IR 05000321/2009007

IR 05000321-09-007, 05000366-09-007; on 10/19/2009 - 11/05/2009; Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Biennial Baseline Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection

ML093380463
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/04/2009
From:	Merzke D J Reactor Projects Branch 7
To:	Madison D R Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-09-007
Download: ML093380463 (19)

Text

December 4, 2009

Mr. Dennis Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant 11030 Hatch Parkway North Baxley, GA 31513

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2009007 AND 05000366/2009007

Dear Mr. Madison:

On November 5, 2009, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at your Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on November 5, 2009, with yourself and other members of your staff.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of plant equipment and activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the sample selected for review, there were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The team concluded that in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. However, during the inspection, some examples of minor problems were identified, including conditions adverse to quality that were not being entered into the corrective action program, narrowly focused condition report evaluations, and corrective actions that were ineffectively tracked or had not occurred.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document SNC 2 system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/

Daniel J. Merzke, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000321/2009007 and 05000366/2009007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information

cc w/encl. (See next page)

_________________________ X G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE MFK /RA/ Via telecom Via telecom DCA /RA/ SMS /RA/ DXM /RA/ NAME MKing EMorris GKolcum DArnett SShaeffer SRose DMerzke DATE 11/30/2009 11/30/2009 11/30/2009 12/01/2009 12/02/2009 12/04/2009 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO SNC 3 cc w/encl: Angela Thornhill Managing Attorney and Compliance Officer Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Jeffrey T. Gasser Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Raymond D. Baker Licensing Manager Licensing - Hatch Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution L. Mike Stinson Vice President Fleet Operations Support Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Paula Marino Vice President Engineering Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Moanica Caston Vice President and General Counsel Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Steven B. Tipps Hatch Principal Engineer - Licensing Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. Ken Rosanski Resident Manager Edwin I. Hatch Oglethorpe Power Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution Lee Foley Manager of Contracts Generation Oglethorpe Power Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution Arthur H. Domby, Esq. Troutman Sanders Electronic Mail Distribution Dr. Carol Couch Director Environmental Protection Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution

Cynthia Sanders Program Manager Radioactive Materials Program Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Jim Sommerville (Acting) Chief Environmental Protection Division Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. Steven M. Jackson Senior Engineer - Power Supply Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. Reece McAlister Executive Secretary Georgia Public Service Commission Electronic Mail Distribution Chairman Appling County Commissioners County Courthouse 69 Tippins Street, Suite 201 Baxley, GA 31513 SNC 4 Letter to Dennis from Daniel J. Merzke December 4, 2009

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2009007 AND 05000366/2009007 Distribution w/encl

C. Evans, RII EICS L. Slack, RII EICS OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMHatch Resource

Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos: DPR-57, NPF-5

Report No: 05000321/2009007 and 05000366/2009007 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: 11030 Hatch Pkwy N Baxley, Georgia 31513 Dates: October 19, 2009 through November 5, 2009

Inspectors: M. King, Senior Project Engineer (Team Leader) E. Morris, Hatch Senior Resident Inspector G. Kolcum, Brunswick Resident Inspector D. Arnett, Project Engineer

Approved by: Daniel J. Merzke, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321/2009-007, 05000366/2009-007; 10/19/2009 - 11/05/2009; Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Biennial Baseline Identification and Resolution of Problems Inspection.

The inspection was conducted by a senior project engineer, a senior resident inspector, a project engineer and a resident inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Identification and Resolution of Problems The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. Generally, the threshold for initiating condition reports (CRs) was appropriately low, as evidenced by the types of problems identified and the large number of CRs entered annually into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). Employees were encouraged by management to initiate CRs. However, the team did identify some examples where plant issues were not appropriately entered into the CAP.

Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were consistent with the licensee's CAP guidance, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally timely, effective, and commensurate with the safety significance of the issues.

The team determined that, overall, audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. The licensee's operating experience (OE) usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensee's processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations. However, the team did identify two examples where the licensee did not evaluate the need to release external OE when defects in vendor supplied qualified components were identified.

Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.

A. NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's CAP procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of CRs. To verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the inspectors reviewed CRs that had been issued between August 2007 and October 2009, including a detailed review of selected CRs associated with the following risk-significant systems: residual heat removal (RHR), RHR service water, station auxiliary DC power system, and reactor building heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC). Where possible, the inspectors independently verified that the corrective actions were implemented as intended. The inspectors also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the team selected a representative number of CRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, Emergency Preparedness, Health Physics, Chemistry, and Security. These CRs were reviewed to assess each department's threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed selected CRs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where CRs were screened for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold.

The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns of equipment associated with the selected systems and other plant areas to assess the material condition and to look for any deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed CRs, maintenance history, completed work orders (WOs) for the systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a 26-month period of time; however, in accordance with the inspection procedure, a 5-year review was performed for selected systems for age-dependent issues.

Control room walkdowns were also performed to assess the main control room (MCR) deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were entered into the CAP. Operator Workarounds and Operator Burden screenings were reviewed, and the inspectors verified compensatory measures for deficient equipment which were being implemented in the field.

The team conducted a detailed review of selected CRs to assess the adequacy of the root-cause and apparent-cause evaluations of the problems identified. The inspectors reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problem described in the CRs and the guidance in the licensee's procedure, NMP-GM-002-GL03, "Cause Determination Guideline." The inspectors assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and had adequately addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

The team reviewed site trend reports, to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified.

The inspectors attended various plant meetings to observe management oversight functions of the corrective action process. These included corrective action program coordinators (CAPCO) meetings and the Management Review Meeting (MRM).

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Assessment Identification of Issues The team determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating CRs as described in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program," management expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate CRs for any reason, a review of system health reports, the types of problems identified, and the large number of CRs entered annually into the CAP. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. However, the team did identify the following examples of minor performance deficiencies where conditions adverse to quality were not entered into the CAP, contrary to procedure NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program." However, the inspectors determined these performance deficiencies were not findings of significance and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy:

• The inspector's review of control room logs identified that on November 4, 2007, a Unit 1 RHR pump discharge check valve, 1E11-F031C, failed to reseat following a surveillance of the Unit 1 'C' RHR pump. The licensee failed to initiate a CR to document this failure. The operability of the RHR system was maintained when the operators briefly started the Unit 1 "A" RHR pump which successfully seated the 1E11-F031C check valve. Inspectors noted that the failure of this check valve to seat had been identified and documented in a previous CR and the repair was scheduled to occur the next day. The licensee initiated CR 2009110928 to address this issue.

• Inspectors identified that work to inspect and repair a Unit 1 RHR pump discharge check valve, 1E11-FO31A, which occurred on September 13, 2008, documented a condition where the disc size was different than expected and required vendor support to resolve. The licensee failed to initiate a CR to document the parts discrepancy. The licensee initiated CR 2009110561 to address this issue. This issue had no impact on the operability of the RHR system.

• Inspectors identified that several CR's had been written which documented electrolyte leakage from battery cells, 1A and 2B station service batteries and the 1A, 1B, 1C, and 2C diesel generator batteries, manufactured by C&D Technologies. The licensee recognized the extent of the condition in the system health report; however, the licensee failed to initiate a CR to document the widespread condition as an adverse trend in the CAP. The licensee initiated CR 209110573 to address this issue. This issue had no impact on the operability of the station service batteries or the diesel generator batteries.

Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues Based on the review of audits conducted by the licensee and the assessment conducted by the inspection team during the onsite period, the team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in the prioritization and evaluation of identified problems.

Problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensee's CAP procedures as described in the CR severity level determination guidance in NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program." Each CR written was assigned a severity level at the CAPCO meeting, and adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk.

The team determined that the licensee had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the site CAP procedures, and assigned cause determinations were appropriate considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. A variety of causal-analysis techniques were used depending on the type and complexity of the issue consistent with licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-GL03, "Cause Determination Guideline." The licensee had performed evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. The team further determined that operability, reportability, and degraded or non-conforming condition determinations had been completed consistent with the guidance contained in NMP-AD-012, "Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions." However, the team did make the following observation in the area of prioritization and evaluation of issues:

• CR 2007107101 was initiated on July 24, 2007, for failure of the Unit 1 'C' RHR pump discharge check valve, 1E11-FO31C, to seat. The operability information documented in the CR concluded the valve was operable after corrective action was taken to reseat the valve and vent the system; however, the CR did not document that the system had become inoperable before the operators performed those corrective actions. By site CAP procedures, a determination of inoperability and entry into the associated technical specification action statement is a key factor in determining the appropriate severity level (SL) for CR's. In this case, the inspectors determined that, although the inoperability aspect was not considered in assigning a SL to this CR, the SL of the CR would not have changed and the licensee conducted the appropriate evaluation of the degraded condition. Inspectors also noted that compensatory actions which were put into place by Operations as a result of this degraded condition were performed outside of the CAP process (i.e., were not documented and tracked by the CR). The licensee initiated CR 2009110566 to address this issue.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the team determined that overall, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected and non-recurring. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence in that a review of performance indicators, all CRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective. However, the team did make the following observations in the area of effectiveness of corrective actions:

• Inspectors identified that CR 2008102274 contained three action items which established specific effectiveness review criteria as documented in the effectiveness review plan section of the root cause analysis. The three action items were subsequently consolidated into a single action item; however, one of the planned effectiveness review criteria of "no event recurrence" was not retained or conducted. This omission of recommended effectiveness review criteria represented a missed opportunity to ensure the intent of the root cause corrective action plan was met. The licensee initiated CR 2009110171 to address this issue.

• A review of tagout records revealed that a corrective action for CR 2008102274 requiring tagout preparers to explicitly document assumptions on tagout cover sheets was not being implemented in practice. Inspectors did not identify any examples where the ineffective implementation of tagout preparation guidance significantly impacted operations or maintenance activities; however, this issue represented a missed opportunity for the licensee to identify an ineffective corrective action. The licensee initiated CR 2009111080 to address this issue.

(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

b. Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)

(1) Inspection Scope The team examined licensee programs for reviewing industry operating experience and reviewed licensee procedure NMP-GM-008, "Operating Experience Program," to assess the effectiveness of how external and internal operating experience data was handled at the plant. In addition, the team selected operating experience documents (e.g., NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and plant internal operating experience items, etc.), which had been issued since August 2007 to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to the Hatch plant, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Assessment Based on a review of documentation related to the review of OE issues, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening OE for applicability to the plant. The inspectors verified for selected issues that industry OE was evaluated at either the corporate or plant level depending on the source and type of document. Relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. OE issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, operating experience was included in each root cause evaluation reviewed by the inspectors in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-GL03, "Cause Determination Guideline." However, the team did make the following observation regarding the licensee's use of OE:

• The inspectors identified two examples where the licensee missed an opportunity to evaluate the need to generate external OE when vendor supplied qualified components were determined to be deficient. The first example was a manufacturing defect associated with the lid-to-jar seal for the 1A and 2B station service batteries and the 1A, 1B, 1C, and 2C diesel generator batteries. The second example was a manufacturing defect affecting RHR pump discharge check valve seat tolerances. The licensee initiated CR 209110573 and CR 2009110603 to address this issue. Subsequent screening by the licensee concluded that neither of the issues above could have created a substantial safety hazard.

(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

c. Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

(1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-003, "Self Assessment."

(2) Assessment The team determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate. Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the team's independent review. The team verified that CRs were created to document all areas for improvement and findings resulting from the self-assessments, and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate. Site trend reports were thorough and a low threshold was established for evaluation of potential trends, as evidenced by the CRs reviewed that were initiated as a result of adverse trends. (3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (1) Inspection Scope During normal interactions with plant employees during the course of this inspection, the inspectors informally interviewed plant personnel regarding their knowledge of the CAP at Hatch and their willingness to write CRs or raise safety concerns. The inspectors conducted interviews to develop a general perspective of the safety-conscious work environment at the site to determine if any conditions existed that would cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Concerns Program Procedure and interviewed the Concerns Coordinator. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of employee concern issues which had been entered into the CAP to verify concerns were being properly reviewed and deficiencies were being resolved.

(2) Assessment Based on the interviews conducted and the CRs reviewed, the team determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and concerns program. These methods were readily accessible to all employees. Based on discussions conducted with a sample of plant employees from various departments, the inspectors concluded that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.

(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On November 5, 2009, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Madison and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

S. Bargeron - Plant Manager T. Beckworth - Employee Concerns Program Coordinator B. Bowers - System Engineer S. Brunson - NSSS System Supervisor

C. Clark - Systems Engineer C. Dixon - Corrective Action Supervisor J. Dixon - Health Physics Manager W. Holt - Outage & Scheduling Manager B. Hulett - Site Design Engineering Manager G. Johnson - Hatch Engineering Director D. Madison - Hatch Site Vice President

R. Miller - Outage Scheduling Coordinator J. Payne - Senior Plant Engineer S. Soper - Engineering Support Manager T. Spring - Acting Operations Manager S. Tipps - Principal Licensing Engineer

K. Underwood - Performance Improvement Supervisor R. Varnadore - Maintenance Manager A. Wilcher - Systems Engineer A. Wolf - Operations Superintendant

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

Concerns Program Procedure, Versions 8 - 10

NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Versions 6

NMP-GM-002-001, Corrective Action Program, Versions 3 - 13

NMP-GM-002-002, Effectiveness Review Instruction, Version 1

NMP-GM-002-GL03, Cause Determination Guideline, Version 12

NMP-GM-002-GL09, CAP Training and Qualification Plan, Version 1

NMP-GM-003, Self Assessment, Versions 7 - 14

NMP-GM-006, Work Management, Version 10.0

NMP-GM-008, Operating Experience Program, Versions 4 - 7

NMP-AD-012, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions, Versions 2 - 6

NMP-ES-005, Scoping and Importance Determination for Equipment Reliability, Version 6.0

Self-Assessments Integrated Performance Assessment - Cross Functional Review Results, January 2009 CAP Trend Summary Report, February 2009 through April 2009 Fleet Oversight Audit of the Corrective Action Program, H-CAP-2009-1 Fleet Oversight Quarterly Assessment Report- 4th Qtr 2008 Fleet Oversight Assessment, H-FOA-EOY-2009-1, HNP Assessment of 2008 End of Year Performance Improvement Focus Areas, August 2009 Team OE Self Assessment, August 4-13, 2008 Apparent Cause/Basic Cause Determination Self-Assessment - August 24-September 2, 2009 Security Department Contingency Response Self Assessment, July 20-28, 2009 H-FOA-EP-2009-1, Fleet Oversight Assessment Report, March 16, 2009

H-FOA-PI-2009-1, Security Firing Range Safety, March 26, 2009 H-FOA-EP-2009-2, Emergency Preparedness Drill #1, July 15, 2009 FME Program Focused Self Assessment, February 27-29, 2008 Maintenance Department, Focused Self Assessment on Procedure Use and Adherence, September 15-23, 2008

Operations Work Management Fleet Self Assessment, July 9-18, 2008 System Monitoring Self Assessment, July 29-31, 2008 RP Team Self-Assessment - High Rad Controls, August 20-24, 2007 Engineering Self Assessment - System Engineering Training, March 23-27, 2009 Site Engineering Performance Monitoring Adverse Trend Summary, August 19, 2009

Condition Reports

(CRs)

2006104145

2007101917

2007101917

2007102616

2007102619

2007102669

2007103319

2007103319

2007105289

2007106026

2007106065

2007106943

2007106973

2007106973

2007107001

2007107101

2007107325

2007107872

2007107887

2007107960

2007107976

2007108031

2007108052

2007108094

2007108113

2007108141

2007108182

2007108207

2007108208

2007108228

2007108310

2007108421

2007108499

2007108523

2007108693

2007108698

Attachment

2007108703

2007108704

2007108705

2007108706

2007108708

2007108709

2007108710

2007108711

2007108712

2007108713

2007108720

2007108721

2007109149

2007109171

2007109560

2007109812

2007109812

2007109991

2007109991

2007110301

2007110370

2007110396

2007111020

2007111034

2007111034

2007111035

2008100154

2008100154

2008100163

2008100410

2008100491

2008100509

2008100632

2008100637

2008100676

2008100681

2008101004

2008101013

2008101376

2008101568

2008101568

2008101568

2008101702

2008101702

2008101703

2008101849

2008101993

2008102081

2008102081

2008102081

2008102141

2008102143

2008102237

2008102274

2008102274

2008102315

2008102328

2008102470

2008102534

2008102596

2008102669

2008102678

2008102741

2008102767

2008102783

2008102803

2008102813

2008103067

2008103067

2008103067

2008103413

2008103498

2008103628

2008103741

2008103776

2008104090

2008104152

2008104154

2008104250

2008104275

2008104352

2008104442

2008104519

2008104612

2008104731

2008104840

2008104894

2008104907

2008105108

2008105108

2008105201

2008105219

2008105358

2008105560

2008105696

2008105696

2008105696

2008105801

2008106016

2008106041

2008106075

2008106109

2008106111

2008106226

2008106252

2008106515

2008106575

2008106694

2008106861

2008106867

2008106907

2008106907

2008107088

2008107368

2008107562

2008107562

2008107697

2008107709

2008107760

2008107923

2008108069

2008108095

2008108250

2008108546

2008109176

2008109177

2008109206

2008109261

2008109616

2008109697

2008109697

2008109728

2008110421

2008111160

2008111160

2008111727

2008111955

2008111956

2008111957

2009100030

2009100069

2009100173

2009100196

2009100197

2009100583

2009100903

2009100911

2009100958

2009100958

2009100999

2009101108

2009101108

2009101161

2009101299

2009101341

2009101411

2009101450

2009101451

2009101597

2009101973

2009102215

2009102385

2009102439

2009102615

2009102712

2009102730

2009102787

2009102825

2009102825

2009103146

2009103239

2009103240

2009103241

2009103264

2009103391

2009103408

2009103531

2009103587

2009103588

2009103950

2009103957

2009104345

2009104405

2009104488

2009104795

2009104795

2009104953

2009104991

2009105006

2009105651

2009105670

2009105763

Attachment

2009105827

2009105836

2009106103

2009106212

2009106714

2009106880

2009106989

2009107004

2009107290

2009107299

2009107511

2009107525

2009107547

2009108179

2009108308

2009108558

2009108558

2009108768

2009108801

2009109272

2009110090

2009110164

2009110164

2009110165

2009110165

2009110166

2009110166

2009110167

2009110168

2009110180

2009110180

2009110181

2009110181

2009110182

2009110182

Action Items (AIs)

2007201184

2007201185

2007203159

2007203160

2007203162

2007205144

2007205148

2007205149

2008201673

2008201993

2008202650

2008204319

2008204641

2008204649

2008205143

2009200294

2009200919

2009200920

2009200946

2009200947

2009201022

2009201023

2009201076

2009201116

2009201661

2009203219

2009203665

Work Orders

(WOs):

1052400101

1060705701

1061937202

1091066701

1091068903

1091989601

2070870801

Operating Orders (OOs):

OO-01-0608S

OO-01-0907S

OO-04-0308

System Health Reports:

Station Auxiliary DC Power Systems, 3

rd Qtr 2007 - 2

nd Qtr 2009 Residual Heat Removal System, 2

nd Qtr 2009 Reactor Building HVAC 2

nd Qtr 2009 Drywell Cooling 2

nd Qtr 2009

Other Documents:

Calculation: 0900269.300 dated March 2, 2009 Allowable Wall loss determination worksheet Watermark

SMNH-08-010 "Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging Criteria Heat Exchanger Minimum Wall Calculation

HPN-2-FSAR

HPN-1-FSAR Drawing for Reactor Building Ventilation System Below

EL 130' 0"

Sheet No H-26229 Reptask 2E11F031B3

Attachment Reptask 2E11F031C1 Reptask 2E11F031D1 Equivalency Determination (ED)

1080147401 As Built Notice (ABN)-H00841,

ABN-H01052

Lesson Plan Z41-MCREC-LP-03701 CRs/AIs initiated as a result of inspection:

2006110106

2009110090

2009110091

2009110105

2009110106

2009110106

2009110136

2009110137

2009110138

2009110139

2009110140

2009110142

2009110144

2009110164

2009110165

2009110166

2009110167

2009110168

2009110169

2009110171

2009110180

2009110180

2009110181

2009110182

2009110190

2009110191

2009110192

2009110194

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