytobi-monthly forALARA,heatstress,riskofincident, andhumanfactorsconcernsandisbasedonsoundengineering judgement.

Changingthemethodofperforming thetesthasnoimpactonthemechanism foritisnotthedeliveryoftheoiltotheconcentric ringthatcausestheaction,buttheoilintheringwhichthencausescentrifugal forcestoovercomespringtension.Duetothisreasontheabilityofthemechanical overspeed protection devicetoperformitsfunctionisnotalteredorimpaired.

Changingofthis.frequency doesnotimpactthefailureprobability ofthemechanism, onlyitsdetection.

Thefrequency changehasnodetrimental effectsonthealternate testmethodology so,therefore, hasnoeffectonthemechanical overspeed mechanism.

Inaddition, theUSARstatesthattheoverspeed protection controlhasnoimpactonnuclearsafety,sotheimplementation ofthischangewillinnowayadversely affectthecapabilities oftheturbinegenerator overspeed protection systemtoperformitsfunction.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage55of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-054Rev.0,162Mod.PN2Y89MX135 9.5-64,9.5-66;Figures9.5-52a,9.5-52c,9.5-53Sh5System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:Auxiliary BoilerSystem(ABF,ABH,ABM)Auxiliary BoilerSystemUpgradeThismodification madethefollowing changestotheauxiliary boilersystem:Modifiedthefeedwater pumpsuctionpipingtoeliminate pumpcavitation problems.

Relocated thesodiumsulfiteinjection pointfromtheauxiliary boilerstothedeaerator inordertoprotectthepipingbetweenthedeaerator andtheauxiliary boilersfromoxygenattackandtoreducetheburdenontheoperators.

Replacedthefeedwater discharge pipingduetocorrosion.

Addedamanualflushlineforthephosphate feedlineinordertopreventfutureplugging.

Addedabypasslinearoundauxiliary steampressurecontrolvalves2ABM-PV11A/B tofacilitate startup.Addedisolation valvestotheauxiliary boilerpressureinstrumentation treestoallowformaintenance ofthedevices.Abandoned inplacepHinstrumentation loops2ABD-10Aand2ABD-10B.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thesechangesweremadetoupgradetheauxiliary boilersystemtoimprovesystemreliability anditscapability tosupporttheplantoperations.

Thesechangeswillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplantsincetheaffectedsystemisnonsafety related,isnotrequiredtoachieveormaintainsafeshutdown, isnotrequiredforsafereactoroperations, anddoesnotdirectlyinterface withanysafety-related systems.Furthermore, thechangesareconfinedtothenonseismic auxiliary boilerbuildingwhichdoesnotcontainanysafety-relatedcomponents; therefore, indirectinterface betweentheproposedchangesandsafety-related systemsisprecluded byphysicalseparation.

Finally,all SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage56ofl36SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)

93-054Rev.0,i&.2(cont'd)pipingchangeshavebeendesignedinaccordance withtheoriginaldesignbasisanddonotintroduce pipingtoanareawhichdidnotpreviously containthistypeofpiping.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion:

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage57of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-057Rev.0,1L2Mod.PN2Y93MX001 3.9B-S,3.9B-23,9.1-27,9.1-30,9.1-31,9C.3-4,9C.3-5;Tables3.9B-2nSh3,9.1-2,9.1-4Sh1;Figure9.1-7,9.1-25System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:N/ARefuelBridgeUpgradesThissafetyevaluation evaluated refuelbridgeupgradesimplemented underModification PN2Y93MX001.

Thismodification addressed theservicepolecaddysystem(SPCS)scopeandthereadoutassemblyscope.ServiePoladTheSPCSisanattachment totheexistingrefueling bridge.TheSPCSconsistsofahandlingplatformontherefueling bridgeandasetofhi-torque servicepoles.Theplatformstoresandalsoprovidesamotorized hoisttohandlethehi-torque poles.Thehandlingplatformisattachedtoarigidframewhichisattachedtothesouthendoftherefueling bridge.ReadouAssemblScoeThepositionreadoutassemblywasrelocated fromtheeastsideofthecontrolconsoletothewestsideofthecontrolconsole.Thesupportbracketishingedtoallowforpositionadjustment.

Inthepreviouslocation, thereadoutassemblydisplaybecameanobstruction totheoperators duringvariousin-coreevaluations.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theimprovements beingmadebythismodification totherefueling bridgedonotaffectanysafety-related system.Theelectrical activities arenotsafetyrelated.Therefueling platformwiththeSPCSstructure hasbeenseismically/dynamically re-evaluated andisconsidered QualityCategoryQ5.Theservicepolecaddyhoistcapacityis1/4ton;therefore, theHeavyLoadCriteriaspecified inNUREG-0612 andreferenced inUSARAppendix9Cdonotapply.TheUSARanalysisinChapter9andAppendix9Carestillbounding.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage58of136SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)

93-057Rev.0,1L2(cont'd.)

Theservicepolecaddysystemisanauxiliary platformattachedtotherefueling platform.

Itisusedtocarryservicepolestodesiredlocations overthereactorcavitytoperformunderwater servicing activities onreactorequipment, suchasshroudheadboltsremovalandinstallation, steamlineplugsinstallation andremoval,andunderwater cameramanipulation.

Therelocation ofthereadoutassemblyfromtheeastsidetothewestsideofthecontrolconsoledoesnotaffectthestructural analysisoftherefuelbridge.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage59of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:93-058Rev.0L1Calculation H21C-027Procedure N2-MPM-GEN-R901 USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:9.1-36FHSRemovalofReactorCavityShieldPlugsA,B,C,andDat40%orLessReactorPowerDescription ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation evaluated theUSARchangesandtheimpactoftheNMP2designasaresultoftheremovalofreactorcavityshieldplugsA,B,CandDat40percentorlessreactorpower.Areviewofthestructural considerations regarding theremovalofthetopfourshieldplugsindicated thattheremovaloftheseplugswillnotaffectthestructural integrity ofthisshieldplugbarrier.Specifically, theseismicandtornadodesignloadsthattheoriginaleightplugbarriersweredesignedforwillnotbeexceededbyhavingonlythelowerfourplugsinplacewhenat40percentorlessreactorpower.Theradiological considerations regarding theremovalofthesefourplugs(A,B,CandD)havebeenevaluated viacalculation H21C-027andresultinaprojected accumulated doserateperoutageworkerfarbelow10CFR20limits.Thepotential increaseincumulative doserateduetothisshieldplugchangewasreviewedandapprovedbytheNlVlP2ALARACommittee onJune17,1993.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheremovalofreactorcavityshieldplugsA,B,CandDat40percentorlessreactorpowerdoesnotaffectthestructural integrity oftheshieldplugbarrier.Theradiological effectsoftheproposedchangehavebeencalculated anddetermined tobenegligible forradiological consequences totherefueling operators duringnormalrefueling operations.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage60of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-059Temporary Mod.93-042N/AHighPressureCoreSpray(HPCS)JumperControlSignalfor2CSH"MOV118Atemporary jumperwasinstalled inthecontrolcircuitoftheHPCSsuppression poolsuctionvalve2CSH"MOV118tosimulateaclosedvalvesignalfromtheHPCStestreturnvalve2CSH"MOV112.Thisprovidedapermissive signalfor2CSH"MOV118toopeneventhoughvalve2CSH"MOV112 wasdeenergized and/orstrokedopen(notclosed).With2CSH"MOV118capableofopening,theHPCSiscapableoftransferring waterfromthesuppression pooltothereactorvesselandmeetstherequirements ofTechnical Specification 3/4.5.1.c.

TheHPCScanbedeclaredoperablewithout2CSH"MOV112 functioning, whichallowsittoberepairedandtestedpriortotherefueling outage.'afety Evaluation Summary:TheHPCSsystemcanbeconsidered operablesincethisjumperinstallation willallowittoperformitsdesignedfunctions withoutanyimpactfrom2CSH"MOV112 onthesystem'sflowrates,pressures, responsetimes,flowpaths,orsetpoints.

Thejumperwillnotaffectanyothercomponents orsystems.Therepairsandtestingof2CSH"MOV112canbeperformed safelypriortotherefueling outage.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage61of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-062Rev.08c1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0038-93 9.1-28,9.1-29,9.1-29a,9.1-32,9.1-37thru9.1%0,9C.6-1;Tables3.2-1Sh7,9.1-2,9.1-4Sh1,3-3Sh1,2,3(App.9C);Figures1.2-10Sh2,9.1-19a,9.1-20a,9.1-25,9.1-27,5-2(App.9C),12.3-12,12.3-45System:TitleofChange:FuelHandlingSystem(FHS)RefuelFloorImprovements

-RPVStrongback

Carousel, WetliftSystem,MainSteamLinePlugsEcKevlarSlingsDescription ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation evaluated theimplementation offourkeyimprovements intherefuelfloorequipment handlingandservicing methodsusedforvesselopeningandclosingactivities duringrefueling operations.

Specifically, thefourchangeswereasfollows:Useofreactorpressurevessel(RPV)headstrongback carouselcapableofliftingthevesselhead.(Thesimultaneous liftingofvesselhead,closurestudhardware, tensioning equipment, andthecarouselandallassociated equipment hasbeenevaluated andwillbeimplemented following additional relatedmodifications totheplant.)2.Useofnewwetliftsystemthatconsistsofadryer/separator spreaderbeamwithair-actuated liftpins,fourturnbuckles forleveladjustment, andtwopairsofmatched-length Kevlarslingseachwithaspecialshackletomatchtheturnbuckles.

3.UseofnewGEREM"lightsteamlineplugstopermitthelocalleakratetesting(LLRT)oftheMSIVstobeperformed inthedirection ofthenormalsteamflowwiththereactorvesselandcavityflooded.4.Useoflightweight Kevlarslingsforliftingreactorshieldplugs,WCSfilteranddemineralizer plugs,storagepoolplugs,drywellhead,insulation frame,storagep'oolgate,andfueltransferbridge.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage62of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Description ofChange:(cont'd.)

93-062Rev.05.1(cont'd.)

Thedesignofthisnewhandlingandservicing equipment meetsthesingle-failure proofcriteriaofNUREG-0612.

Theuseofthisnewequipment reducesthetimerequiredtomanuallyperformthecorresponding riggingattachment activities associated witheachcomponent duringrefueling.

Thistimesavingsresultsinanetreduction inpersonnel exposuretoradiation/contamination.

Thenewwetliftsystemwillallowthewettransferofthedryerwhichprovidesadditional shielding viathefloodedreactorcavity.Thenewmainsteamlineplugsaredesignedtobeinstalled underwater fromtherefueling bridge.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thealternate liftingequipment forvesselopeningandclosingactivities associated withrefueling operations hasbeenprovidedconsistent withthecommitments toNUREG-0612, whichisreferenced inUSARSectionAppendixSC.Thenewmainsteamlineplugshavebeenprovidedassafetyrelatedandareboundedfromanaccidentstandpoint bythefuelroddropaccidentasdescribed inUSARSection15.7.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage63of136SafetyEvaluation No.:)mpiementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-0633.1-27,4.1-2a,4.6-25ControlRodDriveControlBladeReplacement Thereplacement of21controlbladespreviously installed intheUnit2reactorwasrequiredinordertomeetshutdownmarginrequirements inCycle4.Inadditiontotheseblades,theaccelerated replacement ofanadditional 12bladesreducedthespreadofactivated cobaltthroughout theplantandallowedforsomeradioactive decayofcobaltinthesebladespriortoburial.Someradioactive decayofcobaltinthesebladesreducestheirdisposalcosts.TheStellitepinsandrollersusedinthepreviousdesignweremajorcontributors toincreasing radioactive doseratesintheplant.Thecontrolbladestobereplacedwereselectedbasedonnuclearconsiderations andtheblades'oncentration ofactivated cobalt.Atotalof33All-B4Ccontrolbladespreviously installed werereplacedwitheightGeneralElectricDuralife215and25Marathoncontrolblades.SafetyEvaluation Summary:CertaincontrolbladesmustbereplacedtoensurethatthereactorcanbeshutdownnextcycleasdefinedintheTechnical Specification basisforshutdownmargin.Thehighcobaltstainless steelAll-B4CcontrolbladeswithStellitepinsandrollerscurrently usedwillbereplacedwithlowcobaltstainless steelcontrolbladeswithInconelpinsandrollers.Thiswillreducethespreadofactivated cobaltthroughout theplantandreducefuturecontrolbladedisposalcosts.Thereplacement ofcertainAll-B4CcontrolbladeswithDuralife215andMarathoncontrolbladeswillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.TheNRCperformed asafetyevaluation reviewoftheMarathoncontrolbladeandconcluded thatitisacceptable foruseasacontrolbladeinaBWR.AllofthefeaturesintheDuralife215controlbladehavebeenreviewedandapprovedbytheNRConothercontrolbladedesigns.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage64of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:"93-064SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0153-92 9.5-43,9.5-44Div.IIIDieselAirStartSystem(EGA)RevisetheSetpoints fortheDivisionIIIDieselAirStartAirCompressors andAirReceivers Description ofChange:ThissimpledesignchangereducedtheDivisionIIIdieselairstartsystemaircompressor startpressurefrom230psigto215psig.Previously, thecompressors startedat230psigandstoppedat240psig.Thischangemaximizes thedifferential betweenthestartandstoppressures toreducecompressor cyclingandreducecompressor wear.Thenewsetpointmaintains sufficient margintothe190psigminimumpressurerequirement inTechnical Specification Section4.8.1.1.2.a.8.

Thischangealsoreducedtheairreceiverlowpressurealarmfrom225psigto200psigtocoordinate alarmsetpoints withoperating pressuresetpoints.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangewillincreasethedifferential betweenthestartandstoppressuretoreducecompressor cyclingandreducecompressor wear.Thischangewillalsoreducetheairreceiverlowpressurealarmtocoordinate alarmsetpoints withoperating pressuresetpoints.

Thenewsetpoints remainconservative inrelationtosystemoperating requirements andwillmaintainsufficient margintoensureTechnical Specification requirements aremet.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage65of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-066Rev.1N2-OP-728.3-11EHSMomentary Paralleling ofMotorControlCenter(MCC)MainorTieFeederBreakerswithKirkKeyInterlocks Description ofChange:Thischangeallowsthemomentary paralleling ofpowersuppliestothemotorcontrolcenters(MCC)duringapowertransfer, inlieuofadeadbustransferbytheuseofKirkKeys.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheMCCsaredesignedwithdualfeeds;eachfeederissizedtocarrytheentireloadoftheMCC.Themomentary paralleling wouldhavenoeffectontheoperation oftheequipment asthepowersupplieswouldbesynchronized becausebothpowerfeedersareconnected tothesamepowerandtheexistingcoordination isadequate.

Thisprocedure changewillenhancetheavailability oftheMCCs.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded'that thischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage66of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-067Temporary Mod.93-046N/AOffgas(OFG)Temporary BypassoftheOffgasCharcoalFiltersDescription ofChange:TheoffgasfiltersshownonPAID42Chaveexperienced hightemperatures beyondnormallimits.Thistemporary modification installed analternate bypasslinetobypassandisolatethecharcoalfilterstomitigatetheconsequences ofacharcoalfire.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheoffgassystemandtheradiological releaselimitshasbeenperformed.

Thealternate temporary bypassing ofthefilterswillallowquenching ofthecharcoalfirewithoutcausingtheoffgasradiological releaselimitsthroughthemainstacktoexceedtheTechnical Specification limits.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage67of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-068Rev.0,1Ea2Temporary Mod.93-047N/AOffgas(OFG)NitrogenInsertion intotheOffgasCharcoalFiltersDescription ofChange:TheoffgasfiltersshownonPSID42Chaveexperienced hightemperatures beyondnormallimits,withindications offireinthecharcoalbeds.Thistemporary modification introduced nitrogenintothefilterstomitigatethehightemperature condition.

Thenitrogensupplysourcewasatankertruckwithtubing,valves,andinstrumentation.

NotethatthecharcoalfilterswereisolatedviaTemporary Modification 93-046priortonitrogeninsertion.

ThepurposeofRevision2wastoverifythatthecharcoalfirewascompletely extinguished andthatre-ignition wouldnottakeplacewhenthefilterswereplacedbackintoservice.Thiswasaccomplished bygradualadmission ofdryairintothefiltersafterhavingreasonable assurance thatthecharcoalfirehadbeenputoutasmonitored bymeasuring thecarbonmonoxideconcentration andcharcoalfiltertemperature.,

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheoffgascharcoalfiltersandthesystemhasbeenperformed.

Thischangeistomitigatetheconsequences ofthecharcoalhightemperature conditions.

Sincethecharcoalfilterswillbeisolatedpriortotheuseofthistemporary modification, noadverseimpactonthesystem'sfunctional capability isintroduced.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthis-change doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage68of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:93-069GAP-POL-01, QAP-POL-1.01, NLAP-POL-01, NTP-POL-500 USARAffectedPages:13.1-3,13.1-5,13.2-1;Figures13.1-1,13.1-2,13.1-5;AppendixBSystem:TitleofChange:N/ANuclearQualityAssurance, Licensing, andTrainingOrganizational Reporting Structure-RevisedProcedures GAP-POL-01 andQAP-POL-1.01 Description ofChange:TheNuclearQualityAssurance, Licensing andTrainingBrancheswerereorganized asfollows:thepositionofVicePresident NuclearQualityAssurance hasbeeneliminated andthenewpositionofGeneralManagerSafetyAssessment, Licensing, andTrainingestablished.

Theorganizational structure oftheQualityAssurance, Licensing, and.Training organizations haschangedsuchthattheManagersQualityAssurance Units1and2,Licensing, andTrainingreportdirectlytotheGeneralIVlanager SafetyAssessment, Licensing, andTraining.

TheManagerQualityAssurance Supportreportsadministratively totheManagerQualityAssurance Unit2,butretainsfunctional responsibilities forbothunits.Priortothischange,theIVlanagers QualityAssurance Units1and2andtheManagerQualityAssurance SupportreportedtotheVicePresident NuclearQualityAssurance; theManagerLicensing reportedtotheExecutive VicePresident Nuclear;andtheManagerTrainingreportedtotheVicePresident NuclearGeneration.

Functions currently performed bytheQualityAssurance, Licensing, andTrainingorganizations arenotaffectedbytherevisedreporting structure.

NOTE:SeesummaryforSafetyEvaluation 93-127,Rev.1,forsubsequent organization changes.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thechangesmadetotheorganizational structure ofQualityAssurance, Licensing, andTrainingcontinuetoprovidefortheintegrated management ofactivities tosupporttheoperation andmaintenance ofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2.Clearmanagement-control andeffective linesofcommunication andauthority betweentheorganizational unitsinvolvedinthemanagement, operation, andtechnical supportfortheoperation ofNineIVlilePointUnit1andUnit2continuetobe SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage69of136SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)93-069(cont'd.)

provided.

TheManagersQualityAssurance Units1and2retainoverallauthority andresponsibility fortheQAProgramfortheirrespective units,andtheGeneralManagerSafetyAssessment, Licensing, andTrainingwillhaveseniormanagement responsibility forQualityAssurance, Licensing, andTraining/Emergency Preparedness activities, allowingfortheelimination oftheVicePresident NuclearQualityAssurance position.

TheManagersQualityAssurance Units1and2,Licensing andTraining, willhavedirectaccesstoresponsible corporate management atalevelwhereactionappropriate tothemitigation ofqualityassurance, licensing andtraining/emergency preparedness concernscanbeaccomplished, andsufficient independence fromcostandscheduleismaintained.

Basedonthisevaluation, theorganizational structures oftheQualityAssurance, Licensing, andTraining/Emergency Preparedness organizations continues tosatisfytheacceptance criteriaofSRP13.1.1,SRP13.1.2-13.1.3, SRP17.1,SRP17.2andUnit1and2Technical Specification 6.2.1,anddoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage70of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-070SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0039-93 9.1-37;Figure3.8-8PCBAdditionofJackingBlockstotheDrywellHeadDescription ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation evaluated theimplementation offourjackingblocksonthedrywellheadforthepurposeofproviding ameansviahydraulic jackstoassistthepolarcraneinremovingthedrywellhead.Thepreviousmethodofremovingtheheadwiththepolarcraneresultedintheswayingofthedrywellheadasthebindingbetweentheheadandthechimneysectionissuddenlyrelievedasthecraneliftsthehead.Thefourhydraulic jackshavebeenequallyspacedaroundthebaseofthedrywellheadandareconnected toacommonpumpunittoensurethattheyactsimultaneously andevenlyliftthehead.Thedesignofthefourjackingblocksenvelopsthecasewherethedrywellhead'weightiscarriedbythefourjacks.Theintentofthejacksistoprovidetheadditional controlled upliftforcetoovercomethefrictional forcebetweentheheadandthechimneysectionasthepolarcraneliftstheheadoutofthechimneysection.Throughtheuseofthesejacks,whichassistthepolarcraneinliftingthedrywellhead,theswayingoftheheadduringtheliftiseliminated.

Thepolarcranewillremainastheprimaryliftingdeviceforthedrywellhead.Therefore, theJackingblocksandjacksarenotrequiredtomeetthesingle-failure proofcriteriaofNUREG-0612 forheavyloads.Theweldingofthejackingblockstotheexteriorofthedrywellheadisnotconsidered pressureboundaryweldingandweldingwasdoneinaccordance withASMESectionIII,1971throughSummer1973Addenda.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theadditionofthefourjackingblocksonthedrywellheadtoimprovethepresentmethodofdrywellheadremovaldoesnotaffectthecommitment toGuideline fortheControlofHeavyLoadstNUREG-0612) asdescribed inUSARAppendix9C.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage71of136SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)93-070(cont'd.)

Theweldingoftheblockstothedrywellheaddoesnotaffectthedrywellhead'functionasaprimarycontainment boundary.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage72of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:93-073Procedure N2-OP-62Procedure N2-OSP-CNT-M001 USARAffecte'd Pages:System:TitleofChange:NIADBAHydrogenRecombiner Deactivation of2HCS"MOV1A,18,3Aand38Description ofChange:10CFR50AppendixJrequiresTypeCtestingof2HCS"MOV4A, 48,6Aand68forprimarycontainment penetration leakageandrequiresthetestpressurebeappliedinthesamedirection thevalvemustfunctiontoprecludeleakageinanaccident.

However,reversedirection testingispermitted ifitcanbedemonstrated thatsuchtestresultsareequivalent ormoreconservative thanforwardpostaccident direction testing.TheHCSinboardisolation valves2HCS"MOV4A, 48,6Aand68areflexiblediscgatevalvesandwerereversedirection testedinawaythattestresultsarenotequivalent ormoreconservative thanresultsobtainedusingforwardpostaccident direction testing.Therefore, outboardisolation valves2HCS"MOV1A,18,3Aand38weredeactivated intheclosedpositiontomaintainprimarycontainment integrity.

Thissafetyevaluation evaluates theoperability ofHCSfollowing implementation oftheactionsassociated withTechnical Specification 3.6.3.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Sincetheleak-tightness ofHCSinboardisolation valves2HCS"MOV4A, 48,6Aand68cannotbeconfirmed, thesevalvesaredeclaredinoperable.

Therefore, HCSoutboardvalves2HCS"MOV1A,18,3Aand38needtobetemporarily deactivated intheclosedpositiontomaintainprimarycontainment integrity untilsuchtimethattheinboardisolation valvescanbeTypeCtestedsatisfactorily toensureprimarycontainment isolation requirements aremet..TheHCSoutboardisolation valveswillbedeactivated intheclosedpositionbyopeningtheirrespective breakersat2EHS"MCC102 and2EHS"MCC302.

Thesebreakerswillbeadministratively controlled andbeallowedtobeclosedonlywhen SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage73of136SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)93-073(cont'd.)

HCSoperation isrequiredperOperating Procedure N2-OP-62.

However,itisrecognized thatinaccordance withTechnical Specification LCO3.6.3,andapplicable

footnote, thattheoutboardisolation valvesmaybeactivated onanintermittent basiswithadministrative control.Requiredsurveillances willbemaintained currenttoassureHCSoperability.

ClosingthebreakersasrequiredbyN2-OP-62willensurethatprimarycontainment pressures andtemperatures areconsistent withthedesignpressureandtemperature ofHCS.TheMCCshavebeenevaluated foraccessibility.

WalkingpathsforanoperatorfromthecontrolroomtotheMCCsandfromtheOSCtotheMCCshavebeenanalyzedtodetermine theradiation dosesthattheoperatorwouldreceive.ItisexpectedthatthetimerequiredforanoperatortowalkfromthecontrolroomtotheMCCs,closethebreakersandreturntothecontrolroomis10minutesorlessandfromtheOSCtotheMCCs,closethebreakersandreturntotheOSCis15minutesorless.AseparateoperatorwillwalktoeachMCC.Theresulting doseshavebeenevaluated anddetermined tobewithintheacceptable limitsasdefinedintheStandardReviewPlan(NUREG-0800)

Section6Aandmeettherequirements ofGDC19in10CFR50AppendixA.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage74of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-074Temporary Mod.93-040N/AFireProtection

-Water(FPW)Connecting FireProtection SystemtoCondenser TubeFlushRigDescription ofChange:Thistemporary modification permitted theinstallation ofatemporary firehosefromfirehosereel2FPW-FHR14 fortheflushingofthemaincondenser tubesduringrefueling outage3.Theconnection atthefirehosereelrequiredtheinstallation ofanangleY-gatewithtwovalves;onetoisolatethefirefighting hoseandanothertoisolatethetemporary firehoseusedfortubeflushing.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thistemporary modification willhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orcapability tokeeptheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.

Fireprotection capabilities arenotdegradedatanytime,becausesystempressureandflowwillbemaintained inthefireprotection systemwhilethistemporary modification isineffect.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage75of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-076Rev.1Calculation No.A10.1-E-116 3.9A-27aRHR,RCIC,LPCS,HPCSValveAirLeakagetoWaterLeakageCorrelation Description ofChange:Thischangeallowssomeofthereactorcoolantsystempressureisolation valvestoutilizetheirType"C"airtestleakagedatatosatisfythehigh-pressure waterleakratetestrequirement.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:AnanalysiswasmadeoftheairleakageandwaterleakagedatatakenatNMP2from1986to1992,andfromthisanalysisanempirical correlation wasdeveloped toconverttheType"C"airtestleakageratetoahigh-pressure waterleakrateinordertomeettherequirements ofTechnical Specification 3.4.3.2.Thisanalysiswillhavethepractical effectofeliminating thehigh-pressure waterleakagetestforcheckandglobevalvesthathavebeenType"C"airtested,andtheleakagerateconverted towaterleakageusingthecorrelation meetsexistingacceptance criteria.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage76of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-077N/AN/A115-kVOffsitePowerSourcesReplace115-kVCircuitBreakers(R50,R60,R115andR225)atScribaStationDescription ofChange:Thismodification replacedthefour115-kVcircuitbreakersatScribaStationwithbreakersofthesameelectrical rating.Thereplacement breakersareofdifferent designsothatpreviousbreakertripsassociated withthebreakerhydraulic systemwereeliminated.

Theworkwasscheduled suchthatboththemainandfeederbreakerforone115-kVlinepositionwerereplacedatthesametimesothatonlyasinglelineoutagewasrequired.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification enhancesoperation ofthe115-kVoffsitesupplysystembyreplacing existingcircuitbreakerswithmorereliableunits.Thismodification willhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Theworkwillbeperformed whiletheunitisshutdown;therefore, therequirements ofTechnical Specification 3.8.1.2willbemetbyensuringthatoneotheroffsitesupplylineandatleastoneotherdieselgenerator willbeavailable.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage77of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-078Rev.08c1Temporary Mod.93-024N/AIAS,AASTemporary Compressors fortheIASUpgradeModification Description ofChange:Thischangewasrelatedtotheinstrument airsystem(IAS)andthebreathing airsystem(AAS)asdescribed inUSARSection9.3.Itwasrequiredtobeimplemented tofacilitate theimplementation ofpermanent Modification PN2Y92MX004, Instrument AirSystemUpgrade.Aspartoftheabove-referenced permanent modification, theplant'sexistingaircompressors havebeenreplacedandtheplant'spermanent breathing aircompressor hasbeeneliminated.

Thepurposeofthistemporary modification wastoinstalltwotemporary aircompressors tosupplytheplant'sinstrument andbreathing airneedswhilethenewpermanent compressors werebeinginstalled.

Basedonacompressed airavailability/reliability review,Operations requested tohavecheckvalvesinstalled onthetemporary airlinestoreducetheloadonthepermanent IAScompressors intheeventofalinebreakorlossoftemporary airwhiletheplantisoperating.

Inaddition, atemporary hosewasinstalled fromtheoutletof2IAS-DRY1B totheinletof2IAS-FLT3B, bypassing existingplantpiping.Thischangefacilitates permanent tie-instobeimplemented asdirectedbythepermanent modification.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheIAS,AAS,andotherinterfacing systemshasbeenperformed.

Nuclearsafetywillnotbecompromised asthesafety-related components suppliedbythesetemporary aircompressors donotrelyonairtoperformtheirsafetyfunction, orareprovidedwithsafety-related accumulators capableofsupplying theamountofrequiredairfortheperformance oftheirsafetyfunctions.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage78of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitfeofChange:93-079Temporary Mod.93-025N/ASAS,IASTemporary SASCompressor fortheIASUpgradeModification Description ofChange:Thischangewasrelatedtotheserviceairsystem(SAS)andtheinstrument airsystem(IAS)asdescribed inUSARSection9.3.Itwasrequiredtobeimplemented tofacilitate theimplementation ofpermanent Modification PN2Y92MX004, Instrument AirSystemUpgrade.Aspartoftheabove-referenced permanent modification, theplant'saircompressors havebeenreplaced.

Thepurposeofthistemporary modification wastoinstallatemporary aircompressor tosupplytheplant'sserviceairneedswhilethenewpermanent compressors werebeinginstalled.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheSAS,IAS,andotherinterfacing systemshasbeenperformed.

Nuclearsafetywillnotbecompromised asthelossofserviceairwillnotaffecttheplant'ssafeshutdowncapability ortheplant'sabilitytomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage79of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-080SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0102-93 9.1-7a;Figures9.1-3,5-2(App.9C);Table3-3Sh3(App.9C)System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:FNS(NuclearFuelStorage)ControlBladeStorageFrameThischangeprovidedadesignforasafety-related storageframe(2FNS"FRM1)whichsupportsthreenonsafety-related controlrodbladeracks(2FNS-RAK19, 2FNS-RAK20, and2FNS-RAK21).

Theframewasplacedonthespentfuelpoolfloorandprovidesstorageforanadditional 30controlrodblades.Theadditional storagelocationallowsforreplacement ofoldcontrolrodbladeswithnewcontrolrodbladeswithoutdelaytotherefueling process.Placement ofthestorageframeandthethreecontrolrodbladerackswithinthespentfuelpoolwasaccomplished byuseofthemainhoistofthereactorbuildingcrane.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theadditionofthecontrolbladestorageframeandthreecontrolbladeracksenhancestherefueling processforthereplacement ofcontrolrodblades.Theframealsoprovidesstorageforthecontrolrodbladesuntilarrangements foroffsitestoragearemade.Thestorageframeshallbeclassified asanuclearsafety-related component, designedandanalyzedtothesametechnical criteriaasspecified inUSARSection9.1forthespentfuelstorageracks.Theliftingoftheframeandracksshallbeaccomplished utilizing themainhoistofthereactorbuildingcrane,whichisofsingle-failure proofdesign.TheliftingriggingshallmeetthecriteriaprovidedinNlVIPC'scommitment totheguidelines fortheControlofHeavyLoads(NUREG-0612) andtherequirements ofANSIN-14.6.Thischangetothearrangement inthespentfuelpoolshallhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheUnit2reactor.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage80of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-082SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0011-.93 Figures1.2-10,9.1-25,5-2(App.9C),12.3-12,12.3-45System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:SCA,MHFAccessControlBuilding, RefuelFloorThissimpledesignchangeinstalled anaccesscontrolbuildingontherefuelfloorofthereactorbuildingatel~353'-10".

Theaccessbuildingisusedasanofficeprimarily byRadiation Protection forcontrolling accesstoandactivities ontherefuelfloor.Thedesignated storagelocationfortwojibcranes,onestoragepoolplug,andreactorshieldplugswasrevisedtoaccommodate thenewbuildingandavoidphysicalinterference.

Electrical powerrequiredforbuildinglighting, recepticals, exhaustfan,andheatingandcoolingunitsissuppliedbythenormalplantacdistribution system..SafetyEvaluation Summary:Therefuelfloorstructure, usedtosupporttheaccessbuilding, alongwithsystemsusedtosupporttheoperation ofthebuilding, havebeenevaluated anddetermined nottobeadversely impactedbythischange.Thebuilding, whichisclassified asnonsafety related,hasbeenevaluated inaccordance withNuclearEngineering Administrative Procedure NEP-DES-243 sinceitisbeinglocatedinasafety-related area,anditwasdetermined thatnocomponents relatedtosafetywillbeimpactedbythebuildingduringaseismicevent.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage81of136SafetyEvaluation No.:implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-083N2-EPM-GEN-V582 Table7B-1Sh5SCAChangingtheTestingCycleforNon-Class 1ERedundant Protective DevicesWithinPGCCFromEachRefueling Outageto18MonthsDescription ofChange:USARTable7B-1wasrevisedtoindicatetestingwillbeperformed ontheredundant protective circuitbreakerswithinPGCConan18-monthcycleinlieuofthecurrent"eachrefueling outage."Therewerenoequipment, installation oroperating changes.Thischangeallowstestingoftheseprotective deviceson18-monthcyclesinsteadofeachrefueling outage.Thereisnoneedtotestthebreakersduringrefueling outages;theycanbetestedduringnormalplantoperations.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Non-Class 1Ecablesroutedindivisional ductsareinstalled ingroundedflexibleconduit.Flexibleconduitisnotconsidered asaseparation barrier.Inordertosatisfytherequirement theredundant circuitbreakerswereprovidedforprotection ofClass1EcircuitsinPGCCdivisional ductsfromnon-Class 1Ecircuitrunsinflexibleconduit.Therespective circuitsprovidelightingandconvenience outletpowertocontrolroomandrelayroomPGCCpanels.Thereisnospecified frequency fortestingofthecircuitbreakerswithinRegulatory Guide1.75orIEEEStandard384-1974.

NMPCselfimposed"eachrefueling outage"inacommitment totheNRCin1986.The18-monthcycleiswithinageneralrefueling outagescheduleof18months.Therefore, changingofthetestfrequency fromeachrefueling outageto18monthshasnoimpactonthebreakerperformance becausethetimeintervalisnotchanged.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage82of136SafetyEvaluation No.:93-085Implementation DocumentNo.:Procedures N2-FHP-13.1, N2-FHP-13.2, andN2-FHP-3USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:15E.2-1Refuel,NuclearFuel,Reactivity ControlModification oftheNMP2Reload/Offload Procedures Description ofChange:TheNMP2coreoffload/reload procedures wererevisedtoincludethefollowing changes:~FourexposedfuelbundlesaroundeachSRMwillbeunloadedafterthespiraloffloadpatternhasbeencompleted.

Conversely, fourfuelbundleswillbeloadedaroundeachSRMbeforethespiralreloadpatternhasbegun.Addedacontingency foraninoperable SRMintheprecautions sectionoftheoffload/reload procedures.

Duringcoreoffload/reload, withallrodsinserted, theRPScircuitry maybeincoincident logic(i.e.,shortinglinksinstalled).

Beforeacontrolrodiswithdrawn, theRPScircuitry shallbeplacedinanoncoincident configuration.

Theinstructions forremoving/installing theRPSshortinglinksduringreloadwasmovedtoProcedure N2-FHP-13.2, Attachments 3and4,respectively.

Duringcorereload,aholdouttagwillbeplacedonthecontrolrodwithdrawal pushbutton.Thisprovidesadministrative controlstoassureallcontrolrodsremainfullyinserted.

~Acoreoffload/reload sequencemapwasaddedtoprocedures N2-FHP-13.1 andN2-FHP-13.2, respectively.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage83of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Description ofChange:(cont'd.)93-085(cont'd.)

~Instructions todefeattheSRMperiodalarmsweremovedfromN2-FHP-3totheendofN2-FHP-13.1.

Likewise, theinstructions torestorethealarmsweremovedtothebeginning ofN2-FHP-13.2.

~Instructions willbeaddedtoN2-FHP-3, the"Refueling Manual,"toplacetheRPSinnoncoincident modepriortoperforming theshutdownmargintest,anditshallbeinanoncoincident configuration forallcontrolrodmanipulations priortothedemonstration ofshutdownmargin.RPSwillberestoredtocoincident modefollowing shutdownmargintesting.Severalofthesechangessavetimeduringcoreoffloadandreloading.

Otherchangeseliminate problemsthatcouldbecomecriticalpathfortheoutage.Additionally, byplacingtheRPSincoincident mode,surveillance andmaintenance activities thatpreviously suspended coremovementorthathadtowaituntilrefueling wascompletecannowbedoneconcurrent withoffload/reload activities.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedchangestotherefuelprocedures willnotresultinanunreviewed safetyquestion.

EachchangefollowstheNMP2licensing basisrefueling requirements.

Inaddition, industryrecommendations havebeenreviewedand,whereappropriate forNMP2,havebeenincorporated intothesuggested changes.Specifically; therequirements ofTechnical Specifications 3/4.1and3/4.9,GESILs068and372,GERICSIL039,GEPRC89-10andNSAC/164L willbemetbythesechanges.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage84of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-087SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0105-93 Figure5.4-9cReactorCoreIsolation Cooling(ICS)Replacement ofSteamTrap2ICS-TRP1 Thissimpledesignchangewasinitiated todocumentandcontroltheworkactivities associated withthereplacement ofreactorcoreisolation steamtrap2ICS-TRP1.

Theprevioustrapdidnotperformitsintendeddesignfunction.

Replacement wasrequiredwithatypebetterdesigned, thusmorereliable.

Thereplacement trapisnotprovidedwithadrainconnection; therefore, theexistingdrainlinewasremoved.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeshutdownorthecapability tokeep'theplantinasafeshutdowncondition.

Thefunctionorthemethodofperforming thefunctionoftheICSsystemisnotdegradedatanytime.Materials ofconstruction, designandinstallation requirements areconsistent withtheoriginaldesignofthesystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage85of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-088Rev.0L1N/A9A.3-3,9A.3-4,9A.3-31N/AAdoptionofNFPA-600PhysicalFitnessRequirements forFireBrigadeDescription ofChange:ThischangemodifiedtheFireBrigadephysicalfitnessrequirements toreflectthecurrentconsensus standardaspublished bytheNationalFireProtection Association (NFPA600).SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thephysicalfitnessrequirements forFireBrigademembersincludedarequirement foranannualagilitytest.Thisrequirement wascontained inNFPA1001,astandardwhichwasapplicable tomunicipal firedepartment firefighters.

In1991,NFPAapprovedtheissuanceofNFPA600toaddresstherequirements ofindustrial FireBrigadeorganizations, suchastheoneatNineMilePoint.Thisevaluation adoptsthephysicalfitnessrequirements fromNFPA600forapplication totheFireBrigade.Sincethequalifications outlinedinNFPA600satisfyrequirements delineated in10CFRAppendixR,SectionIII.H,nodegradation willresultfromthischange.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage86of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-089GAP-POL-01, Rev.0413.1-13,13.6-1;Figure13.1-2N/ANuclearSecurityandProcurement Organizational Structures

-RevisedProcedure GAP-POL-01 Description ofChange:TheNuclearSecurityandProcurement BranchesofSiteSupportwerereorganized asfollows:1~TheManagerNuclearSecurity's neworganization iscomprised ofthefollowing DirectReports/Sections:

GeneralSupervisor NuclearSecurityOperations Supervisor NuclearSecuritySupportNuclearSecurityInvestigators Supervisor NuclearSecurityAdministration Supervisor AccessAuthorization/Fitness-For-Duty

~TheManagerProcurement's neworganization iscomprised ofthefollowing DirectReports/Sections:

Supervisor Procurement Engineering GeneralSupervisor Inventory Management Supervisor IVlaterial Receipt,Test,andInspection Supervisor Warehouse andStoreroom Operations GeneralSupervisor Purchasing Thediscussion anddepiction ofpositions reporting directlytotheIVlanager NuclearSecurityweredeletedfromSection13oftheUSAR.TheNRC-approved PhysicalSecurityPlanincludesanorganization chartandfunctional descriptions ofresponsibilities andrelationships forkeypersonnel positions intheNuclearSecurityBranch.ChangestothePhysicalSecurityPlanareimplemented pertheprovisions of10CFR50.54(p).

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage87of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Description ofChange:(cont'd.)93-089(cont'd.)

NOTE:Subsequent organization changeswereevaluated underSafetyEvaluations93-127,94-010and94-016.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thechangesmadetotheorganizational structures ofNuclearSecurityandProcurement continuetoprovidefortheintegrated management ofactivities tosupporttheoperation andmaintenance ofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2.Clearmanagement controlandeffective linesofcommunication andauthority betweentheorganizational unitsinvolvedinthemanagement, operation, andtechnical supportfortheoperation ofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2continuetobeprovided.

Basedonthisevaluation, theorganizational structures ofNuclearSecurityandProcurement continuetosatisfytheacceptance criteriaofSRP13.1.1andSRP13.6anddonotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage88of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-090Rev.0L1Mod.PN2Y93MX003 4.6-7,4.6-8,4.6-8a,7.2-5,7.2-5a,7.2-5b;Figures4.6-5a,5.1-2aSystem:TitleofChange:ControlRodDrive,ReactorInstrumentation ReactorVesselInstrumentation Reference LegBackfillDescription ofChange:Thismodification addedaflow-controlled backfilltofourreactorvessellevelinstrumentation reference legs.Thebackfillwasintendedtopreventdissolved noncondensable gasfromcollecting inthereference legsandcreatingafalsehighlevelmeasurement.

Backfillflowwastakenfromcontrolroddrivepumpsdischarge,

filtered, metered,andpassedthroughthereference legs.Thismodification wasmadeinresponsetoNRCBulletin93-03.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftheproposedchangeswasperformed.

Thereview,whichincludeddesign,operability, andpotential systeminteractions, hasdetermined thattheimplementation ofModification PN2Y93MX003 willimprovetheresponseofthelevelinstrumentation onreduction ofreactorpressurewithoutcausinganysignificant safetyoroperability issues.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage89of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:93-092Calculations PR(C)-26-G Rev.0,2-93-004, H21C-029USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/AFHSAllowingWorktoProceedintheUpperElevations oftheDrywellWhileRemovingReactorCoreControlBlades,LPRMs,andOtherNonfuel-Irradiated Components Description ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation evaluated theUSARandtheimpactontheNMP2designasaresultofallowingpersonnel toworkintheupperareasofthedrywellduringthemovementofnonfuel-irradiated hardware.

Thefunctionofthisreviewwastoassurethatradiation workerscouldsafelycarryontheirdutiesduringtherefueloutage.TheNMP2unitmaybeoperatedsafelywiththeimplementation ofthechange.Thechangehasbeenevaluated withrespecttoALARAconsiderations, allowingworktoproceedinthedrywellduringirradiated component movement.

Althoughthischangecouldhaveresultedinanincreased doseratetotheindividual radiation worker,engineered (fueltransfershieldbridge)andprogrammatic controlswereinplacetominimizeanyimpact.Theprojected accumulated doseperoutageworkerremainsfarbelow10CFR20limits.Section15oftheNMP2USARprovidesthedesignbasisanalysisfortheradiological consequences ofpostulated accidents.

Calculations supporting theseanalyseswerereviewed.

Theradiological conditions ofanyoftheanalyzedaccidents, asrequiredinNUREG-0800 (Standard ReviewPlan),arenotaffectedbythischange.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Basedonthereviewandanalysesperformed, allanticipated effectsofthischangeonplantsystemsandsetpoints havebeenreviewedandfoundtobeboundedwithinexistingUSARevaluations.

Thischangeallowsthemovementofirradiated hardwarewithoutadversely impacting permanent plantmonitoring systems.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage90of136SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)93-092(cont'd.)

Radiation willcontinuetobemonitored byexistingplantinstrumentation.

Theactivities havenoactivefunctionrelativetoplantsafeshutdownortoquantitative monitoring ofreleasesofradioactive materialtotheenvironment.

Theproposedactivities havenoimpactonanyeffluentstreams.Thebasisforcontrolling movementofirradiated components istolimitradiation exposuretooperators duringthenormaloperation ofNMP2incompliance with10CFR20.Irradiated hardwareremovalwillnotcreatethepossibility ofadifferent typeofaccidentorequipment malfunction different thancurrently evaluated intheNMP2USAR.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage91of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-093Procedure N2-TlP-HVR-5001 N/ASystem:TitleofChange:ReactorBuildingVentilation (HVR)RemovingUnitCoolers2HVR"UC408A

&.Bor2HVR"UC409A

&BfromServiceSimultaneously forTestingperN2-TTP-HVR-5001 Description ofChange:GenericLetter89-13requiresthatheatexchangers cooledbyservicewaterberegularly testedtoevaluatetheiractualcapacityagainstdesign.Testingofthedivisional switchgear unitcoolers2HVR"UC408A

&Band2HVR"UC409A

&.B,locatedintheauxiliary bays,requiredthatbothunitcoolersinoneswitchgear roombeoutofserviceforshortperiodsoftime.Thissafetyevaluation addresses theacanddcdivisional switchgear equipment operability concernsraisedbythistestingmethod.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theunitcoolersfortheacanddcdivisional switchgear roomsmaybothberemovedfromservicefortestinginaccordance withthisprocedure.

Adedicated operatorwillensurethattheoperableunitcoolerisreturnedtoservicewhenthe'roomtemperature reaches95'F.Thisensuresthatcoolingisestablished priortotheroomtemperature reachingthe104'Facanddcdivisional switchgear equipment qualification limit.Therefore, thistestmethoddoesnotimpairthesafeoperation oftheplant,safeshutdown, fireprotection, jetimpingement, CategoryIIOverI,ALARA,equipment qualification, controlroomhabitability, fuelanalysis, equipment clearances orseismicqualifications.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage92of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-094Temporary IVlod.93-050N/AServiceWaterSystem(SWP)2SWP"PSX1003A InternalDiaphragm Replacement Description ofChange:Thistemporary modification repairedswitch2SWP"PSX1003A withnoncertified parts(diaphragm and0-ring)andreturnedittooperation.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thesafety-related functionofvalve2SWP"FV47A istoisolateCWSfromSWPunderalossofoffsitepowercondition.

Theproposedchangedoesnotaffectthesafety-related parameters ofthevalvesincethemechanical portionofthisswitchisisolatedfromtheportionsofthevalveproviding thesafety-related function.

Failureoftheswitchdoesnotinhibitthevalve'sabilitytoperformitssafety-related function.

However,sincetheswitchispoweredfromasafety-related Class1Esourceandisnotisolatedfromit,theelectrical portionsoftheswitchalongwiththeassociated structural partsareclassified assafetyrelatedtomeetRegulatory Guide1.75r'equirements.

Theproposeddiaphragm changeout willhavenoimpactonthestructural orelectrical properties oftheswitchand,therefore, nonewfailurescenarios areintroduced.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage93of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-095N/A5.4%2a,10.4-22aN/AMethodsofChemicalAnalysisChangeThischangeallowedfortheidentification ofadditional methodstobeusedforthedetermination ofchlorides, pH,andconductivity inthereactorvesselwater.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theidentification ofionchromatography forthedetermination ofchlorideion,andtechniques providing adequatesensitivity tomeetthelimitsspecified inRegulatory Guide.1.56 Revision1,Table1,fortheanalysesofchlorides, conductivity, andpHinreactorvesselwaterisconsistent withindustrypractices, providesasuitabletechnique(s) tomeasureatorbelowacceptable reactorwaterchemistry limits,isincompliance withregulatory requirements, andmaintains thedesignbasisforthereactorwatercleanupsystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage94of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-096GAP-DES-03 N/AN/AInstallation andControlofTemporary Communications Equipment PerGAP-DES-03 Description ofChange:Procedure GAP-DES-03 wasrevisedtoincludeanexclusion fortemporary communications installed inaccordance withanewTechnical SupportAdministrative Procedure.

Thenewprocedure wasdeveloped toallowtheinstallation andcontroloftemporary communications equipment (GAI-TRONICS) infacilities atNineMilePoint(e.g.,temporary trailersinstalled insupportofrefueling outageactivities).

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Procedure GAP-DES-03 isbeingrevisedtoallowtemporary communications equipment tobeinstalled intemporary facilities atNineMilePointutilizing aTechnical SupportAdministrative Procedure.

Thisprocedure controlstheinstallation andremovalofthetemporary communications equipment andensuresthatnoadditional electrical loadisaddedtothenormalplantcommunications systempowersource.Pageandpartylinesignalsfromtheplantcommunications systemwillbefedtothetemporary equipment butthe120Vacpowershallbesuppliedfromtheindividual facility's walloutlets.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage95,of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:93-098SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0147-93, Procedure N2-ESP-RCS-R737 USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Figure8.3-88Sh12ReactorRecirculation SystemRecirculation PumpMotorsPrimaryContainment Penetration Protection SetpointChange'escription ofChange:Thischangeincreased thesetpointoftheinstantaneous overcurrent protection ofthepenetration whichprovidespowertoreactorrecirculation pumps.Thesetpointincreasefrom52Ato64A,orfrom12timesto15timesthefullloadcurrentofthemotor,wasneededtoeliminate inadvertent tripsofthepumpsduringupshifting fromlowtohighspeed.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Afterincreaseofthesetpoint, theprotective relaysstillprovideadequateprotection ofthepenetration.

Theworstcondition oftheshortcircuitforthepenetration whichisallowedbytheprotective relaysisstillbelowthepenetration capability.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage96of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-100SAFER/GESTR LOCAMethodology Sections6.3,15B,15C,AppendixAVariousOperation ofNMP2Reload3/Cycle4Duetotheintroduction offuelofanewdesign(GE11)inReload3(9x9latticeversus8x8latticeusedinpreviousreloads),

variousissuesnotnormallyconsidered inpreviousreloadshavebeenevaluated.

TheReload3fuelbundledesignisknownasGE11-P9CUB332-13GZ-120M-146-T andisanapprovedfueldesigninGESTAR.TheReload3bundleshaveanaverageenrichment of3.32wtloU-235.TheGE11designconsistsof74fuelrods(8beingpartlengthrods)and2largecentralwaterrodscovering7fuelrodlatticepositions.

Themaximumallowable peakLHGRfortheGE11fuelis14.4kW/ft.TheCycle4coreloadingwillinsert196freshGE11bundlesand32twiceburnedGE6Bbundlesthatweredischarged attheendofCycle2.TheGE11fueldesignwaslicensedunderAmendment 22oftheGESTARprocessapprovedbytheNRCinJuly1990.Amendment 22contained fueldesigncriteriaagainstwhichanewfueldesigncouldbecomparedandjudgedacceptable, thusallowingtheintroduction ofnewfuelwithoutpriorNRCreviewandapproval.

TheSAFER/GESTR LOCAmethodology wasusedfortheReload3/Cycle4loss-of-coolantaccident(LOCA)analysis.

ATechnical Specification changewasobtainedwhichallowedtheuseoftheSAFER/GESTR methodology.

SAFER/GESTR istheGEimprovedLOCAmethodology, whichhasbeenapprovedforusebytheNRC.TheNRCapprovedtheuseofSAFER/GESTR atNMP2inAmendment No.52,datedNovember10,1993.Thelimitingtransient forReload3istherodwithdrawal errorevent.ThechangeinMCPRforthiseventsettheOLMCPRat1.36fortheGE11fueland1.31fortheGE6BandGE9Bfuel.Thelimitingeventforthevesseloverpressurization analysisistheMSlVclosure(fluxscram).Thepeaksteamlineandvesselbottompressures are1252and1283psig,whichiswellbelowthesafetylimitof1375psig.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage97of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Description ofChange:(cont'd.)93-100(cont'd.)

Aspartofthereload,additional analyseswereperformed forequipment outofservice.Thisanalysisdetermines theallowable combinations andtheiroperating impactforvariousequipment outofservice.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatNineMilePointUnit2canbesafelyoperatedduringReload3/Cycle4.Operation inaccordance withthissafetyevaluation doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionnorisaTechnical Specification changerequired.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage98of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-101Temporary Mod..93-056 N/ARodSequenceControlSystem(RSCS)Alternate PowerSourceforRSCSPowerSupplyDescription ofChange:Thistemporary modification providedforanalternate powersourceforRSCSPS¹6bydisconnecting cable2RDSNNK523 (fedfrom2VBS-PNLB101) in2CEC"PNL701andconnecting cable2RDSNNK504 (fedfrom2VBS-PNLA101) initsplace.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thereisnoadversenuclearsafetysignificance tothischangesincethenormal.powerprovidedtothisdeviceisblack(nondivisional, nonsafety related)fromthevitalbusu'ninterruptible powersupply2VBB-UPS1B.

Thealternate powersourceutilizedinthistemporary modification isfrom2VBB-UPS1A whichisalsopartoftheplant'snormal120-Vacsystem.TheRSCSisnotasafety-related systemandisnotrequiredduringtherefueling mode.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage99of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-102SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0158-93 Table3.9A-12Sh9;Figures5.4-13b,5.4-13c,5.4-13eSystem:TideofChange:ResidualHeatRemovalSystem(RHS)RemovalofInternals from2RHS"V7,V8andV9Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeremovedtheinternals fromthecheckvalves,2RHS"V7,V8,andV9,locatedintheminimumflowtestlinesoftheRHSpumps(P1A,B,C).SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisdesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orcapability tokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdowncondition.

TheRHSsystemwillnotbedegradedatanytimesincesystempressureandflowwillbemaintained duringpumpminimumflowoperation, andthatsystempressureintegrity will.bemaintained duringallmodesofsystemoperation.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage100of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-103Rev.1N2-OP-38, Rev.6N/ASFCBackupSpentFuelPoolCoolingDuringRefueling OutageDescription ofChange:FourmethodswereproposedforthespentfuelcoolingandmixingasbackupstotheSFCLoopBduringthisoutage.Ofthese,oneiscurrently approvedandtheremaining arebeingevaluated.

TheSFCLoopApumpwasusedbyrestoring Div.Ipowertoitandbyremovingsomeunavailable pumpprotective functions.

Thedisabling oftheprotective featuresallowstheavailability ofthespentfuelcoolingsystemthatotherwise wouldbeunavailable.

Thetwomethodsofcirculating poolandcavitywaterwereacceptable becausetheydidnotinterfere withtheexistingSFCandhelpedreducethespentfuelpoolheatuprate.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thedisability ofthelowflowpumptripwillbereplacedbymanualtripuponexceeding predetermined motorcurrent.Therefore, pumplowflowprotection willstillbeavailable.

Theothertwoprotective functions (lowsuctionanddischarge pressures) areindirectly available throughthemotorcurrent.Thetemporary cavitycleanupsystemandsumppumpsarebeingproposedforenhancing themixingbetweenthespentfuelpoolandreactorcavity.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunieviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage101of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-104N2-TTP-RHR-5001T N/AResidualHeatRemovalSystemDefeatInterlock of2RHS"P1BAssociated withValves2RHS"MOV112and2RHS"MOV113Description ofChange:Thischangedefeatedtheinterlock thatpreventspump2RHS"P1Bfromstartingunlessbothvalves2RHS"MOV112 and2RHS"MOV113 areinthefullopenposition.

Thischangewasdonetofacilitate dynamictestingofvalve2RHS"MOV40B.Thisisatemporary bypassing ofthepumpprotection whilethetestingisbeingdone.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Inordertoperformthedynamictestingof2RHS"MOV40B, asuctionpathforpump2RHS"P1Bisprovidedbyopening2RHS"MOV113.

SinceDivisionIdcpowerfor2RHS"MOV113 isunavailable, thevalvecontrollogicwillmaintainthepumpinatripcondition andpreventthepumpfromstarting.

Theinterlock associated with2RHS"MOV113 topreventstartingpump2RHS"P1Bwithout2RHS"MOV113 fullopenmustbedefeated.

Thiswillbeaccomplished byliftingleads'inthevalvecontrolcircuit.Thesimilarinterlock forvalve2RHS"MOV112 willalsobebypassedduetothephysicalarrangement ofthewiring.Thiswillallowthepumptobestartedwithoutpositionindication for2RHS"MOV113.

Thefunctionofthedefeatedinterlocks willbeprovidedbyprocedural control.Thistemporary alteration willberemoveduponthecompletion ofthe2RHS"MOV40B dynamictestprocedure.

Allotherdesignfunctions remainunchanged.

TheSFCBsystemwillbeavailable forheatremovalandisunaffected bythischange.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage102of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-105N2-OP-38N/ASFCNaturalCirculation ofReactorVesselDuringRefueling PhaseofRFO3Description ofChange:Naturalconvective coolingofthereactorvesselisevaluated asanalternate methodofcompliance withTechnical Specification 3/4.9.11.1 incasetheprimarycoolingmethod(RHRloop)islost.Toincreasetheeffectiveness ofthenaturalcirculation, itwasnecessary tochangetheSFCflowarrangement (coldwaterisroutedtobothreactorcavityspargers).

Inaddition, tocomplywiththeTechnical Specification requirement oftemperature monitoring, amethodisrecommended tomonitorthereactorcoolanttemperature.

Thereactorcoolanttemperature willbemonitored attwolocations:

(1)coreoutlettemperature (hotplume)within-5'fthetopofcore,and(2)nearthevesselwallindowncomer region,nearthejetpumpinletarea.Thearithmetic averageofthesetwotemperatures istheaveragereactorcoolanttemperature.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theabovechangeshavebeenevaluated fortheirimpactonthefuelassemblycoolingandlocalboilingwithinthespentfuelpool.Thenewflowarrangements willcontinuetoprovideadequatecoolingtofuelassemblies inthespentfuelpool.Thecurrentmargin(-35F)betweenthelocalsaturation temperature andpeakcladtemperature willnotbesignificantly affected.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage103of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-106Rev.1NLINCR-02-37, 9-22-1992 8.3-58BYSReduction inOneIVlinuteDischarge RateforDivisionIandDivisionIIEmergency DcBatteries Description ofChange:Oneminutedischarge rateofDivisionIandDivisionIIemergency dcbatteries hasbeenreducedbythevendorduetomoreaccuratebatterytest.Thisdatumisapartofthedcsystemdescription intheUSAR.TheUSARhasbeenrevisedtoreflectthischange.Oneminutedischarge ratealsoaffectsthebatterydischarge curves.Thesecurvesdescribetheperformance ofthebatteries.

Theimpactofthenewoneminutedischarge rateandnewbatterydischarge curveshasbeenanalyzed.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theanalysisperfo'rmed revealedthatnewoneminutedischarge rateandnewbatterydischarge curvesdonotaffecttherequiredsizeofDivisionIandDivisionIIemergency dcbatteries.

Thebatteries stillcansupportadequately two-hours emergency discharge cycleandstationblackout.

Atanypointofpostulated emergency discharge thevoltageofthebatteries doesnotdropbelowthelimitsidentified intheUSAR.Thechangehasnoimpactondcsafety-related cablessizing.Short-circuit currentofthebatteryisreduced;therefore, thedcshort-circuit currentmarginisincreased.

Thisanalysisisappliedforexistingbatteries andforreplacement cells.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage104of136SafetyEvaluation No.:implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-108Procedures N2-OSP-EGS-R003 5R004N/A,.SpentFuelPoolCooling(SFC)Overriding Operation of2SFC"HV6Aor6BOperations requested thecapability ofoverriding theclosureof2SFC"HV6A or6BduringOperating Conditions 4or5whenconducting Procedure N2-OSP-EGS-R003 andR004.Thesevalvesarethesuctioncross-connects betweentherespective skimmersurgetanksinDivisionIandIIoftheSFCsystem.Asdesigned, thevalvesmayeitherbeoperatedmanuallytoopenorcloseorwillcloseautomatically uponalossofpower.ThedesignbasesofSFCpermitseitherthesystemtobeoperatedcross-connected orsplit,withthedivisioncross-connect isolation valvesclosed,wheneitheroneorbothpumpsareinoperation.

N2-OSP-EGS-R003 andR004testsareconducted ontheSFCdivisionwhichdoesnothaveitspumpinoperation.

Whenpowerislosttothatdivisionitsassociated suctioncross-connect valvewillgoclosed.Prioroperating experience hasindicated thattherunningpumpmaytriponlowsuctionpressurewiththeresulting condition thatallSFCislost.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theseprocedure changeshavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orcapability tokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdowncondition orprecluderemovingthedecayheatfromthespentfuelpool.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage105of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-109Rev.0L1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0176-93 N/AHighPressureCoreSprayReplacement ofHPCSValveMotorContractors Description ofChange:Thischangeinstalled newstartercontactors intothecontrolcircuitofvalves2CSH"MOV107, 2CSH"MOV110, 2CSH"MOV111 and2CSH"MOV112.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thenewstartercontactors tobeinstalled "pullin"atalowervoltageandrequireless"holdin"current.Thiswillensurethatevenunderdegradedvoltageconditions thecontrolcircuitwillperformitsintendedfunction.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage106of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-111N/AFigures1.2-1,2.4-1,9A.3-1N/AConstruction oftheHazardous MaterialStorageBuildingDescription ofChange:Thehazardous materialstoragebuildingwasconstructed tothesouthofthemainwarehouse andwestofthebottledgasstoragebuilding, outsidetheprotected area.Thestoragefacilityisasingle-story, nonsafety-related structure havingaslabongradeandprovidesatotalareaofapproximately 6,000squarefeet.Thisbuildingisdesignedtostorehazardous materialcurrently storedinthetemporary construction building(warehouse Cannex)andmeetsallfederal/local codeandenvironmental requirements.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thattheconstruction ofthehazardous materialstoragebuildingdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage107of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:93-112Rev.0&.1N/AUSARAffectedPages:N/ASystem:TitleofChange:VariousRevision5oftheNMP2Emergency Operating Procedures Description ofChange:ThisrevisionoftheEOPschangedsomeoperating limitsasaresultofthenewGE11fuel.Thelimitswhichhavebeenrevisedarethefollowing:

minimumalternate RPVfloodingpressure, minimumnumberofSRVsrequiredforemergency depressurization, minimumRPVfloodingpressure, minimumcorefloodinginterval, maximumcoreuncoverytimelimit,minimumsteamcooling,minimumzeroinjection RPVwaterlevel,heatcapacitytemperature limit,heatcapacitylevellimitandthepressuresuppression pressure.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:AlthoughsomechangeshavebeenmadetotheEOPsbyRevision5,itwasverifiedthat:theoperatoractionsprescribed inthisnewrevisionareinaccordance withtheBWROGEPGs,andwhenappliedtolicensing basisaccidents andtransients, theEOPswillnotincreasetheconsequences oftheseeventsasdepictedintheUSAR.Noneofthesechangeshasalteredthephilosophy, logic,orvalidityoftheNMP2EOPs.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatRevision5oftheEOPsdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage108of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-114NIP-DES-04 Table8.3-16ReactorBuildingCranes(MHR)RevisiontotheNMP2USARTable8.3-16andAttachment (3)ofNIP-DES-04, PrimaryContainment Electrical Penetrations andPenetration Conductors whicharenotRequiredDuringReactorOperation andareProtected byDe-energization Description ofChange:ThischangeupdatedUSARTable8.3-16andAttachment (3)ofNIP-DES-04 toreflectas-installed plantconditions forthosecircuitsassociated withelectrical penetrations andelectrical penetration conductors whichwererequiredtobede-energized duringreactoroperation.

Thischangeremovescircuitsfor2MHR-CRN3, 4,65,67and66,whichhaveprimaryandbackupcircuitovercurrent protection at2NHS-MCC005 cubicle7B,7C,7D,7Eand7F,respectively.

Newcircuitfor2RDS-PLAT1 isaddedtothetablewhichwasinadvertently leftinthelistoflistsforde-energized circuits.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThischangeamendsNMP2USARTable8.3-16andAttachment (3)ofNIP-DES-04 toincludeacircuitfor2RDS-PLAT1, whichisrequiredtobede-energized forelectrical penetration andpenetration protection duringreactoroperation, andremovingthosecircuitswhicharenolongerrequiredtobede-energized duetooperability ofprimaryandbackupcircuitovercurrent interrupting devicesat2NHS-MCC005 cubicle7B,7C,7D,7Eand7Fforreactorbuildingcranes2MHR-CRN3, 4,65,67566,respectively.

The2SCA-PNL406 breaker¹9providespowerattheplatform(2RDS-PLAT1) forlightingpurposesonly.Theplatform2RDS-PLAT1 isusedtorotateandpositionCRDhandlingequipment duringrefueling outageonly.ThiscircuitshallbeincludedinUSARTable8.3-16andAttachment (3)ofNIP-DES-04.

Theoutboardcables(2RCSANC528 62RCSBNC538) from2SCI-PNLC104 shallbesparedinplace.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage109of136SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)93-114(cont'd.)

TherearenoTechnical Specification changesrequiredtoSections3/4.8A.1or3/4.8.4.2 asaresultofthesedocumentation onlychanges.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage110of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-115DER2-93-2511 Figures5.4-13a,5.4-13bResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)Orientation of2RHS"MOV40A/BThischangeacceptedasistheinstallation ofoutboardisolation globevalves2RHS"MOV40A/B.

Thesevalveswerethrottled tocontrolthecooldownrateintheshutdowncoolingmode.Thesevalveswereinstalled suchthatLOCAandreactorvesselpressurecouldbeappliedtotheaboveseatsideoftheglobevalveshouldtheinboardisolation checkvalves2RHS"AOV39A/B failopen,thuscreatingapotential leakpaththroughthevalvepacking.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thoughtheinstalled orientation of2RHS"MOV40A/Benhancesthethrottling capabilities ofthevalve,theorientation alsocreatesapotential leakpaththroughthevalvepacking.However,thedesignofthevalvepackingarrangement isbasedonpressures thatexceedLOCApressureof39.75psigandpeakreactorvesselbottompressureof1279psig.Inaddition, valves2RHS"MOV40A/B arelocalleakratetestedtoatleast39.75psigandhydropressuretestedevery18months.Therefore, thereisahighdegreeofassurance thatthesevalveswillmaintainleak-tight integrity.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage111of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-116DER2-93-2511 Figure5.4-13cResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)Orientation of2RHS"MOV33BThischangeacceptedasistheinstallation ofcontainment isolation globevalve2RHS"MOV33B.

Thisvalveisthrottled tocontrolsuppression chambersprayflow.Thisvalvewasinstalled suchthatpeaksuppression chambercouldbeappliedtotheaboveseatsideoftheglobevalve,thuscreatingapotential leakpaththroughthevalvepacking.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thoughtheinstalled orientation of2RHS"MOV33Benhancesthethrottling capabilities ofthevalve,theorientation alsocreatesapotential leakpaththroughthevalvepacking.However,thedesignofthevalvepackingarrangement isbasedonpressurethatexceedsthecalculated peaksuppression chamberpressureof33.98psig.Inaddition, valve2RHS"MOV33B islocalleakratetestedat40-42psigevery18months.Therefore, thereisahighdegreeofassurance thatthisvalvewillmaintainleak-tight integrity.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage112of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-118Rev.05.1Temporary Mod.93-062N/AHotWaterHeating5.Glycol(HVH)Temporary HotWaterHeatingPlantThissafetyevaluation coveredtheinstallation andoperation ofatemporary hotwaterheatingplant,whichisusedtoprovideanalternate supplyofhotwatertothereactorbuildingglycolheatexchanger, 2HVG-E2.ThenormalsupplyofhotwaterfromtheHVHhotwaterheatexchangers maynotbeavailable duringnormalplantoperation andasourceofhotwaterisneededforglycolheating.Thetemporary hotwaterheatingunitislocatedatleast50feetfromanyplantstructure.

Demineralized waterforsystemfillingisfurnished viadrainvalve2CCP-V915.

Electricpowerfortheunitisprovidedfromtheexistingconstruction powerloop.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Asdiscussed inUSARSection9.4.11,theplantglycolheatingsystemfunctions inconjunction withtheplanthotwaterheatingsystem(discussed inUSARSection9.4.12)toheatoutdoormakeupairusedforventilation.

Asdescribed inUSARSection94.11.3fortheglycolsystemandinUSARSection9.4.12.5fortheplanthotwaterheatingsystem,thefailureormalfunction ofeitherorbothsystem(s) willnotcompromise anysafety-related systemorcomponent orpreventsafereactorshutdown.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage113of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-120N2-ISP-LRT-R5058A Table6.2-65Sh1ReactorCoreIsolation Cooling(ICS)AppendixJTestingof2ICS"MOV126 Thischangeallowedreversetestingofcontainment isolation 2ICS"MOV126.

Thischangeresultedinachangetotestingprocedure N2-ISP-LRT-R5058A whichcontrolsthetestingofthisvalve.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischange,reversetestingof2ICS"MOV126,

'isamoreconservative testbecauseboththeLOCAandnon-LOCAseatwillbesubjected totheLLRTpressure.

Thischangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation oftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage114of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-121EDC2F00874,DER2-93-0501 Figure11.2-1JLWSLiquidWasteManagement SystemAs-BuiltCondition Description ofChange:Thischangeprovidedas-builtconditions ontheaffecteddrawingstoshowremovalofflushinglines(2-LWS-002-464-4 and2-LWS-002-625-4) andvalves(2LWS-V194and2LWS-V203).

SafetyEvaluation Summary:DuetoESDCRC94489B,andinaccordance withECNLWS-631,pressureswitches2LWS-PS42A and2LWS-PS42B weredeletedfromthesystem.Theflushinglines(2-LWS-002-464-4 and2-LWS-002-625-4) andvalves(2LWS-V194 and2LWS-V203) weretheflushingconnections forthepressureswitchesandhavebeenremoved.Tomaintainplantconfiguration control,saidflushinglinesandvalveswillberemovedfromaffecteddrawingstoshowas-builtcondition.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage115of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-122Temporary Mod.93-067N/AMainSteamSystemLeakRepair2MSS-PV29V Thistemporary changewasrelatedtothemainsteamsystem(MSS).Thereheating steamlowloadisolation valvetomoistureseparator reheater2MSS-E1B, valve2MSS-PV29B, wasexperiencing asteamleakthroughthevalvepackingarea.Thechangeinvolvedthetemporary injection ofleakrepairnucleargradesealanttype2Xtoisolatetheleakuntilpermanent repairsweremade.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftherequested changehasbeenperformed.

Thisreview,whichincludedtheeffectsofthistemporary changeonthesystem'soperability, reliability, maintainability, structural integrity, andsysteminteractions, hasfoundthattheinjection ofthesealantandpossibleseizureofvalve2MSS-PV29B intheopenpositionwillnotcauseanyadversesafetyoroperability issues.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage116of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-126Rev.0&1N/A12.3-8thru12.3-11,12.3-19,12.3-22,12.5-1thru12.5-4,12.5-6,12.5-10thru12.5-14,12.5-16,12.5-17;Tables1.8-2Sh3,4,1.9-1Sh49,50System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:N/A10CFR20RevisionToincorporate thechangesnecessary toimplement therevised10CFR20,"Standards forProtection AgainstRadiation."

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Revision1providesabasisforchangingtheTLDprocessing frequency thatwasincorporated intheRadiation Protection Programbasedon,butnotspecifically addressed in,Revision0.Also,theTechnical ReviewCommittee's commentsofMay25,1994,concerning theuseof0-200mRpocketdosimeters andclarification ofradiation zoneterminology areincludedinRevision1.Thechangesarefundamentally administrative innature.Thechangesnecessary tosupporttherevisedPart20areconsistent withthephilosophy ofmaintaining doseAsLowAsisReasonably Achievable (ALARA).Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage117of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:93-127Rev.1GAP-POL-01, Rev.05;NSAS-POL-01, Rev.00;QAP-POL-1.01, Rev.04USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:9A.3-1,9A.3-1a,9A.3-2,Section13.1,13.2-1,AppendixBN/ANuclearSBUOrganizational Structure andResponsibilities

-RevisedProcedures GAP-POL-01 5QAP-POL-1.01, andNewProcedure NSAS-POL-01 Description ofChange:Thepositions ofGeneralManagerSiteSupportandGeneralIVlanager SafetyAssessment, Licensing, andTrainingwerecombinedunderthesinglepositionofVicePresident NuclearSafetyAssessment andSupport.Seniormanagement responsibilities fortheVicePresident NuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportincludethepresent"SafetyAssessment" functional areasofQualityAssurance (QA),Licensing, andTraining; andthe"Support" functions previously implemented withintheSiteSupportorganization.

TheManagerQualityAssurance reportsdirectlytotheExecutive VicePresident NuclearforallQAactivities withintheNuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportorganization (toensuresufficient authority andindependence foreffectively implementing QAresponsibilities withintheNuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportorganization).

TheUnit1Operating Organization (IVlaintenance, Technical Support,andWorkControl/Outage Branchesonly)wasrevisedtoincludethefollowing BranchManagerdirectreports:~Maintenance

-GeneralSupervisor l&CMaintenance, GeneralSupervisor Mechanical/Electrical Maintenance (combined),

Supervisor IVlaintenance Procedures, LeadMaintenance Support,andProgramDirector89-10Implementation.

~WorkControl/Outage

-GeneralSupervisor Maintenance

Planning, Supervisor OutageManagement, andSupervisor Maintenance PlanningPrograms.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage118of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Description ofChange:(cont'd.)

93-127Rev.1(cont'd.)

~Technical Support-LeadSystemEngineers (2)andAdministrative SupportCoordinator(s)

(forSORC,NPRDS,Technical Review,andModification activities).

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedorganization continues toprovidefortheintegrated management ofactivities tosupporttheoperation andmaintenance ofNineMilePointUnits1h2.Clearmanagement control,effective linesofauthority, andcommunication betweentheorganizational unitsirivolved inthemanagement, operation, andtechnical supportofNineMilePointUnits1L2aremaintained.

Theorganizational changesalterthereporting structure ofexistingpositions butdonotaffecttheperformance offunctions orresponsibilities.

Linesofauthority, responsibility andcommunication for"onsite"and"offsite" organizational elementswhichfunctionunderthecognizance oftheQAProgramareestablished intheformofrevisedorganizational charts.Functional descriptions oftheNuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportOrganization andtherevisedUnit1Operating Organization, andjobdescriptions, relationships, andresponsibilities forkeypersonnel positions aredocumented inProcedure GAP-POL-01, NSAS-POL-01, andQAP-POL-1.01.

Basedonthisevaluation, therevisedorganizational structure oftheNuclearSBUcontinues tosatisfytheacceptance criteriaofSRP9.5.1(BTPCMEB9.5-1),SRP13.1.1,SRP13.1.2-13.1.3, SRP13.6,SRP17.2,andUnit1and2Technical Specification 6.2.1.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage119of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-128DER2-93-2396 8.3-62,8.3-70BYSIEEEStandardIssueChangeforClass1EBatteryTestingDescription ofChange:Duringthereplacement ofDivisionIdcbatteryitwasdiscovered thattherewasadiscrepancy betweentheUSARandTechnical Specifications.

Technical Specification Bases,pg.B3/48-2statesthatthesurveillance requirements fordemonstrating theoperability ofthebatteries areinaccordance withtherecommendations ofReg.Guide1.129andIEEE-Std-450-1980.

However,USARSection8.3.2statesthattheregularinspection andmaintenance ofthebatteries isperformed inaccordance withReg.Guide1.129(IEEE-Std-450-1975).

Engineering analyzedthisdiscrepancy andcametotheconclusion thattheUSARwasinerrorandneededtobecorrected toagreewithTechnical Specifications.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Engineering performed acomparison between1975and1980issueofIEEE-Std-450 toensurethatthischangeisnotadversely affecting theClass1Ebatteries.

Thiscomparison revealedthatintheMaintenance andCorrective Actionssections, the1980issueofthestandardisequivalent tothe1975issueormorerestrictive.

IntheBatteryCapacityTestsection,thereisaslightdifference betweenthesetwoissues.Thenatureofthisdifference dependsonthebatterytesttemperature.

However,thevalueofthisdifference isinsignificant tocomparewiththeexcessofthecapacityofthedcbatteries.

Basedontheanalysisperformed, theconclusion ismadethatthischangedoesnotcompromise theabilityofthebatteries toperformthesafety-related functionasdesignedandasdescribed intheUSAR.C%Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage120of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:94-002Temporary Mod.94-003,N2-OP-35N/AReactorCoreIsolation Cooling(ICS)Procedure ChangeEvaluation, N2-OP-35Thischangewasrelatedtothereactorcoreisolation coolingsystem(ICS)asdescribed inUSARSection54.Thechangethrottled open2ICS-LV132 asrequiredtodecreaseitscycling(opening/closing) frequency toanacceptable level.Previously, tocontrolthelevelintheICSsteamsupplydrainlinedrainpot,thisvalvewascycledatapproximately 5-minuteintervals causingannunciator 601302toalarm.Thischangehasbeenprocedurally implemented andiscontrolled viaTemporary Modification 94-003tominimizeannunciation untiltheunderlying causeoftheproblemisevaluated andresolved(reference DER2-93-2805).

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheICSandotherinterfacing systemshasbeenperformed.

Nuclearsafetywillnotbecompromised asthechangewillcontinuetoprovideanadequatelevelcontrolsystemforthesteamsupplydrainlinedrainpot.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage121of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:94-003Temporary Mod.94-008N/AReactorProtection System(RPS)GroupFourScramPilotValvePowerSourceInadvertent cableterminations athydraulic controlunit(HCU)2RDS-L704 causedreactorprotection systemtripchannelsA1andA2tocontrolthe"8"pilotscramvalvesolenoidinsteadoftheintended"A"solenoid.

Accordingly, tripchannelsB1andB2controlthe"A"solenoidinsteadoftheintended"B"coil.ThewiringerrorwaslocatedatthefirstHCUofa24HCUdaisychain,therebyaffecting theentirechain.AllgroupfourHCUsonsidetwoofthereactorwerebeingaffectedby.thedescribed condition.

Thechangedocuments thewiringerrorasatemporary modification sincerestoration willnotbeperformed untilthenextscheduled plantshutdown.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thesafety-related functionoftheRPSistoscramthereactorwhenspecificpredetermined variables areexceeded.

Thedualtripprotective systememploysaone-out-of-two takentwicelogictocontrolfail-safe solenoids.

ThefunctionoftheRPSisnotadversely affectedbythereversedwiringatthegroupfourHCUs.Twoseparatepowersourcescontrolled bytwoseparatetripsystemsarestillprovidedforeachcontrolrodasdelineated bysystemeliminators.

Thisdeviation introduces aconfiguration controlconcernbuthasnofunctional impactontheRPSortheaffectedcontrolroddrives.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage122of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:94-004SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0170-91 9.3-6ServiceAirSystem(SAS)1/2InchHoseCouplingReplacement Thischangemadepermanent the1"hosecouplings installed atstations2SAS-V264and2SAS-V265 perTemporary Modification 90-069.Theincreaseinhosecoupling, valveandassociated components from1/2"to1"providesincreased airflowtoequipment asneeded.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheSASandotherinterfacing systemshasbeenperformed.

Nuclearsafetywillnotbecompromised asthechangewillcontinuetoprovideanadequatesupplyofserviceairtoequipment ondemand.Thischangedoesnotcauseanyequipment important tosafetytobedependent onSAStoperformitssafetyfunction.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage123of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-005Temporary Mod.94-018,N2-OP-35N/AReactorCoreIsolation Cooling(ICS)Procedure ChangeEvaluation, N2-OP-35ThrottleOpen2ICS-LV132 Description ofChange:Thistemporary modification throttled open2ICS-LV132 asrequiredtodecreaseitscycling(opening/closing) frequency toanacceptable level.Currently, tocontrolthelevelintheICSsteamsupplydrainlinedrainpot,thisvalveiscyclingatfrequentintervals causingannunciator 601302toalarm.Thischangehasbeenprocedurally implemented andiscontrolled viaTemporary IVlodification 94-018tominimizeannunciation untiltheunderlying causeoftheproblemisevaluated andresolved.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Anengineering reviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheICSandotherinterfacing systemshasbeenperformed.

Nuclearsafetywillnotbecompromised asthechangewillcontinuetoprovideanadequatelevelcontrolsystemforthesteamsupplydrainlinedrainpot.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage124of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-007Calculation MS-2162-OOC Table3.9A-10Sh1,4ServiceWaterSystemUpdateUSARTable3.9A-10"SummaryofSeismicStressAnalysisResults"Description ofChange:Calculation disposition MS-2162-OOC wasperformed toreflectthelatestresultsoftheseismicstressanalysisoftheservicewaterpumps(2SWP"P1A,B,C,D,E5F)atNMP2.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thecalculation wasreviewedandapprovedtoprovidethetechnical justification oftherevisedvaluesinUSARTable3.9A-10.Thecalculation disposition showsthattheresultsofthelatestseismicstressanalysisareallwithintheircorresponding allowables.

Thischangedoesnotresultinanyphysicalchangetotheequipment norwillitaffectthefunction, operability andstructural integrity ofthesubjectpumps.Therefore, thischangedoesnothaveanimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage125of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-008DER2-93-1896 Table6.2-56Sh19,20ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)ReviseTypeCTestingof2RHS"MOV26A, 26B,27Aand27BfromAirtoWaterDescription ofChange:Duringanindependent auditoftheNMP210CFR50AppendixJprogramitwasnotedthatUSARTable6.2-56indicated thatvalves2RHS"MOV26A, 26B,27Aand27BwereTypeCtested.Thesevalveswereonlineswhosedischarges werebelowsuppression poolminimumwaterleveland,therefore, werenotexposedtoprimarycontainment atmosphere.

Thesevalveswerepreviously TypeCtestedwithairinaccordance withAppendixJ,SectionIII.C.2.a.

Inanswertotheaudititem,testingofthesevalveshasbeenchangedfromaTypeCtestusingairtoahydrostatic test.,SafetyEvaluation Summary:Valves2RHS"MOV26A, 26B,27Aand27Btieintolinesthatpenetrate theprimarycontainment anddischarge intothesuppression poolat193'-23/8".Thelowestminimumsuppression poolwaterlevelis199'-6".Thesevalvesdonotbecomeexposedtotheprimarycontainment atmosphere duringaDBA-LOCAsincetheirdischarge isbelowminimumsuppression poolwaterleveland,therefore, donot.represent potential containment atmospheric leakagepaths.Inaddition, minimumsuppression poolwaterlevelismaintained perTechnical Specification suchthatthewatersealisassured.Thesevalveswillbehydrostatically testedatapressureof1.1Pa.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage126of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-010NSAS-POL-01, Rev.01;POL,Rev.5Section13.1N/AAlterOrganizational Structure andResponsibilities WithintheNuclearStrategic BusinessUnit-RevisedProcedure NSAS-POL-01 andNuclearDivisionPolicy,llPOIffDescription ofChange:Administrative responsibility fortheFitnessforDutyProgramwastransferred fromtheIVlanager NuclearSecuritytotheDirectorHumanResourceDevelopment.

ThepositionoftheSupervisor AccessAuthorization/Fitness forDutyreporting totheManagerNuclearSecuritywaseliminated.

Responsibility foradministering the.AccessAuthorization ProgramwasassumedbytheSupervisor NuclearSecuritySupport,whoalsoassumedtheresponsibilities oftheSupervisor NuclearSecurityAdministration leadingtotheelimination ofthatposition.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theneworganizational structure willcontinuetoprovidefortheintegrated management ofactivities thatsupportoperation ofNineIVlilePointUnits1and2.Clearmanagement controlandeffective linesofauthority arecontinued forNuclearSecuritywithintheNuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportorganization andforFitnessforDutywithinHumanResourceDevelopment.

Althoughorganizational changesalterthereporting structure asitappliestomanagement oftheFitnessforDutyProgramandsupervision oftheUnescorted AccessAuthorization ProgramandSecurityadministrative

services, theactualfunctions withintheseprogramswillnotbeaffected.

Linesofauthority, responsibility andcommunication relatingtoHumanResourceDevelopment arecurrently established inorganizational chartsintheUnit1andUnit2UFSARs.Linesofauthority, responsibility, andcommunication relatingtoNuclearSecurityarealsoshownintheorganizational chartsintheUFSARs,aswellasinthePhysicalSecurityPlan.Revisedjobdescriptions andresponsibilities for SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage127of136SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)94-010(cont'd.)

theManagerNuclearSecurityandtheDirectorHumanResourceDevelopment willbedocumented inNSAS-POL-01 andinPOL,"NuclearDivisionPolicy,"respectively.

Therevisedorganizational structure oftheNuclearSBUmeetstheacceptance criteriaofSRPSections13.1,13.1.1,13.6,and17.2,aswellasUnit1andUnit2Technical Specification 6.2.1.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage128of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-011SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0146-93 Figure8.2-7SPG,YXC,CECRemoveControlRoomRecorderRFM-2SPGN02 (Frequency) andRV-2YXCN10 (Voltage) fromPanel2CEC"PNL852 Description ofChange:Frequency recorderRFM-2SPGN02 andvoltagerecorderRV-2YXCN10 wereinoperable andrepairpartswerenolongeravailable fromthemanufacturer.

Therecorders monitored the345/25-kV Generator ScribaStationLine¹23potential circuit.Theinformation isavailable fromotherexistinginstrumentation onthepanelandasoutputfromGETARS.Therefore, therecorders wereremoved.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thedesignchangehasremovedinoperable andunnecessary equipment fromthecontrolroompaneltoenhanceoperatorvisualfocusonotheroperating instrumentation.

Thischangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage129of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:94-014NSAS-POL-01, Rev.01;NIP-FPP-01, Rev.03USARAffectedPages:9A.3-2thru9A.3-4,9A.3-31,13.2-21;Table13.1-1;Figure13.1-5System:TitleofChange:N/AFireProtection Organizational Structure-RevisedProcedures NSAS-POL-01 andNlP-FPP-01Description ofChange:TheFireProtection organization wasrestructured fromunitspecifictoasiteorganization reporting toasiteSupervisor FireProtection.

The"Site"Supervisor FireProtection reportstotheManagerTechnical

Services, andtheManagerTechnical Servicescontinues tomaintainoverallresponsibility forsiteimplementation oftheFireProtection Program.TheFireBrigadeiscomprised ofatleastthreemembersfromtheFireProtection staffanduptotwomembersfromothersiteorganizations, therebysatisfying theminimumsiteBrigadecomplement offive.BrigademembersdonotincludetheSSSorothermembersoftheminimumshiftcrewnecessary forsafeshutdownoftheunit,oranyotherpersonnel requiredforotheressential functions duringafireemergency.

AllmembersoftheFireBrigadecontinuetobetrained/qualified perexistingFireBrigadeTrainingProgramrequirements.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedorganizational changesalterthereporting structure ofexistingFireProtection staffpositions andthecomposition oftheFireBrigade,butdonotaffecttheperformance ofFireProtection stafffunctions orresponsibilities.

The"site"organization continues toprovideforintegrated.

management offireprotection activities tosupporttheoperation andmaintenance ofNineMilePointUnits1and2,andtoachieveandmaintainsafeshutdownintheeventofafire.Clearmanagement controlandeffective linesofauthority andcommunication betweentheorganizational unitsinvolvedinthemanagement, operation, andtechnical supportfortheoperation ofNineMilePointUnits1and2aremaintained, andtheresponsecapability oftheFireBrigadeisnotaffectedbythereorganization.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage130of136SafetyEvaluation No.:94-014(cont'd.)

SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)

Functional descriptions oftheFireProtection organization, andjobdescriptions, relationships, andresponsibilities forkeypersonnel positions responsible forimplementation oftheFireProtection Program,aredocumented inProcedures NSAS-POL-01 andNIP-FPP-01.

Basedonthisevaluation, therevisedstructure oftheFireProtection organization continues tosatisfytheacceptance criteriaofSRP9.5.1(BTPCMEB9.5-1),SRP13.1.1,andUnit1Technical Specification 6.2.1,anddoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage131of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:94-015Procedures N2-OP-29, N2-OP-101A, N2-OP-101 C,N2-OP-101D USARAffectedPages:System:TileofChange:N/AReactorRecirculation System(RRS)ReviseProcedures N2-OP-29, N2-OP-101A, N2-OP-101C, andN2-OP-101D toAddOwners'roup Stability GuidanceWhenOperating NeartheStability RegionDescription ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation evaluated theimpactofaddingtherevisedBWROwners'roup guidanceconcerning operation nearthestability region.Thischangeincreased thesizeofthestability exitregion.Thechangealsoaddedaregionofheightened awareness betweenthe65%and70%rodlineandlessthan45%coreflow,andtheareagreaterthanthe65%rodlineandbetween45%and50%coreflow.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Currentpracticeistoupshifttherecirculation pumpsatthelowestrodlinepossibletomaximizethemargintothestability regions.Thesechangeswillproceduralize thisoperating philosophy andensurethatrecirculation pumpupshiftanddownshift duringanormalstartuporshutdownwilloccuratlessthanthe65%rodline.~Previously theguidancewouldallowrecirculation pumpupshiftuptothe80%rodline.Anyentryintotheheightened awareness zonewillrequirecontinuous monitoring forthermalhydraulic oscillations.

Thesechangesareconservative measureswhichhelptoprovideagreatermargintothestability exclusion region.Theoperating procedures whichareimpactedbythesechangesareasfollows:N2-OP-29N2-OP-101A N2-OP-101 CN2-OP-101DReactorRecirculation SystemPlantStartupPlantShutdownPowerChanges SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage132of136SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)94-015(cont'd.)

Baseduponthisevaluation, itisconcluded thatNineMilePointUnit2canbesafelyoperatedinaccordance withtheseprocedure changes.Thechangesevaluated inthissafetyevaluation willservetoincreasetheoperating margintotheregionofthepower/flow mapinwhichreactorstability isaconcern.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage133of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:94-016GAP-POL-01, Rev.06;NSAS-POL-01, Rev.01;GAP-OPS-01, Rev.03;NIP-TQS-01, Rev.04USARAffectedPages:12.1-7,12.1-8,12.5-12,Section13.1,13.2-22System:TitleofChange:N/ANuclearSBUOrganizational Structure andResponsibilities

-RevisedProcedures GAP-POL-01, NSAS-POL-01, GAP-OPS-01, andNIP-TQS-01 Description ofChange:Thischangeanalyzedtheimpactofproposedrightsizing andorganizational changeswithintheNuclearGeneration andNuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportorganizations.

Thechangesreflectanoverallreduction insitestaffinglevelsandareduction inthemanagement layersofcertaingroupswithintheOperations, Maintenance, WorkControl/Outage, Radiation Protection, andTechnical SupportBranchesofNuclearGeneration; andtheTrainingBranch,Occupational Safety&.Health,Construction

Services, andOfficeAdministration/

Facilities groupsofNuclearSafetyAssessment andSupport.Responsibilities forcertainfunctions wereconsolidated withinbranchesortransferred betweenbranches, andseveralGeneralSupervisor andSupervisor positions wereabolished resulting inanincreaseinthenumberofdirectreportstoapplicable BranchManagers.

Afterrightsizing, thetotalNineMilePointsitestaffisapproximately 918people.Thisstafflevelisconsistent withNUREG-1047, Section13.1.2.1, whichidentifies theanticipated NineMilePointsitestaffofabout900peopleasbeingwithintherangenormallyexpectedforatwo-unitsite.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Therightsized NuclearGeneration andNuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportorganizations continuetoprovidefortheintegrated management ofactivities tosupporttheoperation andmaintenance ofNineMilePointUnits1and2.Clear SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage134of136SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)94-016(cont'd.)

management controlandeffective linesofauthority andcommunication aremaintained.

Functional descriptions oftheNuclearGeneration andNuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportorganizations, andjobdescriptions, relationships, andresponsibilities forkeypersonnel positions aredocumented inProcedures GAP-POL-01, NSAS-POL-01, GAP-OPS-01, andNIP-TQS-01.

Basedonthisevaluation, therevisedorganizational structures oftheNuclearGeneration andNuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportorganizations continuetosatisfyacceptance criteriafromSRP13.1.1,SRP13.1.2-13.1.3, Unit1and2Technical Specification 6.2.1,ANSIN18.1-1971 (Unit1),andANSI/ANS3.1-1978(Unit2);andsitestafftotalisconsistent withthestaffingrangeexpectedfortwo-unitsites(perNUREG-1047).

Theorganizational changesareincompliance withNRCstandards anddonotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage135of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-041DER2-94-0624 Table8.3-16RSCRemovalofMaintenance andCalibration JacksfromtheListofDe-energized CircuitsUSARTable8.3-16Description ofChange:ThischangerevisedUSARTable8.3-16toremovemaintenance andcalibration (jacks124,128,134and137)circuitsthatprovidedlowenergydcsignaltocommunication jacksintheprimarycontainment.

SafetyEvaluation Summary:Themaintenance andcalibration circuitsforjacks124,128,134and137carrylow-energy dcsignalsontheorderofmilliamperes.

TheoutputcurrentfromthepowersupplyatRCS-88islimitedsothatitwilldelivernomorethan230maundershortedlineconditions.

Theshort-circuit currentvalueisinsignificant ascomparedtothecurrent-carrying capability ofthepenetration assembly(2CES-Z38E).

Moreover, theTechnical Specification 3.8.4.1requirements areapplicable toaccircuitsonly.Therefore, maintenance andcalibration circuitsthatcarrylow-energy dcsignalsforthesejackscanberemovedfromthelistofde-energized circuitsinUSARTable8.3-16.Procedures NIP-DES-04 andN2-OSP-LOG-D001 wererevisedaccordingly.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage136of136SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-042N/A13.5-1,13.5-3,13.5-5;Tables13.5-1Sh1,13.5-5,13.5-6Sh5,6,13.5-7System:TitleofChange:N/AImplementation ofOperating Procedure Improvements Description ofChange:Thischangewasmadetoincorporate adescription ofthescopeandformatofSpecialOperating Procedures withintheUnit2procedure programstructure.

OtherchangestotheUSARweretoimproveinternalconsistency andtomoredearlydescribetheUnit2procedure program.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thesafetyevaluation addresses theacceptability ofusingSpecialOperating Procedures tosatisfytherequirement oftheNMP2Technical Specifications andlicensing basis.ThechangestotheUSARsimplyclarifythemethodofimplementing theguidanceofANSI/ANS3.2-1982andprovideanotherprocedural mechanism foraddressing eventsthathavearegulatory specified procedure requirement.

Basedonth'eevaluation performed, thesechangesmeettherequirements oftheTechnical Specification, thelicensing basis,andindustrystandards, andareincompliance withNRCstandards.

Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML17059A504&oldid=755229"