ML18156A419

From kanterella
Revision as of 22:50, 20 October 2019 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
10 CFR 50, Appendix B Components and Cyber Security Presentation (June 25-29, 2018)
ML18156A419
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/05/2018
From: Aaron Armstrong
NRC/NRO/DCIP/QVIB1
To:
Armstrong A, NRO/DCIP
References
Download: ML18156A419 (15)


Text

10 CFR 50, Appendix B Components and Cyber Security Technical Meeting for Reducing Cyber Risks in the Supply Chain IAEA Headquarters Vienna, Austria June 25-29, 2018 Aaron Armstrong Office of New Reactors (NRO) 1

Topics

  • Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Regulations

  • Discuss the oversight of the supply chain
  • Observations identified during vendor inspection activities
  • Questions 2

NRC Regulations

- Quality Assurance comprises all those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component will perform satisfactorily in service

- Consists of 18 Criteria of Quality Assurance (QA) 3

NRC Regulations

  • NRC evaluated Appendix B and ISO 9001-2000
  • NRC issued the results of this analysis in SECY-03-0117 which is publicly available
  • The attachment to SECY-03-0117 provides the details for the Appendix B to ISO 9001-2000 comparison.

4

NRC Regulations

- Requires evaluation of deviations and failures to comply relating to defects that could create a substantial safety hazard

- Also prescribes the reporting requirements for defects or failures to comply

- Section 21.41, Inspection grants access for NRC inspections 5

NRC Regulations Other NRC Regulations that are applicable to NRC vendors:

Oversight of the supply chain

  • NRCs Vendor Inspection Center of Expertise (COE) provides oversight of vendors supplying safety-related* parts, materials and services.
  • Performs routine and reactive vendor inspections, as well as, quality assurance implementation inspections for new reactor applicants.

Oversight of the supply chain

  • SECY-11-0154, Agencywide approach to Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items, provide the following direction:

- The NRC staff will conduct vendor inspections at suppliers of safety-related Critical Digital Assets (CDAs), in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21

- The NRC staff will evaluate the results of these inspections to determine the need to expand the inspection sample to suppliers and sub-suppliers of non-safety-related CDAs 8

Oversight of the supply chain Vendor oversight of CDAs occurs if the items are procured as basic components (safety-related*)

- Appendix B and Part 21 requirements are contractually imposed on the vendor through the licensees procurement document

- These requirements are inspected by NRC using Inspection Procedure 43002

Oversight of the supply chain

- Provides guidance to ensure NRC staff observes and assesses the vendors actual implementation to meet the licensee's contractual / procedural requirements 10

Vendor Inspection Observations

  • Several licensee purchase orders to a vendor requiring:

- No harmful code or malicious logic: vendor shall have appropriate procedures in place to ensure that no viruses, malicious code or unintended code is transported into the production environment or the operational environment

Vendor Inspection Observations

- Manufacturer redesigned a relay to use a complex programmable logic device (CPLD)

- Use of a CPLD led to loss of safety function

- The plant was unaware of modifications to the basic component, so electromagnetic compatibility was not evaluated 12

Questions?

13

ADAMS Accession Numbers

- ML13148A361

  • Cyber Vendor Inspection Report

- ML15342A429

- ML17123A085

- ML18018A989

  • Allen Bradley Information Notice

- ML15295A173 14

ADAMS Accession Numbers

  • SECY-03-117, Approaches for Adopting More Widely Accepted International Quality Standards

- ML031490421

  • SECY-11-015, Agencywide approach to Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items

- ML112200150 15