ML13241A264

Enclosure 2 - Columbia Generating Station, Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (Public Version)

ML13241A264
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	08/12/2013
From:	Erwin T, Swank D Energy Northwest
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GO2-13-117
Download: ML13241A264 (92)

Text

Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)ENCLOSURE 2COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)

Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)ENERGYNORTHWEST COLUMBIA GENERATING STATIONRICHLAND, WASHINGTON Final Seismic Walkdown Summary ReportResolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: SeismicýzcPI6 //Z"Tom Erwin (Date)Energy Northwest Fukushima Technical LeadDave SwankEnergy Northwest Assistant Vice President, Engineering (Date)

Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)Table of ContentsExecutive Sum m ary ...........................................................................................................

ii1.0 Introduction

........................................................................................................

11.1 Purpose ........................................................................................................

11.2 Acronym G lossary ............................................................................................

12.0 Seism ic Licensing Basis Sum m ary ......................................................................

32.1 Identification of the Seism ic Licensing Basis ....................................................

32.2 Codes, Standards, and M ethods ......................................................................

33.0 Personnel Q ualifications Sum m ary ......................................................................

43.1 Q ualification Sum m ary .....................................................................................

43.1.1 Equipm ent Selection Personnel

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43.1.2 Seism ic W alkdown Engineers (SW Es) ......................................................

43.1.3 Licensing Basis Reviewer

..........................................................................

43.1.4 IPEEE Reviewer

.......................................................................................

43.1.5 Peer Review Team M em bers ...................................................................

53.2 Personnel Q ualifications

...................................................................................

54.0 SSC Selection

....................................................................................................

84.1 Purpose ........................................................................................................

84.2 SW EL Developm ent ..........................................................................................

84.2.1 SW EL 1 Developm ent ..............................................................................

84.2.2 SW EL 2 Developm ent ..............................................................................

114.2.3 Com bined SW EL .....................................................................................

124.3 Inaccessible Equipm ent ................................................................................

124.4 Conclusions

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135.0 Seism ic W alkdown and Area W alk-By Sum m ary ...............................................

145.1 Seism ic W alkdown and Area W alk-by Planning

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145.2 Seism ic W alkdowns

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155.3 Area W alk-Bys ................................................................................................

195.4 Inaccessible and Deferred Item s ....................................................................

206.0 Licensing Basis Evaluation Sum m ary ...............................................................

226.1 Plant M odifications

.........................................................................................

227.0 IPEEE Vulnerabilities

..........................................................................................

238.0 Peer Review Team Report ................................................................................

249.0 References

............................................................................................................

2510.0 Attachm ents ............................................................................................................

26 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)Executive SummaryThis report presents the results of Seismic Walkdowns for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 (Seismic),

requested by the U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC), in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Section 50.54(f).

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Seismic Walkdown Guidance was endorsedby the NRC, to provide detailed guidance and methodology to meet the objectives of theNRC 50.54(f) letter. Energy Northwest used the EPRI Guidance to develop the scope ofSeismic Walkdowns, conduct the Seismic Walkdowns, disposition the findings, preparethe report, and perform a peer review of these efforts.The scope of Seismic Walkdowns was developed by preparation of two SeismicWalkdown Equipment Lists (SWEL), SWEL 1 and SWEL 2. These two lists weredeveloped by an individual with extensive plant operations experience and a qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE) with input from experienced system engineers andplant personnel.

SWEL 1 was a sampling of structures,

systems, and components (SSCs) from frontline safety and support systems related to the five safety functions below:1. Reactor reactivity control2. Reactor coolant pressure control3. Reactor coolant inventory control4. Decay heat removal5. Containment functionThe equipment lists used as a starting point for development of SWEL 1 included a list ofSeismic Category 1 SSCs generated from the plant equipment database and the SafeShutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Individual Plant Examination forExternal Events (IPEEE) program.SWEL 1 was developed by applying the following five sample selection attributes, definedin the EPRI Guidance:

1. A variety of types of systems2. Major new and replacement equipment

3. A variety of types of equipment

4. A variety of environments

5. Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program.ii Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)SWEL 2 is a list of equipment supporting spent fuel pool (SFP) operation.

SWEL 2 wasdeveloped by reviewing spent fuel pool related systems for Seismic Category 1equipment and completing a review of any SSCs that upon failure could result in rapiddrain-down of the SFP. The Seismic Category 1 SSCs were selected for inspection consistent with SWEL 1 methods.

No items were identified that could lead to rapid drain-down of the SFP other than failure of the SFP structure, which is excluded by the EPRIGuidance.

The 116 items on SWEL 1 and the 18 items on SWEL 2 were combined to form the 134items on the combined SWEL, which defined the scope of Seismic Walkdowns.

The items on the combined SWEL were reviewed to determine the population of itemswith anchorage.

More than 50% of items with anchorage were selected for verification, during the walkdowns, that their anchorage configuration was installed per design.Walkdown packages were developed for each item on the SWEL and for each areabased on checklists provided with the EPRI Guidance.

Seismic Walkdowns and AreaWalk-Bys were performed by one walkdown team consisting of two qualified SeismicWalkdown Engineers (SWEs) and assisted, when possible, by operations orknowledgeable plant personnel.

A total of 134 Seismic Walkdowns and 61 Area Walk-Bys were conducted for ColumbiaGenerating Station.

Most Seismic Walkdowns were accomplished with the station on-lineover the course of 10 weeks, in which 120 Seismic Walkdowns and 55 Area Walk-Byswere performed.

Due primarily to accessibility during plant operation, 14 items and 6associated Area Walk-Bys were not completed with the initial group. The walkdowns forthese 14 items, in addition to the opening of 21 electrical panels previously walked down,but not opened, were completed between the time the initial report was submitted inNovember 2012 and the end of refueling outage R21 in June 2013.Issues found during the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-Bys were documented on thewalkdown checklists.

The 134 Seismic Walkdowns performed resulted in theidentification of 40 potentially adverse seismic conditions and the 61 Area Walk-Bysperformed resulted in 79 potentially adverse seismic conditions.

These conditions were submitted to licensing basis evaluation personnel for review andwere either resolved by evaluation (i.e. existing calculation and drawing confirmations) orentered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Condition Reports (CRs). Therewere a total of 84 licensing basis evaluations performed and a total of 37 CRs weregenerated to address potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Several of the 119potentially adverse conditions had both licensing basis evaluations and CRs written.None of the issues identified resulted in a condition that placed the plant outside itslicensing basis, and no operability issues were identified.

iii Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)During the walkdowns, non-seismic related issues (i.e., housekeeping issues) wereidentified and noted on the checklists.

These did not undergo a licensing basisevaluation, but were entered into the CAP by generating CRs.There are no planned design changes to the plant as a result of the walkdowns, but plantWork Requests were generated, when required, to bring the equipment item back intocompliance with existing plant documentation (i.e. installing a missing bolt or clamp).The conclusion of this effort for Columbia Generating Station is that a thorough samplingof safety and support system components was evaluated for integrity and compliance withplant design based on the EPRI Guidance.

This evaluation resulted in discovery of anumber of lower level deficiencies, but none that placed the plant in a condition that wasoutside its licensing basis or compromised the safety function of any SSC.iv Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)1.0 Introduction 1.1 PurposeThis report presents the results of the Seismic Walkdowns for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation (NTTF) 2.3 (Seismic),

requested by the U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in accordance with Title 10 of the Code ofFederal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.54(f)

(Reference 9.9) for Columbia Generating Station.

Columbia Generating Station is operated by Energy Northwest.

1.2 Acronym Glossary10 CFRACIALARAANSIAWBAWCCAPCIACRDOEDSAEPNEPRIFAQFPCFSARGIPHPCSIPEEELBELPCSNEMANEINRCNTTFNQA-1PRAPSAR21Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations American Concrete Institute As Low As Reasonably Achievable American National Standards Institute Area Walk-byArea Walk-By Checklist Corrective Action ProgramContainment Instrument AirCondition ReportDepartment of EnergyDiesel Starting AirEquipment Part NumberElectric Power Research Institute Frequently Asked Questions Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-UpFinal Safety Analysis ReportGeneric Implementation Procedure for Seismic Verification of Nuclear PlantEquipment High Pressure Core SprayIndividual Plant Examination for External EventsLicensing Basis Evaluation Low Pressure Core SprayNational Electrical Manufactures Association Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Near-Term Task ForceNuclear Quality Assurance-1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Probabilistic Safety Assessment Columbia Refueling Outage "21"1 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)RCIC Reactor Core Isolation CoolingRHR Residual Heat RemovalRPV Reactor Pressure VesselSC-1 M Seismic Category 1 M (Maintains Structural Integrity During/After SSE)SFP Spent Fuel PoolSLC Standby Liquid ControlSSCs Structures,

Systems, and Components SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment ListSWC Seismic Walkdown Checklist SWE Seismic Walkdown EngineerSWEL Seismic Walkdown Equipment ListWD WalkdownWNP-2 Washington Nuclear Plant 2WO Work OrderZPA Zero Period Acceleration 2

Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)2.0 Seismic Licensing Basis Summary2.1 Identification of the Seismic Licensing BasisThe seismic licensing basis for Columbia Generating Station is documented in the FinalSafety Analysis Report (FSAR) (Reference 9.1), Section 3.2, Classification of Structures, Components, and Systems.

The FSAR describes the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)loads and their application to the Structures,

Systems, and Components (SSCs) ofColumbia Generating Station.

Technical Memorandum, TM-2143 (Reference 9.4),"Geology, Seismology, and Geotechnical Engineering Report,"

referenced in Section 2.5of the FSAR, contains the results of seismology studies.Seismic design input motion for Columbia Generating Station is established from theinvestigation of the site seismicity.

Based on this investigation, a value of peak horizontal ground acceleration or zero period acceleration (ZPA) of 0.25g for a SSE was established as the conservative design basis. The ground ZPA for vertical direction is taken as twothirds of the horizontal value, which is 0.167g for SSE. The vibratory ground motions,however, are defined by design response spectra for the SSE to account for amplification at various ranges of vibration frequencies.

These design response spectra for thevibratory ground motions form the basis for the seismic design of all Seismic Category 1building structures and structural components of Columbia Generating Station(Reference 9.7).In-structure response spectra are generated to account for the amplification of the groundseismic motions due to the dynamic properties of a building structure.

These in-structure response spectra are the seismic input motion for the qualification of the structural components supported from the building.

2.2 Codes, Standards, and MethodsSection 3.8 of the Columbia Generating Station FSAR describes the design of all SeismicCategory 1 structures.

Table 3.8-4 of the FSAR summarizes the codes, standards, andmethods that were used for the various types of SSCs involved.

3 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)3.0 Personnel Qualifications Summary3.1 Qualification SummaryThis section identifies the qualifications of the personnel who performed activities associated with the Seismic Walkdown efforts at Columbia Generating Station.

A diversegroup of engineers with varied backgrounds and experience were combined to completethe necessary tasks. Section 3.2 of this report indicates specific personnel qualifications, experience of the walkdown team members, and identifies the activity(s) they performed.

3.1.1 Equipment Selection Personnel The equipment selection personnel have knowledge of plant operations, plantdocumentation, and associated SSCs. One was an operations Shift Manager with longtime plant experience at all levels of the Operations Department, who served as theoperations representative.

The other was a degreed engineer with experience in thedesign of seismically qualified

systems, who also served as a Seismic WalkdownEngineer.

3.1.2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)Each of the Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) completed the NTTF 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Training course and had a Bachelor's of Science degree in either civil ormechanical engineering.

SWEs also attended plant specific Human Performance Awareness training.

3.1.3 Licensing Basis ReviewerThe Licensing Basis Reviewer was a degreed civil engineer with extensive experience inplant design and completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training course. TheLicensing Basis Reviewer had knowledge of the seismic licensing basis, seismicqualification methods and documentation, and the Corrective Action Program (CAP) forthe plant.3.1.4 IPEEE ReviewerThe Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) reviewer had adequateengineering experience to review and understand the results of the IPEEE program.

Thereviewer was a degreed civil engineer with background in nuclear plant designrequirements and had completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training course.4 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)3.1.5 Peer Review Team MembersThe qualifications of peer review team members were consistent with the activities forwhich the peer review is being conducted.

The peer review team members were degreedengineers with extensive experience in nuclear plant design.3.2 Personnel Qualifications Michael CorletoActivities Performed:

Seismic Walkdown EngineerEPRI Industry Training Completed:

NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training CourseEducation:

Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering, San Francisco State University Summary of Background/Experience:

Approximately eight years of experience in nuclearplant civil/structural/seismic engineering at Hanford Nuclear Waste Treatment Plant.Originated calculations for the designs of Seismic Category 1 building structures, equipment components and anchorage, and multi-commodity supports for electrical raceways

& piping systems under ANSI N690 and ACI 349 Codes.Gregory (Greg) JaschkeActivities Performed:

Equipment Selection, Seismic Walkdown EngineerEPRI Industry Training Completed:

NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training CourseEducation:

Bachelors of Science in Mechanical Engineering, North Dakota StateUniversity Summary of Background/Experience:

Approximately nine years of experience inengineering, procurement and construction of Seismic Category 1, NQA-1 qualified process piping systems for Hanford Nuclear Waste Treatment Plant. One additional yearof experience at a Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant performing systemcompletion walkdowns for plant startup as well as Engineering, Procurement

&Construction activities.

Leanna Staudenmier Activities Performed:

Seismic Walkdown EngineerEPRI Industry Training Completed:

NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training CourseEducation:

Bachelors of Science in Civil and Environmental Engineering, VirginiaPolytechnic Institute and State University 5

Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)Summary of Background/Experience:

Over a year of experience in nuclear plantcivil/structural/seismic engineering.

Originated design calculations and design documents for equipment anchorage.

Preparation of Plant Design Change packages for ColumbiaGenerating Station.Eugene (Gene) Scott Jr.Activities Performed:

IPEEE Review, Seismic Walkdown EngineerEPRI Industry Training Completed:

NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training CourseEducation:

Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering, Michigan Technological University Summary of Background/Experience:

Approximately 15 years in commercial nuclearpower and waste treatment industries, combined.

A registered Professional CivilEngineer in Texas, Oregon, and Michigan.

Worked as a Plant Design-Pipe StressEngineer and Civil/Structural Engineer with the Maanshan Nuclear Generating Stationsupport team, worked on South Texas Project in the Special Task Group, and has workedas a Civil/Structural/Architectural Engineer at the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant.Myron BairdActivities Performed:

Equipment Selection, Seismic Walkdown SupportEducation:

Bachelors of Science in Technology, Excelsior CollegeSummary of Background/Experience:

Approximately 38 years of nuclear experience with29 years of experience as a Senior Reactor Operator.

Reached the rank of Electricians Mate First Class, serving in the United States Navy, on a nuclear powered submarine.

Has held positions as an Equipment

Operator, Reactor Operator, Shift SupportSupervisor, Control Room Supervisor, Licensed Operator Requalification TrainingSupervisor, Operations Training

Manager, Shift Manager, and Work Control/Outage ShiftManager at Columbia Generating Station.Robert (Bob) SlovicActivities Performed:

Peer ReviewEducation:

Bachelors of Science in Mechanical Engineering (completed NuclearEngineering courses),

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Summary of Background/Experience:

Approximately 32 years in design and construction of commercial nuclear power and nuclear waste projects.

Registered Professional Engineer in the state of Virginia.

Has held positions as a mechanical design engineer, lead site liaison, mechanical group supervisor, assistant project engineer, projectengineer, senior project engineer, area project engineering

manager, discipline 6

Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)production engineering

manager, and project engineering manager.

Started as a designengineer for mechanical systems for initial design of commercial nuclear power plantsand progressed to leading teams of engineers and designers for major projects.

Has heldpositions at Millstone Unit 2, Wolf Creek, Callaway, Grand Gulf, Pilgrim, Turkey Point, andAlmaraz Nuclear Power Plants, Yucca Mountain

facility, Hanford Waste Treatment Plant,as well as design support for several other nuclear power plants.Leo NadeauActivities Performed:

Peer Review LeadEPRI Industry Training Completed:

NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training CourseEducation:

Bachelors and Masters of Science in Mechanical Engineering, University ofConnecticut Summary of Background/Experience:

Over 25 years of experience in projectmanagement and engineering activities related to nuclear power projects including engineering and construction experience during refueling outages in operating facilities, performing new construction and the refurbishment of nuclear power plants. Has over 15years of seismic design experience with nuclear power plants, including Bellefonte Nuclear Station, Bruce Power, Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Station, as well as designsupport at various other nuclear power plants.Greg LisleActivities Performed:

Licensing Basis ReviewerEPRI Industry Training Completed:

NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training CourseEducation:

Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering, Washington State University Summary of Background/Experience:

A registered Professional Civil Engineer in thestate of Washington with 22 years' experience in project design engineering.

Includesfive years at Energy Northwest's Columbia Generating Station and 17 years for theDepartment of Energy (DOE), including five years as Principle Civil/Structural Engineer.

Skilled as a design engineer in developing engineering estimates and schedules forallocating

budgets, preparation of design media (calculations, specifications, drawings),

structural design codes associated with nuclear and non-nuclear applications, and usingfinite element computer software for structural analysis.

7 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)4.0 SSC Selection 4.1 PurposeThis section describes the process used to develop the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL), which defines the scope of the Seismic Walkdowns performed in responseto the NRC's 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012. The SWEL was developed using the guidance provided in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) SeismicWalkdown

Guidance, For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3: Seismic (Reference 9.3) hereafter referred to as the EPRIGuidance.

In addition, clarifications and methods stated in the Frequently AskedQuestions (FAQ) on Seismic Walkdown

Guidance, were followed as noted in Section 4.2below. The FAQ is included as Attachment 9 to this report.4.2 SWEL Development EPRI Guidance, Section 3: Selection of SSCs, describes the process to be used toidentify structures,

systems, and components (SSCs) to be included on a SWEL. ASWEL 1 and SWEL 2 list were required by the EPRI Guidance.

SWEL 1 consists ofsafety-related, Seismic Category 1 items associated with bringing the reactor to a safeshutdown condition and maintaining containment integrity.

SWEL 2 consists ofequipment or systems associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). SWEL 1 and SWEL 2are combined to form the combined SWEL, which defines the overall scope of equipment used as input to the Seismic Walkdowns.

Additional information regarding themethodology and process utilized by the operations and equipment selection personnel todevelop the combined SWEL is provided below.4.2.1 SWEL 1 Development A list of all Seismic Category 1 equipment was generated from the plant equipment database.

Structures, containment penetrations, and piping were removed from the list(valves and instrumentation were included).

This list became Base List 1, as defined inSection 8 of the EPRI Guidance, and is included as Attachment 4.A Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) (Reference 9.5, Table 6-1) for a seismicvulnerability evaluation was previously developed in response to the Individual PlantExamination for External Events (IPEEE) program requested by the NRC in GenericLetter 88-20 (Reference 9.10).Base List 1 was compared to the SSEL. The SWEL 1, as shown in Attachment 2, wasdeveloped by the equipment selection personnel using both the SSEL and Base List 1.Of the 116 items on SWEL 1, 68 were previously included on the IPEEE SSEL.8 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)SWEL 1 was developed by applying the following five sample selection attributes, definedin the EPRI Guidance.

The method of application is summarized for each attribute:

1. A variety of types of systems.

SWEL 1 items were selected to represent a broadrange of SSCs from frontline safety and support systems.

A summary of systemsis provided in Attachment

6. A distribution of SSCs from 26 different systems wasselected.

2. Major new and replacement equipment.

The approach provided in Section 3.2 ofAttachment 9, was followed.

The equipment was first selected for SWEL 1 basedon the other sample selection attributes (i.e., a variety of systems, equipment types, environments, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) risk items, and IPEEEenhancements).

Then, SWEL 1 was thoroughly reviewed to identify whether anyitems had been subject to major changes during approximately the past 15 years.This review was conducted using the plant equipment database to list changesaffecting items on SWEL 1 as well as review by operations, design engineering, and system engineering personnel.

These Items are identified in the "MajorChange" column on SWEL 1.3. A variety of types of equipment.

Sample selection for SWEL 1 included providing avariety of the equipment types described in EPRI Guidance, Appendix B, Classesof Equipment.

A summary of equipment classes from SWEL 1 is provided inAttachment

7. All equipment types are represented with the exception of motorgenerators.

The motor generator equipment type is not represented because noneof the motor generators at Columbia Generating Station are Seismic Category 1.4. A variety of environments.

Sample items were selected from different locations inside and outside the station to include various environments (hot, cold, dry, wet).Attachment 8 provides a summary of the areas where walkdowns and walk-byswere conducted.

Six items in containment (drywell) were added to be walkeddown during the recent R21 refueling outage along with one item located in themain steam tunnel. Another six items were included that are outdoors and exposedto weather conditions, four of which are in close proximity to the spray ponds. Tenitems were included that are located in buildings outside the main station in theservice water pump houses, circulating water pump house, and water treatment building.

The bulk of the items selected are located inside the station's dieselgenerator, radioactive waste, and reactor buildings.

5. Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program.The IPEEE program documentation was reviewed to determine equipment thathad been modified or otherwise enhanced to reduce IPEEE vulnerabilities.

FourSeismic Category 2 fire protection batteries, FP-B0-1 1 OA, FP-B0-1 10B, FP-BO-1A, and FP-BO-1 B, were identified as enhancements; no Seismic Category 1 itemswere identified as enhancements.

These items were added to SWEL 1 to ensureIPEEE enhancements are still in place.9 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)As shown on Attachment 2, the applicable supported safety function(s) were determined for each item as confirmation that the five following safety functions are adequately represented:

1. Reactor reactivity control2. Reactor coolant pressure control3. Reactor coolant inventory control4. Decay heat removal5. Containment functionA Level 1 Seismic PRA exists for Columbia Generating

Station, which was used by aPRA subject matter expert to generate an importance list of basic events. Non-SSCrelated basic events such as plant-practices and operator performance events were notconsidered.

The list of basic events was used by the equipment selection personnel toidentify a sampling of SSCs associated with those basic events having a risk achievement worth value greater than 1.8 for inclusion on SWEL 1. These are identified in the "HighRisk Item" column on SWEL 1 (Attachment 2).There were seven items added to SWEL 1 that are not Seismic Category 1, four are thefire protection batteries which were previously discussed as IPEEE enhancements.

Theremaining three items added to SWEL 1, RFT-CP-COM1, E-TR-ISOL/USA, and DSA-C-1A1, are all Seismic Category 1M (SC 1M) (maintains structural integrity during/after SSE) and were added for the reasons below:E-TR-ISOL/USA

-Added as a transformer supporting important loads, including control room computer equipment, control rod drive system instrumentation, andvarious process radiation monitors.

RFT-CP-COM1

-Added control panel for importance to reactor pressure vessellevel control as it is integral to reactor feedwater pump turbine control.DSA-C-1A1

-This was added for the compressor equipment type since ColumbiaGenerating Station does not have any compressors that are Seismic Category 1.Additionally this item is SC-1 M because it must maintain integrity during and afterthe seismic event to maintain the diesel starting air (DSA) system integrity for thediesel generators.

10 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)4.2.2 SWEL 2 Development Base List 2, as defined in Section 8 of the EPRI Guidance and included as Attachment 5,was developed based on a review of systems and components associated with the SFP.These SFP related items were pulled from the same equipment database generated listof Seismic Category 1 items as Base List 1.In selecting components for SWEL 2 (Attachment

3) from Base List 2, the EPRI Guidanceidentifies four sample selection considerations.

The method of application is summarized for each consideration below:1. A variety of types of systems.

The SFP related items include the Fuel PoolCooling and Clean-up (FPC) system and the associated instrumentation andcontrols.

The summary of systems is provided in Attachment 6.2. Maior new and replacement equipment.

The approach provided in Section 3.2 ofAttachment 9, was followed.

The equipment was first selected for SWEL 2 basedon the other sample selection attributes (i.e., variety of systems, equipment types,and environments).

Then, SWEL 2 was reviewed to identify whether any itemshad been subject to major changes during approximately the past 15 years. Thisreview was conducted using the plant equipment database as well as review byoperations, design engineering, and FPC system engineering personnel.

TheseItems are identified in the "Major Change" column on SWEL 2.3. A variety of types of equipment.

The equipment types from Base List 2 that areidentified in Appendix B of the EPRI Guidance, with the exception of Class 0,"Other,"

were included on SWEL 2. Seismic Category 1 structures and in-linecomponents that are part of Seismic Category 1 piping systems (i.e., piping,manual valves, and instrumentation) were excluded as they are not part of theselection criteria.

A summary of equipment classes from SWEL 2 is provided inAttachment 7.4. A variety of environments.

All of the areas containing equipment types selected inthe previous step were included.

The in-scope FPC equipment is all contained inside the reactor building and main control room in the radioactive waste building.

Attachment 8 provides a summary of the areas in which these Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were conducted.

A total of 18 components were identified that met the criteria for inclusion in the SeismicWalkdowns and were added to SWEL 2. A justification was provided for SFP relatedcomponents identified on Base List 2, as to why the item was added or not added toSWEL 2. This is shown in the "SWEL 2 Inclusion/Exclusion Justification" column on BaseList 2 (Attachment 5).11 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)Rapid Draindown No components, whose failure could result in rapid drain-down of the SFP, were identified for addition to SWEL 2. There are only two penetrations in the SFP which are locatedapproximately 1 foot below the normal operating level. FSAR Section 9.1.2.3.3, SpentFuel and Cask Handling states the following:

"Failure of the gates between the reactor well and the spent fuel storage pool isimprobable.

However, in the event of this failure, the loss of water from thestorage pool into the reactor well would not uncover the stored spent fuel due tothe elevation of the weir wall under the gates. This elevation ensures thatsufficient water is retained in the pool to cover the spent fuel.To avoid unintentional draining of the spent fuel storage pool to levels belowthat required for adequate shielding of the spent fuel, no inlets, outlets, ordrains that would normally permit the pool to be drained are provided.

Discharge lines extending below the pool water level are designed to preventany siphon back flow. Two skimmer surge tanks are provided and are sized toaccommodate water displacement due to large items being placed into orremoved from the spent fuel storage pool."Additionally, the fuel pool cooling return lines to the SFP have both check valves andvacuum breakers to prevent siphoning.

These are supported as part of the SeismicCategory 1 inlet piping system and not an equipment type that is part of the selection criteria for walkdowns.

4.2.3 Combined SWELThe combined SWEL was developed by combining the items on SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 fora total of 134 items. The items on the combined SWEL (Attachment

1) were reviewed todetermine the population of items with anchorage and, as shown on the combined SWEL,more than 50 percent of those items underwent a configuration verification of the installed anchorage during the associated Seismic Walkdown.

The combined SWEL serves as theinput to the Seismic Walkdowns conducted in accordance with EPRI Guidance, Section 4Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.

4.3 Inaccessible Equipment During the equipment selection

process, operations personnel played a key role not onlyin selecting equipment that met the sample considerations, but also in selecting equipment that had accessible anchorage as recommended in the EPRI Guidance.

However, in the course of performing walkdowns, there were four items with anchorage that was not visible and appeared to be difficult to access. E-CB-B/7, E-DP-S1/1 D, E-DP-S1/2, and E-DP-S1/2A were either substituted or removed from SWEL 1, as detailed in12 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)Section 5.2 of this report, but the Area Walk-Bys were still performed.

Additionally, RHR-V-48B was removed for dose considerations and no walk-by was performed.

These fiveitems are shown in strikethrough at the bottom of SWEL 1 and the combined SWEL.Similarly, SWEL 2 shows E-IR-71 at the bottom in strikethrough as it was also removedfor dose considerations.

As discussed in Section 5.4 of this report, there were a number of items that weredeferred and completed later due to location, safety, or schedule.

These included itemsinside containment, electrical panels that required internal inspection, and items added tothe SWEL after further review by plant operations personnel.

These deferred items areidentified in Attachment 11 and were completed by the end of the recent R21 refueling outage.4.4 Conclusions The development of the SWEL was performed and implemented as described in Section4.2 of this report in accordance with EPRI Guidance, Section 3 Selection of SSCs.Clarifications and methods stated in the FAQ provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) were followed as noted in Section 4.2 of this report.13 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)5.0 Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By SummaryThe following subsections provide a summary of the approach used to implement theSeismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys for Columbia Generating Station; to documentthe results of these Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys; and to report any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during plant walkdowns and area walk-bys.

Anyissues found during the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-Bys were documented on thedesignated checklists.

The potentially adverse seismic conditions were submitted forlicense basis evaluations and, if found to be an issue from the license basis evaluation, entered into the CAP as Condition Reports (CRs). The license basis evaluations arestated in Attachment 13, with references to specific checklists.

Non-seismic relatedissues (i.e., housekeeping issues) were also identified and noted on the checklists.

These housekeeping type issues did not undergo a licensing basis evaluation but wereentered into the CAP by generating CRs.Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed in 2 groups, the initial group andthe deferred group. The initial group represents the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys performed prior to the initial submittal of this report in November of 2012. Thedeferred group represents the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys performed afterthe initial submittal of this report for various ALARA and safety reasons.

The deferredSeismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were all performed between the time when theinitial report was submitted in November 2012 and the end of refueling outage R21 inJune 2013. The Seismic Walkdown Checklists for the initial group are included inAttachment 10 and the Seismic Walkdown Checklists for the deferred group are includedin Attachment 10A.5.1 Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by PlanningWalkdown packages were prepared for each component listed on the SWEL and for eachArea Walk-By to be performed.

Each walkdown package included the following items, asapplicable:

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC), Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC), GeneralArrangement drawings showing equipment

location, flow diagrams or isometric drawingsfor valves (when applicable),

anchorage

details, or structural drawings for SWEL itemsrequiring anchorage configuration verification.

A hardcopy of each walkdown packagewas carried by the Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) during performance of thewalkdowns.

Planning and scheduling the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys was completed inaccordance with the station work management system. The Seismic Walkdowns andArea Walk-Bys were scheduled into divisional work weeks ensuring the walkdown teamwould not interfere with regular station operation and maintenance.

A log wasestablished to identify each SWC and AWC, and date of the scheduled walkdown.

Work14 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)packages were generated for each item on the combined SWEL (Attachment 1), inaccordance with plant procedures.

In order to comply with Energy Northwest's Error Prevention

program, each SeismicWalkdown Engineer completed Human Performance Awareness training.

Prior to the startof the Seismic Walkdowns, the initial walkdown team participated in a mock-up walkdownscenario to demonstrate acceptable work practices.

For the deferred walkdowns one ofthe initial team members was paired with the new Seismic Walkdown Engineers that didnot participate in the mock-up.The walkdown team always consisted of two SWEs and was assisted, when possible, byoperations or plant personnel who were knowledgeable of the SWEL item location, general plant area, and also provided assistance in addressing non-seismic relatedissues that were found during the walkdowns.

5.2 Seismic Walkdowns Seismic Walkdowns for Columbia Generating Station were performed in accordance withSection 4 of the EPRI Guidance.

The initial Seismic Walkdown Checklists are included inAttachment 10, and deferred items checklists are included in Attachment 1 OA.The combined SWEL contained 134 items to be walked down. Of the 134 items identified on the combined SWEL, 120 walkdowns were performed with the initial group and 14walkdowns were performed with the deferred group. Both groups of walkdowns utilized asimilar walkdown team and usage of plant work packages.

The deferred group of SWELitems is listed in Attachment 11.The Seismic Walkdowns performed resulted in the identification of 40 potentially adverseseismic conditions as listed in Attachment

13. Note that several of the issues (within thetotal of 40 issues) are similar in nature. The following list summarizes the potentially adverse seismic conditions that were found during the Seismic Walkdowns:

" Missing concrete anchors from surface mounted support plate (for example, asurface mounted plate with 4 bolt holes but with only 3 concrete anchors installed),

• Improperly installed concrete anchors (anchors installed not perpendicular to theplate, resulting in gaps between bolt head and plate surfaces),

" Missing nuts on bolts and missing washers for nuts/bolts in oversized or slottedholes in surface mounted plates,* Anchor bolt and concrete anchor corrosion that appeared to be more than mild," Missing support clamps on instrument tubing that was routed from specific SWELitem,15 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)" Improperly restrained maintenance tools hanging on specific SWEL item," Long cantilevered manual valve operators over specific SWEL item,* Bent flanges on specific SWEL items at bolted interfaces,

" Overhead ceiling tiles in the control room were present and from visual inspection from floor level, the supporting structure and details of the ceiling tiles was notvisible, and" Lights above SWEL equipment that do not have fall restraints or safety chainsThere were six equipment items included in the original combined SWEL scope that weredeleted after being walked down due to inaccessibility (not-authorized to open electrical item based on plant operations) and no visibility of anchorage (i.e. electrical panel wasflush against the wall and anchors were inside the panel). These items, shown instrikethrough at the bottom of Attachments 1, 2, and 3, are listed below along with thereason for deletion and any substitutions made:" E-CB-B/7 (Standby Feed from Backup Transformer, E-TR-B Cubicle 12):Anchorage was neither visible nor entirely accessible because part of the circuitbreaker was energized at the time of the Seismic Walkdown.

This item wassubstituted with "SW-CB-PlA",

which is a 4160V Circuit Breaker that meets thesame safety functions as E-CB-B/7 as described in Section 4.2 of this report forSWEL development.

The Seismic Walkdown for SW-CB-P1A was performed during the recent R21 refueling outage. The Area Walk-by was still performed.

" E-DP-S1/1D (125VDC Distribution Panel located in the Remote Shutdown Room):This panel was flush against the wall and administratively could not be opened tosee anchorage or internal components during the Seismic Walkdown.

A directsubstitution for this item was not made because there is another distribution panel,E-DP-S1/1F, included in the combined SWEL that met similar safety functions, asdescribed in Section 4.2 of this report, for SWEL 1 development.

The Area Walk-By was still performed.

• E-DP-S1/2 (DIV 2 125VDC Main Distribution Panel): Anchorage was not visiblefrom the panel exterior and administratively could not be opened to see anchorage or internal components during the Seismic Walkdown.

A direct substitution for thisitem was not made because there is another distribution panel, E-DP-S1/1F, included in the combined SWEL that met similar safety functions, as described inSection 4.2 of this report, for SWEL 1 development.

The Area Walk-By was stillperformed.

16 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)" E-DP-S1/2A (125V DC Distribution Panel): Anchorage was not visible from thepanel exterior and administratively could not be opened to see anchorage orinternal components during the Seismic Walkdown.

A direct substitution for thisitem was not made because there is another distribution panel, E-DP-S1/1F, included in the combined SWEL that met similar safety functions as described inSection 4.2 of this report, for SWEL 1 development.

The Area Walk-By was stillperformed.

• RHR-V-48B (Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 1 B Bypass Valve (RHR-HX-1 B)): This valve was deleted mainly because the valve was located in a room withdrastically increased radiation dose due to maintenance work performed the weekprior to the Seismic Walkdown.

Due to ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) concerns and several other system Residual Heat Removal (RHR)equipment items that supported the same safety functions and were already on thecombined SWEL, RHR-V-48B was removed.

The Seismic Walkdown and AreaWalk-By were not performed for this equipment item." E-IR-71 (Reactor Building Instrument Rack): This item is located within a lockedhigh radiation area and was removed from SWEL2 due to ALARA concerns.

Adirect substitution for this item was not made since E-IR-69, which shares thesame equipment class and similar safety function, is included in SWEL2. TheSeismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By were not performed for this equipment item.A minimum 50% of combined SWEL items (with anchorage) were to be verified for properanchorage configuration and documented in the Seismic Walkdown Checklists, per EPRIGuidance.

A total of 52 SWEL items were verified.

The total number of SWEL items (134items), minus 39 valves (which are not counted towards anchorage verification),

results in95 SWEL items that can have anchorage verification.

Valve SW-V-2A has its ownseparate anchorage and was counted for verification (not counted in the 39 valves).Since 52 items were verified, 55% of the total SWEL items with anchorage were verified.

Refer to Attachment 1 for specific items verified.

The FAQ in Attachment 12 discusses visual inspection requirements of internalcomponents of electrical cabinet/panel items on the combined SWEL. The requirements are only applicable for the combined SWEL items in the Seismic Walkdowns and notsurrounding equipment within the Area Walk-Bys.

The following Electrical panels were opened for visual inspection of internal components (refer to Attachment 1 for specific details on items listed below):1. E-CP-H13/P611

[Reactor Protection System Trip System B Control Panel]2. E-CP-H13/P618

[RHR Control Panel]3. E-CP-H13/P626

[Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) Control Panel 1]17 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)4. E-CP-H13/P627

[Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) Control Panel 2]5. RFT-CP-COM1

[Fiber/Network Enclosure]

6. CIA-CP-1

[CIA Nitrogen Bottles Control Panel 1]7. CIA-CP-2

[CIA Nitrogen Bottles Control Panel 2]8. E-C1-1A [125V DC Vital Battery Charger A]9. E-C2-1 [250V Battery Charger 1]10. E-CP-ARS

[Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel]11. E-CP-DG/CP3

[HPCS Engine & Generator 480V Power Panel]12. E-CP-DG/EP3

[HPCS Diesel Generator Engine Control Panel]13. E-CP-H13/P833

[Control Room Safety System Panel (Board G2)]14. E-CP-H13/P841

[Control Room Panel (Board G1)]15. E-DP-S1/1F

[Division 1 Critical Switchgear Panel]16. E-DP-S1/HPCS

[125V DC HPCS System Distribution Panel]17. E-IN-2A [Division 2 Critical 120V AC Power Supply Inverter A]18. E-IN-2B [Division 2 Critical 120V AC Power Supply Inverter B]19. E-IR-68 [Reactor Building Instrument Rack]20. E-IR-69 [Reactor Building Instrument Rack]21. E-IR-PO01

[LPCS Instrument Rack]22. E-IR-PO1 1 [SLC Instrument Rack]23. E-IR-PO1 7 [RCIC Instrument Rack]24. E-MC-4A [HPCS Motor Control Center 4A]25. E-MC-7A [Motor Control Center 7A]26. E-MC-8A [Motor Control Center 8A]27. E-MC-8F [Motor Control Center 8F]28. E-PP-8AE

[1 20/240V 200 A Reactor Bldg Instr & Cntl Power Panel]29. FPC-42-7BB9B

[NEMA Size 3 Motor Starter for FPC-P-1 A]30. FPC-42-8BB2D

[NEMA Size 3 Motor Starter for FPC-P-1 B]31. RCIC-SC-C002

[RCIC Turbine Speed Controller]

32. SW-CB-P1 A [4160V Circuit Breaker for SW-M-P/1 A]The items listed above were opened and inspected in accordance with Attachment 12.There were no adverse seismic conditions found inside the opened electrical panels.Components, wiring, and fasteners were in place. Although not deemed to be an adverseseismic condition, one CR was entered into the CAP for broken cable ties found inside E-CP-ARS.18 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)5.3 Area Walk-BysArea Walk-Bys for Columbia Generating Station were performed in accordance withSection 4 of the EPRI Guidance.

The Area Walk-By Checklists for the initial group areincluded in Attachment 10 and the Area Walk-By Checklists for the deferred group areincluded in Attachment 1OA.The Area Walk-By consisted of 61 unique areas that were walked down, resulting in theidentification of 79 potentially adverse seismic conditions as listed in Attachment

13. Notethat several of the issues (within the total of 79 issues) are similar in nature. Thefollowing list summarizes the general potentially adverse seismic conditions found duringthe Area Walk-Bys:

• Surface mounted plates (for pipe supports, tubing, etc.) or supports were missingconcrete anchors (for example, for a surface mounted plate with four bolt holes,only three concrete anchors were installed),

" Missing bolts between support angles and electrical cable trays," Unusual anchorage conditions, such as gaps between support angles withconcrete anchors and the base frame, gaps between bolt heads and platesurfaces, as well as bolts installed at minor angles (resulting in gaps under the boltheads or nuts) and bolts that were not fully engaged," Light fixture interferences, such as lighting fixture support struts and light fixtureexterior casing that were found resting on cable trays, conduit, and firewater piping, as well as spatial concerns with adjacent equipment in a seismic event," Light fixtures with bent hanger rods and disengaged nuts on rod connections,

" Storage permit questions with items in the plant approved storage boundaries.

Inthis case we wanted verification the items (i.e. storage barrels, tool chests) withinthe boundaries were in fact approved based on the storage permit identification numbers.

In some cases, items were stored outside of permit boundaries andcould have spatial interactions with nearby equipment in a seismic event," Overhead ceiling tiles in the Control Room were present during visual inspection from floor level; the supporting structure and details of the supporting structure ofthe ceiling tiles were not visible," Partially engaged nuts (negative bolt shaft projection resulting in several exposedthreads of nuts),* Possible missing supports on instrument tubing routed from equipment, 19 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)" Maintenance/operations items such as a stanchion, scaffolding components, toolcarts (outside of storage areas), and oil dipsticks that can potentially damageequipment during a seismic event," Questionable valve operator orientations.

These valve operators appeared to becantilevered significantly and needed verification that they were within design,* Spalled or cracked concrete and cracked grout (for instance on a grout pad)adjacent to concrete anchors," Lights above equipment that do not have fall restraints or safety chains," Missing conduit covers, and" Bent instrument tubingDuring the Area Walk-Bys, non-seismic related issues were identified, but were eithersafety hazards or related to housekeeping.

For instance, oil leaks on a pump in the areawere noted on the Area Walk-By Checklists (or Seismic Walkdown Checklists if the non-seismic issue related directly to the specific seismic class equipment).

These issues wereentered into the CAP by CRs.Some of the non-seismic related issues found were as follows:* Extraneous duct tape left on various items, such as overhead piping," Equipment tags found on the floor," Light support was broken and was held via cable wire,* Loose or missing conduit covers," Oil leaks,* What appeared to be oil or water ponding (on top of a tank corner that is in aconfined space)," Trash in undesignated

location,

" Unrestrained ladders and ladders left on the floor, and* Loose guardrail 5.4 Inaccessible and Deferred ItemsDuring SWEL development, in order to align with Columbia Generating Station's divisional work weeks for major equipment, it was determined that several equipment 20 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)items should be deferred.

The reasons for the deferrals include radiation exposureconcerns, location (i.e. inside Primary Containment),

as well as waiting for equipment tobe de-energized (i.e. circuit breaker SW-CB-P1A).

The following deferred items (listed below) were not originally included in the SWEL butwere added later based upon discussions with industry peers and additional clarification in the FAQs.* E-CP-H13/P833

[Control Room Safety System Panel (Board G2)]," E-CP-H13/P841

[Control Room Panel (Board G1)]," E-IR-69 [Reactor Building Instrument Rack],* E-IR-71 [Reactor Building Instrument Rack],* FPC-42-7BB9B

[NEMA Size 3 Motor Starter for FPC Pump 1A], and" FPC-42-8BB2D

[NEMA Size 3 Motor Starter for FPC Pump 1 B]* LD-TE-29A

[Main Steam Line Tunnel Inlet Vent Temperature Element]" LD-TE-31 C [Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient Temperature Element]Internal inspections of the electrical items originally on the combined SWEL (cabinets, panels, etc.) were also deferred.

The requirement for internal inspection was clarified in aFAQ (Attachment 12). This clarification came after most of the initial walkdown fieldactivities were completed.

Due to the timing of receipt of the clarification and the potential need for some of the electrical panels to be de-energized to allow the walkdown, thedecision was made to defer these inspections.

The walkdowns for these deferred items were performed between the time the initialreport was submitted in November 2012 and the end of refueling outage R21 in June2013 and are detailed in Attachment

11. The Seismic Walkdown Checklists for thedeferred items are included in Attachment 10A.21 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)6.0 Licensing Basis Evaluation SummaryThe potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during the Seismic Walkdowns andArea Walk-By activities are listed in Attachment

13. Attachment 13 has each issue tied tospecific combined SWEL items and Walk-By Areas. Also listed in the same attachment are the licensing basis evaluations, and any references to CR's written and their status.The total number of potentially adverse seismic conditions identified was 119 (40 SeismicWalkdown issues and 79 Area Walk-By issues).

There were a total of 85 licensing basisevaluations performed (i.e. existing calculation and drawing confirmations) while a total of36 CRs were generated to address issues. The total number of licensing basisevaluations and CRs do not equal the total number of adverse seismic conditions, due tothe fact that some issues have both licensing basis evaluations and CRs, refer toAttachment 13 for specific details.

Attachment 13 is organized by Walk-By Area, whichcorresponds to the header information on each Area Walk-By Checklist.

Listed for eachWalk-By Area is the equipment item (from the combined SWEL) within the area, anyissues found (this would be documented on the Seismic Walkdown Checklist for thespecific equipment),

and "Walk-by Items" found during the Area Walk-By as documented on the associated Area Walk-By Checklist.

No potentially adverse seismic issues or housekeeping issues were identified resulting inthe equipment or the plant being outside of the license basis. Although some of the CRsstill need to be closed, initial evaluations were performed to ensure proper plantoperability and safety. These evaluations are documented in the individual CRs identified in Attachment 13.6.1 Plant Modifications There are no planned or newly installed changes to the plant as a result of implementing the EPRI Guidance.

The changes that have occurred or will occur (via CRs) will bringalignment between plant configuration and plant documentation.

(e.g. installing a missingtube clamp or providing justification within design calculations and drawings).

22 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)7.0 IPEEE Vulnerabilities The recommended improvements resulting from the Individual Plant Examination forExternal Events (IPEEE) were identified in Section 7.3 of the Washington Nuclear Plant 2(WNP-2) IPEEE report (Reference 9.6). Washington Nuclear Plant 2 was the originalname of Columbia Generating Station.

The status of each proposed improvement wasprovided to the NRC under letter G02-01-010 (Reference 9.2). This letter provided thestatus of seven improvements, five of which are seismic related.

Of these five,Improvement 3 installed straps on the fire protection diesel engine batteries.

None of theother four improvements resulted in changes to the plant or procedures.

Additionally, oneaction was completed at the time of the IPEEE submittal.

This action installed missinganchorage nuts or washers in two air handling units in the Division 1 Diesel Generator Room to restore the units to the design anchorage configuration.

The NRC staffevaluation report of Columbia Generating Station's IPEEE submittal concluded thatEnergy Northwest's IPEEE process was capable of identifying the most likely severeaccidents and severe accident vulnerabilities from external events, and the ColumbiaGenerating Station IPEEE met the intent of Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 88-20 and theresolution of specific safety issues discussed in the staff evaluation report(Reference 9.8).The fire protection diesel engine batteries (FP-BO-1 10A, FP-B0-1 10B, FP-B0-1A and FP-B0-1B) identified in Letter G02-01-010 (Reference 9.2) are included in SWEL 1. Thesubsequent Seismic Walkdown found the fire protection diesel engine batteries to beseismically acceptable.

The modifications installed based upon guidance from the IPEEEare still in place.23 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)8.0 Peer Review Team ReportI The initial Peer Review Team Report is included as Attachment

14. An updated PeerReview Team Report, for the deferred SWEL items, is included as Attachment 14A.24 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)9.0 References 9.1 Columbia Generating Station.

(2011). Final Safety Analysis Report, Ammendment

61. Richland, WA: Energy Northwest.

9.2 DW Coleman, Energy Northwest (2001, January 24). Letter G02-01 -010: InitialSubmittal of Individual Plant Examination for External Events.9.3 Electric Power Research Institute.

(2012). Seismic Walkdown

Guidance, ForResolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic.Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute.

9.4 Energy Northwest.

(1998, November).

Technical Memorandum, TM-2143,"Geology, Seismology, and Geotechnical Engineering Report."9.5 EQE International.

(1994). Development of Seismic Fragilities for WNP-2 IPEEE.Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program.

EQEInternational.

9.6 JV Parrish, Energy Northwest (1995, June 26). Letter G02-95-119:

Initial Submittal of Individual Plant Examination for External Events.9.7 Energy Northwest.

(1993). CIVES-1:

Seismic/Dynamic Analysis of Structural Components.

9.8 Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

(2001). Letter G12-01-022:

Review of ColumbiaGenerating Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events Submittal (TACNo. M83695).

Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

9.9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

(2012). Request For Information Pursuant ToTitle 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, And 9.3, Of The Near-Term Task Force Review Of Insights From TheFukushima Dai-lchi Accident.

Washington, D.C.: NRC.9.10 Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

(1988) Generic Letter 88-20, "Individual PlantExamination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities

-1 OCFR 50.54(f),"

November 23,1988.25 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)10.0 Attachments 1 ) Combined SWEL2) SWEL 13) SWEL 24) Base List 15) Base List 26) Summary of Equipment Systems7) Summary of Equipment Classes8) Summary of Walk-by Areas9) FAQ -Frequently Asked Questions on Seismic Walkdown Guidance10) Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By Checklists 1 OA) Deferred Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by Checklists

11) Deferred SWEL Items12) FAQ -Electrical Panel Inspection

13) Licensing Basis Evaluations

14) Peer Review Team Report14A) Peer Review Team Report Update26 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 1-Combined SWELThis attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a finalversion has been included in this submittal.

Enclosre 2 -Public VersionAttachment I -Combined SWELDeveloped By My r aidDe"60me I seehionDeveloped By GregJ Jake eM/Poswoffliselectin Dale7/ Z-/Date-/29 3-.--~ T YEquipmenPart NumberLEPNIEquipment ClassiGIP ClassiMsjorChanoeNIgnRiskItemFunction I Walk-13v Area Description I An-chc-ragle IEwupmew DescdpftAncVorieVerifedWaikdowfCompletion DateC-CH-CR-1 A 1 11 NCCH-CR-1B 1 1 ___ NL¸~IA-CP-120NNCIA II CHILLED WATER CHILLER PKG (0lVI 1J.23,4,5 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM (DIV 2) 1,2.3,4.5 0L PANEL 2OL PANEL 22 RO'I-ILE TK-AB DISCHYYA/14/"2012

[;[A-CP-2 2 0 IJ A N IT IICIA-SRPV-Sfl aNN.5" 2-WAY SOL VLV ON N,CIA-SPV-8A a I N N .5" 2-WAY SOL VLV ON N2 BOTTLE TK-8A DISCH 2ON-V-106 7 N N V Wer lNetLow Tem Isolation 2CN-V-07 7 N N Vpizer Inlet Low Temp Isolation 2CRD-HCU-2635 0 N Y CRD HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNIT ASSY 1ORD-HCU-3027 0 N Y CRD HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNIT ASSY 1CSP-V-5 7 N N Sumession Pool Vacuum ReieflInbd AO) 5DCW-HX-1B1 21 N N DG-ENG-1 B1 COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 1.2.3.4.5 DCW-HX-1B2 21 N N DG-ENG-1B2 COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER 1,3.4.5DEA.FN-21 9 N N DG2 ROOM STANDBY EXHAUST FAN 1.2,3.4,5 DEA-FN-31 9 N N HPCS ROOM STANDBY EXHAUST FAN 3DG-ENG-1A1 17 N Y UNIT1 DIESELGENENG I (NORTH) 1.2,3.4.5 DG-ENG-1A2 17 N Y UNIT I DIESEL GEN ENG 2 (SOUTH) 1.2.3.4,5 DG-ENG-1B1 17 N Y UNIT 2 DIESEL GEN ENG 1 (NORTH) 1.2,3.4.5 DG.ENG-1B2 17 N Y UNIT 2 DIESEL GEN ENG 2 (SOUTH) 1,2.3.4.5 DG-ENG-1C 17 N Y DIESEL ENGINE FOR HPCS SYSTEM 3DMA-AH-21 10 1 N N DG2 ROOM STANDBY AIR HANOLING UNIT 1.2,3,4.5 DMA-AH-22 10 N N 0G2 ROOM NORMAL OPERATING AIR HANDLING UNIT 1.2,3.4,5 DMA-AH-31 10 N N HPCS ROOM STANDBY AIR HANDUNG UNIT 3DMA-AH-32 10 N N HPCS ROOM NORMAL OPERATING AIR HANDLING UNIT 3DO-P-1A 6 N Y DO-TK-1A FUEL TRANSFER PUMP (25 GPM) 1,2,3,4,5 DO-P-1B a0 N Y DO-TK-1B FUEL TRANSFER PUMP (25 GPM) 12,23,4,5 DO-P-2 6 N Y HPCS DO-TK-2 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP (25 GPM) 3DO-TK-3A 21 N Y DAY TANK FOR OG-ENG-1Al

& 1A2 (3,000 GAL) 1,2,3,4,5 DO-TK-3B 21 N Y DAY TANK FOR DG-ENG-I B1 & 1B2 (3,000 GAL) 1,2,3,4,5 DO-TK-3C 21 N Y DAY TANK FOR HPCS DG-ENG-IC (3,000 GAL) 3DSA-C-1A1 12 N Y MOTOR-DRIVEN AIR COMPRESSOR FOR DG-ENG-1A1

& 1A2 1,2.3.4,5 DSA-TK-3A 21 N Y DG-ENG-AI

& 1 A2 AIR RECEIVER 132 CF') 1,2,3,4,5 DSA.TK-4A 21 N Y DG-ENG-1A1

& 1A2 AIR RECEIVER (32 CFT 1,2,3.4,5 DSA-TK-7A 21 N Y DG-ENG-1A1

& IA2 AIR RECEIVER (32 CFT) 1,2,3,5DSA-TK-8A 21 N Y DG-ENG-IA1

& 1A2 AIR RECEIVER (32 CFT) 12.3.4,5E-B1-1 Is N Y 125V BATTERY 01_-1 12.3.4,5E-B1-2 1 N Y 2BTR1-2 1.2,345E-B2-1 15 N N 2 V BATTERY 82-1 123.4,5E.C1-1A 16 Y Y 125VDC VITAL BATr CHARGER A -123.4,5Y Y 8/14/2012 Y Y 7/31/2012 Y Y 7/31/2012 N N 7/31/2012 N N 7/31/2012 N N 8/21/2012 N N 5/21/2012 N N 7/31/2012 N N 7/31/2012 N N 9/5=2012Y Y 9/11/2012 Y Y 9/11/2012 Y Y 9/11/2012 Y N 9/4/2012Y N 9r25/2012 Y Y 9/25/2012 Y Y 9/11/2012 Y Y 9/11/2012 Y Y 9/4/2012Y Y 9/11/2012 Y Y 9/11/2012 Y Y 9/4/2012Y Y 9/4/2012Y Y 8/28/2012 Y Y 9)11/2012 Y Y 9/4/2012YYY"V-YYYYYYYYYYYYYNNNNNYYNYN8128/2012 9/11/2012 9/4/20128r820 128/28/2012 8128/2012 8/28/2012 8/28/2012 8/1/20129/11/2012 8/1/20127/31/2012 7/3112012 E-C2-116NN250V BATTERY CHARGER 11 3 _12345I of 4 Enclosre 2 -Public VersionAttachment 1 -Combined SWELEquipment Equipment High I S WalkdPart Number Class Majow Risk Safety HaslAnchorage Completion (EPN) (GIP Class) IChagei Item Equipment Description FunctionWalk-ByArea Descrdptin Anchorage Verified Date.-Ur-pqnaF'.I'P.L I U-MNI', I I:cMIJ: I

• rI-U I PUW ANL.YN9'11,iZ 12'.-CP-DG/CP3 20 N N HPCS ENGINE & GEN 480V POWER PANEL 3:-CP-DG/EP3 20 N N HPCS DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE CONTROL PNL 3E-CP-H13/P611 20 N N RPS TRIP SYS B CONTROL PANEL 1.4*.-CP-H13/P618 20 N N DIV 2 RHR CONTROL PANEL 3.4.5E-CP-H13/P626 20 N N FPC4CP=-CP-Hl3/P627 20 N N FPC CP 2 4E-CP-Hi 3/P833 20 N N CTL ROOM SAFETY SYS PANEL (BOARD G2Y .4'-CP-H13/P841 20 N N CONTROL ROOM PANEL (BOARD GI) 4O-DP-SII1F 14 N Y IDIV I CRITICAL SWGR DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1,2.3A4,5 E-DP-Sl/HPCS 14 Y N 1 25VDC HPCS SYS DISTRIBUTION PANEL 3E-IN-2A 16 Y N DIV 2 CRITmCAL 120 VAC POWER SUPPLY INVERTER A 2.3,4.5-IN-28 16 Y N DIV 2 CRITICAL 120 VAC POWER SUPPLY INVERTER B 2,3,4,5;-IR-68 18 N N RX BLDG INSTR RACK 5.-IR-69 18 N N RX BLDG INSTR-RACK 4E-IR-P001 18 N N LPCS INSTRUMENT RACK 3'TR-POI 18 N N SLC INSTRUMENT RACK 1E-IR-POI7 18 N N RCIC'INSTRUMENT RACK 1,2.3E-MC-4A 1 N N HPCS MOLTOR CONTROL CENTER 4A 3-MC-7A _ 1 N N MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 7A 1.3,4E-MC-8A 1 N N MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 8A 1.3,4.MC-8F I N N MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 8F 1.2,3,4.5 E-PP-MAE 2 N N 120240V 200A RX BLDG INSTR & CNTL POWER PNNLE-TR-7171 4 N Y 4160-480V STA SER TRANSFORMER 1,3,4.5ETR7/73 4 N N 4160-48DV STA SER TRANSFORMER 1,3.4.5TR-ISOL/USA 4 N N ISOLATION TRANSFORMER FOR E-PP-US/A N/AFP-BO-1IOA 15 Y N FP-P-110 BATTERY A 3FP-BO-110B 15 Y N FP-P-110 BATTERY B 3FP-B0-1IA 15 Y N FP-P-1 BATTERY A 3FP-B0-1B 15 Y N FP-P-1 BATTERY B 3PC..42-7BBgB I N N NEMA SIZE 3 MOTOR STARTER FOR FPC-P-IA 4FPC-42-8BB2D I N N FPC-P-1B 4FPC-FCV-1 0 N N Fuel Pool F/D By ' ' 4FPC-HX-1A 21 N N FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER 1A 4FPC-HX-1 B 21 N N FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER 1B 4FPC-P-1A 5 Y N FUEL POOL COOLING CIRCULATION PUMP IA (575 GPM) 4FPC-P-1B 5 Y N FUEL POOL COOLING CIRCULATION PUMP 1B (575 GPM) 4:PC-V-149 8 N N Supp Pool Cleanp Return Outboard Isol (MO) 5FPC-V-153 8 N _N. Supp Pool Cleanup Suction Inbd Isol (MO) 5FPC-V-154

8. N N SuPo Cleanup Suction Outbd Isol (MO) 5FPC.V-156 8 N N Suppool Cleanup Return Inbd Isol (MO) 5FPC-V-172 8 N N FPC-HX-1A

& 1B DISCH TO FILTER-DEMIN (MO) ISOL VALVE 4FPC-V-173 8 N N FILTER-DEMIN INLET MO) ISOL VALVE 4FPC-V-175 8 N N FILTER-DEMIN BYPASS (MO) VALVE 4FPC-V-181A 8 Y N lCirculation Pump A Suction (MO) 4FPC-V-1816 8 Y N Circulation Pump B Suction (MO) 4FPC-V-184 8 N N FILTER-DEMIN OUTLET (MO) ISOL VALVE 4iPCS-Bi -DG3 15 Y N 1 25V DIV 3 58 CELL STATION BATTERY 3iPCS-P-i 6 N N MAIN HPCS PUMP 3Y N 9/4/2012Y N 9W4/2012Y N 8/1412012 Y N 8/14/2012 Y N 8/1412012 Y N 8/14/2012 Y N 12/4/2012 Y N 1214/2012 Y Y 9/2512012 Y N 914/2012Y Y 8/15/2012 Y Y 8/15/2012 Y N 8/7/2012Y N 12/4/2012 Y Y 8/28/2012 Y Y 8/21/2012 Y Y 9/18/2012 Y N 9/4/2012Y N 9/25r2012 Y N 8/15/2012 Y N 8/14/2012 Y N 8/15/2012 Y N 9W25/2012 Y N 9/25/2012 Y N 8/1/2012Y Y 8/2112012 Y Y 8/21/2012 Y Y 8/21/2012 Y Y 8/21/2012 Y N 11/29/2012 Y N 11/26/2012 N N 8/7/2012Y Y 808/2012Y Y 8/0/2012Y Y 818/2012Y Y 8/8/2012N N 8/7/2012N N 8/7/2012N N 8/712012N N 81712012N N 8/7/2012N N 8/7/2012N N 8/7/2012N N 8/8/2012N N 808/2012N N 8/712012Y N 914/2012Y Y 915/20122of4 Enclosre 2 -Public VersionAttachment I -Combined SWELEquipment Equipment I M Highi j Wamlcdown Put Number Class M Risk Safety Has Anchorage CompletioM

([EP.) (GIP Class) Change itemr Euipment Description Function Walk-By Area Description Anchorage Verified noteiPCS.r-26NNHPI'LS UIESEL SER-VICE WA IEH PUMPRHPCS-P-3 5 N N HPCS SYSTEM WATER LEG PUMP 3 8 N N RPV INJECTION MOV 3.D-TE-29A 19 N N MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL INLET VEN 5D-TE-31C 19 N N MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL AMBIENT TEMP 5,PCS-P-2 5 N N LPCS WATER LEG PUMP 3,4.5LPCS-V-5 8 N N RPV Injection 3AS-V-22B 8 N Y MS LINE B INBOARD ISOL SOV 3.5AS-V-22C 8 N Y MS LINE C INBOARD ISOL SOV 3.5AS-V.37C 0 N N 101 CHECK MS-RV-2D DISCHARGE 5AS-V-37K 0 N N 1i- CHECK MS-RV-ID DISCH 5&S-V-38C 0 N N 10" CHECK VAC BKR FOR MS-RV-2D 5MS-V-38K 0 N N 10' CHECK VAC BKR FOR MS-RV-1D 5PRA.FN-1B 9 N N RECIRCULATION FAN FOR PRA-FC-IB 12g3.4,5RCIC-HX-l 21 N Y RCIC BAROMETRIC CONDENSE 1,2.3RCIC-HX-2 21 N Y RCIC LUBE OIL COOLER HT EXCH 1,2,3RCIC-P-1 5 N Y RCIC PUMP 1.2.3RCIC-P-2 5 N Y RCIC VACUUM PUMP 12,3.CIC-PS-9A 0 N Y RCIC-DT-1 EXH PRESS HIGH TRIP SWITCH 1 23RCIC-PS-9B 0 N Y RCIC-DT-1 EXH PRESS HIGH TRIP SWITCH 123RCIC-SC-C002 20 N Y RCIC TURBINE SPEED CONTROLLER 1,2,3IFT-CP-COM1 20 N N FIBER/NETWORK ENCLOSURE 3RHR-P-2A 6 N Y RHR PUMP LOOP A HX SUPPLY 3.415RHR-P-3 5 N N RHR WATER LEG PUMP 3.4,5RHR-V-16B 8 N N Lower B fw a. 5RHR-V-17B 8 N NN Lower Drywell Spa 5IHR-V-27A 8 N Y ession Pool Spray 5RHR-V-42B 8 N N LPCI Isolation 3RRA-FC-4 10 N N HPCS PMP RM FAN COOLER ASSY 3SGT-FN-1A1 9 N N EXHAUST FAN SGT-FU-IA 5SGT-FU-1A 10 N N STANDBY GAS FILTER UNIT I 5SGT-V-1A 88 N N INLET FROM CONTAINMENT 5SGT-V-3A2 8 N N 18'MO BFLY SGT-FN-1A1 INLET 5XLC-P-1A 5 N N _SLC_ PUMP 1.3SLC-TK-1 21 N N SLC'STORAGE TANK 1.3ýLC-V-1A 8 N N SLC Storage Tank Outlet 1,3SW-CB-P1A 3 Y N 4160V CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR SW-M-P./1A 1.214,5SW-P-1B 6 Y Y LOOP B MAIN SSW PUMP 1 A3,4,5SW-V-165A 0 N N B Spray Header Bypass ..23,4t5SW-V-165B 0 N N A Header Bypass ...2.34.5SW-V-170A 0 N N B Spray Header Isolaton 1.2.3W455W-V-170B 0 N N A Spray Header Isolation 11.2,3,4,5 SW-V-29 8 N Y HPCS-P-2 DISCHARGE VALVE (MO) 3YYNYYYNNNNNNNYYYYYYYYYYYNNNNYYYNNYYNYYNNNNNYNVYNNNYNNNNNNNNNYYNNNNNYYNNNNYYYNNYYNNNNNNNNYNNNNN9//20129/5/2012914/201212/1112012 5/23/2013 8/2912012 82w/20126/512013615/20136/5/20136/5/20136/5120136/5/r2013 9/6/2013911912012 9/1912012 911912012 9119/2012 9/1912012 9119/2012 9/19/2012 9/1512012 9/5,201 19/12/201'd 91281201'd 7/25/201'.

9/12/201'g 9251201.7/25=2014 7125/2012 7/251201' 7/25=201, 7/25/201d 97/25/2012 7/251201' 12/11/201--

9/502011, 9/5120129/5120128/29/2014 9/6/2014$/442DI'

,8/44/8QMQ SW-V-2A8NYSW-P-1A DISCHARGE VALVE12.3.4,5hW-V-2B8NYSw-P.* VAVILE1_234.5__Go soi-448/ 1____i9p-sw2 _ 4 1N k'Xr-MR.re

MR- 42 1 4vDA3mGPN'M4,,4b5iM4dttt fl-, fll'C.OI l n DANIcl+/-44_____ N .l26VL.*

" 4rl 43o114 Enclosre 2 -Public VersionAttachment 1 -Combined SWELEquipment I Equipment I PartNumber IClass I Major IRiskI(EPN) I (GIP Class) Change ItRem _Equipment Description 6IS 1N I 1I .INSTR RACKI NI-V-49 N I lN-lRTotal = 1341I I ~Walkdown Ssafety Has Anchorage Completion FucioWalk-By Area Desortotion Anchorage Verified Date4 N NIAIN N WIASafety Functions

1. Reactor reactivity control2. Reactor coolant pressure control3. Reactor coolant inventory control4. Decay heat removal5, Containment functionEquipment Classes0 -Other1 -Motor Control Centers and Wall Mounted Contactors 2 -Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels3 -Medium Voltage Switchgear, Metal-Clad Switchgear 4 -Transformers 5 -Horizontal Pumps6 -Vertical Pumps7 -Pneumatic-Operated Valves (Hydraulic) 8 -Motor Operated Valves and Solenoid Operated Valves9- Fans10 -Air Handlers11 -Chilers12 -Air Compressors 13 -Motor Generators 14 -Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Swvtches15 -Battery Racks16 -Battery Chargers and Inverlers 17 -Engine Generators 18 -instruments Racks19 -Temperature Sensors20 -Instrumentation and Control Panels21 -Tanks and Heat Exchangers 4o14 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 2-SWEL 1This attachment was not modified from the initial revision of this report and therefore isnot included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 3-SWEL 2This attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a finalversion has been included in this submittal.

Enclosre 2 -Public VersionAttachment 3 -SWEL 2Equipment Equipment Part Number Class Major(EPN) (GIP Class) Change Equipment Description Walk-By Area Description E-CP-H13/P626 20 N FPC CP 1E-CP-H13/P627 20 N FPC CP 2E-CP-H13/P833 20 N CTL ROOM SAFETY SYS PANEL (BOARD G2)E-CP-H13/P841 20 N CONTROL ROOM PANEL (BOARD G1)E-IR-69 18 N RX BLDG INSTR RACKFPC-42-7BB9B 1 N NEMA SIZE 3 MOTOR STARTER FOR FPC-P-1AFPC-42-8BB2D 1 N FPC-P-1 BFPC-FCV-1 0 N Fuel Pool F/D BypassFPC-HX-1A 21 N FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER 1AFPC-HX-1 B 21 N FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER 1 BFPC-P-1A 5 Y FUEL POOL COOLING CIRCULATION PUMP 1A (575 GPM)FPC-P-1 B 5 Y FUEL POOL COOLING CIRCULATION PUMP 1 B (575 GPM)FPC-V-172 8 N FPC-HX-1 A & 1 B DISCH TO FILTER-DEMIN (MO) ISOL VALVEFPC-V-173 8 N FILTER-DEMIN INLET (MO) ISOL VALVEFPC-V-175 8 N FILTER-DEMIN BYPASS (MO) VALVEFPC-V-181A 8 Y Circulation Pump A Suction (MO)FPC-V-1 81 B 8 Y Circulation Pump B Suction (MO)FPC-V-184 8 N FILTER-DEMIN OUTLET (MO) ISOL VALVEE-R-74 8 N IRX BLDG INSTR RACKTotal = 18I1 of 1 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 4-Base List 1This attachment has been withheld Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 5-Base List 2This attachment has withheld Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 6-Summary of Equipment SystemsThis attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a finalversion has been included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 6 -Summary of Equipment SystemsSystem System Description SWEL 1 SWEL 2 Combined SWELCCH CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER 2 0 2CIA CONTAINMENT INSTRUMENT AIR 4 0 4CN CONTAINMENT NITROGEN 2 0 2CRD CONTROL ROD DRIVE 2 0 2CSP CONTAINMENT SUPPLY PURGE 1 0 1DCW DIESEL COOLING WATER 2 0 2DEA DIESEL (BUILDING)

EXHAUST AIR 2 0 2DG DIESEL GENERATOR 5 0 5DMA DIESEL (BUILDING)

MIXED AIR 4 0 4DO DIESEL OIL 6 0 6DSA DIESEL (ENGINE)

STARTING AIR 5 0 5E ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 26 5 31FP FIRE PROTECTION 4 0 4FPC FUEL POOL COOLING 4 13 17HPCS HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY 5 0 5LD LEAK DETECTION 2 0 2LPCS LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY 2 0 2MS MAIN STEAM (NUCLEAR) 6 0 6PRA PUMP HOUSE RETURN AIR 1 0 1RCIC REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING 7 0 7RFT REACTOR FEEDWATER TURBINE 1 0 1RHR RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL 6 0 6RRA REACTOR (BUILDING)

RETURN AIR 1 0 1SGT STANDBY GAS TREATMENT 4 0 4SLC STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL 3 0 3SW STANDBY SERVICE WATER 9 0 91 Total 116 18 1341 of 1 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 7-Summary of Equipment ClassesThis attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a finalversion has been included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 7 -Summary of Equipment ClassesGIP Class Class Title SWEL 1 SWEL 2 Combined SWEL0 Other 12 1 131 Motor Control Centers and Wall Mounted Contactors 4 2 62 Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels 1 0 13 Medium Voltage Switchgear, Metal-Clad Switchgear 1 0 14 Transformers 3 0 35 Horizontal Pumps 6 2 86 Vertical Pumps 7 0 77 Pneumatic-Operated Valves (Hydraulic) 3 0 38 Motor Operated Valves and Solenoid Operated Valves 20 6 269 Fans 4 0 410 Air Handlers 6 0 611 Chillers 2 0 212 Air Compressors 1 0 113 Motor Generators 0 0 014 Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches 2 0 215 Battery Racks 8 0 816 Battery Chargers and Inverters 4 0 417 Engine Generators 5 0 518 Instruments Racks 4 1 519 Temperature Sensors 2 0 220 Instrumentation and Control Panels 9 4 1321 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 12 2 14Total 116 18 134II1 of 1 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 8-Summary of Walk-By AreasThis attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a finalversion has been included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 8 -Summary of Walk-By AreasWalk-By Area Description Building Elevation (Column Lines) SWEL 1 SWEL 2 Combined SWELService Water Pump House A 441 3 0 3Service Water Pump House B 441 3 0 3Containment (Drywell) 506 6 0 6Diesel Generator Building 441 4 0 4Diesel Generator Building 441 2 0 2Diesel Generator Building 441 1 0 1Diesel Generator Building 441 3 0 3Diesel Generator Building 441 4 0 4Diesel Generator Building 441 2 0 2Diesel Generator Building 441 1 01 1Diesel Generator Building 441 5 0 5Diesel Generator Building 441 1 0 1Diesel Generator Building 441 1 0 1Diesel Generator Building 441 1 0 1Diesel Generator Building 441 1 0 1Diesel Generator Building 455 3 0 3Water Treatment Building 438 2 0 2Outdoor Inside Protected Area 441 2 0 2Circulating Water Pumphouse 448 2 0 2Reactor Building 422 1 0 1Reactor Building 422 2 0 2Reactor Building 422 4 0 4Reactor Building 422 1 0 1Reactor Building 422 1 0 1Reactor Building 422 2 0 2Reactor Building 441 3 0 3Reactor Building 441 4 0 4Reactor Building 444 1 0 1Reactor Building 471 21 0 2Reactor Building 471 2 3 5Reactor Building 471 2 0 2Reactor Building 501 2 0 2Reactor Building 522 1 0 1Reactor Building 522 1 0 1Reactor Building 522 2 0 2Reactor Building 522 1 0 1Reactor Building 522 0 1 1Reactor Building 522 1 0 1Reactor Building 548 1 2 3Reactor Building 548 0 6 6Reactor Building 548 3 0 3Reactor Building 548 1 0 1Reactor Building 572 4 0 4Reactor Building 572 }0 1 1Reactor Building 572 }0 1 1Steam Tunnel 501 1 0 1Service Water Spray Pond A 435 2 0 2Service Water Spray Pond B 435 2 0 2Radwaste Building 467 5 0 5Radwaste Building 467 1 0 1Radwaste Building 467 1 0 1Radwaste Building 467 2 0 2Radwaste Building 467 2 0 2Radwaste Building 467 1 0 1Radwaste Building 467 3 0 3Radwaste Building 467 0 0 0Radwaste Building 501 2 4 6Radwaste Building 501 1 0 1Radwaste Building 501 1 0 1Radwaste Building 525 2 0 2Radwaste Building 525 1 0 1Totals 61 116 18 134** This Area Walk-By was completed for an item that was later removed from the SWEL.1 of 1 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 9-FAQ-Frequently Asked Questions on Seismic Walkdown GuidanceThis attachment was not modified from the initial revision of this report and therefore isnot included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 10-Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By Checklists This attachment has been withheld.

Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 1OA-Deferred Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-By Checklists This attachment has been withheld Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 11-Deferred SWEL ItemsThis attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a finalversion has been included in this submittal.

This attachment has been edited to withholdsensitive information Enclose 2 -Public VersionAttachment 11 -Deferred SWEL ItemsInternalEQUIP CLASS Safety Walk-By Area Requires Internal Walkdown Inspection EPN (GIP Class) EQUIPMENTDESCRIPTION Function Description Inspection Completed Completed CIA-CP-1 20 CIA N2 BOTTLES CONTROL PANEL 2 YES 7/31/2012 12/11/2012 CIA-CP-2 20 CIA N2 BOTTLES CONTROL PANEL 2 YES 7/31/2012 12/4/2012 E-C1-1A 16 125VDC VITAL BATT CHARGER A 1,2,3,4,5 YES 7/31/2012 5/22/2013 E-C2-1 16 250V BATTERY CHARGER 1 1,2,3,4,5 YES 7/31/2012 5/22/2013 E-CP-ARS 20 ALTERNATE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL 2,3,4,5 YES 9/18/2012 5/21/2013 E-CP-DG/CP3 20 HPCS ENGINE & GEN 480V POWER PANEL 3 YES 9/4/2012 5/31/2013 E-CP-DG/EP3 20 HPCS DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE CONTROL PNL 3 YES 9/4/2012 5/31/2013 E-CP-H13/P833 20 CTL ROOM SAFETY SYS PANEL (BOARD G2) 4 YES 12/4/2012 12/4/2012 E-CP-H13/P841 20 CONTROL ROOM PANEL (BOARD G1) 4 YES 12/4/2012 12/4/2012 E-DP-S1/1F 14 DIV 1 CRITICAL SWGR DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1,2,3,4,5 YES 9/25/2012 5/22/2013 E-DP-S1/HPCS 14 125VDC HPCS SYS DISTRIBUTION PANEL 3 YES 9/4/2012 5/31/2013 E-IN-2A 16 DIV 2 CRITICAL 120 VAC POWER SUPPLY INVERTER A 1,2,3,4,5 YES 8/15/2012 6/3/2013E-IN-2B 16 DIV 2 CRITICAL 120 VAC POWER SUPPLY INVERTER E 1,2,3,4,5 YES 8/15/2012 6/3/2013E-IR-68 18 RX BLDG INSTR RACK 4 YES 8/7/2012 12/4/2012 E-IR-69 18 RX BLDG INSTR RACK 4 YES 12/4/2012 12/4/2012 E-IR-PO01 18 LPCS INSTRUMENT RACK 3 YES 8/28/2012 12/11/2012 E-IR-PO11 18 SLC INSTRUMENT RACK 1 YES 8/21/2012 12/11/2012 E-IR-P017 18 RCIC INSTRUMENT RACK 1,2,3 YES 9/18/2012 12/11/2012 E-MC-4A 1 HPCS MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 4A 3 YES 9/4/2012 5/31/2013 E-MC-7A 1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 7A 1,2,3,4,5 YES 9/25/2012 5/22/2013 E-MC-8A 1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 8A 1,2,3,4,5 YES 8/15/2012 6/3/2013E-MC-8F 1 MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 8F 1,2,3,4,5 YES 8/14/2012 6/3/2013E-PP-8AE 2 120/240V 200A RX BLDG INSTR & CNTL POWER PNL 5 YES 8/15/2012 6/3/2013FPC-42-7BB9B 1 NEMA SIZE 3 MOTOR STARTER FOR FPC-P-1 A 4 YES 11/29/2012 11/29/2012 FPC-42-8BB2D 1 NEMA SIZE 3 MOTOR STARTER FOR FPC-P-1 B 4 YES 11/26/2012 11/26/2012 LD-TE-29A 19 MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL INLET VENT TEMP 5 NO 12/11/2012 N/ALD-TE-31C 19 MAIN STEAM LINE TUNNEL AMBIENT TEMP 5 NO 5/23/2013 N/AMS-V-22B 8 MS LINE "B" INBOARD ISOL SOV 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/AMS-V-22C 8 MS LINE "C" INBOARD ISOL SOV 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/AMS-V-37C 0 10" CHECK MS-RV-2D DISCHARGE 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/AMS-V-37K 0 10" CHECK MS-RV-1D DISCH 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/AMS-V-38C 0 10" CHECK VAC BKR FOR MS-RV-2D 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/AMS-V-38K 0 10" CHECK VAC BKR FOR MS-RV-1D 5 NO (valve) 6/5/2013 N/ARCIC-SC-C002 20 RCIC TURBINE SPEED CONTROLLER 1,2,3 YES 9/19/2012 12/11/2012 SW-CB-P1A 3 4160V CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR SW-M-P/1A 1,2,3,4,5 YES 5/20/2013 5/20/2013 Page 1 of 1 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 12-FAQ-Electrical Panel Inspection This attachment was not modified from the initial revision of this report and therefore isnot included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 13-Licensing Basis Evaluations This attachment has been modified from the initial revision of this report and a finalversion has been included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusSLC-P-1A None N/A N/A N/ASLC-TK-1 None N/A N/A N/AizSLC-V-1A None N/A N/A N/ASGT-V-3A2 None N/A N/A N/ASGT-V-IA None N/A N/A N/ASGT-FU-1A None N/A N/A N/ASGT-FN-1A1 None N/A N/A N/AThe support in question provides support tothe 3/8" tubing for the SGT-FIS-2A2.

ReviewWalk-By Item #1 Pipe support missing base plate bolt of details on the plant drawing for this support 267511 Completeindicates that the missing bolt is allowed.License Basis is MetThis issue is entered directly into theCorrective Action Program to evaluate thisWalk-By Item #2 Light fixture resting on firewater line condition.

The initial functionality 267512 Completedetermination found the piping to remain fully_qualified.

2The Storage Permit process is governed by aSite Wide Procedure.

Review of the storagepermit indicates the permit for the area inWalk-By Item #3 Storage Permit #268 has question is applicable to (2) 55 gallon drums N/A N/Aunrestrained barrels with equipment inside. This is consistent withwhat is discussed on the walk-by checklist andis therefore satisfactory.

License Basis is MetThis issue has been addressed by a previousCondition Report (CR 255023) and concluded Walk-By Item #4 HNES #6 is not restrained that it did not impact continued operability of N/A N/Aitems near byLicense Basis Is MetPage 1 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written I CR StatusNone during external inspection E-DP-S1/1F Opened for internal Inspection on N/A N/A N/A5/22/13 during R21 refuel outage, noadverse seismic issues identified Rod hanger located on North end of This issue is entered directly into thecentral room lighting string has a nut Corrective Action Program.

A work requestE-TR-7/71 central room lighatingstringllhasnaan was generated to correct the problem.

No CR 271532 Completeon the rod that is not fully engaged operability determination was required for thisbelow the hook iseissue.The flange that is bent belongs to a cover thatspans between E-TR-7/73 and E-SL-73.A portion of the flange connecting E- Design documents evaluate the floorTR-7/73 and E-SL-73 is partially bent anchorage of E-TR-7/73 without considering E-E-TR-7/73 resulting in the bolt at that location to TR-7/73 and E-SL-73 being coupled together.

N/A N/Aresn intbot fy egagd lThis cover has no structural relevance withbe not fully engaged irespect to the floor anchorage design of eitherE-TR-7/73 or E-SL-73.License Basis Is MetNone for external inspection Opened for internal inspection on Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 285207 OpenE-CP-ARS 5/20/13 during R21 refuel outage.Two broken tie-wraps identified, not aseismic issue.None- walkdown for this component SW-CB-PIA performed on 5/20/13 during R21 N/A N/A N/AoutageThe conduit support in question is shown onplant drawings.

The plant drawing for theConduit support is missing anchor on support indicates that the missing anchors areWalk-By Item #5 considered as abandoned and are not N/A N/Abase plate required.

Therefore, the missing anchors areaccounted for.License Basis Is MetWalk-By Item #6Light fixture has spacial interaction issue with adjacent conduit supportThe conduit support is considered a hardtarget in accordance with plant engineering procedures.

The light fixture will not have anadverse effect on the support due to contactgenerated from a seismic event. The lightfixture does not require safety chains asidentified by the plant design drawing.

Thisindicates that the fixture has been evaluated tohave no adverse affect on safety relatedequipment in the event the light should fall.License Basis Is MetN/AN/AContinued on Next PagePage 2 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusThe trays are supported by Cable Tray SupportTS-2310 as shown on the plant drawing.

The CR 268720W Cable tray missing bolts to support EDISON impact report indicates loads are nerated toWalk-By Item #7 small and the tray attachment remains Completearm qualified with a single bolt. The drawing install missingrequires 2 bolts per tray attachment.

boltst License Basis is MetThe Storage Permit process is governed by aSite Wide Procedure.

Review of the storageStorage Permit #252 has permits indicates the permit for the area ofWalk-By Item #8 S ra d t box concern is applicable to a red tool box and N/A N/A8 unrestrained tool box breaker storage straps, This is consistent withwhat is discussed on the walk-by checklist License Basis is MetNone for external inspection E-CI-1A Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A5/22/13 during R21 refueling outage,no adverse seismic issues identified None for external inspection E-C2-1 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A5/22/13 during R21 refueling outage,no adverse seismic issues identified The support in question is the wall attachment portion of a cable tray support.

It is shown onplant drawings as a 3 base plate support.

Thesupport has been installed as a 3 baseplate

2support, white the analysis documented in thedesign calculation evaluates for only the upperSupport between two sides of DP-S2- and lower baseplates.

The extra middle baseWalk-By Item #9 1 is missing bolts. Threaded inserts plate that has been installed reduces the span N/A N/Acan be seen. between base plates and provides additional anchors beyond what has been evaluated forin the calculation even when considering theundocumented missing anchors.

Thus, thisportion of tray support remains qualified forseismic and dead weight design loads.License Basis is MetPage 3 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations I r IArea Walk-by SWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusCRD-HCU-3027 None N/A N/A N/ACRD-HCU-2635 None N/A N/A N/AThe Control Rod Drive hydraulic control unit(HCU) modules are installed on elevatedconcrete pads. The pads are secured to thefloor with cast in place #5 rebar stirrups at 12"on center. The pads are shown on a plantdrawing.

The angle with the anchor bolts isAt base of CRD-HCU-3015 there is a part of the CRD HCU frame as shown on theWalk-By Item #10 At p base of ach e i plant drawing.

The concrete pads and the N/A N/A0gap in anchorage frames are independent of each other. Theconcrete pad does not provide lateral restraint for the angle of the frame. Therefore, the gapbetween the concrete pad and the frame hasno affect on the seismic qualification of theCRD modules.License Basis is MetThe framing channel is in contact with3/4"HPCS(55)-4 discharge vent/drain pipe forHPCS-P-1 as shown on plant isometric pipingLight strut above power panel E-PP- drawings.

The 3/4" pipe is considered a soft CR 269942 toWalk-By Item #11 3DAA is resting between a pipeline target in accordance with the applicable eliminate contact Completeand a conduit.

Pipe has valve HPCS- engineering evaluation procedure.

The light between light andV-87 nearby fixture is considered a light weight object and pipingwill not have an adverse effect on the pipe dueto contact generated from a seismic event.License Basis is MetNone for external inspection CIA-CP-1 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A12/11/12, no adverse seismic issuesidentified None for external inspection CIA-CP-2 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A12/4/12, no adverse seismic issuesidentified CIA-SPV-6B None N/A N/A N/ACIA-SPV-8A None N/A N/A N/AWalk-By Item #123-way pipe support on South wallnear center of truck bay has an offsetbolt on surface mounted plate. Pipesupport is 3rd from East wall. CN-V-51 is reference for pipe systemThe subject hanger is depicted on plantdrawings.

Additionally, another plant drawingdepicts an anchor configuration similar to whatis identified in the field. An engineering calculation has evaluated the anchorconfiguration consistent with what is seen inthe field.License Basis Is MetN/AN/AContinued on Next PagePage 4 of 29 Enclosure 2- Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR Status:3, The HVAC duct work is considered a hardtarget in accordance with the engineering evaluation procedure.

Because light fixturesare considered light objects, they will not havean adverse effect on the ducting due to contactLights are either in contact or resting geeaefrmasiicvntThlgt NANAWalk-Byneate ftem #a onimi HVACt verica tilbacn.higt E Walk-By Item #13 on HVAC vertical tie bracing.

Lights g efixtures do not require safety chains as NIA N/ASare on the North wall of the truck bay identified by applicable plant drawings, which: indicate that the fixtures have been evaluated to have no adverse affect on safety relatedequipment in the event the light should fall.License Basis is MetNone for external inspection RCIC-SC-C002 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A12/11/12, no adverse seismic issuesidentified The cable tray supports are considered a hardtarget in accordance with engineering Vevaluation procedures.

The light fixture will nothave an adverse effect on the supports due tomccontact generated from a seismic event.>' Evaluation of safety chain requirements forlighting is described by the applicable plantdrawings.

Light fixtures that do not requireWalk-By Item #14 All overhead lighting along the East chains indicate that the fixtures are out of the N/A N/Awall is in contact with cable tray zone of influence of safety related equipment supports in the event the light should fall. Some lightfixtures have safety chains attached asindicated by the plant drawings which indicatethey are in the zone of influence of safetyrelated equipment and will keep the lights fromfalling.

This is consistent with what is seen inthe field.License Basis Is MetPage 5 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-Iby SWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written I CR StatusE-TR-ISOL/USA None N/A N/A N/AThe ceiling tile support grid has been designedto Seismic Category 1 requirements asevaluated by engineering calculation.

Theceiliangdtile are poeresnto i the o individual ceiling tiles are secured to theroom and are considered to be thevertical limit of the seismic walkdown support grid with hold down clips as described Walk-By Item #15 Visual inspection from the floor in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/Acannot verifyespiofrom sythe foor system. No tiles were observed to becannot verify the support system for displaced or degraded in such a way thatthe ceiling tiles. would indicate the seismic mounting iscompromised.

License Basis Is MetThe unrestrained red tool chest along thesouth wall does not meet requirements ofengineering procedural requirements to be anunrestrained object in the control room, as it iscloser than the height of the chest + 9" from CR 269249 Completesafety related equipment.

A revision to theapplicable engineering calculation wasTool chest and a computer cart along performed that indicates that the chest isthe South wall of the Control Room acceptable to be unrestrained.

Walk-By Item #16 may tip over during a seismic event Licensing Basis Is Metand damage nearby equipment Computer cart meets requirements of theengineering procedure that deals with storageof equipment with an aspect ratio less than1.3. Therefore the cart will not tip over and N/Amust be no closer than 4.5" from safety relatedequipment to be unrestrained.

The cart meetsthese requirements.

License Basis Is metE-B1-1 None N/A N/A N/AE-B2-1 None N/A N/A N/AWith a half inch nut, full thread engagement has 5.6 threads.

The anchor installation isOn E-BO-IA battery rack, the front 2 lacking 2 threads of engagement for a totalWalk-By Item #17 anchor bolts have nuts with only engagement of 3.6 threads.

Full tensile CR 269408 Completeabout 50% thread engagement capacity of a bolt is achieved with only 3threads of engagement.

License Basis is MetThe subject hanger is similar to a QB stylehanger as shown on plant drawings.

TheMissing bolt on conduit support RW applicable engineering calculation evaluates Walk-By Item #18 46 289 in the SE comer of the battery the hanger configuration with one end of the N/A N/Aroom hanger having only I anchor. This is consistent with what is seen in the field.License Basis is MetPage 6 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusFPC-V-175 None N/A N/A N/AFPC-FCV-1 None N/A N/A N/AThis issue is entered directly into theSocket wrench stored on front of rack Corrective Action Program.

It was determined is free to swing and can hit internal the tools were not required and were removed.E-IR-68 components of the rack. CR 269186 CompleteOpened for intemal inspection on12/4/12, no seismic issues identified oThe applicable plant drawing indicates that a 3--way support should be installed.

The issue wasin iz: Tubing connecting to the FPC-FCV-1 entered into the Corrective Action Program.

A5 Walk-By Item #19 appears that a support connection calculation revision was performed that CR 268406 Completemay be missing upstream of valve.maybemisin.usteamofvaveindicates the support clamps are not required.

License Basis Is MetStorage Permit #032 has a rack Revisit of this storage area shows thatcontaining rolls of new hazardous everything is within the boundary of the area.material storage bags which extends Review of the storage permits indicates theWalk-By Item #20 outerial storage ba bounds permit is applicable to various sized Rad bags, N/A N/Aoutside the storage area boundary sleeving and green bags. This is consistent tape indicating that it may not be with what is discussed on the walk-by checklist included on the storage permit License Basis is MetFPC-V-149 None N/A N/A N/AFPC-V-1 72 None N/A N/A N/AFPC-V-173 None N/A N/A N/AFPC-V-184 None N/A N/A N/ANone for external inspection E-IR-P017 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A12/10/12, no adverse seismic issuesidentified The Storage Permit process is governed by afSite Wide Procedure.

Review of the storagepermit indicates the permit is applicable toSsteel posts with chains attached to place inStorage Permit #233 has two barrels floor pockets when floor plugs are removed.Walk-By Item #21 labeled for rigging and scaffold type The storage area contained two barrels N/A N/Aequipment.

containing the posts and related equipment.

This is consistent with what is discussed onthe walk-by checklist License Basis is MetPage 7 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations YArea Walk-bySWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusFPC-V-153 None N/A N/A N/AFPC-V-154 None N/A N/A N/AFPC-V-156 None N/A N/A N/AThe tubing isometric as shown on the plantdrawing indicates that the subject hanger is aThere is a missing bolt on the surface type 116-19, as shown on the applicable Thlk-ByItm22 mner i lat mss boltong thure t hanger drawing, The applicable hangerWalk-By Item #22 mounted plate supporting tubing to calculations have evaluated the base plate N/A N/Awith a missing anchor similar in location to theanchor that is not installed.

License Basis is MetThe tubing isometric as shown on the plantdrawing indicates that the subject hanger is atype 116-3, as shown on the applicable hangerThere is a missing bolt on the surface drawing.

The applicable hanger calculation hasWalk-By Item #23 mounted plate supporting tubing to evaluated the base plate with a missing anchor N/A N/ASW-V-762similar in location to the anchor that is notinstalled.

License Basis is MetFPC-P-1A None N/A N/A N/AFPC-P-1B None N/A N/A N/AAdditional lead blankets were placedon the East end of FPC-HX-1A, without any anchorage or restraints.

Since this exchanger already has Temporary shielding is controlled by a plantlead shield wrappings, tied around procedure and log system. The Temporary FPC-HX-1A the exchanger, it Is unclear if the lead Shielding Control Log entry for this shielding N/A N/Ablankets were meant to serve as has addressed the weight of the additional temporary radiation shielding only shielding.

and if the additional weight is License Basis is Metaccounted for in the structural analysis of the exchanger and itsanchorage.

Additional lead blankets were placedon the East end of FPC-HX-1B, without any anchorage or restraints.

Since this exchanger already has Temporary shielding is controlled by a plantlead shield wrappings, tied around procedure and log system. The Temporary FPC-HX-1 B the exchanger, it is unclear if the lead Shielding Control Log entry for this shielding N/A N/Ablankets were meant to serve as has addressed the weight of the additional temporary radiation shielding only shielding.

and if the additional weight is License Basis Is Metaccounted for in the structural analysis of the exchanger and itsanchorage.

FPC-V-181A None N/A N/A N/AFPC-V-181B NoneN/AN/AN/AContinued on Next PagePage 8 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusNear the north end of FPC-P-1B astanchion is standing with no This issue is entered directly into theWalk-By Item #24 apparent reason. This is a potential Corrective Action Program.

The subject CR 268643 Completeseismic hazard as it could fall onto stanchion was removed.nearby equipment.

Scaffold ladder along north wall is This issue is entered directly into thetouching or nearly touching RCC Corrective Action Program.

It was evaluated 1ý Walk-By Item #25 piping. Ladder is next to and above torreception foram. t be eva6uated 6to be acceptable for scaffolding to be inaPccessBgoig to platm f contact with the large bore RCC piping.access to RCC valves.The isometric drawing for the subject pipingMissing support on 1 0"FPC(1 5)-2. shows an item welded to the pipe flange thatWalk-By Item #26 Support end brackets are seen with once belonged to a hanger. The hanger has N/A N/Ano support between them been removed but the brackets have been left.License Basis is MetNone on extemal inspection Review of PPM 10.25.105, Motor ControlOpened for internal inspection on Center and Switchgear Maintenance E-MC-8F 6/3/13 during R21 refuel outage. addresses this conditions and requires only N/A N/ASeveral control power transformers having 3 attachment bolts.are only attached with 3 of 4 possible License Basis is Metbolts.SW-TCV-1 I B valve operator installed The pipe stress calculation associated with thesupport layout is questionable.

Valve subject valve was reviewed.

The fieldWalk-By Item #27 operator stands vertically but no configuration of an unbraced valve operator is N/A N/Alateral supports are present for the consistent with the design configuration operator not the valve below it License Basis is MetE-DP-S1/2 wasdeleted from theN SWEL due toZ inaccessibility of the None N/A N/A N/Aanchors.

An areawalkby was stillperformed, no,D issues identified Page 9 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations

-- I I YArea Walk-by SWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusCCH-CR-1A None N/A N/A N/AAnchor bolts have what appears to This issue is entered directly into theCCH-CR-1B be more than mild corrosion Corrective Action Program to evaluate this CR 271321 Completecondition.

No impact to operability was found.The piping isometric for the associated pipingshows the valve operator oriented 30 degreesfrom vertical with a hanger attached at theThe support layout for valve operator valve height. The pipe stress calculation Walk-By Item #28 SW-EHO-TCV/1 5A appears to be associated with the subject valve was also N/A N/AW y #sti5Aappea reviewed.

The field configuration of anquestionable.

unbraced valve operator oriented off verticalwith a brace at the valve is consistent with thedesign configuration License Basis Is MetThe pipe stress calculation associated with theThe support layout for valve operator subject valve was reviewed.

The fieldWalk-By Item #29 SW-EHO-TCV/15B appears to be configuration of an unbraced valve operator is N/A N/Aquestionable, consistent with the design configuration License Basis is MetThe fire water pipe is considered a hard targetin accordance with the engineering evaluation procedure.

The piping is not associated withsprinkler piping and therefore clearance requirements of NFPA 13 do not apply.Because the light fixtures are relatively lightA light casing is touching a vertical weight, according to the procedural guidanceWalk-By Item #30 firewater pipe for hose station RWB- they will not have an adverse effect on the N/A N/AHS-33 piping due to contact generated from a seismicevent. The light fixture does not require safetychains as identified by the applicable plantdrawing, which indicates that the fixture willhave no adverse affect on safety relatedequipment in the event the light should fall.License Basis Is MetPage 10 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusE-CP-H13/P611 Ceiling tiles are present in the controlroom and are considered to be thevertical limit of the seismic walkdown.

Visual inspection from the floorcannot verify the support system forthe ceiling tiles.The ceiling tile support grid has been designedto Seismic Category 1 requirements asevaluated by the engineering calculation.

Theindividual ceiling tiles are secured to thesupport grid with hold down clips as described in the purchase specification for the ceiling tilesystem. No tiles were observed to bedisplaced or degraded in such a way thatwould indicate the seismic mounting iscompromised.

License Basis is MetN/AN/A0 CjCDThe ceiling tile support grid has been designedto Seismic Category 1 requirements asevaluated by engineering calculation.

TheCeiling tiles are present in the control individual ceiling tiles are secured to theroom and are considered to be thevert lmit od te onsidereisi walbdthesupport grid with hold down clips as described E-CP-H13/P618 vertical limit of the seismic walkdown, in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/AVisual inspection from the floor system. No tiles were observed to becannot verify the support system for displaced or degraded in such a way thatthe ceiling tiles, would indicate the seismic mounting iscompromised.

License Basis Is MetThe ceiling tile support grid has been designedto Seismic Category I requirements asevaluated by engineering calculation.

TheCeiling tiles are present in the control individual ceiling tiles are secured to theroom and are considered to be thevertical limit of the seismic walkdown support grid with hold down clips as described E-CP-H13/P626 Vical imit f the floor in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/AVisual inspection from the floor system. No tiles were observed to becannot verify the support system for sse.N ie eeosre obc the verify t otiyst displaced or degraded in such a way thatthe ceiling tiles, would indicate the seismic mounting iscompromised.

License Basis is MetThe ceiling tile support grid has been designedto Seismic Category 1 requirements asevaluated by engineering calculation.

TheCeiling tiles are present in the control individual ceiling tiles are secured to theroom and are considered to be thevertical limit of the seismic walkdown support grid with hold down clips as described E-CP-H13/P627 Visual inspection from the floor in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/Acannot verify the support system for system. No tiles were observed to bethe ceiling tilesy displaced or degraded in such a way thatwould indicate the seismic mounting iscompromised.

License Basis is MetE-CP-H13/P833 Walkdown peformed 12/4/12.Ceiling tiles are present in the controlroom and are considered to be thevertical limit of the seismic walkdown.

Visual inspection from the floorcannot verify the support system forthe ceiling tiles.The ceiling tile support grid has been designedto Seismic Category 1 requirements asevaluated by engineering calculation.

Theindividual ceiling tiles are secured to thesupport grid with hold down clips as described in the purchase specification for the ceiling tilesystem. No tiles were observed to bedisplaced or degraded in such a way thatwould indicate the seismic mounting iscompromised.

License Basis Is MetN/AN/AContinued on Next PagePage 11 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations F YArea Walk-by SWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusThe ceiling tile support grid has been designedto Seismic Category 1 requirements asevaluated by engineering calculation.

TheCeiling tiles are present in the control individual ceiling tiles are secured to theroom and are considered to b the tr support grid with hold down clips as described E-CP-H13/P841 vertical limit of the seismic walkdown, in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/AVisual inspection from the floor .system. No tiles were observed to becannot verify the support system for displaced or degraded in such a way thatc the verife sotiyst would indicate the seismic mounting isthe ceiling tiles, compromised.

License Basis is MetThe subject anchor bolt is a 3/4" Hilti Drop-In(HDI) and was installed under a plant workThere is spalled concrete behind the order. The Anchor Inspection Checklist notedWalk-By Item #31 lower back anchor bolt of E-CP- the spalled concrete and found the installation N/A N/ATCOM/1 acceptable based on the HDI depth and subsetrelative to spall depth.License Basis is MetThere is a missing bolt betweenCable Tray 6783C-DIV2 and thesupport angle. This occurs in theSouth East comer of Room C213right above E-IN-2A and E-IN-2BThe cable tray support is shown on plantdrawings.

The load on the tray support,according to Edison, is 22.5 lbs. The plantdesign drawing indicates a horizontal seismicfactor of 1.5 for a lateral shear load of 34 lbs.The missing bolt is specified on the applicable drawing as a 3/8" diameter ASTM A307 boltwhich has a shear capacity of 1100 lbs inaccordance with the AISC Manual Of SteelConstruction.

The shear capacity of the singleinstalled bolt is much greater than the designlateral load. The subject cable tray and supportremain qualified to all loading even with themissing cable tray bolt.License Basis is MetCR 270308To replace themissing boltCompleteE-IN-2AThe light fixture does not require a safety chainas identified by the applicable plant drawing.Light above E-IN-2A is hung by rod, This indicates that the fixture will have noshould have chain attached adverse affect on safety related equipment in N/A N/Athe event the light should fall.License Basis is MetOpened for internal inspection on6/3/13 during R21 refueling outage,no adverse seismic issue identified N/AN/AN/AContinued on Next PagePage 12 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusThere is a missing bolt betweenCable Tray 6783C-DIV2 and thesupport angle. This occurs in theSouth East corner of Room C213right above E-IN-2A and E-IN-2BThe cable tray support is shown on plantdrawings.

The load on the tray support,according to Edison, is 22.5 lbs. The plantdesign drawing indicates a horizontal seismicfactor of 1.5 for a lateral shear load of 34 lbs.The missing bolt is specified on the applicable drawing as a 3/8" diameter ASTM A307 boltwhich has a shear capacity of 1100 lbs inaccordance with the AISC Manual Of SteelConstruction.

The shear capacity of the singleinstalled bolt is much greater than the designlateral load. The subject cable tray and supportremain qualified to all loading even with themissing cable tray bolt.License Basis is MetCR 270308To replace themissing boltCompleteJ4Z00CU(DE-IN-2BThe light fixture does not require a safety chainas identified by the applicable plant drawing.Light above E-IN-2B is hung by rod, This indicates that the fixture will have noN/A N/Ashould have chain attached adverse affect on safety related equipment inthe event the light should fall.License Basis is MetThe bent flange is minor and does not effectthe anchors for the inverter.

It will not have anBent flange on frame adverse affect on E-IN-2B during a seismic N/A N/AeventLicense Basis is MetOpened for internal inspection on6/3/13 during R21 refueling outage,no adverse seismic issue identified N/AN/AN/AContinued on Next PagePage 13 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations

'I. rArea Walk-by SWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusI 4 4.Several bolt heads were cut flush tomake room for seismic base restraint platesUltra sonic testing was performed to find theembedment depth of the 112" diameter HiltiKwik Bolts (HKB) surrounding the base of E-MC-8A. The results of the testing concluded that the 1/2" diameter HKB's did not haveminimum embedment and have beenabandoned in place and replaced with baserestraints designed in accordance withengineering calculation and shown on plantdrawings.

License Basis Is MetN/AN/AE-MC-8AUltra sonic testing was performed to find theembedment depth of the 1/2" diameter HiltiKwik Bolts (HKB) surrounding the base of E-MC-8A. The results of the testing concluded The south eastern bolt head on the that the 1/2" diameter HKB's did not havetransition frame wasn't entirely flat or minimum embedment and have been N/A N/Aengaged abandoned in place and replaced with baserestraints designed in accordance withengineering calculation and shown on plantdrawings.

License Basis is MetOpened for internal inspection on6/3/13 during R21 refueling outage.Several control power transformers are only attached with 3 of 4 possiblebolts.Review of PPM 10.25.105, Motor ControlCenter and Switchgear Maintenance addresses this conditions and requires onlyhaving 3 attachment bolts.License Basis is MetN/AN/A1- 1Walk-By Item #32RPS-MG-2 flywheel shroud anchorbolt on base plate, located on SWcomer has a nut that is not fullyengagedThe subject anchor bolt has approximately 3threads not engaged.

The anchor bolt is a 11/4" Hilti Super Kwik bolt in accordance withthe installation drawing.

Threads for theanchors are 1 1/4 -7 UNC. A 1 1/4" nut has aheight of 1 1/16". Therefore there areapproximately 4 threads engaged.

CR 269408provides the discussion that 3 threadengagement develops full strength of the bolt.License Basis is MetN/AN/AContinued on Next PagePage 14 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusThe cable tray support is shown on plantdrawings which provide the details andattachment alternatives for attaching the cabletrays to the supports.

If there is a clip that hasCable tray in NE comer of room is been welded between the tray and the support CR 270351Walk-By Item #33 missing bolt. Approx. 6' off of north in lieu of using a bolt, this is acceptable as it To replace the Completewall and 4' off of east wall still meets the attachment requirements.

missing boltDuring performance of the Work Request thatwas generated for this issue, this condition wasverified to be the case.License Basis is MetConduit is considered a hard target inaccordance with the applicable engineering Cevaluation procedure.

Because it is relatively light weight, the light fixture will not have anHorizontal strut for light above E-IN- adverse effect on the support due to contactHgenerated from a seismic event. The lightWalk-By Item #34 2A and E-IN-2B can hit DIVA-AVUS-N/A N/A30-1 conduit during a seismic event, fixture does not require safety chains asidentified by the applicable installation drawing,Uwhich indicates that the fixture is out of thezone of influence of safety related equipment in the event the light should fall.License Basis Is MetWt pThe wrap is a Flame-Safe Fire Resistant Wht lsi rpaon al ry Blanket installed in accordance with plantWalk-By Item #35 is visible and can be a flammable proedures, N/A N/Asource. Located in NE corner of room procedures, N/ALicense Basis is MetWalk-By Item #36 Grey duct tape found on end of pipe This is a house keeping issue CR 268788 Completesupport License Basis is MetThere was a temporary tool cart and The temporary tool cart is part of "Work inoscillator monitor on the south end of Progress".

Wheels are chocked in accordance Walk-By Item #37 the room, and also a -panel case on with the applicable plant procedure that N/A N/Athe floor in the south east corner of governs storage of temporary equipment.

the room Licensing Basis is MetPage 15 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations

-- -I I YArea Walk-by SWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusFP-BO-110A None N/A N/A N/AFP-B0-110B None N/A N/A N/AUnsecured item on north side ofPWC-FU-1, ladder/steps The area is a non-safety related seismicWalk-By Item #38 unrestrained near DO-TK-7, the category 2 area. These issues are a house CR 269268 Completestand for PWC-P-8 is rusted and keeping issueneeds repair, several empty drums License Basis is Metand cart should be removedCN-V-106 None N/A N/A N/ACN-V-107 None N/A N/A N/AThis is a outside area with no safety relatedThere are seismic category 2 non- equipment.

The equipment associated withWalk-By Item #39 safety related equipment in the area the cracked grouting is far enough from safety CR 269240 Completewith cracks in grouting around anchor related equipment that it will not be a spatialbolts. interaction concern.License Basis is MetNoted venting or leaking and frostformed near CN-V-1 3. Build up of Maintenance IssueWalk-By Item #40 frost appeared to be damaging License Basis Is Met CR 269204 Completeinsulation.

Venting appears to becoming from CN-PCV-2FP-B0-1A None N/A N/A N/AFP-B0-1 B None N/A N/A N/ACW-V-1A, 1B, and 1C all have oneWalk-By Item #41 missing anchor/bolt holding down the Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 291016 Openmotor operatorStorage drums containing handrails The level transmitter is not safety related.

ThisWalk-By item #42 that could impact CW-LT-4 was is a house keeping issue CR 269273 Completenoted License Basis is MetAED DWG 02H22-05,47 shows 6 The plant installation drawing reflects 4holes available for anchor anchors installed.

The drawing referred to ininstallation.

Only 4 are installed, the issue description is a panel construction

drawing, not showing anchorage.

License Basis is MetE-IR-P011 N/A N/AOpened for internal inspection on12/11/12, no adverse seismic issuesidentified.

Page 16 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusDSA-TK-3A None N/A N/A N/ADSA-TK-4A None N/A N/A N/AThe attachment bolts are evaluated in theapplicable seismic qualification documents.

DSA-TK-7A has a weight of 800 lbs. with anattachment bolt size of 3/4". The seismicAnchor bolt on west side of tank qualification document has conservatively DSA-TK-7A appears to be bent or installed at a evaluated the attachment bolt arrangement for Completeskewed angle the tank. Review of this evaluation shows thereis sufficient margin in the evaluation toconsider the skewed attachment bolt to be~ineffective.

License Basis Is MetDSA-TK-8A None N/A N/A N/ADSA-C-1A1 None N/A N/A N/AThe dimensions on the desk are 29" high and30" width for an aspect ratio of 1.03. Thisaspect ratio is less than the limiting ratio of 1.5Desk near south wall is near SM- in the applicable plant procedure.

Therefore Walk-By Item #43 Desk 4160 southw ear the desk will not overturn.

The desk is 10" from N/A N/ADG1-7 4160 switchgear S-DG1-7-4160 which is greater than the 3"minimum required by the plant procedure to bean acceptable condition.

License Basis Is MetDO-P-IA None N/A N/A N/ANDO-TK-3A None N/A N/A N/APage 17 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations

q. I V IArea Walk-by SWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusNone for external inspection E-IR-P001 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A12/11/12, no adverse seismic issuesidentified RHR-V-27A None N/A N/A N/AThe light is not actually in contact with the pipebut is very close. The pipe is considered a softtarget in accordance with the applicable engineering evaluation procedure.

Because ofits relatively light weight, the light fixture will nothave an adverse affect on the pipe due toWalk-By Item #44 Light In contact with PI-VX-260 and contact generated from a seismic event. Thepiping light fixture does not require safety chains as N/A N/Aidentified by the plant installation drawing,which indicates that the fixture has beenevaluated to have no adverse affect on safetyrelated equipment in the event the light shouldfall.License Basis is MetProcess instrument line X-86A is shown onplant drawings and has analysis in anengineering calculation that can be retrieved by the normal plant records system. However,an additional approved calculation has beenlocated that supersedes the output of theSupport of PI-V-X86A is questionable calculation of record. This calculation has notWalk-By item #45 as it appears to be cantilevered out been officially input into Asset Suite (the N/A N/Aengineering record retrieval system).

Itfrom support appears that the new calculation has evaluated the process instrument line X-86A that addedthe short section of tubing that tee's off themain run of tubing and included PI-V-X86A1 and PI-V-X86A2.

This evaluation appearsconsistent with the tubing installation drawing.License Basis Is MetThe configuration of the motor operator is5 Motor Operator is a questionsal size consistent with the pipe stress calculation andLPCS-V-5 inorelatiorator i e size oftheoperator.the seismic qualification documentation that N/A N/AIn relation to the size of the operator, was reviewed.

License Basis is MetRHR-P-2A None N/A N/A N/AThe subject support is depicted on the tubingMissing anchor bolt on support isometric drawing details.

There is a note onWalk-By item #46 Mist a lt PSR-V-012 the detail indicating that the missing anchor N/A N/Abolt has been deleted.License Basis Is MetValve FDR-V-601 operator Is The cantilever orientation of the operator hascantilever out from the valve body a been accounted for in the design calculation Walk-By item #47 considerable distance.

As this is the that was reviewed.

N/A N/A422' elevation, this could be a License Basis Is Metflooding concern if it were to fail.Page 18 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusLPCS-P-2 None N/A N/A N/ASW-V-2A None N/A N/A N/Acc HPCS-P-2 None N/A N/A N/ASW-V-29 None N/A N/A N/AHPCS-V-4 None N/A N/A N/AjjNPage 19 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusNone for external inspection E-CP-DG/CP3 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A5/31/13 during R21 refueling outage,no adverse seismic issues identified The batteries have plexiglass covers thatshield the electrical connections from above.CNo safety chain on light above The applicable installation drawing does notHPCS-B1-DG3 Nof tey cspecify a safety chain attached to the lights N/A N/Abattery' over the battery, which is consistent with whatis seen in the fieldLicense Basis Is MetNone for external inspection E-MC-4A Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A5/31/13 during R21 refueling outage,no adverse seismic issues identified None for external inspection E-DP-S1/HPCS Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A5/31/13 during R21 refueling outage,no adverse seismic issues identified Floor drain piping hanger FD-265 has amissing stud at the Richmond insert. FD-265 isdepicted on an approved plant drawing andassociated piping isometric drawing.

AnSupport above door to D103 diesel engineering evaluation has been prepared and Generated toWalk-By item #48 oil storage tank access room has a approved that has modeled the piping system i Completemissing bolt without benefit of hanger FD-265. Results of install missingthat evaluation show that the piping systemand adjacent hangers remain qualified to ANSIB31.1 Code requirements.

License Basis Is MetThe support in question is depicted on plantdrawings.

According to the applicable engineering calculations, the loads on thishanger are very small with design loadingconservatively chosen to be 50 lbs in eachdirection.

The anchor bolts are 1/2" HDI withBase plate supporting line for DSA- allowable tensile and shear capacity perWalk-By item #49 AR-2C near valve DSA-V-81b B i anchor of 1,688 lbs and 1,568 Ibs, respectively N/A N/Amissing a bolt in accordance with engineering procedures.

The hanger in question remains qualified andwill provide support for the 1/2"DSA(4)-2 drainpipe during a seismic event with only 3 of theanchor bolts installed.

License Basis is MetThe applicable installation drawing shows aLighting behind E-MC-4A has one safety chain on one light and one light withoutWalk-By item #50 light with a safety chain and one light a safety chain behind E-MC-4A which is N/A N/Awithout a safety chain consistent with what is seen in the field.License Basis Is MetPage 20 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusDO-P-2 None N/A N/A N/AjDO-TK-3C None N/A N/A N/ADG-ENG-1C None N/A N/A N/A-4 ý3 None for external inspection E-CP-DG/EP3 Opened for internal inspection on N/A N/A N/A5/31/13 during R21 refueling outage,no adverse seismic issues identified There are a few bolts that needDEAFN31 washers installed on anchorage of The bolts are still in place and capable ofDEA-FN-31 we r o d flange o carrying design loads CR 271064 CompleteDEA-FN-31 from duct flange to License Basis is Metsupport frame on north side of flangeDMA-AH-32 None N/A N/A N/Acc 4DMA-AH-31 None N/A N/A N/AThe ceiling tile support grid has been designedto Seismic Category 1 requirements asCevaluated by engineering calculation, TheCeiling tiles are present in the control individual ceiling tiles are secured to thevertical limit of the seismic walkdown.

support grid with hold down clips as described coRFT-CP-COM1 in the purchase specification for the ceiling tile N/A N/A8j Visual inspection from the floorcannt veifythe upprt tfor system. No tiles were observed to besysem displaced or degraded in such a way thatthe ceiling tiles, would indicate the seismic mounting is<compromised.

License Basis is MetPage 21 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-bySWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusRRA-FC-4 None N/A N/A N/AHPCS-P-3 None N/A N/A N/AHPCS-P-1 None N/A N/A N/AThe tubing associated with PSR-V-014 isshown on plant drawings.

The subject hangerMissing bolt on base plate for support with the missing anchor bolt is identified inWalk-By item #51 on south wall just east of PSR-V-014.

drawing details.

The drawing detail has N/A N/ASupport is for same line identified a deleted anchor bolt consistent withthe anchor bolt that is missing in the field.License Basis Is MetThe cantilever orientation of the operator hasWalk-By item #52 FDR-V-603 is cantilevered out a been accounted for in the engineering N/A N/Aconsiderable distance calculation for the valve.License Basis Is MetThe piping in question is floor drain piping. TheLead shielding for what looks to be section identified is shown on a plant pipingfloor drain piping may not be isometric drawing near hanger EDR-82. Theaccounted for in pipe seismic piping analysis for this pipe is evaluated by anWalk-By item #53 analysis.

Lead shielding for piping engineering calculation and the lead shielding N/A N/Alocated about 7' off of east wall on is evaluated in a modification to thatsouth half of HPCS pump room calculation that was performed prior toShielding log 95-2-0010 installing the shielding.

License Basis Is MetCSP-V-5 None N/A N/A N/ASupporting angles against the wallbehind panels have drilled holes butno anchors installed The top left bolt head when facing thepanel is not engaged entirely and boltappears to be installed at an angleThe calculation for anchorage of the E-PP-8AEis contained in seismic qualification documentation.

Anchorage qualification isbased on a 6 bolt anchor arrangement using1/2" diameter Hilti Drop-ins (HDI) with one ofthe top anchors missing for a total of 5anchors.

Installed anchors are (18) 5/8"diameter HDI's in a more conservative grouping pattern by having 2 anchors installed for each single anchor used for the evaluation.

The skewed angle can be considered asineffective and the pattern would still bebounded by the evaluation.

License Basis is MetN/AN/A*1-E-PP-8AEN/AN/AOpened for intemal inspection on6/3/13 during R21 refueling outage,no adverse seismic issue identified N/AN/AN/AContinued on Next PagePage 22 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusThe hanger in question does not support lineCAC-800-9.

The hanger in question is anHVAC support with the pipe on the supportbeing a sump vent pipe. The HVAC layout isshown on a current plant drawing.

HangerNear column lines 8.7/N a support for identification is shown on a historical drawingWalk-By item #54 line CAC-800-9 is contacting conduit as Hanger 4071. Duct Hanger 4071 is depicted N/A N/AASH-9304-1 on a separate plant drawing.

The calculation that evaluates duct hanger 4071 contained inthe installation contract files shows thathanger deflections are low so there is noadverse affect to hanger 4071 by being inVcontact with the conduit.License Basis is MetThe conduit and tee are considered a softtarget in accordance with the applicable engineering evaluation procedure.

Because ofits relatively light weight, the light fixture will notEast/West running light located North have an adverse affect on the conduit or teeWalk-By Item #55 West comer of hatch (Approximate due to contact generated from a seismic event. N/A N/Acolumn line 7.7/N) is in contact with The light fixture does not require safety chainshorizontal conduit and tee connection as identified by the plant installation drawing,which indicates that the fixture will have noadverse affect on safety related equipment inthe event the light should fall.License Basis is MetSW-V-165A None N/A N/A N/ASW-V-170A None NIA N/A N/ASW-V-165B None N/A N/A N/ASW-V-170B None N/A N/A N/ACracks in the concrete of the spray pond wallsNoted several surface cracks in theWalk-By item #56 spray pond wall. Most severe crack were previously identified.

Propagation is Previouslocated about 15 south of SW-V- being tracked and trended as described in a Closed933A .,eeprevious CR.933A License Basis Is MetB Missing or abandoned anchor on NW The missing bolt is accounted for in theMissig Bomr a ond fanc on Equipment Qualification Record for the fan. N/A N/Aceff License Basis Is MetSW-P-2B None N/A N/A N/ASW-V-2B None N/A N/A N/APage 23 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations YArea Walk- bby SWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusE-131-2 None N/A N/A N/ADMA-AH-21 None N/A N/A N/ADMA-AH-22 is set on a concrete pad that issecured to the floor with #5 rebar dowels. Thedesign of the pad is shown on plant drawings.

Horizontal rebar is also provided with lap joints.Approximately 2"x2"x3" of concrete is The horizontal rebar encircles the pad and areDMA-AH-22 chipped off near the 3rd anchor along positioned such that they cross the shear cone N/A N/ANW comer of DMA-AH-22 planes for the anchors providing a muchgreater shear strength than plain unreinforced concrete.

The condition does not affectmounting qualification.

License Basis is MetThis issue is entered directly into theBolt is missing a nut at the top flange Corrective Action Program to initiate repairs.

CR 271067 Completeon the South side of DEA-FN-21 Initial operability assessment was that allequipment remained operable.

DEA-FN-21 Northern most bolt from flange to This issue is entered directly into thelateral support of DEA-FN-21 should Corrective Action Program to initiate repairs.

CR 271067 Completehave a washer because the hole is Initial operability assessment was that allslotted equipment remained operable.

DO-TK-3B None N/A N/A N/AA washer was noticed on the floor This issue is entered directly into thethat may have come from a Corrective Action Program to initiate repairs.

CR 270372 CompleteWalk-by Item #57 permanent platform above as there Initial operability assessment was that allwas a bolt on the beam connection equipment remained operable.

missing a washerDCW-HX-1 B1 None N/A N/A N/ADCW-HX-1 B2 None N/A N/A N/ADG-ENG-1 B1 None N/A N/A N/ADG-ENG-1 B2NoneN/AN/AN/APage 24 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusDO-P-1B None N/A N/A N/ADipstick is standing in a bucket and is This issue is entered directly into theunrestrained laterally.

It can fall Corrective Action Program to remove item.Walk-by Item #58 The initial operability assessment was that CR 271146 Complete<tubing and valves on top of tank there was no impact to operability of adjacenttequipment.

iThe cantilever orientation of the operator has-RHR-P-3 FDR-V-604 is cantilevered out been accounted for in the engineering N/A N/Asignificantly above RHR-P-3 calculation for the valve.lQLicense Basis Is MetRHR-V-16B None N/A N/A N/ARHR-V-17B None N/A N/A N/AThis issue is entered directly into theMirror standing in comer of room Corrective Action Program to correct theWalk-by Item #59 could fall and damage tubing nearby condition.

The initial operability assessment CR 271133 Completeshould be restrained was that there was no impact to operability ofadjacent equipment.

The structural floor plan for Reactor BuildingIEl. 501 is shown on plant drawings.

TheIn NE corner of room there is an drawing detail that shows the opening inWalk-by Item #60 opening in the concrete wall with quesin is show s ti 4 o f th N/A N/Aexposed rebar question is shown in Section 7740-7740 of the~drawing.

License Basis is MetLigh fiturein oomhas eveely This issue is entered directly into theCorrective Action Program to initiate repair.Walk-by Item #61 one of them is not engaged and a This condition does not impact operability of CR 270988 Complete>1 wire has been used as a temporary quick-fix adjacent equipment.

This issue is entered directly into theL Corrective Action Program to initiate repair.< Walk-by Item #62 Loose and rs The initial operability assessment was that CR 270992 Completeathere was no impact to operability of adjacentequipment.

This issue is entered directly into theBent tubing around 18" off floor in Corrective Action Program to evaluate if repairWalk-by Item #63 central part of room is needed. The initial operability assessment CR 271135 Openwas that there was not an impact to operability of the equipment.

VThis issue is entered directly into theValve tag on floor for RHR-V-16B MO Corrective Action Program to correct theWalk-by Item # and hose, and duct tape in various condition.

The initial operability assessment CR 271133 Complete.places was that there was no impact to operability ofpadjacent equipment.

Page 25 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusRHR-V-42B None N/A N/A N/ALoose wrenches are hanging on wall CR 270931nearby. They are unrestrained at the This issue is entered directly into the Generated to getRCIC-PS-9A bottom of the tools and can swing Corrective Action Program to correct the wrenches Completeduring a seismic event and hit RCIC- condition.

properlyPS-9A restrained This issue is entered directly into theTubing at penetration seal R01 5- Corrective Action Program to correct theRCIC-PS-9B Tub ing a clamp condition.

The initial operability assessment CR 270927 Complete4009 is missing a clamp was that there was no impact to operability ofthe equipment.

The tubing associated with RHR-PI-2A isshown on a plant drawing.

The hanger inquestion is identified as a Type 220-1. TheWalk-by Item # 65 There is a missing bolt on a tubing drawing for this type of hanger references the N/A N/Asupport from RHR-PI-2A hanger calculation.

This calculation hasevaluated hanger installation with a missinganchor similar to the one seen in the fieldLicense Basis Is MetRCIC-HX-1 None N/A N/A N/ARCIC-HX-2 None N/A N/A N/AThis issue is entered directly into theCorrective Action Program to correct thepump casing that is not fully engaged condition.

The initial operability assessment was that there was no impact to operability ofthe equipment.

RCIC-P-1 CR 271312 OpenThis issue is entered directly into the2 of the 4 bolts on the pump casing Corrective Action Program to correct thedo not have washers on what condition.

The initial operability assessment appears to be oversized holes was that there was not impact to operability ofthe equipment.

RCIC-P-2 None N/A N/A N/AThe tubing associated with RCIC-V-19 isshown on a plant drawing.

The hanger inThere is a missing bolt on a base question is identified as a Type 320-1. TheWalk-by Item #66 plate for tubing that routes from RCa C plant drawing for this type of hanger references N/A N/AV-19 the hanger calculation.

This calculation hasevaluated the hanger with two missing anchorswhich bounds the condition found in the fieldLicense Basis Is MetPage 26 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written ICR StatusWalk-by Item #67Hanger RCIC-2, for piping with RCIC-V-708, may be missing a snubber onthe west side. Only one snubberinstalled on east sideHanger RCIC-2 is depicted on a plant drawing.The detail of the hanger shows that only oneside of the clamp is used. This hanger is not asnubber but a rigid strut and is consistent withwhat is seen in the field.License Basis is MetN/AN/ACThe CR describes that the installed strut forpipe support RCIC-2 does not look exactly likethe sketch drawing of the strut in theinstallation drawing.

However, the drawing billUponfinvesgation of RCIC-2, thes n of material for item #14 says: "Strut, GrinnellWalk-by Item #68 concfiguratonfiguration seen on CVo Fig 210 Size 2 (OR EQUAL)."

The installed CR 271216 CompleteDWG 215-08,3533 strut is an equal strut fabricated by a different pipe hanger fabrication company (NPSI ratherthan Grinnell).

The drawing allows theinstallation as installed.

License Basis Is MetLight in northwest comer of RCIC This issue is entered directly into theWalk-by Item #69 Pump Room has one support rod Corrective Action Program to correct thethat is bent with nuts on rod not fully condition.

There is no operability impact from CR 271325 Completethreaded into it's counterparts this condition.

This issue is entered directly into theCorrective Action Program to evaluate thiscondition.

It was found that this issue hasbeen identified previously and evaluated by anWalk-by Item #70 Excessive vibration of level switch 10 earlier Action Request.

This Action Request CR 271328 Completenoticed caused an engineering calculation to be doneto determine if vibration was acceptable.

Thiscalculation determined that vibration levelswere acceptable and no piping or hangermodification was necessary.

This issue is entered directly into theWalk-by Item #71 RClC-P-3 had a hole in junction box Corrective Action Program to correct the CR 271349 Completecondition.

Initial determination was that therewas no impact to operability of the equipment.

Walk-by Item #72RCIC-V-59 had gold colored/coated bolts in the flange platesThis issue is entered directly into theCorrective Action Program to evaluate thiscondition.

Review by engineering determined that the bolting met the requirements of thedesign and was satisfactory.

CR 271348CompleteDG-ENG-1A1 None N/A N/A N/ADG-ENG-1A2 None N/A N/A N/AThe cast in place anchor bolts belonged tohangers DCW-4622-11 and DCW-4622-12.

On Northeast corer of DG-ENG-1A1 These hangers are shown on a historical plantnear DCW-TK-2A1, there are cast in drawing.

This historical drawing was voidedWalk-by Item #73 place bolts on the concrete floor for a due to design activities associated with a plant N/A N/ATsupport that is either missing ors abandoned design change that removed hangers DCW-a o4622-11 and DCW-4622-12.

License Basis is MetPage 27 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-bySWEL ItemIssues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR WrittenCR StatusAnchor on Northwest comer of E-MC- Ultra sonic testing was performed to find the7A does not have a washer and there embedment depth of the 1/2" diameter Hiltiis a gap between the channels Kwik Bolts (HKB) surrounding the base of E-bottom flange and the floor, exposing MC-7A. The results of the testing concluded the shaft of the anchor that the 1/2" diameter HKB's did not haveminimum embedment and have beenE-MC-7A abandoned in place and replaced with base N/A N/Arestraints designed in accordance with anengineering calculation and shown on plantOpened for internal inspection on installation drawings for the switchgear.

5/22/13 during R21 refueling outage, License Basis is Metno adverse seismic issues identified Wall mounted supports for E-CP- This issue is entered directly into theC72/SO01A are not flush against the Corrective Action Program to evaluate theWalk-by Item #74 wall (appears that the surface condition and correct it if necessary.

Initial CR 271334 Completemounted plates and anchors have assessment determined that there was nopulled out resulting in a gap between impact to the operability of the equipment.

plates and wall surfacesThe subject anchor bolt has approximately 1thread not engaged.

The anchor bolt are 1 1/4"Hilti Super Kwik bolts in accordance with theNut on bolt located on Northeast installation drawing.

Threads for the anchorsNut-byIte on bl floted o ortha of arel 1/4 -7 UNC. A 1 1/4" nut has a height oft N/A N/AWalk-by Item #75 comer of the flywheel support of RPS 1/16". Therefore there are approximately 6MG-i is not fully engaged threads engaged.

CR 269408 provides theevaluation that 3 thread engagement developsfull strength of the bolt.License Basis is MetThe wall mounted support is cable tray supportOn East wall behind E-MC-S1/1D, TS-2303.

TS-2303 is an (8) anchor boltwall mounted support for cable tray hanger. The anchor identified as not fullyhas anchor bolt issues. The wall engaged is one of the top anchors.

TS-2303 isWalk-by Item #76 mounted support is located about 3'- detailed on a plant drawing.

The calculation N/A N/A6" South of large diagonal supports that evaluates TS-2303 evaluates the hangerbehind E-MC-S1/1D.

The top right as if the top 2 anchors have failed. Thisbolt is not fully engaged while the 3rd calculation bounds the condition found in theright bolt is missing a washer field for this hangerLicense Basis is MetE-IR-69 Bolt on front base of rack slightly Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 275620 closedbent or skewed.Walk-by Item #77 Missing bolt on cable tray support.

Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 275619 closedLocation 8.5/M.7Page 28 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 13 -Summary of Walkdowns, Walk-Bys and License Basis Evaluations Area Walk-by SWEL Item Issues Identified Licensing Basis Evaluation CR Written CR StatusLD-TE-29A None N/A N/A N/AM FPC-42-8BB2D None N/A N/A N/APC-42-7BB9B None N/A N/A N/AMS-V-22C None N/A N/A N/AMS-V-22C None N/A N/A N/AMS-V-37C None N/A N/A N/AMS-V-38C None N/A N/A N/AMS-V-37K None N/A N/A N/AMS-V-38K None N/A N/A N/ALD-TE-31C None N/A N/A N/AWalk-by Item #78 Jacket Split on conduit to LD-TE- Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 285562 Complete0 .Walk-by Item #78 31C, not a seismic issueWalk-by Item #79 Damaged.

iNot a sesmicn ssuear P Entered into Corrective Action Program CR 285565 CompletePage 29 of 29 Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 14-Peer Review Team ReportThis attachment was not modified from the initial revision of this report and therefore isnot included in this submittal.

Enclosure 2 -Final Seismic Walkdown Summary Report (public version)COLUMBIA GENERATING

STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397FINAL SEISMIC WALKDOWN SUMMARY REPORT(Public Version)Attachment 14A-Peer Review Team Report UpdateThis attachment is a new attachment not previously included in the report.

Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 14A -Update to Peer Review Team ReportColumbia Generating StationFukushima NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownPeer Team Review Summary -July 2013 UpdateThe Peer Review function and required activities are delineated in EPRI Report 1025286,Seismic Walkdown

Guidance, Section 6, Peer Review. The Peer Review Team is tasked toperform a review of the Seismic Walkdown effort including the following activities:

1. Review the selection of the SSCs included on the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List(SWEL).2. Review a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.3. Review of the licensing basis evaluations.

4. Review of the decisions for entering or not entering the potentially adverse seismicconditions into the Corrective Action Process (CAP).5. Review of the submittal report.6. Summarize the results of the peer review process in the submittal.

Peer Review activities were previously performed throughout the duration of the seismicwalkdowns beginning in June 2012 and completed in October 2012. Subsequent to theissuance of the initial report additional Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed to address equipment that was considered inaccessible.

The results of this Peer Review effortare summarized in this document.

The Peer Review Team members for this update were LeoNadeau (Lead) and Robert Slovic.1. SWEL -No revisions to SWEL-1 were required.

SWEL-2 was revised to remove one item;E-IR-71 was removed due to its location in a locked high radiation area. This revision toSWEL-2 was compared to the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic WalkdownGuidance, Section 3, Selection of SSC and Appendix F, Peer Review Checklist by the PeerReview Team. The SWEL was found to be in accordance with applicable requirements.

2. Licensing Basis Evaluations (LBE) -LBE's were performed as required to document as-found conditions.

The LBE Summary (Attachment

13) was updated to provide a revisedstatus.3. Sample of Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) and Area Walkdown Checklist (AWC)The Peer Review Team concluded that the level of detail contained in the SWC/AWCperformed and summarized below was appropriate and in accordance with the EPRI Report1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance.

a. SWC/AWC were prepared in compliance with ERPI Report 1025286, SeismicWalkdown

Guidance, Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys andAppendix B, Checklists with no modifications or additions.

b. The Walkdown Team included two (2) Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE); GregoryJaschke, Eugene Scott or Leanna Staudenmier.

A review of the ColumbiaGenerating Station's Personnel Qualification Database demonstrated that the SWEsPage 1 of 6 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 14A -Update to Peer Review Team Reportwere included in that database and have been qualified as a SWE in accordance with the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.c. Walkdowns were planned by work week and managed using the ColumbiaGenerating Station's Work Order/Work Management process.

This workmanagement and planning approach was found to comply with the EPRI Report1025286 guidance and Columbia Generating Station work control methods.d. Completed SWC/AWC documentation packages listed in the tables below werereviewed and comply with the EPRI Report 1025286 guidance.

e. Equipment Class listed on SWCs were correct.f. There were thirty-three (33) SWCs and six (6) AWCs performed for a total of 39documentation packages (SWC/AWC, Work Order, Condition Report) and are listedin the tables below. All 39 documentation packages were reviewed by the PeerReview Team representing 100% of the total. This exceeds the EPRI Report1025286, Section 6, Peer Review requirement for the Peer Team to review 10% to25% of the documentation packages.

The SWCs/AWCs documentation packagesreviewed by the Peer Review Team were determined to be appropriately detailedand complete.

During its review, the Peer Review Team identified minor commentson the documentation packages.

These comments were transmitted to the SWEsand were incorporated into the documentation packages.

SWC Description Eqmt. Peer Review CommentClass1. CIA-CP-1 CIA N2 Bottles Control 20 Peer Review (PR) Acceptable Reactor Building Panel2. CIA-CP-2 CIA N2 Bottles Control 20 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Panel3. E-C1-1A 125VDC Vital Battery 16 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Charger A4. E-C2-1 250V Battery Charger 1 16 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg.5. E-CP-ARS Alternate Remote 20 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Shutdown Panel6. E-CP-DG/CP3 HPCS Engine & GEN 20 PR Acceptable DG Building 480V Power Panel7. E-CP-DG/EP3 HPCS Generator 20 PR Acceptable DG Building Engine Control Panel8. E-CP-H13/P833 Control Room Safety 20 PR Acceptable:

MinorRadwaste Bldg. System Panel-Board G2 administrative issue -SWC didnot indicate Equipment Description.

SWEs corrected omission on SWC.9. E-CP-H1 3/P841 Control Room Panel 20 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Board G110. E-DP-S1/1 F DIV 1 Critical Swtchgr.

14 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Distribution Panel11. E-DP-S1/HPCS 125VDC HPCS 14 PR Acceptable DG Building Distribution Panel I IPage 2 of 6 IEnclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 14A -Update to Peer Review Team Report12. E-IN-2A DIV 2 Critical 120 VAC 16 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Power Supply Inverter A13. E-IN-2B DIV 2 Critical 120 VAC 16 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Power Supply Inverter14. E-IR-68 Reactor Building 18 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Instrument Rack15. E-IR-69 Reactor Building 18 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Instrument Rack16. E-IR-POO1 LPCS Instrument Rack 18 PR Acceptable Reactor Building17. E-IR-PO1 1 SLC Instrument Rack 18 PR Acceptable:

Item #5Reactor Building disposition documented inAttachment 13, LBE18. E-IR-PO1 7 RCIC Instrument Rack 18 PR Acceptable Reactor Building19. E-MC-4A HPCS Motor Control 1 PR Acceptable DG Bldg. Center 4A20. E-MC-7A Motor Control Center 7A 1 PR Acceptable:

Anchorage, Radwaste Bldg. item #2 disposition documented in Attachment 13, LBE21. E-MC-8A Motor Control Center 8A 1 PR Acceptable:

Anchorage, Radwaste Bldg. item #2 disposition documented in Attachment 13, LBE22. E-MC-8F Motor Control Center 8F 1 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg.23. E-PP-8AE 120/240V 200A Rx 2 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Bldg. Instrument

&Control Power Panel24. FPC-42-7BB9B NEMA Size 3 Motor 1 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Starter for FPC-P-1A25. FPC-42-8BB2D NEMA Size 3 Motor 1 PR Acceptable Reactor Building Starter for FPC-P-1 B26. LD-TE-29A Main Steam Line Tunnel 19 PR Acceptable Reactor Building.

Inlet Vent27. LD-TE-31C MS Line Tunnel 19 PR Acceptable Steam Tunnel Ambient Temperature

28. MS-V-22B MS Line "B" Inboard 8 PR Acceptable Containment Isolation SOV29. MS-V-22C MS Line "C" Inboard 8 PR Acceptable Containment Isolation SOV30. MS-V-37C/38C 10" Check MS-RV-2D 0 PR Acceptable Containment Discharge

31. MS-37K/38K 10" Check MS-RV-1 D 0 PR Acceptable Containment Discharge

32. RCIC-SC-C002 RCIC Turbine Speed 20 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. Controller

33. SW-CB-P1A 4160V Circuit Breaker 3 PR Acceptable Radwaste Bldg. for SW-M-P/1 APage 3 of 6 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 14A -Update to Peer Review Team ReportAWC Peer Review Comment1. Drywell Elevation 506' PR Acceptable AZ 270 -AZ 602. Reactor Building Elevation 522' PR Acceptable H.3-K.6/5.3-9.4

3. Reactor Building Elevation 522 PR Acceptable L.6-N.8/6.5-9.4

4. Reactor Building Elevation 572 PR Acceptable M-M.6/5.4-6.2

5. Reactor Building Elevation 572' PR Acceptable M-N/7.9-8.3

6. Reactor Building Elevation 501 PR Acceptable ST501, G.5-H/5.2-6.8 1__4. Review Licensing Basis Evaluations/Review CAP Decisions

-Potentially AdverseSeismic Conditions were identified by the SWE on the SWC/AWC, forwarded to, andtracked by the Licensing Basis Evaluator (Greg Lisle, Site Engineering) on Attachment 13.The Peer Review Team reviewed the three (3) Condition Reports (CRs) submitted to theColombia Generating Station Corrective Action Program (CAP) as a result of seismicwalkdowns and area walk-bys.

It was determined that the threshold level at which aCondition Report (CR) was generated was low enough to ensure that a potentially adverseseismic condition or licensing basis issue would have been appropriately documented.

NoPotentially Adverse Seismic Conditions that could not be reconciled against licensing basisdocumentation were found.5. Review Submittal Report -A review of the submittal report was performed by members ofthe Peer Review Team and it was determined that the objectives and requirements of the50.54(f)

Letter and EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance were met.Peer Team MemberPeer Team MemberLeo Nadeau (Lead)Date July 2, 2013Date 17 July 2013Robert SlovicPage 4 of 6 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 14A -Update to Peer Review Team ReportPeer Review Checklist for SWELInstructions for Completing Checklist This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List(SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist shouldbe used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may havechanged to address those findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL 1 selection?

YI0 NI]Change to SWEL-2 was not significant and SWEL adequately represents a diversesample of the equipment required to perform the five (5) safety functions.

2. Does SWEL 1 include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:

a. Various types of systems?

YO N[INo significant changes were made to the SWEL andf it includes an appropriate representation of types of systems.b. Major new and replacement equipment?

YJO NEIThe SWEL 1 includes all known major new and replacement equipment thatqualifies.

c. Various types of equipment?

Y NIOIThe SWEL 1 includes an appropriate representation of types of equipment.

d. Various environments?

YI NOThe SWEL I includes various types of environments Page 5 of 6 Enclosure 2 -Public VersionAttachment 14A -Update to Peer Review Team ReportPeer Review Checklist for SWELe. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program?A total of 4 pieces of equipment were included in SWEL 1 based on the IPEEEprogram.f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL 1?Yes, the narrative in the Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) was reviewed andused in the selection of the SWEL equipment.

YO NOYO NOI3. For SWEL 2:a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included inSWEL 2?A total of 18 items were included in the SWEL 2.b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items notincluded in SWEL 2?A justification was provided for SFP related components identified on Base List 2,as to why the item was added or not added to SWEL 2. The justification providedwas appropriate.

YO NE4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.None5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL? YO NE]Door Al~n~. *1 I on AhDAnrio*

• rr*.Peer Reviewer

1. 2: Robert Slovk cDate: July 2, 2013Date: July 17. 2013Page 6 of 6