Information Notice 1992-85, Potential Failures of Emergency Core Cooling Systems Caused by Foreign Material Blackage
- - UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555December 23, 1992NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-85: POTENTIAL FAILURES OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLINGSYSTEMS CAUSED BY FOREIGN MATERIAL BLOCKAGE
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice to alert addressees to the potential failure of emergency core coolingsystems (ECCS) caused by foreign material blockage. It is expected thatrecipients will review the information for applicability to their facilitiesand consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However,suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
H. B. Robinson Unit 2On August 23, 1992, while the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant was in mode 4, hotshutdown, plant personnel were performing an operations surveillance test ofthe B safety injection (SI) pump. This test found that the recirculation flowwas 20 percent lower than it had been when it was last measured on July 12,1992. Prompted by the resident inspector, the Carolina Power and LightCompany (the licensee) retested this pump on August 24, 1992, and found norecirculation flow. The licensee also tested the A SI pump and found therecirculation flow was 10 percent lower than when it was last measured. Thelicensee declared both pumps inoperable and took the unit to cold shutdown.On August 25, 1992, the licensee opened the B SI pump recirculation line andremoved a single piece of white plastic, about the size of a nickel, from theinline orifice.Previously, on July 8, 1992, the licensee had declared the B SI pumpinoperable after a quarterly inservice inspection surveillance test found thatit was producing a recirculation flow of 11.4 Liters [3 gallons] per minute,rather than the required 132.5 Liters [35 gallons] per minute. On July 9,1992, the licensee shut down the plant to determine the cause of the low flow.The licensee removed the recirculation line for the B SI pump and found thatdebris was obstructing the inline orifice.9212170209 Pyt I ( /'aq9A Ac se 0C20 28 IN 92-85December 23, 1992 On July 12, 1992, after flushing the B SI pump and verifying thatrecirculation flows for both SI pumps were acceptable, the licensee returnedthe unit to service. The licensee also tested all other ECCS pumps that couldhave had contact with foreign material. The licensee believed, prior to plantstartup, that all debris had been removed.Point Beach Unit 2On September 28, 1992, the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee)performed an ASME Section XI quarterly test of containment spray pumps andvalves. During the test, the licensee noted that the discharge pressure forthe A train containment spray pump was zero and that the pump was making anabnormal noise. The test was stopped and the pump was declared inoperable.Upon disassembly of the pump, a foam rubber plug was found blocking theimpeller suction. The licensee removed the plug and retested the pump. Thetest was successfully completed and the pump was declared operable.DiscussionThe licensee at H. B. Robinson determined that the foreign material found inthe SI system was a plastic material that had been used during a modificationof the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system performed in March throughJune 1992. The plastic material is manufactured by DuPont and the trade nameis Delrin-AF. At the time of the RHR modification, the plastic material hadbeen cut into-four 23=centimeter [9-inch]-diameter,-circular pieces for use-asweld purge dams. However, after completing the modification, the licensee didnot account for two of the four pieces. Delrin-AF decomposes at RCS systemconditions because of reaction with the water and thermal degradation. Thelicensee suspected that the purge dam pieces broke,. entered the RHR pipingafter breaking, and migrated into the refueling water storage tank (RWST) andSI header during initial cavity draindown.The licensee sent divers with cameras into the RWST to inspect for theplastic. The divers found three fragments of Delrin-AF plastic and also otherpieces of miscellaneous debris. The location and size of the recoveredDelrin-AF material agrees with the material migration theory since all of thepieces were larger than those recovered from the B SI pump in July and August.The licensee inspected orifices for the SI pump minimum flow recirculationlines and also visually inspected piping, tanks, and components to find andremove any foreign material. Also, the licensee evaluated the potentialeffect on other ECCS equipment and concluded that the ECCS equipment wouldcontinue to be operable and reliabl IN 92-85December 23, 1992 The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined thatthe plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications were made toinstall full flow test lines in the RHR, containment spray and safetyinjection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage. The NRC reviewed theevent and determined that one train of the safety injection system piping wasrendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of the presence of theplug. This condition had continued for about a year and was caused byinadequate foreign material exclusion controls during the system modificationsmade in the previous outage.The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or postmodification testing since blockages may not appear immediately. However,small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where thedebris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation. Theseexamples illustrate the consequences of failure to ensure accountability ofall materials that are used when safety systems are opened and to performcleanliness checks of all affected areas prior to system closure.Related Generic CommunicationOn November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris InContainment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," whichaddressed problems that could result from debris in containment emergencysumps.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.rnan K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Eric Benner, NRR(301) 504-1171
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices z-4Va0z0V-vzCD -->n-_ _z110-4UcmmU1 0 CflCa/zAttachmentIN 92-85December 23, 1992Page I of 1LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformationNotice No. Subject92-84 Release of PatientsTreated with TemporaryImplants88-23, Potential for GasSupp. 4 Binding of High-Pres-sure Safety InjectionPumps during A DesignBasis Accident92-83 Thrust Limits forLimitorque Actuatorsand Potential Over-stressing of Motor-Operated Valves92-82 Results of Thermo-Lag330-1 CombustibilityTesting92-81 Potential Deficiencyof Electrical Cableswith Bonded HypalonJackets92-80 Results of Thermo-Lag330-1 CombustibilityTesting92-79 Non-Power ReactorEmergency Event Response92-78 Piston to CylinderLiner Tin Smearing onCooper-Bessemer KSVDiesel EnginesVate ofIssuance Issued to12/17/92 All Nuclear RegulatoryComnission Medical (Licensees.12/18/92 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors12/17/92 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors12/15/92 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors12/11/92 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.12/07/92 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.12/01/92 All holders of OLs or CPs(for test and researchreactors.11/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.DL -Operating LicenseCP -Construction Permit
'UIN 92-XXDecember xx, 1992 The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined thatthe plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications were made toinstall full flow test lines-in the residual heat removal (RHR), containmentspray and safety injection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage. The NRCreviewed the event and determined that one train of the safety injectionsystem piping was rendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of thepresence of the plug. The NRC issued a Notice of Violation and ProposedImposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $75,000. This violation, whichwas classified at Severity Level III, continued for about a year and wascaused by inadequate foreign material exclusion controls during the systemmodifications made in the previous outage.The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or postmodification testing since blockages may not appear immediately. However,small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where thedebris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation. Wheneversafety systems are opened, it is important to ensure accountability of anymaterials that are used and to perform cleanliness checks of all affectedareas prior to system closure.Related Generic CommunicationOn November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris InContainment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," whichaddressed problems that could result from debris in containment emergencysumps.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Eric Benner, NRR(301) 504-1171
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOEAB:DORS ASC/OEAB:DORS ADM:RPB PM:PD2-1:DRPEDGarcia* AGautam* JMain* BMozafari*10/07/92 10/14/92 09/28/92 10/13/92C/SRXB:DSSA C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS OE C/OGCB:DORS D/DORSRJones* AChaffee* JBirmingham , Lieberman* GMarcus BGrimes10/08/92 11/09/92 12////92 ~/ ' 2/09/92 12/1 i/927 12/ /92DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMG 4 I' JK)IN 92-XXDecember xx, 992The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined thatthe plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications were made toinstall full flow test lines in the residual heat removal (RHR), containmentspray and safety injection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage. The NRCreviewed the event and determined that one train of the safety injectionsystem piping was rendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of thepresence of the plug. The NRC is issuing a Notice of Violation and ProposedImposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $75,000. This violation, whichhas been classified at Severity Level III, continued for about a year and wascaused by inadequate foreign material exclusion controls during the systemmodifications made in the previous outage.The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or postmodification testing since blockages may not appear immediately. However,small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where thedebris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation. Wheneversafety systems are opened, it is important to ensure accountability of anymaterials that are used and to perform cleanliness checks of all affectedareas prior to system closure.Related Generic CommunicationOn November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris InContainment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," whichaddressed problems that could result from debris in containment emergencysumps.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Eric Benner, NRR(301) 504-1171
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOEAB:DORS ASC/OEAB:DORS ADM:RPB PM:PD2-1:DRPEDGarcia* AGautam* JMain* BMozafari*10/07/92 10/14/92 09/28/92 10/13/92C/SRXB:DSSA C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS OE AzK C/OGCB:DORSRJones* AChaffee* JBirmingham JLieberman GMarcus10/08/92 11/09/92 12/ /92 12/f /92 12/ /92DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMGD/DORSBGrimes12/ /92 I IIN 92-XXDecember xx, 992pieces of miscellaneous debris. The location and size of the recoveredDelrin-AF material agrees with the material migration theory since all of thepieces were larger than those recovered from the B SI pump in July and August.The licensee inspected orifices for the SI pump minimum flow recirculationlines, and visually inspected piping, tanks, and components to find and removeany foreign material. Also, the licensee evaluated the potential effect onother ECCS equipment and concluded that the ECCS equipment would continue tobe operable and reliable.7-1- t-The staff notes thatl$resence of small debris may not be detected byoperational or post-modification testing since blockages may not appearimmediately. However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller crosssections where the debris can collect and cause blockage after extendedoperation. Whenever safety systems are opened, it is important to ensureaccountability of any materials that are used and to perform'cleanlinesschecks of all affected areas prior to system closure.Related Generic CommunicationOn November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris InContainment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," whichaddressed problems that could result from debris in containment emergencysumps.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical cor
Attachment:
- SEE PREVIOUSOEAB:DORSDGarcia*10/07/92C/SRXB:DSSARJones*10/08/92DOCUMENT NAMEitact: Eric Benner, NRR(301) 504-1171List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesCONCURRENCEASC/OEAB:DORS ADM:RPB PM:PD2-1:DRPEAGautam* JMain* BMozafari*10/14/92 09/28/92 10/13/92C/OEAB:DORS OGCB:DORS OE C/OGCAChaffee* JBirmingham* JLieberman* GMarc11/09/92 12/11/92 12/09/92 12/11E: G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMGB:DORSus*/92D/DORSBGrimes12/ /92
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOEAB:DORSDGarcia*10/07/92ASC/OEAB:DORSAGautam*10/14/92ADM:RPBJMain*09/28/92PM:PD2-1:DRPEBMozafari*10/13/92C/SRXB:DSSARJones*10/08/92DOCUMENT NAME:C/OEAB:DORS C/OGCB:DORSAChaffee* GMarcus11/09/92 / /92G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMGD/DORSBGrimes/ /92 IN 92-XXNovember xx, 1992 Related Generic CommunicationOn November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, 'Debris InContainment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," in which itdiscussed problems that could result from debris found in containmentemergency sumps.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:D. Garcia, NRR(301) 504-1170
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOEAB:DORSDGarcia*10/07/92ASC/OEAB:DORSAGautam*10/14/92ADM:RPBJMain*09/28/92PM:PD2-1:DRPEBMozafari*10/13/92C/SRXB:DSSARJones*10/08/92C/OE f DORSAChaffeeIl /.ci/92C/OGCB:DORSGMarcus/ /92 ID/DORSBGrimes/ /92DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMC IN 92-XXOctober xx, 1992 Related Generic CommunicationOn November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris InContainment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," in which itdiscussed problems that could result from debris found in containmentemergency sumps.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:D. Garcia, NRR(301) 504-1170
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOEAB:DORSDGarcia*10/07/92ASC/OEAB:DgRS/cLAGautamOC/6 //~/ 92ADM:RPBJMain*09/28/92PM:PD2-1:DRPEBMozafari*10/13/92C/SRXB:DSSARJones*10/08/92C/OEAB:DORSAChaffee/ /92C/OGCB:DORSGMarcus/ /92D/DORSBGrimes/ /92DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DEBRIS.DMG IN 92-XXOctober xx, 1992 Related Generic CommunicationOn November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, 'Debris InContainment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations,' in which itdiscussed problems that could result from debris found in containmentemergency sumps.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Denise M. Garcia, NRR(301) 504-1170
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS0 : RS,92C/ SARJon'es/0 /1(/92CONCURRENCEASC/OEAB:DORSAGautam/ /92C/OEAB:DORSAChaffee/ /92ADM:RPBJMain*09/28/92C/OGCB:DORSGMarcus/ /92PM:PD2-1 :DRP fl,_fv,BMozafari/0//13/92D/DORSBGrimes/ /92DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DEBRIS.DMG This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Denise M. Garcia, NRR(301) 504-1171
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesOEAB:DOEADGarcia/ /92SC/OEAB:DOEAAGautam/ /92ADM:RPBJMain Q h9/ 2J /f2PM:PD2-1:DRPEBMozafari/ /92C/SRXB:DSTRJones/ /92C/OEAB:DOEAAChaffee/ /92C/OGCB:DOEAGMarcus/ /92D/DOEACRossi/ /92DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DEBRIS.DMG K-)UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555December 23, 1992NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-85: POTENTIAL FAILURES OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLINGSYSTEMS CAUSED BY FOREIGN MATERIAL BLOCKAGE
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice to alert addressees to the potential failure of emergency core coolingsystems (ECCS) caused by foreign material blockage. It is expected thatrecipients will review the information for applicability to their facilitiesand consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However,suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
H. B. Robinson Unit 2On August 23, 1992, while the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant was in mode 4, hotshutdown, plant personnel were performing an operations surveillance test ofthe B safety injection (SI) pump. This test found that the recirculation flowwas 20 percent lower than it had been when it was last measured on July 12,1992. Prompted by the resident inspector, the Carolina Power and LightCompany (the licensee) retested this pump on August 24, 1992, and found norecirculation flow. The licensee also tested the A SI pump and found therecirculation flow was 10 percent lower than when it was last measured. Thelicensee declared both pumps inoperable and took the unit to cold shutdown.On August 25, 1992, the licensee opened the B SI pump recirculation line andremoved a single piece of white plastic, about the size of a nickel, from theinline orifice.Previously, on July 8, 1992, the licensee had declared the B SI pumpinoperable after a quarterly inservice inspection surveillance test found thatit was producing a recirculation flow of 11.4 Liters [3 gallons] per minute,rather than the required 132.5 Liters [35 gallons] per minute. On July 9,1992, the licensee shut down the plant to determine the cause of the low flow.The licensee removed the recirculation line for the B SI pump and found thatdebris was obstructing the inline orifice.9212 0209
<-2 <off92-85December 23, 1992 On July 12, 1992, after flushing the B SI pump and verifying thatrecirculation flows for both SI pumps were acceptable, the licensee returnedthe unit to service. The licensee also tested all other ECCS pumps that couldhave had contact with foreign material. The licensee believed, prior to plantstartup, that all debris had been removed.Point Beach Unit 2On September 28, 1992, the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee)performed an ASME Section XI quarterly test of containment spray pumps andvalves. During the test, the licensee noted that the discharge pressure forthe A train containment spray pump was zero and that the pump was making anabnormal noise. The test was stopped and the pump was declared inoperable.Upon disassembly of the pump, a foam rubber plug was found blocking theimpeller suction. The licensee removed the plug and retested the pump. Thetest was successfully completed and the pump was declared operable.DiscussionThe licensee at H. B. Robinson determined that the foreign material found inthe SI system was a plastic material that had been used during a modificationof the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system performed in March throughJune 1992. The plastic material is manufactured by DuPont and the trade nameis Delrin-AF. At the time of the RHR modification, the plastic material hadbeen cut into four 23-centimeter (9-inch] diameter, circular pieces for use asweld purge dams. However, after completing the modification, the licensee didnot account for two of the four pieces. Delrin-AF decomposes at RCS systemconditions because of reaction with the water and thermal degradation. Thelicensee suspected that the purge dam pieces broke, entered the RHR pipingafter breaking, and migrated into the refueling water storage tank (RWST) andSI header during initial cavity draindown.The licensee sent divers with cameras into the RWST to inspect for theplastic. The divers found three fragments of Delrin-AF plastic and also otherpieces of miscellaneous debris. The location and size of the recoveredDelrin-AF material agrees with the material migration theory since all of thepieces were larger than those recovered from the B SI pump in July and August.The licensee inspected orifices for the SI pump minimum flow recirculationlines and also visually inspected piping, tanks, and components to find andremove any foreign material. Also, the licensee evaluated the potentialeffect on other ECCS equipment and concluded that the ECCS equipment wouldcontinue to be operable and reliabl IN 92-85December 23, 1992 The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined thatthe plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications were made toinstall full flow test lines in the RHR, containment spray and safetyinjection systems, during the 1991 refueling outage. The NRC reviewed theevent and determined that one train of the safety injection system piping wasrendered inoperable in the recirculation mode because of the presence of theplug. This condition had continued for about a year and was caused byinadequate foreign material exclusion controls during the system modificationsmade in the previous outage.The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational or postmodification testing since blockages may not appear immediately. However,small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where thedebris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation. Theseexamples illustrate the consequences of failure to ensure accountability ofall materials that are used when safety systems are opened and to performcleanliness checks of all affected areas prior to system closure.Related Generic CommunicationOn November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris InContainment Emergency Sumps and Incorrect Screen Configurations," whichaddressed problems that could result from debris in containment emergencysumps.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.rnan K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Eric Benner, NRR(301) 504-1171
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices lI 1K"K-,IAttachmentIN 92-85December 23, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to92-8488-23,Supp. 492-8392-8292-8192-80Release of PatientsTreated with TemporaryImplantsPotential for GasBinding of High-Pres-sure Safety InjectionPumps during A DesignBasis AccidentThrust Limits forLimitorque Actuatorsand Potential Over-stressing of Motor-Operated ValvesResults of Thermo-Lag330-1 CombustibilityTestingPotential Deficiencyof Electrical Cableswith Bonded HypalonJacketsResults of Thermo-Lag330-1 CombustibilityTestingNon-Power ReactorEmergency Event ResponsePiston to CylinderLiner Tin Smearing onCooper-Bessemer KSVDiesel Engines12/17/9212/18/9212/17/9212/15/9212/11/9212/07/9212/01/9211/30/92All Nuclear RegulatoryCommission MedicalLicensees.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor test and researchreactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.92-7992-78OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit