ML18038A360

Forwards Rev 9 to Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 FSAR (Updated), Vol I & Rev 2 to Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 Fire Hazards Analysis. Annual Safety Evaluation Summary Rept Also Encl

ML18038A360
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	06/28/1991
From:	WILCZEK S W NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17058A830	List: ML18038A360
References
NMP1L-0589, NMP1L-589, NUDOCS 9107020464
Download: ML18038A360 (269)

Text

REGULATORYXNFORMATXONDXSTRIBUTXONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9107020464DOC.DATE:91/06/28NOTARIZED:YESDOCKETFACXL:50-220NineMilePointNuclearStation,Unit1,NiagaraPowe05000220AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONWXLCZEK,S.W.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorp.RECXP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATXONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk),.g~R

SUBJECT:

ForwardsRev9to"NineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1'FSAR(Updated),"Vol'I&Rev2to"NineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1FireHazardsAnalysis."Annualsafetyevaluationsummaryreptalsoencl.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:AO53DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRI'ENCLQSIZE:ik5+'V~+TITLE:ORSubmittal:UpdatedFSAR(50.71)andAAAendments/NOTES:ARECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-1LABRINKMAN,DXNTERNAL:ACRSNRR/DST8E2RGN1EXTERNAL:IHSNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL10112210111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-1PD0~9'BREGPILE01NRCPDRSAICLXNER,RCOPIESLTTRENCL10111111*'11DRDNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMP1-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISISFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPXESREQUIRED:LTTR13ENCL10DD 1"00)~CNll

'trNIASAIRA0~og@HKNIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATION/301PLAINFIELDROAD,SYRACUSE,NEWYORK13212/TELEPHONE(315)428-715tStanleyW.Wilczek,Jr.VicePresidentNudearSupportJune28,1991NMP1L0589U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:NineMilePointUnit1DocketNo.50-220DPR-63Gentlemen:Pursuanttotherequirementsof10C.F.R.550.71(e)and10C.F.R.550.59(b),NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationherebysubmitsRevision9totheNineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Updated)andtheannualSafetyEvaluationSummaryReport.One(1)signedoriginalandten(10)copiesoftheFSAR(Updated)Revision9areenclosed.CopiesarealsobeingsentdirectlytotheRegionalAdministrator,RegionI,andtheSeniorResidentInspectoratNineMilePoint.TheFSAR(Updated)revisioncontainschangesmadesincethesubmittalofRevision8inJune1990.Thecertificationrequiredby10C.F.R.550.71(e)(2)isattachedtothisletter.ThetextandtablechangesassociatedwithFSAR(Updated)Revision9,withtheexceptionofrun-overpagesorthosepageswhichareintentionallyblank,areannotated'byverticalbarsplacedinthepagemargins.NotethatchangebarsindicateonlythosechangesmadeinFSAR(Updated)Revision9(i.e.,changebarsmarkingchangesmadeinpreviousrevisionshavenotbeenretained).Allrevisedpagesandfiguresaremarkedwiththecurrentrevisionnumberanddate.TheenclosedannualSafetyEvaluationSummaryReportcontainsbriefdescriptionsofchangestothefacilitydesign,FSAR(Updated),procedures,tests,andexperiments.NoneoftheSafetyEvaluationsinvolvedanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10C.F.R.550.59(a)(2).Alsosubmittedwiththisletter,consistentwiththeguidanceofGenericLetter86-10,isRevision2oftheNineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA).Copiesare9107020464,910628PDRi':tADOCK,',0~<000220K~~"~"-'PDR

Page2alsobeingsentdirectlytotheRegionalAdministrator,RegionI,andtheSeniorResidentInspectoratNineMilePoint.Revision2oftheFHAconsistsofarepublicationofthedocumentinitsentirety.ChangesassociatedwithFHARevision2aredescribedintheSafetyEvaluationSummaryReportunderSafetyEvaluation90-052,Revision1.Thesechangeshavebeenmadeinaccordancewith10C.F.R.550.59anddonotresultinadecreaseintheeffectivenessoftheFireProtectionProgram.IfyouhaveanyquestionsconcerningthisFSARrevisionortheFHArevision,pleasecontactMr.JohnJ.Laffreyat(315)428-7334.Verytrulyyours,NIAGARAMOAKPOERCORPORATIONS.W.Wilczek,Jr.VicePresidentNuclearSupportDV/mlsEnclosure001438GGxc:RegionalAdministrator,RegionIMr.R.A.Capra,ProjectDirector,NRRMr.D.S.Brinkman,SeniorProjectManager,NRRMr.W.L.Schmidt,SeniorResidentInspectorMr.D.R.Haverkamp,Chief,ReactorProjectsSectionNo.1BRecordsManagement h

UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONIntheMatterofNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation(NineMilePointUnit1)DocketNo.50-220CERTIFICATINS.W.WilczekJr.,beingdulysworn,statesthatheisVicePresidentofNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation;thatheisauthorizedonthepartofsaidCorporationtosignandfilewiththeNuclearRegulatoryCommissionthedocumentsattachedhereto;andthatallsuchdocumentsaretrueandcorrecttothebestofhisknowledge,information,andbelief.S..Wilczek,Jr.VicePresidentNuclearSupportSubscribedandsworntobeforeme,aNotaryPubliciriandfortheStateofNewYorkandCountyofthis@dayof1991.otarPubliinandforCounty,NewYorkMyCommissionExpires:BEVERLYW.RIPKANotaryPublicStateolNewYorkQual,tnOswegoCLNo.46li87MyCommisstonExp.r8 t,~'l0,ll,yly NINEMILEPOINTNUCLEARSTATIONUNIT1NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATIONUPDATEDFSARRECEIPTACKNOWLEDGEMENTIacknowledgereceiptof:Revision9Mycopyhasbeenupdated,andsupersededpageshavebeenremovedanddiscarded.SetReassinmentand/orSetHolderChaneofAddress(ifnecessary)Pleasereassignthismanualto,and/orchangemyaddressasfollows:Pleasefurnishallrequestedinformationandreturnto:JoanneGilletteNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation301PlainfieldRoadSyracuse,NY13212NameofsetholderCompanySignatureSetNo.Date

)

NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)INSERTIONINSTRUCTIONSThefollowinginstructionsarefortheinsertionofthecurrentrevisionintotheNineMilePointUnit1FSAR(Updated)andtheListofEffectivePages.ThesepagesincludethoseidentifiedontheERRATASHEET,whichwasinsertedintheListofEffectivePagesVolumedistributedwiththeRevision8update.Removepages,tables,and/orfigureslistedintheREMOVEcolumnandreplacethemwiththepages,tables,and/orfigureslistedintheINSERTcolumn.Dashes(-)ineithercolumnindicatenoactionrequired.Verticalbarshavebeenplacedinthemarginsofpagesandtablestobeinsertedtoindicaterevisionlocations.iRevision9FII-1June1991 0

'NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)INSERTIONINSTRUCTIONSTABLEOFCONTENTSREMOVEINSERTxxvxvi1xviiaxyiibxxvxxvixxvliXXXxxxvRevision9FII-2June1991

NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)INSERTIONINSTRUCTIONSLISTOFFIGURESREMOVEgiv1INSERTxlixlviRevision9FII-3June1991

NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)INSERTIONINSTRUCTIONSLISTOFTABLESREMOVEINSERTRevision9FII-4June1991

NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)INSERTIONINSTRUCTIONSLISTOFEFFECTIVEPAGESREMOVE8-1thruEP8-29-1PE10-1J811-113114-1'5-1thruEP15-3+P16-1thtttEP16-317-1thruEP17-2INSERTEP-iEP1-1EP2-1EP3-1EP4-1EP5-1EP6-1EP7-1EP8-1thruEP8-2EP9-1EP10-1EP11-1EP12-1EP13-1EP14-1EP15-1thruEP15-3EP16-1thruEP16-3EP17-1thruEP17-2Revision9FII-5June1991

NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)INSERTIONINSTRUCTIONSVOLUMEIREMOVE21-1WI-19-22II-231Zf434-4816~129478a-15-11-13QI-14XI-15g-16VfI-17189-20,40-50I-61-61a-63II-4I-8I-62I-71I-804X-29(TABLEII-8)(TABLEV-1)(FIGUREV-1)(FIGUREVI-18)(TABLEVI-3a)(TABLEVI-3a)(FIGUREVII-2)(FIGUREVII-4)(FIGUREVII-5)(FIGUREVII-13)(FIGUREVII-17)(FIGUREVIII-2)thruVIII-102INSERTI-2I-3II-21III-1III-5III-19III-22III-23III-43III-44III-48IV-31V-3V-11V-14V-29VI-16VI-19aVI-25VI-40VI-41VI-47VI-48aVII-1VII-5.VII-11VII-13VII-13aVII-14VXI-15VII-16VII-17VII-18VII-19VII-20VII-40VII-50VII-61VII-61aVII-63VIII-4VIII-8VIII-62VIII-71VIII-80IX-4IX-29(TABLEII-8)(TABLEV-1)(FIGUREV-1)(FIGUREVI-4a)(FIGUREVI-18)(TABLEVI-3a)(TABLEVI-3a)(FIGUREVII-2)(FIGUREVII-4)(FIGUREVIX-4a)(FIGUREVII-5)(FXGUREVII-13)(FIGUREVII-17)(FIGUREVIII-2)thruVIII-109Revision9FII-6June1991

'IT NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)INSERTIONINSTRUCTIONSVOLUMEI(Continued)(FIGUREX-1)(FIGUREX-3)12I-18(TABLEXII-5)REMOVE30VX2(TABLEIX-I)-33.(TABLEIX-1)INSERT,IX-30IX-31IX-32IX-33IX-33aIX-33bX-2X-9X-15X-21X-22X-24X-25X-26X-34X-42X-59X-60X-61X-61aX-63X-64X-65X-66XI-12.XII-18(TABLEIX-1)(TABLEIX-1)(TABLEIX-1)(TABLEIX-1)(FIGUREX-1)(FIGUREX-3)(TABLEXII-5)Revision9FII-7June1991 0

NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)INSERTIONINSTRUCTIONSVOLUMEIIREMOVE~&I3.I-5022-7I-8II-9II-10II-11.II-12II-13I-14I-15I-16-18II-19II-206-46-4852-54-61-64-81-81a~82~~82bW23~136(FIGUREXIII-1)(FIGUREXIII-2)(TABLEXV-2)(TABLEXV-4)(TABLEXV-9)(TABLEXV-9a)(TABLEXV-15)(FIGUREXV-55)(TABLEXV-17)(TABLEXV-18)(TABLEXV-19)(TABLEXV-20)(TABLEXV-21)INSERTXIII-1XIII-2XIII-3XIII-4XIII-5XIII-5aXIII-6XIII-7XIII-8XIII-9XIII-10XIII-11XIII-12XIII-13XIII-14..XIII-15XIII-16XIII-17XIII-18XIII-19XIII-20XV-6XV-46ZV-48XV-52.XV-54XV-61XV-64XV-81XV-81aXV-81bXV-82XV-82bXV-96XV-125ZV-126XV-134XV-136(FIGUREXIII-1)(FIGUREXIII-2)(TABLEXV-2)(TABLEXV-4)(TABLEXV-9)(TABLEXV-9a)(TABLEXV-15)(FIGUREXV-55)(TABLEZV-17)(TABLEXV-18)(TABLEXV-19)(TABLEXV-20)(TABLEXV-21)~137a~137b37c-37d-137e(TABLEXV-21a)ZV-137aXV-137bXV-137cXV-137dXV-137d1XV-137e(TABLEXV-21a)Revision9FII-8June1991 0

NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)INSERTIONINSTRUCTIONSVOLUMEII(Continued)REMOVEhX(f37f~64~j-'126Mg-127M-128-129-130-133-142j-169lÃf187(TABLEXV-21b)(TABLEXV-21c)(FIGUREXV-56b)(FIGUREXV-56c)(TABLEXVI-2)(TABLEXVI-13),(TABLEXVI-20)(TABLEXVI-21)(TABLEXVI-22)(TABLEXVI-23)(TABLEXVI-26)(FIGUREXVI-46)(FIGUREXVI-47)(FIGUREXVI-54)(FIGUREXVI-56)(TABLEXVI-31)INSERTXV-137fXV-137gXV-137jXV-137kXV-160XV-164XVI-7XVI-10XVI-23XVI-65XVI-126XVI-127XVI-128XVI-129XVI-130XVI-133XVI-142XVI-169XVI-170XVI-177XVI-179XVI-186XVI-187XVI-238(TABLEXV-21b)(TABLEXV-21c)(FIGUREXV-56b)(FIGUREXV-56c)(TABLEXVI-2)(TABLEXVI-13)(TABLEXVI-20)(TABLEXVI-21)(TABLEXVI-22)(TABLEXVI-23)(TABLEXVI-26)(FIGUREXVI-46)(FIGUREXVI-47)(FIGUREXVI-54)(FIGUREXVI-56)(TABLEXVI-31)RevisionFII-9June1991 EnclosuretoNMP1L0586NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONSUMMARYREPORT1991I.9'107020464DocketNo.50-220LicenseNo.DPR-63

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage1of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:81-065Rev.1Mod.Nl-80-040N/'APostAccidentSamplingPostAccidentSamplingSystemDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationinstalledanewpostaccidentreactorcoolantsamplingsystem.Thesamplelinewastappedandnewpipingwasroutedtothesamplingstation.Anadditionalsamplesourcewasprovidedbytappingintothecontrolroddrivehydraulicline.Two,new,one-thirdhorsepowerpumpshavebeenprovidedtoensurethatasamplecouldbeobtainedwhenthereactorisatlowpressure.Thepipingstation,aconfigurationofpipingdesignedtoreducethetemperatureandpressureofthesample,wasinstalledonthereactorbuildingwallcolumnK-8,abovefloorelevation281'.Asamplestationwasinstalledontheoppositesideofthewallabovefloorelevation277'ntheturbinebuilding.Thesamplestationwasconnectedtothepipingstationviathirteen1j'8-inchpipesthroughreactorbuildingpenetrationR-33.ReactorBuildingClosedLoopCooling(RBCLC')isusedtoprovidecoolingforthepumpsandthepipingstation.An80-gallondemineralizedwatertank,pressurizedto100psibynitrogen,wasinstalledadjacenttothesamplestationtoprovideameansforflushingthesystem.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThemodificationwasinstalledtomeetthepostaccidentreactorcoolantsamplingrequirementsoutlinedinSectionII.B.3ofNUREG0737.InstallationofthissystemwasinaccordancewiththeguidelinessetforthinSectionII.1.8aoftheNRCclarificationletterdatedOctober30,1979.

0 SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage2of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:81-065Rev.1SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)Thesystemservesapostaccidentmonitoringfunctiononly,whichisnotreliedontomitigateorpreventanyanalyzedtransientsoraccidents,anddoesnotadverselyimpactthefunctionofcomponents/systemsrelieduponforsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.RBCLCsystemintegrityhasbeenmaintained.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage3of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:85-046Mods.N1-85-34,Nl-85-35x-65FireProtectionSprinklerSystemandFireDamperUpgradingandInstallationDescriptionofChange:ThesemodificationsestablishedthereworkandinstallationsnecessarytoupgradethesprinklersystemsandfiredampersatNineMilePointUnit1.Theworkassociatedwiththefiredampersinvolvedtheinstallationandtestingofvariousnewdampersnecessaryformaintainingtheintegrityoffireratedbarriers.Thisworkalsoinvolvedreworkofexistingfiredamperassembliestocomplywithmanufacturers'etailsandSMACNAstandards.Thedampersarelocatedintheturbine,screenhouse,offgas,administration,reactorandradwastesolidificationandstoragebuildings.ThesemodificationswereinitiatedasaresultoftheGageandBabcockFireProtectionAudit,NRCAppendixRInspection,andanumberofANIInsuranceInspections.Toaddressthe.concernsidentifiedinthesereports,thesemodificationsconsistedofthedesign/redesignoftheexistingsprinklerpipingnetworkandtheinstallationofnewsystemswithtie-instotheexistingfireprotectionwaterdistriburtionsystem.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Failureofapipingsystemduringanearthquakethatcouldcausefailureofsafety-relatedequipmentwasevaluated.Therefore,sprinklersystemslocatedoverornearsafety-relatedequipmentweredesignedtoensurethatduringaseismiceventtheintegrityofthesafety-relatedequipmentismaintained.Designcriteriaaddressedthepossibilityoffallingcomponentsanddelugerelease,andincorporatedthepreventativemeasurestoprecludesuchoccurrences.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage4of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:85-046SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)ThemodifiedsprinklersystemscomplywithNFPA13-83.Allnewsystemswerehydrostaticallytestedatnotlessthan200psipressurefortwohours.Systemsthathavebeenmodifiedorrepairedtoanappreciableextentweretestedfortwohoursateither50psiabovenormalstaticpressureor200psi.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage5of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System87-008Rev.2Mod.Nl-86-081N/AReactorContainmentPurgeandFillTitleofChange:RemovalofHaysOxygen.andCambridgeDewPointAnalyzersDescriptionofChange:TheHaysCorporationoxygenanalyzer,Model635-1I,wasremovedbecauseitlackedtheadjustmentcontrolnecessarytoaccuratelycoverthedesiredrange.Documentationtosupportproperoperationandcalibrationwasalsoinadequateormissing.TheCambridgeDewPointAnalyzerwasremovedbecauseithadexcessivedriftproblems.Thismodelwasobsoleteand,consequently,couldnotberepaired.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesbfanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreasedbecausethecontainmentoxygenconcentrationisadequatelymonitoredbytheredundantH2-02primarycontainmentmonitoringsystem.MaintainingtheoxygenconcentrationwithinTechnicalSpecification3.1.1limitseliminatesthepossibilityofhydrogencombustionfollowingaloss-of-coolantaccidentconcurrentwithafailureofthecorespraysystem.TheCambridgeDewPointAnalyzerisnon-safetyrelatedandisnotassociatedwithanyaccidentanalysis.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage6of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-013N/AIX-4BennettsBridge115kVBennettsBridgeHydroStationEnergyManagementSystem(EMS)DescriptionofChange:Thisevaluationaddressedtheinstallationofanenergymanagementsystem(EMS),consistingofaremoteterminalunit(RTU),intheBennettsBridgeControlRoom.WiththeEMSinoperationandcontrolofBennettsBridgeandLighthouseHillStations,manualoperationsperformedbytheBennettsBridgeoperatorduringanemergencywillnowberemotelycontrolledfromtheEMSCentralRegionalControlCenterlocatedatHenryClayBoulevard.Uponreceivinganalarmforthecompletelossof115Voff-sitepowertoNineMilePointUnit1,theoperatoratHenryClayBoulevardwillnowmanuallyswitchoneoftwogeneratorsatBennettsBridgetothelinesupplyingtheLighthouseHillStation,whichinturnsuppliesemergencybackuppowertotheHighPressureCoolantInjection(HPCI)system.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AllexistingcontrolfunctionsintheBennettsBridgeControlRoomremainintactformaintenanceoremergencyoperation.Alocal/remotecontroldevicelocatedontheRTUintheBennettsBridgeControlRoomallowsoperationfromeithertheRegionalControlCenterorBennettsBridge,butnotbothsimultaneously.TheHPCISystemensuresadequatecorecoolingforsmalllinebreakswhichexceedthecapabilityofthecontrolroddrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallowrapiddepressurizationforcorespraytobeeffective.SincetheHPCIbackuppowersupplywasnotassuredduringsystemblackoutduetorequiredoperatoractionatBennettsBridge,creditwasnottakenforitsuseintheAppendixKECCSAnalysis.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage7of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-016Rev.1Mod.Nl-86-43N/AControlRoomDCRDRPhaseIIDescriptionofChange:ThismodificationconsistedofvariouscosmeticandfunctionalfixestoresolveHumanEngineeringObservations(HEOs)scheduledfor1988.Cosmeticfixesareoperationalaidsandenhancementssuchaschanginglabels,addingsetpointdata,changingscales,pencolors,chartpaper,pointers,completingmimicsorrevisingtheHumanFactorsDesignManual.ThefunctionalfixesconsistofreplacingrecordersonBpanelandtheH,O,recorders.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThecosmeticandfunctionalfixesfortheDetailed'ontrolRoomDesignReview(DCRDR)PhaseIImodificationsdonotaffecttheoperationofanyplantsafetysystem.Thismodificationprovidesoperatoraids,enhancements,andconsistencyincontrolroomdisplaysandprovidesmoreaccurateandreliablerecordingdevices.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage8of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:87-017GeneralElectricReportRDE18-0687UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/AControlRodDriveUseofBWR/6PartsinNineMile1HCUsDescriptionofChange:/aseplacementpartsfortheHCUdesignpresentlyinstalled.InordertodeterminewhichoftheBWR/6partswereappropriateforreplacementparts,GeneralElectric,theHCUmanufacturer,wasconsulted.ReplacementpartsforNineMilePointUnit1hydrauliccontrolunits(HCUs)areincreasinglydifficulttoprocureduetotheirage.Toovercomethisdeficiency,NiagaraMohawkevaluatedtheuseofseveralHCUsavailablefromacancelledBWR/6plant.TheintentwastousetheseBWR6HCUsrThepurposeofthisevaluationwastoreviewthose.partsacceptablefordirectreplacementandthosewithslightmodification,asidentifiedinTables3-4and3-5ofGEreportRDE118-0687.SafetyEvaluationSummary:PartsacceptablefordirectreplacementandthoseacceptablewithslightmodificationarelistedonGEreport,RDE118-0687,"EvaluationoftheInterchangeabilityBetweentheBWR/6andNineMilePointPlants1and2HydraulicControlUnits."UseofpartsacceptablefordirectreplacementandthoseacceptablewithslightmodificationassparesintheplantareacceptableprovidedthattheguidelinesfromGeneralElectricarecompliedwith.NMPCmechanicalengineeringreviewedeachoftheproposedminormodificationstothedesignatedsparesandfoundthemacceptable.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage9of6SSafetyEvaluationNo.:87-017SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)Thischangeinvolvedtheadaptionofpartsforuseasspares.Functionally,thesystemwillremainunchangedandwillnotbedegraded.UseoftheBWRf'6replacementpartsdoesnotchangethefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheFSAR.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage10of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:88-002Mod.N1-87-35III-9(FIII-4)Nj'A'pgradeofTurbineBuilding-AdministrationBuildingAccessControlPoint(Elevation261')DescriptionofChange:Thepurposeofthismodificationwastoupgradetheturbinebuilding/administrativebuildingaccesscontrolpointinordertoprovidemorethoroughradiationmonitoringandfasterprocessingofpersonnel.TheneedtoupgradetheaccesscontrolpointwasrevealedduringINPOinspectionsandinternalQAaudits.Thescopeofthemodificationwasasfollows:1)Demolitionoftheexistingdeconroom.2)Permanentremovalofonewasherfromthelaundryroomanddecontaminationofthetrenchbehindthewashers.3)Constructionofanewdeconroominthenortheastcorneroftheaccesscontrolareawhich,willconsistofstandardsolidconcreteblockfrom4-footleveltoceiling.4)InstallationoftwoFriskallIIAmonitors.5)Constructionofanewwallbetweenthetopoftheexistinglaundryroomwallandthe277'loorslab.6)Theremoval,revisionoradditionofrequiredplantservices.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ArevisiontoFSARFigureIII-4,StationFloorPlanElevation261'-0"wasincorporatedintotheJune1988FSARUpdate.TheupgradeoftheaccesscontrolpointincludinginstallationoftheFriskallmonitorshadnoeffectontheoperationofanysafety-relatedequipment.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage11of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:88-006Mod.N1-86-057N/ARodWorthMinimizerRodWorthMinimizerInoperabilityIndicationDescriptionofChange:TechnicalSpecificationSection3.1.1.b(3)(b')requirestherodworthminimizer(RWM)tobeoperableinordertomovecontrolrodswheninthestartuporrunmodebelow20percentratedthermalpower.Afterthewithdrawalofatleast12controlrods,theTechnicalSpecificationallowsthesubstitutionofasecondoperatororengineerinplaceoftheRWM.Ononeoccasion,withlessthan12controlrodswithdrawnandreactorpowerlessthan20%,controlrodsweremovedwhiletherodworthminimizerwasinoperable.InvestigationsintotheeventconcludedthattheRWMhadfailedduetoanindexingerrorinthesoftware.Duetotheunusualnatureofthefailure,normalinoperabilityindicationsandalarmswerenotgeneratedtotheoperator.ThepurposeofthischangewastoprovideRWMhardwarechangesthatwillinitiateinoperabilityalarmsfortheoperatorshouldasimilarproblemoccurinthefuture.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheRWMisacomputerizedprogramthatsupplementsproceduralcontrolsinenforcinganalyzedcontrolrodwithdrawalsequences.Itisconsiderednon-safetyrelated;therefore,10CFR50AppendixBdoesnotapply.Theconnectingofthreeadditionalcontacts(computerparity,computerstallandcomputertrouble)tothespareindicatorprovidesvitalinformationtotheoperatorandcouldpossiblypreventfutureTechnicalSpecificationsviolations.ThehardwarechangesdonotaffectanyotherplantsystemsbesidestheRWMandcontrolroomEconsole.FSARanalysesconcerningarodwithdrawerrororcontrolroddropareunaffected.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage12of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:88-020SiteEmergencyPlan,Section5.2.2.gUFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/ASiteEmergencyPlanEmergencyPlanStaffingRequirementfortheShiftTechnicalAdvisorDescriptionofChange:Thischangeresolvesaninconsistencyinon-shiftstaffingrequirementsfortheShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA).TheSiteEmergencyPlaniscurrentlyinterpretedtorequiretheSTApositiontobestaffedatUnit1atalltimes.TheplantTechnicalSpecificationsrequiretheSTApositiontobestaffedwhentheunitisoperatingorinhotshutdown.ThereisnoSTAstaffingrequirementiftheunitisincoldshutdownorrefueling.ThechangeauthorizesamendmentoftheSiteEmergencyPlantoclarifythatstaffingoftheSTApositionforUnit1isnotrequiredwhenitisincoldshutdownorrefueling.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheNRC,inaletterdatedJuly2,1980,statedtheSTAwasnotrequiredforcoldshutdownorrefueling.TheNRC,inalaterletter(July31,1980),identifiedthattheon-shiftSTAisrequiredonlyforpoweroperation,startup,orhotshutdown.NUREG0654,Rev.1,II.B.5referencestheJuly31,1980letter,butinTableB-l,minimumstaffingrequirementsfailtospecifyplantoperatingconditionsrelatedtostaffingrequirements.Duringcoldshutdownorrefueling,reactorcoolanttemperatureislowandthereactorisnotpressurized.Thereactorcoolanttemperatureisequaltoorlessthan212'Finrefuelingorcoldshutdown.Undertheseconditions,possiblewaterleveltransientsorthefuelroddropaccidentsarethemostsignificantevents.Theseeventsarenotofthecomplexityofthoseeventsthatmightoccurduringpoweroperation.Specialon-shiftengineeringexpertiseisnotrequired,whichiswhytheNRCdidnotrequireSTAsfortherefuelingandcoldshutdownmodes.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage13of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:88-020SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)TheSiteEmergencyPlanhasbeenrevisedconsistentwiththeTechnicalSpecificationstospecifythattheSTApositionisrequiredonlywhenthereactorisinthepoweroperation,startup,orhotshutdownmodes.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage14of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:89-13Rev.'364Mod.N1-89-131,andN1-OP-14VII-15,VII-16,VII-17,VII-19'V160'V164System:TitleofChange:ContainmentSpraySystemContainmentSprayPostDBALOCAAppendixJWaterSealDescriptionofChange:SafetyEvaluation89-13,Revision3,providedadditionalanalysisofthewatersealmethodtobeemployedatNMP1.Theanalyzedmethodusedthefollowingsystemconfigurationtoprovidethewatersealwhilesprayingcontainment:a.Intertievalves80-45and80-40normallyopen(manualvalves)b.Intertievalves80-41and80-44normallyclosed(remoteairoperatedvalves)c.Injectionvalves80-15,80-16,80-35,80-36normallyopen(remoteairoperated).SafetyEvaluation89-13,Revision4,evaluatedwhethertheabovedescribedvalveline-ups(inNl-OP-14)toimplementthewatersealwillimpactthevariousmodesofcontainmentspraysystemoperation,specifically,drywellandsuppressionpoolspraying,toruscooling,toruslevelcontrol,post-LOCAcontainmentfloodup,andsupplyingrawwatertothecontainmentsprayspargersandcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theanalyzedconfigurationprovidestherequiredwaterseal.OperatingProcedureN1-OP-14providesadequateproceduralguidancetoterminatesprayandinitiatetoruscooling,toruslevelcontrol,orcontainmentfloodingasdictatedbyEOPs.ThewatersealduringspraymodesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.1

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage15of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:89-13Rev.364SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)Establishmentofthewatersealdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetywithrespecttosprayingcontainment.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthattheContainmentSprayPostDBALOCAAppendixJWaterSealdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage16of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-024Rev.2Mod.N1-89-208VI-40,VI-41(FVI-18)InstrumentAir113ReactorBuildingTrackBayInnerDoorSealAirSupplyDescriptionofChange:Therearetwodoorsonthereactorbuildingtrackbay,eitherofwhichservestoprovidesecondarycontainmentatrequiredperiods.Thepurposeofthismodificationwastoupgradethereliabilityoftheairsupplyandaircontrolequipmentandsealhousingtotheinnertrackbaydoorinflatableseal.1nadequateairsealsupportalongtheperimeterofthedoorframewasidentified.Anewsealhousingandfasteningmethodwasdesignedandinstalledtoeliminatepotentialproblems.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Whentheinnerdoorisused,thesealispressurizedtoprovideleaktightness.Airtopressurizethesealwassuppliedfromoneoftwosources(i.e.,houseserviceairoradedicatedcompressorasabackupsource).Anewsourceofsafety-relatedairwassuppliedtothesealfrominstrumentairbranchpiping.Theprobabilityofadoorsealsystemfailurewasreducedasaresultofthismodificationbyupgradingthedoorsealairsupply,aircontrolequipmentandsealhousingtosafety-relatedcriteria.Thismodificationincreasedtheassurancethatunderpostulatedadverseplantconditions,thedoorsealsystemwouldcontinuetobeoperableandcontributetomaintainingsecondarycontainment.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage17of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-029Mod.No.N1-89-209X21gX9(FX-3)HeadSpraySystem(34)PartialRemovaloftheHeadSprayPipingDescriptionofChange:Thepurposeofthischangewastoeliminateuseofthereactorheadspraycoolingsystem.Thiswasaccomplishedbypermanentlyremovingthespoolpiecelocatedinthesystemdischargelinetothereactorvesselhead.Theremainingsystempiping(includingtheportionthatcontainsthecontainmentisolationvalves)wasblindflangedandsupportedinamannerconsistentwiththeoriginaldesignbasis.TheisolationvalvescontinuetobemaintainedasdescribedintheTechnicalSpecifications.Minorchangestotwoplantoperationprocedures,OP-4,"ShutdownCoolingandHeadSpraySystem,"andOP-5,"ControlRodDriveSystems,"werealsoimplemented.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theheadspraysystemwasnotrequiredtooperateunderanyshutdown,cooldown,accident,ortransientconditions.Thesystemwasoriginallyinstalledtobeusedduringnormalplantshutdownonly.However,atNMP1thissystemwasnotregularlyused.ThisflowpathwasalsonotrequiredtosatisfyAppendixRcoldshutdowninventorymakeuprequirementssincesufficientmakeupcapability(viatheCRDhydraulicsystem)isprovidedbyotherredundantflowloops.Thedeletionofthespoolpieceandtheinsertionoftheblindflangesprovidedaddedassuranceofreactorpressurevesselisolation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage18of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:89-034Rev.1ProblemReport530III-1,III-5,III-23@III43/VI25~VII40'VI23'vz-65,xvz-126,XVI-127(TXVI-20),xvz-128(Txvz-21)gxvz-129(Txvz-22),XVI-130(TXVI23)Ixvz-133(Txvz-26),xvz-142,XVI186(TXVI31)~XVI187System:Generic-SteelandConcreteStructuresTitleofChange:ConstructionCodesforModificationsandAdditionstoNMP1SteelandConcreteStructures~~DescriptionofChange:Thissafetyevaluationwasforaproposedchangeinmodification/changeprocedurethatpermittedtheuseofcurrentconstructioncodesformodificationsandadditions,toNMP1steelandconcretestructuresinlieuoftheoriginalconstructioncodes.Specificallythischangepermitted:(a)useofcurrentconstructioncodesforallstand-alonemodifications/changes,and(b)useofcurrentconstructioncodesforreanalysisofexistingstructures,whenrequired,foramodification/changeoraredefinitionofdesignloads,etc.Thecurrentconstructioncodeswereconsideredtobeupgradesrelativetotheoriginalconstructioncodes.Thatis,therequirementsofthecurrentconstructioncodeswereconsideredtobeasgoodas,orbetter(butnotnecessarilymoreconservative)than,therequirementsoftheoriginalconstructioncodes.Onthisbasis,itwasconcludedthatstand-alonemodifications/changestoNMP1steelandconcretestructuresmaybedesignedandanalyzedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofthecurrentconstructioncodes.Indoingso,itwasconsideredimportantthatthemodification/changemeetalltherequirementsofthecurrentconstructioncode-notsomerequirementsofthecurrentcodeandotherrequirementsoftheoriginalconstructioncode.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage19of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:89-034Rev.1SafetyEvaluationSummary:ItwasconcludedthattheoveralldesignmarginsprovidedbythecurrentindustrycodesforsteelandconcretestructureswereadequateforNMP1and,infact,arethesameasthoseprovidedinnewplants.Ampletechnicaljustificationexiststousethecurrentindustrycodestoanalyzeandmodify/changeexistingNMP1steelandconcretestructures.Foranystand-alonemodifications/changesinthestructuralcomponentsofNMP1,itwasacceptabletodesignandanalyzethemodification/changeinaccordancewiththecurrentconstructioncode,aslongasallrequirements(e.g.,materialdesign,inspection,etc.)ofthecurrentconstructioncodeweremet.Itwasnotacceptabletomixrequirements(e..g.,thedesignrequirementsfromthecurrentcodewiththeinspectionrequirementsfromtheoriginalcode)unlessthedifferenceswerereconciled.Forreanalysisofexistingstructures,itwasacceptabletoreanalyzetheexistingstructuretothecurrentconstructioncode,providedthatallconstructiondetailsoftheexistingstructuremettherequirementsofthecurrentcode.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcluded,thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage20of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-037N//AN/AInstrumentAirSystemEvaluationofAcceptabilityofNon-SafetyRelatedLoadsontheSafetyRelatedInstrumentAirSystemDescriptionofChange:Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluationwastoevaluatetheacceptabilityofbothsafety-relatedandnon-safetyrelatedairloadsbeingsuppliedoffthesafety-relatedinstrumentairsystem(IAS).Nophysicalchangesweremadetothefacilityasaresultofthisevaluation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Subsequenttotheissuanceoftheoperatinglicense,systemloadswereincreasedsuchthattwoIAScompressors(485scfmeach)hadeachbeenreducedto66%capacity.A729scfmcompressorwasalsoaddedtothesystem.Thereductionintheabilityofeither485scfmcompressortoindependentlyandfullysupporttheloadsonIASisacceptableduetothelargestoragecapacityofthesystem(assumingloadsareintermittent).Operatoractioncanbetakentoeitherisolatenon-vitalloadsfromtheIASsystemortorestoretooperabilityaninoperable'ompressorordieselgeneratorduringaDBAeventwhichassumesasingleactivefailure.TheIASsystemwasdedicatedinplaceasasafety-relatedsystem;however,atthetimeofdedicatingthesystem,theeffectofnon-safetyrelatedloadsonsystemperformancewasnotevaluated.Basedupontheoriginallicensingbasis,itisconcludedthatthesenon-safetyrelatedloadswouldnotfailinamannerthatwouldcausealossoftheirpressureretentionfunctionoftheairintheIASsystemduringaDBA.ThisreasoningissupportedbythepositionthataseismiceventisnotpostulatedduringaDBA.Withoutaseismiceventduringpostulateafailureoftheairnon-safetyrelatedairloadonconcludedthatthepresenceofsafety-relatedairsystemdoesperformanceofIAS.aDBA,itisunreasonabletopressureretentionfunctionofaIAS.Therefore,itcanbenon-safetyrelatedloadsonanotdegradethereliabilityand

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage21of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:89-037SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)Basedupontheabove,theexistenceofnon-safetyrelatedloadsonthesafety-relatedIASdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandisincompliancewithNRCstandards.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage22of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-001N/AN/ARadwasteBuildingTemporaryHEPAVentilationfortheRadwasteBldg.225'levationClean-upProjectDescriptionofChange:Radwastebuildingelevation225'ascleanedbyvacuumingupradwasteprocessfiltersludgeandpumpingthesludgebackthroughthenormalradwastesystemsforprocessing.Duringtheentireoperation,itwasnecessarytousetemporaryHEPAfilterunitstodirectcleanairflowtotheareastobeoccupiedbypersonnelanddirectcontaminatedairawayfromtheseareasandthepointsofegresstoelevation225'.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheadditionofthetwoHEPAfilterunitscausedsomeminorimbalancestotheflowsshownonFigureIII-15oftheFSAR.ItwasqualitativelydemonstratedanddocumentedthattheintendedflowpathsoftheHVACsystemweremet,i.e.,flowfromlowestcontaminatedareatomorecontaminatedtohighestcontaminatedbytheuseof"smoketubetesting"onthe236',248'nd261'levationsoftheradwastebuildingimmediatelyafterthetemporaryHEPAventilationunitswerestarted.Airwasremovedfromthemostcontaminatedareas,andprocessedthroughHEPAfiltersdesignedtofilterradioactivelycontaminatedairwhichresultedinradioactively"clean"airatthefilterdischarge.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage23of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-008N/AN/'AFuelCoreOperatingLimitsReport-Revision1DescriptionofChange:Channelbowwasidentifiedasacontributingfactorinthefuelfailures(4-fuelpins)experiencedattheOskarshamnreactorinDecember1987.ThischangeraisestheMCPRlimitinthecoreoperatinglimitsreport(COLR)tocompensateforthepotentialimpactofchannelbowing,andappliesamultipliertotheMAPLHGRlimitsintheCOLRtocompensateforthepotentialimpactofrecirculationlinepipewhipduringaDBALOCA.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ChannelbowandGeneralElectric'sproposedlongtermfixhasbeenreviewedandacceptedbytheNRC(NoticeNo.89-69).Untilthelongtermfix(updatingtheprocesscomputerdatabanktoincorporatechannelbowintheRfactors)isincorporated,theraisingoftheMCPRoperatinglimitwillprovideassurancethattheSLCPRwillnotbeviolated.ThecurrentMAPLHGRlimitsintheCOLR(Revision0)assumetwospargerseachfedbyonecorespraypumpandonetoppingpump.Theotherpumpstringsareassumedlostthroughasinglefailure,e.g.,lossofadieselgenerator.(Anexceptionisthecorespraylinebreakeventwhichcreditsonlytheremainingspargerfedbyaonepumpstring).ThechangeisbasedonananalysisoftheDBArecirculationlinebreak(includingresultingloss,bypipewhip,ofacoresprayandemergencycondenserline)andcreditsoperationofasinglespargerfedbyaonepumpstring.ThechangeinMCPRfrom1.41to1.445andtheapplicationofa.85MAPLHGRmultiplierisincompliancewithNRCstandards.ThesechangesdonotresultinanyphysicalmodificationstoanyECCSsystems.ThechangesensurethattheSLCPRlimitand

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage24of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-008SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)acceptancecriteriaof10CFR50.46arenotviolated.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage25of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:90-013Rev.4leod.N1-90-030X-25,XV-61(TXV-4),XV-64ReactorBuildingClosedLoopCoolingWaterSystem(RBCLC)TitleofChange:InstallationofTravelStopinTCV70-137ValveActuatorDescriptionofChange:ThischangeinstallsamechanicaltravelstopinthepistonactuatoroftheTCV70-137valvetopreventthevalvefromclosingcompletelytotheRBCLCheatexchangersunderanyfailsituation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheexistingRBCLCwatertemperaturecontrolloopisonlyondiesel102;therefore,theLOOPwillcauseE/P70-137,TC70-23B,etc.,tofailTCV70-137closedbecause,perprocedureN1-ICP-C-70,theLOOPwillcausealowsignalforE/P70-137causingthepositionertoclosevalveTCV70-137toheatexchangers.LicensingcommitmentstakecreditfortheTCV70-137intheRBCLCsystemfailinginopenpositionintheeventoflossofinstrumentairtotheTCVpermittingfullflowtotheRBCLCheatexchangers.Theactualvalve,whentested,remainedinthe"as-is"position.Dependingonthevalvepositionatthetimeoffailure,thevalvecouldpotentiallydrifttothefullbypasspositionduetoflowinducedforces.ThissingleactivefailuremayresultininadequateflowthroughtheRBCLCheatexchangers,thuspreventingcoolingofvariousessentialheatloads.InordertoprecludepotentialclosingofTCV70-137totheRBCLCheatexchangersduetoLOOPand/orlossofinstrumentair,amechanicaltravelstopisinstalledinthepistonactuator.SincecreditcannotbetakenforoperatoractionduringaDBAevent,thetravelstopislimitedtoprovideadequatecoolingcapacitytoassureremovalofemergencyessentialheatloadof8.34x10Btu/hr.AlthoughonlythecontrolroomairconditioningchillerandtheCADsystems,whichareatotalloadof0.76x10'tu/hr,areultimatelyessential,Engineeringhasdesignedthemechanicaltravelstoptoallowadequateflowstocoolalltheessentialloads.

0'Aa SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage26of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-013Rev.4SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)Engineeringdesignedthemechanicaltravelstoptoassurecoolingoftheseloadstoeithermitigatetheconsequencesofanaccidentortoassuredecayheatremoval(e.g.,spentfuelpool).Duringnormaloperationwhensomeessentialandmostofthenon-essentialheatloadsarefunctioning,TCV70-137willremainabovethemechanicaltravelstop.Potentialovercoolingofpipingandequipmentwouldoccurduringaccidentornormalplantoperationinwinterwhenlakewatermaycoolto32'FresultingincoolerRBCLCwater.ThiscoolerRBCLCwaterinwinterwillnotcauseanydamagetotherecirculatingpumpsealsbecausetheytripduringaDBAevent.However,duringnormalplantoperation,coolerRBCLCwatermaybeaconcernfortherecirculatingpumpseals.Therefore,thetravelstopforTCV70-137isselectedinamannerthat,duringaDBAevent,itwilllimittemperatureto95'F(FSARlimit)with81'Flakewatertemperatureinsummerandapproximately60'Fduringnormaloperationinwinterwhenlakewatertemperatureis32'F.Thiswillprecludeanydamagetotherecirculatingpumpseals.Basedontheaboveanalysis,itisconcludedthatdisablementoftheRBCLCsystemduetosingleactivefailure,asdiscussedabove,isprecludedbyinstallationofamechanicaltravelstopinthepistonactuatorofTCV70-137.Thispreventsitfromclosingcompletelyonlossofinstrumentairorlossofpowertothetemperaturecontrolinstruments.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage27of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-014Rev.02Mod.Ni-90-005IX-29,IX-30MGSetsMGSetSpeedControlDescriptionofChange:ThepurposeofthischangewastoeliminatethespeedcontrolproblemsassociatedwithMotorGenerator(MG)Sets161,162,167,171,and172identifiedduringtheN1-ST-R2(simulatedLOCA/LOOP)test.Thischangeentailedthede-energizationofacemergencylightingforashorttimeperiodonlossofoffsitepower(LOOP)andreturnofthebatterychargeronauto(closureofthedcbreaker).SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theanalysisshowsthattheemergencydclightingprovidesadequatelightingforplantoperatorsandemergencymaintenancepersonneltoperformnecessaryoperationsandrepairs,includingthesafeaccessandegressroutesthereto.ThisisincompliancewiththerequirementsofAppendixR,SafeShutdownAnalysis,FireProtectionandLifeSafetyCode.Thetest,usingtheUnit1simulator,indicatedthattheilluminationinthecontrolroomisadequatefortheoperatorstoperformtheirfunctionsduringthenon-AppendixRevents.TheNMP1emergencylightingalsosatisfiestheguidancecontainedinNUREG-0800.TheanalysisalsoshowsthatautomaticclosureofthebatterychargerbreakerisincompliancewiththeFSAR,andthedesignimplications,asdescribedearlier,donotconstituteanydesigndeficiency.Basedontheevaluation.performed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage28of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:90-015Rev.1TechnicalSpecificationBasesSections3.1.8and4.1.8UFSARAffectedPages:VZZ-61,VZZ-61a,VIZ-63(FVII-17)System:HPCI/Feedwater,Systems29,49,50TitleofChange:HPCIFlowReductionDescriptionofChange:Thehighpressurecoolantinjection(HPCI)systemisanoperatingmodeofthecondensate/feedwatersystem.TheHPCIsystemprovidesanalternatemethodofemergencycorecoolingforcertainsmallbreakLOCAswhichdonotresultinrapidreactorvesseldepressurization.ThechangerevisestheminimumrequiredflowfortheHPCIsystemfrom3800gpm(designflowrate)to3420gpminordertotakeintoaccounta10%flowdegradationofthepumpswithoperation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissafetyevaluationassessestheacceptabilityofa10percentreductionintheHPCIflowrate(from3800gpmto3420gpm)usedinHPCIperformanceanalyses.WhentheflowrequirementsforHPCIwereoriginallyspecifiedintheTechnicalSpecificationBasesandFSAR,themaximumoutputfromonefeedwatertrain(condensatepump,feedwaterboosterpumpandfeedwaterpump)of3800gpmwasspecified.Thisflowcapabilitydidnottakeintoaccountanydegradationofthepumpswithoperation.Hence,thecurrentHPCIflowrate(3800gpm)isthesystemcapabilityratherthanamakeuprequirement.AreductioninassumedHPCIflowrateaffectsthecalculatedHPCIperformancecapabilitytoprovidecorecoveragebyitselfforlinebreaksupto0.063ft(ratherthan0.07ft)whileitsoriginalintendedfunction,todepressurizethevesselto365psig,remainsunaffected.IntheeventofasmallbreakLOCAandlossofoffsitepower,theADSsystem,emergencycondenserandcorespraywouldstillbeavailabletomaintainpeakcladtemperaturesbelow10CFR50.46limitswhiledepressurizingthevessel.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage29of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-015Rev.1SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)HPCIisstillcapableofdepressurizingthevesselto365psigsothatcoresprayisinitiated.AnavailableHPCIflowof3420gpmpermitspumpperformancetrendinginaccordancewithSectionXIoftheASMECodewhileensuringthesystemremainsoperable.AchangetoTechnicalSpecificationBasesSections3.1.8and4.1.8hasbeenapprovedbytheNRC(12/31/90)toreduceHPCIflowto90%ofthefeedwaterpumpsystemdesigncapabilitytoallowmarginfortrendingofpumpperformance.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage30Of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:90-017Rev.1N/'AVII11'II13(FVII4)gVII13a(FVII-4a),VII-14(FVII-5),VII-15,VII-16,VII-18System:ContainmentSprayandContainmentSprayRawWaterTitleofChange:ContainmentSpraySystemAcceptanceCriteriaDescriptionofChange:TheFSAR(Updated)wasrevisedtoupdatetheperformanceparametersandsystemacceptancecriteriaforthecontainmentsprayandcontainmentsprayrawwater(CSRW)pumps,andtodeletethe"typical"performancecurvesforthesepumpsfromtheFSAR(Updated).ThesechangesreflecttheresultsofinservicetestsperformedonthepumpsaspartoftheISTprogram.Operabilityrequirementsforthecontainmentsprayrawwaterpumpswereaddedwithrespecttopressuremaintainedontherawwatersideofthecontainmentsprayheatexchangers,andflowasafunctionoflakewatertemperature.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thepresentcontainmentanalysis,asdescribedintheFSAR(Updated),isnotaffectedforthefollowingreasons:1)Thecontainmentsprayflowrequirementof3000gpmisunchanged.Basedonfieldvalidatedpumpcurvesandaconservativehydraulicmodel,thepumpdevelopedheadrequirementat3000gpmhasbeendeterminedtobe242.5ft(105psid).The375ftcurrentlyspecifiedissimplytheratedheadofthepumpat3000,gpm.2)TheCSRWheatremovalrequirementof60xlOBtu/hrisunchanged.ThisrequirementismetwhenthemaximumallowablelakewatertemperatureattheestablishedCSRWflowisnotexceeded.Arangeofflowsandtheircorrespondingtemperatureshasbeendetermined.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage31of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-017Rev.1SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)Therequirementfor10psipositivepressureontheCSRWoutletoftheheatexchangersrelativetotheshellsideisunchanged.Thisrequirementensuresthatanyleakageisintothecontainmentspraysystem.Basedonfieldvalidatedcurves,therequiredoutletpressurehasbeendeterminedtobe141psig.The160psigrequirementcurrentlyintheFSAR(Updated)wasapump-basedrequirementwhichenvelopesthe10psidrequirementfortheheatexchanger.TheseFSAR(Updated)changesdidnotinvolveanyphysicalchangestotheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage32of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-019TemporaryProcedureNl-89-10XII-18(TXII-5)RadwasteRemovalofExtraneousEquipmentUsingtheTetheredRemoteOperatingDevice(TROD)DuringtheRadwasteBuildingCleanupOperationDescriptionofChange:TheusebftheTRODwasaddressedinSafetyEvaluation190-084.InorderfortheTRODtoadequatelyperformthecleanupoperation,itwasnecessarytoremovecertainpiecesofequipmentsuchastheconveyersystem,drumcappingandfillingequipmentandtheassociatedcontrolsystems.Equipmentwasremovedroboticallybecauseofthecontaminationlevelsonthem.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Sincenobuildingstructuralmemberswereallowedtoberemovedormodifiedbythisanalysis,theremovalofthisabandonedequipmenthadnoeffectontheradwastebuildingintegrity.TheEquipmentQualificationReviewshowsnoconcernwiththeremovalofthisabandonedequipment.Thisequipmentwasnotrequiredforthesafeshutdownofthereactor,nordiditprovideanysafetyfunction.Theremovalofthisequipmentdidnotimpactanyofthepreviouslyidentifiedcircuitsinvolvedinthesafeshutdownoftheplant,anyemergencylightintheplantnorthefiredetectionsysteminthearea.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage33of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:90-026Mod.Nl-90-107VI-16MainSteamLineContainmentPenetrationsZ-2AandX-2BTitleofChange:MainSteamPenetrationsBellowsRepairDescriptionofChange:ThemainsteamlinecontainmentpenetrationsweredeterminedtobeleakingduringtheperformanceofaLocalLeakRateTest(LLRT).Subsequently,leakswerediscoveredintheconvolutionsoftwoofthefourbellowsexpansionjoints.Therepairconsistedofinstalling"clam-shell"bellowshalvesovertheexistingbellows.Aportionoralloftheconvolutedsectionoftheexistingbellowswasremoved.Landingringswereattachedtothepipenipplesoftheexistingexpansionjoints.Thetwoleakingbellowswererepairedpriortoplantstartup,andtheothertwonon-leakingbellowswererepairedafterplantstartup.\SafetyEvaluationSummary:AccidentsanalyzedintheFSARwillbeunaffectedsincetheclam-shellbellowswillperformthedesignfunctionoftheoriginalbellows.Theadditionoftheclam-shellbellowswillnotchangetheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment.Theadditionoftheclam-shellbellowshelpsreducetheconsequencesofanaccidentbyreducingcontainmentleakage.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage34of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:90-028ChemistryProcedureN1-CSP-7X,Rev.0UFSARAffectedPages:System:VIII-71StackAuxiliaryEffluentSamplingTitleofChange:StackEffluentSamplingUsingAuxiliarySamplingEquipmentDescriptionofChange:ThestackgasmonitoringsystemsforUnit1aretheRadioactiveGaseousEffluentMonitoringSystem(RAGEMS)andtheOffgasEffluentStackMonitoringSystem(OGESMS).OGESMSisthenormaloperationsystemandRAGEMSistheaccidentmonitoringsystem.ThischangeaddressedtheregularplantstackgasmonitoringsystemstoallowsamplingusingauxiliarysamplingequipmentandproceduresdescribedinN1-CSP-7XtoallowtheplanttocontinueoperatinginaccordancewiththeTechnicalSpecifications.TheauxiliarysamplingequipmentarrangementspecifiedinNl-CSP-7Xconsistsoftygontubingconnectedtothenormalsamplesupplyandreturnlines,afilterholderforiodineandparticulatecartridges,aflowmeter,pump,pressure.gaugeandfoursamplevalves.ThisequipmentcanbeinstalledandfunctioningwithintheeighthoursrequiredbyTechnicalSpecificationSection3.6.14.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThetemporaryalterationtoRAGEMSorOGESMStoobtainstackeffluentsamplesusingauxiliaryequipmentallowscontinuedoperationoftheplantwithcontinuedeffluentreleaseviathemainstackinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecification3.6.14.TheexistingfunctionsofRAGEMSandOGESMSarenotaltered.Useoftheauxiliarysamplingarrangementdoesnotaffectthequantityofreleasedeffluentsanddoesnotresultinalossofcontrolofradioactivereleases.Analysisoftheauxiliarysamplingsystemhasdemonstratedthatthesystemwillproviderepresentativesamples.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage35of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:90-035N/'AXV81~XV81bXV82(TXV-9),XV-96,XV-125(TXV-15)gXV126(FXV55)gXV-134(TXV-18),XV-136(TXV-21),XV-137b,XV137dgXV-137d1System:TitleofChange:FuelCoreOperatingLimitsReport-Revision02DescriptionofChange:Thissafetyevaluationwaswrittentoevaluatethefollowing:a.removaloftheaddertotheMCPRlimitinthecoreoperatinglimitsreport(COLR)whichcompensatedforthepotentialimpactofchannelbowing,b.c~removalofthemultiplierontheMAPLHGRlimitsfortheP8DNB277fuelintheCOLRwhichcompensatedforthepotentialimpactofrecirculationlinepipewhipduringaDBALOCA,andremovaloftheMAPLHGRlimitsforfueltype8DNB277.SafetyEvaluationSummary:a~b.GeneralElectrichaddeterminedthepotentialimpactofchannelbowofMCPRtobeupto0.035forD.Latticeplants(NineMilePointUnit1).ToaccountforthistheMCPRlimitswereraisedfrom1.41to1.445inCOLRRevision1.TheprocesscomputerdatabankhasbeenupdatedtoincorporatechannelbowintotheRfactorsandthe.035penaltywasredundantandwasremoved.AfuelMAPLHGRevaluationwasperformedfortheNineMilePoint1NuclearPowerStationusingtheSAFERmethodologydescribedinNEDC-30996-A.TheanalysisutilizedallmodelsandproceduresfortheReload10a11fuelbundlesdesigns.TheReload9fuelbundledesignwasalsoaddressed.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage36of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-035SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)Fromthis,aMAPLHGRmultiplierof.85wasimplementedinCOLRRevision1toensurecompliancewithregulatoryfuelpeakcladdingtemperatureandcladdingoxidationlimitsfortheP8DRB299andBD321Bfuel.Inaddition,thisevaluationdeterminedthattheP8DNB277fuel'slimitswereconservativeandrequirednomultiplier.c.TheMAPLHGRlimitsforfueltypeSDNB277havebeenremovedfromtheCOLRasthisfueltypeisnotintheCycle10core.BasedupontheaboveanalysisthechangeinMCPRfrom1.445to1.41,theremovalofthe.85MAPLHGRmultiplierfromthePSDNB277fuel,andtheremovaloffueltypeSDNB277fromtheCOLRdonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandareincompliancewithNRCstandards.ThesechangesdonotresultinanyphysicalmodificationstoanyECCSsystems.TheMCPRchangeandtheremovalofthe.85MAPLHGRmultiplierfromtheP8DNB277fuelwereimplementedthroughamodificatontotheprocesscomputerdatabank.ThechangesensurethattheSLCPRlimitandacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50.46arenotviolated.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage37of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:90-037Mod.Nl-89-174Rev.1Temp.Mod.5299UFSARAffectedPages:SystemN/ALowPressureReactorFeedwaterSystem(SystemI51)TitleofChange:TemporaryGaggingofReliefValves51-04A,05A,06A,and51-77,78,79DescriptionofChange:Thisevaluationprovides:Thetechnicaljustificationwhichdemonstratesthatthereliefvalvesmaybetemporarilygaggedduringplantoperationwithoutconstitutinganunreviewedsafetyquestion.2.Thenecessaryprecautionstobetakentoensurethereliefvalvegagsareremovedduringvarioussystemisolationconditions.ModificationN1-89-174,Rev.0,decreasedthelowpressurereactorfeedwatersystemdesignpressurefrom600to500psig.Setpointsforsafetyreliefvalvesinthesystemoriginallysetat600psigwerechangedto500psig.Asaresultofrecentfeedwatersystemtesting,boththecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpcurveshavebeenfieldcorrected,andithasbeenconcludedthatthemaximumsystemoperatingpressureswillexceed500psig.Therefore,ModificationNl-89-174hasbeenrevisedtoincreasethedesignpressurefrom500psigto530psig.Accordingly,thesubjectreliefvalvesmustalsoberesetto530psig.Asitwasimpracticaltoremove,reset,andreinstallthereliefvalvesinthetimeallotted,thesubjectreliefvalvesweregagged.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thereliefvalvesaresmall(3/4"x1")andlowcapacity(27gpm)designedprimarilyforthermalrelief.ThevalvesareinstalledforpreventionofexcessivepressuresinthesystemwhentheportionofthesystembecomesisolatedandthatportionmaybesubjectedtounexpectedsourcesofheatasstatedintheFSAR.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage38of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-037SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)Thereliefvalvesarenotinstalledtopreventexcessivedynamicheadinthesystem.Furthermore,duetothesmallsizeandlowcapacityofthereliefvalves,thevalveswillprovideinsignificantdynamicpressurerelief.Therefore,thevalvesweretemporarilygaggedduringnormalplantoperationandaresubjecttothefollowingprovisions:1.Theportionsofthesystemprotectedbythereliefvalvesdidnotbecomeisolatedbytheclosingofvalves(Note:Unexpectedautomaticisolationofthevalvesisnotofconcernbecausethevalvesrequiredtoisolatethefeedwaterheatersandpumpsareallmanuallyoperatedvalves).2.Cautionstatementswereincorporatedintotheapplicableplantoperatingprocedureswhichgaveinstructiontoremovethereliefvalvetestrods(i.e.,removegags)priortoclosingtherequiredvalvesnecessarytoisolateatrainoffeedwaterheatersorafeedwaterpump.Furthermore,anytimepiping/equipmentprotectedbythereliefvalvesisisolated,thepiping/equipmentventordrainvalvesareopened.Additionalcautionistakentoensurethefeedwaterpumpcasingwarm-upsupplyvalvesareclosedpriortoclosingthepumpsuctionisolationvalves.Temporarilygaggingthesubjectreliefvalvesdoesnotrepresentanunreviewedsafetyquestion,nordoesitadverselyaffectoperationorpreventsafeshutdownoftheplant.Thedesigncodeforthelowpressurefeedwatersystemdoesnotrequirereliefvalvesforthisapplication;therefore,gaggingthevalvesdoesnotviolatedesigncoderequirements.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage39of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-038Rev.1ImplementationDocumentNo.:N/AUFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:III-19TurbineBuildingVentilationOperationwithTurbineBuildingVentsand/orDoorsOpenDescriptionofChange:ThisanalysisaddressestheimpactsofoperatingtheNMP1plantwiththeturbinebuildingroofvents,exteriordoorsorothernormallyclosedfixturesinanopenposition.Thisanalysiswasperformedtopermitadditionalbuildingcoolingduringwarmweatherconditions.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheturbinebuildingHVACsystemhasnosafety-relatedfunction.Failureormalfunctionofthesystemwillnotcompromiseanysafety-relatedsystemorcomponent,orpreventsafereactorshutdown.Theturbinebuildingisnotclassifiedasacontainmentstructure;however,itsventilationsystemisdesignedtoexhaustmoreairthanismechanicallysupplied,therebymaintaininganegativepressuretoinhibittheexfiltrationofcontaminants.OnlythemainstackandemergencycondenserventareconsideredasnormalreleasepointsforNMP1.Sincebuildingfixtureswillonlybeopenedintermittentlyasdesiredtoprovideadditionalbuildingcooling,theopenventsordoorsarenotconsideredtobeadditionalreleasepoints.Evaluationshavebeenperformedtoensurethatopenturbineroofventsand/ordoorsdonotprovideapotentialforunmonitoredeffluentreleasesduringnormaloperation,andtoensurethattheestimatedannualdosesfromgaseouseffluentswillremainbelowdosecriteriaspecifiedin10CFR20andintheTechnicalSpecifications.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage40of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:90-039CalculationS13.4-70-F007Z-22,Z-24,Z-25ReactorBuildingClosedLoopCoolingTitleofChange:ReviseFSARChapterZ,SectionDDescriptionofChange:Thereactorbuildingclosedloopcooling(RBCLC)heatexchangershavebeenrepairedtocorrectproblemsassociatedwithflowinducedtubevibrationattheinletandoutletnozzles.However,flowinducedvibrationremainsaprobleminthevicinityoftheturnaroundopeningofthebaffle.ItwasnecessarytolimittheshellsideflowtoeachRBCLCheatexchangertoapproximately3000gpm.(Tubesideflowisnotaconcernforflowinducedtubevibration.)Shellsideflowwasadministrativelycontrolledbyrevisingoperatingprocedures.Limitingtheshellsideflowtoapproximately3000gpmperheatexchangerdidnotaffecttheRBCLCsystem'scapacityandflexibilitytocoolvariouscombinationsofequipmentregardlessofthestation'spoweroutput.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Forthevariousmodesofoperation,calculations/performancecurveshavebeendevelopedtodeterminetheactualRBCLCsystemcapabilitywithvariousarrangementsofheatexchangers,pumps,andvaryingshellsideandtubesideflows.Theresultsshowedthatforthemostdemandingloadcases,i.e.,10-hourshutdownandnormalshutdown,anycombinationofonepumpandtwoheatexchangersprovidedadequatecooling,i.e.,RBCLCeffluenttemperatureof90+5'Fandsufficientflowtorequiredon-lineusers.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage41of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-039'afetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)LimitingRBCLCheatexchangershellsideflowtobelowapproximately3000gpmwillassureeliminationofharmfulflowinducedtubevibration.Withthisdone,thestructuralintegrityoftheRBCLCheatexchangersisassured.TheRBCLCsystem'scapacityforcoolingandoperatingflexibilitywillbeunaffectedbytheseadministrativecontrols.CalculationsontheRBCLCsystem(includinghydraulicbenchmarking)andtheshutdowncoolingsystemshowthattheyhavesufficientcapacitytohandlethemostlimitingoperationalmode,i.e.,10-hourshutdown.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage42of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-040Rev.1Mod.N1-90-900V-29,VIII4~XV6(TXV2),XV46'V48'V52@XV54EmergencyCondenser(39)EmergencyCondenserAutoInit.TimeDelaySetpointDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationchangedthesettingoftheeightemergencycoolingsystem(ECS)automaticinitiationtimers(11K61,11K61A,11K62,11K62A,12K61,12K61A,12K62,12K62A)from10secondsto12+1seconds.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheFSARstatesthatduringaturbinetripwithpartialbypass"...thevesselpressureexceedsthetrippointfortheECSactuationforonlyapproximately6.6seconds.Thus,fromthisanalysis,atimedelayof10secondsissetfortheemergencycoolingsystemtopreventitsactuationinthisinstance."TheFSARalsostatesthatthesetpointof15secondsisalimitthatshallnotbeexceededforMSIVclosureanalysis.Therefore,thetimersetpointisboundedonthelowendbyturbinetripwithpartialbypassanalysis(approximately7seconds)andthehighendbyMSIVclosureanalysis(approximately15seconds).Thesetpointof12+1secondsiswithinthelimitsdescribedinTechnicalSpecificationSection3.1.3and4.1.3Bases,andthereisnoimpacttoanypresentsafetyanalysis.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage43of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-043Rev.'N/AN/AContainmentSpraySystemJustifiedOperabilityoftheContainmentSpraySystematReducedPowerLevelsandElevatedLakeTemperaturesDescriptionofChange:Thissafetyevaluationjustifiestheoperabilityofthecontainmentspraysystemswiththereactoroperatingatreducedpowerwhentherawwaterlaketemperaturesareabovethefullpowerallowabletemperature.Intheeventofanaccidentwhenthereactorisatreducedpower,theheatgenerationrate,aswellasthedecayheat,arelowerthanthoseforthedesignbasisaccidentdescribedintheFSAR,thusrequiringalesserdutyfromthecontainmentsprayheatexchangers.Sincetherequiredheatremovalrateislower,smallerdifferentialtemperaturesarerequiredacrosstheheatexchangersallowingforhigherlakewatertemperatures.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Operatingtheplantatlowpowerlevelswithcorrespondinglyhigherallowablelaketemperaturedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentbecausetheconsequencesofanaccidentarelesssevereatlowerpowerlevels.Also,thecontainmentspraysystemisapostaccidentsystem,sotheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentisnotchanged.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage44of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:90-044PowerAscensionTestN1-PAT-8-3UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/AHPCI/FeedwaterTemporarilyDisableHPCIInjectiononHighFlowDescriptionofChange:ThissafetyevaluationexaminestheconsequencesoftemporarilydisablingHighPressureCoolantInjection(HPCI)autoinitiationonfeedwaterflowsgreaterthan1.9x10ibm/hroneithermotordrivenfeedwaterpump(duringN1-PAT-8-3only).HPCIinitiationonhighflowisforpumpprotectionfromrunout(maximumdischargeandlowesthead).Beyondthispointcavitationandvibrationcanoccur,damagingthepump.Limitingpumpflowto3800gpmpreventsthepumpfromrunoutanddamage.Thus,HPCIinitiationathighflowisnotnecessarilyindicativeofareactorproblemrequiringHPCI,ratheritisasafetymechanismtoensurepumpintegrity.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TemporarilydisablingHPCIautoinitiationonhighmotordrivenpumpflow(greaterthan1.9x10ibm/hr)doesnotdegradethedesignoftheHPCIsystemasdescribedintheFSARandTechnicalSpecifications.ThroughoutthedurationofPowerAscensionTestN1-PAT-8-3,motorcurrentandNPSHaremonitoredtoensurepumpprotection.ThefunctionanddesignoftheHPCIsystemremainedunchanged.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage45of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-045NMPCSpecificationN-126I-3Nj'AUseofThreadedConnectionsandCompressionFittingsDescriptionofChange:ThischangeconsistedofrevisingpipingspecificationstopermitlimiteduseofthreadedconnectionsandcompressionfittingsonNMP1pipingsystems.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThecodeofrecordfororiginalconstructionofNMP1pipingsystemsisASAB31.1-1955.Subsequentconstructionforrepair,replacement,ormodificationstoexistingsystemsisperformedtoASMESectionXIper10CFR50.55a.ASMESectionXI,paragraphIWA-7120,allowscompliancetoeithertheoriginalcode(ASAB31.1)ortheASMECode,providedreconciliationtotheoriginalcodeismade.ASAB31.1NuclearInterpretationN-3requiressealweldsatallthreadedconnectionsonnuclearpiping,while.ASMErequiressealweldsonlyatClass1pipingthreadedconnections.Thus,originalconstructionrequiredsealweldsatthreadedconnectionswhileplantrepairsormodificationsmaynotrequiresealwelds,dependingonwhetherornottheyareonASMEClass1equivalentsystemsandprovidedtheASMECodeisreconciledtotheASAB31.1Code.Thereconciliationdeterminedthatthreadedconnectionsmusthavesealweldsexceptincertainisolatedapplications:1)2)3)4)TheSystemisnotanASMEClass1equivalentsystem,Pressureboundaryintegrityrequirementsaremet,(asdefinedinB31.1),ComponentqualificationandASMEclassificationisdocumentedinacalculation,TheappropriatePipeSpecificationRecordSet(PSRS)isrevisedtodocumenteachspecificapplicationofthreadedconnectionswithoutsealwelds.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage46of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-045SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)NosealweldrequirementexistsforcompressionfittingssocompressionfittingsmaybeusedasspecifiedinASAB31.1-1955.ASME-1980hasbeenreconciledtoB31.1-1955andcanbeusedforcompressionfittingsifnecessary.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage47of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:90-046Rev.2InformationNotice89-76,GenericLetter89-13UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/AN/AZebraMusselBiocideTreatmentProgramDescriptionofChange:TheNRCrequiresthatlicenseesimplementandmaintainanongoingprogramofsurveillanceandcontroltechniquestosignificantlyreducetheincidenceofflowblockageduetobiofoulingofsafety-relatedservicewatersystemsandothersystemstakingfeedfromtheGreatLakes.ThereareseveralbiocidesonthemarketforuseincontrollingZebramussels.However,thereisonechemical,Clamtrol-CT-1(hereafterreferredtoasClamtrol)suppliedbyBetzLaboratories,Inc.,whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNewYorkStateDepartmentofEnvironmentalConservation(DEC)foruseincontrollingthesemollusks.Thissafetyanalysisisdesignedtocovertheuseof.ClamtrolinthescreenhouseforebaytocontrolthegrowthofthemusselsinthesystemstakingfeedorcoolingwaterfromLakeOntariowater.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Clamtrolhasbeenusedsuccessfullyatseveralnuclearpowerplants(Peachbottom,Fermi,Perry,Comanche.Peak,etc.)forcontrollingmollusktypeanimals.Nonegativereportshavebeennotedattributedtotheuseofthischemical.Theadditionofachemicalbiocidetothelakewaterintakestructuretocontrolanderadicatezebramusselsinthesystemstakingfeedfromthissource,i.e.,circulatingwater,servicewater,emergencydieselgeneratorcoolingwater,containmentsprayrawwaterandfirewater,willnotaffecttheanalysisofpostulatedaccidentspreviouslyevaluatedforthesesystems,becausethesystemswillnotbetakenoutofnormaloperatingconfiguration.Ratherbyprocedure,variouspumpswillbestartedandvalveswithinthesystemopenedtoassurethateachportionofthesystemstobetreatedisactuallytreatedwiththechemicalbiocide.Also,engineeringevaluationoftheuseofthischemicalhasshownthatthechemicalshouldhavenoeffectonthematerialsofconstructionofthetreatedsystems.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage48of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-046Rev.2SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)Floodinganalysisisnotaffectedbyaruptureofthehopperormoatduringaseismicevent.ThischemicaladditiondoesnotaffecttheoperabilityoftheaffectedsystemsorcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanthosepreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.Thesystemswillnotbetakenoutoftheirconfigurationnorwillequipmentbeaddedortakenoutofthesystem.ThechemicaladditionwillnotaffectthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationbecausethistypeoftemporarychemicaladditionisnotthecurrentbasisofanyTechnicalSpecification.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage49of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-047TemporaryMod.5309ZI-12CondensateSystemOxygenInjectionDescriptionofChange:ThepurposeofthissafetyevaluationwastoaddressthetemporarymodificationtoinjectoxygenintothesuctionsideofthecondensatepumpsandthechangetotheFSARforthedesiredfeedwateroxygenconcentration.TheFSARhadstatedthattheoxygenconcentrationinthecondensatedischargeheaderwasexpectedtobe7ppb.TomeettheBWRWaterChemistryguidelines,NMP1StationGeneralOrderN89-07,andtheNMP1FuelsWarranty,therecommendedrangeforfeedwateroxygenconcentrationshouldbe20-50partsperbillion(ppb).FSARpageXI-12hasbeenrevisedtoreflecttherecommendedrangeof20-50ppb.Thetemporarymodificationtoinjectoxygenintothe.suctionsideofthecondensatepumpsinordertoincreasethelevelofoxygeninthecondensateandfeedwaterwasnotperformed.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Becausetheoxygenconcentrationofthecondensate/feedwatersystemreturnedtothe20-50ppbrangeaspowerwasincreased,thetemporarymodificationwasnotperformed.However,theadditionofoxygenintothecondensateandfeedwatersystemswouldnotaffectanyoftheanalyzedaccidentsinthesafetyanalysisreport.Theoxygeninjectionwasintendedtoenhancewaterchemistrytopreventgeneralerosioncorrosioninthepiping.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthechangetotheFSARdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage50of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:90-048RestartTestProcedureN1-PAT-2-2Rev.2UFSARAffectedPages:System:N/ATurbineBypassPortionofMainSteamTitleofChange:PowerAscensionTestExceptionIN1-PAT-2-2-1ShortfallofTurbineBypassValveCapacityDescriptionofChange:RestarttestprocedureN1-PAT-2-2hasmeasuredaturbinesteambypassvalvecapacityof2.51mlb/hrversusthe2.901mlb/hrvaluestatedinFSARChapterXI.MechanicalDesignEngineering,inconsultationwithGE,Electrical,LicensingandFuelsorganizations,hasreviewedandevaluatedthesubjectExceptionNo.N1-PAT-2-2-1whichreported2.51mlb/hrversusthe2.901mlb/hrvaluestatedintheFSAR.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThissafetyevaluationconfirmsGE'sconcurrencethatUnit1testingandoperationcancontinueinspiteofthecapacitydifference.Thebypassvalve'scapacityshortfallisacceptablebasedonthesafetyevaluationconsiderations.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthattheslightreductionincapacityobserveddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.'

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage51of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-049N/ASectionXIIIReorganizationNineMilePointNuclearDivisionReorganizationDescriptionofChange:SectionXIIIoftheFSAR(Updated)describestheorganizationresponsibleforoperationofNineMilePointUnit1.TheNuclearDivisiondepartmentshavebeenreorganized,positionsredefinedandtitlechangesmade.Titleshavebeenchangedtobemorejobspecific.DepartmentsandpositionswereredefinedandreorganizedtoenhancetheflowofcommunicationandproductivityoftheNuclearDivisionwhileeasingtheworkload.ThereorganizationoftheNuclearDivisionmaybestbedescribedastheadjustmentoflayersofmanagementandspansofcontrol.(Spanofcontrolreferstothenumberofpeoplethatreporttoamanager;layersdefinethedistanceinthechainofcommandfromtheseniorofficertofrontlineworkers.)SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThissafetyevaluationaddressestheNineMilePointNuclearDivisionReorganization.Theneworganizationdictatesfunctionallines,eliminatingredundantfunctionsandreducingsituationswhereworkdonebyonegroupmustbepassedontoanotherunitthatreportstoadifferentpartoftheorganization.Also,theneworganizationestablishesdistinctlinesofauthorityandresponsibilityforeachUnit.Theorganizationalchangeswillnotaffectthesafeoperationofsystemsorsafeshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation,thereorganizationdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandisincompliancewithNRCstandards.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage52of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:90-050CoreOperatingLimitReport,Rev.3UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:SectionsVIIandXVFuelCoreOperatingLimitsReport-Revision3DescriptionofChange:ThischangeaddressesremovingthemultiplierontheMAPLHGRlimitsintheCOLRRevision02andincorporatingnewMAPLHGRlimitsbasedonahighercoresprayflow.Inaddition,theMAPLHGRmultipliersforfour-loopoperationhavebeenspecifiedinmoredetailratherthantheboundingnumberpreviouslyused.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AfuelMAPLHGRevaluationwasperformedfortheNineMilePoint1NuclearPowerStationusingtheSAFERmethodology.,Peakcladdingtemperature(PCT)andcladdingoxidationwerecalculatedforseveraldifferentfuelaverageplanar'exposurepoints.Fromthesecalculations,MAPLHGRlimitswerecalculatedtoensurecompliancewithregulatoryfuelPCTandcladdingoxidationlimitsfortheP8DRB299andBD321Bfuel.ThesecalculationsalsodeterminedthattheP8DNB277fuel'slimits(calculatedusingpre-SAFERmethodology)wereconservativeandrequirednomultiplier.BasedupontheaboveanalysisthenewMAPLHGRlimitsareincompliancewithNRCstandards.Thesechangesdonotresultinanyphysicalmodificationstoanysystems.TheMAPLHGRlimitsareimplementedthroughamodificationtotheprocesscomputerdatabank.Thechangeensuresthattheacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50.46arenotviolated.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage53of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-051TemporaryMod.5317N/ACondensateCondensatePump11/12PowerSuppliesDescriptionofChange:Duringrecentsurveillancetestinginvolvingthecondensatesystem,condensatepump11failedtoprovideflowafterattemptingtoplaceitbackintoservice.Underthistemporarymodification,thepowersupplyforcondensatepump12waschangedfrompowerboard101topowerboard11,thusenablingcondensatepump12toreplacecondensatepump11asthebackupHPCIpump.condensatepump11wastemporarilysuppliedfrompowerboard101topermitoperationofcondensatepump11afterrepairswerecompleted.Thiswasaccomplishedbyinterchangingthe4160-voltfeedercablessupplyingcondensatepump11andcondensatepump12.Condensatepump11circuitbreakerinPB11,withitsassociatedcontrolsandinstrumentation,wasusedforcondensatepump12andviceversa.Affecteddrawings,panellabelingandannunciationwerealsotemporarilychangedasaresultofthismodificationtoprovideconsistentreferencesandnomenclature.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TechnicalSpecification3.1.8definestheHPCIsystemLimitingConditionforOperation.Redundantcomponentsarerequiredtobeoperableatalltimes.Withthistemporarymodification,condensatepump12satisfiedtheHPCIdesignrequirementsintermsofbothcontrollogicandpowersupplyintegrityforbackup(redundant)pumpoperation.Capabilityofcondensatepump12tooperateas'aHPCIpump,asdescribedintheTechnicalSpecificationbases,wasdemonstratedbysurveillancetestinginaccordancewithTechnicalSpecification4.1.8.b.Also,condensatepump12motor,currentlyclassifiednon-safetyrelated,wasdedicatedasa"9"componentforthistemporarymodification.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatusingcondensatepump12asabackupHPCIpumponatemporarybasiswasinconformancewithHPCIdesignbasisandlicensingrequirementsanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

I'1 SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage54of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-053TemporaryMod.5318N/ACondensateSuction(49)BlankFlangeCondensatePumpI11StrainerDescriptionofChange:Duringsurveillancetestinginvolvingthecondensatesystem,condensatepumpI11failedtoprovideflowafterattemptingtoplaceitbackintoservice.TroubleshootingsuggestedthatthecondensatepumpIliisolationvalvemaynothaveopened.Thepurposeofthistemporarymodificationwastoblankflangecondensatepump511strainer(EPN49-53)downstreamofsuctionisolationvalve(EPN49-11)toinvestigatetheoperabilityofthecondensatepumpsuctionvalve.Thisrequiredtheremovalofthebellows(EPN49-08)andinopingcondensatepump111.Installationoftheflangeatthedownstreamsideofthestrainerbodymaintainedthepressureboundaryofthecondensatesystemwhenthesuctionvalvewasopened.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TechnicalSpecification3.1.8definestheHPCIsystemLimitingConditionforOperation.Redundantcomponentsarerequiredtobeoperableatalltimes.CondensatepumpI12HPCIdesignrequirementswastemporarilyreconfiguredtoperformasanHPCIpumpwhilecondensatepump111wasoutofservice,withthepressureboundarymaintainedbytheblankflange.(Thisconfigurationwasevaluatedunderaseparatesafetyevaluation.)TheblankflangedesignwasinaccordancewithANSI/ASMEB31.1-1986.TheboltingandtheinstallationwereinaccordancewithANSI/ASMEB31.1-1986andEngineeringSpecificationSDS-006.TheanalysisdemonstratedthatthisTemporaryModificationdidnoteffecttheabilityoftheCondensateSystemtosupportHPCIoperationasrequiredbyTechnicalSpecificationsandassociatedbases.Furthermore,itmetapplicabledesignbasesandqualityrequirements.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage55of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-057Rev.1Unit1FireHazardsAnalysisN/AFireBarriersFHAFireBarrierUpgradesDescriptionofChange:ThischangeupgradedvariousplantbarrierstofireratedasanenhancementtotheFireProtectionProgram.ThesubjectbarriersconsistoftheUnit1stack(261'o289'),mainsteamtunnel240'loorslab(G-H,10-12),andreactorbuildingbarriersinthefirebreakzonesatelevations237',261',281',and298'.Eachoftheseareaddressedbelow.Stack:Upgradingthestack(261'o289')to3-hourfireratedestablishedaleveloffireprotectioncontroloverfuturemodificationstoensurethestack'sfireratingisnotdegraded.MainSteamTunnel:UpgradingthesteamtunnelG-H,10-12,240'loorslabto3-hourfireratedestablishedaleveloffireprotectioncontroloverfuturemodificationstoensuretheslab'sfireratingisnotdegraded.FireBreakZones:Onelevation237'fthereactorbuilding,theinstrumentroomnorthwallatPc,8-9,hasbeenupgradedtoathree-hourrating.Thisbarrierisnotedashavinganon-ratedfeature(ventilationductwithoutafiredamper).2.Onelevation281'fthereactorbuilding,thenorthwallofinstrumentroomatMb,6-7,hasbeenupgradedtoaone-hourbarrier.3.Thereactorbuilding298'loorslabbetweenMb-N,6-7,overlappingthe281'irebreakzonehasbeenupgradedtoaone-hourbarrier.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage56of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-057Rev.1SafetyEvaluationSummary:UpgradingthebarriersisanenhancementtotheFireProtectionProgramandprovidesamoreconservativebarrierdesign.Showingthesebarriersasfireratedonplantdrawingsensuresthatcontrolsexisttopreventbarrierderatingbyfuturemodifications.TheseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddonotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage57of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:90-063Calculations125VDC-BATTERY-CASEBg125VDCBATT11CASEBg125VDC-BATT12-CASE-BUFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:IX29IIX30'X31gIX32(TIX1)~IX33(TIX1)Ix-33a(TIX-1),IZ-33b(TIZ-1)125VDCSystemFSARChapterIZChangesDescriptionofChange:TheMGSetsarepresentlyonlyidentifiedbytheirfunctioninthetextofFSARChapterIX.ThischangeaddedtheequipmentpiecenumberbywhicheachMGSetisindividuallyreferred,andrevisedthelistofmajor125VdcsystemloadsandtheircurrentdrawsinTableIZ-1.TableIZ-1wasrevisedsothatitagreeswiththecurrentplantdesignandassociatedcalculations.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheadditionoftheMGSetnumberstotheFSARtextdoesnotchangethedesign,analyses,orevaluationsoftheMGSets.Baseduponthechangestothenumberofthemajorloadsandtheircurrentdraw,aslistedinFSARTableIZ-1,thebatteriesremainadequatefortheFSARCase"a"andFSARCase"b"events.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage58of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:D90-084Mod.Nl-89-251N/ARadwasteTetheredRemoteOperatingDevice(TROD)DescriptionofChange:UseofTetheredRemoteOperatingDevice(TROD)duringtheRadwasteBuilding-El225'lean-upprojectto:uprightthedrumsofsludge,transportemptydrumstoasafeareaforfinaldecontamination,manipulatehydrolazingequipmentfordeconningofequipment,floorsandwalls,holdhosesforvacuumingofdrumsandfloors,holdhosesfortheadditionofsluicingwatertodrums,anddisassemblyandremovalofinstalledequipmentwhichhinderedtheclean-upeffortSafetyEvaluationSummary:ThesafetyevaluationconsideredtheeffectsofusingtheexistingmonorailsystemtomoveandoperatetheTROD.Structuralcalculationno.S2.3-WD225-MISC01demonstratesthattheexistingmonorailsystemhassufficientcapacitytosupporttheTRODbasedonvariousoperatinglimitationsasidentifiedinstructuralcalculations.TheTRODoperationwillbecontrolledwithintheselimitationsbasedonanapprovedTRODoperatingprocedure.Thestructuralcalculationconsidersdead,liftedandliftingimpactloads.Furthermore,thestructuralanalysisdemonstratesthatiftheTRODshouldfallfromthemonorailsupportsystem,therewillbenoadverseimpactontheradwastebuildingmatoranysafety-relatedsystem.TheuseoftheTRODintheclean-upeffortontheRadwasteBuildingEl.225'ndEl.236'-6"(duringtestingphase)doesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage59of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-003Rev.1N/'ASectionXIIIReorganizationNineMilePointRadiationProtectionReorganizationDescriptionofChange:SectionXIIIoftheFSAR(Updated)describestheorganizationresponsibleforoperationofNineMilePointUnit1.InordertoreflecttheproposedorganizationalstructureoftheRadiationProtectionorganization,positionshavebeenredefinedandtitlechangesmade.PositionswereredefinedandreorganizedtoenhancetheeffectivenessoftheRadiationProtectionorganization.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheseorganizationalchangeswillprovidetheRadiationProtectionorganizationwithresourcestobebothefficientandeffectivewhilemeetingNRCguidance(NUREG0800).Theseorganizationalchangeswillnotaffectthesafeoperationofsystemsorsafeshutdownoftheplant.ThesechangesareincompliancewithNRCStandards.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

t SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage60of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:91-021N/AVIII-80throughVIII-109VariousPlantandSystemMonitoringInstrumentationTitleofChange:UpdateofNineMilePointUnit1FinalSafetyAnalysisReportRegardingInstrumentationofRegulatoryGuide1.97DescriptionofChange:ThischangerevisedSectionVIII.C.5oftheFSARtodocumentinformationandcommitmentsregardingimplementationofRegulatoryGuide(RG)1.97atUnit1thathavebeenpreviouslysubmittedtotheNRC,orwerepresentedduringNRCinspectionsandaudits.RelativetothematerialthatiscurrentlyintheFSAR,theproposedreplacementmaterialimplementedthefollowing:a0Addedrelevantlicensingbackgroundinformation.b.Addeddefinitionsof"Type"and"Category"asthesetermsrelatespecificallytoRG1.97variablesandassociatedinstrumentation.c~AddedasummaryofthedeterminationthattherearenoRG1.97TypeAvariablesforUnit1.(ThematerialpreviouslyintheFSARidentifiedseveralparametersasTypeAvariables,butnobasisfortheirselectionordeterminationwasprovided.)d.Addedasummaryofthebasisfor,andthedeterminationof,thelistof"EOPKeyParameters."e.Added,inmatrixformat,thespecificationofTypeandCategoryforUnit1ofallBWRvariableslistedinRG1.97withtheplant-specificbasisforeachofthedifferencesfromthegeneralrecommendationsofRG1.97Table1,"BWRVariables,"explained/justified.AddedasummarydescriptionoftheimportantRG1.97instrumentdesignandimplementationcriteriathatwereestablishedaspartoftheUnit11990restartactivities.(RelatestotheevaluationsandactivitiesperformedtoresolveRG1.97implementationissuesidentifiedbytheNRC.)

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage61of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:91-021DescriptionofChange:(Continued)g.Deletedthelistingsoftheplant-specificRG1.97instrumentsandassociateddesignfeatures(i.e.,removesinformationcurrentlyincludedintheFSARregardingplant-specificRG1.97instrumentation).Inaddition,thedeterminationoftheEOPkeyparametersresultedintwoadditionalparametersbeingidentifiedbeyondthoseoriginallyclassifiedas"TypeA."Thesetwoparametersare"NeutronFlux(APRMs)"and"DrywellWaterLevel."SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThechangetoFSARSectionVIII.C.5clearlydocumentedtheapproachfollowedatNineMilePointUnit1forimplementationofRG1.97.Theprincipalfeaturesofthisapproachare:Designationofagroupofvariablesas"EOPKeyParameters."VariablessodesignatedaredeterminedbyanalysisoftheNMP1EmergencyOperatingProcedures.InstrumentationformonitoringtheEOPkeyparametersisspecifiedasCategory1.ThroughtheapplicationoftheCategory1designation,componentsofsomemonitoringinstrumentsare,newlydesignatedassafetyrelated.ImplementationofRG1.97atNMP1waspursuedonabasiswhichincludedtheperformanceofplant-uniquereviewsandevaluationsofspecificdesigncriteriaforselectedinstrumentationasdocumentedinvariousletterstotheNRCandinassociatedNRCinspection/evaluationreports.Implementationofthischangedidnotaddto,delete,orphysicallymodifyanyexistingplantstructures,systems,orcomponents.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage62of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:ZmplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:91-02510CFR50.54xzzz-5aQualityAssuranceTopicalReportTitleofChange:Revision6totheQualityAssuranceTopicalReport(NMPC-QATR-1)DescriptionofChange:Revision6totheTopicalReportwasageneralupdateandclarificationoftheaccountabilityofqualityattainingfunctionsincludingchangesrequestedbyNuclearDivisionorganizationssincetheissuanceofRevision5.Therevisionincludedthefollowing:1)TheTopicalReporthasbeenrevisedtoreflectthecurrentorganizationsandresponsibilities.2)ExperiencequalificationofQualityAssurancemanagersandsupervisorshasbeenrevisedtobeconsistentwiththerequirementsofANS3.1.3)IAppendixBDeterminationshavebeenaddedasoneoftheprocessestoidentifysafety-relateditemstobeincludedinthescopeoftheQualityAssuranceProgramandtheextenttowhichitscontrolsareapplied.4)Thepreparation,review,andapprovalofmaterialandserviceprocurementspecificationshasbeenaddedtothescopeofNuclearEngineering'sresponsibilities.TheoverallcontrolofdesigndocumentshasbeenchangedfromthedesignofficetoNuclearEngineeringtoreflectthechangesintheorganization.5)ThescopeofprocurementdocumentcontentshasbeenincreasedtoincludematerialdescriptionandQualityAssuranceprogrammaticrequirementsofASMENQA-1basicrequirementswhereapplicable.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage63of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:91-025DescriptionofChange:(Continued)6)Thestatement"Alternately,itemsorservicesmaybeprocuredfromsuppliersandacceptedbasedonappropriateinspectionorverificationactivities"hasbeenaddedtotheQATR-1sectiononcontrolofpurchasedmaterial,equipmentandservices.7)AninterpretationhasbeenaddedtoAppendixB"InterpretationsandExceptionsofAppendixADocuments"forparagraph3.2ofReg.Guide1.281983Ed.Rev.3.8)9)NMPCrequiresthatqualifiedsuppliersinvolvedinactiveprocurementsbeauditedeverythreeyears.However,atoleranceofonequarterofayearcanbeapplied.ThisallowsforschedulingflexibilitywhichmayberequiredduetoperformanceconsiderationstoresolveanyopenitemsfromvendorauditswithouttheremovalofthesupplierfromtheQualifiedContractorsList.TheTopicalReporthasbeenrevisedtoallowfortheorganizationorpersonaccountableforthequalityattainingfunctiontoperformtherequiredreviewand/orverification.10)ThemeansbywhichthemanagementofNMPCatthepresidentialorchiefexecutiveofficerlevelassessestheQualityProgramhasbeenchangedtoreflectthecurrentassessmentreportingmethods'(InternalSALPType,AssessmentReportsissuedsemi-annually)andtheexecutivelevelmeetingsattendedbytheVicePresidentQualityAssurance.(NuclearOversightCommittee,CEOandCo-Tenants)TheelementsoftheQATRwhichapplytoradioactivewastehandlingactivitieswererevisedtochangetheannualauditsoftheradioactivewastehandlingprogramtoQualityAssuranceauditsoftheradioactivewastehandlingprogram.12)ThelistingofdepartmentalprocedureshasbeenrevisedtoNuclearDivisionDirectivesandNuclearDivisionInterfacingProcedurestoreflectthecurrentrestructureoftheNuclearDivisionProcedureSystem.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage64of65SafetyEvaluationNo.:91-025SafetyEvaluationSummary:(Continued)IncreasestothescopeoftheQualityProgramasoutlinedintheevaluationdonotreduceanypreviouscommitmentsorreducetheeffectivenessoftheQualityAssuranceProgram.Thechangeswillnothaveanyeffectonthesafeoperationofanysystemorsafeshutdownoftheplant.ThischangedoesnotconstituteanunresolvedsafetyquestionandisincompliancewithNRCstandards.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportage65of65UFSARTEXT,TABLEANDFIGURECHANGES(BASEDONPREVIOUSLYREPORTEDSAFETYEVALUATIONS)Anumberoftext,tableandfigurechangesweremadetotheUFSARtoincludeadditionalchangesthatarebasedonpreviouslyreportedsafetyevaluations.Thesechangesareidentifiedbelow.SafetyEvaluationNo.:81-39PreviouslyReported:07/19/82Mod.No.Nl-81-22UFSARTableV-1(pageV-3)andTableXVI-2(pageZVI-7)havebeenupdatedtoreflectthereactorpressurevesselclosurestudmaterialasASMESA-540asopposedtoSA-193.ThesechangesareconsistentwithSafetyEvaluation81-39,whichwaspreviouslyreported.~~~~~SafetyEvaluationNo.:82-27Mod.No.N1-82-58reviouslyReported:06/27/85and06/24/88UFSARpageX-63Section3.2.1hasbeenrevisedtoindicatethat"six"(notfive)separatewaterspraysystemsareprovidedfortheprotectionofthemaintransformers,stationservicetransformer,tworeservetransformersandthehydrogenstoragerack.Modification82-58addedanadditionaltransformerandwaterspraysystem.SafetyEvaluationNo.:84-03PreviouslyReported:06/27/85Mod.No.Nl-82-13UFSARpageZ-42hasbeenrevisedtoprovideareferencetoFSARpageZ-40,FigureX-7.Thischangeisadministrativeinnature,toclarifythepurposeofUFSARFigureZ-7.SafetyEvaluationNo.:89-13Rev.1PreviouslyReported:06/27/90Mod.No.N1-89-131UFSARpagesVII-15,VII-16,VII-17,VII-19,ZV-160andXV-164havebeenupdatedtoreflectchangesmadetotheContainmentSpraySystem.oraPostDBALOCAAppendixJWaterSeal.

NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONSUMMARYREPORT1991NINEMILEPOINTNUCLEARSTATIONUNIT1FIREHAZARDSANALYSISREVISION2

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport-FHAPage1of54SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:90-052Rev.1FireHazardsAnalysisRev.2N/AFireProtectionSystems99-101TitleofChange:FireHazardsAnalysis1990UpdateDescriptionofChangeandSafetyEvaluationSummaryfollow.

Page2of54TABLEOFCONTENTS1.02.0CorrectionofErrorsandOmissionsNotTechnicalinNature1.1BackgroundandScope1.2Analysis1.3ConclusionCorrectionofErrorsandOmissionsTechnicalinNature2.1BackgroundandScope2.2Analysis2.3Conclusion3.04.0BatteryRoomDoors3.1BackgroundandScope3.2Analysis3.3ConclusionOffgasBuilding,SafetyRelatedEquipment4.1BackgroundandScope4.2Analysis4.3Conclusion5.0OrganizationandPersonnel5.1BackgroundandScope5.2Analysis5.3Conclusion6.07.0DieselFirePumpRoomDescription6.1BackgroundandScope62Analysis6.3ConclusionFireAreaDesignations7.1BackgroundandScope7.2Analysis7.3Conclusion8.0FireDetectto'nSystems8.1BackgroundandScope8.2Analysis8.3Conclusion9.0AdditionofFixedSuppressionList9.1BackgroundandScope9.2Analysis9.3Conclusion10.0AdditionofNFPACodeDeviation9.1BackgroundandScope9.2Analysis9.3'onclusion

Page3of54TABLEOFCONTENTS(Continued)11.0AdditionofCharcoalFilterFireProtectionandFireLoadingInformation11.1BackgroundandScope11.2Analysis11.3Conclusion12.0FHAOverlayChanges12.1BackgroundandScope12.2Analysis12'Conclusion13.0FireRatedHallsandSlabs13.1BackgroundandScope13.2Analysis13.3Conclusion14.0TransformerOilSpillPrevention14.1BackgroundandScope14.2Analysis14.3Conclusion15.0TechnicalSpecifications15.1BackgroundandScope15.2Analysis15.3Conclusion16.0PreviouslyAcceptedFPDCNs17.0References

page4of541.0TITLE:CORRECTIONOFERRORSANDOMISSIONSNOTTECHNICALINNATURE.1.1BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:InDec.1987the"NineMileUnit1FireProtectionProgram"wasrevisedandissuedtotheNRC,June1,1988,asthe"FireHazardsAnalysis"Revision1.ThisupdatedFireHazardsAnalysiswasageneralrewriteoftheprograminitsentirety.DuetothelargescopeoftheRevisionIupdate,manyerrorsandomissionsexistedwhicharebeingcorrectedinthe1990annualupdate.1.2ANALYSIS:Errorsandomissionsbeingaddressedinthisdeterminationarenottechnicalinnatureandareconsistentwiththeoriginaldocument'sintentsandbases.CorrectingtheerrorsandomissionswillprovideforaclearerdescriptionoftheFireProtectionProgram.AsummaryofthesechangesareprovidedasTable1.0.TheonlyitemaffectedbythesechangesistheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangestonotaffect:FSARsectionX',"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQualification,10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NMPlTechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."

1.3CONCLUSION

Errorsandomissionsbeingcorrectedwiththisdeterminationarenottechnicalinnature.CorrectingtheseerrorsandomissionswillprovideforamorereadableclearFireHazardsAnalysiswithoutaffectingthedocument'sintents.orbases.TheseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddonotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationarecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thesechangesdonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page5of54ERRORSANDOMISSIONSTABLEFHATNChange...FH:NATUREHANTableofContents1.2.1.21.1.21.2.21.2.41.2.51.32.1.22.1.52,1.92.2.22.2.3.22.2.42.2.5.12.2.5.22.2.62.2.72.4.4.42.4.1.12.4.1.22.4.1.32.4.1.42.4.1.7TB320BatteryRackevaluationisauspiciescategoryandisDuring..document.standardsforIngeneralspec1f1ctrayspreventfireredundant...fireprevent...systems.eg,Halonconsequencesoracceptablefirefireutil1zesopenspraySafe...removal.vessel...s1nk,drawingsanalysestopreludeBy...metspecialseparationbuildingandsim11arareaddressedPr1mary...conditionforleadershipcompletionofthedr111shallhavethefirebrigadewhenfightingdevelopmentofthecharcoalbutnotbespecialseparat1onand/orShutdownEvaluationSystemandautomaticInanycase,thelessin1tsuseconf1gurat1ontheextentatanend...powerboardRB340/TB333/TB351/TB369BatteryPackevaluat1onareauspicescategoryandareDurtng...document.standardsusedinSpecifictrayswhereappropriatepreventafireredundant...shutdownprevent...boundariese.g.halonconsequencesofacceptablefireutilizeswaterspraySafe...established.vessel,overlaysfordrawingsanalyzestoprecludeIncorporation...equ1pmentspatialseparationbuild1ngsorsimilarisaddressedConductiontoassessleadershipcomplet1onhavefirebrigadeoffightingdevelopmentofthecharcoalbutisnotspac1alseparat1onandShutdownAnalys1sSystem(s),anautomat1cThelessthegreatestextentattheend...powerboardsclarifyWrongWordgrammarspellinggrammarclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifytypotypotypotypoclar1fyclarifyclarifyclar1fywrongwordtypoclarifywrongwordgrammargrammargrammarclarifyclarifyclarifyclar1fyclarifygrammargrammargrammargrammarwrongwordclar1fyclarifyclar1fygrammarclarifyclar1fyclarifygrammar I'

Page6of54FHASECTION2.41.82.4.1.92.4.).iO2.4.2.12.4.2.32.22.4'.42.4.3.52.4.3.62.4.3.82.4.3.102.4.4.12.4.4.72.4.4.82.4.5.12.5.1.1Table2.5.1.1-1Table2.5'.1-2Table2.5.1.1-72.5.2.3Change...FROM:walltothewallequipmentduringtosafety-relatedautomaticsystemC-39491-CboundedcablingcablebarriersTransient...totalNewcables...Testcarbondioxidepreactioncable,propagationalongNewcables...requirementCableisonlypermittedforcabletraysorconduit.kepttoaminimumthrough...systemMFACPorLFACPheatventscompensateshouldstat1onalarmsSCBApaksBatteryRack/instairway,aswellas)nH)ththe(MFCP)(LFCP)surve)llanceRmPanelMGSetIVRoomverticalf1reatanettemporarilyhoweverNormal...funct1onsscreenhousewallsDailybecheckingTO:walluptothemetalwallequipmentorsupportingsystemsnecessaryforthesafeshutdownoftheplantresultantfromtothissafety-relatedautomaticfiresystemC-39591-Cboundedbyratedconstructioncabling,cablewallsAllowance...totalSincethe..~383.carbondioxide,pre-actioncablepropagationoffirealongSincethe...383.Onlycableispermittedincabletraysorconduits.*kepttotheminimumby...monitormain...panelventscompensatefiref1ghtingeffortsshouldStationoperationsSCBApacksBatteryPack/1nstairways,aswellas,inWhenthedeletesurveillanceandactionsRmPanelsMGSetAreaValveRoomverticalshaftturbine-typecentrifugalwithanetTemporarily.However,Systems...auxiliaryScreenhousewalls,asrequiredDailybycheckingNATUREOFCHANGEclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifytypoclarifygrammarclarifyclarifyc'1arifytypogrammarclarifyclarifyclarifygrammarclarifyclarifyc'larifyclarifyclarifytypowrongword/typotypogrammarextraneousclarifytypoclarifytypoclarifygrammarclarifyclarifytypoclarifytypo kt'(i'r page7ofFHASECTION2.5.2.52.5.2.72.5.3.12.5.3.32.5.2.72.5.3.32.5.3.42.5.3.42.5.3'2.5.4.12.5.4.22.5.5.12.5.5.32.5.6.12.6.1.22.6.32.6.52.6.72.6.8.22.6.9Change...FROM:use.Even...connectionareprovidedtoprovide2.3.7.2hydranthousestheyard,MayandNovemberprovideminorsystemsprotectssafetyor,manual...automatic,hydranthousesidentifiedsprayback-upback-upor2.5.3.4-22.5.3.4hazardSystemsstandpipeconcentrateformanualwhichdesignedfortomaintainback-upandataminimumtestedlocationapplication261protectsafetyrelatedorareexposurehazardstosafetyminimumlevelevaluatetheLocalPanelC-3031LOCATplacementsarethisperiodapparatusisisphysicallywhichalsoThe...areaprovidedforthis,areforalarmat11/2hourisprotecteddieselgeneratorroomenclosureatoneTO:useprov)de2.5.7.2hydranthosehousesthetwoyardorMayorNovemberminimizesystemssafetyorprotecting(manual...automatic)hydranthosehousesidentifiedwaterspraybackupbackupdelete2.5.3.4-1hazard,Systems"standpipesconcentratetosupportwhichdesignedtomaintainbackupandtestedlocalapplication261ft.protectsafetyrelatedareas,exposurehazardsorsafetyminimumtanklevelevacuatetheapplicableLocalPanelsC-3031ManualLOCATIONplacementistheseperiodsapparatusunitsarearephysicallythisalsoThe...roomprovideinthisareaalarmsataminimumof11/2hourareprotectedDieselGeneratorRoomenclosure(FA18DG102MissileShield)atNATUREOFCHANGEconsistencyclarifytypoclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifygrammarclarifyclarifyspellingconsolidatedtypogrammartypogrammarclarifygrammargrammarspellingclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifytypoclarifyclarifytypotypogramargrammargramnargrammargrammarc1arifyclarifygrammarclarifygrammargrammarclarifyclarify

Page8of54FHASECTION2.6.112.6.142.6.153.13.1,13.1.23,2.13.2.43.3.13.3.43.3.53.4.13.4.23.4.33.4.4Change...FROM:canstillbeextinguishersareprovided...area.withoutFuelAreastorageareaBuilding...isRadwasteRadwasteAnautomaticthedocontaminationzoneincludinganticipateeg.'tairway,however,BuildingishavebeenprovidedremainsentiresystemorencloseHowever,intheareasprovidesthisareextinguishersprovides'ystemsprovidesprovidesback-upfoamwaterfoamhosetanksmanualBuild1ng,however,isInaddition,theseareprovidedThereexistunprotectedsteelpartofcont1nuedfirealarmsLossoftheseareas1nhab1tab1eRoomdoesnotmaterial,howeverisSystemberequiredTO:isextinguishers.evenwiththelossofFuelStorageVaultstoragevaultBuilding...isHasteWasteAutomaticthepermanentdecontaminationzone'sandanticipatede.g.stairway.HoweverBuildingareprovideremaintheentiresystemcouldbeortoencloseIntheareaprovidethisareaextinguishersprovidesystemsprovideprovidebackupthefoamwaterthefoamhosetankseachincludingaseparatemanualBuilding.However,itisThesearealsoprovidedUnprotectedsteelexistsw1thincontinuousfireareasLossofshutdowncomponentsintheseareasuninhabitableRoomsdonotmaterial.HoweveritisSystemlsrequiredNATUREOFCHANGEclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifygrammarclarifygrammarclarifygrammargrammargrammarclarifygrammarclarifytypoclarifygrammartypogrammargrammargrammarspellingclarifyclar1fyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifygramnarclarify~rongwordtypoclarifywrongwordgrammar,clarifygrammar 4\~.b, Page9of54FHASECTIONChange...FROM'O:NATUREOFCHANGE3.4.53.5.13.5.53.6.13.7.13.7.43.7.53.9.13.9.33.9.53.10.13.10.23.10.53.11.53.11.1extinguishersprovidesBuildingzoned,ad)acentBuilding,however,isequipmentBuildingspartofeg.Automatic,PreactorSprinklerSystemsprovidewirepumpBailerRoomEastRadwasteBailerRoomAtimed...detectors.zoned,itconsideredispouredHowever,ifzoned,AnautomaticsystemprovidesstairtowersprovidesstairtowerenclosurefromtheHowever...plant.zoned,thisareabussbussTank1sresealedconf1gurationprimaryextinguishersprovideBuildingroofzonedwhereitprotrudesBuilding.However,itiscablesBuildingwithine.g.AnautomaticpreactionsprinklersystemprovidesfirepumpBalerRoomtheEastHasteBalerRoomAtimed...actuation.zoneditisconsideredarepouredIfzonedSeparateautomaticsystemsprovidestairtowersprovidestairtowersenclosuresandfiredepartmentEquipment...plant.zonedthisbuildingbusbusTankareeachsealedconfigurationsnormalstationgrammarclarifygrammarclarifyclarifyclarifytypoclarifytypowrongwordclarifygrammartypowrongwordtypoclarifywrongwordclarifygrammargrammargrammarclarifygrammarclarifygrammargrammartypogrammarclarifyclarifygrammarclarifyspellingspellingclarifywrongwordtypoc1arifyTable3.7.1Table3.6-1Table2.3Table1.2.2BailerFIRESUBAREANonconformingItems10.0Stat1onssite...sufficientapenetrationslocationsispenetrat1onsBalerspellingFIREAREAclarifyNonconformingItems12.0typoStationgrammarsite-pumpers.clarifyatpenetrationsgrammarlocationsaregrammarpenetrationsisprovidedclarify

Page10of54FHASECTIONTable3.1.1-2Table3.1.1-6Table3.3-1Table3.3-2Table3.3-1Table3.6-1Change..FROM:SprinklerValue-InsulationBailerSprinkler"blank"RoomPowerboard...RoomCablePumpCableArea"blank"TO:NATUREOFCHANGESprinklersVa1ve-InsulationBalerSprink1ers"Separation...EvaluationtypotypospellingtypoclarifyBelow...102/103CableEnclosureCircWaterPumpCableTunnelBuildingEntranceLevel261clarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyRoomandSteamTunnelclarify

Page11of542.0TITLE:CORRECTIONOFERRORSANDOMISSIONSTECHNICALINNATURE2.1BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:InDecember1987the"NineMileUnit1FireProtectionProgram"wasrevisedandissuedtotheNRC,June1,1988,asthe"FireHazardsAnalysis,"Revision1.DuetothelargescopeoftheRevision1update,errorsandomissionsexistedwhicharebeingcorrectedinthe1990annualupdate.Inaddition,changesarebeingimplementedtoremovetherevisiondatesonreferenceddocumentstofacilitatefutureupdatesandtoincludechangesintheprogramthathaveminimalimpacts.Thesechangesaccuratelyreflectthe"asbuilt"conditionoftheprogram.2.2ANALYSIS:Thechangesbeingimplementedinthissectionaretechnicalinnature.ThesechangeswillmakethecontentoftheFireHazardsAnalysisconsistentwithotherdesignbasisdocumentandthe"asbuilt"conditionoftheprogram.2.

2.1REFERENCES

Revisiondatesornumbersarebeingremovedinthisupdateforthosereferenceddocumentsthataredynamicandsubjecttofuturechanges'hesedocumentswillbereferencedinthefutureonlybythedocumenttitle.ThesechangeswillfacilitatefutureupdatestotheFireHazardsAnalysisbyremovingtheneedtocontinuallychangethereferenceddocument'srevisionnumberordated.ByreferencingonlythedocumenttitlesintheFireHazardsAnalysis,itisimpliedthatthecurrentrevisionortherevisionusedatthetimeofthesystemdesignisapplicable.ThischangewillmaketheFireHazardsAnalysisclearer,moreaccurate,anduserfriendly.FHASECTIONFROMTO1.2.1.1"AppendixRReview,Safe"AppendixRReview,SafeShutdownEvaluation,"ShutdownAnalysis."Revision1,Sept.1987.2,1.1.12.32.4.4.72.5.2.33.1.1FPQAP-1NHPC-FPQAP-l,Revision1September1987NFPA204-68Section16,FireProtectionHandbook,15thEditionASTM-D270-65ASTH-D/975-74NFPAFireProtectionHandbook,14thEdition(NMPC-FPQAP-1)NMPC-FPQAP-1NFPA204NFPAFireProtectionHandbookASTHStandardsASTHStandardsNFPAFireProtectionHandbook

Page12of542.2.2ShutdownTemperatureInsection1.3oftheFireHazardsAnalysisthetemperaturereferencedforhotandcoldshutdownwas200'.Thisisbeingchangedtothecorrecttemperatureof212'2>>B.ThiswillmaketheFHAtextconsistentwithNMPITechnicalSpecificationsandAppendixRSafeShutdownAnalysis.ThetemperaturereferencedforhotandcoldshutdownisintheFHAsolelytoprovidedefinftionsanddoesnotaffecttheoverallcontentofthedocument.2.2.3FireHazardTablesSection2.4.1.2oftheFHAidentifiedthatTables3.1.1-1through3.1.1-9indicatedthepresenceofsafety-relatedequipment/cabling.Revision0oftheFHAincludedalistingofSafeShutdownequipmentinthecorrespondingTables.ThisinformationwasnotincludedinTables3.1.1-1through3.1.1-9fortheRevision1update.ThelistingofsafeshutdownequipmentandSafeShutdownequipmentimpactedbycablesforeachfireareaisavailableinthe"AppendixRSafeShutdownAnalysis."ThetextoftheFHAidentifiesthepresenceofsafety-relatedequipmentandcablingforparticularbuildingareas.IncludingthisinformationinTables3.1.1-1through3.1.1-9wouldberedundantandisnotnecessary.Therefore,referencetosafety-relatedequipmentintheseTablesisbeingdeletedfromsection2.4.1.2.2.2.4FireOetectfonSection2.5.1.4oftheFHAdescribesthatthefiredetectionandcontrolsystemsareconnectedtotheplantemergencypowersupply.Confusionhasexistedoverthemechanicsofhowthisisachieved.Unit1electricalhasprovidedamoredetaileddescriptiononhowthefiredetectionandcontrolsystemispowered4.ThisdescriptionisbeingusedtoclarifyandreplacetheexistingdescriptionintheFHA.Thereviseddescriptionprovidesmoretechnicaldetailbutdoesnotchangetheunderlyingbasisthatthefiredetectionandcontrolsystemsareconnectedtotheplantemergencypowersupply2.2.5SupplyValvesSection2.5.3.2oftheFHAisbeingrevfsedtoreadthatwatersupplysystemvalvesaresupervisedinthecorrectposftion,ratherthanpositivelysupervisedintheopenposition.Amajorityofthesupplyvalvesareintheopenposition.Thereare,however,instanceswhenftisdesfrabletohavesupplyvalvesintheclosedposition.Examplesofthiswouldbewhenasystemisdesignedtobemanuallyoperated,TurbineBuildingTrackBay,orisabackuptoanothersystem,Unit2cross-connection.ThischangewillcorrecttheFHAtoreflecttheplantdesignandprocedures.

Page13of542.2.6Tech.Specs.TablesoffireprotectionequipmentlocatedintheTechnicalSpecificationswereduplicatedintheFHAtofacilitateeventuallyremovingthefireprotectionfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.ThefiredetectionsystemDA-2092W,sprinklersystemHP-2041,andhosestationFS-114wereincorrectlyshownasdetectionsystemDA-2092E,sprinklersystemWP-2031,andhosestationFS-144intables2.5.1.1-2,sect)on2.5.3.3andtable2.5.3.4-1,respectively.Similarly,thecolumndesignationsforhosestationsFS-108andFS-405intables2.5.3.4-1and2.5.3.4-2wereincorrectlyshownasLllandW9.ThecorrectcolumnsareK11andH9.ThesetablesandsectionarebeingrevisedtomatchtheTechn/cal.Specif)cat)onsexactly.2.2.7CableSpreadingRoomFireprotectionfortheCableSpreadingRoomisdescribedinsection2.6.3oftheFHA.Cablingnecessarytoachievehotshutdownindependentofthecablespreadingroomisdescribedastheredundanttrain.TheshutdownsupervisorycontrolsystemwhichautomaticallyinitiatestheemergencycondenserhotshutdownsystemsuponreceivingreactorprocessparametersiscompletelyseparateandindependentfromtheredundanthotshutdownsystemsintheCableSpreadingRoom2.Referencetoitbeingaredundanttrainis,therefore,beingremoved.2.2.8TurbineGeneratorSuppressionSystems.Foamwaterfireprotectionsystemsfortheturbinegeneratorareasaredescribedinsection3.3.5oftheFHA.ThedescriptionsforthesesystemsareinconsistentwiththeactualdesignandthedescriptionprovidedlntheFSAR57.Inparticular,onlythewaterportionoffoursystemsisautomaticandfoam)n)ect)onforallofthesystemsismanuall'ylnltiatedfromtheControlRoomand/orFoamRoom.Thedescrlptlonofthesesystemsls,therefore,beingrevisedtomoreclearlystatetheactualdesign.2.2.9AdministrationBuildingSuppressionSystemsAnareadescriptionoftheAdministrationBuildingisprovidedlnsection3.10.5.PreviouslyaRecordsFileRoomand'RecordsProcessingAreawerelocatedintheAdministrationBuilding.Theuseoftheseroomsandthehazardslocatedinthemhassincechanged.Forthisreason,considerationisbeinggiventoconverttheexistingpreactlonsprinklersystemtoawetpipesprinklersystem,asthehazardofwaterdamageintheareanolongermeritsapreactionsprinklersystem48.ThisintentlsbeingreflectedinthisFHAupdated.Anyplantmodificationswillbeaddressedunderaseparatesafetyevaluation.

Page14ofS42.2.10ReactorBuildingHoseReelsSection2.6.1.2oftheFHAdescribesfireprotectionprovidedintheprimarycontainmentduringrefuelingandmajormaintenance.Thisdescription,inpart,specifiestheuseofone-inchhosereelswhichisbeingchangedtohosereels.Thismoregenericwordingisintendedtofacilitateanyfuturechangesiflargersizehosereelsaredesired(11/2in.21/2in.).2.2.11CombustibleLoadingAssumptionsusedtoassigncombustibleloadingtoplantequipmentandareaswastobeprovidedinsection2.1.1oftheFHA.Howeveronlytwotypesofequipmentarelisted(motoroperatedvalves,motorsandcable)andacombustibleloadingvalueisonlyassignedtothemotor-operatedvalves,motors.Thevalueassignedtomotor-operatedvalves,motorsisnotthevalueusedintheactualcombustibleloadinganalysistoarriveatthevaluesshowninFHAtables3.1.1-1through3.1.1.9.ThissectionoftheFHAisthereforebeingreplacedwiththeassumptionsusedtodevelopthecombustibleloadinganalysis.ThischangeisconsistentwiththevaluesshownintheFHAcombustibleloadingtables.Thischangewillcorrecttheexist1nginformationaswellasdocumentingtheotherassumptionsused.2.2.12FireBrigadeThetitle"FireDepartment"asitappears.throughouttheFHAisbeingchangedto"FireBrigade."Subtledifferencesexistinthedefinitionforthesetitles.ThetitlemostapplicabletotheNMPlstructureisFireBrigade.ThischangewillalsomaketheFHAconsistentwiththeTechnicalSpecificationswhichusethetitle"FireBrigade."2.2.13Misc.Addit1onal1nformationisbeingaddedwhichsupportsorenhancespos1tionspreviouslyreflected1ntheFHA.Insection2.4.1.1referenceisbeingaddedtotheDamageRepairProcedureswhichareusedtomitigatetheeffectsofapostulatedfire.Acalculationhasbeenperformed,andisnowreferencedinsection2.6.8.2,whichsupportstheacceptabilityofunprotectedstructuralsteel.ANFPAcodedeviationexistsforthedieselandelectricfirepumpcontrollers.AchangeinthesetpointsforthepressureswitchesonthesesystemsenhancesNMPCpreviousargumentforthefirepumpsabilitytostaggerstartandis,therefore,beingadded.Thesechangesareconsideredasaddit1onalinformationwhichdoesnotchangebutsupportsconclusionspreviouslyreachedintheFHA.

Page15of54~~2.2.14ReactorBuildingStairwellReferencetotheReactorBuildingsoutheaststair'wellisbeingaddedtosection3.2.1oftheFHA.ThisstairwellwaspreviouslyshownontheFHAfirebarrierdrawings.Althoughthestairwelldoesnotseparatesafety-relatedequipment,itisappropriatetoreferenceitasitisthemainmeansofegressfromthebuilding.2.2.15FireZoneSuppression/DetectionTheSummaryHazardsAnalysistablesincludedintheFHAarebeingrevisedtocorrecterrorsandomissionsintheprotectionprovidedforthefirezones.Thesetablesfunctiontoprovideinformationonthehazardsandcombustibleloadinginplantareas.Additionally,referenceisprovidedforthemainfireprotectionfeatures.intheareas.ThesefeaturesarebeingrevisedtobettermatchthetextoftheFHAandtheFHAoverlayswherethefireprotectionfeaturesinformationwasderived.2.32.2.16BulkGasStorageSections2.4.2.2and3.11.1oftheFHA,inpart,describethebulkgasstorageofhydrogenandnitrogen.Thewordingofsection2.4.2.2indicatesthatthehydrogenandnitrogenstoragetanksarecommonwheninfacttwoseparatetanksexist".Insection3.11.1thetanksarrangementsaredescribedhavingtheirlongaxesperpendiculartotheWestandNorthwallsoftheReactorBuilding.Thisarrangementisphysicallyimpossible.Forthesereasons,theFHAisbeingcorrectedtoindicatetwotankswiththeiraxesperpendiculartotheWestwalloftheReactorBuilding'TheonlyitemaffectedbythesechangesistheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangesdonot'affect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQualification,10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NMP1TechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."CONCLUSION:ChangesbeingimplementedinthissectionaffectthetechnicalcontentoftheFHA.Thesechanges,however,donotaffectthebasesorintentsoftheFHA.ImplementingthesechangeswillmakethecontentoftheFHAconsistentwiththe"as-built"conditionoftheplantorwillclarifythecontentoftheFHAtofacilitatefutureupdates.TheseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddonotaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thesechangesdonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page16of543.0TITLE:BatteryRoomDoors3.1BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:HallsseparatingtheBatteryRoomsfromtheTurbineBuildingaredesignedtoprovideatwo-hourfireresistancerating3.FiredoorsD-112,0-113,0-114,and0-115provideaccesstotheBatteryRooms.NMPChascommittedtoprovidefiredoorinstallationsinaccordancewithNFPA80,StandardforFireDoorsandHindows14.NFPA80requiresthatfiredoorsinstalledintwo-hourratedwallsbedesignedtoprovidea11/2hourfireresistiveratings>>.Originallythree-hourratedfiredoorswithnon-ratedlouverswereinstalledintheBatteryRooms.The1977FireProtectionSERidentifiedthatthisconditionwasevaluatedandthattheconstructionofthedoorswouldprovideanacceptableresistanceofa11/2hourratingoncethelouverswerereplacedwithfireratedlouvers15.However,11/2hourf1rerateddamperswereprovidedinlieuoffireratedlouvers3.ThisconditionwasevaluatedandreflectedinRevision1oftheFHA.In1988followingtheGageBabcockAudit,aNonconformanceReportwaswrittenontheBatteryRoomDoors,duetothefactthattheinstallationutilizingfiredamperswasatechnicaldeviationfromNFPA8016,173.2BatteryRoomdoors0-112,0-113,D-114,and0-115werereplacedin1989withthree-hourrateddoorstocorrectthiscondition1819.ThissafetyevaluationshallbeusedonlytochangethetextoftheFHAtoreflectthenewconfiguration.A'NALYSIS:Revision1oftheFHA,Section2.6.7,identifiesthethree-hourratedfiredoorsand11/2hourfiredampersusedintheBatteryRoomconfiguration3.SincethistimetheBatteryRoomdoorshavebeenreplacedwithnewflushthree-hourrateddoors1920.Correspondingly,thetextoftheFHAisbeingrevisedtoreflectthenewcondition19.TheBatteryRoomdoorsdescribed1nRevision1oftheFHAfunct1onedtomainta1na11/2hourresistiveratingandprovideventilationpathsnecessarytoadequatelypreventanybuildupofhydrogengas~.Thenewthree-hourrateddoorswillsimilarlyma1ntainthef1rebarriersintegrityandwillprovideadequateventilat1onusingthe3/4in.doorundercuts>>21.Thisconf1guration1sconsideredtobeanupgradeintheprotectionoriginallyprovided.ReflectingthisconditionintheFHAisappropr1ateandinnowaydetractsfromthecurrentconfigurat1on.

Page17of54TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQualificati'on,10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NMPlTechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."

3.3CONCLUSION

BatteryRoomdoors0-112,0-113,0-114,and0-115havebeenreplhced,toresolveconcernswiththe11/2hourdampersusedintheirconfiguration.Thereplacementdoorsaredesignedtoprovidethree-hourfireresistiveprotection.ThereplacementdoorsareanupgradeinthefireprotectionprovidedfortheBatteryRooms.ReflectingthischangeintheFHAisappropriate.ThisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddoesnotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thischangedoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

0 Page18of544.0TITLE:Off-GasBuilding,SafetyRelatedEquipment4.14.24'BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:Section3.8oftheFHAisbeingrevisedtoidentifythepresenceofthesafetyrelatedcablesupplyingnormalpowertopowerboard103.Section3.8oftheFHAdescribesindetailthefireprotectionfeaturesandhazardsoftheOffgasBuilding.,PreviouslythissectionoftheFHAidentifiedthatnosafetyrelatedequipmentwaslocatedintheOffgasBuilding.IntheFireHazardsAnalysisforeachbuilding,adescriptionofthesafetyrelatedequipmentandcablingisprovided.ThissafetyevaluationwilladdresschangingthewordingoftheFHAtoreflecttheroutingofcable101-87.ANALYSIS:Cables101-11and101-5frompowerboards102and103routedtopowerboard101wereincloseproximitytooneanother.ModificationN1.80.11involvedreroutingcable101-11ascable101-87toaffordsufficientseparationoftheoutputcablessuchthatacommonfailurewouldnotdisablebothpowerboards25Cable101-87isroutedthroughtheOffgasBuilding26.Thismodificationisaddressedinsafetyevaluation80-05.SafetyrelatedequipmentandcablingareidentifiedintheFHA,inpart,toprovidethebasesforfireprotectionfeaturesandfamiliarizeengineerswiththeplantlocations.Cable101-87isrouted-throughtheOffgasBuildingtopreventacommonfailurefromdisablingbothpowerboards103and102.Thesignif'icanceofthiscableroutinghaspreviouslybeenevaluatedinsafetyevaluation80-0525~27.Additionally,thiscableroutingisreflectedintheAppendixRAnalysisforUnit1.Thechannelizedcableroutingdesignoftheplantismaintainedwiththismodification28.TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQualification,10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NMP1TechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."CONCLUSION:TheFHAisused,inpart,toidentifythepresenceofsafetyrelatedequipmentorcabling.TheFHAisbeingrevisedthroughthisevaluationtoshowthepresenceofthesafetyrelatedcable101-87intheOffgasBuilding.

Page19of54ModificationN1.80.11initiatingthischangewasproperlyevaluatedandisconsistentwiththeplantdesignguidelines.Changing'heFHAtoreflectthesafetyrelatedcableisappropriateandwi.llfacilitatefuturefireprotectionreviewsfortheOffgasBuilding.ThisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddoesnotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thischangedoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page20of54S,OTITLE:OrganizationandPersonnel5.15.2BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:FireProtectionPersonnelandorganizationalresponsibilitiesaredescribedintheFHA.ConflictshaveexistedbetweenthissectionoftheFHAandotherfireprotectiondocuments(NEL-805,AP.3.5,NDMP-6,FPQAP-1).ThepurposeofthisevaluationistoreviewthesafetysignificanceassociatedwithrevisingtheFHAtoincludechangesintheprogram,agreaterlevelofdetailandtoprovideconsistencywithotherfireprotectiondocuments.ANALYSIS:OrganizationalresponsibilitiesandpersonnelimplementingthefireprotectionprogramatNMPIhavebeendynamic.Revision2oftheFHAincludesthefollowingchangesthathavetakenplaceintheprogramstructure:TheExecutiveVicePresidentNuclearOperationshasoverallmanagementresponsibilityforfireprotection.ThetitleofSupervisorFireProtectionisnowSiteFireProgram.Coordinator.Responsib)lityforimplementationoftheQualityAssuranceProgramrestswiththeVicePresidentQualityAssuranceandnottheSupervisorQualityAssurance.ThepositionandresponsibilitiesoftheFireProtectionProgramManagerhavebeencreated.QualificationsfortherolesoftheFireProtectionEngineer,FireProtectionEngineerQualified,andAppendixREngineerhavebeenadded.ThesechangestotheFireProtectionorganizationwereimplementedtoimprovetheprogramandaddresspreviouslyidentifiedshortcomings>>.Organizationalresponsib11)tiesintheFHAhavealsobeenexpandedtoincludeagreaterlevelofdetail.Thesechangesidentifyresponsibilitiesforpositionspreviouslyincludedinotherprimarydocuments2gOrganizationalresponsibilitiesareincludedforthefollowingtitles:TechnicalSuperintendent,SupervisorTraining,SiteFireProgramCoordinator,SupervisorsOperation,UnitSupervisors,VicePres)dentNuclearEngineeringandLicensing,FireProtectionEngineerQualif1ed,HanagerNuclearConsulting,FireProtectionProgramManager,VicePresidentQualityAssurance,HanagerQualityAssuranceNuclear,SupervisorQualityAssuranceOperationsSurve)llance,SupervisorQualityEngineer)ngControl,HanagerCorporateQual)tyAssurance,SupervisorQualityAssuranceAudits,SupervisorQualityAssuranceServices,HanagerQua11tyandRel)ab)l)ty,SupervisorQua11tyAssuranceEngineering,SupervisorProcurementQualityandReliab)11ty,SupervisorHater1alQualityEng)neer)ng,RiskManagementDepartment,HanagerSystemPurchasing,ProgramDirectorNuclearHaterialHanagementandHanagerHeterandLaboratory.Persons1nthesepositionshave,inpart,responsibilit)esforma)orandminoraspectsoftheprogram2g.IncludingthesepositionsintheFHAwillhelptoelim1nateanyconfusionoverprogramresponsibil)tiesandinterfaces.TheonlyitemaffectedbythesechangesistheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangestonotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQual)ficat)on,10CFR50AppendixR,

Page21of54ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysis'eview,ISI/ISTdesigncri.teria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NHPlTechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."

5.3CONCLUSION

ChangestothefireprotectionpersonnelandorganizationdescribedintheFHAarepartofanoverallefforttoimproveandintegratethedifferentaspectsofthefireprotectionprogram.Thesechangesaredesignedtoprovideagreaterlevelofconsistencyinallfireprotectiondocuments.Thisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunction,.describedintheFSARanddoesnotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineHilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thischange'doesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page22of546.0T1TLE:DieselFirePumpRoomDescription6.1BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:TheareadescriptionfortheDieselFirePumpRoomlocatedontheeastsideofthescreenhouseatelevation256'-0"isbeingrevisedtomoreaccuratelyidentifythefireprotectionfeaturesprovided.TheexistingdescriptionoftheDieselFirePumpRoomidentifiesfireratedwallsandroofassembliesareprovided.OnlythesouthandwestwallsexposedtotheScreenhouseneedtobeidentifiedasfirerated.ThenorthandeastwallsoftheDieselFirePumpRoomareexteriorwallswithnosignificantexposurefromtheyardarea.Inaddition,thefloorslaboftheDieselFirePump'Roomprovidesratedprotectionfromtheareabelow.Forthesereasons,section3.6.1oftheFHAisbeing--revisedspecificallytotdentifythebarrierswhicharefirerated.6.2StructuralsteelformingtheroofassemblyoftheDieselFirePumpRoomwaspreviouslyidentifiedasunprotected.Asprinklersystemlocatedaboveandbelowthisassemblyiscreditedforprovidingexposureprotectionfortheunprotectedsteel>.Thissteelis,however,nowprovidedwiththree-hourfireresistiveprotection33.TheFHAisbeingrevisedtoreflectth1sconfiguration.ANALYSIS:WallsoftheDieselFirePumpRoomaredescribedintheFHAasfirerated.Twoofthesewallsareexter1orplantwalls'hatdonotseparatesafetyrelatedequipmentandarenotexposedtosignificantoutsidefirehazards.Consequentlythereisnoreasontoestablishafireratingforthesewall&~,norhavetheybeenratedinthepast34.Sectton3.6.1oftheFHAis,therefore,beingrevisedtospecificallycalloutonlythesouthandwestwallasfirerated.ThefloorslaboftheDieselF1rePumpRoomispotentiallyexposedtothead)acentf1reareabelow.Thefloorslabwas,however,notrated.Thiscond)ttonwasreportedtotheNRCunderLER88-0936.Inordertocorrectthisdeficiency,thefloorslaboftheD1eselFirePumpRoomisnowma1ntainedasathree-hourfirebarrier19.TheFHAisbeingrevisedtoreflectthisupgradeintheDieselFirePumpRoomconfigurat1on.Upgradesintheplant'sfireprotectionfeatureswereimplementedaroundthe1982-1985ttmq,frametosatisfytheseparationrequtrementsofAppendtxWto10CFR5023>.UpgradestotheD1eselFirePumpRoomincludedprotectingthestructuralsteelwithathree-hourratedconfiguration>>38.ThenewDieselF)rePumpRoomconfigurat1onisevaluatedunderSafetyEvaluation83-0838.TheFHAaddressedthesechangesinpart,however,protectionofthestructuralsteelwasoverlooked.Anautomaticsprinklersystemiscreditedwithprotectingthestructuralsteeltnlieuofftreprooftng3.Underthissafetyevaluat1on,theFHAisbeing

Page23of54revisedtocreditthethree-hourratedfireproofinginstalledtoprotectthestructuralstee133.TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQualification,10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria.HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NHP1TechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtecti,onPlan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."

6.3CONCLUSION

Tobetterrepresenttheas-builtconfigurationoftheDieselFirePumpRoom,theapplicableFHAsectionsarebeingrevisedtobetterdescribetheroom'sfireprotectionfeaturesclarifytheOieselFirePumpRoom'sdescriptionandincorporatethechangesfrompreviousmodifications.ThisevaluationisnecessarytoaccuratelyreflectthecurrentconfigurationintheFHA.ThisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddoesnotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreated,andnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thischangedoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page24of547.0TITLE:FireAreaDesignations.7.17.2BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:FireBarriersareprov1dedatNMPltosubdividethestructuresintodistinctareas.Thesebarriersseparatebuildingareasandredundantsafeshutdownequipmentintof1reareasforthepurposeof.mitigatingtheconsequencesresultantfromafireevent.Fireareasarefurtherdividedintofirezoneswhoseboundariesneednotconsistofratedorapprovedbarriers,butarechosenbasedonthephysicalplantdesign,convenience,and/orlayoutoffiredetectionandsuppressionsystems.Fireareasandzoneshavenumericoralphanumericdesignatorstodistinguishthemforreferencepurposes,Thesedesignatorsarenotconsistentbetweenthetwopr1maryfireprotectiondocuments,theFHAandSafeShutdownAnalysisandwiththebuildingareas.Forthisreason,thedesignatorsusedintheFHAarebeingrevised.Thischangeisconsideredclericalinnatureasitdoesnoteffectthefirebarrierswhichprovideseparation,ofthebuildingareas.ANALYSIS:Twoareadesignations,fireareaandfiresub-area,havebeenusedintheFHAforareasseparatedbythree-hourbarriersoracceptableAppendixRseparationrespectively.Theterm"firearea"asusedinAppendixR,however,meansanareasufficientlyboundedtowithstandthehazardsassociatedwiththeareaand,asnecessary,toprotectimportantequipmentwithintheareafromafireoutsidethearea32.Thetermfiresub-areaasitappearsintheFHAis,therefore,amisnomerasthefiresub-areasmeettherequirementsoffireareas.Changingthedesignatoroffiresub-areatofireareawi11alsobettermatchthealphanumericdesignatorsgiventothemintheAppendixRanalysis.Forthesereasonsthedefinitionofandreferencetofiresub-areasasItappearsintheFHAisbeingchangedtofirearea.FireareashavebeenchosenatNMPItosatisfytherequirementofAppendixAtoBTP9.5-1andtheSafeShutdownAnalysisforAppendixRto10CFR50.TheFHAdescr1besthefireprotectionfeaturesprovidedfortheseareas.TheSafeShutdownAnalysisisthedrivingdocumentfordeterminingama]orityofthefireareaboundariesandfunctionallyusestheseareaboundariestodemonstratecompliancew1thAppendixRto10CFR50.FireareadesignatorsastheyappearintheFHAhavenotbeenconsistentwiththedes1gnatorsusedintheSafeShutdownAnalysisalthoughtheactualphysicalboundariesforseparationremainthesame.Forthisreason,theFireAreadesignatorsusedintheSafeShutdownAnalys1saresupercedingthoseusedintheFHA.FireareadesignationshavealsobeengiventotheBatteryandBatteryBoardRooms,DieselGenerator102miss11eshieldandDieselGenerator103cableway,ReactorbuildingEastandWest,OffgasTunnel,Diesel-FirePumpRoomandFoamRoom,alongwithconsolidatingtheOffgasBuildingandAdministrationBuildingintolargerfireareas.Again,thephysicalseparationoftheareaswasprev1ouslycreditedintheFHAandSafeShutdownAnalysis.These

Page25of54changeswereimplementedtomatchtheSafeShutdownAnalysisthateithercreditedorconsolidatedtheareaforanalysispurposes.Inadditiontothesechanges,thefirezonedesignatorfortheMSIVroomisbeingchanged.ThefirezonedesignatorgiventotheHSIVroom,RlE,reflectedthezoneaspartoftheReactorBuilding.ThiszonehasalwaysbeenpartoftheTurbineBuildingandisreflectedthiswayintheSafeShutdownAnalysis.UsingthedesignatorRlEisamisnomerthatleadstoconfusionregardingwheretheHSIVroomislocated.Forthisreason,firezoneRlEisbeingrelabeledasT1A.Torepresentthischange,drawings8-40142-Coverlay4-2and8-40143-Coverlay4-3havebeenrevised.TheseoverlaychangesareincludedinFireProtectionDocument(FPDCN)FHA-90-3(seeSafetyEvaluationsection12.0).ThefollowingchangesarebeingmadetotheFHAinordertoreconciledifferencesinthewaythefireareasarereferencedintheSafeShutdownAnalysis:FireHazardsAnalysisSection3.0:From:FAlTo:FA5FA6FA19FA13FA25FA26(FA12,FA27,FA28,FA29,FA29,FA30)FAl,FA2FA5,FA16A,FA168,FA17A,FA178FA6,FA9FA18,FA19FA13,FA14FA5FA15.FA12,FA4FireAreaZoneSummaryTables3.2-1-3.10-1:From:FSA1To:FSA2FSA18FSAFBZFSA1CFASRlEFA6FA22FA19"blank"FA25"blank"FA26FA27FA27(FA28,FA29,FA30)FA1FA2YardFA1orFA2FA3FA16A,FA168,FA17A,FA178T1AFA9FA20FA18FA14FA5FA5FA15FA12,FA4FA12

Page26of54SummaryHazardsAnalysisTables3.1.1-1to3.1.1-9:From:FSA1To:FSA1BFSA18FSA,FBZFSAICFA6FA5RlEFA22FA19FA13FA25FA26FA27(FA28,FA29,,FA30>FA27FAlFA2YardFA1orFA2FA3FA9FA16A,FA168,FA17A,FA17BTlAFA20FA18FA14FA5FA15FA12FA12FA4Theseproposedchangesdonotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQualification,10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHab1tability,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesignicriteria,NMPlTechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."7,3CONCLUSION:FirebarriersandboundariesareusedatNMPltoseparatethestructuresintodistinctareas.Inconsistencieshaveexistedinthedesignatorsusedtodescribetheseareas.Forthisreason,changesarebeingimplementedtotheFHAtoreconciledifferencesinNRCdefinitions32,theSafeShutdownAnalysisandplantconf1guration.Thesechangesareconsideredclericalinnatureastheydonotaffectthefirebarrierswhichprovideseparationofthebuildingareas.TheseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddonotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreatedandnoadverseeffectson,thesafeoperationofNinelh1lePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thesechangesdonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page27of548.0TITLE:FireDetectionSystems.8.18.2BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:FiredetectionsystemsareinstalledatNMPltodetectrapidlythosefiresthatdooccur.Therebyextendingtheconceptofdefense-in-depthtofireprotectioninsafety-relatedareas>>.Insection2.5oftheFHA,adescriptionoftheNMPldetectionsystemsisprovidedalongwithtableslistingthosedetectionsystemswhichprovideprotectionofsafety-relatedequipment.ThesetablesaretransposeddirectlyfromtheNMPlTechnicalSpecificationsandwilleventuallyreplacethem32.FireProtectionEngineeringhasidentifiedtwoadd>tiondetectionzonesthatsatisfythebasesforthesystemslistedintheFHAandare,therefore,tobeincluded40.Additionally,modificationshavebeenpreviouslyimplementedwhichdeviatefromthefiredetectionsystemdescriptionintheFHA,andadddetectorstozones0-2151,0-3031PL,D-3054,0-4197,0-420741.Thisexcept1onand-newdetectionwillalsobelisted.Therefore,thepurposeofthissafety.evaluationsectionshallbetoadddetectionsystemsandanadditionaldetectortotheFHAtablesandtoaddanexceptiontothefiredetectionsystemdesignprovided.ANALYSIS:Aspartoftheconceptofdefense-in-depthdetectionsystemsareinstalledatNMPltorapidlydetectthosefiresthatdooccur>>.Detectionsystemshavebeeninstalledbasedonthelocationoffirehazardsandtheareasorequipmentbeingprotected.Asubsetofthesedetectionsystemsarethosesystemsthatprovideprotectionforareasthatcontainorpresentafireexposuretosafety-relatedequipment339.A11stingofthesesystemsisprovidedintheNMPITechnicalSpecificationsandtheFHAforthepurposeofidentifyingnecessarycompensatoryactionsandsurvelllancesrequiredfortheiroperation.FireProtectionEngineer1nghasidentifiedtwoadditionaldetectionsystemsthat,inpart,protectsafety-related,safeshutdownequipment40.DetectionsystemD-2194attheTurbineBuilding277'levat1onprotects,inpart,RemoteShutdownPanel12.Likewise,detectionsystem0-2304attheTurbineBuilding291'levationprotects,1npart,D.C.ValveBoard12.RemoteShutdownPanel12andD.C.ValveBoard12areclassifiedassafeshutdownequipmentandconta1ncomponentsthataresafetyrelated242.Basedonthis,1thasbeendeterminedthatdetectionsystems0-2194and0-2304merittheextracompensatoryactionsandsurveillancerequiredtobeperformedonthosesystemsintheFHAtables40.Table2.5.1.1-41ntheFHAis,therefore,beingrevisedtoincludesystems0-2194andD-2304.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthatanappropriatenumberofoperabledetectorsforthesesystemswouldbe59and28detectorsrespectively43.Thischangeisconsideredanupgrade1ntheprogramthatisconsistentw1ththeoriginalbasesoftheFHA.

Page28of54Firedetectionsystem0-3054providesprotectionfortheControlRoomarea.Anadditionaldetector,0-3054-27,hasbeeninstalledon'thissystemtoprovidedetectionintheControlRoomventilationductontheTurbineBuildingelevation300-ft.54.DetectionSystemD-3054isincludedintheTechnicalSpecifications.However,theadditionaldetectorwasnotincluded.ThisdiscrepancywaspreviouslyidentifiedduringanexternalauditoftheTechnicalSpecifications5556.Inordertocorrectthisdiscrepancy,thefiredetectiontablesintheFHAarebeingrevisedtoincludedetectorD-3054-27.8.3Additionally,theTechnicalSpecificationiscurrentlyincorrectinthenumberofdetectorsspecifiedfordetectionzones0-3031PL,0-4197,andD-4207.TheFHAisbeingrevisedtoshow102,10and8detectorsforthesezonesrspectively.Section2.5oftheFHAalsoprovidesinformationonallofthefiredetectionsystem'sdesigns.Inparticular,itspecifiesthatdetectionzonewiringisClassAsupervised,meaningthatthecontrolwiringforthedetectorsisloopedindualpathstopreventthelossofasingledetectorfromdisablingthesystem44.DetectionsystemsD-1114andDA-1114have,however,beenchangedtoClassBSupervisedmeaningthatonlyasinglepathisprovidedforthecontrolwiring~1.BychangingtoaClassBSuperviseddesign,failureofonedetectorwilldisablethedetectorsthatfollowitontheloop44.Detectionsystems0-1114andDA-1114arelocatedinthehydrogensealoilunitroom.Sincethesetwosystemsloopthemaingeneratorleads,inducedACvoltagewasexperiencedwiththeClassAdesign.Thisinducedvoltagecausedthesystemstroublealarmlighttoglowcontinuallyandpotent1allycouldhavecausedtheinadvertentactuationoftheareasuppressionsystems.ForthisreasonthedetectionsystemdesignswerechangedtoClass8Supervisedandtheproblemwaseliminated40.ThischangewasappropriatelyaddressedinSafetyEvaluation82-03.Thissafetyevaluat1onsectionisbeingpresentedonlytoincorporatethisexcept1ontothespecifieddesignintheFHA.TheonlyitemaffectedbythesechangesistheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangestonotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQualification,10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitab111ty,FuelAnalys1sReview,ISI/ISTdesigncr1teria,HumanFactorsdesigncriter1a,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NHP1TechnicalSpecif1cations,EnvironmentalProtect1onPlan,oranyaccidentdiscussed1nFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."CONCLUSION:DetectionsystemsandadetectorexistatNHPl,0-2194,andD-2304,andD-3054-27,thatmerittheextracompensatoryact1onsandsurveillancerequiredtobeperformedonthosesystemslistedintheFHAtables.Additionally,systemshavebeenmodified,D-1114andDA-1114,thatdeviatefromthedesignspecif1edintheFHA.Itis,therefore,appropriatetospecifythesechangesintheFHA.Thesechangesareanupgradeintheprogramorhavebeenpreviouslyevaluated.

Page29of54TheseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddonotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreatedandnoadverseaffectsonthesafeoperationofNineHilePointUnitlarecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thesechangesdonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page30of549.0TITLE:AdditionofFixedSuppressionList.9.1BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:TheNineMilePointUnit1(NMP1')FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA)isaLicensingdocumentintendedtoaddressthefeaturesandadequacyofthefireprotectionprogram.FHAsection2.5discussestheNMPlsuppressionsystems.TheonlysuppressionsystemsidentifiedinthissectionaretheTechnicalSpecificationsystemsprotectingsafety-relatedequipment.InordertoenhancetheFHA,acompletelistofallthefixedfiresuppressionsystemsisbeingaddedtotheFHA.ThisFHAenhancementwillprovideaneasilyaccessiblereferencelistofallfixedsuppressionzonenumbers,suppressionsystemtypesandlocationdescriptionofsystemcoverage.9.2ThepurposeofthisSafetyvaluationsectionistoanalyzetheadditionofacompleteNMP1suppressionsystemlisttotheFHA.ANALYSIS:Thefixedfiresuppressionsystemsincludewater(wet-pipe,dry-pipe,preactionandwaterspray),foam-water,C02(lowpressureandhighpressure)andHalon1301,Thesesystemsarelocatedtoprotectspecificcombustibles,hazardousequipmentandareasofNMP1.Thetypeofsystemusedistheoptimumforthetypeoffireexpected,basedonthehazardpresent,Thenewsuppressionsystemlisthasbeeninserted1ntheFHAasTable4.0.FHATable4.0wasobtainedfromcontrolledNMPCdrawings(andassociatedOCRs)andprocedures.Referencesto"seeTable4.0forcomplete11stofplantsuppressionsystems,"havebeenaddedtoFHAsections2.5.3.1-,2.5.3.6,2.'5.4.3,and2.5.5.1.TheFHA"Tableof'ontents/ListofTables"hashadthereferencetoTable4.0added.TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:anyotherFHAsectionsincludingthesection3.0,"DetailedFireHazardsAnalysisbyBuilding,"FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"surveillanceandtestingprocedures,AL'ARAdesign,EquipmentQualification,10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitab111ty,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncr1teria,NMP1Techn1calSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."Th1sproposedchangeisanenhancementthatsimplyaddsadditionalreferenceinformat1ontotheFHA.

9.3CONCLUSION

Onefunct1onoftheNMPlFHAistodescribethesuppressionsystemspresentintheplant.Th1sproposedchangewillhelpdescr1beallthefixedsuppressionsystemstomaketheFHAamoreinformativedocument.Th1sproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddoesnot.adverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.No

Page31ofS4changestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineHilePointUnitlarecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thischangedoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page32of5410,0TITLE:AdditionofNFPACodeDeviation.10.1BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:NationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)standard8013,section2-5.4,requiresthathollowmetalsteeldoor/frameclearancesnotexceed1/8inchforheadjam,sides,andbetweendoubledoors.Maximumclearanceatdoorbottomisnottoexceed3/8inchwhenthereisaraisednoncombustiblesilland3/4inchwhennosillispresent.ModificationNl-87-032installednewdoorsatNineMilePointUnit1(NMP1),butnotframes.TheInstallationPlanforthemodificationcalledoutthattheNFPA80door/frameclearancecriteriabesatisfied.Afterinstallation,measurementofclearancesdeterminedthattheNFPA80clearancecriteriacouldnotbesatisfiedfordoorsD117-lAandD291.Afterinspectionofthedoorsandthesurroundingconditions,FireProtectionEngineeringEvaluation(FPEE)-1-90-00752waspreparedsomodificationNl-87-032couldbeclosed.TheFPEEdeterminedthattherewasadequatejustificationtoconcludethatthefiredoorswillperformtheirintendedfunctionofaratedfirebarrierevenwithslightlylargerdoor/frameclearancesthanthatspecifiedbyNFPA80.AllNFPAcodedeviationsforNHPlarelistedinFHATable1.2.2.ThistableliststheNFPAcodedeviationsandthejustificationsforeachdeviation.Basedonthefollowingsection10.2"ANALYSIS,"itlsconcludedthatundercertaincircumstances,firedoor/framegapscanexceedthelimitssetbyNFPA80.Todocumentthis,theNFPAcodedeviationandjustificationmustbeaddedtoFHATable1.2.2.Thisidentifiedcodedeviationlsnotspecifictodoors0117-1Aor0291andiswrittengenerically.Thisgenericdeviation(notspecifictoanyparticulardoor)willallowsimilarfuturedeviations,withonlythepreparationofaFPEEinsteadofa10CFR50.59determination.ThepurposeofthisSafetyEvaluationsectionistoanalyzetheproposedchangeofaddingagenericNFPA80codedeviationtotheFHA.10.2ANALYSIS:Firebarriers(includingdoors,dampers,penetratlons.etc.)arepassiveelementsintheNHP1fireprotectionprogram.Firedoorassembliesaredesignedandinstalledinaccordancewithtestedconfigurationstoprovideaspecificdegreeoffireresistance(usuallyequaltothatofthebarrier).Theoperabilityoffiredoors(alongwithalloftheotherelementsofabarrier),ensuresthatafirewillbeconfinedoradequatelyretardedfromspreadingtoadjacentfireareas.ThepresenceofoperablefiredoorsatNHP1helpsminimizethepossibilityofasinglefirerapidlyinvolvingseveralfireareasofthefacilitypriortodetectionandextinguishment.

Page33of54Theproposedexemption/deviationistoallowdoor/framegapsofupto1/8inchgapbeyondthatstatedinNFPA80section2-5.4.Thelimitationsonthisproposedchangeareasfollows:1)appliestohollowmetalsteeldoorsonly;2)theminimumlatchengagementintothestrikeplatespecifiedinNFPA80issatisfied;3)aFireProtectionEngineeringEvaluation(FPEE)ispreparedinaccordancewithNEL-805thatjustifieswhytheexcessdoorgapisacceptable.PerNEL-805,theFPEEmustbeapprovedbytheFireProtectionProgramManager.Reasonsthatexcessdoor/framegapsareacceptablemayinclude(butarenotlimitedto):1)thelabeledfiredoormeetsorexceedsthefireratingofthebarrier;2)presenceoffiredetectionononeorbothsidesofthebarrier;3)presenceofsuppressionsystemsononeorbothsidesofthebarrier;4)absenceofsafety-relatedequipmentononeorbothsidesofthebarrier;5)lowareafireloadingcomparedtothatofthebarrier;6)doorisnotnormallyusedforegress;7!othermeansofegressexist;8)adequatedoorlatchengagement;9)theresultsoffiredoortestsperformedforotherutilities.Items8and9arediscussedbelow.Themajor,firedoortestrequirementisthatitstayinplacewithoutopeningduringapotentialfire.Firedoors.canwarpwhenexposedtoafire.Thiswarpagecouldcausethelatchbolttoretractfromthestrikeplate,allowingthedoortoswingopen.Therefore,therequiredminimumlatchengagementintothestrikemustbesatisfied.Note:TherequiredminimumlatchthrowiseitherstampedonthedoorlabelorobtainedfromNFPA80Table2-88.Therequiredminimumlatchthrowminus1/8inch(themaximumNFPAdoorjambclearance)equalstherequiredminimumlatchengagement.Theactualmeasuredlatchthrowminustheactualdoorjambclearancemustmatchorexceedtherequiredminimumlatchengagement.References22,23,and24arefiredoorenduranceandhosestreamtests.performedforotherutilitiesonFenestraandOverlybranddoorswithexcessivedoorgaps.Theresultsofthesetestsshowsthatincreaseddoor/frameclearancesupto1'/4inchforheadjamand~sides,1/2inchforbottomswithraisedsills,and1inchforbottomwithoutraisedsills,stillpassthestandard3-hrfireandhosestreamtest.Thus,theNFPAdoor/frameclearancecriteriaisexceededby1/8inchforheadjams,sides,andbottomswithraisedsills,and1/4inchforbottomswithoutraisedsills.Althoughthesametestresultsmaynotbeobtainedforallbrandsoffiredoorsduetodifferencesinconstruction,thistestdataisconsideredgenerallyapplicabletoal.lqualityfirerateddoors,suchasusedatNMPl.ThisproposedchangeonlyaffectstheFHATable1.2.2anddoesnotaffectanyotherNMPldocuments.Theproposedchangewillallowfuturedoorswithdoor/framegaps,ofnotmorethan1/8inchabovetheNFPAcodelimit,tobeevaluatedtoensuretheyprovidetherequiredfireresistancetolimitfireandsmokepropagation.If

Page34of54thedoorgapconfigurationisdeterminedtobeadequate,basedonFPEE,nofurtherdocumentation(i.e.,a10CFR50.59determination)willberequired.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:anyotherFHAsectionsincludingthesection3.0"OetailedFireHazardsAnalysisbyBuilding,"FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQualification,10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NMP1TechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."ThisproposedchangewillincreasetheaccuracyofFHATable1.2.2bylistingallexistingNFPAcodedeviations,asistheintentofthetable.

10.3CONCLUSION

Basedontheresultsoffiretestdataandcertainotherdoor/plantcriteria(latchengagement,suppression,detection,fireloading,etc.),thereisadequatejustificationforexceedingtheNFPA80door/framegapsby1/8inch.ThechangewillrequirethataFireProtectionEngineeringEvaluationbeperformedforanyfuturedoorthatcannotquitemeettheNFPAgapcriteria.WiththeFPEEbeingapprovedbytheFireProtectionProgramManager,adequatecontrolsexisttoensurethecodedeviationisnotabused.ThisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddoesnotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsareshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thischangedoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page35of5411.0TITLE:AdditionofCharcoalFilterFireProtectionandFireLoadingInformation.Note:ThisSafetyEvaluationsectiondiscussesanumberofsubjectsassociatedwithcharcoalfilterfireprotection.Inaddition,charcoalfilterfireloadingandothermodificationfireloadingchangesareincluded.Tomoreclearlydistinguishbetweenthesetopics,eachisassignedasubjectnumber.11.1BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:~Subect1:TheNineMllePointUnit1(NMPl)FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA)describesfireprotectionforplantcharcoalfiltersystems.TheonlysystemsdiscussedaretheReactorBuildingandControlRoomEmergencyVentilationcharcoalsystems.Inadditiontothesesystems,therearecharcoalfilterfiredetection/suppressionsystemsontheRadwasteSolidificationItStorageBuilding(RSSB)HVACExhaustSystemandtheoldTSCEmergencyVentilationSystem.ThenewTSCVentilationSystemutilizesducttypesmokedetectiondownstreamofthecharcoalfilterwithoutasuppressionsystem.TheadditionofinformationaboutthenewTSCVentilationSystemisincludedinSubject4below.Toproperlyaddressallfiveofthesesystems,additionalinformationhasbeenaddedtotheFHAthatdescribesthesesystems.~Subect2:TheAdministrationBuildingPenthouseVentilationRoomisnotcurrentlyidentifiedasafirezone.ThisproposedchangeaddsthePenthouseVentilationRoomtothedesignateafirezonesoftheAdministrationBuilding.~Subect3:ThefireloadinginformationlistedforFireZonesRS3AandRS4Aistransposed.Thisproposedchangecorrectsthezonefireloadingerrors.~Subect4:Modification63-60,"RelocationoftheTechnicalSupportCenter,"addedtheTSCCharcoalFilterEquipmentRoom.ThisproposedchangeaddsapplicableinformationtotheFHAaboutthenewTSCandTSCCharcoalFilterEquipmentRoom.~Subect6:AsaresultofModificationN1-69-229,thefireloadinginformationofFHATable3.1.1-2,"SummaryHazardsAnalysis-TurbineBuilding,"hasbeenmodified.Thisproposedchangeupdatestheabovefireloadingtabletoreflectthecurrentfireloadingaftertheperformanceofthemodification.~gubect6:TuominordiscrepanciesexistontheFNAfloorplandrawings(B40141-CthroughB-40148-C)thatrequirerevisiontomakethesedrawingsmoreaccurate.ThepurposeofthisSafetyEvaluationistoanalyzetheproposedchangeoftheabovesixsubjects.11.2ANALYSIS:~Subect1:TheNMP1FNASection2.4.4.4describesfireprotectionforplantcharcoalfiltersystems.TheonlysystemsdiscussedaretheReactorBuildingandControlRoomEmergencyVentilationcharcoalsystems.Inadditiontothesesystems,therearecharcoalfilterfiredetection/suppressionsystemsontheRSSB t

Page36of54HVACExhaustSystemandtheoldTSCEmergencyVentilationSystem.ThenewTSCVentilationSystemutilizesducttypesmokedetectiondownstreamofthecharcoalfilterwithoutasuppressionsystem.TheadditionofinformationaboutthenewTSCVentilationSystemisincludedinSubject4below.TheintentoftheFHAistoaddressallpertinentaspectsoftheNMP1FireProtectProgramandtheplantfireprotectionfeatures.ReferencingtheadditionalcharcoalfireprotectionsystemsisneededtoensuretheFHAadequatelyaddressestheplantsfireprotectionfeatures.Thischangesimplyaddsacompletedescriptionofcharcoalfilterfiresystemspresentlyinstalled.Thereinstallationhasbeenaddressedinpreviousreviewsandthereforeisnotachangetotheplantoranunreviewedsafetyquestion.Toproperlyaddressallfiveofthesesystems,additionalinformationhasbeenaddedtotheFHAthatdescribesthesesystem'.TheFHAsection2.4.4.4describesthecharcoalfilterfireprotectionfortheControlRoomandReactorBuildingEmergencyVentilationSystems.Asdiscussedabove,thereareactuallyfivecharcoalfiltersystemsthatareequippedwithsuppressionand/ordetectionsystems.Therefore,FHAsection2.4.4.4hasbeenrevisedtodescribeeachsystem.FHAsection3.0istheFireHazards/LoadingStudythathassectionsdescribingthefiredetectionandsuppressionsystemspresentforeachplantbuilding.Review'ofeachbuildingfiredetectionandsuppressiondescriptionfoundthatnoneofthecharcoalfilterdetection/suppressionsystemsaredescribed.Therefore,FHAsections3,3.5(forTurbineBuilding),section3.9.5(forRSSB)andsection3.10.5(forAdmin.Building)havebeenrevisedtoincludethedescriptionofthesefiresystems.NMPlFSARsectionX-K.2.2doesnotaddressthefixedsuppressionsystemsoftheControlRoomEmergencyVentilationSystemortheRSSBHVACExhaustsystem.FSARsectionX-K.3.2.1doesnotaddressthefixedsuppressionsystemsontheRSSBHVACExhaustsystem.ALicensingDocumentChangeNotice(LDCN)hasbeenpreparedtoincludereferencetothesecharcoalfiltersuppressionsystems.FHATables3.1.1-1thru3.1.1-9listthefireloadingandfiresystemspresentforeachfirezoneoftheplant.FireZonesT4A.T6C,RS4A,AB3A,andAB5containthefivecharcoalfiltersystems.Thefireloadingtablesthatlistthesezonesdonotidentifythepresenceofthecharcoalfireprotectionsystems.Therefore.FHATables3.1.1-2(T4A,TGC),3.1.1-8(RS4A),and3.1.1-9(AB3A,ABS)havebeenrevisedtoidentifythepresenceofthecharcoalfilterdetectionandsuppressionsystems.Inaddition,thefireloadingtablesforfirezonesT4AandT6Cdonotlistthecharcoalasapartofthefireloadingofthearea.Therefore,theweightofcombustiblecharcoalisbeingaddedtoTable3.1.1-2.ThefireloadingtableforFireZoneT4Aalsodidnotincludethe289'ezzanineleveloftheTurbineAuxiliaryExtensionBuilding.Therefore,thefireloadingandadditionalareaisbeingaddedtoTable3.1.1-2.

Page37of54~Subect2:TheAdmlnlstratlongulldlngVentllatlonPenthouse,elevation290',housestheoldTSCEmergencyVentilationCharcoalFilters(alongw1thotherequipment).Thisroomisenclosedandhasgeneralareasmokedetection(D-9249),charcoalfilterheatdetection(D-9249FL),andacharcoalfilterwaterspraysystem(WO-9249FL).Basedonthisroombeingattachedtotheplant,withacertain.fireload1ngandfiresystemspresent,thisroomshouldhaveadesignatedfirezonenumber.Therefore,theAdministrationBuildingVentilationPenthousehasbeenassignedasFireZoneAB5.Toincorporatethisaddition,Table3.10-1hashadFireZoneAB5addedtotheFireArea/ZoneSummaryandtheFireZoneAB5fireloadinginformationhasbeenaddedtoTable3.1.1-9.TheadditiontozonenumberAB5toFHAdrawingB-40145-Coverlay3-5isincludedonFPDCNFHA-90-3(seesection12.0).Noadditionalfirebarrierrequirementsarecreatedbythist;hange.~Subect3:WhileperformingresearchonSub3ectl,ltwasobservedthattheFHATable3.1.1-8fireloadinginformationforFireZonesRS3AandRS4Aistransposed.Thetranspositionwasidentifiedbythetypeofcombustiblespresentandthediscrepancyinareasquarefeetofthetwozones.Fieldwalkdownofcombustiblesandzoneareaconfirmthatthefireloadinginformationforthesetwozonesaretransposed.Reviewofthefireloadingfieldwalkdownsheetsshowsthattheerroroccurredduringtheinit1alf1reloadingfieldwalkdowns.FireProtectionEngineeringhascorrectedthiserroronthefireloadingfieldwalkdownsheetsforFireZonesRS3AandRS4A.FHATable3.1.1-8hasbeencorrectedtoshowtheproperfireloadinginformationforFireZonesRS3AandRS4A.Thispreviouslyunidentifiederror,hasnoadverseaffectontheadequacyofthefireprotectionfeaturesinfirezonesRS3AandRS4Aanddoesnotrequirethat'dditionalfireprotectionfeaturesbeinstalledormod1f1ed.~Subect4:SafetyEvaluation85-01addressedthechangesofModification83-50,"RelocationoftheTechnicalSupportCenter,"Thef1reloadingforFireZoneAB2B(FHATable3.1.1-9)wasproperlyupdatedtoindicatethefireload1ngforthenewTSCduringtheFHArevisionl.However,otherinformationexiststhatrequiresincorporation.Otherrequ1redFHAchanges1ncludeadditionofthe:1)TSCCharcoalFilterEqu1pmentRoomtotheFHA261'loorplandrawingB-40143-C;2)LocationsoftheductsmokedetectorsonB-40143-CFHAoverlay1-3andB-40142-CFHAoverlay1-2;3)TSCCharcoalFilterEquipmentRoomfireloadinginformationtoFHATable3.1.1-9forFireZoneAB3A;4)words"TechnicalSupportCenter"toFHAdrawingB-40142-CinthegeneralareaofFireZoneAB2B.TheoldTSCareaisnowtheWorkControlOfficeand,thus,thedeletionofthewords"DESTECHSUPPCTR"fromFHAdrawingB-40144-C1srequired.Toincorporatethefloorplandrawingchanges,DesignChangeRequest(DCR)Nl-90-001LS635hasbeenpreparedalongwiththeassociatedFireProtectionDocumentChangeNotice(FPOCN)FHA-90-4.ThefloorplanoverlaychangeshavebeenincludedinFPDCNFHA-90-3(seeSafetyEvaluationsection12.0).

Page38of54AftertherelocationoftheTSC,NMPhastwoTSCcharcoalfilterventilationsystems,anewoneandanoldone.ThenewTSCcharcoalfilterventilationsystemisnotequippedwithafixedsuppressionsystem.FSARsectionsX-K.2.2andX-K.3.2.1bothreferencetheTSCcharcoalfiltersuppressionsystems.Tomakethesesectionscorrect,theword"old"isbeingaddedtospecifythecorrectsystem.ThischangeisincludedontheLOCNdiscussedinSub)ect1.0.AllotherNMPdocumentchangesasaresultoftheTSCrelocationhavebeenimplemented/incorporated.~Subect5:NodlflcatlonN1-89-229,replacedthe125VDCstationbatterieswithlargersizeandweightbatteries.Therefore,theFHATable3.1.1-2,"SummaryHazardsAnalysis-TurbineBuilding,"hasbeenrevisedtoshowtheincreasehweightofcombustiblebatterycomponentsinthe277'atteryrooms(FireZones82AandB2B).NootherFHAchangesarerequiredasaresultofModificationN1-89-229.~Subect6:FNAfloorplandrawings8-40141-Cthrough8-40148-Callstate,"ACCESSPASSAGEWAY(FUTURE)."WiththecompletionofNineMilePointUnit2,thepassagewaysarecompleteandpresent.Therefore,FPOCNFHA-90-4includesthedelytionoftheword"FUTURE"fromdrawingsB-40141-CthroughB-40148-C.Inaddition,FHAfloorplandrawingB-40144-CidentifiestheAdmin.Building277'ileRoomandViewing5WorkRoom.Thesetworoomsnolongerhavethesespecifiedfunctionsand,therefore,isincorrect.FPOCNFHA-90-4andOCRNl-90-001-LS635havebeenpreparedtodeletethetitlesofthesetworooms.ThesechangesmaketileFHAfloorplandrawingsbetterrepresenttheactualplantconfiguration.EndofIndividualSubectAnalsis:Theonlydocumen'tsaffectedbythesechangesisFSARsectionX-K,"FireProtectionSystem,"andtheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangesdonotaffect:surveillanceandtestingprocedures,ALARAdesign,EquipmentQualification,10CFRSOAppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NMP1TechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."ThyrseproposedchangesmaketheFHAmoreaccurateby;1)addressingallcharcoalfilterfiresuppressionsystems;2)includingallrequiredplantareasasfirezones;3)correctingfireloadingerrors;4)includingallaffectsoftheTSCrelocation;5)includingmodificationrelatedfireloadingchanges;6)correctingminordrawingerrors.

Page39of54

11.3CONCLUSION

OneofthefunctionsoftheFHAistodescribetheNMPlsuppression/detectionsystems.TheseproposedchangescorrectpreviouserrorsandomissionsandhelpdescribeallthecharcoalfiresystemstomaketheFHAamorecompleteandinformativedocument.AnotherfunctionoftheFHAistolisttheestimatedcombustiblefireloadingforeachfirezone.TheproposedfireloadingchangeshelpmaketheFHAmoreaccuratebyindicatingtheas-builtfireloadingofthesub)ectfireareasandcorrecteddrawingerrors.TheseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddonotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated,Basedontheaboveanalysis,thesechangesdonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page40of54'2.0TITLE:FHAOverlayChanges.12.1BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:FireHazardsAnalysisdrawings8-40141-Cthrough8-40148-CarefloorplansshowingthelocationsoffireratedbarriersateachelevationofNineHilePointUnit(NMP1).OverthedrawingsaretransparentoverlaysshowingtheidentificationnumbersandphysicallocationsoftheNHPIfiredetectionsystems,firesuppressionsystems,smokeremovalzonesandfirezones.Plantwalkdownanddrawingreviewhaveidentifiedanumberofoverlayerrors.FireProtectionDocumentChangeNotice(FPDCN)FHA-90-3hasbeenpreparedtocorrecttheseerrors.ThepurposeofthisSafetyEvaluationsectionistoanalyzetheproposedchangesofFPDCNFHA-90-3.12.2ANALYSIS:Thefirepmtectionsystems(water,foam,C02,andHalonsuppressionandfiredetection)primaryfunctionistoextendtheconceptofdefense-in-depthtofireprotectioninsafetyrelatedareasbyrapidlydetecting,containing,andext1nguishinganyfireswhichmightoccur.Toensurethefireprotectionprogramismaintained,accuratedrawingsmustexistthatshowtheactualconfigurationofallfiresystems.Asfiresystemsaremodified,allrelateddrawings,ideally,areupdatedtoshowthechange.TheFHAfloorplanoverlayshavebeenoverlookedintheprocess(inmanycases)and,thus,alargenumberoferrorsexistontheoverlays.Otheroverlaydiscrepanciesident1fiedaresimplyduetoerrorsduringtheoriginaloverlaypreparation.Twod1screpanciesareduetochangesinfirezonenumbersasaresultoftheNMPIAppendixRAnalysiswhichwerenotincorporatedinthe1987FHAupdate.ThisproposedchangedoesaffectFHAoverlays8-40142-C2-2,3-2,4-2.8-40143-C1-3,2-3,4-3,8-40144-C1-4,2-4,4-4,8-40145-C1-5,2-5,3-5,8-40146-C1-6,2-6,8-40148-C2-8.Aspartofthissamesafetyevaluation(section9.0),Table4.0isbeingaddedtotheFHA.FHATable4.0listsallthef1xedsuppressionsystemsintheplant.FPDCNFHA-90-3correctsvarioussuppress1onsystemnumbersthatwereincorrectontheFHAoverlays.Thesecorrect1onshavebeenincorporatedonTable4.0.Aspartofth1ssamesafetyevaluation(sect1on7.0),FireZoneRlE1sbeingchangedtoF1reZoneT1A.FPDCNFHA-90-3alsoincludestherequiredchangeto8-40142FHAOverlay4-2and8-40143-CFHAoverlay4-3tochangeFireZoneRlEtoTlA.

Page41of54Aspartofthissamesafetyevaluation(Section11.0,Subject2),theAdmin.BuildingPenthouseisbe1ngmadeFireZoneAB5on'-40154-Coverlay3-5.FPDCNFHA-90-3alsoincludestherequiredchangetothisoverlay.Aspartofthissamesafetyevaluation(section11.0,subject4),theductsmokedetectionofthenewTechnicalSupportCenterisbeingaddedtoB-40143-CFHAoverlay1-3andB-40142-CFHAoverlay1-2.FPDCNFKA-90-3alsoincludestherequiredchangestotheabovedrawingoverlays.NMPCreferencedrawingsshowingthecorrectfiresystemconfigurationsarelistedontheFPDCNpages.Allcontrolledfireprotectiondrawingsreviewedareaccurateand,thus,nootherdrawingchangesarerequired.Surveillanceandtestingproceduresarenotaffectedbythischangesinceallrequiredfiresystemsareproperlyidentifiedandtested.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:anyotherFHAsectionsincludingthesection3.0"DetailedFireHazardsAnalysisByBuilding,"FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQualification,10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NMPlTechnicalSpecifications,Environmental,ProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."ThisproposedchangewillincreaseaccuracyoftheFHAfloorplanoverlaysbyshowingtheas-builtconditionoftheNMPlfireprotectionsystems.

12.3CONCLUSION

TheFHAfloorplanoverlaysareusedtoquicklydeterminefirezoneareasandtheareasofNMPlthathavedetection,suppression,andsmokeremovalsystems.Errorsintheseoverlayscouldleadtomis1nformation.Thesechangesw111helpensureaccurateinformationisobtainedfromtheoverlays.ThisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddoesnotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpec1flcationsarecreated,andnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thischangedoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page42of5413.0TITLE:FireRatedWallsandSlabs.13.1BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:FirebarriersareutilizedtoseparatestructuresatNMP1intodistinctareas.Thesebarriersareidentifiedondrawings8-40141-Cthrough8-40148-C.Barriersidentifiedonthesedrawingsareallinclusiveofthosebeingmaintained.ThesebarrierswereestablishedtosatisfytheseparationrequirementsofAppendixAtoBTP9.5-1andAppendixRto10CFR50,aswellas,InsuranceRecommendations,LifeSafetyconcerns,andgoodfireprotectionengineeringdesigns.Mostrecently,firebarriersandboundarieshavebeenincorporatedintothesedrawingstoincorporatetheresultsoftheSafeShutdownAnalysisrequiredbyAppendixRto10CFR50.Subsequenttothiseffort,numerousdeficiencieswereidentifiedinthefirebarrierprogramatNMP11645'6.Resultantfromthesedeficiencies,thedesignbasisdocumentsforthefirebarrierswerechangedtoreflecttheas-installedcondition31.FireBarrierdrawings8-40141-Cthrough8-40148-Cwererevisedaspartofthefirebarrierupgrades19.Theserevisionsproducedas-builtdrawingsoffireratedbarriers.ForthepurposeofthisFHAupdate,thesechangeswillbeevaluatedforincorporationintotheFHAbygroupingandaddressingthechangesbyspecificcategories.13.2ANALYSIS:Drawing8-40141-Cthrough8-40148-CareissuedaspartoftheFHAtodefinefirebarriersutilizedatNMPl.Inresponse.toNRCviolationsthesedrawingswererevisedtoreflecttheas-builtcond/tionofthebarriers.Changesmadetodrawings8-40141-Cthrough8-40148-C,inordertoproduceas-builtdrawings,canbecategorizedasdrawingerrors,omissions,revisedboundaries,changeinbarrierratingsandclarifications.13.2.1DrawingErrors:Thefollowingdrawingerrorshavebeencorrectedaspartofthefirebarrierdrawingupdate:DescritlonLocationN185044LS-557-532-603-568-603Adding2-hr.ReactorBuildingSouthWal1sDeleting1-hr.floorslabareainexcessoftheMechanicalStorageAreaDeletingfloorsandwallsshownintheHydrogenSealOilplatformareaDeleting3-hr.floorslabsoverstair-wellsDeleting3-hr.floorslaboverstair-well,Extending2-hr.wallintheReactorBuilding351-369RB320TB277TB261TB261TB/RB

Page43of54ThesouthwalloftheReactorBuildingalongcolumnlineJbetweenrows4and12hasafireresistiveratingof2hoursaboveelevation340'.Theratingofthiswallwascorrectlyshownonelevation340'.Thedrawingdetailsforthissamewaliatelevations351'nd369',however,failedtoshowthewalls'orrespondingrating.Tocorrectthisdiscrepancy,thedrawingdetailsnowshowthesouthwalloftheReactorBuildingas2hourrated.ThesouthstairwelloftheReactorBuildingisseparatedwith2hourfireresistivebarriers.Inpart,thisisaccomplishedbyutilizingthewallatcolumnlineLbetweenrows91/2andllatelevation261'.Previouslythecolorcodingidentifyingthewallsratingstoppedatcolumnline10approximatelyfivefeedshortofthewallslength.Thiserrorhasbeenresolvedbyextendingthecolorcodingtheentirelengthof-thewall.Floorassembliesarerequiredtoberatedovertheboundariesforthefireareasorhazardsbeingseparated.PortionsofthefloorslabsoverthemechanicalstorageareaandoverseveralTurbineBuildingstairwellsunnecessarilyoverlapintosimilarareasnotrequiringseparation.Inordertoreducetheamountoffirebarriersbeingmaintained,theunnecessaryoverlappingportionsofthesefloorassembliesarenolongershownasfirerated.Onelevation277'ftheTurbineBuildingratedbarriersareshownseparatingtheHydrogenSealOilplatform.However,theonlybarriersrequiredtoseparateHydrogenSealOilhazardarethewallsandflooroftheHydrogenSealOilUnitroom.AsthebarriersoftheHydrogenSealOilUnitroomsufficientlyboundthehazardthefireratingsforthebarriersoftheHydrogenSealOilplatformarebeingremoved.Thesechangesarebeingmadetocorrectdrawingerrorsnecessarytoreflecttheas-builtplantconfigurationconsistentwith,theoriginaldesignintentsandbases.13.2.2Omiss,ions:/Thefirebarrierdrawingshavealsobeenrevisedtoaddnecessaryfireratingsandfeaturespreviouslyomitted.Thefollowingisalistofthesechanges:H185044LS-557-532-603-694DescritionAdditionof2-hr.ceilingontheReactorBuildingsoutheaststairwellAdditionof1-hr.floortoHechanicalStorageAreaAdding2-hr.wallsanda3-hr.floortotheHydrogensealoilUnitRoomAddingprotectedsouthandeastwallsoftheControlRoomLocation340300291291RBTBTBCT

Page44of54DCR-567N185035LS-244N185044LS-566-542-581N188001LS-145LocationAdding2-hr.AdministrationBuilding277ShaftAdding3-hr.floorandceilingto261AdministrationBuildingOilStorageRmAdding3-hr.floortotheDieselFire261PumpRmAdding3-hr.wallsandfloorforthe250TurbineBuildingsouthelevatorshaftAddinga3-hr.wallandfloorforthe250HainSteamTunnelAddinga3-hr.wallandfloorforthe250TurbineBuildingNorthStairwellsADADSMTBTBTBIntheseareasitwasdeterminedthattheexistingbarrierswerenotsufficienttoboundthehazardsorplantareas.Theseareasweresubsequentlyupgradedbyestablishingfireratingsforexistingbarriersorcreditingprotectionfeaturesprovided.Theseupgradesareenhancementstotheprogramwhichimprovetheabilitytomitigatetheeffectsofanticipatedfires.Theadditionofthesechangeswillproperlyidentifythenecessaryfireprotectionfeaturesandwillfacilitatemaintainingfireprotectioncommitmentsfortheseareas.13.2.3RevisedBoundaries:Aportionoftheareaboundarieswerealsochangedwhichsubsequentlyhasresultedinchangingthefollowingareabarriers:DCRDescritionLocationN185044LS-542-554LG-084-145,422556566Addinganddeletingbarrierstobetter300.291AD/TBdefinethebarriersseparatingthestairwellsandelevatorshaftbetweentheAdministrationandTurbineBuildingsAddinganddeletingwallsofthe288.261CT.ControlRoomVentShaft250DeletingCableSpreadingRoomexterior250CTAddinganddeletingbarrierstobetter250RB/TBdefinethebarriersoftheeastandweststairwellsseparatingtheReactorandTurbineBuildings.Deletingredundantbarriersseparating250HB/RSSBtheHasteBuildingandtheRSSBDeletingthewallsoftheDieselFire230SHPumpSumpnowprotectedbyafloorslab

Page45of54FirebarriersareutilizedatNMPlinparttoestablishandseparatefireareas.Duringthepenetrationupgradeeffort,around1989,minorchangesweremadetomanyofthefirearea.boundries19.Fireareaboundrieswereredefinedtooptimizetheavailablebarriersrequiredforseparatingplantareasandspecifichazardsorequipment.ThefirebarriersnotedabovehavebeenrevisedtoreflectredefinedfireareaboundrieswhichseparatetheNMP1structure.13.2.4Ratings:Thefollowingfirebarrierratingshavebeenchangedwherethebarrier'sconstructionwasinconsistentwiththeratingorhazardbeingseparatednolongerexist:DCRDescritionLocationN189008LS-471N185044LG-075N190001LS-237N1805044LS-603Changingthe3-hr.wallsofthe298ReactorBuildingIsolationValveRoomto1-hr.wallsDeletingthe2-hr.ratingforAdminis-277trationBuildingFileRoomHallsDeletingthe2-hr.ratingforthe277AdministrationBuildingViewingandWorkRoomwalls.Deletingthe2-hr.walloftheWaste261BuildingTruckLoadingPlatformRBADAOTheReactorBuildingEmergencyCondenserIsolationValveRoomwallsarebeingchangedfroma3-hr.ratingtoa1-hr.ratinginordertoel.iminatetheneedtoreplacetheinstalledfiredooranddamper.ThewallsoftheIsolationValveRoomareconstructedtoathree-hourratinganautomatichalonsuppressionsystemanddetectionsystemarealsoprovided.Thecombustibleloadingoftheroomiswellbelow1-hr.Thefiredoorisratedat11/2hoursandadamperisprovidedtocontainthehalononly.Inordertomaintainthethree-hourfireratingfortheroomwalls,thedooranddamperwouldhavehadtobereplaced.Basedonthelowcombustibleloading,automaticsuppressionanddetection,itisacceptabletoreclassifythewallsasone-hourbarrierseliminatingtheneedtoreplacethedooranddamper.Two-hourratedfirebarrierswereprovidedfortheAdministrationBuildingFileRoomandViewingandHorkRoom.Theoccupancyofthyrseroomshassincechangedwiththenewoccupancynotrequiringratedbarriers4748.Forthisreasonthebarrierratingsarebeingdeleted.

Page46of54,Two-hr.ratedfirebarrierswereprovidedfortheWasteBuildingTruckLoadingPlatform.Thesebarriersarebeingdeletedastheyarenotnecessarytoprovideadequateseparation.13.2.5Clarifications:Inadd1tiontobarrierchanges,thefollowingnoteshavebeenincorporatedintothebarrierdrawings:DCRN185035LS-244N185044LS-542N188001LS-694N185044LS-557DescritionRSSBControlRoomRoofTurbineBuildingStairwellsandElevatorAd]acenttotheAdministrationBuildingControlRoomWallsabove289'-4"WallsofDieselGeneratorRooms,ReactorBuildingAirlockLocation261RSSB277,261AO/TB250277CT261DG/RBTheseOCRsincorporatenotesthatarebeingaddedtothebarrierdrawingstoclarifyareasthedrawingscannotclearlyshow.TheonlyitemaffectedbythesechangesistheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangestonotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"AURAdesign,EquipmentQualification,10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesi'gncriteria,NHP1TechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."

13.3CONCLUSION

Drawings8-40141-Cthrough8-40148-Careall1nclusiverepresentat1onsofthefirebarriersatNHPl.Deficienciesexistedinthesedrawingsandinthebarriersselected.Thesedeficiencieswereproperlyevaluatedforthepurposeofproducingas-builtdrawingsoftheplantstructures.Throughthisevaluationthespecificdrawingchangeshavebeencategorizedandevaluatedfor1ncorporation'1ntotheFHA.Theseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed1ntheFSARanddonotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechn1calSpecificationarecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineNlePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thesechangesdonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

f Page47of54'4.0TITLE:TransformerOilSpillPrevention14.114.214.3BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:PreviouslyNHP1utilizedaspillretentionsystemfortransformelsthathadthepotentialforeventualrunoffIntoLakeOntario.InJune1986theUnitedStatesEnvironmentalProtect)onAgency(EPA)performedafieldinspectiontoconfirmtheOilSpillPreventionControlandCountermeasurePlansforNineMilePoint49.TheEPAreportmaderecommendationswhichrequiredphysicalchangestoprovideadditionaloilspillprotectiontopreventcontaminationofLakeOntario49.ThesechangeswereevaluatedforsafetysignificanceandimplementedatNHP).ThissafetyevaluationsectionwillbeusedtochangethedescriptionoftheoilcollectionsystemintheFHAtomatchtheexistingconfiguration.ANALYSIS:FHAsection2.4.1.8providesadescriptionoftheoilcollectionsystemusedforapotentialtransformeroilspill.ChangeshavebeenmadetoimprovethedesignofthissystemtosatisfyFederalandStateenvironmentalregulations.Likewise,theFHAisbeingrevisedtoreflectthiscurrentdesign.AsitIsdescribedintheFHA,thetransformeroilspi11containmentconsistsofa12in.rocklayerinacurbedareasurroundingeachtransformer.DrainageofthissystemallowedforanynormaloraccidentaloilspillagetoeventuallyenterLakeOntario.Similarly,thenewdrainagesystemutilizescurbsandbasinstocontainspillsatthesource5~.However,asystemofdrainagesewerstransportspotentialrunofffromtheseareastoaretentionbasinwheretheoilisseparatedfromtherunoffpriortoitsrelease50.ThisdesignaccountsforrunoffQomrainfall,aswellas,automaticandmanualfiresuppress1onsystems50.Thisimproveddes1gnhaspreviouslybeenreviewedforundersafetyevaluation88-004.Itis,therefore,appropriatetorevisetheFHAtoreflectthisnewconfiguration.TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQual)f)cat)on,)OCFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncr1teria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NHPlTechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussed)nFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."CONCLUSION:Section2.4.1.8oftheFHAprovidesadescript)onofthetransformer011collectionsystem,SincethelastrevisionoftheFHA,thissystemhasbeenmodifiedtoimprovetheoilcollect1oncapab111tyandpreventthepotentialforo11pollutionenter1ngLakeOntario.Thismodificationhasbeenpreviouslyreviewedforsafetysignificance.Itisappropriateto)ncludethisimprovedconfigurationintheFHAdescription.

Page48of54ThisproposedchangedoesnotalteranvsafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddoesnotadverselyaffectfireprotectionor.safeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsare'reatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineHilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thischangedoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page49of5415.0TITLE:TechnicalSpecifications'5.1BACKGROUNDANDSCOPE:GenericLetter86-10requestedthatlicensesincorporatetheNRC-approvedFireProtectionProgramintheirFinalSafetyAnalysisReports51.Uponcompletionofthisprogram,thelicenseeswerefurtherencouragedto,inpart,removeunnecessaryfireprotectionTechnicalSpecifications.Later,theNRCprovidedspecificguidanceinGenericLetter88-12fortheremovaloffireprotectionfromtechnicalspecifications.InaccordancewithGenericLetter86-10,NMPltranscribedthefireprotectionTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsintorevisiononeoftheFHAinpreparationforeventuallyremovingtheTechnicalSpecifications.AportionoftherequirementsforfirebrigadestaffingandthedefinitionforaFireHatchPatrolwere,however.nottransposed.InaccordancewiththeoriginalintentofhousingTechnicalSpecificationrequireme'htsintheFHA,thesechangeswillbeimplementedthroughthissafetyevaluation.15.2ANALYSIS:NiagaraMohawkiscurrentlypursuingremovingfireprotectionfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.Inordertoaccomplishthis,thefireprotectionprogramrequirementscurrentlyintheTechnicalSpecificationswillbehousedintheFHA.ThemajorportionofthiswasaccomplishedinrevisiononeoftheFHA.ThisrevisionoftheFHAwillincludetwoadditionalchangestoinsureprogramcompliance.TechnicalSpecificationsmandatethataFireBrigadeoffivemembersshallbemaintainedonsite.FireBrigadecompositionmaybelessthantheminimumrequirementsforaperiodnottoexceedtwohoursinordertoaccommodateunexpectedabsence,providedimmediateactionistakentofilltherequiredpositions.Section2.1.1.2oftheFHAstatesthataChiefNuclearFire-fighterandfourNuclearFire-fightersareassignedtorotatingshifts.Itisnotapparentinthisdescriptionthatthefirebrigadestaffingisaprogramrequirementnorareanyprovisionsallottedforanunexpectedabsence.ThissectionoftheFHAis,therefore,beingrevisedtobettermatchthecurrentTechnicalSpecifications.TheTechnicalSpecificationsdefineactionsforaFireHatch.Inparticular,atleasteachhour,anareawithinoperablefireprotectionequipmentshallbeinspectedforabnormalconditions.AlthoughtheFHAdoesmakereferencetotheFireHatchPatrol,thertquirementsforthepatrolarenotincluded.Forthisreason,section2.1.1.2oftheFHAwillalsoberevisedtoincludetheseprogramrequirements.TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtectionSystem,"ALARAdesign,EquipmentQualification,lOCFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability,FuelAnalysisReview,

Page50of54ISI/ISTdesigncriteria,HumanFactorsdesigncriteria,HeavyLoaddesigncriteria,NMPlTechnicalSpecifications,EnvironmentalProtectionPlan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussedinFSARchapterXV-"SafetyAnalysis."

15.3CONCLUSION

InaccordancewithNRCguidance,fireprotectionrequirementscurrentlyhousedinheTechnicalSpecificationsarebeingtranscribedintotheFHA.ThemajorportionofthiseffortwasaccomplishedinrevisiononeoftheFHA.However,twoareaswereoverlooked.Forthisreason,theFHAisbeingrevisedtoexpandandincludeprogramrequirementsforFireBrigadestaffingandFireHatchPatrols.ThesechangesareconsistentwithcurrentNRCguidanceandwilleventuallyfacilitateremovingfireprotectionfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.ThisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribedintheFSARanddoesnotadverselyaffectfireprotectionorsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperationofNineMilePoint1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis,thischangedoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Page51of5416.0TITLE:PreviouslyAcceptedFPOCNs.ForfutureFHAannualupdates,areportwillbeprovidedtosummarizeandincorporatealloftheapplicableFPOCNs.ThisreportwillestablishatraceablepathbetweentheupdatedFHA,associatedsafetyevaluationsandFPOCNs.Ootothesizeofthissafetyevaluation,itisimpracticaltowriteaseparatereport.Forthisreason,theapplicableFPOCNsarebeingincorporatedbyreferenceintothissafetyevaluationwhichwillactasthereportforrevision2totheFHA.SafetyEvaluations89-025and90-042includechangesnecessarytobeincorporatedinthisrevisionoftheFHA.FPOCNsFHA-90-01andFHA-90-02werepreparedforthesechangesandareincludedasanattachmenttothisSafetyEvaluation.ThesechangeswerepreviouslyevaluatedandareonlybeingincludedinthisSafetyEvaluationforreferencepurposes.

Page52of54l.2.3.4,5.6.8.9.10.12.13.14.15.16.17.18.19.20.21.22.REFERENCESTechnicalSpecificationsNMPl.AppendixRAnalysis.FireHazardsAnalysisR.l.LetterF.J.ConstancetoJ.Limes2/8/90.LetterM.KammertoJ.Jirousek12/7/87.ProcedureNl-FPM-FPW-M002..ProcedureNl-FST-FPW-W001.TechnicalSpecificationNMP1Amend.53.OCRN1-85-044-LS-557.CharcoalFilterDrawings.FireProtectionProgram.BTP9.5-1App.A.NFPA80,StandardforFireDoorsandWindows.NMPCFSAR.FireProtectionSER7-26-79.GBAAuditReport1984-1985.NCR1-88-2009.MWRNl-85-044-LA093.50.59DeterminationD87-001R.3.DCRN1-85-044LS494.Calc.S10-203-HV01..WarnockHerseyInternational,Inc.,"ReportoftheFireEnduranceandHoseStreamTestingofa6'0"*7'0"FireRatedDoorAssemblyInstalledWithExcessiveClearancesinaConcreteBlockWall,"performedforPaloVerdeGeneratingStationonOctober24,1986.23.WarnockHerseyInternational,Inc.,"ReportoftheFireEnduranceandHoseStreamTestingofTwoSingle,FireRatedDoorAssembliesWithExcessiveClearancesInstalledinaConcreteBlockWall,"performedforPaloVerdeGeneratingStationonOctober22,1986.24.WarnockHerseyInternational,Inc.,"ReportoftheFireEnduranceandHoseStreamTestingofAPairof3'0"*7'0"SteelDoorsanda6'0"*7'0"SteelFrameAssemblyWithExcessiveClearancesBetweentheDoorandFrame,"performedforGeorgiaPowerCompanyonMay5,1987.25'.SafetyEvaluation80-05.

Page53of5426.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.34.35.36.37.38.39.40.41.42.43.44,45.46.47.48.49.50.51.52.53.54.55.56.57.58.59.LetterJ.F.LimestoH.L.Schivone3/9/90SM-CS90-0098.DrawingC-19907-CSh.3R.4.ElectricalDesignGuide1300.NMPC-FPQAP-1R.2.NEL-805.ResponsetoNOV,NMPlL0317,Oct.21,1988.GenericLetter86-10.DrawingC-27152-CSh.1R.2.FireratedbarrierdrawingB-4014-C.OCRN185044LS566.LER88-09.AppendixRto10CFR50.'afetyEvaluation83-08.LetterG.GresocktoFileMarch1,1982.Letter.R.C.BeliertoM.A.DooleySept.21,1989.'afetyEvaluation82-03.Q-List.LetterJ.F.LimestoA.BarnhardtJune13,1990.NFPACodes72D&72E.NOV(NRCInspectionReportNc.50-220/88-15)Sept.19,1988.LER83-44.LetterSellertoAndersen1/29/90.MemoGC89-014(12/8/89)D.T.Edelmann.SafetyEvaluations88-004.EngineeringReportforwastewaterTreatmentFacilityforRunofffromOilSpillAreasNineMilePointUnit1Jun18,1989.GenericLetter88-17.FireProtectionEngineeringEvaluationFPEE-1-90-007,"ExcessiveDoor/FrameClearanceofFireDoors0117AandD291.OCRN-l-90-001LS635,"FHAFloorPlanDrawingUpdate."DrawingC-34010-C'ev.3.LetterR.C.BeliertoBobPigeon,SM1-089-0443,9-7-89.PickardLowe&GarrickAuditNo.0366.LetterNMPlL0450NiagaraMohawktoNRCNov.3,1989.NMP1FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(updated).DCRN1-90-001LS673.

Page54of5460.61,62.63.64.65.66.YendorDraining,Custodis,CH-520-67-A.DrawingC-10321-C.FireProtectionHandbook16thEdition.LetterNMPCtoNRCDec.22,1983;May11,1984.NRCFireBreakZoneSER,8-6-86.DrawingB-40148-CCalculationM31.1-RX261-CW01

'I00