IR 05000298/2018003

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000298/2018003

ML18304A484
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	10/31/2018
From:	Jason Kozal NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
To:	Dent J Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
References
IR 2018003
Download: ML18304A484 (34)

Text

October 31, 2018

SUBJECT:

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000298/2018003

Dear Mr. Dent:

On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Cooper Nuclear Station. On October 17, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented two findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, NRC inspectors documented one Severity Level IV violation with no associated finding. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Cooper Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment, or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Cooper Nuclear Station. Jr.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jason W. Kozal, Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-298 License No. DPR-46

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000298/2018003 w/Attachment: Documents Reviewed

Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket Number(s):

05000298

License Number(s):

DPR-46

Report Number(s):

05000298/2018003

Licensee:

Nebraska Public Power District

Facility:

Cooper Nuclear Station

Location:

Brownville, Nebraska

Inspection Dates:

July 1, 2018 to September 30, 2018

Inspectors:

P. Vossmar, Senior Resident Inspector

M. Tobin, Acting Senior Resident Inspector

M. Stafford, Resident Inspector

J. Ambrosini, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector, R-I

R. Azua, Senior Reactor Inspector

W. Cullum, Reactor Engineer

P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector

D. Johnson, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NSIR

J. Kirkland, Senior Operations Engineer

C. Stott, Reactor Engineer

Approved By:

Jason W. Kozal

Chief, Project Branch C

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Cooper Nuclear Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings and violations are summarized in the tables below.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information in a License Amendment Request Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Inspection Procedure Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000298/2018003-01 Closed Not Applicable 71114.01 -

Exercise Evaluation The inspectors identified that the licensee provided inaccurate information to the NRC in a license amendment request for an emergency action level scheme change. Specifically, the licensee provided information about the measurement ranges of a liquid effluent radiation monitor used in emergency action levels that was not accurate.

Failure to Perform Process Applicability Determination Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Inspection Procedure Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000298/2018003-02 Closed H.5 - Work Management 71152 -

Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a,

Procedures, for the licensees failure to follow Administrative Procedure 0.9, Tagout,

Revision 88, for performing a monthly audit and Process Applicability Determination.

Specifically, the inspectors noted that a clearance order on the safety-related residual heat removal service water booster pump room fan coil unit was hanging for greater than 90 days with no Process Applicability Determination performed, which resulted in the power switch for the fan coil unit being unintentionally tagged out of its normal configuration for almost 2 years.

Failure to Provide Adequate Lubrication for Drywell Fan Coil Units Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Inspection Procedure Initiating Events Green FIN 05000298/2018003-03 Closed H.5 - Work Management 71152 -

Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed a Green, self-revealed finding for the licensees failure to implement Work Order 5060136 during maintenance on the drywell fan coil units. Specifically, on October 26, 2016, during bearing replacement work on drywell fan coil, unit D, maintenance personnel failed to properly reinstall auto-lubricator injection connectors after removing the interferences per the work order instructions. This error resulted in the failure of fan coil, unit D, due to inadequate bearing lubrication and ultimately led to a downpower and reactor shutdown.

PLANT STATUS

Cooper Nuclear Station began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On August 24, 2018, the plant commenced power coast down and on September 29, 2018, the licensee shut the plant down for Refueling Outage

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/

reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Protected area fire protection distribution on July 27, 2018

(2) Startup station service transformer during emergency station service transformer bus replacement on August 9, 2018

(3) Core spray B following maintenance on August 15, 2018

Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the residual heat removal system on September 14, 2018.

71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly Quarterly Inspection

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Standby gas treatment room, Fire Area RB-V, Zone 5B, on August 6, 2018

(2) Reactor building southeast quad, Fire Area RB-B, Zones 1B and 1G, on August 15, 2018

(3) Optimum water chemistry building, Fire Area YD, Zone 26, on August 24, 2018

(4) Reactor building northeast 903 foot level, Fire Area RB-FN, Zone 2A-1, on September 11, 2018

(5) Reactor building northwest 903 foot level, Fire Area RB-CF, Zones 2A-2 and 2B, on September 11, 2018

Annual Inspection (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance on March 30, 2018, and August 23, 2018.

71111.06Flood Protection Measures Cables

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:

(1) Manhole 6A on July 18, 2018

71111.07Heat Sink Performance Heat Sink (Triennial)

The inspectors evaluated exchanger/sink performance on the following components from August 20, 2018, to August 23, 2018:

(1) Residual heat removal heat exchanger B, cooled by service water, Section 02.02b

(2) Reactor equipment cooling heat exchanger B, cooled by service water, Section 02.02b

(3) Emergency diesel generator 1 jacket water heat exchanger, cooled by service water, Section 02.02b

(4) Emergency diesel generator 1 intercooler A, cooled by service water, Section 02.02b

71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification

The inspectors observed and evaluated training scenarios in the simulator on August 28, 2018.

Operator Performance (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated plant shutdown for Refueling Outage 30 on September 29, 2018.

Operator Exams (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed and evaluated requalification examination results on August 15, 2018.

71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Drywell fan coil Unit A on August 24, 2018

(2) Core spray system on September 28, 2018

71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) New fuel receipt inspections on July, 27, 2018

(2) Emergency station service transformer replacement on August 10, 2018

(3) Core spray B valve maintenance on August 15, 2018

(4) Residual heat removal A maintenance window on September 5, 2018

(5) Reactor recirculation M-G set A generator brushes arcing on September 13, 2018

71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Reactor core flow indication issues on July 24, 2018

(2) Mechanical remote operating station hardened vent control structure design discrepancy on August 3, 2018

(3) Residual heat removal service water 18-inch pipe elbow found below bounding 20-inch pipe minimum thickness requirement on September 11, 2018

(4) Residual heat removal service water B pipe SW-E-10-2851-3 found below minimum wall thickness on September 28, 2018

(5) Residual heat removal service water B pipe SW-E-8-2851-3 found below minimum wall thickness on September 28, 2018

(6) Residual heat removal service water B pipe SW-E-7-2851-7 found below minimum wall thickness on September 28, 2018

71111.18Plant Modifications

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary modification:

(1) Voltage regulator temporary modification to address manual controller failure on August 16, 2018

71111.19Post Maintenance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) Core spray A following maintenance on August 1, 2018

(2) Emergency diesel generator compressor 2B replacement on August 10, 2018

(3) Phase 1 of planned emergency station service transformer bus replacement on August 10, 2018

(4) Emergency station service transformer bus corona and moisture repairs on August 10, 2018

(5) Core spray B following maintenance on August 15, 2018

===71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities (Partial Sample) The inspectors evaluated Refueling Outage 30 activities from September 29, 2018, to September 30, 2018. The inspectors completed inspection procedure Sections 03.01.a and 03.01.c.1.

71111.22Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Routine===

(1) Alternate rod insertion instrumentation and control surveillance on July 5, 2018

(2) Emergency diesel generator 2 monthly surveillance run on September 11, 2018

(3) High pressure coolant injection steam line low pressure logic system functional test on September 29, 2018

In-service (1 Sample)

(1) Standby liquid control pump operability test and discharge check valve radiography on September 27, 2018

71114.01Exercise Evaluation

The inspectors evaluated the biennial emergency plan exercise conducted July 31, 2018.

The exercise simulated a fire in the reactor building, a failure on the turbine requiring a manual reactor scram followed by a failure of the reactor protection system to bring the reactor to shutdown (anticipated transients without scram), failures preventing emergency response personnel access to the reactor building, multiple failures of safety relief valves to operate when required, and a pipe break on the high pressure core injection line with a failure of the inboard isolation valve to close. A filtered and monitored radiological release was simulated to occur from the ruptured pipe through the reactor building standby gas treatment system. A wind shift after the General Emergency required the emergency response personnel to develop a second protective action recommendation. The inspectors discussed exercise performance with staff at Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VII.

71114.08Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review

The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the proposed scenario for the July 31, 2018, biennial emergency plan exercise on June 21, 2018. The inspectors discussed the proposed scenario with staff at FEMA Region VII.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

(1) IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (07/01/2017-06/30/2018)

(2) EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (04/01/2017-06/30/2018)

(3) EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation Sample (04/01/2017-06/30/2018)

(4) EP03: Alert And Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (04/01/2017-06/30/2018)

71152Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review

The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for trends in station human performance and risk recognition that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Drywell fan coil unit bearing failures on September 14, 2018

(2) Service water booster pump fan coil unit tagged out for an extended period on September 21,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information in a License Amendment Request Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Inspection Procedure Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 5000298/2018003-01 Closed Not Applicable

71114.01 - Exercise

Evaluation The inspectors identified that the licensee provided inaccurate information to the NRC in a license amendment request for an emergency action level scheme change. Specifically, the licensee provided information about the measurement ranges of a liquid effluent radiation monitor used in emergency action levels that was not accurate.

Description:

The NRC approved an emergency action level (EAL) scheme on February 23, 2010, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)

Accession No. ML100080231), which included changes to emergency action levels AU1.2 and AA1.2. The Unusual Event threshold was 2 times the calculated alarm value for a liquid release, the Alert threshold was 200 times the calculated alarm value. Liquid release alarm setpoints are variable and calculated using methods detailed in the licensees Offsite Dose Assessment Manual. The maximum permissible alarm value was 0.099 µCi/ml on the liquid radwaste effluent monitor, with the maximum instrument range being 0.100 µCi/ml.

The licensee identified on October 26, 2010, that there were no controls in place to ensure that two times and two hundred times the calculated alarm value could be read on the liquid radwaste effluent monitor. Therefore, the licensee could not ensure that emergency action levels AU1.2 and AA1.2 would be accurately implemented when conditions warranted for any specific release package. This was documented in Condition Report CR-CNS-2010-07974.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees license amendment request dated February 26, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090700408), and the licensees response to a request for additional information dated September 24, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092750402) to determine whether the conditions identified in the corrective action program existed at the time the licensee requested the license amendment and whether the request correctly described the instrument responses. The inspectors determined that the licensee was requested to affirm in the request for additional information that all instruments referenced in the license amendment request were capable of measuring the parameter values provided in the proposed emergency action levels. The licensee responded on September 24, 2009, that all instruments were capable of measuring the values proposed in the emergency action levels, including the radiation monitors.

Corrective Action: The licensee made a change to the emergency action levels in 2010 to add upscale high on the liquid effluent radiation monitor as an initiating condition. In 2017 the licensee removed upscale high as a condition of AU1.2 to restore the differentiation between classifications. The inspectors reviewed the licensees current emergency action levels and determined the emergency action levels can be implemented. There is no immediate safety concern pending the licensees long-term corrective action to implement a new emergency action level scheme based on Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors, Revision 6.

Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-CNS-2010-07974, CR-CNS-2016-04791, CR-CNS-2017-01508, CR-CNS-2017-04468, and CR-CNS-2018-04662

Performance Assessment:

The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a reactor oversight program performance deficiency of minor significance. Specifically, it was determined that the licensee failed to maintain the effectiveness of the emergency plan, but it was a minor performance deficiency due to the continued effectiveness of the EAL despite the error.

Enforcement:

Severity: The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance.

Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter noncompliance. This issue was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation using the NRC Enforcement Policy dated May 15, 2018, Section 2.3.11, Inaccurate and Incomplete Information, and Section 6.9, Inaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure to Make a Required Report.

The Enforcement Policy, Section 6.9(c)(1), provides that a violation is characterized as Severity Level III if the accurate information would have caused the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake substantial further inquiry. There are no corresponding Severity Level IV examples. Through discussion with the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR), it was determined that had the accurate information been provided (or had the NRC known the information was inaccurate), the NRC license reviewer would have used the request for additional information (RAI) process to address the license amendment request. Specifically, the licensee would have been required to revise their proposed emergency action levels so they could be implemented before the emergency action scheme change was approved. Because the RAI is a routine NRC process, it was concluded that the failure to provide accurate information to the NRC would not have caused the NRC to undertake substantial further inquiry, and the violation was appropriately characterized as Severity Level IV.

Violation: Section 50.9(a) of 10 CFR states, in part, that information provided by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.

Contrary to the above, on February 26, 2009, and September 24, 2009, information was provided to the Commission by the licensee that was not complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the licensee provided information about the measurement ranges of a liquid effluent radiation monitor used in emergency action levels that were not correct. The information was material to the NRCs decision whether to approve a license amendment request. The NRC approved a license amendment for an emergency action level scheme on February 23, 2010, which included emergency action levels which could not be implemented; the approval of those emergency action levels was based on the incorrect submission provided by the licensee.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Perform Process Applicability Determination Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Inspection Procedure Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000298/2018003-02 Closed H.5 - Work Management

71152 - Problem

Identification and Resolution The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to follow Administrative Procedure 0.9, Tagout, Revision 88, for performing a monthly audit and Process Applicability Determination.

Specifically, the inspectors noted that a clearance order on the safety-related residual heat removal service water booster pump room fan coil unit was hanging for greater than 90 days with no Process Applicability Determination performed, which resulted in the power switch for the fan coil unit being unintentionally tagged out of its normal configuration for almost 2 years.

Description:

In April 2018, inspectors identified a tag, on the safety-related residual heat removal (RHR) service water booster pump (SWBP) room fan coil unit (FCU), which maintained the power switch for the FCU OFF, out of its normal position. This safety-related FCU supports operation of more than one RHR SWBP in the event that normal control building ventilation is lost during an emergency. The FCU had recently been repaired and the licensee informed the inspectors that it had been returned to service. Upon further investigation, the inspectors noted that the tag had been present since July 2016, nearly 2 years. The inspectors also noted that the clearance order (CO) for the Tagout did not have a Process Applicability Determination (PAD) performed. The PAD would have helped the operators recognize the off-normal position of this power switch and would have identified any compensatory measures for the condition. Ultimately the licensee returned the power switch to the normal position, returning the RHR SWBP room FCU to service.

The inspectors reviewed the history associated with this CO. In 2016, the licensee created a work order (WO), WO 5140788, to remove an obsolete, abandoned cooling tower. This cooling tower, a standby to control building ventilation, had been used to cool the RHR SWBP room. The licensee had abandoned this cooling tower in place in 2005. In July of that year, the licensee identified damage to the fan motor associated with this cooling tower.

A subsequent work order, WO 5143045, was created to remove the damaged fan motor, which posed a safety risk, until the obsolete cooling tower could be fully removed. The licensee had to establish a CO in order to remove the fan motor. The CO was established on July 29, 2016. As part of the Tagout process, operations correctly identified this CO as requiring a PAD. The PAD was required because the CO tagged the safety-related RHR SWBP room FCU out of its normal position. On July 31, 2016, a revision to the CO was created and established. This revised CO was not marked as requiring a PAD, and the initial CO was removed. On August 3, 2016, the work to remove the damaged fan motor was completed; however, the CO remained in place to support abandoning the obsolete cooling tower per WO 5140788.

On September 22, 2016, the licensee conducted a monthly Tagout Audit, which included the tag on the RHR SWBP room FCU. As part of the audit process, the licensee incorrectly marked the CO as not requiring a PAD because the work was intended to support abandoning equipment. This was incorrect because the power switch for the safety-related FCU was not being abandoned and was maintained in an off-normal position. WO 5143045, to remove the damaged fan motor, was closed out and marked as complete on October 3, 2016. In January 2017, WO 5140788, to abandon the cooling tower, was placed in a Reschedule status, to be completed at some point in the future. The CO to support this removal was still in place and no subsequent Tagout Audits would identify the need for a PAD.

On October 13, 2017, the licensee identified leakage from the service water portion of the RHR SWBP room FCU. The service water leak was repaired on April 5, 2018. Upon completing work and clearing the tags used to repair the leak, the licensee informed the inspectors that the fan coil unit had been restored to service. A few days later, the inspectors questioned the status of the RHR SWBP room FCU. It was at this time that inspectors noticed the power switch for the FCU was still tagged in the off-normal, OFF position. The inspectors noted that the licensee was surprised to learn of the remaining tag. With the switch positioned to OFF, the FCU would not run if called upon, and only one of four RHR SWBPs could be used in the event of an emergency. These questions led the licensee to revise the CO to remove the tag from the RHR SWBP room FCU. In total, the FCU was inadvertently tagged out from July 29, 2016, until May 8, 2018.

Corrective Action: The licensee revised the clearance order in order to remove the tag from the safety-related RHR SWBP room FCU, thereby returning the fan coil unit to service.

Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report CR-CNS-2018-05472

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to follow Administrative Procedure 0.9 for performing a monthly audit and Process Applicability Determination was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to follow Administrative Procedure 0.9 resulted in a missed opportunity to identify that the RHR SWBP FCU power switch had been inadvertently left tagged out of its normal position. In this configuration, the licensee was limited to only being able to run one RHR SWBP at a time, thereby adversely impacting the cornerstone objective.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding:

(1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system, structure, or component;

(2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function;

(3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time or two separate safety systems out of service for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; and

(4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Cross-cutting Aspect: This finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with work management, in that the licensee failed to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work, resulting in the safety-related RHR SWBP room FCU remaining inadvertently tagged out for an extended period of time.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Section 1.c of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, requires procedures for Equipment Control including configuration control activities such as locking and tagging. The licensee established Administrative Procedure 0.9, Tagout, Revision 88, to meet this requirement.

Procedure 0.9, Step 22.1.2 requires, in part, that a monthly audit shall ensure an action is issued to the operations department to complete a Process Applicability Determination for components that are greater than 45 days but less than 90 days that result in a change in normal plant configuration.

Contrary to the above, on September 22, 2016, the licensee failed to ensure that the monthly audit issued an action to the operations department to complete a Process Applicability Determination (PAD) for components that were greater than 45 days but less than 90 days that resulted in a change in normal plant configuration. Specifically, the licensee failed to complete a PAD for a clearance order that changed the normal plant configuration of the safety-related RHR SWBP room FCU power switch from ON to OFF.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Provide Adequate Lubrication for Drywell Fan Coil Units Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Inspection Procedure Initiating Events

Green FIN 05000298/2018003-03 Closed H.5 - Work Management

71152 - Problem

Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding for the licensees failure to implement Work Order 5060136 during maintenance on the drywell fan coil units. Specifically, on October 26, 2016, during bearing replacement work on drywell fan coil, unit D, maintenance personnel failed to properly reinstall auto-lubricator injection connectors after removing the interferences per the work order instructions. This error resulted in the failure of drywell fan coil, unit D, due to inadequate bearing lubrication, and ultimately led to a downpower and reactor shutdown.

Description:

On May 11, 2018, operations personnel secured drywell fan coil unit (DWFCU) D after they observed indications of fan failure. Subsequently, on May 26, 2018, DWFCU A also failed and needed to be secured. The licensee lowered power by approximately 5 percent in order to maintain drywell temperature below the 150 degree Fahrenheit technical specification limit. As a result of the challenge to drywell temperature limits, the licensee shut the plant down in order to repair the DWFCUs. Upon inspection, the licensee discovered that bearings associated with the D and A DWFCUs had catastrophically failed due to improper lubrication, and both fans had sustained damage related to these failures. Further investigation revealed the auto-lubricator device that ensured bearing lubrication during the cycle had been installed in the wrong port on the bearing housing of DWFCU D. As a result, these bearings did not receive any of the relubrication that was required throughout the operating cycle. In addition, bearings with tighter tolerances than what was dictated by design specifications had been installed in all four DWFCUs as a result of an unrecognized vendor material supply issue. The licensee concluded that both of these issues led to the DWFCU bearing failures.

The inspectors reviewed work orders (WOs) associated with the work that took place during the 2016 refueling outage that replaced bearings on all four DWFCUs. The inspectors found that WO 5060136 provided instructions to remove interferences (bearing lubricator, accelerometer, and thermos couple cables) as required for inboard and outboard bearing replacement. An additional step instructed workers to reinstall the removed interferences.

The inspectors concluded that these steps were not performed properly in accordance with licensee guidance on control of in-process material, and that the bearing auto-lubricators should have been restored to connect to the same bearing housing port that they had been removed from, as directed by the WO. The inspectors also concluded that the WO should have contained more detailed instructions to ensure that the auto-lubricator was reinstalled properly, that photos or drawings should have been attached to the work order to aid in worker identification of the as-found configuration, and that the workers failed to recognize that they had lost traceability control of the bearing lubricators and should have terminated execution of the work until traceability could be restored.

Corrective Actions: The licensee repaired and replaced damaged portions of all affected drywell fan coil units; revised the associated maintenance plans to include auto-lubricator installation instructions; and initiated an engineering change to address necessary improvements to the lubrication systems for the fan coil unit bearings.

Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report CR-CNS-2018-03245

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to ensure that the drywell fan cooling units were provided with adequate lubrication was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the issue resulted in a downpower and reactor shutdown due to challenging technical specification drywell temperature limits.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, and determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition.

Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work management, because the licensee failed to ensure that the organization implemented a process of planning and executing work activities to assure that the DWFCU auto-lubricators were connected to the correct bearing housing ports.

Enforcement:

The inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

On June 7, 2018, as part of the biennial emergency preparedness inspection, the inspectors discussed the proposed exercise scenario with Mr. T. Morgan, Branch Chief, Technological Hazards Branch, FEMA Region VII, and other FEMA regional staff.

On June 21, 2018, as part of the biennial emergency preparedness inspection, the inspectors discussed the proposed exercise scenario with Mr. J. Stough, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other licensee staff.

On August 2, 2018, as part of the biennial emergency preparedness inspection, the inspectors discussed exercise performance with Mr. T. Morgan, Branch Chief, Technological Hazards Branch, FEMA Region VII, and other FEMA regional staff.

On September 10, 2018, the inspectors presented the biennial emergency preparedness exercise and performance indicator inspection results to Mr. J. Dent, Jr., Site Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On October 12, 2018, the inspectors discussed the significance of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise and performance indicator inspection findings with Mr. J. Shaw, Manager, Licensing, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.

On August 15, 2018, the inspector presented the annual licensed operator requalification inspection results to Mr. J. Florence, Superintendent, Simulator and Training Support, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On August 23, 2018, the inspectors presented the heat sink performance inspection results to Mr. J. Kalamaja, General Manager Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.

On October 17, 2018, the inspector presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Mr. J. Dent, Jr., Site Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

THIRD PARTY REVIEWS Inspectors reviewed Institute of Nuclear Power Operations reports that were issued during the inspection period.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2017-00553

2018-01015

2018-04816

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

2016, Sheet 7

Fire Protection System Site Plan

2045

Flow Diagram - Core Spray System

N58

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

Protected Equipment Tracking Form - ESST

Week 1832

August 6,

2018

CNS-2040, Sheet 2

Flow Diagram RHR Sys B

CNS-FP-352

Yard Fire Protection

N02

DCD-13

RHR Design Control Document

February 14,

2018

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

2.1.11.3

Radwaste/Augmented Radwaste Building Data

103

2.2.15A

Startup Transformer Component Checklist

2.2.30A

Fire Protection System Component Checklist

2.2.69

Residual Heat Removal System

101

2.2A.CS.DIV2

Core Spray Component Checklist

2.2A.RHR.DIV1

Residual Heat Removal System Component Checklist

(DIV 1)

2.2B.CS.DIV2

Core Spray System Instrument Valve Checklist

2.2B.RHR.DIV2

Residual Heat Removal System Component Checklist

(DIV 2)

Work Orders

218034

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2018-01888

2018-04015

2018-04068

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision

Fire Brigade Scenario #5

0-BARRIER-MAPS

Barrier Maps

CNS-FP-212

Reactor Building Southeast Quadrant

AB/05

CNS-FP-222

Reactor Building Standby Gas Treatment Room

AB/04

CNS-FP-242

Turbine Building Basement South

AB/05

CNS-FP-247

Turbine Building - Bus Duct Area

AB/07

CNS-FP-268

Transformer Yard

N05

CNS-FP-343

OWC Gas Generator Bldg

N05

EE-01-006

Disposition of NFPA Code Compliance Deviations

(Systems in Fire Zones Requiring an IPEEE Phase 2

Screening)

NEDC 10-080

Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design

Element Review EPM Report R1906-002-001

NEDC 11-104

Fire Safety Analysis for Fire Area RB-V EPM

Report R1906-008-RBV

TPP 207,

Fire Drill Report

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

0.7.1

Control of Combustibles

0-BARRIER-MISC

Miscellaneous Buildings

3.6.1

Fire Barrier Control

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2018-04041

2018-04052

2018-04083

2018-04119

2018-04135

2018-04178

2018-04240

2018-04275

2018-04817

2018-04898

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision

CNS-EE-16

Underground Electrical Layout

FDN-F02

Maintenance Rule Function FDN-F02 Performance

Criteria Basis Document

Notifications

11515173

11515267

11515943

11516865

11517491

11518668

11520057

11520617

11534368

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

2.3_S-1

Panel S - Annunciator S-1

71111.07 - Heat Sink Performance

Calculations

Number

Title

Revision

NEDC 00-095A

EQ Normal Temperature, Relative Humidity, Pressure

and Radiation

NEDC 00-095C

High Energy Line Break/Loss of Coolant Accident

Inside Containment

NEDC 00-095D

HELB EQ - RB Pressure / Temperature Response

NEDC 00-095E

CNS Reactor Building Post-LOCA Heating Analysis

NEDC 00-095G

Development of Methodology and Applications to Allow

the Reduction of Beta TID to Equipment in the CNS

EQ Program

NEDC 11-140

Review of ZNE Calculation 11-198 Rev. 1 Cooper

Nuclear Station Service Water System Analysis

NEDC 12-019

SW Post-LOCA Flow Test Revised Acceptance

Criteria

NEDC 91-239

DGLO/DGJW/DG Intercooler Heat Exchanger

Evaluation

NEDC 92-034

Water Hammer Analysis of Service Water System

3, 3C1, 3C2

NEDC 93-050

RHR Quad Temperature With Hatches Removed

Calculations

Number

Title

Revision

NEDC 93-184

RHR Heat Exchangers Thermal Performance and

Tube Plugging Margin

NEDC 94-021

REC-HX-A and REC-HX-B Maximum Allowable

Accident Case Fouling

NEDC 97-085

RHR Quad Heatup Rate After a Loss of Cooling With

Two Pump Operation

NEDC 97-087

Acceptance Criteria for HPCI Room Cooler and

Reactor Building Quad Coolers

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2016-04984

2018-04932

2018-04946

Design Basis Documents

Number

Title

Date

DG1

Diesel Generator (DG) - Design Criteria Document

January 14,

2016

DGb

Appendix B - Component Design Information

January 14,

2016

REC1

Reactor Equipment Cooling System Design Criteria

Document

December 3,

2014

RECb

Appendix B Component Design Information

May 20, 2016

RHR1

Residual Heat Removal System Design Criteria

Document

April 4, 2016

RHRb

Appendix B Component Design Information

February 14,

2018

SW1

Service Water and Residual Heat Removal Service

Water Booster System Design Criteria Document

January 18,

2016

SWb

Appendix B Component Design Information

June 2, 2017

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

2006 SH 1

Flow Diagram Circulating, Screen Wash and Service

Water Systems

2006 SH 3

Flow Diagram Circulating, Screen Wash and Service

Water Systems

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

2006 SH 4

Flow Diagram Circulating, Screen Wash and Service

Water Systems

2031 SH 2

Flow Diagram Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water

System

2036 SH 1

Flow Diagram Reactor Building Service Water System 4

2040 SH 2

Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal SYS Loop B

KSV-47-8

Diesel Generator 1 & 2 Cooling Water Schematic

N27

KSV-47-9-NP

Jacket Water Schematic

KSV-91-10-NP

Intercooler Piping (16-Cyl. Eng.)

N02

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

RHR HX B Thermal performance test

January 18,

2016

RHR HX B Thermal performance test

January 17,

2018

REC HX B Thermal Performance Test

February 23,

2018

REC HX B Thermal Performance Test

April 25,

2018

REC HX TEMA

June 17,

1968

RHR HX TEMA

October 6,

1993

6.SW.102

Service Water System - Post-LOCA Flow Verification

(Division 1)

October 25,

2014

6.SW.102

Service Water System - Post-LOCA Flow Verification

(Division 1)

October 18,

2016

6.SW.102

Service Water System - Post-LOCA Flow Verification

(Division 2)

October 12,

2014

6.SW.102

Service Water System - Post-LOCA Flow Verification

(Division 2)

November 3,

2016

AE-5498

Procurement Drawing for EDG LO Heat Exchanger

March 27,

1970

AE-5499

Procurement Drawing for EDG JW Heat Exchanger

February 27,

1970

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

CNSS907024

Response to Generic Letter 89-13

January 29,

1990

Conco Job #26066

Eddy Current Report for NPPD Cooper Nuclear

Station Unit 1 DGJW-HX-JW1 and DGLO-HX-LO1

February

2018

LO 2015-0224-009

Flow Accelerated / Microbiologically Influenced

Corrosion Programs Focused Self-Assessment Report

VM-1778

ITT / American Heat Exchangers Composite Manual

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

2.3 DG1

Panel DG-1 - Annunciator DG-1

7.0.8.1

System Leakage Testing

7.2.42.3

Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging

Work Orders

4718578

4848585

4911606

4953685

4953686

5040446

5055085

5057836

5069818

5115446

5164181

201942

234301

71111.11 - License Operator Requalification Program

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2018-05727

2018-05730

2018-05735

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

Annual Requalification Results Summary

August 15,

2018

IPTE RE30

Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution Brief for

Refueling Outage 30 Shutdown

RMP-30-027

Refueling Outage 30 Reactor Shutdown Reactivity

Management Plan

September

20, 2018

SKL0560126

Ops Quick HIT #22

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

SKL05151333

DEH Malfunction-RFP B Trip and RRMG B Jordan

Failure

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

2.1.4

Normal Shutdown

164

2.1.5

Reactor Scram

2.1.10

Station Power Changes

115

2.4RR

Reactor Recirculation Abnormal

2.4RXPWR

Reactor Power Anomalies

2.4TEC

TEC Abnormal

6.RCS.601

Technical Specification Monitoring of RCS

Heatup/Cooldown Rate

10.9

Control Rod Scram Time Evaluation

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2017-04681

2017-05664

2018-01188

2018-02869

2018-03244

2018-03245

2018-03260

2018-04693

2018-04901

2018-05421

2018-05438

2018-05845

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluations for

HV-F09

2004 through

2018

22, Sheet 3

Primary Containment Cooling & Nitrogen Inerting

System

CNS-HV-39

Reactor Building Drywell Cooling Developed Flow

Diagram w/ Measurement & Damper Locations

CS-PF01A

Maintenance Rule Function, Performance Criteria

Basis

CS-PF01B

Maintenance Rule Function, Performance Criteria

Basis

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

CS-SD1

Maintenance Rule Function, Performance Criteria

Basis

ECCS-F01

Maintenance Rule Function, Performance Criteria

Basis

HV-F09

Maintenance Rule Function, Performance Criteria

Basis

NEDC 89-1439

Drywell Air Cooling System Upgrade Air Flow

Derivation

Notifications

11390131

11406486

11462355

11536478

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

2.2.40

Drywell Cooling System

2A1271AC

Drywell Cooling System

3-EN-DC-204

Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis

3C1

3-EN-DC-205

Maintenance Rule Monitoring

5C1

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2018-04523

2018-04645

2018-05231

2018-05374

2018-05381

2018-05382

2018-05383

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Date

Protected Equipment Posting for ESST Week 1832

August 5,

2018

Protected Equipment Posting for Week 1833 CS B

Window

August 13,

2018

Protected Equipment Posting for Week 1836 RHR A

Window

September 3,

2018

GEK 45920A

GE Systems manual for RRMG

October 1992

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

0-CNS-WM-104

On-line Schedule Risk Assessment

0-CNS-WM-104A

On-line Fire Risk Management Actions

0-PROTECT-EQP

Protected Equipment Program

2.0.3.1

Operational Strategy Guidance Process

6.REFUEL.307

Refueling Bridge Interlocks Test Prior to Working in

Spent Fuel Pool

10.23

Movement of New Fuel for Inspection

10.23.1

New Fuel Inspection and Channeling

OSGD-2018-05383

RRMG A Brushes Arcing

Work Orders

5101201

5101209

5112943

5167376

5170157

5171983

208105

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2016-04472

2016-05558

2018-04121

2018-04213

2018-04358

2018-05164

2018-05403

2018-05439

2018-05470

2018-05489

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

2851-1

SW-1 Class IV P - Reactor Bldg

791E250

Jet Pump Instrument System Elementary Diagram

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

Significant changes from the 2008 to the 2011 edition

of ACI 318 Article from Precast Concrete Institute

(PCI) Journal

Winter 2013

ECR 11516867

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

N-513-4

ASME Code Case Evaluation Criteria for Temporary

Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3

Piping,Section XI, Division 1

NEDC 15-025

Mechanical ROS Civil/Structural Design for the

Hardened Containment Vent System Project

PBD-FAC

Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program Basis Document 0

PBD-MIC

Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion Program Basis

Document

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

0.5.OPS

Operations Review of Condition Reports/Operability

Determination

3.10

Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) and

Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) Program

Implementation

Work Orders

5065112

23979

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2018-04564

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision

DEC-5260125

Design Equivalent Change Package - TG VRG Track

and Hold

ODMI 2018-04564

Main Generator Voltage Regulator Control

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

2.1.11.1

Turbine Building Data

168

2.2.14

2KV Electrical System

2.2.77

Turbine Generator

118

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

2.3_C-3

Annunciator C-3 Procedure

2.4GEN-H2

Generator or Hydrogen Abnormal

5.3GRID

Degraded Grid Voltage

Work Orders

260097

260098

71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2018-04448

2018-04471

2018-04719

2018-04723

2018-04743

2018-04744

2018-04757

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

2077

Flow Diagram - Diesel Gen Bldg Service Water,

Starting Air, Fuel Oil, Sump System & Roof Drains

N78

5759-D001, Sheet 2

and 3

5kV 2000A 3P 3W Bus Replacement Layout

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

6.MISC.401

Position Indicator Inservice Testing (IST)

6.1CS.101

Core Spray Test Mode Surveillance Operation

6.1CS.201

Reference Leg Injection Flow Verification and IST

Check Valve Testing

6.2CS.101

Core Spray Test Mode Surveillance Operation

(IST)(DIV 2)

6.2CS.201

CS Motor Operated Valve Operability Test (IST)(DIV 2) 21

6.2DG.105

Diesel Generator Starting Air Compressor Operability

7.3.20.3

Motor Analysis

7.3.41

Examination, Repair, and High Pot Testing of

Non-Segregated Buses and Associated Equipment

7.3.51

Electrical Meter Calibration Check

Work Orders

5101202

5141231

5143101

5147405

5179896

5186076

207476

207547

208602

208853

208933

208935

209259

209261

218034

210044

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2017-06021

2018-05356

2018-05368

2018-05625

2018-05723

Drawings

Number

Title

Revision

945E632

ARI/ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip

N02

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

6.HPCI.308

HPCI Auto Isolation Logic Steam Line Low Pressure

Logic System Functional Test (Reactor Pressure

Greater Than or Equal to 150 PSIG)

6.SLC.101

SLC Pump Operability Test

6.1ARI.301

ARI/ATWS/RPT Low-Low and PCIS Low-Low-Low

Reactor Water Level Channel Calibration Test

6.2DG.101

Diesel Generator 31 Day Operability Test (IST)(DIV 2)

9.EN-RP-150

Radiography and X-Ray Testing

Work Orders

5149721

71114.01 - Exercise Evaluation

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2016-04501

2016-04591

2016-04791

2016-04933

2016-04934

2016-05311

2016-05390

2017-01631

2017-03021

2017-03929

2017-03998

2017-04422

2017-04466

2017-04468

2017-04696

2017-04854

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2017-04874

2017-05029

2017-05037

2017-05039

2017-06824

2018-00539

2018-00747

2018-01319

2018-02631

2018-02845

2018-02873

2018-03033

2018-03080

2018-03142

2018-03157

2018-03283

Miscellaneous Documents

Title

Revision/Date

Cooper Nuclear Station Emergency Plan

Evaluation Report for the Exercise conducted December 20, 2016

January 19,

2017

Evaluation Report for the Exercise conducted March 28, 2017

April 7, 2017

Evaluation Report for the Exercise conducted May 16, 2017

May 24, 2017

Evaluation Report for the Exercise conducted August 15, 2017

August 23,

2017

Evaluation Report for the Exercise conducted October 17, 2017

October 25,

2017

Evaluation Report for the Exercise conducted January 30, 2018

February 14,

2018

Evaluation Report for the Exercises conducted in August and September 2016 September

15, 2016

Evaluation Report for the August through November 2017 Mini-Drills

November 29,

2017

Evaluation Report for the Notification of Unusual Event declared September 2,

2016

September 8,

2016

Evaluation Report for the Notification of Unusual Event declared on November

11, 2017

November 17,

2017

Procedures

Number

Title

Date

0-CNS-LI-102

Corrective Action Process, Revision 8

August 23,

2017

5.7.1

Emergency Classification, Revision 60

April 12,

2018

5.7.2

Emergency Director EPIP, Revision 36

February 28,

2018

Procedures

Number

Title

Date

5.7.6

Notification, Revision 73

December

18, 2017

5.7.7

Activation of the TSC, Revision 39

November 3,

2016

5.7.8

Activation of the OSC, Revision 27

March 28,

2016

5.7.9

Activation of the EOF, Revision 36

November 3,

2016

5.7.12

Emergency Radiation Exposure Control, Revision 17

March 14,

2018

5.7.14

Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking, Revision 22

October 14,

2017

5.7.15

OSC Team Dispatch, Revision 22

April 25,

2018

5.7.20

Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 29

March 22,

2017

5.7.23

Activation of the Joint Information Center, Revision 17

February 3,

2016

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2017-01203

2017-01805

2017-01857

2017-01858

2017-02185

2017-02895

2017-02937

2017-03256

2017-05026

2017-05889

2018-00160

2018-00650

2018-02306

2018-03157

2018-04184

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision/Date

PI Documentation and Data Review Form, Scrams

with Complications, Reporting Period

July 2018

EPDG 2

G-1: Emergency Preparedness

Performance Indicator Guide

NEI 99-02

Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator

Guideline

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision/Date

5.7.1

Emergency Classification

59, 60

5.7.6

Notification

2, 73

5.7.20

Protective Action Recommendations

5.7.27

Alert and Notification System, Revision 19

December 12,

2017

5.7.27.2

False Activation of Alert and Notification System,

Revision 9

December 12,

2017

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Condition Reports (CR-CNS-)

2017-07513

2018-02363

2018-02869

2018-03180

2018-03245

2018-03251

2018-03261

2018-03265

2018-03268

2018-03294

2018-04415

2018-04629

2018-04816

2018-04827

2018-04865

2018-04938

2018-05022

2018-05054

2018-05058

2018-05170

2018-05272

2018-05307

2018-05320

2018-05472

Miscellaneous Documents

Number

Title

Revision

22, Sheet 3

Primary Containment Cooling & Nitrogen Inerting

System

2016-0060-008

Work Tracker

CNS-HV-39

Reactor Building Drywell Cooling Developed Flow

Diagram w/ Measurement & Damper Locations

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

0.47

Control of In-Process Material

0.9

Tagout

88, 94

0-EN-LI-100

Process Applicability Determination

18C2

2.1.11.3

Radwaste/Augmented Radwaste Building Data -

Modes 1, 2, and 3

103

2.2.38A

HVAC Control Building System Component Checklist

Procedures

Number

Title

Revision

2.2.40

Drywell Cooling System

Work Orders

4440167

4503202

4503487

5060133

5060134

5060135

5060136

5140788

5143045

214101

247353

247354

ML18304A484

SUNSI Review

ADAMS:

Non-Publicly Available

Non-Sensitive

Keyword:

By: JWK

Yes No

Publicly Available

Sensitive

NRC-002

OFFICE

SRI:DRP/C

ASRI:DRP/C

RI:DRP/C

BC:DRS/EB1

BC:DRS/EB2

BC:DRS/OB

NAME

PVoss

MTobin

MStafford

TFarnholtz

GWerner

VGaddy

SIGNATURE

PJV

MCT

MHS

TRF

GEW

vgg

DATE

10/26/2018

10/29/2018

10/26/2018

10/26/2018

10/26/2018

10/26/18

OFFICE

BC:DRS/PSB2

ATL:DRS/IPAT

SPE:DRP/C

BC:DRP/C

NAME

HGepford

GMiller

DProulx

JKozal

SIGNATURE

HJG

GBM

DLP

JWK

DATE

10/26/18

10/29/18

10/29/18

10/31/2018