ML17088A321

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COL Appendix C, ITAAC
ML17088A321
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/12/2018
From:
Office of New Reactors
To:
Hoellman J P/NRO/DNRL/LB4/301-415-5481
Shared Package
ML17088A330 List:
References
Download: ML17088A321 (507)
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APPENDIX C TURKEY POINT UNIT 7 INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................ C-32 1.1 Definitions ............................................................................................................... C-32 1.2 General Provisions.................................................................................................. C-35 1.3 Figure Legend......................................................................................................... C-38 1.4 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ........................................................................ C-42 2.0 System Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC.......................................................... C-48 2.1 Reactor....................................................................................................................... C-48 2.1.1 Fuel Handling and Refueling System................................................................... C-48 2.1.01.01........................................................................................................................ C-49 2.1.01.02........................................................................................................................ C-49 2.1.01.03........................................................................................................................ C-49 2.1.01.04........................................................................................................................ C-49 2.1.01.05........................................................................................................................ C-49 2.1.01.06.i ...................................................................................................................... C-49 2.1.01.06.ii ..................................................................................................................... C-49 2.1.01.07.i ...................................................................................................................... C-49 2.1.01.07.ii ..................................................................................................................... C-49 2.1.01.07.iii .................................................................................................................... C-50 2.1.01.07.iv .................................................................................................................... C-50 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System...................................................................................... C-52 2.1.02.01........................................................................................................................ C-63 2.1.02.02a...................................................................................................................... C-63 2.1.02.02b...................................................................................................................... C-63 2.1.02.03a...................................................................................................................... C-63 2.1.02.03b...................................................................................................................... C-63 2.1.02.04a...................................................................................................................... C-64 2.1.02.04b...................................................................................................................... C-64 2.1.02.05a.i .................................................................................................................... C-64 C-1

2.1.02.05a.ii ................................................................................................................... C-64 2.1.02.05a.iii .................................................................................................................. C-64 2.1.02.05b...................................................................................................................... C-64 2.1.02.06........................................................................................................................ C-65 2.1.02.07a.i .................................................................................................................... C-65 2.1.02.07a.ii ................................................................................................................... C-65 2.1.02.07b...................................................................................................................... C-65 2.1.02.07c ...................................................................................................................... C-66 2.1.02.08a.i .................................................................................................................... C-66 2.1.02.08a.ii ................................................................................................................... C-66 2.1.02.08b...................................................................................................................... C-66 2.1.02.08c ...................................................................................................................... C-66 2.1.02.08d.i .................................................................................................................... C-67 2.1.02.08d.ii ................................................................................................................... C-67 2.1.02.08d.iii .................................................................................................................. C-67 2.1.02.08d.iv .................................................................................................................. C-68 2.1.02.08d.v ................................................................................................................... C-68 2.1.02.08d.vi .................................................................................................................. C-68 2.1.02.08d.vii ................................................................................................................. C-68 2.1.02.08d.viii................................................................................................................. C-68 2.1.02.08e...................................................................................................................... C-68 2.1.02.09a...................................................................................................................... C-68 2.1.02.09b.i .................................................................................................................... C-69 2.1.02.09b.ii ................................................................................................................... C-69 2.1.02.09c ...................................................................................................................... C-69 2.1.02.10........................................................................................................................ C-69 2.1.02.11a.i .................................................................................................................... C-69 2.1.02.11a.ii ................................................................................................................... C-69 2.1.02.11b.i .................................................................................................................... C-69 2.1.02.11b.ii ................................................................................................................... C-69 2.1.02.11b.iii .................................................................................................................. C-70 2.1.02.11c.i .................................................................................................................... C-70 2.1.02.11c.ii ................................................................................................................... C-70 2.1.02.12a.i .................................................................................................................... C-70 C-2

2.1.02.12a.ii ................................................................................................................... C-70 2.1.02.12a.iii .................................................................................................................. C-70 2.1.02.12a.iv .................................................................................................................. C-71 2.1.02.12a.v ................................................................................................................... C-71 2.1.02.12a.vi .................................................................................................................. C-71 2.1.02.12a.vii ................................................................................................................. C-71 2.1.02.12a.viii................................................................................................................. C-71 2.1.02.12a.ix .................................................................................................................. C-71 2.1.02.12b...................................................................................................................... C-71 2.1.02.13a...................................................................................................................... C-71 2.1.02.13b...................................................................................................................... C-72 2.1.02.13c ...................................................................................................................... C-72 2.1.02.14........................................................................................................................ C-72 2.1.02.15........................................................................................................................ C-72 2.1.3 Reactor System ................................................................................................... C-76 2.1.03.01........................................................................................................................ C-80 2.1.03.02a...................................................................................................................... C-80 2.1.03.02b...................................................................................................................... C-80 2.1.03.02c ...................................................................................................................... C-80 2.1.03.03........................................................................................................................ C-80 2.1.03.04........................................................................................................................ C-80 2.1.03.05........................................................................................................................ C-80 2.1.03.06.i ...................................................................................................................... C-81 2.1.03.06.ii ..................................................................................................................... C-81 2.1.03.06.iii .................................................................................................................... C-81 2.1.03.07.i ...................................................................................................................... C-81 2.1.03.07.ii ..................................................................................................................... C-81 2.1.03.08........................................................................................................................ C-81 2.1.03.09a.i .................................................................................................................... C-82 2.1.03.09a.ii ................................................................................................................... C-82 2.1.03.09b...................................................................................................................... C-82 2.1.03.09c ...................................................................................................................... C-82 2.1.03.10........................................................................................................................ C-82 2.1.03.11........................................................................................................................ C-82 C-3

2.1.03.12........................................................................................................................ C-83 2.1.03.13........................................................................................................................ C-83 2.1.03.14........................................................................................................................ C-83 2.2 Nuclear Safety Systems ............................................................................................. C-90 2.2.1 Containment System ........................................................................................... C-90 2.2.01.01...................................................................................................................... C-100 2.2.01.02a.................................................................................................................... C-100 2.2.01.02b.................................................................................................................... C-100 2.2.01.03a.................................................................................................................... C-100 2.2.01.03b.................................................................................................................... C-100 2.2.01.04a.i .................................................................................................................. C-100 2.2.01.04a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-100 2.2.01.04b.................................................................................................................... C-101 2.2.01.05.i .................................................................................................................... C-101 2.2.01.05.ii ................................................................................................................... C-101 2.2.01.05.iii .................................................................................................................. C-101 2.2.01.06a.i .................................................................................................................. C-101 2.2.01.06a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-102 2.2.01.06b.................................................................................................................... C-102 2.2.01.06c .................................................................................................................... C-102 2.2.01.06d.i .................................................................................................................. C-102 2.2.01.06d.ii ................................................................................................................. C-102 2.2.01.07.i .................................................................................................................... C-103 2.2.01.07.ii ................................................................................................................... C-103 2.2.01.08...................................................................................................................... C-103 2.2.01.09...................................................................................................................... C-104 2.2.01.10a.................................................................................................................... C-104 2.2.01.10b.................................................................................................................... C-104 2.2.01.10c .................................................................................................................... C-104 2.2.01.11a.i .................................................................................................................. C-104 2.2.01.11a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-104 2.2.01.11a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-104 2.2.01.11a.iv ................................................................................................................ C-105 2.2.01.11b.................................................................................................................... C-105 C-4

2.2.2 Passive Containment Cooling System ............................................................... C-107 2.2.02.01...................................................................................................................... C-113 2.2.02.02a.................................................................................................................... C-113 2.2.02.02b.................................................................................................................... C-113 2.2.02.03a.................................................................................................................... C-113 2.2.02.03b.................................................................................................................... C-113 2.2.02.04a.................................................................................................................... C-113 2.2.02.04b.................................................................................................................... C-113 2.2.02.05a.i .................................................................................................................. C-114 2.2.02.05a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-114 2.2.02.05a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-114 2.2.02.05b.................................................................................................................... C-114 2.2.02.05c .................................................................................................................... C-114 2.2.02.06a.i .................................................................................................................. C-114 2.2.02.06a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-115 2.2.02.06b.................................................................................................................... C-115 2.2.02.06c .................................................................................................................... C-115 2.2.02.07a.i .................................................................................................................. C-115 2.2.02.07a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-115 2.2.02.07a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-116 2.2.02.07b.i .................................................................................................................. C-116 2.2.02.07b.ii ................................................................................................................. C-116 2.2.02.07b.iii ................................................................................................................ C-116 2.2.02.07c .................................................................................................................... C-117 2.2.02.07d.................................................................................................................... C-117 2.2.02.07e.i .................................................................................................................. C-117 2.2.02.07e.ii ................................................................................................................. C-117 2.2.02.07f.i ................................................................................................................... C-117 2.2.02.07f.ii .................................................................................................................. C-117 2.2.02.08a.................................................................................................................... C-117 2.2.02.08b.................................................................................................................... C-117 2.2.02.08c .................................................................................................................... C-118 2.2.02.09...................................................................................................................... C-118 2.2.02.10a.................................................................................................................... C-118 C-5

2.2.02.10b.................................................................................................................... C-118 2.2.02.10c .................................................................................................................... C-118 2.2.02.11a.i .................................................................................................................. C-118 2.2.02.11a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-118 2.2.02.11a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-118 2.2.02.11b.................................................................................................................... C-119 2.2.3 Passive Core Cooling System ........................................................................... C-121 2.2.03.01...................................................................................................................... C-134 2.2.03.02a.................................................................................................................... C-134 2.2.03.02b.................................................................................................................... C-134 2.2.03.03a.................................................................................................................... C-134 2.2.03.03b.................................................................................................................... C-134 2.2.03.04a.................................................................................................................... C-134 2.2.03.04b.................................................................................................................... C-134 2.2.03.05a.i .................................................................................................................. C-135 2.2.03.05a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-135 2.2.03.05a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-135 2.2.03.05b.................................................................................................................... C-135 2.2.03.06...................................................................................................................... C-136 2.2.03.07a.i .................................................................................................................. C-136 2.2.03.07a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-136 2.2.03.07b.................................................................................................................... C-136 2.2.03.07c .................................................................................................................... C-136 2.2.03.08a.................................................................................................................... C-137 2.2.03.08b.01 ............................................................................................................... C-137 2.2.03.08b.02 ............................................................................................................... C-137 2.2.03.08c.i.01 ............................................................................................................. C-137 2.2.03.08c.i.02 ............................................................................................................. C-138 2.2.03.08c.i.03 ............................................................................................................. C-138 2.2.03.08c.i.04 ............................................................................................................. C-139 2.2.03.08c.ii ................................................................................................................. C-139 2.2.03.08c.iii ................................................................................................................ C-139 2.2.03.08c.iv.01 ........................................................................................................... C-139 2.2.03.08c.iv.02 ........................................................................................................... C-139 C-6

2.2.03.08c.iv.03 ........................................................................................................... C-140 2.2.03.08c.iv.04 ........................................................................................................... C-140 2.2.03.08c.v.01 ............................................................................................................ C-140 2.2.03.08c.v.02 ............................................................................................................ C-140 2.2.03.08c.vi.01 ........................................................................................................... C-140 2.2.03.08c.vi.02 ........................................................................................................... C-140 2.2.03.08c.vi.03 ........................................................................................................... C-140 2.2.03.08c.vii................................................................................................................ C-141 2.2.03.08c.viii ............................................................................................................... C-141 2.2.03.08c.ix ................................................................................................................ C-142 2.2.03.08c.x ................................................................................................................. C-143 2.2.03.08c.xi ................................................................................................................ C-144 2.2.03.08c.xii................................................................................................................ C-144 2.2.03.08c.xiii ............................................................................................................... C-144 2.2.03.08c.xiv............................................................................................................... C-144 2.2.03.08d.................................................................................................................... C-144 2.2.03.09a.i .................................................................................................................. C-144 2.2.03.09a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-145 2.2.03.09a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-145 2.2.03.09b.................................................................................................................... C-145 2.2.03.09c .................................................................................................................... C-145 2.2.03.10...................................................................................................................... C-145 2.2.03.11a.i .................................................................................................................. C-145 2.2.03.11a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-145 2.2.03.11b.i .................................................................................................................. C-146 2.2.03.11b.ii ................................................................................................................. C-146 2.2.03.11b.iii ................................................................................................................ C-146 2.2.03.11c.i .................................................................................................................. C-146 2.2.03.11c.ii ................................................................................................................. C-146 2.2.03.12a.i .................................................................................................................. C-146 2.2.03.12a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-146 2.2.03.12a.iv ................................................................................................................ C-146 2.2.03.12b.................................................................................................................... C-147 2.2.03.13...................................................................................................................... C-147 C-7

2.2.4 Steam Generator System .................................................................................. C-151 2.2.04.01...................................................................................................................... C-164 2.2.04.02a.................................................................................................................... C-164 2.2.04.02b.................................................................................................................... C-164 2.2.04.03a.................................................................................................................... C-164 2.2.04.03b.................................................................................................................... C-164 2.2.04.04a.................................................................................................................... C-164 2.2.04.04b.................................................................................................................... C-164 2.2.04.05a.i .................................................................................................................. C-165 2.2.04.05a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-165 2.2.04.05a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-165 2.2.04.05b.................................................................................................................... C-165 2.2.04.06...................................................................................................................... C-165 2.2.04.07a.i .................................................................................................................. C-166 2.2.04.07a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-166 2.2.04.07b.................................................................................................................... C-166 2.2.04.07c .................................................................................................................... C-166 2.2.04.08a.i .................................................................................................................. C-166 2.2.04.08a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-166 2.2.04.08b.i .................................................................................................................. C-167 2.2.04.08b.ii ................................................................................................................. C-167 2.2.04.08c .................................................................................................................... C-167 2.2.04.09a.i .................................................................................................................. C-167 2.2.04.09a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-167 2.2.04.09b.i .................................................................................................................. C-167 2.2.04.09b.ii ................................................................................................................. C-167 2.2.04.10...................................................................................................................... C-167 2.2.04.11a.................................................................................................................... C-168 2.2.04.11b.i .................................................................................................................. C-168 2.2.04.11b.ii ................................................................................................................. C-168 2.2.04.12a.i .................................................................................................................. C-168 2.2.04.12a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-168 2.2.04.12a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-168 2.2.04.12b.................................................................................................................... C-168 C-8

2.2.5 Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System .......................................... C-173 2.2.05.01...................................................................................................................... C-181 2.2.05.02a.................................................................................................................... C-182 2.2.05.02b.................................................................................................................... C-182 2.2.05.03a.................................................................................................................... C-182 2.2.05.03b.................................................................................................................... C-182 2.2.05.04a.................................................................................................................... C-182 2.2.05.04b.................................................................................................................... C-182 2.2.05.05a.i .................................................................................................................. C-182 2.2.05.05a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-183 2.2.05.05a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-183 2.2.05.05b.................................................................................................................... C-183 2.2.05.06a.................................................................................................................... C-183 2.2.05.06b.................................................................................................................... C-183 2.2.05.07a.i .................................................................................................................. C-183 2.2.05.07a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-183 2.2.05.07a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-183 2.2.05.07b.i .................................................................................................................. C-184 2.2.05.07b.ii ................................................................................................................. C-184 2.2.05.07c .................................................................................................................... C-184 2.2.05.07d.................................................................................................................... C-184 C.2.2.05.07e ................................................................................................................ C-184 2.2.05.08...................................................................................................................... C-185 2.2.05.09a.................................................................................................................... C-185 2.2.05.09b.................................................................................................................... C-185 2.2.05.10...................................................................................................................... C-185 2.2.05.11...................................................................................................................... C-185 2.2.05.12...................................................................................................................... C-185 2.3 Auxiliary Systems ..................................................................................................... C-188 2.3.1 Component Cooling Water System.................................................................... C-188 2.3.01.01...................................................................................................................... C-190 2.3.01.02...................................................................................................................... C-190 2.3.01.03.i .................................................................................................................... C-190 2.3.01.03.ii ................................................................................................................... C-190 C-9

2.3.01.04...................................................................................................................... C-190 2.3.01.05...................................................................................................................... C-190 2.3.2 Chemical and Volume Control System .............................................................. C-192 2.3.02.01...................................................................................................................... C-199 2.3.02.02a.................................................................................................................... C-199 2.3.02.02b.................................................................................................................... C-200 2.3.02.03a.................................................................................................................... C-200 2.3.02.03b.................................................................................................................... C-200 2.3.02.04a.................................................................................................................... C-200 2.3.02.04b.................................................................................................................... C-200 2.3.02.05.i .................................................................................................................... C-200 2.3.02.05.ii ................................................................................................................... C-200 2.3.02.05.iii .................................................................................................................. C-201 2.3.02.06a.i .................................................................................................................. C-201 2.3.02.06a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-201 2.3.02.06b.................................................................................................................... C-201 2.3.02.06c .................................................................................................................... C-201 2.3.02.07a.................................................................................................................... C-201 2.3.02.07b.................................................................................................................... C-202 2.3.02.07c .................................................................................................................... C-202 2.3.02.08a.i .................................................................................................................. C-202 2.3.02.08a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-202 2.3.02.08a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-202 2.3.02.08b.................................................................................................................... C-202 2.3.02.09...................................................................................................................... C-202 2.3.02.10a.................................................................................................................... C-203 2.3.02.10b.i .................................................................................................................. C-203 2.3.02.10b.ii ................................................................................................................. C-203 2.3.02.11a.i .................................................................................................................. C-203 2.3.02.11a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-203 2.3.02.11a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-203 2.3.02.11a.iv ................................................................................................................ C-203 2.3.02.11b.................................................................................................................... C-204 2.3.02.12a.................................................................................................................... C-204 C-10

2.3.02.12b.................................................................................................................... C-204 2.3.02.13...................................................................................................................... C-204 2.3.02.14...................................................................................................................... C-204 2.3.3 Standby Diesel Fuel Oil System ........................................................................ C-207 2.3.03.01...................................................................................................................... C-208 2.3.03.02...................................................................................................................... C-208 2.3.03.03a.................................................................................................................... C-208 2.3.03.03b.................................................................................................................... C-208 2.3.03.03c .................................................................................................................... C-208 2.3.03.03d.................................................................................................................... C-208 2.3.03.04...................................................................................................................... C-208 2.3.03.05...................................................................................................................... C-208 2.3.4 Fire Protection System ...................................................................................... C-211 2.3.04.01...................................................................................................................... C-212 2.3.04.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-212 2.3.04.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-212 2.3.04.03...................................................................................................................... C-212 2.3.04.04.i .................................................................................................................... C-212 2.3.04.04.ii ................................................................................................................... C-212 2.3.04.05...................................................................................................................... C-212 2.3.04.06...................................................................................................................... C-212 2.3.04.07...................................................................................................................... C-212 2.3.04.08...................................................................................................................... C-213 2.3.04.09...................................................................................................................... C-213 2.3.04.10...................................................................................................................... C-213 2.3.04.11...................................................................................................................... C-213 2.3.5 Mechanical Handling System ............................................................................ C-217 2.3.05.01...................................................................................................................... C-218 2.3.05.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-218 2.3.05.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-218 2.3.05.02.iii .................................................................................................................. C-218 2.3.05.03a.i .................................................................................................................. C-218 2.3.05.03a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-218 2.3.05.03a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-218 C-11

2.3.05.03b.i .................................................................................................................. C-219 2.3.05.03b.ii ................................................................................................................. C-219 2.3.05.03b.iii ................................................................................................................ C-219 2.3.05.03c.i .................................................................................................................. C-219 2.3.05.03c.ii ................................................................................................................. C-219 2.3.05.03d.i .................................................................................................................. C-219 2.3.05.03d.ii ................................................................................................................. C-220 2.3.05.04...................................................................................................................... C-220 2.3.6 Normal Residual Heat Removal System ............................................................ C-221 2.3.06.01...................................................................................................................... C-229 2.3.06.02a.................................................................................................................... C-229 2.3.06.02b.................................................................................................................... C-229 2.3.06.03a.................................................................................................................... C-229 2.3.06.03b.................................................................................................................... C-230 2.3.06.04a.................................................................................................................... C-230 2.3.06.04b.................................................................................................................... C-230 2.3.06.05a.i .................................................................................................................. C-230 2.3.06.05a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-230 2.3.06.05a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-230 2.3.06.05b.................................................................................................................... C-231 2.3.06.06...................................................................................................................... C-231 2.3.06.07a.i .................................................................................................................. C-231 2.3.06.07a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-231 2.3.06.07b.................................................................................................................... C-231 2.3.06.07c .................................................................................................................... C-232 2.3.06.08a.................................................................................................................... C-232 2.3.06.08b.................................................................................................................... C-232 2.3.06.09a.i .................................................................................................................. C-232 2.3.06.09a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-232 2.3.06.09b.i .................................................................................................................. C-232 2.3.06.09b.ii ................................................................................................................. C-233 2.3.06.09b.iii ................................................................................................................ C-233 2.3.06.09b.iv ................................................................................................................ C-233 2.3.06.09b.v ................................................................................................................. C-233 C-12

2.3.06.09c .................................................................................................................... C-233 2.3.06.09d.................................................................................................................... C-233 2.3.06.10...................................................................................................................... C-233 2.3.06.11a.................................................................................................................... C-234 2.3.06.11b.................................................................................................................... C-234 2.3.06.12a.i .................................................................................................................. C-234 2.3.06.12a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-234 2.3.06.12a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-234 2.3.06.12a.iv ................................................................................................................ C-234 2.3.06.12b.................................................................................................................... C-234 2.3.06.13...................................................................................................................... C-234 2.3.06.14...................................................................................................................... C-235 2.3.7 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System ....................................................................... C-237 2.3.07.01...................................................................................................................... C-242 2.3.07.02a.................................................................................................................... C-242 2.3.07.02b.................................................................................................................... C-242 2.3.07.03...................................................................................................................... C-242 2.3.07.04...................................................................................................................... C-242 2.3.07.05.i .................................................................................................................... C-242 2.3.07.05.ii ................................................................................................................... C-242 2.3.07.05.iii .................................................................................................................. C-243 2.3.07.06a.................................................................................................................... C-243 2.3.07.06b.................................................................................................................... C-243 2.3.07.07a.................................................................................................................... C-243 2.3.07.07b.i .................................................................................................................. C-243 2.3.07.07b.ii ................................................................................................................. C-243 2.3.07.07b.iii ................................................................................................................ C-243 2.3.07.07b.iv ................................................................................................................ C-243 2.3.07.07b.v ................................................................................................................. C-244 2.3.07.07b.vi ................................................................................................................ C-244 2.3.07.07c .................................................................................................................... C-244 2.3.07.08.i .................................................................................................................... C-244 2.3.07.08.ii ................................................................................................................... C-244 2.3.07.09...................................................................................................................... C-244 C-13

2.3.07.10...................................................................................................................... C-244 2.3.07.11...................................................................................................................... C-244 2.3.8 Service Water System ....................................................................................... C-247 2.3.08.01...................................................................................................................... C-248 2.3.08.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-248 2.3.08.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-249 2.3.08.02.iii .................................................................................................................. C-249 2.3.08.03...................................................................................................................... C-249 2.3.08.04...................................................................................................................... C-249 2.3.9 Containment Hydrogen Control System ............................................................ C-251 2.3.09.01...................................................................................................................... C-254 2.3.09.02a.................................................................................................................... C-254 2.3.09.02b.................................................................................................................... C-255 2.3.09.03.i .................................................................................................................... C-255 2.3.09.03.ii ................................................................................................................... C-255 C.2.3.09.03.iii ............................................................................................................... C-255 2.3.09.03.iv .................................................................................................................. C-255 2.3.09.04a.................................................................................................................... C-255 2.3.09.04b.................................................................................................................... C-256 2.3.09.05...................................................................................................................... C-256 2.3.10 Liquid Radwaste System ................................................................................... C-257 2.3.10.01...................................................................................................................... C-260 2.3.10.02a.................................................................................................................... C-260 2.3.10.02b.................................................................................................................... C-260 2.3.10.03a.................................................................................................................... C-261 2.3.10.03b.................................................................................................................... C-261 2.3.10.04a.................................................................................................................... C-261 2.3.10.04b.................................................................................................................... C-261 2.3.10.05a.i .................................................................................................................. C-261 2.3.10.05a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-261 2.3.10.05a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-261 2.3.10.05b.................................................................................................................... C-262 2.3.10.06a.................................................................................................................... C-262 2.3.10.06b.................................................................................................................... C-262 C-14

2.3.10.07a.i .................................................................................................................. C-262 2.3.10.07a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-262 2.3.10.07b.................................................................................................................... C-262 2.3.10.08...................................................................................................................... C-262 2.3.10.09...................................................................................................................... C-262 2.3.10.10...................................................................................................................... C-263 2.3.11 Gaseous Radwaste System .............................................................................. C-265 2.3.11.01...................................................................................................................... C-265 2.3.11.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-266 2.3.11.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-266 2.3.11.02.iii .................................................................................................................. C-266 2.3.11.03a.................................................................................................................... C-266 2.3.11.03b.................................................................................................................... C-266 2.3.11.03c .................................................................................................................... C-266 2.3.12 Solid Radwaste System..................................................................................... C-269 2.3.12.01...................................................................................................................... C-269 2.3.12.02...................................................................................................................... C-269 2.3.13 Primary Sampling System ................................................................................. C-270 2.3.13.01...................................................................................................................... C-273 2.3.13.02...................................................................................................................... C-273 2.3.13.03...................................................................................................................... C-273 2.3.13.04...................................................................................................................... C-273 2.3.13.05.i .................................................................................................................... C-273 2.3.13.05.ii ................................................................................................................... C-273 2.3.13.05.iii .................................................................................................................. C-274 2.3.13.06a.i .................................................................................................................. C-274 2.3.13.06a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-274 2.3.13.06b.................................................................................................................... C-274 2.3.13.06c .................................................................................................................... C-274 2.3.13.07...................................................................................................................... C-274 2.3.13.08...................................................................................................................... C-275 2.3.13.09...................................................................................................................... C-275 2.3.13.10a.................................................................................................................... C-275 2.3.13.10b.................................................................................................................... C-275 C-15

2.3.13.11a.................................................................................................................... C-275 2.3.13.11b.................................................................................................................... C-275 2.3.13.12...................................................................................................................... C-275 2.3.14 Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System .......................................... C-277 2.3.14.01...................................................................................................................... C-278 2.3.14.02...................................................................................................................... C-278 2.3.14.03...................................................................................................................... C-278 2.3.14.04...................................................................................................................... C-278 2.3.15 Compressed and Instrument Air System ........................................................... C-279 2.3.15.01...................................................................................................................... C-280 2.3.15.02...................................................................................................................... C-280 2.3.15.03...................................................................................................................... C-280 2.3.16 Potable Water System ....................................................................................... C-281 2.3.17 Waste Water System ......................................................................................... C-281 2.3.18 Plant Gas System.............................................................................................. C-281 2.3.19 Communication System..................................................................................... C-281 2.3.19.01a.................................................................................................................... C-282 2.3.19.01b.................................................................................................................... C-282 2.3.19.02a.................................................................................................................... C-282 2.3.19.02b.................................................................................................................... C-282 2.3.20 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System ................................................ C-283 2.3.21 Secondary Sampling System............................................................................. C-283 2.3.22 Containment Leak Rate Test System ................................................................ C-283 2.3.23 This section intentionally blank .......................................................................... C-283 2.3.24 Demineralized Water Treatment System ........................................................... C-283 2.3.25 Gravity and Roof Drain Collection System ......................................................... C-283 2.3.26 This section intentionally blank .......................................................................... C-283 2.3.27 Sanitary Drainage System ................................................................................. C-283 2.3.28 Turbine Island Vents, Drains, and Relief System ............................................... C-283 2.3.29 Radioactive Waste Drain System ...................................................................... C-284 2.3.29.01...................................................................................................................... C-285 2.3.29.02...................................................................................................................... C-285 2.3.29.03...................................................................................................................... C-285 2.3.29.04...................................................................................................................... C-285 C-16

2.3.30 Storm Drain System .......................................................................................... C-287 2.3.31 Raw Water System ............................................................................................ C-287 2.3.32 Yard Fire Water System .................................................................................... C-287 2.4 Steam and Power Conversion Systems.................................................................... C-288 2.4.1 Main and Startup Feedwater System................................................................. C-288 2.4.01.01...................................................................................................................... C-289 2.4.01.02...................................................................................................................... C-289 2.4.01.03...................................................................................................................... C-289 2.4.01.04...................................................................................................................... C-289 2.4.2 Main Turbine System......................................................................................... C-291 2.4.02.01...................................................................................................................... C-291 2.4.02.02a.................................................................................................................... C-291 2.4.02.02b.................................................................................................................... C-291 2.4.02.02c .................................................................................................................... C-291 2.4.02.03.i .................................................................................................................... C-291 2.4.02.03.ii ................................................................................................................... C-292 2.4.02.03.iii .................................................................................................................. C-292 2.4.3 Main Steam System .......................................................................................... C-293 2.4.4 Steam Generator Blowdown System ................................................................. C-293 2.4.5 Condenser Air Removal System ........................................................................ C-293 2.4.6 Condensate System .......................................................................................... C-294 2.4.06.01...................................................................................................................... C-294 2.4.06.02...................................................................................................................... C-294 2.4.7 Circulating Water System .................................................................................. C-296 2.4.8 Auxiliary Steam Supply System ......................................................................... C-296 2.4.9 Condenser Tube Cleaning System .................................................................... C-296 2.4.10 Turbine Island Chemical Feed System .............................................................. C-296 2.4.11 Condensate Polishing System ........................................................................... C-296 2.4.12 Gland Seal System............................................................................................ C-296 2.4.13 Generator Hydrogen and CO2 System .............................................................. C-296 2.4.14 Heater Drain System ......................................................................................... C-296 2.4.15 Hydrogen Seal Oil System ................................................................................ C-296 2.4.16 Main Turbine and Generator Lube Oil System ................................................... C-296 C-17

2.5 Instrumentation and Control Systems ....................................................................... C-297 2.5.1 Diverse Actuation System ................................................................................. C-297 2.5.01.01...................................................................................................................... C-300 2.5.01.02a.................................................................................................................... C-300 2.5.01.02b.................................................................................................................... C-300 2.5.01.02c.i .................................................................................................................. C-300 2.5.01.02c.ii ................................................................................................................. C-300 2.5.01.02d.................................................................................................................... C-300 2.5.01.03a.................................................................................................................... C-301 2.5.01.03b.................................................................................................................... C-301 2.5.01.03c .................................................................................................................... C-301 2.5.01.03d.................................................................................................................... C-301 2.5.01.03e.................................................................................................................... C-301 2.5.01.03f..................................................................................................................... C-301 2.5.01.03g .................................................................................................................... C-302 2.5.01.03h.................................................................................................................... C-302 2.5.01.04...................................................................................................................... C-302 2.5.01.05...................................................................................................................... C-302 2.5.2 Protection and Safety Monitoring System .......................................................... C-304 2.5.02.01...................................................................................................................... C-311 2.5.02.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-312 2.5.02.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-312 2.5.02.02.iii .................................................................................................................. C-312 2.5.02.03...................................................................................................................... C-312 2.5.02.04...................................................................................................................... C-312 2.5.02.05a.................................................................................................................... C-313 2.5.02.05b.................................................................................................................... C-313 2.5.02.06a.i .................................................................................................................. C-313 2.5.02.06a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-313 2.5.02.06b.................................................................................................................... C-313 2.5.02.06c.i .................................................................................................................. C-313 2.5.02.06c.ii ................................................................................................................. C-314 2.5.02.07a.................................................................................................................... C-314 2.5.02.07b.................................................................................................................... C-314 C-18

2.5.02.07c .................................................................................................................... C-314 2.5.02.07d.................................................................................................................... C-314 2.5.02.07e.................................................................................................................... C-314 2.5.02.08a.i .................................................................................................................. C-314 2.5.02.08a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-315 2.5.02.08a.iii ................................................................................................................ C-315 2.5.02.08b.i .................................................................................................................. C-315 2.5.02.08b.ii ................................................................................................................. C-315 2.5.02.08c .................................................................................................................... C-315 2.5.02.09a.................................................................................................................... C-316 2.5.02.09b.................................................................................................................... C-316 2.5.02.09c .................................................................................................................... C-316 2.5.02.09d.................................................................................................................... C-316 2.5.02.10...................................................................................................................... C-316 2.5.02.11...................................................................................................................... C-317 2.5.02.12...................................................................................................................... C-318 2.5.02.13...................................................................................................................... C-319 2.5.02.14...................................................................................................................... C-319 2.5.3 Plant Control System ......................................................................................... C-322 2.5.03.01...................................................................................................................... C-322 2.5.03.02...................................................................................................................... C-322 2.5.4 Data Display and Processing System ................................................................ C-323 2.5.04.01...................................................................................................................... C-326 2.5.04.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-326 2.5.04.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-326 2.5.04.02.iii .................................................................................................................. C-326 2.5.04.03...................................................................................................................... C-326 C.2.5.04.04a ................................................................................................................ C-327 C.2.5.04.04b ................................................................................................................ C-327 C.2.5.04.04c ................................................................................................................ C-327 2.5.5 In-Core Instrumentation System ........................................................................ C-328 2.5.05.01...................................................................................................................... C-329 2.5.05.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-329 2.5.05.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-329 C-19

2.5.05.02.iii .................................................................................................................. C-329 2.5.05.03a.i .................................................................................................................. C-329 2.5.05.03a.ii ................................................................................................................. C-330 2.5.05.03b.................................................................................................................... C-330 2.5.05.03c .................................................................................................................... C-330 2.5.05.04...................................................................................................................... C-330 2.5.6 Special Monitoring System ................................................................................ C-331 2.5.06.01...................................................................................................................... C-331 2.5.06.02...................................................................................................................... C-331 2.5.7 Operation and Control Centers System ............................................................. C-332 2.5.8 Radiation Monitoring System ............................................................................. C-332 2.5.9 Seismic Monitoring System ............................................................................... C-332 2.5.09.01...................................................................................................................... C-332 2.5.09.02...................................................................................................................... C-333 2.5.09.03...................................................................................................................... C-333 2.5.10 Main Turbine Control and Diagnostic System .................................................... C-334 2.5.11 Meteorological and Environmental Monitoring System ...................................... C-334 2.5.12 Closed Circuit TV System .................................................................................. C-334 2.6 Electrical Power Systems ......................................................................................... C-335 2.6.1 Main ac Power System ...................................................................................... C-335 2.6.01.01...................................................................................................................... C-340 2.6.01.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-340 2.6.01.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-340 2.6.01.02.iii .................................................................................................................. C-340 2.6.01.03a.................................................................................................................... C-340 2.6.01.03b.................................................................................................................... C-340 2.6.01.04a.................................................................................................................... C-340 2.6.01.04b.................................................................................................................... C-340 2.6.01.04c .................................................................................................................... C-341 2.6.01.04d.................................................................................................................... C-341 2.6.01.04e.................................................................................................................... C-341 2.6.01.04f..................................................................................................................... C-341 2.6.01.05...................................................................................................................... C-341 2.6.01.06...................................................................................................................... C-341 C-20

2.6.2 Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System ............................. C-347 2.6.02.01...................................................................................................................... C-347 2.6.02.02a.................................................................................................................... C-347 2.6.02.02b.................................................................................................................... C-347 2.6.02.02c .................................................................................................................... C-348 2.6.3 Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System ..................................... C-351 2.6.03.01...................................................................................................................... C-356 2.6.03.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-356 2.6.03.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-356 2.6.03.02.iii .................................................................................................................. C-357 2.6.03.03...................................................................................................................... C-357 2.6.03.04a.................................................................................................................... C-357 2.6.03.04b.................................................................................................................... C-357 2.6.03.04c .................................................................................................................... C-357 2.6.03.04d.................................................................................................................... C-358 2.6.03.04e.................................................................................................................... C-358 2.6.03.04f..................................................................................................................... C-358 2.6.03.04g .................................................................................................................... C-358 2.6.03.04h.................................................................................................................... C-359 2.6.03.04i ..................................................................................................................... C-359 2.6.03.05a.................................................................................................................... C-359 2.6.03.05b.................................................................................................................... C-359 2.6.03.05c .................................................................................................................... C-359 2.6.03.05d.i .................................................................................................................. C-359 2.6.03.05d.ii ................................................................................................................. C-359 2.6.03.06...................................................................................................................... C-360 2.6.03.07...................................................................................................................... C-360 2.6.03.08...................................................................................................................... C-360 2.6.03.09...................................................................................................................... C-360 2.6.03.10...................................................................................................................... C-361 2.6.03.11...................................................................................................................... C-361 2.6.4 Onsite Standby Power System .......................................................................... C-368 2.6.04.01...................................................................................................................... C-369 2.6.04.02a.................................................................................................................... C-369 C-21

2.6.04.02b.................................................................................................................... C-369 2.6.04.02c .................................................................................................................... C-369 2.6.04.03...................................................................................................................... C-369 2.6.04.04...................................................................................................................... C-369 2.6.5 Lighting System ................................................................................................. C-371 2.6.05.01...................................................................................................................... C-372 2.6.05.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-372 2.6.05.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-372 2.6.05.03.i .................................................................................................................... C-372 2.6.05.03.ii ................................................................................................................... C-372 2.6.05.04...................................................................................................................... C-372 2.6.05.05.i .................................................................................................................... C-373 2.6.05.05.ii ................................................................................................................... C-373 2.6.05.06.i .................................................................................................................... C-373 2.6.05.06.ii ................................................................................................................... C-373 2.6.6 Grounding and Lightning Protection System...................................................... C-374 2.6.06.01.i .................................................................................................................... C-375 2.6.06.01.ii ................................................................................................................... C-375 2.6.06.01.iii .................................................................................................................. C-376 2.6.06.01.iv .................................................................................................................. C-376 2.6.7 Special Process Heat Tracing System ............................................................... C-377 2.6.8 Cathodic Protection System .............................................................................. C-377 2.6.9 Plant Security System ....................................................................................... C-377 2.6.09.01...................................................................................................................... C-378 2.6.09.03...................................................................................................................... C-379 2.6.09.04...................................................................................................................... C-379 2.6.09.05a.................................................................................................................... C-379 2.6.09.05b.................................................................................................................... C-379 2.6.09.05c .................................................................................................................... C-379 2.6.09.06...................................................................................................................... C-380 2.6.09.07a.................................................................................................................... C-380 2.6.09.07b.................................................................................................................... C-380 2.6.09.08...................................................................................................................... C-380 2.6.09.09...................................................................................................................... C-380 C-22

2.6.09.13a.................................................................................................................... C-380 2.6.09.13b.................................................................................................................... C-380 2.6.09.13c .................................................................................................................... C-381 2.6.09.15a.................................................................................................................... C-381 2.6.09.15b.................................................................................................................... C-381 2.6.09.16...................................................................................................................... C-381 C.2.6.9 Physical Security ........................................................................................... C-382 C.2.6.09.01 .................................................................................................................. C-382 C.2.6.09.02 .................................................................................................................. C-382 C.2.6.09.03a ................................................................................................................ C-382 C.2.6.09.03b ................................................................................................................ C-382 C.2.6.09.04a ................................................................................................................ C-383 C.2.6.09.04b ................................................................................................................ C-383 C.2.6.09.05a ................................................................................................................ C-383 C.2.6.09.05b ................................................................................................................ C-383 C.2.6.09.06 .................................................................................................................. C-383 C.2.6.09.07 .................................................................................................................. C-383 C.2.6.09.08a ................................................................................................................ C-384 C.2.6.09.08b ................................................................................................................ C-384 C.2.6.09.09 .................................................................................................................. C-384 2.6.10 Main Generation System ................................................................................... C-385 2.6.11 Excitation and Voltage Regulation System ........................................................ C-385 C.2.6.12 Transmission Switchyard and Offsite Power System ..................................... C-385 C.2.6.12.01 .................................................................................................................. C-385 C.2.6.12.02 .................................................................................................................. C-385 C.2.6.12.03 .................................................................................................................. C-385 C.2.6.12.04 .................................................................................................................. C-385 C.2.6.12.05 .................................................................................................................. C-386 C.2.6.12.06 .................................................................................................................. C-386 C.2.6.12.07.i ................................................................................................................ C-387 C.2.6.12.07.ii................................................................................................................ C-388 2.6.13 Offsite Retail Power System ................................................................................. C-388 2.7 HVAC Systems......................................................................................................... C-389 2.7.1 Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System ............................................. C-389 C-23

2.7.01.01...................................................................................................................... C-394 2.7.01.02a.................................................................................................................... C-394 2.7.01.02b.................................................................................................................... C-394 2.7.01.03a.................................................................................................................... C-394 2.7.01.03b.................................................................................................................... C-395 2.7.01.04a.................................................................................................................... C-395 2.7.01.04b.................................................................................................................... C-395 2.7.01.05.i .................................................................................................................... C-395 2.7.01.05.ii ................................................................................................................... C-395 2.7.01.05.iii .................................................................................................................. C-395 2.7.01.06a.................................................................................................................... C-395 2.7.01.06b.................................................................................................................... C-396 2.7.01.07...................................................................................................................... C-396 2.7.01.08a.................................................................................................................... C-396 2.7.01.08b.................................................................................................................... C-396 2.7.01.08c .................................................................................................................... C-396 2.7.01.08d.................................................................................................................... C-396 2.7.01.09...................................................................................................................... C-396 2.7.01.10a.................................................................................................................... C-396 2.7.01.10b.................................................................................................................... C-396 2.7.01.11...................................................................................................................... C-396 2.7.01.12...................................................................................................................... C-397 2.7.01.13...................................................................................................................... C-397 2.7.01.14...................................................................................................................... C-397 2.7.2 Central Chilled Water System............................................................................ C-401 2.7.02.01...................................................................................................................... C-403 2.7.02.02...................................................................................................................... C-403 2.7.02.03a.................................................................................................................... C-403 2.7.02.03b.................................................................................................................... C-403 2.7.02.04...................................................................................................................... C-403 2.7.02.05...................................................................................................................... C-403 2.7.3 Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System ............................. C-407 2.7.03.01...................................................................................................................... C-408 2.7.03.02a.................................................................................................................... C-408 C-24

2.7.03.02b.................................................................................................................... C-408 2.7.03.03...................................................................................................................... C-408 2.7.03.04...................................................................................................................... C-408 2.7.4 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System ................................................... C-412 2.7.04.01...................................................................................................................... C-413 2.7.04.02a.................................................................................................................... C-413 2.7.04.02b.................................................................................................................... C-413 2.7.04.02c .................................................................................................................... C-413 2.7.04.03...................................................................................................................... C-413 2.7.04.04...................................................................................................................... C-413 2.7.5 Radiologically Controlled Area Ventilation System ............................................ C-417 2.7.05.01...................................................................................................................... C-418 2.7.05.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-418 2.7.05.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-418 2.7.05.02.iii .................................................................................................................. C-418 2.7.05.03...................................................................................................................... C-418 2.7.6 Containment Air Filtration System ..................................................................... C-420 2.7.06.01...................................................................................................................... C-421 2.7.06.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-421 2.7.06.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-421 2.7.06.03.i .................................................................................................................... C-421 2.7.06.03.ii ................................................................................................................... C-421 2.7.06.03.iii .................................................................................................................. C-421 2.7.06.04...................................................................................................................... C-421 2.7.06.05...................................................................................................................... C-421 2.7.7 Containment Recirculation Cooling System ....................................................... C-424 2.7.07.01...................................................................................................................... C-424 2.7.07.02...................................................................................................................... C-424 2.7.8 Radwaste Building HVAC System ..................................................................... C-425 2.7.9 Turbine Island Building Ventilation System ........................................................ C-425 2.7.10 Health Physics and Hot Machine Shop HVAC System ...................................... C-425 2.7.11 Hot Water Heating System ................................................................................ C-425 3.0 Non-System Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC ................................................ C-426 3.1 Emergency Response Facilities ............................................................................ C-426 C-25

3.1.00.01...................................................................................................................... C-426 3.1.00.02...................................................................................................................... C-426 3.1.00.03...................................................................................................................... C-426 3.1.00.04...................................................................................................................... C-426 3.1.00.05...................................................................................................................... C-427 3.1.00.06...................................................................................................................... C-427 3.2 Human Factors Engineering ................................................................................. C-427 3.2.00.01a.................................................................................................................... C-429 3.2.00.01b.................................................................................................................... C-429 3.2.00.01c.i .................................................................................................................. C-429 3.2.00.01c.ii ................................................................................................................. C-430 3.2.00.01d.................................................................................................................... C-430 3.2.00.01e.................................................................................................................... C-430 3.2.00.02...................................................................................................................... C-431 3.2.00.03.i .................................................................................................................... C-431 3.2.00.03.ii ................................................................................................................... C-431 3.2.00.03.iii .................................................................................................................. C-431 3.2.00.03.iv .................................................................................................................. C-431 3.2.00.03.v ................................................................................................................... C-431 3.2.00.04...................................................................................................................... C-431 3.2.00.05...................................................................................................................... C-431 3.2.00.06.i .................................................................................................................... C-431 3.2.00.06.ii ................................................................................................................... C-431 3.2.00.06.iii .................................................................................................................. C-432 3.2.00.07...................................................................................................................... C-432 3.2.00.08...................................................................................................................... C-432 3.2.00.09...................................................................................................................... C-432 3.3 Buildings................................................................................................................... C-434 3.3.00.01...................................................................................................................... C-449 3.3.00.02a.i.a ............................................................................................................... C-449 3.3.00.02a.i.b ............................................................................................................... C-449 3.3.00.02a.i.c ............................................................................................................... C-450 3.3.00.02a.i.d ............................................................................................................... C-450 3.3.00.02a.ii.a .............................................................................................................. C-450 C-26

3.3.00.02a.ii.b .............................................................................................................. C-450 3.3.00.02a.ii.c .............................................................................................................. C-451 3.3.00.02a.ii.d .............................................................................................................. C-451 3.3.00.02a.ii.e .............................................................................................................. C-451 3.3.00.02a.ii.f ............................................................................................................... C-451 3.3.00.02b.................................................................................................................... C-451 3.3.00.02c .................................................................................................................... C-451 3.3.00.02d.................................................................................................................... C-452 3.3.00.02e.................................................................................................................... C-452 3.3.00.02f..................................................................................................................... C-452 3.3.00.02g .................................................................................................................... C-452 3.3.00.02h.................................................................................................................... C-452 3.3.00.03a.................................................................................................................... C-453 3.3.00.03b.................................................................................................................... C-453 3.3.00.03c .................................................................................................................... C-453 3.3.00.03d.................................................................................................................... C-453 3.3.00.04a.................................................................................................................... C-454 3.3.00.04b.................................................................................................................... C-454 3.3.00.04c .................................................................................................................... C-454 3.3.00.05a.................................................................................................................... C-454 3.3.00.05b.................................................................................................................... C-454 3.3.00.05c .................................................................................................................... C-455 3.3.00.06a.................................................................................................................... C-455 3.3.00.06b.................................................................................................................... C-455 3.3.00.07aa .................................................................................................................. C-455 3.3.00.07ab .................................................................................................................. C-455 3.3.00.07ac .................................................................................................................. C-456 3.3.00.07ba .................................................................................................................. C-456 3.3.00.07bb .................................................................................................................. C-456 3.3.00.07bc .................................................................................................................. C-456 3.3.00.07c.i.a ............................................................................................................... C-457 3.3.00.07c.i.b ............................................................................................................... C-457 3.3.00.07c.ii.a .............................................................................................................. C-457 3.3.00.07c.ii.b .............................................................................................................. C-457 C-27

3.3.00.07d.i .................................................................................................................. C-457 3.3.00.07d.ii.a .............................................................................................................. C-458 3.3.00.07d.ii.b .............................................................................................................. C-459 3.3.00.07d.ii.c .............................................................................................................. C-460 3.3.00.07d.iii.a ............................................................................................................. C-461 3.3.00.07d.iii.b ............................................................................................................. C-461 3.3.00.07d.iii.c.............................................................................................................. C-461 3.3.00.07d.iv.a ............................................................................................................. C-462 3.3.00.07d.iv.b ............................................................................................................. C-462 3.3.00.07d.iv.c ............................................................................................................. C-463 3.3.00.07d.v.a .............................................................................................................. C-463 3.3.00.07d.v.b .............................................................................................................. C-464 3.3.00.07d.v.c .............................................................................................................. C-464 3.3.00.07e.................................................................................................................... C-464 3.3.00.08...................................................................................................................... C-465 3.3.00.09...................................................................................................................... C-465 3.3.00.10.i .................................................................................................................... C-465 3.3.00.10.ii ................................................................................................................... C-465 3.3.00.10.iii .................................................................................................................. C-466 3.3.00.12...................................................................................................................... C-466 3.3.00.13...................................................................................................................... C-466 3.3.00.14...................................................................................................................... C-466 3.3.00.16...................................................................................................................... C-467 3.3.00.17...................................................................................................................... C-467 3.4 Initial Test Program .................................................................................................. C-469 3.5 Radiation Monitoring................................................................................................. C-469 3.5.00.01.i .................................................................................................................... C-473 3.5.00.01.ii ................................................................................................................... C-473 3.5.00.01.iii .................................................................................................................. C-473 3.5.00.02.i .................................................................................................................... C-473 3.5.00.02.ii ................................................................................................................... C-473 3.5.00.03...................................................................................................................... C-473 3.5.00.04...................................................................................................................... C-474 3.5.00.05...................................................................................................................... C-474 C-28

3.5.00.06...................................................................................................................... C-474 3.5.00.07...................................................................................................................... C-474 3.5.00.08...................................................................................................................... C-474 3.6 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection ................................................ C-476 3.6.00.01.i .................................................................................................................... C-476 3.6.00.01.ii ................................................................................................................... C-476 3.6.00.01.iii .................................................................................................................. C-477 3.6.00.01.iv .................................................................................................................. C-477 3.6.00.01.v ................................................................................................................... C-477 3.6.00.01.vi .................................................................................................................. C-477 3.6.00.01.vii ................................................................................................................. C-477 3.7 Design Reliability Assurance Program ...................................................................... C-478 3.7.00.01...................................................................................................................... C-484 C.3.8 Emergency Planning ITAAC ................................................................................. C-485 C.3.8.1.1 Emergency Classification System ....................................................... C-485 C.3.8.01.01.01 ............................................................................................................. C-485 C.3.8.01.01.02 ............................................................................................................. C-485 C.3.8.1.2 Notification Methods and Procedures ................................................. C-486 C.3.8.01.02.01 ............................................................................................................. C-486 C.3.8.01.02.02 ............................................................................................................. C-486 C.3.8.01.02.03 ............................................................................................................. C-486 C.3.8.1.3 Emergency Communications............................................................... C-487 C.3.8.01.03.01 ............................................................................................................. C-487 C.3.8.01.03.02 ............................................................................................................. C-487 C.3.8.1.4 Public Education and Information ....................................................... C-488 C.3.8.01.04.01 ............................................................................................................. C-488 C.3.8.1.5 Emergency Facilities and Equipment .................................................. C-488 C.3.8.01.05.01.01 ........................................................................................................ C-488 C.3.8.01.05.01.02 ........................................................................................................ C-488 C.3.8.01.05.01.03 ........................................................................................................ C-488 C.3.8.01.05.01.04 ........................................................................................................ C-489 C.3.8.01.05.01.05 ........................................................................................................ C-489 C.3.8.01.05.01.06 ........................................................................................................ C-489 C.3.8.01.05.01.07 ........................................................................................................ C-489 C-29

C.3.8.01.05.01.08 ........................................................................................................ C-489 C.3.8.01.05.02.01 ........................................................................................................ C-490 C.3.8.01.05.02.02 ........................................................................................................ C-490 C.3.8.01.05.02.03 ........................................................................................................ C-490 C.3.8.1.6 Accident Assessment ......................................................................... C-490 C.3.8.01.06.01 ............................................................................................................. C-490 C.3.8.01.06.02 ............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.03 ............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.04 ............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.05 ............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.06 ............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.07 ............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.08 ............................................................................................................. C-492 C.3.8.01.06.09 ............................................................................................................. C-492 C.3.8.1.7 Protective Response ............................................................................ C-493 C.3.8.01.07.01 ............................................................................................................. C-493 C.3.8.1.8 Exercises and Drills ............................................................................ C-494 C.3.8.01.08.01.01 ........................................................................................................ C-494 C.3.8.01.08.01.02 ........................................................................................................ C-501 C.3.8.01.08.01.03 ........................................................................................................ C-502 C.3.8.1.9 Implementing Procedures .................................................................... C-502 C.3.8.01.09.01 ............................................................................................................. C-502 C.3.8.2 Pipe Rupture Hazard Analysis ....................................................................... C-503 C.3.8.02.01 .................................................................................................................. C-503 C.3.8.3 Piping Design................................................................................................. C-504 C.3.8.03.01 .................................................................................................................. C-504 C.3.8.4 Waterproof Membrane ................................................................................... C-505 C.3.8.04.01 .................................................................................................................. C-505 C.3.8.5 Concrete Fill .................................................................................................. C-505 C.3.8.05.01 .................................................................................................................. C-505 C.3.8.05.02a ................................................................................................................ C-505 C.3.8.05.02b ................................................................................................................ C-505 C.3.8.6 Seismic Category I Structure Foundation Grouting ........................................ C-506 C.3.8.06.01.i ................................................................................................................ C-506 C-30

C.3.8.06.01.ii................................................................................................................ C-507 ....................................................................................................................... C-508 C-31

1.0 Introduction 1.1 Definitions The following definitions apply to terms used in the design descriptions and associated inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC).

Acceptance Criteria means the performance, physical condition, or analysis result for a structure, system, or component that demonstrates that the design or program commitment is met.

Analysis means a calculation, mathematical computation, or engineering or technical evaluation. Engineering or technical evaluations could include, but are not limited to, comparisons with operating experience or design of similar structures, systems, or components.

As-built means the physical properties of a structure, system, or component following the completion of its installation or construction activities at its final location at the plant site. In cases where it is technically justifiable, determination of physical properties of the as-built structure, system, or component may be based on measurements, inspections, or tests that occur prior to installation, provided that subsequent fabrication, handling, installation, and testing does not alter the properties.

Column Line is the designation applied to a plant reference grid used to define the location of building walls and columns. Column lines may not represent the center line of walls and columns.

Design Commitment means that portion of the design description that is verified by ITAAC.

Design Description means that portion of the design that is certified.

Design Plant Grade means the elevation of the soil around the nuclear island assumed in the design of the AP1000, i.e., floor elevation 100'-0".

Division (for electrical systems or electrical equipment) is the designation applied to a given safety-related system or set of components that is physically, electrically, and functionally independent from other redundant sets of components.

Floor Elevation is the designation applied to name a floor. The actual elevation may vary due to floor slope and layout requirements.

Functional Arrangement (for a system) means the physical arrangement of systems and components to provide the service for which the system is intended, and which is described in the system design description.

Inspect or Inspection means visual observations, physical examinations, or reviews of records based on visual observation or physical examination that compare a) the structure, system, or component condition to one or more design commitments or b) the program implementation C-32

elements to one or more program commitments, as applicable. Examples include walkdowns, configuration checks, measurements of dimensions, or nondestructive examinations.

Inspect for Retrievability of a display means to visually observe that the specified information appears on a monitor when summoned by the operator.

ITAAC Number is a unique number based on three character strings. The first string represents the source of the ITAAC where a C or E denotes the ITAAC source is from the combined license or early site permit respectively. No alpha character denotes the ITAAC source is from the design control document (DCD). The second string represents the chapter, section, and subsection where the ITAAC table is located within the source document and contains three or more numbers separated by decimals. If the source document is not numbered, the string is based on the ITAAC table number within this appendix. The third string identifies the location of the ITAAC within the table and will vary in length and composition based on the source table numbering convention.

La is the maximum allowable containment leakage as defined in 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.

Physical Arrangement (for a structure) means the arrangement of the building features (e.g.,

floors, ceilings, walls, and basemat) and of the structures, systems, and components within, which are described in the building design description.

Program Commitment means that portion of the program description that is verified by ITAAC.

The bracketed, alphanumerical designations included in the emergency planning ITAAC identify the evaluation criteria (i.e., program elements) from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 Planning Standards that were used to develop the specific generic ITAAC in NUREG-0800, Table 14.3.10-1.

Qualified for Harsh Environment means that equipment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of its safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function. These environmental conditions include applicable time-dependent temperature and pressure profiles, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, submergence, and their synergistic effects which have a significant effect on the equipment performance. Equipment identified in the Design Description as being Qualified for Harsh Environment includes the:

a) equipment itself b) sensors, switches and lubricants that are an integral part of the equipment c) electrical components connected to the equipment (wiring, cabling and terminations)

Items b and c are Qualified for Harsh Environment only when they are necessary to support operation of the equipment to meet its safety-related function listed in the Design Description table and to the extent such equipment is located in a harsh environment during or following a design basis accident.

Sensor means a transmitter, resistance temperature detector, thermocouple or other transducer, plus associated cables, connectors, preamplifiers, reference junction boxes, or other signal C-33

processing equipment that is located in the immediate proximity of the sensor and subject to the same environmental conditions.

Site Grade means the as-built elevation of the soil to the west side of the nuclear island.

Adjacent buildings are located on the other sides of the nuclear island.

Tag Number in the ITAACs represents the complete tag number or a portion of the tag number used to identify the actual hardware (or associated software). For instrumentation, the tag number identified in the ITAACs does not include the type of instrument (for example, the Containment Exhaust Fan A Flow Sensor, VFS-11A, does not include the designators FE [flow element] or FT [flow transmitter], which would appear on the actual hardware or in the associated software). This is because the designator VFS-11A and the equipment description are sufficient to uniquely identify the channel associated with the designated instrument function, and this method of identification eliminates the need to list every portion of the instrumentation channel required to perform the function. In most cases, the channel number includes physical hardware. There are, however, a few places where the channel number represents only a calculation in software. In those cases, the channel data can be displayed. In many instances, the word sensor is used in the equipment description to identify that the item is an instrument.

Test means the actuation, operation, or establishment of specified conditions to evaluate the performance or integrity of as-built structures, systems, or components, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

Transfer Open (Closed) means to move from a closed (open) position to an open (closed) position.

Type Test means a test on one or more sample components of the same type and manufacturer to qualify other components of the same type and manufacturer. A type test is not necessarily a test of the as-built structures, systems, or components.

UA of a heat exchanger means the product of the heat transfer coefficient and the surface area.

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1.2 General Provisions The following general provisions are applicable to the design descriptions and associated ITAAC.

Treatment of Individual Items The absence of any discussion or depiction of an item in the design description or accompanying figures shall not be construed as prohibiting a licensee from utilizing such an item, unless it would prevent an item from performing its safety functions as discussed or depicted in the design description or accompanying figures.

If an inspections, tests, or analyses (ITA) requirement does not specify the temperature or other conditions under which a test must be run, then the test conditions are not constrained.

When the term "operate," "operates," or "operation" is used with respect to an item discussed in the acceptance criteria, it refers to the actuation and running of the item. When the term "exist,"

"exists," or "existence" is used with respect to an item discussed in the acceptance criteria, it means that the item is present and meets the design commitment.

Implementation of ITAAC The ITAAC are provided in tables with the following three-column format:

Design (or Program) Inspections, Acceptance Commitment Tests, Analyses Criteria Each design or program commitment in the left-hand column of the ITAAC tables has an associated ITA requirement specified in the middle column of the tables.

The identification of a separate ITA entry for each design or program commitment shall not be construed to require that separate inspections, tests, or analyses must be performed for each design or program commitment. Instead, the activities associated with more than one ITA entry may be combined, and a single inspection, test, or analysis may be sufficient to implement more than one ITA entry.

An ITA may be performed by the licensee of the plant or by its authorized vendors, contractors, or consultants. Furthermore, an ITA may be performed by more than a single individual or group, may be implemented through discrete activities separated by time, and may be performed at any time prior to fuel load (including before issuance of the combined license for those ITAACs that do not necessarily pertain to as-installed equipment). Additionally, an ITA may be performed as part of the activities that are required to be performed under 10 CFR Part 50 (including, for example, the quality assurance (QA) program required under Appendix B to Part 50); therefore, an ITA need not be performed as a separate or discrete activity.

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Many of the acceptance criteria include the words A report exists and concludes that When these words are used, it indicates that the ITAAC for that design commitment will be met when it is confirmed that appropriate documentation exists and the documentation shows that the design commitment is met. Appropriate documentation can be a single document or a collection of documents that show that the stated acceptance criteria are met. Examples of appropriate documentation include design reports, test reports, inspection reports, analysis reports, evaluation reports, design and manufacturing procedures, certified data sheets, commercial dedication procedures and records, quality assurance records, calculation notes, and equipment qualification data packages. For plants at sites which are qualified using the hard rock high frequency (HRHF) ground motion response spectra (GMRS), high frequency seismic screening and qualification testing required as a result of the evaluation of potential high frequency sensitive components is included in the equipment qualification data packages.

Many entries in the ITA column of the ITAAC tables include the words Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying When these words are used it indicates that the ITA is tests, type tests, analyses, or a combination of tests, type tests, and analyses and a report will be produced documenting the results. This report will be available to inspectors.

Many ITAAC are only a reference to another ITAAC location, either a section, subsection, or ITAAC table entry (for example, See ITAAC Table ). A reference to another ITAAC location is always in both the ITA and acceptance criteria columns for a design commitment. This reference is an indication that the ITA and acceptance criteria for that design commitment are satisfied when the referenced ITA are completed and the acceptance criteria for the referenced sections, subsections, or table entries are satisfied. If a complete section is referenced, this indicates that all the ITA and acceptance criteria in that section must be met before the referencing design commitment is satisfied.

Discussion of Matters Related to Operations In some cases, the design descriptions in this document refer to matters that relate to operation, such as normal valve or breaker alignment during normal operation modes. Such discussions are provided solely to place the design description provisions in context (for example, to explain automatic features for opening or closing valves or breakers upon off-normal conditions). Such discussions shall not be construed as requiring operators during operation to take any particular action (for example, to maintain valves or breakers in a particular position during normal operation).

Interpretation of Figures In many but not all cases, the design descriptions in Section 2 include one or more figures. The figures may represent a functional diagram, general structural representation, or another general illustration. For instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, figures may also represent aspects of the relevant logic of the system or part of the system. Unless specified explicitly, the figures are not indicative of the scale, location, dimensions, shape, or spatial relationships of as-built structures, systems, and components. In particular, the as-built attributes of structures, C-36

systems, and components may vary from the attributes depicted on the figures, provided that those safety functions discussed in the design description pertaining to the figure are not adversely affected.

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1.3 Figure Legend The conventions used in this section are for figures described in the design description. The figure legend is provided for information.

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C-39 C-40 MISCELLANEOUS A component that is part of the system functional arrangement shown on the figure and is included in the design commitments for the system.

A component that is part of the system functional arrangement shown on the figure.

A system or component of another system that is not part of the system functional arrangement shown on the figure.

A functional connection to another system that is not part of the system functional arrangement shown on the figure.

ASME CODE CLASS BREAK An ASME Code class break is identified by a single line to the designated location for the class break, as shown in the example below (see note 1).

NOTES:

1. The header, ASME Code Section III Class, must appear at least once on each figure on which ASME class breaks are shown, but need not appear at every class break shown on a figure.

Indicates Non-ASME Code Section III C-41

1.4 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations The acronyms presented in this section are provided for information.

ac Alternating Current AC Acceptance Criteria ADS Automatic Depressurization System AHU Air Handling Units ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ANS Alert and Notification System ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers atm Atmosphere BTU British Thermal Unit CAS Compressed and Instrument Air System CAV Cumulative Absolute Velocity cc Cubic Centimeter CCS Component Cooling Water System CDE Committed Dose Equivalent CDS Condensate System cfm Cubic Feet per Minute CFR Code of Federal Regulations Ci Curie CIM Component Interface Module CMT Core Makeup Tank CNS Containment System COL Combined Operating License/Combined License cpm Counts Per Minute CR Control Room CRDM Control Rod Drive Mechanism CSA Control Support Area CST Condensate Storage Tank CVS Chemical and Volume Control System CWS Circulating Water System DAS Diverse Actuation System DBT Design Basis Threat dc Direct Current DCD Design Control Document DDS Data Display and Processing System C-42

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations (cont.)

DOS Standby Diesel Fuel Oil System D-RAP Design Reliability Assurance Program DTS Demineralized Water Treatment System DVI Direct Vessel Injection DWS Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System EAL Emergency Action Level EBF Eccentrically Braced Framing ECS Main ac Power System EDS Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System EFS Communication System EGS Grounding and Lightning Protection System EIP Emergency Implementing Procedure El. Elevation ELS Plant Lighting System EMI Electromagnetic Interference EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERDS Emergency Response Data System ERO Emergency Response Organization ESD Electrostatic Discharge F Fahrenheit FE Flow Element FHM Fuel Handling Machine FHS Fuel Handling and Refueling System FPS Fire Protection System ft Feet FT Flow Transmitter FTS Fuel Transfer System FWS Main and Startup Feedwater System GRMS Ground Motion Response Spectra gpm Gallons per Minute GRCA Grey Rod Cluster Assemblies GSU Generator Stepup Transformer C-43

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations (cont.)

HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HFE Human Factors Engineering HL Hot Leg hr Hour HRHF Hard Rock High frequency HSI Human-System Interface HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning HX Heat Exchanger Hz Hertz I&C Instrumentation and Control IDS Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System IIS In-core Instrumentation System in Inches I&C Instrumentation and Control IRC Inside Reactor Containment IRWST In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank ITA Inspections, Tests, Analyses ITAAC Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria JIC Joint Information Center KI Potassium Iodide kW Kilowatt lb/hr Pounds per Hour LBB Leak Before Break LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection m Meters MBtu Million British Thermal Units MCC Motor Control Center MCR Main Control Room MHS Mechanical Handling System MOV Motor-operated Valve MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve MSS Main Steam System MTS Main Turbine System MW Megawatt MWe Megawatt Electric C-44

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations (cont.)

MWt Megawatt Thermal NI Nuclear Island NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S.

OCS Operation and Control Centers System ORC Outside Reactor Containment OSC Operations Support Center PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recommendation PCCAWST Passive Containment Cooling Ancillary Water Storage Tank PCCWST Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank PCS Passive Containment Cooling System PGS Plant Gas System pH Potential of Hydrogen PLS Plant Control System PMS Protection and Safety Monitoring System PORV Power-operated Relief Valve PRHR Passive Residual Heat Removal psia Pounds per Square Inch Absolute psig Pounds per Square Inch Gauge PSS Primary Sampling System pu Per Unit PWS Potable Water System PXS Passive Core Cooling System QA Quality Assurance R/hr Roentgen per Hour RAP Reliability Assurance Program RAT Reserve Auxiliary Transformer RC Reinforced Concrete RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly RCDT Reactor Coolant Drain Tank RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RFI Radio Frequency Interference RM Refueling Machine RMS Radiation Monitoring System C-45

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations (cont.)

RNS Normal Residual Heat Removal System RP Radiation Protection RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel RSR Remote Shutdown Room RSW Remote Shutdown Workstation RTD Resistance Temperature Detector RXS Reactor System RV Reactor Vessel SC Steel and Concrete scf Standard Cubic Feet scfm Standard Cubic Feet per Minute SDS Sanitary Drainage System SFHT Spent Fuel Handling Tool SFP Spent Fuel Pool SFS Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System SG Steam Generator SGS Steam Generator System SJS Seismic Monitoring System SMS Special Monitoring System SSCs Structures, Systems, and Components SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SWC Surge Withstand Capability SWS Service Water System TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent TSC Technical Support Center UAT Unit Auxiliary Transformer UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply V Volt VAS Radiologically Controlled Area Ventilation System VBS Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System VCS Containment Recirculation Cooling System Vdc Direct Current Voltage VES Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System VFS Containment Air Filtration System VHS Health Physics and Hot Machine Shop Areas VLS Containment Hydrogen Control System C-46

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations (cont.)

VRS Radwaste Building HVAC System VWS Central Chilled Water System VXS Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System VZS Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System wg Water Gauge WGS Gaseous Radwaste System WLS Liquid Radwaste System WSS Solid Radwaste System WWS Waste Water System WRS Radioactive Waste Drain System ZOI Zone of Influence ZOS Onsite Standby Power System C-47

2.0 System Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC 2.1 Reactor 2.1.1 Fuel Handling and Refueling System Design Description The fuel handling and refueling system (FHS) transfers fuel assemblies and core components during fueling operations and stores new and spent fuel assemblies in the new and spent fuel storage racks. The refueling machine (RM) and the fuel transfer tube are operated during refueling mode. The fuel handling machine (FHM) is operated during normal modes of plant operation, including startup, power operation, cooldown, shutdown and refueling.

The component locations of the FHS are as shown in Table 2.1.1-2.

1. The functional arrangement of the FHS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.1.
2. The FHS has the RM, the FHM, and the new and spent fuel storage racks.
3. The FHS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the fuel transfer tube penetrating containment.
4. The RM and FHM/spent fuel handling tool (SFHT) gripper assemblies are designed to prevent opening while the weight of the fuel assembly is suspended from the grippers.
5. The lift height of the RM mast and FHM hoist(s) is limited such that the minimum required depth of water shielding is maintained.
6. The RM and FHM are designed to maintain their load carrying and structural integrity functions during a safe shutdown earthquake.
7. The new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor required by 10 CFR 50.68 limits during normal operation, design basis seismic events, and design basis dropped spent fuel assembly accidents over the spent fuel storage racks.

C-48

Table 2.1.1-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 2.1.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the FHS Inspection of the as-built The as-built FHS conforms is as described in the Design Description of system will be performed. with the functional this Section 2.1.1. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.1.

2 2.1.01.02 2. The FHS has the refueling machine Inspection of the system will The FHS has the RM, the (RM), the fuel handling machine (FHM), be performed. FHM, and the new and spent and the new and spent fuel storage racks. fuel storage racks.

3 2.1.01.03 3. The FHS preserves containment See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, integrity by isolation of the fuel transfer items 1 and 7. items 1 and 7.

tube penetrating containment.

4 2.1.01.04 4. The RM and FHM/spent fuel handling The RM and FHM/SFHT The RM and FHM/SFHT tool (SFHT) gripper assemblies are gripper assemblies will be gripper assemblies will not designed to prevent opening while the tested by operating the open open while suspending a weight of the fuel assembly is suspended controls of the gripper while dummy test assembly.

from the grippers. suspending a dummy fuel assembly.

5 2.1.01.05 5. The lift height of the RM mast and The RM and FHM will be The bottom of the dummy FHM hoist(s) is limited such that the tested by attempting to raise a fuel assembly cannot be minimum required depth of water shielding dummy fuel assembly. raised to within 24 ft, 6 in.

is maintained. of the operating deck floor.

6 2.1.01.06.i 6. The RM and FHM are designed to i) Inspection will be i) The RM and FHM are maintain their load carrying and structural performed to verify that the located on the nuclear integrity functions during a safe shutdown RM and FHM are located on island.

earthquake. the nuclear island.

7 2.1.01.06.ii 6. The RM and FHM are designed to ii) Type test, analysis, or a ii) A report exists and maintain their load carrying and structural combination of type tests and concludes that the RM and integrity functions during a safe shutdown analyses of the RM and FHM FHM can withstand seismic earthquake. will be performed. design basis dynamic loads without loss of load carrying or structural integrity functions.

8 2.1.01.07.i 7. The new and spent fuel storage racks i) Analyses will be performed i) The calculated effective maintain the effective neutron to calculate the effective neutron multiplication factor multiplication factor required by 10 CFR neutron multiplication factor for the new and spent fuel 50.68 limits during normal operation, in the new and spent fuel storage racks meets the design basis seismic events, and design storage racks during normal requirements of basis dropped spent fuel assembly conditions. 10 CFR 50.68(1) limits under accidents over the spent fuel storage racks. normal conditions.

9 2.1.01.07.ii 7. The new and spent fuel storage racks ii) Inspection will be ii) The new and spent fuel maintain the effective neutron performed to verify that the storage racks are located on multiplication factor required by 10 CFR new and spent fuel storage the nuclear island.

50.68 limits during normal operation, C-49

Table 2.1.1-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria design basis seismic events, and design racks are located on the basis dropped spent fuel assembly nuclear island.

accidents over the spent fuel storage racks.

10 2.1.01.07.iii 7. The new and spent fuel storage racks iii) Seismic analysis of the iii) A report exists and maintain the effective neutron new and spent fuel storage concludes that the new and multiplication factor required by 10 CFR racks will be performed. spent fuel racks can 50.68 limits during normal operation, withstand seismic design design basis seismic events, and design basis dynamic loads and basis dropped spent fuel assembly maintain the calculated accidents over the spent fuel storage racks. effective neutron multiplication factor required by 10 CFR 50.68(1) limits.

11 2.1.01.07.iv 7. The new and spent fuel storage racks iv) Analysis of the new and iv) A report exists and maintain the effective neutron spent fuel storage racks under concludes that the new and multiplication factor required by 10 CFR design basis dropped spent spent fuel racks can 50.68 limits during normal operation, fuel assembly loads will be withstand design basis design basis seismic events, and design performed. dropped spent fuel assembly basis dropped spent fuel assembly loads and maintain the accidents over the spent fuel storage racks. calculated effective neutron multiplication factor required by 10 CFR 50.68(1) limits.

Note:

1. The requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 are summarized as follows:
  • For new fuel storage racks:

- The effective neutron multiplication factor (K-effective) must not exceed 0.95 when flooded with unborated water and

- K-effective must not exceed 0.98 with optimum moderator conditions.

  • For spent fuel storage racks:

- If methodology does not take credit for soluble boron:

  • K-effective must not exceed 0.95 when flooded with unborated water.

- Or if methodology takes credit for soluble boron:

  • K-effective must not exceed 0.95 when flooded with borated water and
  • K-effective must remain below 1.0 when flooded with unborated water.

C-50

Table 2.1.1-2 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Refueling Machine FHS-FH-01 Containment Fuel Handling Machine FHS-FH-02 Auxiliary Building Spent Fuel Storage Racks FHS-FS-02 Auxiliary Building New Fuel Storage Racks FHS-FS-01 Auxiliary Building Fuel Transfer Tube FHS-FT-01 Auxiliary Building/Containment C-51

2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System Design Description The reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat from the reactor core and transfers it to the secondary side of the steam generators for power generation. The RCS contains two vertical U-tube steam generators, four sealless reactor coolant pumps (RCPs), and one pressurizer.

The RCS is as shown in Figure 2.1.2-1 and the component locations of the RCS are as shown in Table 2.1.2-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the RCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.2.
2. a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for leak before break (LBB) meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.
7. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

C-52

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between RCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

8. The RCS provides the following safety-related functions:

a) The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure protection in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

b) The reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) have a rotating inertia to provide RCS flow coastdown on loss of power to the pumps.

c) Each RCP flywheel assembly can withstand a design overspeed condition.

d) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events.

e) The RCS provides emergency letdown during design basis events.

9. The RCS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The RCS provides circulation of coolant to remove heat from the core.

b) The RCS provides the means to control system pressure.

c) The pressurizer heaters trip after a signal is generated by the PMS.

10. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
11. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having diverse actuation system (DAS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from DAS.

12. a) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

13. a) Controls exist in the MCR to trip the RCPs.

b) The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the DAS.

C-53

14. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.1.2-3 to perform the listed function.
15. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.1.2-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.1.2-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position Steam Generator 1 RCS-MB-01 Yes Yes - -/- - - - -

Steam Generator 2 RCS-MB-02 Yes Yes - -/- - - - -

RCP 1A RCS-MP-01A Yes Yes - No/No No Yes/Yes No -

(pump trip)

RCP 1B RCS-MP-01B Yes Yes - No/No No Yes/Yes No -

(pump trip)

RCP 2A RCS-MP-02A Yes Yes - No/No No Yes/Yes No -

(pump trip)

RCP 2B RCS-MP-02B Yes Yes - No/No No Yes/Yes No -

(pump trip)

Pressurizer RCS-MV-02 Yes Yes - No/No - Yes/No No -

(heaters) (heater trip)

Automatic PXS-MW-01A Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Depressurization System (ADS)

Sparger A ADS Sparger B PXS-MW-01B Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Pressurizer Safety RCS-PL-V005A Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Valve Open/

Transfer Closed Pressurizer Safety RCS-PL-V005B Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Valve Open/

Transfer Closed First-stage ADS RCS-PL-V001A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Motor-operated Valve (Valve Open (MOV) Position)

C-54

Table 2.1.2-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position First-stage ADS MOV RCS-PL-V001B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is (Valve Open Position)

Second-stage ADS RCS-PL-V002A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is MOV (Valve Open Position)

Second-stage ADS RCS-PL-V002B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is MOV (Valve Open Position)

Third-stage ADS RCS-PL-V003A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is MOV (Valve Open Position)

Third-stage ADS RCS-PL-V003B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer As Is MOV Position) Open Fourth-stage ADS RCS-PL-V004A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Squib Valve Position) Open Fourth-stage ADS RCS-PL-V004B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Squib Valve Position) Open Fourth-stage ADS RCS-PL-V004C Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Squib Valve Position) Open Fourth-stage ADS RCS-PL-V004D Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Squib Valve Position) Open ADS Discharge Header RCS-PL-V010A Yes Yes No Yes/Yes No No/No Transfer -

A Vacuum Relief Valve Open ADS Discharge Header RCS-PL-V010B Yes Yes No Yes/Yes No No/No Transfer -

B Vacuum Relief Valve Open First-stage ADS RCS-PL-V011A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Isolation MOV Position) Open First-stage ADS RCS-PL-V011B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Isolation MOV Position) Open Second-stage ADS RCS-PL-V012A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Isolation MOV Position) Open Second-stage ADS RCS-PL-V012B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Isolation MOV Position) Open Third-stage ADS RCS-PL-V013A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Isolation MOV Position) Open Third-stage ADS RCS-PL-V013B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Isolation MOV Position) Open Fourth-stage ADS RCS-PL-V014A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No None As Is MOV Position)

Fourth-stage ADS RCS-PL-V014B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No None As Is MOV Position)

C-55

Table 2.1.2-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position Fourth-stage ADS RCS-PL-V014C Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No None As Is MOV Position)

Fourth-stage ADS RCS-PL-V014D Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No None As Is MOV Position)

Reactor Vessel Head RCS-PL-V150A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer Closed Vent Valve Position) Open Reactor Vessel Head RCS-PL-V150B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer Closed Vent Valve Position) Open Reactor Vessel Head RCS-PL-V150C Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer Closed Vent Valve Position) Open Reactor Vessel Head RCS-PL-V150D Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer Closed Vent Valve Position) Open RCS Hot Leg 1 RCS-101A - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - -

Flow Sensor RCS Hot Leg 1 RCS-101B - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - -

Flow Sensor RCS Hot Leg 1 RCS-101C - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - -

Flow Sensor RCS Hot Leg 1 RCS-101D - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - -

Flow Sensor RCS Hot Leg 2 RCS-102A - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - -

Flow Sensor RCS Hot Leg 2 RCS-102B - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - -

Flow Sensor RCS Hot Leg 2 RCS-102C - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - -

Flow Sensor RCS Hot Leg 2 RCS-102D - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - -

Flow Sensor RCS Cold Leg 1A RCS-121A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Cold Leg 1B RCS-121B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Cold Leg 1B RCS-121C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Cold Leg 1A RCS-121D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor C-56

Table 2.1.2-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position RCS Cold Leg 2B RCS-122A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Cold Leg 2A RCS-122B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Cold Leg 2A RCS-122C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Cold Leg 2B RCS-122D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Cold Leg 1A RCS-125A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes (Wide -/- - -

Dual Range Range)

Temperature Sensor RCS Cold Leg 2A RCS-125B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes (Wide -/- - -

Dual Range Range)

Temperature Sensor RCS Cold Leg 1B RCS-125C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes (Wide -/- - -

Dual Range Range Temperature Sensor RCS Cold Leg 2B RCS-125D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes (Wide -/- - -

Dual Range Range)

Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 1 RCS-131A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 2 RCS-131B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 1 RCS-131C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 2 RCS-131D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 1 RCS-132A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 2 RCS-132B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 1 RCS-132C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor C-57

Table 2.1.2-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position RCS Hot Leg 2 RCS-132D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 1 RCS-133A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 2 RCS-133B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 1 RCS-133C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 2 RCS-133D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 1 Wide RCS-135A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Range Temperature Sensor RCS Hot Leg 2 Wide RCS-135B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Range Temperature Sensor RCS Wide Range RCS-140A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Pressure Sensor RCS Wide Range RCS-140B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Pressure Sensor RCS Wide Range RCS-140C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Pressure Sensor RCS Wide Range RCS-140D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Pressure Sensor RCS Hot Leg 1 Level RCS-160A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor RCS Hot Leg 2 Level RCS-160B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor Passive Residual Heat RCS-161 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Removal (PRHR)

Return Line Temperature Sensor Pressurizer Pressure RCS-191A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor Pressurizer Pressure RCS-191B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor Pressurizer Pressure RCS-191C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor C-58

Table 2.1.2-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position Pressurizer Pressure RCS-191D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor Pressurizer Level RCS-193A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Reference Leg Temperature Sensor Pressurizer Level RCS-193B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Reference Leg Temperature Sensor Pressurizer Level RCS-193C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Reference Leg Temperature Sensor Pressurizer Level RCS-193D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Reference Leg Temperature Sensor Pressurizer Level RCS-195A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor Pressurizer Level RCS-195B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor Pressurizer Level RCS-195C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor Pressurizer Level RCS-195D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor RCP 1A Bearing Water RCS-211A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 1A Bearing Water RCS-211B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 1A Bearing Water RCS-211C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 1A Bearing Water RCS-211D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 1B Bearing Water RCS-212A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 1B Bearing Water RCS-212B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 1B Bearing Water RCS-212C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 1B Bearing Water RCS-212D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor C-59

Table 2.1.2-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position RCP 2A Bearing Water RCS-213A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 2A Bearing Water RCS-213B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 2A Bearing Water RCS-213C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 2A Bearing Water RCS-213D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 2B Bearing Water RCS-214A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 2B Bearing Water RCS-214B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 2B Bearing Water RCS-214C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 2B Bearing Water RCS-214D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Temperature Sensor RCP 1A Pump Speed RCS-281 - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Sensor RCP 1B Pump Speed RCS-282 - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Sensor RCP 2A Pump Speed RCS-283 - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Sensor RCP 2B Pump Speed RCS-284 - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

Sensor Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.1.2-2 ASME Code Leak Before Functional Capability Line Name Line Number Section III Break Required Hot Legs RCS-L001A Yes Yes Yes RCS-L001B Cold Legs RCS-L002A Yes Yes Yes RCS-L002B RCS-L002C RCS-L002D C-60

Table 2.1.2-2 ASME Code Leak Before Functional Capability Line Name Line Number Section III Break Required Pressurizer Surge Line RCS-L003 Yes Yes Yes ADS Inlet Headers RCS-L004A/B Yes Yes Yes RCS-L006A/B RCS-L030A/B RCS-L020A/B Safety Valve Inlet Piping RCS-L005A Yes Yes Yes RCS-L005B Safety Valve Discharge RCS-L050A/B Yes No Yes Piping RCS-L051A/B ADS First-stage Valve RCS-L010A/B Yes No Yes Inlet Piping RCS-L011A/B ADS Second-stage RCS-L021A/B Yes Yes Yes Valve Inlet Piping RCS-L022A/B No ADS Third-stage Valve RCS-L131 Yes Yes Yes Inlet Piping RCS-L031A/B Yes RCS-L032A/B No ADS Outlet Piping RCS-L012A/B Yes No Yes RCS-L023A/B RCS-L033A/B RCS-L061A/B RCS-L063A/B RCS-L064A/B RCS-L200 RCS-L069A/B RCS-L240A/B PXS-L130A/B ADS Fourth-stage Inlet RCS-L133A/B Yes Yes Yes Piping RCS-L135A/B RCS-L136A/B RCS-L137A/B Pressurizer Spray Piping RCS-L106 Yes No No RCS-L110A/B RCS-L212A/B RCS-L213 RCS-L215 RNS Suction Piping RCS-L139 Yes Yes No RCS-L140 CVS Purification Piping RCS-L111 Yes No No RCS-L112 C-61

Table 2.1.2-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function RCP 1A Breaker (Status) ECS-ES-31 Yes -

RCP 1A Breaker (Status) ECS-ES-32 Yes -

RCP 1B Breaker (Status) ECS-ES-41 Yes -

RCP 1B Breaker (Status) ECS-ES-42 Yes -

RCP 2A Breaker (Status) ECS-ES-51 Yes -

RCP 2A Breaker (Status) ECS-ES-52 Yes -

RCP 2B Breaker (Status) ECS-ES-61 Yes -

RCP 2B Breaker (Status) ECS-ES-62 Yes -

Pressurizer Heaters RCS-EH-03 Yes On/Off Pressurizer Heaters RCS-EH-04A Yes On/Off Pressurizer Heaters RCS-EH-04B Yes On/Off Pressurizer Heaters RCS-EH-04C Yes On/Off Pressurizer Heaters RCS-EH-04D Yes On/Off Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve RCS-PL-V004A Yes -

(Position Indication)

Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve RCS-PL-V004B Yes -

(Position Indication)

Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve RCS-PL-V004C Yes -

(Position Indication)

Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve RCS-PL-V004D Yes -

(Position Indication)

Pressurizer Safety Valve RCS-PL-V005A Yes -

(Position Indication)

Pressurizer Safety Valve RCS-PL-V005B Yes -

(Position Indication)

Pressurizer Spray Valve RCS-PL-V110A Yes -

(Position Indication)

Pressurizer Spray Valve RCS-PL-V110B Yes -

(Position Indication)

Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve RCS-PL-V150A Yes -

(Position Indication)

Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve RCS-PL-V150B Yes -

(Position Indication)

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Table 2.1.2-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve RCS-PL-V150C Yes -

(Position Indication)

Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve RCS-PL-V150D Yes -

(Position Indication)

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 12 2.1.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built The as-built RCS conforms RCS is as described in the Design system will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.1.2. arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.2.

13 2.1.02.02a 2.a) The components identified in Inspection will be conducted The ASME Code Section III Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code of the as-built components as design reports exist for the as-Section III are designed and documented in the ASME built components identified in constructed in accordance with ASME design reports. Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Code Section III requirements. Section III.

14 2.1.02.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Inspection will be conducted The ASME code Section III Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code of the as-built piping as design reports exist for the as-Section III is designed and constructed documented in the ASME built piping identified in Table in accordance with ASME Code design reports. 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section Section III requirements. III.

15 2.1.02.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 pressure boundary welds will that the ASME Code Section as ASME Code Section III meet be performed in accordance III requirements are met for ASME Code Section III requirements. with the ASME Code non-destructive examination of Section III. pressure boundary welds.

16 2.1.02.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as pressure boundary welds will that the ASME Code Section ASME Code Section III meet ASME be performed in accordance III requirements are met for Code Section III requirements. with the ASME Code Section non-destructive examination of III. pressure boundary welds.

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Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 17 2.1.02.04a 4.a) The components identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code performed on the components that the results of the Section III retain their pressure required by the ASME Code hydrostatic test of the boundary integrity at their design Section III to be components identified in pressure. hydrostatically tested. Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

18 2.1.02.04b 4.b) The piping identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code performed on the piping that the results of the Section III retains its pressure required by the ASME Code hydrostatic test of the piping boundary integrity at its design Section III to be identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as pressure. hydrostatically tested. ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

19 2.1.02.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 performed to verify that the equipment identified in can withstand seismic design basis seismic Category I equipment Table 2.1.2-1 is located on the loads without loss of safety function. and valves identified in Table Nuclear Island.

2.1.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

20 2.1.02.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic can withstand seismic design basis analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can loads without loss of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

21 2.1.02.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I iii) Inspection will be iii) A report exists and equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 performed for the existence of concludes that the as-built can withstand seismic design basis a report verifying that the as- equipment including anchorage loads without loss of safety function. built equipment including is seismically bounded by the anchorage is seismically tested or analyzed conditions.

bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

22 2.1.02.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Inspection will be performed A report exists and concludes Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional for the existence of a report that each of the as-built lines capability is required is designed to verifying that the as-built identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for withstand combined normal and piping meets the requirements which functional capability is seismic design basis loads without a for functional capability. required meets the loss of its functional capability. requirements for functional capability.

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Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 23 2.1.02.06 6. Each of the as-built lines identified Inspection will be performed An LBB evaluation report in Table 2.1.2-2 as designed for LBB for the existence of an LBB exists and concludes that the meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation report or an LBB acceptance criteria are evaluation is performed of the evaluation report on the met by the as-built RCS piping protection from the dynamic effects of protection from dynamic and piping materials, or a pipe a rupture of the line. effects of a pipe break. break evaluation report exists Section 3.3, Nuclear Island and concludes that protection Buildings, contains the design from the dynamic effects of a descriptions and inspections, line break is provided.

tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.

24 2.1.02.07a.i 7.a) The Class 1E equipment i) Type tests, analyses, or a i) A report exists and identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being combination of type tests and concludes that the Class 1E qualified for a harsh environment can analyses will be performed on equipment identified in withstand the environmental Class 1E equipment located in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified conditions that would exist before, a harsh environment. for a harsh environment can during, and following a design basis withstand the environmental accident without loss of safety conditions that would exist function for the time required to before, during, and following a perform the safety function. design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

25 2.1.02.07a.ii 7.a) The Class 1E equipment ii) Inspection will be ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being performed of the as-built Class concludes that the as-built qualified for a harsh environment can 1E equipment and the Class 1E equipment and the withstand the environmental associated wiring, cables, and associated wiring, cables, and conditions that would exist before, terminations located in a harsh terminations identified in during, and following a design basis environment. Table 2.1.2-1 as being accident without loss of safety qualified for a harsh function for the time required to environment are bounded by perform the safety function. type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

26 2.1.02.07b 7.b) The Class 1E components Testing will be performed on A simulated test signal exists at identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are powered the RCS by providing a the Class 1E equipment from their respective Class 1E simulated test signal in each identified in Table 2.1.2-1 division. Class 1E division. when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

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Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 27 2.1.02.07c 7.c) Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, RCS Class 1E divisions, and between 7.d. item 7.d.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

28 2.1.02.08a.i 8.a) The pressurizer safety valves i) Inspections will be i) The sum of the rated provide overpressure protection in conducted to confirm that the capacities recorded on the accordance with Section III of the value of the vendor code plate valve ASME Code plates of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel rating is greater than or equal safety valves exceeds Code. to system relief requirements. 1,500,000 lb/hr.

29 2.1.02.08a.ii 8.a) The pressurizer safety valves ii) Testing and analysis in ii) A report exists and provide overpressure protection in accordance with ASME Code concludes that the safety valves accordance with Section III of the Section III will be performed set pressure is 2485 psig + 25 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel to determine set pressure. psi Code.

30 2.1.02.08b 8.b) The RCPs have a rotating inertia A test will be performed to The pump flow coastdown will to provide RCS flow coastdown on determine the pump flow provide RCS flows greater than loss of power to the pumps. coastdown curve. or equal to the flow shown in Figure 2.1.2-2, Flow Transient for Four Cold Legs in Operation, Four Pumps Coasting Down.

31 2.1.02.08c 8.c) Each RCP flywheel assembly can Shop testing of each RCP Each RCP flywheel assembly withstand a design overspeed flywheel assembly will be has passed an overspeed condition. performed at the vendor condition of no less than 125%

facility at overspeed of operating speed.

conditions.

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Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 32 2.1.02.08d.i 8.d) The RCS provides automatic i) A low pressure flow test i) The calculated ADS piping depressurization during design basis and associated analysis will be flow resistance from the events. conducted to determine the pressurizer through the sparger total piping flow resistance of with all valves of each ADS each ADS valve group group open is connected to the pressurizer < 2.91E-6 ft/gpm2.

(i.e., ADS Stages 1-3) from the pressurizer through the outlet of the downstream ADS control valves. The reactor coolant system will be at cold conditions with the pressurizer full of water. The normal residual heat removal pumps will be used to provide injection flow into the RCS discharging through the ADS valves.

Inspections and associated analysis of the piping flow paths from the discharge of the ADS valve groups connected to the pressurizer (i.e., ADS Stages 1-3) to the spargers will be conducted to verify the line routings are consistent with the line routings used for design flow resistance calculations.

33 2.1.02.08d.ii 8.d) The RCS provides automatic ii) Inspections and associated ii) The calculated flow depressurization during design basis analysis of each fourth-stage resistance for each group of events. ADS valve group (four valves fourth-stage ADS valves and and associated piping piping with all valves open is:

connected to each hot leg) will be conducted to verify the line Loop 1: < 1.70x10-7 ft/gpm2 routing is consistent with the line routing used for design flow resistance calculations. Loop 2: < 1.57x10-7 ft/gpm2 34 2.1.02.08d.iii 8.d) The RCS provides automatic iii) Inspections of each fourth- iii) The flow area through each depressurization during design basis stage ADS valve will be fourth-stage ADS valve is events. conducted to determine the > 67 in2.

flow area through each valve.

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Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 35 2.1.02.08d.iv 8.d) The RCS provides automatic iv) Type tests and analysis iv) A report exists and depressurization during design basis will be performed to concludes that the effective events. determine the effective flow flow area through each stage 1 area through each stage 1,2,3 ADS valve > 4.6 in2 and each ADS valve. stage 2,3 ADS valve is > 21 in2.

36 2.1.02.08d.v 8.d) The RCS provides automatic v) Inspections of the elevation v) The minimum elevation of depressurization during design basis of the ADS stage 4 valve the bottom inside surface of the events. discharge will be conducted. outlet of these valves is greater than plant elevation 110 feet.

37 2.1.02.08d.vi 8.d) The RCS provides automatic vi) Inspections of the ADS vi) The discharge of the ADS depressurization during design basis stage 4 valve discharge will be stage 4 valves is directed into events. conducted. the steam generator compartments.

38 2.1.02.08d.vii 8.d) The RCS provides automatic vii) Inspection of each ADS vii) The flow area through the depressurization during design basis sparger will be conducted to holes in each ADS sparger is events. determine the flow area > 274 in2.

through the sparger holes.

39 2.1.02.08d.viii 8.d) The RCS provides automatic viii) Inspection of the viii) The centerline of the depressurization during design basis elevation of each ADS sparger connection of the sparger arms events. will be conducted. to the sparger hub is < 11.5 feet below the IRWST overflow level.

40 2.1.02.08e 8.e) The RCS provides emergency Inspections of the reactor A report exists and concludes letdown during design basis events. vessel head vent valves and that the capacity of the reactor inlet and outlet piping will be vessel head vent is sufficient to conducted. pass not less than 8.2 lbm/sec at 1250 psia in the RCS.

41 2.1.02.09a 9.a) The RCS provides circulation of Testing and analysis to The calculated post-fuel load coolant to remove heat from the core. measure RCS flow with four RCS flow rate is > 301,670 reactor coolant pumps gpm.

operating at no-load RCS pressure and temperature conditions will be performed.

Analyses will be performed to convert the measured pre-fuel load flow to post-fuel load flow with 10-percent steam generator tube plugging.

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Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 42 2.1.02.09b.i 9.b) The RCS provides the means to i) Inspections will be i) Pressurizer heater backup control system pressure. performed to verify the rated groups A and B each has a capacity of pressurizer heater rated capacity of at least 168 backup groups A and B. kW.

.

43 2.1.02.09b.ii 9.b) The RCS provides the means to ii) Tests will be performed to ii) Controls in the MCR control system pressure. verify that the pressurizer operate to cause the pressurizer spray valves can open and spray valves to open and close.

close when operated from the MCR.

44 2.1.02.09c 9.c) The pressurizer heaters trip after Testing will be performed to The pressurizer heaters a signal is generated by the PMS. confirm trip of the pressurizer identified in Table 2.1.2-3 trip heaters identified in after a signal is generated by Table 2.1.2-3. the PMS.

45 2.1.02.10 10. Safety-related displays identified Inspection will be performed Safety-related displays in Table 2.1.2-1 can be retrieved in the for retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can MCR. related displays in the MCR. be retrieved in the MCR.

46 2.1.02.11a.i 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to i) Testing will be performed i) Controls in the MCR cause the remotely operated valves on the squib valves identified operate to cause a signal at the identified in Table 2.1.2-1 to perform in Table 2.1.2-1 using controls squib valve electrical leads active functions. in the MCR without stroking which is capable of actuating the valve. the squib valve.

47 2.1.02.11a.ii 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to ii) Stroke testing will be ii) Controls in the MCR cause the remotely operated valves performed on the other operate to cause the remotely identified in Table 2.1.2-1 to perform remotely operated valves operated valves (other than active functions. listed in Table 2.1.2-1 using squib valves) to perform active controls in the MCR. functions.

48 2.1.02.11b.i 11.b) The valves identified in i) Testing will be performed i) The squib valves receive a Table 2.1.2-1 as having PMS control on the squib valves identified signal at the valve electrical perform an active safety function after in Table 2.1.2-1 using real or leads that is capable of receiving a signal from the PMS. simulated signals into the actuating the squib valve.

PMS without stroking the valve.

49 2.1.02.11b.ii 11.b) The valves identified in ii) Testing will be performed ii) The other remotely Table 2.1.2-1 as having PMS control on the other remotely operated operated valves identified in perform an active safety function after valves identified in Table Table 2.1.2-1 as having PMS receiving a signal from the PMS. 2.1.2-1 using real or simulated control perform the active signals into the PMS. function identified in the table after receiving a signal from PMS.

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Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 50 2.1.02.11b.iii 11.b) The valves identified in iii) Testing will be performed iii) These valves open within Table 2.1.2-1 as having PMS control to demonstrate that remotely the following times after perform an active safety function after operated RCS valves receipt of an actuation signal:

receiving a signal from the PMS. RCS-V001A/B, V002A/B, V001A/B < 40 sec V003A/B, V011A/B, V002A/B,V003A/B < 100 V012A/B, V013A/B open sec within the required response V011A/B < 30 sec times. V012A/B,V013A/B < 60 sec 51 2.1.02.11c.i 11.c) The valves identified in i) Testing will be performed i) The squib valves receive a Table 2.1.2-1 as having DAS control on the squib valves identified signal at the valve electrical perform an active safety function after in Table 2.1.2-1 using real or leads that is capable of receiving a signal from DAS. simulated signals into the actuating the squib valve DAS without stroking the valve.

52 2.1.02.11c.ii 11.c) The valves identified in ii) Testing will be performed ii) The other remotely Table 2.1.2-1 as having DAS control on the other remotely operated operated valves identified in perform an active safety function after valves identified in Table Table 2.1.2-1 as having DAS receiving a signal from DAS. 2.1.2-1 using real or simulated control perform the active signals into the DAS. function identified in the table after receiving a signal from DAS.

53 2.1.02.12a.i 12.a) The automatic depressurization i) Tests or type tests of motor- i) A test report exists and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 operated valves will be concludes that each motor-perform an active safety-related performed that demonstrate operated valve changes function to change position as the capability of the valve to position as indicated in indicated in the table. operate under its design Table 2.1.2-1 under design conditions. conditions.

54 2.1.02.12a.ii 12.a) The automatic depressurization ii) Inspection will be ii) A report exists and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 performed for the existence of concludes that the as-built perform an active safety-related a report verifying that the as- motor-operated valves are function to change position as built motor-operated valves bounded by the tests or type indicated in the table. are bounded by the tests or tests.

type tests.

55 2.1.02.12a.iii 12.a) The automatic depressurization iii) Tests of the motor- iii) Each motor-operated valve valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 operated valves will be changes position as indicated perform an active safety-related performed under pre- in Table 2.1.2-1 under pre-function to change position as operational flow, differential operational test conditions.

indicated in the table. pressure and temperature conditions.

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Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 56 2.1.02.12a.iv 12.a) The automatic depressurization iv) Tests or type tests of squib iv) A test report exists and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 valves will be performed that concludes that each squib valve perform an active safety-related demonstrate the capability of changes position as indicated function to change position as the valve to operate under its in Table 2.1.2-1 under design indicated in the table. design conditions. conditions.

57 2.1.02.12a.v 12.a) The automatic depressurization v) Inspection will be v) A report exists and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 performed for the existence of concludes that the as-built perform an active safety-related a report verifying that the as- squib valves are bounded by function to change position as built squib valves are bounded the tests or type tests.

indicated in the table. by the tests or type tests.

58 2.1.02.12a.vi 12.a) The automatic depressurization vi) See item 8.d.i in this table. vi) See item 8.d.i in this table.

valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 The ADS stage 1-3 valve flow perform an active safety-related resistances are verified to be function to change position as consistent with the ADS stage indicated in the table. 1-3 path flow resistances.

59 2.1.02.12a.vii 12.a) The automatic depressurization vii) See item 8.d.ii in this vii) See item 8.d.ii in this valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 table. table. The ADS stage 4 valve perform an active safety-related flow resistances are verified to function to change position as be consistent with the ADS indicated in the table. stage 4 path flow resistances.

60 2.1.02.12a.viii 12.a) The automatic depressurization viii) See item 8.d.iii in this viii) See item 8.d.iii in this valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 table. table.

perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

61 2.1.02.12a.ix 12.a) The automatic depressurization ix) See item 8.d.iv in this ix) See item 8.d.iv in this valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 table. table.

perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

62 2.1.02.12b 12.b) After loss of motive power, the Testing of the remotely Upon loss of motive power, remotely operated valves identified in operated valves will be each remotely operated valve Table 2.1.2-1 assume the indicated performed under the identified in Table 2.1.2-1 loss of motive power position. conditions of loss of motive assumes the indicated loss of power. motive power position.

63 2.1.02.13a 13.a) Controls exist in the MCR to Testing will be performed on Controls in the MCR operate to trip the RCPs. the RCPs using controls in the trip the RCPs.

MCR.

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Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 64 2.1.02.13b 13.b) The RCPs trip after receiving a Testing will be performed The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the PMS. using real or simulated signals signal from the PMS.

into the PMS.

65 2.1.02.13c 13.c) The RCPs trip after receiving a Testing will be performed The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the DAS. using real or simulated signals signal from the DAS.

into the DAS.

66 2.1.02.14 14. Controls exist in the MCR to Testing will be performed on Controls in the MCR operate to cause the components identified in the components in Table 2.1.2- cause the components listed in Table 2.1.2-3 to perform the listed 3 using controls in the MCR. Table 2.1.2-3 to perform the function. listed functions.

67 2.1.02.15 15. Displays of the parameters Inspection will be performed The displays identified in identified in Table 2.1.2-3 can be for retrievability of the RCS Table 2.1.2-3 can be retrieved retrieved in the MCR. parameters in the MCR. in the MCR.

Table 2.1.2-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Steam Generator 1 RCS-MB-01 Containment Steam Generator 2 RCS-MB-02 Containment Reactor Coolant Pump 1A RCS-MP-01A Containment Reactor Coolant Pump 1B RCS-MP-01B Containment Reactor Coolant Pump 2A RCS-MP-02A Containment Reactor Coolant Pump 2B RCS-MP-02B Containment Pressurizer RCS-MV-02 Containment ADS Sparger A PXS-MW-01A Containment ADS Sparger B PXS-MW-01B Containment C-72

Figure 2.1.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Reactor Coolant System C-73

Figure 2.1.2-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Reactor Coolant System C-74

Figure 2.1.2-2 Flow Transient for Four Cold Legs in Operation, Four Pumps Coasting Down C-75

2.1.3 Reactor System Design Description The reactor system (RXS) generates heat by a controlled nuclear reaction and transfers the heat generated to the reactor coolant, provides a barrier that prevents the release of fission products to the atmosphere and a means to insert negative reactivity into the reactor core and to shutdown the reactor core.

The reactor core contains a matrix of fuel rods assembled into fuel assemblies using structural elements. Rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs) are positioned and held within the fuel assemblies by control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs). The CRDMs unlatch upon termination of electrical power to the CRDM thereby releasing the RCCAs. The fuel assemblies and RCCAs are designed in accordance with the principal design requirements.

The RXS is operated during normal modes of plant operation, including startup, power operation, cooldown, shutdown and refueling.

The component locations of the RXS are as shown in Table 2.1.3-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the RXS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.3.
2. a) The reactor upper internals rod guide arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3-1.

b) The rod cluster control and drive rod arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3-2.

c) The reactor vessel arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3-3.

3. The components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
4. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.
5. The pressure boundary components (reactor vessel [RV], control rod drive mechanisms

[CRDMs], and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
7. The reactor internals will withstand the effects of flow induced vibration.
8. The reactor vessel direct injection nozzle limits the blowdown of the reactor coolant system (RCS) following the break of a direct vessel injection line.
9. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

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b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between RXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

10. The reactor lower internals assembly is equipped with holders for at least eight capsules for storing material surveillance specimens.
11. The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) beltline material has a Charpy upper-shelf energy of no less than 75 ft-lb.
12. Safety-related displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
13. The fuel assemblies and rod cluster control assemblies intended for initial core load and listed in Table 2.1.3-1 have been designed and constructed in accordance with the principal design requirements.
14. A top-of-the-head visual inspection, including 360 degrees around each reactor vessel head penetration nozzle, can be performed.

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Table 2.1.3-1 ASME Code Class 1E/ Safety-Section III Seismic Qual. for Related Equipment Name Tag No. Classification Cat. I Harsh Envir. Display RV RXS-MV-01 Yes Yes - -

Reactor Upper Internals Assembly RXS-MI-01 Yes Yes - -

Reactor Lower Internals Assembly RXS-MI-02 Yes Yes - -

Fuel Assemblies (157 locations) RXS-FA-A07/A08/A09/B05/B06/B07/B08/ No(1) Yes - -

B09/B10/B11/C04/C05/C06/C07/C08/C09/C10/

C11/C12/D03/D04/D05/D06/D07/D08/D09/

D10/D11/D12/D13/E02/E03/E04/E05/E06/E07/

E08/E09/E10/E11/E12/E13/E14/F02/F03/F04/

F05/F06/F07/F08/F09/F10/F11/F12/F13/F14/

G01/G02/G03/G04/G05/G06/G07/G08/G09/

G10/G11/G12/G13/G14/G15/H01/H02/H03/

H04/H05/H06/H07/H08/H09/H10/H11/H12/

H13/H14/H15/J01/J02/J03/J04/J05/J06/J07/J08/

J09/J10/J11/J12/J13/J14/J15/K02/K03/K04/

K05/K06/K07/K08/K09/K10/K11/K12/K13/

K14/L02/L03/L04/L05/L06/L07/L08/L09/L10/

L11/L12/L13/L14/M03/M04/M05/M06/M07/

M08/M09/M10/M11/M12/M13/N04/N05/N06/

N07/N08/N09/N10/N11/N12/P05/P06/P07/P08/

P09/P10/P11/ R07/R08/R09 Rod Cluster Control Assemblies RXS-FR-B06/B10/C05/C07/C09/C11/D06/ No(1) Yes - -

(RCCAs) (minimum 53 locations) D08/D10/E03/E05/E07/E09/E11/E13/F02/F04/

F12/F14/G03/G05/G07/G09/G11/G13/H04/

H08/H12/J03/J05/J07/J09/J11/J13/K02/K04/

K12/K14/L03/L05/L07/L09/L11/L13/M06/

M08/M10/N05/N07/N09/N11/P06/P10 Gray Rod Cluster Assemblies RXS-FG-B08/D04/D12/F06/F08/F10/H02/H06/ No(1) Yes - -

(GRCAs) (16 locations) H10/H14/K06/K08/K10/M04/M12/P08 C-78

Table 2.1.3-1 ASME Code Class 1E/ Safety-Section III Seismic Qual. for Related Equipment Name Tag No. Classification Cat. I Harsh Envir. Display Control Rod Drive Mechanisms RXS-MV-11B06/11B08/11B10/11C05/11C07/ Yes Yes No/No No (CRDMs) (69 Locations) 11C09/11C11/11D04/11D06/11D08/11D10/

11D12/11E03/11E05/11E07/11E09/11E11/

11E13/11F02/11F04/11F06/11F08/11F10/

11F12/11F14/11G03/11G05/11G07/11G09/

11G11/11G13/11H02/11H04/11H06/11H08/

11H10/11H12/11H14/11J03/11J05/11J07/

11J09/11J11/11J13/11K02/11K04/11K06/

11K08/11K10/11K12/11K14/11L03/11L05/

11L07/11L09/11L11/11L13/11M04/11M06/

11M08/11M10/11M12/11N05/11N07/11N09/

11N11/11P06/11P08/11P10 Incore Instrument QuickLoc RXS-MY-Y11 through Y18 Yes Yes - -

Assemblies (8 Locations)

Source Range Detectors (4) RXS-JE-NE001A/NE001B/NE001C/NE001D - Yes Yes/Yes No Intermediate Range Detectors (4) RXS-JE-NE002A/NE002B/NE002C/NE002D - Yes Yes/Yes Yes Power Range Detectors - Lower (4) RXS-JE-NE003A/NE003B/NE003C/NE003D - Yes Yes/Yes No Power Range Detectors - Upper (4) RXS-JE-NE004A/NE004B/NE004C/NE004D - Yes Yes/Yes No Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

1. Fuel assemblies are designed using ASME Section III as a general guide.

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Table 2.1.3-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 68 2.1.03.01 1. The functional arrangement of the RXS Inspection of the as-built The as-built RXS conforms is as described in the Design Description of system will be performed. with the functional this Section 2.1.3. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.3.

69 2.1.03.02a 2.a) The reactor upper internals rod guide Inspection of the as-built The as-built RXS will arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3-1. system will be performed. accommodate the fuel assembly and control rod drive mechanism pattern shown in Figure 2.1.3-1.

70 2.1.03.02b 2.b) The control assemblies (rod cluster Inspection of the as-built The as-built RXS will and gray rod) and drive rod arrangement is system will be performed. accommodate the control as shown in Figure 2.1.3-2. assemblies (rod cluster and gray rod) and drive rod arrangement shown in Figure 2.1.3-2.

71 2.1.03.02c 2.c) The reactor vessel arrangement is as Inspection of the as-built The as-built RXS will shown in Figure 2.1.3-3. system will be performed. accommodate the reactor vessel arrangement shown in Figure 2.1.3-3.

72 2.1.03.03 3. The components identified in Table Inspection will be conducted The ASME Code Section III 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III are of the as-built components as design reports exist for the designed and constructed in accordance documented in the ASME as-built components with ASME Code Section III requirements. design reports. identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III.

73 2.1.03.04 4. Pressure boundary welds in components Inspection of as-built pressure A report exists and identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code boundary welds will be concludes that the ASME Section III meet ASME Code Section III performed in accordance with Code Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

74 2.1.03.05 5. The pressure boundary components (RV, A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc performed on the components concludes that the results of assemblies) identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as of the RXS required by the the hydrostatic test of the ASME Code Section III retain their ASME Code Section III to be pressure boundary pressure boundary integrity at their design hydrostatically tested. components (RV, CRDMs, pressure. and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

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Table 2.1.3-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 75 2.1.03.06.i 6. The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand performed to verify that the equipment identified in seismic design basis loads without loss of seismic Category I equipment Table 2.1.3-1 is located on safety function. identified in Table 2.1.3-1 is the Nuclear Island.

located on the Nuclear Island.

76 2.1.03.06.ii 6. The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis loads without loss of analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

77 2.1.03.06.iii 6. The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand performed for the existence of concludes that the as-built seismic design basis loads without loss of a report verifying that the as- equipment including safety function. built equipment including anchorage is seismically anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

analyzed conditions.

78 2.1.03.07.i 7. The reactor internals will withstand the i) A vibration type test will be i) A report exists and effects of flow induced vibration. conducted on the (first unit) concludes that the (first unit) reactor internals reactor internals have no representative of AP1000. observable damage or loose parts as a result of the vibration type test.

79 2.1.03.07.ii 7. The reactor internals will withstand the ii) A pre-test inspection, a ii) The as-built reactor effects of flow induced vibration. flow test and a post-test internals have no observable inspection will be conducted damage or loose parts.

on the as-built reactor internals.

80 2.1.03.08 8. The reactor vessel direct vessel injection An inspection will be The throat area of the direct nozzle limits the blowdown of the RCS conducted to verify the flow vessel injection line nozzle following the break of a direct vessel area of the flow limiting flow limiting venturi is less injection line. venturi within each direct than or equal to 12.57 in2.

vessel injection nozzle.

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Table 2.1.3-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 81 2.1.03.09a.i 9.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in i) Type tests, analysis, or a i) A report exists and Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh combination of type tests and concludes that the Class 1E environment can withstand the analysis will be performed on equipment identified in environmental conditions that would exist Class 1E equipment located in Table 2.1.3-1 as being before, during, and following a design a harsh environment. qualified for a harsh basis accident without loss of safety environment can withstand function for the time required to perform the environmental the safety function. conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

82 2.1.03.09a.ii 9.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in ii) Inspection will be ii) A report exists and Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh performed of the as-built concludes that the as-built environment can withstand the Class 1E equipment and the Class 1E equipment and the environmental conditions that would exist associated wiring, cables, and associated wiring, cables, before, during, and following a design terminations located in a and terminations identified basis accident without loss of safety harsh environment in Table 2.1.3-1 as being function for the time required to perform qualified for a harsh the safety function. environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

83 2.1.03.09b 9.b) The Class 1E components identified Testing will be performed by A simulated test signal in Table 2.1.3-1 are powered from their providing simulated test exists for Class 1E respective Class 1E division. signals in each Class 1E equipment identified in division. Table 2.1.3-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

84 2.1.03.09c 9.c) Separation is provided between RXS See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E 7.d. item 7.d.

divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

85 2.1.03.10 10. The reactor lower internals assembly is Inspection of the reactor At least eight capsules are in equipped with holders for at least eight lower internals assembly for the reactor lower internals capsules for storing material surveillance the presence of capsules will assembly.

specimens. be performed.

86 2.1.03.11 11. The RPV beltline material has a Manufacturing tests of the A report exists and Charpy upper-shelf energy of no less than Charpy V-Notch specimen of concludes that the initial 75 ft-lb. the RPV beltline material will RPV beltline Charpy upper-be performed. shelf energy is no less than 75 ft-lb.

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Table 2.1.3-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 87 2.1.03.12 12. Safety-related displays of the Inspection will be performed Safety-related displays parameters identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can for retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.1.3-1 be retrieved in the MCR. related displays in the MCR. can be retrieved in the MCR.

88 2.1.03.13 13. The fuel assemblies and rod cluster An analysis is performed of A report exists and control assemblies intended for initial core the reactor core design. concludes that the fuel load and listed in Table 2.1.3-1 have been assemblies and rod cluster designed and constructed in accordance control assemblies intended with the established design requirements. for the initial core load and listed in Table 2.1.3-1 have been designed and constructed in accordance with the principal design requirements.

89 2.1.03.14 14. A top-of-the-head visual inspection, A preservice visual A report exists that including 360 degrees around each reactor examination of the reactor documents the results of the vessel head penetration nozzle, can be vessel head top surface and top-of-the-head visual performed. penetration nozzles will be inspection, including 360 performed. degrees around each reactor vessel head penetration nozzle.

C-83

Table 2.1.3-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location RV RXS-MV-01 Containment Reactor Upper Internals Assembly RXS-MI-01 Containment Reactor Lower Internals Assembly RXS-MI-02 Containment Fuel Assemblies (157 locations) RXS-FA-A07/A08/A09/B05/ Containment (located in auxiliary B06/B07/B08/B09/B10/B11/ building prior to fuel loading)

C04/C05/C06/C07/C08/C09/

C10/C11/C12/D03/D04/D05/

D06/D07/D08/D09/D10/D11/

D12/D13/E02/E03/E04/E05/

E06/E07/E08/E09/E10/E11/E12/

E13/E14/F02/F03/F04/F05/F06/

F07/F08/F09/F10/F11/F12/F13/

F14/G01/G02/G03/G04/G05/

G06/G07/G08/G09/G10/G11/

G12/G13/G14/G15/H01/H02/

H03/H04/H05/H06/H07/H08/

H09/H10/H11/H12/H13/H14/

H15/J01/J02/J03/J04/J05/J06/

J07/J08/J09/J10/J11/J12/J13/

J14/J15/K02/K03/K04/K05/

K06/K07/K08/K09/K10/K11/

K12/K13/K14/L02/L03/L04/

L05/L06/L07/L08/L09/L10/L11/

L12/L13/L14/M03/M04/M05/

M06/M07/M08/M09/M10/M11/

M12/M13/N04/N05/N06/N07/

N08/N09/N10/N11/N12/P05/

P06/P07/P08/P09/P10/P11/R07/

R08/R09 Rod Cluster Control Assemblies RXS-FR-B06/B10/C05/C07/ Containment (located in auxiliary (RCCAs) (minimum 53 locations) C09/C11/D06/D08/D10/E03/ building prior to fuel loading)

E05/E07/E09/E11/E13/F02/F04/

F12/F14/G03/G05/G07/G09/

G11/G13/H04/H08/H12/J03/

J05/J07/J09/J11/J13/K02/K04/

K12/K14/L03/L05/L07/L09/

L11/L13/M06/M08/M10/N05/

N07/N09/N11/P06/P10 Gray Rod Cluster Assemblies RXS-FG-B08/D04/D12/F06/ Containment (located in auxiliary (GRCAs) (16 locations) F08/F10/H02/H06/H10/H14/ building prior to fuel loading)

K06/K08/K10/M04/M12/P08 C-84

Table 2.1.3-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Control Rod Drive Mechanisms RXS-MV-11B06/11B08/ Containment (CRDMs) (69 Locations) 11B10/11C05/11C07/11C09/

11C11/11D04/11D06/11D08/

11D10/11D12/11E03/11E05/

11E07/11E09/11E11/11E13/

11F02/11F04/11F06/11F08/

11F10/11F12/11F14/11G03/

11G05/11G07/11G09/11G11/

11G13/11H02/11H04/11H06/

11H08/11H10/11H12/11H14/

11J03/11J05/11J07/11J09/11J11/

11J13/11K02/11K04/11K06/

11K08/11K10/11K12/11K14/

11L03/11L05/11L07/11L09/

11L11/11L13/11M04/11M06/

11M08/11M10/11M12/11N05/

11N07/11N09/11N11/11P06/

11P08/11P10 Incore Instrument QuickLoc RXS-MY-Y11 through Y18 Containment Assemblies (8 Locations)

Source Range Detectors (4) RXS-JE-NE001A/NE001B/ Containment NE001C/NE001D Intermediate Range Detectors (4) RXS-JE-NE002A/NE002B/ Containment NE002C/NE002D Power Range Detectors - Lower (4) RXS-JE-NE003A/NE003B/ Containment NE003C/NE003D Power Range Detectors - Upper (4) RXS-JE-NE004A/NE004B/ Containment NE004C/NE004D C-85

Table 2.1.3-4 Key Dimensions and Acceptable Variations of the Reactor Vessel and Internals (Figure 2.1.3.2 and Figure 2.1.3-3)

Dimension Nominal Acceptable or Elevation Value Variation Description (inches) (inches) (inches)

RV inside diameter at beltline (inside cladding) A 159.0 +1.0/-1.0 RV wall thickness at beltline (without cladding) B 8.4 +1.0/-0.12 RV wall thickness at bottom head (without cladding) C 6.0 +1.0/-0.12 RV inlet nozzle inside diameter at safe end D 22.0 +0.35/-0.10 RV outlet nozzle inside diameter at safe end E 31.0 +0.35/-0.10 Elevation from RV mating surface to centerline of inlet F 62.5 +0.25/-0.25 nozzle Elevation from RV mating surface to centerline of outlet G 80.0 +0.25/-0.25 nozzle Elevation from RV mating surface to centerline of direct H 100.0 +0.25/-0.25 vessel injection nozzle Elevation from RV mating surface to inside of RV bottom I 397.59 +1.0/-0.50 head (inside cladding)

Elevation from RV mating surface to top of lower core J 327.3 +0.50/-0.50 support plate Separation distance between bottom of upper core plate K 189.8 +0.20/0.20 and top of lower core support with RV head in place C-86

Figure 2.1.3-1 Reactor Upper Internals Rod Guide Arrangement C-87

Figure 2.1.3-2 Rod Cluster Control and Drive Rod Arrangement C-88

Figure 2.1.3-3 Reactor Vessel Arrangement C-89

2.2 Nuclear Safety Systems 2.2.1 Containment System Design Description The containment system (CNS) is the collection of boundaries that separates the containment atmosphere from the outside environment during design basis accidents.

The CNS is as shown in Figure 2.2.1-1 and the component locations of the CNS are as shown in Table 2.2.1-4.

1. The functional arrangement of the CNS and associated systems is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.1.
2. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.
6. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between CNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.

C-90

7. The CNS provides the safety-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere.
8. Containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against currents that are greater than the continuous ratings.
9. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
10. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as having diverse actuation system (DAS) control perform an active function after receiving a signal from the DAS.

11. a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

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Table 2.2.1-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS/DAS Function Position Service Air Supply Outside CAS-PL-V204 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- None -

Containment Isolation Valve CAS-PL-V205 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Service Air Supply Inside Closed Containment Isolation Check Valve Instrument Air Supply Outside CAS-PL-V014 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer Closed Containment Isolation Valve Position) Closed

-

CAS-PL-V015 Yes Yes No -/- -/- Transfer -

Instrument Air Supply Inside Closed Containment Isolation Check Valve Component Cooling Water CCS-PL-V200 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer As Is System (CCS) Containment Position) Closed Isolation Motor-operated Valve (MOV) - Inlet Line Outside Reactor Containment (ORC)

No CCS-PL-V201 Yes Yes No -/- -/- Transfer -

CCS Containment Isolation Closed Check Valve - Inlet Line Inside Reactor Containment (IRC)

CCS Containment Isolation MOV CCS-PL-V207 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer As Is

- Outlet Line IRC Position) Closed CCS Containment Isolation MOV CCS-PL-V208 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer As Is

- Outlet Line ORC Position) Closed CCS Containment Isolation CCS-PL-220 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Relief Valve - Outlet Line IRC Closed/

Transfer Open C-92

Table 2.2.1-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS/DAS Function Position Demineralized Water Supply DWS-PL-V244 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- None -

Containment Isolation Valve ORC Demineralized Water Supply DWS-PL-V245 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Containment Isolation Check Closed Valve IRC Fuel Transfer Tube FHS-FT-001 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Fuel Transfer Tube Isolation FHS-PL-V001 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- Transfer -

Valve Closed Fire Water Containment Supply FPS-PL-V050 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- None -

Isolation Valve - Outside Fire Water Containment Isolation FPS-PL-V052 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Supply Check Valve - Inside Closed Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System SFS-PL-V037 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

(SFS) Discharge Line Closed Containment Isolation Check Valve - IRC SFS Discharge Line Containment SFS-PL-V038 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer As Is Isolation MOV - ORC Position) Closed SFS Suction Line Containment SFS-PL-V034 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer As Is Isolation MOV - IRC Position) Closed Yes (Valve SFS Suction Line Containment SFS-PL-V035 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Position) Yes/No Transfer As Is Isolation MOV - ORC Closed No SFS Suction Line Containment SFS-PL-V067 Yes Yes No -/- -/- Transfer -

Isolation Relief Valve - IRC Closed/

Transfer Open C-93

Table 2.2.1-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS/DAS Function Position Containment Purge Inlet VFS-PL-V003 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Closed Containment Isolation Valve - (Valve Closed ORC Position)

Containment Purge Inlet VFS-PL-V004 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Closed Containment Isolation Valve - (Valve Closed IRC Position)

Integrated Leak Rate Testing VFS-PL-V008 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- None -

Vent Discharge Containment Isolation Valve - ORC Containment Purge Discharge VFS-PL-V009 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer Closed Containment Isolation Valve - Position) Closed IRC Yes (Valve Containment Purge Discharge VFS-PL-V010 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Closed Containment Isolation Valve - Closed ORC C-94

Table 2.2.1-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS/DAS Function Position Vacuum Relief Containment VFS-PL-V800A Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer As Is Isolation A - ORC Position) Closed/

Transfer Open Yes (Valve Vacuum Relief Containment VFS-PL-V800B Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Position) Yes/No Transfer As Is Isolation B - ORC Closed/

Transfer No Open Vacuum Relief Containment VFS-PL-V803A Yes Yes No -/- -/- Transfer -

Isolation Check Valve A - IRC Closed/

Transfer No Open Vacuum Relief Containment VFS-PL-V803B Yes Yes No -/- -/- Transfer -

Isolation Check Valve B - IRC Closed/

Transfer Open Fan Coolers Return Containment VWS-PL-V082 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer Closed Isolation Valve - IRC Position) Closed Yes (Valve Fan Coolers Return Containment VWS-PL-V086 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Position) Yes/No Transfer Closed Isolation Valve - ORC Closed No Fan Coolers Return Containment VWS-PL-V080 Yes Yes No -/- -/- Transfer -

Isolation Relief Valve - IRC Closed/

Transfer Open C-95

Table 2.2.1-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS/DAS Function Position Fan Coolers Supply Containment VWS-PL-V058 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer Closed Isolation Valve - ORC (Valve Closed Position)

Fan Coolers Supply Containment VWS-PL-V062 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Isolation Check Valve - IRC Closed Reactor Coolant Drain Tank WLS-PL-V067 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/No Transfer Closed (RCDT) Gas Outlet Containment Position) Closed Isolation Valve - IRC Yes (Valve RCDT Gas Outlet Containment WLS-PL-V068 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Position) Yes/No Transfer Closed Isolation Valve - ORC Closed Sump Discharge Containment WLS-PL-V055 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes/Yes Transfer Closed Isolation Valve - IRC Position) Closed Yes (Valve Sump Discharge Containment WLS-PL-V057 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Closed Isolation Valve - ORC Closed Sump Discharge Containment WLS-PL-V058 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Isolation Relief Valve - IRC Closed/

Transfer Open Spare Penetration CNS-PY-C01 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Spare Penetration CNS-PY-C02 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Spare Penetration CNS-PY-C03 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Main Equipment Hatch CNS-MY-Y01 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Maintenance Hatch CNS-MY-Y02 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Personnel Hatch CNS-MY-Y03 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Personnel Hatch CNS-MY-Y04 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

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Table 2.2.1-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS/DAS Function Position Containment Vessel CNS-MV-01 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P03 DAS-EY-P03Z Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P01 ECS-EY-P01X Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P02 ECS-EY-P02X Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P06 ECS-EY-P06Y Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P09 ECS-EY-P09W Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P10 ECS-EY-P10W Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P11 IDSA-EY-P11Z Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P12 IDSA-EY-P12Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P13 IDSA-EY-P13Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P14 IDSD-EY-P14Z Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P15 IDSD-EY-P15Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P16 IDSD-EY-P16Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P18 ECS-EY-P18X Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P21 EDS-EY-P21Z Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P22 ECS-EY-P22X Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P23 ECS-EY-P23X Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P24 ECS-EY-P24 Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P25 ECS-EY-P25W Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P26 ECS-EY-P26W Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P27 IDSC-EY-P27Z Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P28 IDSC-EY-P28Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

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Table 2.2.1-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS/DAS Function Position Electrical Penetration P29 IDSC-EY-P29Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P30 IDSB-EY-P30Z Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P31 IDSB-EY-P31Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

Electrical Penetration P32 IDSB-EY-P32Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

Instrument Penetration P46 PCS-PY-C01 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Instrument Penetration P47 PCS-PY-C02 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Instrument Penetration P48 PCS-PY-C03 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Instrument Penetration P49 PCS-PY-C04 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.2.1-2 ASME Code Line Name Line Number Section III Instrument Air In CAS-PL-L015 Yes Service Air In CAS-PL-L204 Yes Component Cooling Water Supply to Containment CCS-PL-L201 Yes Component Cooling Water Outlet from Containment CCS-PL-L207 Yes Demineralized Water In DWS-PL-L245, L230 Yes Fire Protection Supply to Containment FPS-PL-L107 Yes Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Discharge SFS-PL-L017 Yes Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Suction from Containment SFS-PL-L038 Yes Containment Purge Inlet to Containment VFS-PL-L104, L105, L106 Yes Containment Purge Discharge from Containment VFS-PL-L203, L204, L205, Yes L800, L801A/B, L803, L804, L805A/B Fan Cooler Supply Line to Containment VWS-PL-L032 Yes Fan Cooler Return Line from Containment VWS-PL-L055 Yes RCDT Gas Out WLS-PL-L022 Yes Waste Sump Out WLS-PL-L073 Yes C-99

Table 2.2.1-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 90 2.2.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the CNS Inspection of the as-built The as-built CNS conforms and associated systems is as described in system will be performed. with the functional the Design Description of this Section arrangement as described in 2.2.1. the Design Description of this Section 2.2.1.

91 2.2.01.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table Inspection will be conducted The ASME Code Section III 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are of the as-built components as design reports exist for the designed and constructed in accordance documented in the ASME as-built components with ASME Code Section III requirements. design reports. identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III./

92 2.2.01.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 Inspection will be conducted The ASME Code Section III as ASME Code Section III is designed and of the as-built piping as design reports exist for the constructed in accordance with ASME documented in the ASME as-built piping identified in Code Section III requirements. design reports. Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III.

93 2.2.01.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as pressure boundary welds will concludes that the ASME ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code be performed in accordance Code Section III Section III requirements. with the ASME Code Section requirements are met for III. non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

94 2.2.01.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built A report exists and identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code pressure boundary welds will concludes that the ASME Section III meet ASME Code Section III be performed in accordance Code Section III requirements. with the ASME Code Section requirements are met for III. non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

95 2.2.01.04a.i 4.a) The components identified in Table i) A hydrostatic or pressure i) A report exists and 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain test will be performed on the concludes that the results of their pressure boundary integrity at their components required by the the pressure test of the design pressure. ASME Code Section III to be components identified in tested. Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

96 2.2.01.04a.ii 4.a) The components identified in Table ii) Impact testing will be ii) A report exists and 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain performed on the containment concludes that the their pressure boundary integrity at their and pressure-retaining containment and pressure-design pressure. penetration materials in retaining penetration accordance with the ASME materials conform with Code Section III, Subsection fracture toughness NE, to confirm the fracture requirements of the ASME toughness of the materials. Code Section III.

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Table 2.2.1-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 97 2.2.01.04b 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 A hydrostatic or pressure test A report exists and as ASME Code Section III retains its will be performed on the concludes that the results of pressure boundary integrity at its design piping required by the ASME the pressure test of the pressure. Code Section III to be piping identified in pressure tested. Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

98 2.2.01.05.i 5. The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand performed to verify that the equipment identified in seismic design basis loads without loss of seismic Category I equipment Table 2.2.1-1 is located on structural integrity and safety function. and valves identified in Table the Nuclear Island.

2.2.1-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

99 2.2.01.05.ii 5. The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis loads without loss of analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can structural integrity and safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.

100 2.2.01.05.iii 5. The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be iii) The as-built equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand performed for the existence of including anchorage is seismic design basis loads without loss of a report verifying that the as- seismically bounded by the structural integrity and safety function. built equipment including tested or analyzed anchorage is seismically conditions.

bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

101 2.2.01.06a.i 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in i) Type tests, analyses, or a i) A report exists and Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh combination of type tests and concludes that the Class 1E environment can withstand the analyses will be performed on equipment identified in environmental conditions that would exist Class 1E equipment located in Table 2.2.1-1 as being before, during, and following a design a harsh environment. qualified for a harsh basis accident without loss of safety environment can withstand function for the time required to perform the environmental the safety function. conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

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Table 2.2.1-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 102 2.2.01.06a.ii 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in ii) Inspection will be ii) A report exists and Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh performed of the as-built concludes that the as-built environment can withstand the Class 1E equipment and the Class 1E equipment and the environmental conditions that would exist associated wiring, cables, and associated wiring, cables, before, during, and following a design terminations located in a and terminations identified basis accident without loss of safety harsh environment. in Table 2.2.1-1 as being function for the time required to perform qualified for a harsh the safety function. environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

103 2.2.01.06b 6.b) The Class 1E components identified Testing will be performed by A simulated test signal in Table 2.2.1-1 are powered from their providing a simulated test exists at the Class 1E respective Class 1E division. signal in each Class 1E equipment identified in division. Table 2.2.1-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

104 2.2.01.06c 6.c) Separation is provided between CNS See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E 7.d. item 7.d.

divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

105 2.2.01.06d.i 6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical i) Type tests, analyses, or a i) A report exists and penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as combination of type tests and concludes that the non-Class being qualified for a harsh environment can analyses will be performed on 1E electrical penetrations withstand the environmental conditions non-Class 1E electrical identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as that would exist before, during, and penetrations located in a harsh being qualified for a harsh following a design basis accident without environment. environment can withstand loss of containment pressure boundary the environmental conditions integrity. that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.

106 2.2.01.06d.ii 6.d) The non-Class 1E electrical ii) Inspection will be ii) A report exists and penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as performed of the as-built non- concludes that the as-built being qualified for a harsh environment can Class 1E electrical non-Class 1E electrical withstand the environmental conditions penetrations located in a harsh penetrations identified in that would exist before, during, and environment. Table 2.2.1-1 as being following a design basis accident without qualified for a harsh loss of containment pressure boundary environment are bounded by integrity. type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

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Table 2.2.1-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 107 2.2.01.07.i 7. The CNS provides the safety-related i) A containment integrated i) The leakage rate from function of containment isolation for leak rate test will be containment for the containment boundary integrity and performed. integrated leak rate test is provides a barrier against the release of less than La.

fission products to the atmosphere.

108 2.2.01.07.ii 7. The CNS provides the safety-related ii) Testing will be performed ii) The containment purge function of containment isolation for to demonstrate that remotely isolation valves (VFS-PL-containment boundary integrity and operated containment V003, -V004, -V009, and -

provides a barrier against the release of isolation valves close within V010) close within fission products to the atmosphere. the required response times. 20 seconds, containment vacuum relief isolation valves (VFS-PL-V800A and

-V800B) close within 30 seconds, SGS valves SGS-PL-V040A/B and SGS-PL-V057A/B are covered in subsection 2.2.4, Table 2.2.4-4 (item 11.b.ii) and all other containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds upon receipt of an actuation signal.

109 2.2.01.08 8. Containment electrical penetration An analysis for the as-built Analysis exists for the as-assemblies are protected against currents containment electrical built containment electrical that are greater than the continuous ratings. penetration assemblies will be penetration assemblies and performed to demonstrate (1) concludes that the that the maximum current of penetrations are protected the circuits does not exceed against currents which are the continuous rating of the greater than their continuous containment electrical ratings.

penetration assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant protection devices in series and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assemblys rated short circuit thermal capacity data and prevent current from exceeding the continuous current rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly.

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Table 2.2.1-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 110 2.2.01.09 9. Safety-related displays identified in Inspection will be performed Safety-related displays Table 2.2.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. for retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.2.1-1 related displays in the MCR. can be retrieved in the MCR.

111 2.2.01.10a 10.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause Stroke testing will be Controls in the MCR those remotely operated valves identified performed on remotely operate to cause remotely in Table 2.2.1-1 to perform active operated valves identified in operated valves identified in functions. Table 2.2.1-1 using the Table 2.2.1-1 to perform controls in the MCR. active safety functions.

112 2.2.01.10b 10.b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.1- Testing will be performed on The remotely operated 1 as having PMS control perform an active remotely operated valves valves identified in safety function after receiving a signal listed in Table 2.2.1-1 using Table 2.2.1-1 as having from the PMS. real or simulated signals into PMS control perform the the PMS. active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from PMS.

113 2.2.01.10c 10.c) The valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 Testing will be performed on The remotely operated as having DAS control perform an active remotely operated valves valves identified in safety function after receiving a signal listed in Table 2.2.1-1 using Table 2.2.1-1 as having from DAS. real or simulated signals into DAS control perform the the DAS. active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from DAS.

114 2.2.01.11a.i 11.a) The motor-operated and check valves i) Tests or type tests of i) A test report exists and identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an motor-operated valves will be concludes that each motor-active safety-related function to change performed to demonstrate the operated valve changes position as indicated in the table. capability of each valve to position as indicated in operate under design Table 2.2.1-1 under design conditions. conditions.

115 2.2.01.11a.ii 11.a) The motor-operated and check valves ii) Inspection will be ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an performed for the existence of concludes that the as-built active safety-related function to change a report verifying that the as- motor-operated valves are position as indicated in the table. built motor-operated valves bounded by the tests or type are bounded by the tests or tests.

type tests.

116 2.2.01.11a.iii 11.a) The motor-operated and check valves iii) Tests of the motor- iii) Each motor-operated identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an operated valves will be valve changes position as active safety-related function to change performed under indicated in Table 2.2.1-1 position as indicated in the table. preoperational flow, under pre-operational test differential pressure, and conditions.

temperature conditions.

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Table 2.2.1-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 117 2.2.01.11a.iv 11.a) The motor-operated and check valves iv) Exercise testing of the iv) Each check valve identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an check valves with active changes position as active safety-related function to change safety functions identified in indicated in Table 2.2.1-1.

position as indicated in the table. Table 2.2.1-1 will be performed under preoperational test pressure, temperature and fluid flow conditions.

118 2.2.01.11b 11.b) After loss of motive power, the Testing of the remotely After loss of motive power, remotely operated valves identified in operated valves will be each remotely operated Table 2.2.1-1 assume the indicated loss of performed under the valve identified in Table motive power position. conditions of loss of motive 2.2.1-1 assumes the power. indicated loss of motive power position.

Table 2.2.1-4 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Containment Vessel CNS-MV-01 Shield Building C-105

Figure 2.2.1-1 Containment System C-106

2.2.2 Passive Containment Cooling System Design Description The passive containment cooling system (PCS) removes heat from the containment during design basis events.

The PCS is as shown in Figure 2.2.2-1 and the component locations of the PCS are as shown in Table 2.2.2-4.

1. The functional arrangement of the PCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.2.
2. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

c) The passive containment cooling ancillary water storage tank (PCCAWST) can withstand a seismic event.

6. a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between PCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

7. The PCS performs the following safety-related functions:

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a) The PCS delivers water from the PCCWST to the outside, top of the containment vessel.

b) The PCS wets the outside surface of the containment vessel. The inside and outside of the containment vessel above the operating deck are coated with an inorganic zinc coating.

c) The PCS provides air flow over the outside of the containment vessel by a natural circulation air flow path from the air inlets to the air discharge structure.

d) The PCS drains the excess water from the outside of the containment vessel through the two upper annulus drains.

e) The PCS provides a flow path for long-term water makeup to the passive containment cooling water storage tank (PCCWST).

f) The PCS provides a flow path for long-term water makeup from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool.

8. The PCS performs the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The PCCAWST contains an inventory of cooling water sufficient for PCS containment cooling from hour 72 through day 7.

b) The PCS delivers water from the PCCAWST to the PCCWST and spent fuel pool simultaneously.

c) The PCCWST includes a water inventory for the fire protection system.

9. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
10. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as having diverse actuation system (DAS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the DAS.

11. a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

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Table 2.2.2-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated for Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Component Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position PCCWST PCS-MT-01 No Yes - - - - - -

Water Distribution Bucket PCS-MT-03 No Yes - - - - - -

Water Distribution Wiers PCS-MT-04 No Yes - - - - - -

PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V001A Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Open (Valve Open Position)

PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V001B Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Open (Valve Open Position)

PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V001C Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is (Valve Open Position)

PCCWST Isolation Block PCS-PL-V002A Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer As Is MOV (Valve Open Position)

PCCWST Isolation Block PCS-PL-V002B Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer As Is MOV (Valve Open Position)

PCCWST Isolation Block PCS-PL-V002C Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer As Is MOV (Valve Open Position)

PCS Recirculation Return PCS-PL-V023 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

Isolation Valve Close PCCWST Supply to Fire PCS-PL-V005 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

Protection System Isolation Close Valve PCS Makeup to SFS PCS-PL-V009 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

Isolation Valve Open/

Transfer Close C-109

Table 2.2.2-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated for Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Component Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position Water Makeup Isolation PCS-PL-V044 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

Valve Open Water Bucket Makeup Line PCS-PL-V015 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

Drain Valve Close Water Bucket Makeup Line PCS-PL-V020 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

Isolation Valve Open PCCWST Long-Term PCS-PL-V039 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

Makeup Line Check Valve Open PCCWST Long-Term PCS-PL-V042 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

Makeup Drain Isolation Close PCS Discharge to SFS Pool PCS-PL-V045 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

Isolation Valve Open Recirc Header Discharge to PCS-PL-V046 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

PCCWST Isolation Valve Close PCCWST Drain Isolation PCS-PL-V049 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

Valve Close Recirc Header Discharge to PCS-PL-V050 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

SFS Pool Isolation Valve Open/Close PCCWST Discharge to SFS PCS-PL-V051 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer -

Pool Isolation Valve Open/Close PCS Water Delivery Flow PCS-001 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Sensor PCS Water Delivery Flow PCS-002 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Sensor PCS Water Delivery Flow PCS-003 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Sensor PCS Water Delivery Flow PCS-004 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Sensor C-110

Table 2.2.2-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated for Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Component Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position Containment Pressure PCS-005 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Sensor Containment Pressure PCS-006 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Sensor Containment Pressure PCS-007 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Sensor Containment Pressure PCS-008 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Sensor PCCWST Water Level PCS-010 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Sensor PCCWST Water Level PCS-011 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Sensor High-range Containment PCS-012 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Pressure Sensor High-range Containment PCS-013 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Pressure Sensor High-range Containment PCS-014 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Pressure Sensor Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.2.2-2 Functional ASME Code Capability Pipeline Name Line Number Section III Required PCCWST Discharge Lines PCS-PL-L001A/B/C/D Yes Yes PCCWST Discharge Cross-connect PCS-PL-L002 Yes Yes Line PCCWST Discharge Header Lines PCS-PL-L003A/B Yes Yes PCS-PL-L005 Post-72-hour Supply Line Connection PCS-PL-L051 Yes Yes PCS-PL-L054 PCS-PL-L065 Post-72-hour Containment Cooling PCS-PL-L004 Yes Yes Makeup From Supply Line PCS-PL-L007 Connections PCS-PL-L008 PCS-PL-L023 PCS-PL-L050 Post-72-hour SFS Makeup From PCS-PL-L011 Yes Yes PCCWST PCS-PL-L017 PCS-PL-L018 PCS-PL-L030*

PCS-PL-L073 Post-72-hour SFS Makeup From PCS-PL-L025 Yes Yes Supply Line Connection PCS-PL-L029 PCS-PL-L030*

PCS-PL-L048 PCS-PL-L049 Note:

  • Line PCS-PL-L030 is a common makeup line from both sources.

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Table 2.2.2-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 119 2.2.02.01 1. The functional arrangement Inspection of the as-built system The as-built PCS conforms to the of the PCS is as described in will be performed. functional arrangement as the Design Description of this described in the Design Section 2.2.2. Description of this Section 2.2.2.

120 2.2.02.02a 2.a) The components identified Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code the as-built components as design reports exist for the as-Section III are designed and documented in the ASME design built components identified in constructed in accordance with reports. Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code ASME Code Section III Section III.

requirements.

121 2.2.02.02b 2.b) The pipelines identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code the as-built piping as documented design reports exist for the as-Section III are designed and in the ASME design reports. built piping identified in constructed in accordance with Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code ASME Code Section III Section III.

requirements.

122 2.2.02.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds Inspection of the as-built pressure A report exists and concludes that in components identified in boundary welds will be performed the ASME Code Section III Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code in accordance with the ASME requirements are met for non-Section III meet ASME Code Code Section III. destructive examination of Section III requirements. pressure boundary welds.

123 2.2.02.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds Inspection of the as-built pressure A report exists and concludes that in the pipelines identified in boundary welds will be performed the ASME Code Section III Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code in accordance with the ASME requirements are met for non-Section III meet ASME Code Code Section III. destructive examination of Section III requirements. pressure boundary welds.

124 2.2.02.04a 4.a) The components identified A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes that in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code performed on the components the results of the hydrostatic test Section III retain their pressure required by the ASME Code of the components identified in boundary integrity at their Section III to be hydrostatically Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code design pressure. tested. Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

125 2.2.02.04b 4.b) The pipelines identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes that Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code performed on the piping required the results of the hydrostatic test Section III retain their pressure by the ASME Code Section III to of the piping identified in boundary integrity at their be hydrostatically tested. Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code design pressure. Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

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Table 2.2.2-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 126 2.2.02.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I i) Inspection will be performed to i) The seismic Category I components identified in verify that the seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand components and valves identified Table 2.2.2-1 are located on the seismic design basis loads in Table 2.2.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

without loss of safety function. Nuclear Island.

127 2.2.02.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and concludes components identified in combination of type tests and that the seismic Category I Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand analyses of seismic Category I components can withstand seismic design basis loads components will be performed. seismic design basis loads without without loss of safety function. loss of safety function.

128 2.2.02.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I iii) Inspection will be performed iii) The report exists and components identified in for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand verifying that the as-built components including anchorage seismic design basis loads components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the without loss of safety function. are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

tested or analyzed conditions.

129 2.2.02.05b 5.b) Each of the pipelines Inspection will be performed for A report exists and concludes that identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for the existence of a report each of the as-built pipelines which functional capability is concluding that the as-built identified in Table 2.2.2-2 for required is designed to pipelines meet the requirements which functional capability is withstand combined normal and for functional capability. required meets the requirements seismic design basis loads for functional capability.

without a loss of its functional capability.

130 2.2.02.05c 5.c) The PCCAWST can Inspection will be performed for A report exists and concludes that withstand a seismic event. the existence of a report verifying the as-built PCCAWST and its that the as-built PCCAWST and anchorage are designed using its anchorage are designed using seismic Category II methods and seismic Category II methods and criteria.

criteria.

131 2.2.02.06a.i 6.a) The Class 1E components i) Type tests or a combination of i) A report exists and concludes identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as type tests and analyses will be that the Class 1E components being qualified for a harsh performed on Class 1E identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as environment can withstand the components located in a harsh being qualified for a harsh environmental conditions that environment. environment can withstand the would exist before, during, and environmental conditions that following a design basis would exist before, during, and accident without loss of safety following a design basis accident function for the time required to without loss of safety function for perform the safety function. the time required to perform the safety function.

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Table 2.2.2-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 132 2.2.02.06a.ii 6.a) The Class 1E components ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and concludes identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as of the as-built Class 1E that the as-built Class 1E being qualified for a harsh components and the associated components and the associated environment can withstand the wiring, cables, and terminations wiring, cables, and terminations environmental conditions that located in a harsh environment. identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as would exist before, during, and being qualified for a harsh following a design basis environment are bounded by type accident without loss of safety tests, analyses, or a combination function for the time required to of type tests and analyses.

perform the safety function.

133 2.2.02.06b 6.b) The Class 1E components Testing will be performed by A simulated test signal exists at identified in Table 2.2.2-1 are providing a simulated test signal the Class 1E components powered from their respective in each Class 1E division. identified in Table 2.2.2-1 when Class 1E division. the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

134 2.2.02.06c 6.c) Separation is provided See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.

between PCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

135 2.2.02.07a.i 7.a) The PCS delivers water i) Testing will be performed to i) When tested, each one of the from the PCCWST to the measure the PCCWST delivery three flow paths delivers water at outside, top of the containment rate from each one of the three greater than or equal to:

vessel. parallel flow paths. - 469.1 gpm at a PCCWST water level of 27.4 ft + 0.2, - 0.0 ft above the tank floor

- 226.6 gpm when the PCCWST water level uncovers the first (i.e. tallest) standpipe

- 176.3 gpm when the PCCWST water level uncovers the second tallest standpipe

- 144.2 gpm when the PCCWST water level uncovers the third tallest standpipe 136 2.2.02.07a.ii 7.a) The PCS delivers water ii) Testing and or analysis will be ii) When tested and/or analyzed from the PCCWST to the performed to demonstrate the with all flow paths delivering and outside, top of the containment PCCWST inventory provides an initial water level at 27.4 +

vessel. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of adequate water flow. 0.2, - 0.00 ft, the PCCWST water inventory provides greater than or equal to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of flow, and the flow rate at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is greater than or equal to 100.7 gpm.

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Table 2.2.2-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 137 2.2.02.07a.iii 7.a) The PCS delivers water iii) Inspection will be performed iii) The elevations of the from the PCCWST to the to determine the PCCWST standpipes above the tank floor outside, top of the containment standpipes elevations. are:

vessel. - 16.8 ft +/- 0.2 ft

- 20.3 ft +/- 0.2 ft

- 24.1 ft +/- 0.2 ft 138 2.2.02.07b.i 7.b) The PCS wets the outside i) Testing will be performed to i) A report exists and concludes surface of the containment measure the outside wetted that when the water in the vessel. The inside and the surface of the containment vessel PCCWST uncovers the standpipes outside of the containment with one of the three parallel flow at the following levels, the water vessel above the operating deck paths delivering water to the top delivered by one of the three are coated with an inorganic of the containment vessel. parallel flow paths to the zinc material. containment shell provides coverage measured at the spring line that is equal to or greater than the stated coverages.

- 24.1 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 90% of the perimeter is wetted.

- 20.3 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 72.9% of the perimeter is wetted.

- 16.8 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 59.6% of the perimeter is wetted.

139 2.2.02.07b.ii 7.b) The PCS wets the outside ii) Inspection of the containment ii) A report exists and concludes surface of the containment vessel exterior coating will be that the containment vessel vessel. The inside and the conducted. exterior surface is coated with an outside of the containment inorganic zinc coating above vessel above the operating deck elevation 135'-3".

are coated with an inorganic zinc material.

140 2.2.02.07b.iii 7.b) The PCS wets the outside iii) Inspection of the containment iii) A report exists and concludes surface of the containment vessel interior coating will be that the containment vessel vessel. The inside and the conducted. interior surface is coated with an outside of the containment inorganic zinc coating above 7' vessel above the operating deck above the operating deck.

are coated with an inorganic zinc material.

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Table 2.2.2-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 141 2.2.02.07c 7.c) The PCS provides air flow Inspections of the air flow path Flow paths exist at each of the over the outside of the segments will be performed. following locations:

containment vessel by a natural - Air inlets circulation air flow path from - Base of the outer annulus the air inlets to the air discharge - Base of the inner annulus structure. - Discharge structure 142 2.2.02.07d 7.d) The PCS drains the excess Testing will be performed to With a water level within the water from the outside of the verify the upper annulus drain upper annulus 10" + 1" above the containment vessel through the flow performance. annulus drain inlet, the flow rate two upper annulus drains. through each drain is greater than or equal to 525 gpm.

143 2.2.02.07e.i 7.e) The PCS provides a flow i) See item 1 in this table. i) See item 1 in this table.

path for long-term water makeup to the PCCWST.

144 2.2.02.07e.ii 7.e) The PCS provides a flow ii) Testing will be performed to ii) With a water supply connected path for long-term water measure the delivery rate from the to the PCS long-term makeup makeup to the PCCWST. long-term makeup connection to connection, each PCS the PCCWST. recirculation pump delivers greater than or equal to 100 gpm when tested separately.

145 2.2.02.07f.i 7.f) The PCS provides a flow i) Testing will be performed to i) With the PCCWST water level path for long-term water measure the delivery rate from the at 27.4 ft + 0.2, - 0.0 ft above the makeup from the PCCWST to PCCWST to the spent fuel pool. bottom of the tank, the flow path the spent fuel pool. from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool delivers greater than or equal to 118 gpm.

146 2.2.02.07f.ii 7.f) The PCS provides a flow ii) Inspection of the PCCWST ii) The volume of the PCCWST path for long-term water will be performed. is greater than 756,700 gallons.

makeup from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool.

147 2.2.02.08a 8.a) The PCCAWST contains Inspection of the PCCAWST will The volume of the PCCAWST is an inventory of cooling water be performed. greater than 780,000 gallons.

sufficient for PCS containment cooling from hour 72 through day 7.

148 2.2.02.08b 8.b) The PCS delivers water Testing will be performed to With PCCASWST aligned to the from the PCCAWST to the measure the delivery rate from the suction of the recirculation PCCWST and spent fuel pool PCCAWST to the PCCWST and pumps, each pump delivers simultaneously. spent fuel pool simultaneously. greater than or equal to 100 gpm to the PCCWST and 35 gpm to the spent fuel pool simultaneously when each pump is tested separately.

C-117

Table 2.2.2-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 149 2.2.02.08c 8.c) The PCCWST includes a See ITAAC Table 2.3.4-2, items 1 See ITAAC Table 2.3.4-2, items 1 water inventory for the fire and 2. and 2.

protection system.

150 2.2.02.09 9. Safety-related displays Inspection will be performed for Safety-related displays identified identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can retrievability of the safety-related in Table 2.2.2-1 can be retrieved be retrieved in the MCR. displays in the MCR. in the MCR.

151 2.2.02.10a 10.a) Controls exist in the Stroke testing will be performed Controls in the MCR operate to MCR to cause the remotely on the remotely operated valves cause remotely operated valves operated valves identified in identified in Table 2.2.2-1 using identified in Table 2.2.2-1 to Table 2.2.2-1 to perform active the controls in the MCR. perform active functions.

functions.

152 2.2.02.10b 10.b) The valves identified in Testing will be performed on the The remotely operated valves Table 2.2.2-1 as having PMS remotely operated valves in identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as control perform an active safety Table 2.2.2-1 using real or having PMS control perform the function after receiving a signal simulated signals into the PMS. active function identified in the from the PMS. table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

153 2.2.02.10c 10.c) The valves identified in Testing will be performed on the The remotely operated valves Table 2.2.2-1 as having DAS remotely operated valves listed in identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as control perform an active safety Table 2.2.2-1 using real or having DAS control perform the function after receiving a signal simulated signals into the DAS. active function identified in the from the DAS. table after receiving a signal from the DAS.

154 2.2.02.11a.i 11.a) The motor-operated i) Tests or type tests of motor- i) A test report exists and valves identified in Table 2.2.2- operated valves will be performed concludes that each motor-1 perform an active safety- to demonstrate the capability of operated valve changes position related function to change the valve to operate under its as indicated in Table 2.2.2-1 position as indicated in the design conditions. under design conditions.

table.

155 2.2.02.11a.ii 11.a) The motor-operated ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and concludes valves identified in Table 2.2.2- for the existence of a report that the capability of the as-built 1 perform an active safety- verifying that the capability of the motor-operated valves bound the related function to change as-built motor-operated valves tested conditions.

position as indicated in the bound the tested conditions.

table.

156 2.2.02.11a.iii 11.a) The motor-operated iii) Tests of the motor-operated iii) Each motor-operated valve valves identified in Table 2.2.2- valves will be performed under changes position as indicated in 1 perform an active safety- preoperational flow, differential Table 2.2.2-1 under related function to change pressure, and temperature preoperational test conditions.

position as indicated in the conditions.

table.

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Table 2.2.2-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 157 2.2.02.11b 11.b) After loss of motive Testing of the remotely operated After loss of motive power, each power, the remotely operated valves will be performed under remotely operated valve identified valves identified in Table 2.2.2- the conditions of loss of motive in Table 2.2.2-1 assumes the 1 assume the indicated loss of power. indicated loss of motive power motive power position. position.

Table 2.2.2-4 Component Name Tag No. Component Location PCCWST PCS-MT-01 Shield Building PCCAWST PCS-MT-05 Yard Recirculation Pump A PCS-MP-01A Auxiliary Building Recirculation Pump B PCS-MP-01B Auxiliary Building C-119

Figure 2.2.2-1 Passive Containment Cooling System C-120

2.2.3 Passive Core Cooling System Design Description The passive core cooling system (PXS) provides emergency core cooling during design basis events.

The PXS is as shown in Figure 2.2.3-1 and the component locations of the PXS are as shown in Table 2.2.3-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the PXS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.3.
2. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as designed for leak before break (LBB) meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.
7. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between PXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

8. The PXS provides the following safety-related functions:

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a) The PXS provides containment isolation of the PXS lines penetrating the containment.

b) The PRHR HX provides core decay heat removal during design basis events.

c) The CMTs, accumulators, in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) and containment recirculation provide reactor coolant system (RCS) makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

d) The PXS provides pH adjustment of water flooding the containment following design basis accidents.

9. The PXS has the following features:

a) The PXS provides a function to cool the outside of the reactor vessel during a severe accident.

b) The accumulator discharge check valves (PXS-PL-V028A/B and V029A/B) are of a different check valve type than the CMT discharge check valves (PXS-PL-V016A/B and V017A/B).

c) The equipment listed in Table 2.2.3-6 has sufficient thermal lag to withstand the effects of identified hydrogen burns associated with severe accidents.

10. Safety-related displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
11. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 to perform their active function(s).

b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform their active function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as having diverse actuation system (DAS) control perform their active function after receiving a signal from the DAS.

12. a) The squib valves and check valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

13. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.2.3-3 can be retrieved in the MCR C-122

Table 2.2.3-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position Passive Residual Heat PXS-ME-01 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Removal Heat Exchanger (PRHR HX)

Accumulator Tank A PXS-MT-01A Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Accumulator Tank B PXS-MT-01B Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Core Makeup Tank (CMT) A PXS-MT-02A Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

CMT B PXS-MT-02B Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

IRWST PXS-MT-03 No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

IRWST Screen A PXS-MY-Y01A No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

IRWST Screen B PXS-MY-Y01B No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

IRWST Screen C PXS-MY-Y01C No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Containment Recirculation PXS-MY-Y02A No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Screen A Containment Recirculation PXS-MY-Y02B No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Screen B pH Adjustment Basket 3A PXS-MY-Y03A No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

pH Adjustment Basket 3B PXS-MY-Y03B No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

pH Adjustment Basket 4A PXS-MY-Y04A No Yes -/- -/-

pH Adjustment Basket 4B PXS-MY-Y04B No Yes -/- -/-

Downspout Screen 1A PXS-MY-Y81 No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Downspout Screen 1B PXS-MY-Y82 No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Downspout Screen 1C PXS-MY-Y83 No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Downspout Screen 1D PXS-MY-Y84 No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Downspout Screen 2A PXS-MY-Y85 No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Downspout Screen 2B PXS-MY-Y86 No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

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Table 2.2.3-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position Downspout Screen 2C PXS-MY-Y87 No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

Downspout Screen 2D PXS-MY-Y88 No Yes - -/- - -/- - -

CMT A Inlet Isolation PXS-PL-V002A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/No None As Is Motor-operated Valve (Position)

CMT B Inlet Isolation Motor- PXS-PL-V002B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/No None As Is operated Valve (Position)

CMT A Discharge Isolation PXS-PL-V014A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Open Valve (Position) Open CMT B Discharge Isolation PXS-PL-V014B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Open Valve (Position) Open CMT A Discharge Isolation PXS-PL-V015A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Open Valve (Position) Open CMT B Discharge Isolation PXS-PL-V015B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Open Valve (Position) Open CMT A Discharge Check PXS-PL-V016A Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Valve Open/

Transfer Closed CMT B Discharge Check PXS-PL-V016B Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Valve Open/

Transfer Closed CMT A Discharge Check PXS-PL-V017A Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Valve Open/

Transfer Closed C-124

Table 2.2.3-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position CMT B Discharge Check PXS-PL-V017B Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Valve Open/

Transfer Closed Accumulator A Pressure PXS-PL-V022A Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Relief Valve Open/

Transfer Closed Accumulator B Pressure PXS-PL-V022B Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Relief Valve Open/

Transfer Closed Accumulator A Discharge PXS-PL-V027A Yes Yes Yes -/- Yes - /No None As Is Isolation Valve Accumulator B Discharge PXS-PL-V027B Yes Yes Yes -/- Yes - /No None As Is Isolation Valve Accumulator A Discharge PXS-PL-V028A Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Check Valve Open/

Close Accumulator B Discharge PXS-PL-V028B Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Check Valve Open/

Close Accumulator A Discharge PXS-PL-V029A Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Check Valve Open/

Close Accumulator B Discharge PXS-PL-V029B Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Check Valve Open/

Close C-125

Table 2.2.3-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position Nitrogen Supply PXS-PL-V042 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer Close Containment Isolation Valve (position) Closed Nitrogen Supply PXS-PL-V043 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Containment Isolation Check Closed Valve PRHR HX Inlet Isolation PXS-PL-V101 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/No None As Is Motor-operated Valve (position)

PRHR HX Control Valve PXS-PL-V108A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Open (Position) Open PRHR HX Control Valve PXS-PL-V108B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Open (Position) Open Containment Recirculation A PXS-PL-V117A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes None As Is Isolation Motor-operated (position)

Valve Containment Recirculation B PXS-PL-V117B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes None As Is Isolation Motor-operated (position)

Valve Containment Recirculation A PXS-PL-V118A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Squib Valve (Position) Open Containment Recirculation B PXS-PL-V118B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Squib Valve (Position) Open Containment Recirculation A PXS-PL-V119A Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed C-126

Table 2.2.3-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position Containment Recirculation B PXS-PL-V119B Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed Containment Recirculation A PXS-PL-V120A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Squib Valve (Position) Open Containment Recirculation B PXS-PL-V120B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Squib Valve (Position) Open IRWST Injection A PXS-PL-V122A Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed IRWST Injection B PXS-PL-V122B Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed IRWST Injection A Squib PXS-PL-V123A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Valve (Position) Open IRWST Injection B Squib PXS-PL-V123B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Valve (Position) Open IRWST Injection A PXS-PL-V124A Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed IRWST Injection B PXS-PL-V124B Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer -

Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed C-127

Table 2.2.3-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position IRWST Injection A Squib PXS-PL-V125A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Valve (Position) Open IRWST Injection B Squib PXS-PL-V125B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer As Is Valve (Position) Open IRWST Gutter Isolation PXS-PL-V130A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Closed Valve (Position) Closed IRWST Gutter Isolation PXS-PL-V130B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Closed Valve (Position) Closed CMT A Level Sensor PXS-011A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT A Level Sensor PXS-011B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT A Level Sensor PXS-011C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT A Level Sensor PXS-011D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT B Level Sensor PXS-012A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT B Level Sensor PXS-012B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT B Level Sensor PXS-012C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT B Level Sensor PXS-012D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT A Level Sensor PXS-013A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT A Level Sensor PXS-013B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT A Level Sensor PXS-013C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT A Level Sensor PXS-013D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT B Level Sensor PXS-014A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT B Level Sensor PXS-014B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

CMT B Level Sensor PXS-014C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

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Table 2.2.3-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. Safety- Control Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related PMS/ Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display DAS Function Position CMT B Level Sensor PXS-014D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

IRWST Level Sensor PXS-045 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

IRWST Level Sensor PXS-046 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

IRWST Level Sensor PXS-047 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

IRWST Level Sensor PXS-048 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

PRHR HX Flow Sensor PXS-049A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

PRHR HX Flow Sensor PXS-049B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Containment Flood-up Level PXS-050 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor Containment Flood-up Level PXS-051 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor Containment Flood-up Level PXS-052 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - -

Sensor RNS Suction Leak Test PXS-PL-V208A Yes Yes No -/- No -/- - -

Valve Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-129

Table 2.2.3-2 ASME Leak Functional Code Before Capability Line Name Line Number Section III Break Required PRHR HX inlet line from hot leg and RCS-L134, PXS-L102, PXS-L103, Yes Yes Yes outlet line to steam generator channel PXS-L104A, PXS-L104B, PXS-L105, head RCS-L113 PXS-L107 Yes Yes No CMT A inlet line from cold leg C and RCS-L118A, PXS-L007A, PXS-L015A, Yes Yes Yes outlet line to reactor vessel direct PXS-L016A, PXS-L017A, PXS-L018A, vessel injection (DVI) nozzle A PXS-L020A, PXS-L021A PXS-L019A, PXS-L070A Yes Yes No CMT B inlet line from cold leg D and RCS-L118B, PXS-L007B, PXS-L015B, Yes Yes Yes outlet line to reactor vessel DVI PXS-L016B, PXS-L017B, PXS-L018B, nozzle B PXS-L020B, PXS-L021B PXS-L019B, PXS-L070B Yes Yes No Accumulator A discharge line to DVI PXS-L025A, PXS-L027A, PXS-L029A Yes Yes Yes line A Accumulator B discharge line to DVI PXS-L025B, PXS-L027B, PXS-L029B Yes Yes Yes line B IRWST injection line A to DVI line A PXS-L125A, PXS-L127A Yes Yes Yes PXS-L123A, PXS-L124A, PXS-L118A, Yes No Yes PXS-L117A, PXS-L116A, PXS-L112A IRWST injection line B to DVI line B PXS-L125B, PXS-L127B Yes Yes Yes PXS-L123B, PXS-L124B, PXS-L118B, Yes No Yes PXS-L117B, PXS-L116B, PXS-L114B, PXS-L112B, PXS-L120 IRWST screen cross-connect line PXS-L180A, PXS-L180B Yes No Yes Containment recirculation line A PXS-L113A, PXS-L131A, PXS-L132A Yes No Yes C-130

Table 2.2.3-2 ASME Leak Functional Code Before Capability Line Name Line Number Section III Break Required Containment recirculation line B PXS-L113B, PXS-L131B, PXS-L132B Yes No Yes IRWST gutter drain line PXS-L142A, PXS-L142B Yes No Yes PXS-L141A, PXS-L141B Yes No No Downspout drain lines from polar PXS-L301A, PXS-L302A, PXS-L303A, Yes No Yes crane girder and internal stiffener to PXS-L304A, PXS-L305A, PXS-L306A, collection box A PXS-L307A, PXS-L308A, PXS-L309A, PXS-L310A Downspout drain lines from polar PXS-L301B, PXS-L302B, PXS-L303B, Yes No Yes crane girder and internal stiffener to PXS-L304B, PXS-L305B, PXS-L306B, collection box B PXS-L307B, PXS-L308B, PXS-L309B, PXS-L310B C-131

Table 2.2.3-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function CMT A Discharge Isolation Valve (Position) PXS-PL-V014A Yes (Position) -

CMT B Discharge Isolation Valve (Position) PXS-PL-V014B Yes (Position) -

CMT A Discharge Isolation Valve (Position) PXS-PL-V015A Yes (Position) -

CMT B Discharge Isolation Valve (Position) PXS-PL-V015B Yes (Position) -

Accumulator A Nitrogen Vent Valve PXS-PL-V021A Yes (Position) -

(Position)

Accumulator B Nitrogen Vent Valve PXS-PL-V021B Yes (Position) -

(Position)

Accumulator A Discharge Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V027A Yes (Position) -

(Position)

Accumulator B Discharge Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V027B Yes (Position) -

(Position)

PRHR HX Control Valve (Position) PXS-PL-V108A Yes (Position) -

PRHR HX Control Valve (Position) PXS-PL-V108B Yes (Position) -

Containment Recirculation A Isolation PXS-PL-V017A Yes (Position) -

Valve Containment Recirculation B Isolation PXS-PL-V017B Yes (Position) -

Valve Containment Recirculation A Isolation PXS-PL-V118A Yes (Position) -

Valve (Position)

Containment Recirculation B Isolation PXS-PL-V118B Yes (Position) -

Valve (Position)

Containment Recirculation A Isolation PXS-PL-V120A Yes (Position) -

Valve (Position)

Containment Recirculation B Isolation PXS-PL-V120B Yes (Position) -

Valve (Position)

IRWST Line A Isolation Valve (Position) PXS-PL-V121A Yes (Position) -

IRWST Line B Isolation Valve (Position) PXS-PL-V121B Yes (Position) -

IRWST Injection A Isolation Squib PXS-PL-V123A Yes (Position) -

(Position)

IRWST Injection B Isolation Squib PXS-PL-V123B Yes (Position) -

(Position)

IRWST Injection A Isolation Squib PXS-PL-V125A Yes (Position) -

(Position)

IRWST Injection B Isolation Squib PXS-PL-V125B Yes (Position) -

(Position)

C-132

Table 2.2.3-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function IRWST Gutter Bypass Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V130A Yes (Position) -

(Position)

IRWST Gutter Bypass Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V130B Yes (Position) -

(Position)

Accumulator A Level Sensor PXS-JE-L021 Yes -

Accumulator B Level Sensor PXS-JE-L022 Yes -

Accumulator A Level Sensor PXS-JE-L023 Yes -

Accumulator B Level Sensor PXS-JE-L024 Yes -

PRHR HX Inlet Temperature Sensor PXS-JE-T064 Yes -

IRWST Surface Temperature Sensor PXS-JE-T041 Yes -

IRWST Surface Temperature Sensor PXS-JE-T042 Yes -

IRWST Bottom Temperature Sensor PXS-JE-T043 Yes -

IRWST Bottom Temperature Sensor PXS-JE-T044 Yes -

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-133

Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 158 2.2.03.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built PXS conforms PXS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.2.3. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.3.

159 2.2.03.02a 2.a) The components identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section the as-built components as design reports exist for the III are designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design as-built components identified accordance with ASME Code reports. in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Section III requirements. Code Section III.

160 2.2.03.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section the as-built piping as design reports exist for the III is designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design as-built piping identified in accordance with ASME Code reports. Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III requirements. Section III.

161 2.2.03.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes components identified in Table 2.2.3- pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Section 1 as ASME Code Section III meet performed in accordance with III requirements are met for ASME Code Section III the ASME Code Section III. non-destructive examination requirements. of pressure boundary welds.

162 2.2.03.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Section ASME Code Section III meet ASME performed in accordance with III requirements are met for Code Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

163 2.2.03.04a 4.a) The components identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section performed on the components that the results of the III retain their pressure boundary required by the ASME Code hydrostatic test of the integrity at their design pressure. Section III to be hydrostatically components identified in tested. Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

164 2.2.03.04b 4.b) The piping identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section performed on the piping required that the results of the III retains its pressure boundary by the ASME Code Section III to hydrostatic test of the piping integrity at its design pressure. be hydrostatically tested. identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

C-134

Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 165 2.2.03.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 to verify that the seismic equipment identified in can withstand seismic design basis Category I equipment and valves Table 2.2.3-1 is located on the loads without loss of safety function. identified in Table 2.2.3-1 are Nuclear Island.

located on the Nuclear Island.

166 2.2.03.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic can withstand seismic design basis analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can loads without loss of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the screens can withstand seismic dynamic loads and also post-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights.

167 2.2.03.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built can withstand seismic design basis verifying that the as-built equipment including loads without loss of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the as-built screens including their anchorage are bounded by the seismic loads and also post-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights.

168 2.2.03.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Inspection will be performed A report exists and concludes Table 2.2.3-2 for which functional verifying that the as-built piping that each of the as-built lines capability is required is designed to meets the requirements for identified in Table 2.2.3-2 for withstand combined normal and functional capability. which functional capability is seismic design basis loads without a required meets the loss of its functional capability. requirements for functional capability.

C-135

Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 169 2.2.03.06 6. Each of the as-built lines Inspection will be performed for An LBB evaluation report identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as the existence of an LBB exists and concludes that the designed for LBB meets the LBB evaluation report or an LBB acceptance criteria are criteria, or an evaluation is evaluation report on the met by the as-built RCS performed of the protection from the protection from dynamic effects piping and piping materials, or dynamic effects of a rupture of the of a pipe break. Section 3.3, a pipe break evaluation report line. Nuclear Island Buildings, exists and concludes that contains the design descriptions protection from the dynamic and inspections, tests, analyses, effects of a line break is and acceptance criteria for provided.

protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.

170 2.2.03.07a.i 7.a) The Class 1E equipment i) Type tests, analyses, or a i) A report exists and identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being combination of type tests and concludes that the Class 1E qualified for a harsh environment can analyses will be performed on equipment identified in Table withstand the environmental Class 1E equipment located in a 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a conditions that would exist before, harsh environment. harsh environment can during, and following a design basis withstand the environmental accident without loss of safety conditions that would exist function for the time required to before, during, and following perform the safety function. a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

171 2.2.03.07a.ii 7.a) The Class 1E equipment ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being of the as-built Class 1E concludes that the as-built qualified for a harsh environment can equipment and the associated Class 1E equipment and the withstand the environmental wiring, cables, and terminations associated wiring, cables, and conditions that would exist before, located in a harsh environment. terminations identified in during, and following a design basis Table 2.2.3-1 as being accident without loss of safety qualified for a harsh function for the time required to environment are bounded by perform the safety function. type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

172 2.2.03.07b 7.b) The Class 1E components Testing will be performed by A simulated test signal exists identified in Table 2.2.3-1 are providing a simulated test signal at the Class 1E equipment powered from their respective in each Class 1E division. identified in Table 2.2.3-1 Class 1E division. when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

173 2.2.03.07c 7.c) Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, PXS Class 1E divisions, and between 7.d. item 7.d.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

C-136

Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 174 2.2.03.08a 8.a) The PXS provides containment See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, isolation of the PXS lines penetrating 1 and 7. items 1 and 7.

the containment.

175 2.2.03.08b.01 8.b) The PXS provides core decay 1. A heat removal performance 1. A report exists and heat removal during design basis test and analysis of the PRHR concludes that the PRHR HX events. HX will be performed to heat transfer rate with the determine the heat transfer from design basis number of PRHR the HX. For the test, the reactor HX tubes plugged is:

coolant hot leg temperature will 1.78 x 108 Btu/hr with be initially at 540°F with the 520°F HL Temp and 80°F reactor coolant pumps stopped. IRWST temperatures.

The IRWST water level for the 1.11 x 108 Btu/hr with test will be above the top of the 420°F HL Temp and 80°F HX. The IRWST water IRWST temperatures.

temperature is not specified for the test. The test will continue until the hot leg temperature decreases below 420°F.

176 2.2.03.08b.02 8.b) The PXS provides core decay 2. Inspection of the elevation of 2. The elevation of the heat removal during design basis the PRHR HX will be centerline of the HXs upper events. conducted. channel head is greater than the HL centerline by at least 26.3 ft.

177 2.2.03.08c.i.01 8.c) The PXS provides RCS i) A low-pressure injection test i) The injection line flow makeup, boration, and safety and analysis for each CMT, each resistance from each source is injection during design basis events. accumulator, each IRWST as follows:

injection line, and each 1. CMTs:

containment recirculation line The calculated flow resistance will be conducted. Each test is between each CMT and the initiated by opening isolation reactor vessel is valve(s) in the line being tested. 1.81 x 10-5 ft/gpm2 and Test fixtures may be used to 2.25 x 10-5 ft/gpm2.

simulate squib valves.

1. CMTs:

Each CMT will be initially filled with water. All valves in these lines will be open during the test.

C-137

Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 178 2.2.03.08c.i.02 8.c) The PXS provides RCS i) A low-pressure injection test i) The injection line flow makeup, boration, and safety and analysis for each CMT, each resistance from each source is injection during design basis events. accumulator, each IRWST as follows:

injection line, and each 2. Accumulators:

containment recirculation line The calculated flow resistance will be conducted. Each test is between each accumulator and initiated by opening isolation the reactor vessel is valve(s) in the line being tested. 1.47 x 10-5 ft/gpm2 and Test fixtures may be used to 1.83 x 10-5 ft/gpm2.

simulate squib valves.

2. Accumulators:

Each accumulator will be partially filled with water and pressurized with nitrogen. All valves in these lines will be open during the test. Sufficient flow will be provided to fully open the check valves.

179 2.2.03.08c.i.03 8.c) The PXS provides RCS i) A low-pressure injection test i) The injection line flow makeup, boration, and safety and analysis for each CMT, each resistance from each source is injection during design basis events. accumulator, each IRWST as follows:

injection line, and each 3. IRWST Injection:

containment recirculation line The calculated flow resistance will be conducted. Each test is for each IRWST injection line initiated by opening isolation between the IRWST and the valve(s) in the line being tested. reactor vessel is:

Test fixtures may be used to simulate squib valves.

Line A: 5.53 x 10-6 ft/gpm2

3. IRWST Injection: and 9.20x10-6 ft/gpm2 The IRWST will be partially filled with water. All valves in these lines will be open during and the test. Sufficient flow will be provided to fully open the check Line B:6.21x10-6 ft/gpm2 and valves. 1.03 x 10-5 ft/gpm2.

C-138

Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 180 2.2.03.08c.i.04 8.c) The PXS provides RCS i) A low-pressure injection test i) The injection line flow makeup, boration, and safety and analysis for each CMT, each resistance from each source is injection during design basis events. accumulator, each IRWST as follows:

injection line, and each 4. Containment Recirculation:

containment recirculation line The calculated flow resistance will be conducted. Each test is for each containment initiated by opening isolation recirculation line between the valve(s) in the line being tested. containment and the reactor Test fixtures may be used to vessel is:

simulate squib valves.

4. Containment Recirculation: Line A: 1.11 x 10-5 ft/gpm2 A temporary water supply will be connected to the recirculation lines. All valves in these lines and will be open during the test.

Sufficient flow will be provided Line B: 1.04 x 10-5 ft/gpm2.

to fully open the check valves.

181 2.2.03.08c.ii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS ii) A low-pressure test and ii) The flow resistance from makeup, boration, and safety analysis will be conducted for the cold leg to the CMT is injection during design basis events. each CMT to determine piping 7.21 x 10-6 ft/gpm2.

flow resistance from the cold leg to the CMT. The test will be performed by filling the CMT via the cold leg balance line by operating the normal residual heat removal pumps.

182 2.2.03.08c.iii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS iii) Inspections of the routing of iii) These lines have no makeup, boration, and safety the following pipe lines will be downward sloping sections injection during design basis events. conducted: between the connection to the

- CMT inlet line, cold leg to RCS and the high point of the high point line.

- PRHR HX inlet line, hot leg to high point 183 2.2.03.08c.iv.01 8.c) The PXS provides RCS iv) Inspections of the elevation iv) The maximum elevation makeup, boration, and safety of the following pipe lines will of the top inside surface of injection during design basis events. be conducted: these lines is less than the

1. IRWST injection lines; elevation of:

IRWST connection to DVI 1. IRWST bottom inside nozzles surface 184 2.2.03.08c.iv.02 8.c) The PXS provides RCS iv) Inspections of the elevation iv) The maximum elevation makeup, boration, and safety of the following pipe lines will of the top inside surface of injection during design basis events. be conducted: these lines is less than the

2. Containment recirculation elevation of:

lines; containment to IRWST 2. IRWST bottom inside lines surface C-139

Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 185 2.2.03.08c.iv.03 8.c) The PXS provides RCS iv) Inspections of the elevation iv) The maximum elevation makeup, boration, and safety of the following pipe lines will of the top inside surface of injection during design basis events. be conducted: these lines is less than the

3. CMT discharge lines to DVI elevation of:

connection 3. CMT bottom inside surface 186 2.2.03.08c.iv.04 8.c) The PXS provides RCS iv) Inspections of the elevation iv) The maximum elevation makeup, boration, and safety of the following pipe lines will of the top inside surface of injection during design basis events. be conducted: these lines is less than the

4. PRHR HX outlet line to SG elevation of:

connection 4. PRHR HX lower channel head top inside surface 187 2.2.03.08c.v.01 8.c) The PXS provides RCS v) Inspections of the elevation v) The elevation of the makeup, boration, and safety of the following tanks will be bottom inside tank surface is injection during design basis events. conducted: higher than the direct vessel

1. CMTs injection nozzle centerline by the following:
1. CMTs 7.5 ft 188 2.2.03.08c.v.02 8.c) The PXS provides RCS v) Inspections of the elevation v) The elevation of the makeup, boration, and safety of the following tanks will be bottom inside tank surface is injection during design basis events. conducted: higher than the direct vessel
2. IRWST injection nozzle centerline by the following:
2. IRWST 3.4 ft 189 2.2.03.08c.vi.01 8.c) The PXS provides RCS vi) Inspections of each of the vi) The calculated volume of makeup, boration, and safety following tanks will be each of the following tanks is injection during design basis events. conducted: as follows:
1. CMTs 1. CMTs 2487 ft3 190 2.2.03.08c.vi.02 8.c) The PXS provides RCS vi) Inspections of each of the vi) The calculated volume of makeup, boration, and safety following tanks will be each of the following tanks is injection during design basis events. conducted: as follows:
2. Accumulators 2. Accumulators 2000 ft3 191 2.2.03.08c.vi.03 8.c) The PXS provides RCS vi) Inspections of each of the vi) The calculated volume of makeup, boration, and safety following tanks will be each of the following tanks is injection during design basis events. conducted: as follows:

3.- IRWST 3. IRWST > 73,900 ft3 between the tank outlet connection and the tank overflow C-140

Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 192 2.2.03.08c.vii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS vii) Inspection of the as-built vii) Plates located above each makeup, boration, and safety components will be conducted containment recirculation injection during design basis events. for plates located above the screen are no more than 1 ft containment recirculation above the top of the screen screens. and extend out at least 10 ft perpendicular to and at least 7 ft to the side of the screen surface.

193 2.2.03.08c.viii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS viii) Inspections of the IRWST viii) The screens utilize makeup, boration, and safety and containment recirculation pockets with a frontal face injection during design basis events. screens will be conducted. The area of 6.2 in2 and a screen inspections will include surface area 140 in2 per measurements of the pockets and pocket. IRWST Screens A the number of pockets used in and B each have a sufficient each screen. The pocket frontal number of pockets to provide face area is based on a width a frontal face area 20 ft2, a times a height. The width is the screen surface area 500 ft2, distance between pocket and a screen mesh size of centerlines for pockets located 0.0625 inch. IRWST Screen beside each other. The height is C has a sufficient number of the distance between pocket pockets to provide a frontal centerlines for pockets located face area 40 ft2, a screen above each other. The pocket surface area 1000 ft2, and a screen area is the total area of screen mesh size 0.0625 perforated plate inside each inch. Each containment pocket; this area will be recirculation screen has a determined by inspection of the sufficient number of pockets screen manufacturing drawings. to provide a frontal face area 105 ft2, a screen surface area 2500 ft2, and a screen mesh size 0.0625 inch.

A debris curb exists in front of the containment recirculation screens which is > 2 ft above the loop compartment floor.

The bottoms of the IRWST screens are located 6 in above the bottom of the IRWST.

C-141

Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 194 2.2.03.08c.ix 8.c) The PXS provides RCS ix) Inspections will be ix) The type of insulation makeup, boration, and safety conducted of the insulation used used on these lines and injection during design basis events. inside the containment on the equipment is a metal reflective ASME Class 1 lines, reactor type or a suitable equivalent.

vessel, reactor coolant pumps, If an insulation other than pressurizer and steam generators. metal reflective insulation is used, a report must exist and conclude that the insulation is a suitable equivalent.

Inspections will be conducted of The type of insulation used on other insulation used inside the these lines and equipment is a containment within the zone of metal reflective type or a influence (ZOI). suitable equivalent. If an insulation other than metal reflective insulation is used, a report must exist and conclude that the insulation is a suitable equivalent.

Inspection will be conducted of The type of insulation used on other insulation below the these lines is metal reflective maximum flood level of a design insulation, jacketed fiberglass, basis loss-of-coolant accident or a suitable equivalent. If an (LOCA). insulation other than metal reflective or jacketed fiberglass insulation is used, a report must exist and conclude that the insulation is a suitable equivalent.

C-142

Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 195 2.2.03.08c.x 8.c) The PXS provides RCS x) Inspections will be conducted x) A report exists and makeup, boration, and safety of the as-built nonsafety-related concludes that the coatings injection during design basis events. coatings or of plant records of used on these surfaces have a the nonsafety-related coatings dry film density of used inside containment on 100 lb/ft3. If a coating is walls, floors, ceilings, and used that has a lower dry film structural steel except in the density, a report must exist CVS room. Inspections will be and conclude that the coating conducted of the as-built non- will not transport. A report safety-related coatings or of exists and concludes that plant records of the non-safety- inorganic zinc coatings used related coatings used on on these surfaces are Safety -

components below the maximum Service Level I.

flood level of a design basis LOCA or located above the maximum flood level and not inside cabinets or enclosures.

Inspections will be conducted on caulking, tags, and signs used A report exists and concludes inside containment below the that tags and signs used in maximum flood level of a design these locations are made of basis LOCA or located above the steel or another metal with a maximum flood level and not density 100 lb/ft3. In inside cabinets or enclosures. addition, a report exists and concludes that caulking used in these locations or coatings used on these signs or tags have a dry film density of 100 lb/ft3. If a material is used that has a lower density, a report must exist and conclude that there is insufficient water flow to transport lightweight caulking, signs, or tags.

Inspections will be conducted of A report exists and concludes ventilation filters and fiber- that the ventilation filters and producing fire barriers used fire barriers in these locations inside containment within the have a density of 100 lb/ft3.

ZOI or below the maximum flood level of a design basis LOCA.

C-143

Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 196 2.2.03.08c.xi 8.c) The PXS provides RCS xi) Inspection of the as-built xi) The CMT inlet diffuser makeup, boration, and safety CMT inlet diffuser will be has a flow area 165 in2.

injection during design basis events. conducted.

197 2.2.03.08c.xii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS xii) Inspections will be xii) Each upper level tap line makeup, boration, and safety conducted of the CMT level has a downward slope of 2.4 injection during design basis events. sensors (PSX-11A/B/D/C, - degrees from the centerline of 12A/B/C/D, - 13A/B/C/D, - the connection to the CMT to 14A/B/C/D) upper level tap the centerline of the lines. connection to the standpipe.

198 2.2.03.08c.xiii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS xiii) Inspections will be xiii) These surfaces are makeup, boration, and safety conducted of the surfaces in the stainless steel.

injection during design basis events. vicinity of the containment recirculation screens. The surfaces in the vicinity of the containment recirculation screens are the surfaces located above the bottom of the recirculation screens up to and including the bottom surface of the plate discussed in Table 2.2.3-4, item 8.c.vii, out at least 10 feet perpendicular to and at least 7 feet perpendicular to the side of the screen face.

199 2.2.03.08c.xiv 8.c) The PXS provides RCS xiv) Inspections will be xiv) These surfaces are made makeup, boration, and safety conducted of the exposed of stainless steel or titanium.

injection during design basis events. surfaces of the source range, intermediate range, and power range detectors.

200 2.2.03.08d 8.d) The PXS provides pH Inspections of the pH adjustment pH adjustment baskets exist, adjustment of water flooding the baskets will be conducted. with a total calculated volume containment following design basis 560 ft3.

accidents. The pH baskets are located below plant elevation 107 ft, 2 in.

201 2.2.03.09a.i 9.a) The PXS provides a function to i) A flow test and analysis for i) The calculated flow cool the outside of the reactor vessel each IRWST drain line to the resistance for each IRWST during a severe accident. containment will be conducted. drain line between the IRWST The test is initiated by opening and the containment is isolation valves in each line. 4.07 x 10-6 ft/gpm2.

Test fixtures may be used to simulate squib valves.

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Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 202 2.2.03.09a.ii 9.a) The PXS provides a function to ii) Inspections of the as-built ii) The combined total flow cool the outside of the reactor vessel reactor vessel insulation will be area of the water inlets is not during a severe accident. performed. less than 6 ft2. The combined total flow area of the steam outlet(s) is not less than 12 ft2.

A report exists and concludes that the minimum flow area between the vessel insulation and reactor vessel for the flow path that vents steam is not less than 12 ft2 considering the maximum deflection of the vessel insulation with a static pressure of 12.95 ft of water.

203 2.2.03.09a.iii 9.a) The PXS provides a function to iii) Inspections will be iii) A flow path with a flow cool the outside of the reactor vessel conducted of the flow path(s) area not less than 6 ft2 exists during a severe accident. from the loop compartments to from the loop compartment to the reactor vessel cavity. the reactor vessel cavity.

204 2.2.03.09b 9.b) The accumulator discharge An inspection of the accumulator The accumulator discharge check valves (PXS-PL-V028A/B and and CMT discharge check valves check valves are of a different V029A/B) are of a different check is performed. check valve type than the valve type than the CMT discharge CMT discharge check valves.

check valves (PXS-PL-V016A/B and V017A/B).

205 2.2.03.09c 9.c) The equipment listed in Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes Table 2.2.3-6 has sufficient thermal combination of type tests and that the thermal lag of this lag to withstand the effects of analyses will be performed to equipment is greater than the identified hydrogen burns associated determine the thermal lag of this value required.

with severe accidents. equipment.

206 2.2.03.10 10. Safety-related displays of the Inspection will be performed for Safety-related displays parameters identified in Table 2.2.3-1 the retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can can be retrieved in the MCR. related displays in the MCR. be retrieved in the MCR.

207 2.2.03.11a.i 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to i) Testing will be performed on i) Controls in the MCR cause the remotely operated valves the squib valves identified in operate to cause a signal at the identified in Table 2.2.3-1 to perform Table 2.2.3-1 using controls in squib valve electrical leads their active function(s). the MCR, without stroking the that is capable of actuating the valve. squib valve.

208 2.2.03.11a.ii 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to ii) Stroke testing will be ii) Controls in the MCR cause the remotely operated valves performed on remotely operated operate to cause remotely identified in Table 2.2.3-1 to perform valves other than squib valves operated valves other than their active function(s). identified in Table 2.2.3-1 using squib valves to perform their the controls in the MCR. active functions.

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Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 209 2.2.03.11b.i 11.b) The valves identified in i) Testing will be performed on i) Squib valves receive an Table 2.2.3-1 as having PMS control the squib valves identified in electrical signal at the valve perform their active function after Table 2.2.3-1 using real or electrical leads that is capable receiving a signal from the PMS. simulated signals into the PMS of actuating the valve after a without stroking the valve. signal is input to the PMS.

210 2.2.03.11b.ii 11.b) The valves identified in ii) Testing will be performed on ii) Remotely operated valves Table 2.2.3-1 as having PMS control the remotely operated valves other than squib valves perform their active function after other than squib valves identified perform the active function receiving a signal from the PMS. in Table 2.2.3-1 using real or identified in the table after a simulated signals into the PMS. signal is input to the PMS.

211 2.2.03.11b.iii 11.b) The valves identified in iii) Testing will be performed to iii) These valves open within Table 2.2.3-1 as having PMS control demonstrate that remotely 20 seconds after receipt of an perform their active function after operated PXS isolation valves actuation signal.

receiving a signal from the PMS. PXS-V014A/B, V015A/B, V108A/B open within the required response times.

212 2.2.03.11c.i 11.c) The valves identified in i) Testing will be performed on i) Squib valves receive an Table 2.2.3-1 as having DAS control the squib valves identified in electrical signal at the valve perform their active function after Table 2.2.3-1 using real or electrical leads that is capable receiving a signal from the DAS. simulated signals into the DAS of actuating the valve after a without stroking the valve. signal is input to the DAS.

213 2.2.03.11c.ii 11.c) The valves identified in ii) Testing will be performed on ii) Remotely operated valves Table 2.2.3-1 as having DAS control the remotely operated valves other than squib valves perform their active function after other than squib valves identified perform the active function receiving a signal from the DAS. in Table 2.2.3-1 using real or identified in Table 2.2.3-1 simulated signals into the DAS. after a signal is input to the DAS.

214 2.2.03.12a.i 12.a) The squib valves and check i) Tests or type tests of squib i) A test report exists and valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 valves will be performed that concludes that each squib perform an active safety-related demonstrate the capability of the valve changes position as function to change position as valve to operate under its design indicated in Table 2.2.3-1 indicated in the table. condition. under design conditions.

215 2.2.03.12a.ii 12.a) The squib valves and check ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built perform an active safety-related verifying that the as-built squib squib valves are bounded by function to change position as valves are bounded by the tests the tests or type tests.

indicated in the table. or type tests.

216 2.2.03.12a.iv 12.a) The squib valves and check iv) Exercise testing of the check iv) Each check valve changes valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 valves with active safety position as indicated in perform an active safety-related functions identified in Table 2.2.3-1 function to change position as Table 2.2.3-1 will be performed indicated in the table. under preoperational test pressure, temperature, and fluid flow conditions.

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Table 2.2.3-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 217 2.2.03.12b 12.b) After loss of motive power, the Testing of the remotely operated After loss of motive power, remotely operated valves identified valves will be performed under each remotely operated valve in Table 2.2.3-1 assume the indicated the conditions of loss of motive identified in Table 2.2.3-1 loss of motive power position. power. assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

218 2.2.03.13 13. Displays of the parameters Inspection will be performed for Displays identified in identified in Table 2.2.3-3 can be retrievability of the displays Table 2.2.3-3 can be retrieved retrieved in the MCR. identified in Table 2.2.3-3 in the in the MCR.

MCR.

Table 2.2.3-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat PXS-ME-01 Containment Building Exchanger (PRHR HX)

Accumulator Tank A PXS-MT-01A Containment Building Accumulator Tank B PXS-MT-01B Containment Building Core Makeup Tank (CMT) A PXS-MT-02A Containment Building CMT B PXS-MT-02B Containment Building IRWST PXS-MT-03 Containment Building IRWST Screen A PXS-MY-Y01A Containment Building IRWST Screen B PXS-MY-Y01B Containment Building IRWST Screen C PXS-MY-Y01C Containment Building Containment Recirculation Screen A PXS-MY-Y02A Containment Building Containment Recirculation Screen B PXS-MY-Y02B Containment Building pH Adjustment Basket 3A PXS-MY-Y03A Containment Building pH Adjustment Basket 3B PXS-MY-Y03B Containment Building pH Adjustment Basket 4A PXS-MY-Y04A Containment Building pH Adjustment Basket 4B PXS-MY-Y04B Containment Building C-147

Table 2.2.3-6 Equipment Tag No. Function Hot Leg Sample Isolation Valves PSS-PL-V001A/B Transfer open Liquid Sample Line Containment Isolation PSS-PL-V010A/B Transfer open Valves IRC Containment Pressure Sensors PCS-012, 013, 014 Sense pressure RCS Wide Range Pressure Sensors RCS-191A, B, C, D Sense pressure SG1 Wide Range Level Sensors SGS-011, 012, 015, 016 Sense level SG2 Wide Range Level Sensors SGS-013, 014, 017, 018 Sense level Hydrogen Monitors VLS-001, 002, 003 Sense concentration Hydrogen Igniters VLS-EH-01 through 64 Ignite hydrogen Containment Electrical Penetrations P01, P02, P03, P06, P09, Maintain containment P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, boundary P15, P16, P18, P21, P22, P23, P24, P25, P26, P27, P28, P29, P30, P31, P32 C-148

Figure 2.2.3-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Passive Core Cooling System C-149

Figure 2.2.3-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Passive Core Cooling System C-150

2.2.4 Steam Generator System Design Description The steam generator system (SGS) and portions of the main and startup feedwater system (FWS) transport and control feedwater from the condensate system to the steam generators during normal operation. The SGS and portions of the main steam system (MSS) and turbine system (MTS) transport and control steam from the steam generators to the turbine generator during normal operations. These systems also isolate the steam generators from the turbine generator and the condensate system during design basis accidents.

The SGS is as shown in Figure 2.2.4-1, sheets 1 and 2, and portions of the FWS, MSS, and MTS are as shown in Figure 2.2.4-1, sheet 3, and the locations of the components in these systems is as shown in Table 2.2.4-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the SGS and portions of the FWS, MSS, and MTS are as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.4.
2. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.4-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as designed for leak before break (LBB) meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.
7. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

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b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between SGS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

8. The SGS provides the following safety-related functions:

a) The SGS provides a heat sink for the reactor coolant system (RCS) and provides overpressure protection.

b) During design basis events, the SGS limits steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.

c) The SGS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the SGS lines penetrating the containment. The inside containment isolation function (isolating the RCS and containment atmosphere from the environment) is provided by the steam generator, tubes, and SGS lines inside containment while isolation outside containment is provided by manual and automatic valves.

9. The SGS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) Components within the main steam system, main and startup feedwater system, and the main turbine system identified in Table 2.2.4-3 provide backup isolation of the SGS to limit steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.

b) During shutdown operations, the SGS removes decay heat by delivery of startup feedwater to the steam generator and venting of steam from the steam generators to the atmosphere.

10. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
11. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from PMS.

12. a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

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Table 2.2.4-1 ASME Loss of Code Remotely Class 1E/ Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Qual. for Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Harsh Envir. Display PMS Function Position Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V030A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG01 Open/

Transfer Closed Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V030B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG02 Open/

Transfer Closed Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V031A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG01 Open/

Transfer Closed Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V031B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG02 Open/

Transfer Closed Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V032A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG01 Open/

Transfer Closed Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V032B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG02 Open/

Transfer Closed Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V033A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG01 Open/

Transfer Closed C-153

Table 2.2.4-1 ASME Loss of Code Remotely Class 1E/ Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Qual. for Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Harsh Envir. Display PMS Function Position Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V033B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG02 Open/

Transfer Closed Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V034A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG01 Open/

Transfer Closed Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V034B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG02 Open/

Transfer Closed Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V035A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG01 Open/

Transfer Closed Main Steam Safety SGS-PL-V035B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer -

Valve SG02 Open/

Transfer Closed Power-operated SGS-PL-V027A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer As Is Relief Valve Block Position) Closed Motor-operated Valve Steam Generator 01 Power-operated SGS-PL-V027B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer As Is Relief Valve Block Position) Closed Motor-operated Valve Steam Generator 02 Steam Line SGS-PL-V036A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Condensate Drain Position) Closed Isolation Valve C-154

Table 2.2.4-1 ASME Loss of Code Remotely Class 1E/ Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Qual. for Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Harsh Envir. Display PMS Function Position Steam Line SGS-PL-V036B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Condensate Drain Position) Closed Isolation Valve Main Steam Line SGS-PL-V040A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer As Is Isolation Valve Position) Closed Main Steam Line SGS-PL-V040B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer As Is Isolation Valve Position) Closed Steam Line SGS-PL-V086A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No Yes Transfer Closed Condensate Drain Closed Control Valve Steam Line SGS-PL-V086B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No Yes Transfer Closed Condensate Drain Closed Control Valve Main Feedwater SGS-PL-V057A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer As Is Isolation Valve Position) Closed Main Feedwater SGS-PL-V057B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer As Is Isolation Valve Position) Closed Startup Feedwater SGS-PL-V067A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer As Is Isolation Motor- Position) Closed operated Valve Startup Feedwater SGS-PL-V067B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer As Is Isolation Motor- Position) Closed operated Valve Steam Generator SGS-PL-V074A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Blowdown Isolation Position) Closed Valve C-155

Table 2.2.4-1 ASME Loss of Code Remotely Class 1E/ Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Qual. for Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Harsh Envir. Display PMS Function Position Steam Generator SGS-PL-V074B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Blowdown Isolation Position) Closed Valve Steam Generator SGS-PL-V075A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No Yes Transfer Closed Blowdown Isolation Closed Valve Steam Generator SGS-PL-V075B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No Yes Transfer Closed Blowdown Isolation Closed Valve Power-operated SGS-PL-V233A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Relief Valve Position) Closed Power-operated SGS-PL-V233B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Relief Valve Position) Closed Main Steam SGS-PL-V240A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Isolation Valve Position) Closed Bypass Isolation Main Steam SGS-PL-V240B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Isolation Valve Position) Closed Bypass Isolation Main Feedwater SGS-PL-V250A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Control Valve Position) Closed Main Feedwater SGS-PL-V250B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Control Valve Position) Closed Startup Feedwater SGS-PL-V255A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Control Valve Position) Closed C-156

Table 2.2.4-1 ASME Loss of Code Remotely Class 1E/ Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Qual. for Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Harsh Envir. Display PMS Function Position Startup Feedwater SGS-PL-V255B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Yes Transfer Closed Control Valve Position) Closed Steam Generator 1 SGS-001 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Narrow Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 1 SGS-002 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Narrow Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 1 SGS-003 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Narrow Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 1 SGS-004 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Narrow Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 2 SGS-005 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Narrow Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 2 SGS-006 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Narrow Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 2 SGS-007 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Narrow Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 2 SGS-008 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Narrow Range Level Sensor C-157

Table 2.2.4-1 ASME Loss of Code Remotely Class 1E/ Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Qual. for Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Harsh Envir. Display PMS Function Position Steam Generator 1 SGS-011 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Wide Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 1 SGS-012 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Wide Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 2 SGS-013 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Wide Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 2 SGS-014 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Wide Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 1 SGS-015 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Wide Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 1 SGS-016 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Wide Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 2 SGS-017 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Wide Range Level Sensor Steam Generator 2 SGS-018 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Wide Range Level Sensor Main Steam Line SGS-030 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Steam Generator 1 Pressure Sensor C-158

Table 2.2.4-1 ASME Loss of Code Remotely Class 1E/ Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Qual. for Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Harsh Envir. Display PMS Function Position Main Steam Line SGS-031 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Steam Generator 1 Pressure Sensor Main Steam Line SGS-032 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Steam Generator 1 Pressure Sensor Main Steam Line SGS-033 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Steam Generator 1 Pressure Sensor Main Steam Line SGS-034 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Steam Generator 2 Pressure Sensor Main Steam Line SGS-035 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Steam Generator 2 Pressure Sensor Main Steam Line SGS-036 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

Steam Generator 2 Pressure Sensor Main Steam Line SGS-037 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Steam Generator 2 Pressure Sensor Steam Generator 1 SGS-55A No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Startup Feedwater Flow Sensor Steam Generator 1 SGS-55B No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Startup Feedwater Flow Sensor C-159

Table 2.2.4-1 ASME Loss of Code Remotely Class 1E/ Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Qual. for Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Harsh Envir. Display PMS Function Position Steam Generator 2 SGS-56A No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Startup Feedwater Flow Sensor Steam Generator 2 SGS-56B No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Startup Feedwater Flow Sensor Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.2.4-2 Functional ASME Code Leak Before Capability Line Name Line Number Section III Break Required Main Feedwater Line SGS-PL-L002A, L002B Yes No No Main Feedwater Line SGS-PL-L003A, L003B Yes No No Startup Feedwater Line SGS-PL-L004A, L004B Yes No No Startup Feedwater Line SGS-PL-L005A, L005B Yes No No Main Steam Line (within containment) SGS-PL-L006A, L006B Yes Yes Yes Main Steam Line (outside of SGS-PL-L006A, L006B Yes No Yes containment)

Main Steam Line SGS-PL-L007A, L007B Yes No No Safety Valve Inlet Line SGS-PL-L015A, L015B, Yes No Yes L015C, L015D, L015E, L015F, L015G, L015H, L015J, L015K, L015L, L015M Safety Valve Discharge Line SGS-PL-L018A, L018B, Yes No Yes L018C, L018D, L018E, L018F, L018G, L018H, L018J, L018K, L018L, L018M Power-operated Relief Block Valve Inlet SGS-PL-L024A, L024B Yes No No Line Power-operated Relief Valve Inlet Line SGS-PL-L014A, L014B Yes No No Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Inlet SGS-PL-L022A, L022B Yes No No Line Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass SGS-PL-L023A, L023B Yes No No Outlet Line C-161

Table 2.2.4-2 Functional ASME Code Leak Before Capability Line Name Line Number Section III Break Required Main Steam Condensate Drain Line SGS-PL-L021A, L021B Yes No No Steam Generator Blowdown Line SGS-PL-L009A, L009B Yes No No Steam Generator Blowdown Line SGS-PL-L027A, L027B Yes No No Steam Generator Blowdown Line SGS-PL-L010A, L010B Yes No No Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.2.4-3 Equipment Name Tag No. Control Function Turbine Stop Valve MTS-PL-V001A Close Turbine Stop Valve MTS-PL-V001B Close Turbine Control Valve MTS-PL-V002A Close Turbine Control Valve MTS-PL-V002B Close Turbine Stop Valve MTS-PL-V003A Close Turbine Stop Valve MTS-PL-V003B Close Turbine Control Valve MTS-PL-V004A Close Turbine Control Valve MTS-PL-V004B Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V001 Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V002 Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V003 Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V004 Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V005 Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V006 Close Moisture Separator Reheater 2nd Stage Steam Isolation Valve MSS-PL-V015A Close Moisture Separator Reheater 2nd Stage Steam Isolation Valve MSS-PL-V015B Close Main Feedwater Pump FWS-MP-02A Trip Main Feedwater Pump FWS-MP-02B Trip Main Feedwater Pump FWS-MP-02C Trip Startup Feedwater Pump FWS-MP-03A Trip Startup Feedwater Pump FWS-MP-03B Trip C-163

Table 2.2.4-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 219 2.2.04.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built SGS and portions SGS and portions of the FWS, MSS, will be performed. of the FWS, MSS, and MTS and MTS are as described in the Design conform with the functional Description of this Section 2.2.4. arrangement as defined in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.4.

220 2.2.04.02a 2.a) The components identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section the as-built components as design reports exist for the III are designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design as-built components identified accordance with ASME Code Section reports. in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME III requirements. Code Section III.

221 2.2.04.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section the as-built piping as design reports exist for the as-III is designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design built piping identified in accordance with ASME Code Section reports. Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code III requirements. Section III.

222 2.2.04.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code as ASME Code Section III meet ASME performed in accordance with Section III requirements are Code Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

223 2.2.04.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Code Section III meet ASME Code performed in accordance with Section III requirements are Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

224 2.2.04.04a 4.a) The components identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section performed on the components that the results of the III retain their pressure boundary required by the ASME Code hydrostatic test of the integrity at their design pressure. Section III to be hydrostatically components identified in tested. Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

225 2.2.04.04b 4.b) The piping identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section performed on the piping required that the results of the III retains its pressure boundary by the ASME Code Section III to hydrostatic test of the piping integrity at its design pressure. be hydrostatically tested. identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

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Table 2.2.4-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 226 2.2.04.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand to verify that the seismic equipment identified in seismic design basis loads without loss Category I equipment identified Table 2.2.4-1 is located on the of safety function. in Table 2.2.4-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Nuclear Island.

227 2.2.04.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis loads without loss analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

228 2.2.04.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built seismic design basis loads without loss verifying that the as-built equipment including of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

229 2.2.04.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Inspection will be performed for A report exists and concludes Table 2.2.4-2 for which functional the existence of a report that each of the as-built lines capability is required is designed to concluding that the as-built identified in Table 2.2.4-2 for withstand combined normal and seismic piping meets the requirements which functional capability is design basis loads without a loss of its for functional capability. required meets the functional capability. requirements for functional capability.

230 2.2.04.06 6. Each of the as-built lines identified Inspection will be performed for An LBB evaluation report in Table 2.2.4-2 as designed for LBB the existence of an LBB exists and concludes that the meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation evaluation report or an LBB acceptance criteria are is performed of the protection from the evaluation report on the met by the as-built RCS dynamic effects of a rupture of the line. protection from effects of a pipe piping and piping materials, or break. Section 3.3, Nuclear a pipe break evaluation report Island Buildings, contains the exists and concludes that design descriptions and protection from the dynamic inspections, tests, analyses, and effects of a line break is acceptance criteria for protection provided.

from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.

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Table 2.2.4-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 231 2.2.04.07a.i 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified i) Type tests, analyses, or a i) A report exists and in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a combination of type tests and concludes that the Class 1E harsh environment can withstand the analyses will be performed on equipment identified in Table environmental conditions that would Class 1E equipment located in a 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a exist before, during, and following a harsh environment. harsh environment can design basis accident without loss of withstand the environmental safety function for the time required to conditions that would exist perform the safety function. before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

232 2.2.04.07a.ii 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a of the as-built Class 1E concludes that the as-built harsh environment can withstand the equipment and the associated Class 1E equipment and the environmental conditions that would wiring, cables, and terminations associated wiring, cables, and exist before, during, and following a located in a harsh environment. terminations identified in design basis accident without loss of Table 2.2.4-1 as being safety function for the time required to qualified for a harsh perform the safety function. environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

233 2.2.04.07b 7.b) The Class 1E components Testing will be performed by A simulated test signal exists identified in Table 2.2.4-1 are powered providing a simulated test signal at the Class 1E equipment from their respective Class 1E division. in each Class 1E division. identified in Table 2.2.4-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

234 2.2.04.07c 7.c) Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item SGS Class 1E divisions, and between 7.d. 7.d.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

235 2.2.04.08a.i 8.a) The SGS provides a heat sink for i) Inspections will be conducted i) The sum of the rated the RCS and provides overpressure to confirm that the value of the capacities recorded on the protection in accordance with Section vendor code plate rating of the valve vendor code plates of III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure steam generator safety valves is the steam generator safety Vessel Code. greater than or equal to system valves exceeds 8,240,000 lb/hr relief requirements. per steam generator.

236 2.2.04.08a.ii 8.a) The SGS provides a heat sink for ii) Testing and analyses in ii) A report exists to indicate the RCS and provides overpressure accordance with ASME Code the set pressure of the valves protection in accordance with Section Section III will be performed to is less than 1305 psig.

III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure determine set pressure.

Vessel Code.

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Table 2.2.4-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 237 2.2.04.08b.i 8.b) During design basis events, the i) Testing will be performed to See item 11 in this table.

SGS limits steam generator blowdown confirm isolation of the main and feedwater flow to the steam feedwater, startup feedwater, generator. blowdown, and main steam lines. See item 11 in this table.

238 2.2.04.08b.ii 8.b) During design basis events, the ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists to indicate SGS limits steam generator blowdown for the existence of a report the installed flow limiting and feedwater flow to the steam confirming that the area of the orifice within the SG main generator. flow limiting orifice within the steam line discharge nozzle SG main steam outlet nozzle will does not exceed 1.4 sq. ft.

limit releases to the containment.

239 2.2.04.08c 8.c) The SGS preserves containment See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, integrity by isolation of the SGS lines item 7. item 7.

penetrating the containment.

240 2.2.04.09a.i 9.a) Components within the main i) Testing will be performed to i) The valves identified in steam system, main and startup confirm closure of the valves Table 2.2.4-3 close after a feedwater system, and the main turbine identified in Table 2.2.4-3. signal is generated by the system identified in Table 2.2.4-3 PMS.

provide backup isolation of the SGS to limit steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.

241 2.2.04.09a.ii 9.a) Components within the main ii) Testing will be performed to ii) The pumps identified in steam system, main and startup confirm the trip of the pumps Table 2.2.4-3 trip after a signal feedwater system, and the main turbine identified in Table 2.2.4-3. is generated by the PMS.

system identified in Table 2.2.4-3 provide backup isolation of the SGS to limit steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.

242 2.2.04.09b.i 9.b) During shutdown operations, the i) Tests will be performed to i) See ITAAC Table 2.4.1-2, SGS removes decay heat by delivery of demonstrate the ability of the Item 2.

startup feedwater to the steam generator startup feedwater system to and venting of steam from the steam provide feedwater to the steam generators to the atmosphere. generators.

243 2.2.04.09b.ii 9.b) During shutdown operations, the ii) Type tests and/or analyses ii) A report exists and SGS removes decay heat by delivery of will be performed to demonstrate concludes that each power-startup feedwater to the steam generator the ability of the power-operated operated relief valve will and venting of steam from the steam relief valves to discharge steam relieve greater than 300,000 generators to the atmosphere. from the steam generators to the lb/hr at 1106 psia +/-10 psi.

atmosphere.

244 2.2.04.10 10. Safety-related displays identified in Inspection will be performed for Safety-related displays Table 2.2.4-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can MCR. related displays in the MCR. be retrieved in the MCR.

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Table 2.2.4-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 245 2.2.04.11a 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to Stroke testing will be performed Controls in the MCR operate cause the remotely operated valves on the remotely operated valves to cause the remotely operated identified in Table 2.2.4-1 to perform listed in Table 2.2.4-1 using valves to perform active safety active functions. controls in the MCR. functions.

246 2.2.04.11b.i 11.b) The valves identified in Table i) Testing will be performed on i) The remotely-operated 2.2.4-1 as having PMS control perform the remotely operated valves valves identified in Table an active safety function after receiving listed in Table 2.2.4-1 using real 2.2.4-1 as having PMS control a signal from PMS. or simulated signals into the perform the active function PMS. identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

247 2.2.04.11b.ii 11.b) The valves identified in Table ii) Testing will be performed to ii) These valves close within 2.2.4-1 as having PMS control perform demonstrate that remotely the following times after an active safety function after receiving operated SGS isolation valves receipt of an actuation signal:

a signal from PMS. SGS-V027A/B, V040A/B, V027A/B < 44sec V057A/B, V250A/B close V040A/B, V057A/B < 5 sec within the required response V250A/B < 5 sec times.

248 2.2.04.12a.i 12.a) The motor-operated valves i) Tests or type tests of motor- i) A test report exists and identified in Table 2.2.4-1 perform an operated valves will be concludes that each motor-active safety-related function to change performed to demonstrate the operated valve changes position as indicated in the table. capability of the valve to operate position as indicated in Table under its design conditions. 2.2.4-1 under design conditions.

249 2.2.04.12a.ii 12.a) The motor-operated valves ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.2.4-1 perform an for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built active safety-related function to change verifying that the as-built motor- motor-operated valves are position as indicated in the table. operated valves are bounded by bounded by the tests or type the tests or type tests. tests.

250 2.2.04.12a.iii 12.a) The motor-operated valves iii) Tests of the motor-operated iii) Each motor-operated valve identified in Table 2.2.4-1 perform an valves will be performed under changes position as indicated active safety-related function to change pre-operational flow, differential in Table 2.2.4-1 under pre-position as indicated in the table. pressure, and temperature operational test conditions.

conditions.

251 2.2.04.12b 12.b) After loss of motive power, the Testing of the remotely operated After loss of motive power, remotely operated valves identified in valves will be performed under each remotely operated valve Table 2.2.4-1 assume the indicated loss the conditions of loss of motive identified in Table 2.2.4-1 of motive power position. power. assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

Motive power to SGS-PL-V040A/B and SGS-PL-V057A/B is electric power to the actuator from plant services.

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Table 2.2.4-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Main Steam Line Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V040A Auxiliary Building Main Steam Line Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V040B Auxiliary Building Main Feedwater Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V057A Auxiliary Building Main Feedwater Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V057B Auxiliary Building Main Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V250A Auxiliary Building Main Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V250B Auxiliary Building Turbine Stop Valves MTS-PL-V001A Turbine Building MTS-PL-V001B MTS-PL-V003A MTS-PL-V003B Turbine Control Valves MTS-PL-V002A Turbine Building MTS-PL-V002B MTS-PL-V004A MTS-PL-V004B Main Feedwater Pumps FWS-MP-02A Turbine Building FWS-MP-02B FWS-MP-02C Feedwater Booster Pumps FWS-MP-01A Turbine Building FWS-MP-01B FWS-MP-01C C-169

Figure 2.2.4-1 (Sheet 1 of 3)

Steam Generator System C-170

Figure 2.2.4-1 (Sheet 2 of 3)

Steam Generator System C-171

Figure 2.2.4-1 (Sheet 3 of 3)

Steam Generator System C-172

2.2.5 Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System Design Description The main control room emergency habitability system (VES) provides a supply of breathable air for the main control room (MCR) occupants and maintains the MCR at a positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas whenever ac power is not available to operate the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) or high radioactivity is detected in the MCR air supply. (See Section 3.5 for Radiation Monitoring). The VES also limits the heatup of the MCR, the 1E instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment rooms, and the Class 1E dc equipment rooms by using the heat capacity of surrounding structures.

The VES is as shown in Figure 2.2.5-1 and the component locations of the VES are as shown in Table 2.2.5-6.

1. The functional arrangement of the VES is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.5.
2. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.5-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

b) Separation is provided between VES Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

7. The VES provides the following safety-related functions:

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a) The VES provides a 72-hour supply of breathable quality air for the occupants of the MCR.

b) The VES maintains the MCR pressure boundary at a positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas. There is a discharge of air through the MCR vestibule.

c) The heat loads within the MCR, the I&C equipment rooms, and the Class 1E dc equipment rooms are within design basis assumptions to limit the heatup of the rooms identified in Table 2.2.5-4.

d) The system provides a passive recirculation flow of MCR air to maintain main control room dose rates below an acceptable level during VES operation.

e) The system provides shielding below the VES filter that is sufficient to ensure main control room doses are below an acceptable level during VES operation.

8. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.
9. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 to perform their active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

10. After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.
11. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.2.5-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.
12. The background noise level in the MCR does not exceed 65 dB(A) at the operator workstations when the VES is operating.

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Table 2.2.5-1 Class 1E/ Loss of ASME Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-01 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 01 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-02 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 02 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-03 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 03 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-04 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 04 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-05 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 05 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-06 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 06 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-07 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 07 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-08 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 08 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-09 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 09 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-10 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 10 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-11 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 11 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-12 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 12 C-175

Table 2.2.5-1 Class 1E/ Loss of ASME Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-13 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 13 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-14 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 14 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-15 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 15 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-16 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 16 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-17 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 17 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-18 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 18 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-19 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 19 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-20 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 20 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-21 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 21 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-22 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 22 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-23 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 23 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-24 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 24 C-176

Table 2.2.5-1 Class 1E/ Loss of ASME Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-25 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 25 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-26 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 26 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-27 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 27 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-28 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 28 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-29 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 29 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-30 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 30 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-31 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 31 Emergency Air Storage VES-MT-32 No Yes - -/- - - - -

Tank 32 Air Delivery Alternate VES-PL-V001 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Isolation Valve Open Eductor Flow Path VES-PL-V045 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Isolation Valve Close Eductor Bypass Isolation VES-PL-V046 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Valve Open Pressure Regulating VES-PL-V002A Yes Yes No -/- No - Throttle -

Valve A Flow C-177

Table 2.2.5-1 Class 1E/ Loss of ASME Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position Pressure Regulating VES-PL-V002B Yes Yes No -/- No - Throttle -

Valve B Flow MCR Air Delivery VES-PL-V005A Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No Yes Transfer Open Isolation Valve A Open MCR Air Delivery VES-PL-V005B Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No Yes Transfer Open Isolation Valve B Open Temporary Instrument VES-PL-V018 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer -

Isolation Valve A Open Temporary Instrument VES-PL-V019 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer -

Isolation Valve B Open MCR Pressure Relief VES-PL-V022A Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No Yes Transfer Open Isolation Valve A Open MCR Pressure Relief VES-PL-V022B Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No Yes Transfer Open Isolation Valve B Open Air Tank Safety Relief VES-PL-V040A Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Valve A Open Air Tank Safety Relief VES-PL-V040B Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Valve B Open Air Tank Safety Relief VES-PL-V040C Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Valve C Open Air Tank Safety Relief VES-PL-V040D Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Valve D Open Main Air Flow Path VES-PL-V044 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Isolation Valve Close C-178

Table 2.2.5-1 Class 1E/ Loss of ASME Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position MCR Air Filtration Line VES-PY-N01 Yes Yes - - - - - -

Eductor MCR Air Filtration Line VES-MY-F01 No Yes - - - - - -

Charcoal Filter MCR Air Filtration Line VES-MY-F02 No Yes - - - - - -

HEPA Filter MCR Air Filtration Line VES-MY-F03 No Yes - - - - - -

Postfilter MCR Filter Shielding 12401-NS-01 No Yes - - - - - -

MCR Gravity Relief VES-MD-D001A No Yes - - - - - -

Dampers MCR Gravity Relief VES-MD-D001B No Yes - - - - - -

Dampers MCR Air Filtration Line VES-MD-D002 No Yes - - - - - -

Supply Damper MCR Air Filtration Line VES-MD-D003 No Yes - - - - - -

Supply Damper MCR Air Filtration Line VES-MY-Y01 No Yes - - - - - -

Silencer MCR Air Filtration Line VES-MY-Y02 No Yes - - - - - -

Silencer MCR Air Delivery Line VES-003A No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Flow Sensor C-179

Table 2.2.5-1 Class 1E/ Loss of ASME Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position MCR Air Delivery Line VES-003B No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Flow Sensor MCR Differential VES-004A No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Pressure Sensor A MCR Differential VES-004B No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Pressure Sensor B Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.2.5-2 ASME Code Functional Capability Line Name Line Number Section III Required MCR Relief Line VES-PL-022A Yes Yes MCR Relief Line VES-PL-022B Yes Yes Table 2.2.5-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Air Storage Tank Pressure VES-001A Yes Air Storage Tank Pressure VES-001B Yes Table 2.2.5-4 Heat Load 0 to 24 Hours Heat Load 24 to 72 Hours Room Name Room Numbers (Btu/s) (Btu/s)

MCR Envelope 12401 26.1 (hour 0 through 0.5) 2.9 15.6 (hour 0.5 through 3.5) 5.8 (hour 3.5 through 24)

I&C Rooms 12301, 12305 8.8 0 I&C Rooms 12302, 12304 13.0 4.2 dc Equipment Rooms 12201, 12205 3.7 (hour 0 through 1) 0 2.4 (hour 2 through 24) dc Equipment Rooms 12203, 12207 5.8 (hour 0 through 1) 2.0 4.5 (hour 2 through 24)

Table 2.2.5-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 252 2.2.05.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built VES conforms VES is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.2.5. arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.5.

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Table 2.2.5-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 253 2.2.05.02a 2.a) The components identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section the as-built components as design reports exist for the as-III are designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design built components identified in accordance with ASME Code Section reports. Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code III requirements. Section III.

254 2.2.05.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section the as-built piping as design reports exist for the as-III is designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design built piping identified in accordance with ASME Code Section reports. Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code III requirements. Section III.

255 2.2.05.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Section as ASME Code Section III meet ASME performed in accordance with III requirements are met for Code Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

256 2.2.05.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Section Code Section III meet ASME Code performed in accordance with III requirements are met for Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

257 2.2.05.04a 4.a) The components identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section performed on the components that the results of the III retain their pressure boundary required by the ASME Code hydrostatic test of the integrity at their design pressure. Section III to be hydrostatically components identified in tested. Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

258 2.2.05.04b 4.b) The piping identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section performed on the piping required that the results of the III retains its pressure boundary by the ASME Code Section III to hydrostatic test of the piping integrity at its design pressure. be hydrostatically tested. identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

259 2.2.05.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand to verify that the seismic equipment identified in seismic design basis loads without loss Category I equipment and valves Table 2.2.5-1 is located on the of safety function. identified in Table 2.2.5-1 are Nuclear Island.

located on the Nuclear Island.

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Table 2.2.5-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 260 2.2.05.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis loads without loss analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

261 2.2.05.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built seismic design basis loads without loss verifying that the as-built equipment including of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

262 2.2.05.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Inspection will be performed for A report exists and concludes Table 2.2.5-2 for which functional the existence of a report that each of the as-built lines capability is required is designed to verifying that the as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 for withstand combined normal and seismic meets the requirements for which functional capability is design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability. required meets the functional capability. requirements for functional capability.

263 2.2.05.06a 6.a) The Class 1E components Testing will be performed by A simulated test signal exists identified in Table 2.2.5-1 are powered providing a simulated test signal at the Class 1E equipment from their respective Class 1E division. in each Class 1E division. identified in Table 2.2.5-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

264 2.2.05.06b 6.b) Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, VES Class 1E divisions, and between item 7.d. item 7.d.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

265 2.2.05.07a.i 7.a) The VES provides a 72-hour i) Testing will be performed to i) The air flow rate from the supply of breathable quality air for the confirm that the required amount VES is at least 60 scfm and occupants of the MCR. of air flow is delivered to the not more than 70 scfm.

MCR.

266 2.2.05.07a.ii 7.a) The VES provides a 72-hour ii) Analysis of storage capacity ii) The calculated storage supply of breathable quality air for the will be performed based on capacity is greater than or occupants of the MCR. manufacturers data. equal to 327,574 scf.

267 2.2.05.07a.iii 7.a) The VES provides a 72-hour iii) MCR air samples will be iii) The MCR air is of supply of breathable quality air for the taken during VES testing and breathable quality.

occupants of the MCR. analyzed for quality.

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Table 2.2.5-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 268 2.2.05.07b.i 7.b) The VES maintains the MCR i) Testing will be performed i) The MCR pressure pressure boundary at a positive pressure with VES flow rate between 60 boundary is pressurized to with respect to the surrounding areas. and 70 scfm to confirm that the greater than or equal to 1/8-in.

MCR is capable of maintaining water gauge with respect to the required pressurization of the the surrounding area.

pressure boundary.

269 2.2.05.07b.ii 7.b) The VES maintains the MCR ii) Air leakage into the MCR ii) Air leakage into the MCR pressure boundary at a positive pressure will be measured during VES is less than or equal to 10 cfm.

with respect to the surrounding areas. testing using a tracer gas.

270 2.2.05.07c 7.c) The heat loads within the MCR, An analysis will be performed to A report exists and concludes the I&C equipment rooms, and the determine that the heat loads that: the heat loads within Class 1E dc equipment rooms are from as-built equipment within rooms identified in Table within design basis assumptions to limit the rooms identified in 2.2.5-4 are less than or equal the heatup of the rooms identified in Table 2.2.5-4 are less than or to the specified values or that Table 2.2.5-4. equal to the design basis an analysis report exists that assumptions. concludes:

- The temperature and humidity in the MCR remain within limits for reliable human performance for the 72-hour period.

- The maximum temperature for the 72-hour period for the I&C rooms is less than or equal to 120°F.

- The maximum temperature for the 72-hour period for the Class 1E dc equipment rooms is less than or equal to 120°F.

271 2.2.05.07d 7d) The system provides a passive Testing will be performed to The air flow rate at the outlet recirculation flow of MCR air to confirm that the required amount of the MCR passive filtration maintain main control room dose rates of air flow circulates through the system is at least 600 cfm below an acceptable level during VES MCR passive filtration system, greater than the flow operation. measured by VES-003A/B.

272 C.2.2.05.07e 7e) Shielding below the VES Filter is Inspection will be performed for A report exists and concludes capable of providing attenuation that is the existence of a report that the as-built shielding sufficient to ensure main control room verifying that the as-built identified in Table 2.2.5-1 doses are below an acceptable level shielding meets the requirements meets the functional during VES operation. for functional capability. requirements and exists below the filtration unit, and within its vertical projection.

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Table 2.2.5-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 273 2.2.05.08 8. Safety-related displays identified in Inspection will be performed for Safety-related displays Table 2.2.5-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can MCR. related displays in the MCR. be retrieved in the MCR.

274 2.2.05.09a 9.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause Stroke testing will be performed Controls in the MCR operate remotely operated valves identified in on remotely operated valves to cause remotely operated Table 2.2.5-1 to perform their active identified in Table 2.2.5-1 using valves identified in Table functions. the controls in the MCR. 2.2.5-1 to perform their active safety functions.

275 2.2.05.09b 9.b) The valves identified in Testing will be performed on The remotely operated valves Table 2.2.5-1 as having PMS control remotely operated valves listed identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as perform their active safety function in Table 2.2.5-1 using real or having PMS control perform after receiving a signal from the PMS. simulated signals into the PMS. the active safety function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

276 2.2.05.10 10. After loss of motive power, the Testing of the remotely operated After loss of motive power, remotely operated valves identified in valves will be performed under each remotely operated valve Table 2.2.5-1 assume the indicated loss the conditions of loss of motive identified in Table 2.2.5-1 of motive power position. power. assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

277 2.2.05.11 11. Displays of the parameters Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in identified in Table 2.2.5-3 can be retrievability of the parameters Table 2.2.5-3 can be retrieved retrieved in the MCR. in the MCR. in the MCR.

278 2.2.05.12 12. The background noise level in the The as-built VES will be The background noise level in MCR does not exceed 65 dB(A) at the operated, and background noise the MCR does not exceed 65 operator workstations when VES is levels in the MRC will be dB(A) at the operator work operating. measured at the operator work stations when the VES is stations with the plant not operating.

operating.

Table 2.2.5-6 Component Name Tag Number Component Location Emergency Air Storage Tank 01 VES-MT-01 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 02 VES-MT-02 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 03 VES-MT-03 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 04 VES-MT-04 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 05 VES-MT-05 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 06 VES-MT-06 Auxiliary Building C-185

Table 2.2.5-6 Component Name Tag Number Component Location Emergency Air Storage Tank 07 VES-MT-07 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 08 VES-MT-08 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 09 VES-MT-09 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 10 VES-MT-10 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 11 VES-MT-11 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 12 VES-MT-12 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 13 VES-MT-13 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 14 VES-MT-14 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 15 VES-MT-15 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 16 VES-MT-16 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 17 VES-MT-17 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 18 VES-MT-18 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 19 VES-MT-19 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 20 VES-MT-20 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 21 VES-MT-21 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 22 VES-MT-22 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 23 VES-MT-23 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 24 VES-MT-24 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 25 VES-MT-25 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 26 VES-MT-26 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 27 VES-MT-27 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 28 VES-MT-28 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 29 VES-MT-29 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 30 VES-MT-30 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 31 VES-MT-31 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 32 VES-MT-32 Auxiliary Building C-186

Figure 2.2.5-1 Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System C-187

2.3 Auxiliary Systems 2.3.1 Component Cooling Water System Design Description The component cooling water system (CCS) removes heat from various plant components and transfers this heat to the service water system (SWS) during normal modes of plant operation including power generation, shutdown and refueling. The CCS has two pumps and two heat exchangers.

The CCS is as shown in Figure 2.3.1-1 and the CCS component locations are as shown in Table 2.3.1-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the CCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.1.
2. The CCS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CCS lines penetrating the containment.
3. The CCS provides the nonsafety-related functions of transferring heat from the normal residual heat removal system (RNS) during shutdown and the spent fuel pool cooling system during all modes of operation to the SWS.
4. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.1-1 to perform the listed functions.
5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

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Table 2.3.1-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function CCS Pump A CCS-MP-01A Yes Start (Run Status)

CCS Pump B CCS-MP-01B Yes Start (Run Status)

CCS Discharge Header Flow Sensor CCS-101 Yes -

CCS to Normal Residual Heat Removal CCS-301 Yes -

System Heat Exchanger (RNS HX) A Flow Sensor CCS to RNS HX B Flow Sensor CCS-302 Yes -

CCS to Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System CCS-341 Yes -

(SFS) HX A Flow Sensor CCS to SFS HX B Flow Sensor CCS-342 Yes -

CCS Surge Tank Level Sensor A CCS-130 Yes -

CCS Surge Tank Level Sensor B CCS-131 Yes -

CCS Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature CCS-121 Yes -

Sensor CCS Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature CCS-122 Yes -

Sensor CCS Flow to Reactor Coolant Pump CCS-PL-V256A Yes -

(RCP) 1A Valve (Position Indicator)

CCS Flow to RCP 1B Valve (Position CCS-PL-V256B Yes -

Indicator)

CCS Flow to RCP 2A Valve (Position CCS-PL-V256C Yes -

Indicator)

CCS Flow to RCP 2B Valve (Position CCS-PL-V256D Yes -

Indicator)

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.3.1-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 279 2.3.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built CCS conforms CCS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.1. arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.1.

280 2.3.01.02 2. The CCS preserves containment See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, integrity by isolation of the CCS lines items 1 and 7. items 1 and 7.

penetrating the containment.

281 2.3.01.03.i 3. The CCS provides the nonsafety- i) Inspection will be performed i) A report exists and related functions of transferring heat for the existence of a report that concludes that the UA of each from the RNS during shutdown and the determines the heat transfer CCS heat exchanger is greater spent fuel pool cooling system during capability of the CCS heat than or equal to 14.0 million all modes of operation to the SWS. exchangers. Btu/hr-°F.

282 2.3.01.03.ii 3. The CCS provides the nonsafety- ii) Testing will be performed to ii) Each pump of the CCS can related functions of transferring heat confirm that the CCS can provide at least 2685 gpm of from the RNS during shutdown and the provide cooling water to the cooling water to one RNS HX spent fuel pool cooling system during RNS HXs while providing and at least 1200 gpm of all modes of operation to the SWS. cooling water to the SFS HXs. cooling water to one SFS HX while providing at least 4415 gpm to other users of cooling water.

283 2.3.01.04 4. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed to Controls in the MCR operate the pumps identified in Table 2.3.1-1 to actuate the pumps identified in to cause pumps listed in perform the listed functions. Table 2.3.1-1 using controls in Table 2.3.1-1 to perform the the MCR. listed functions.

284 2.3.01.05 5. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for Displays identified in Table in Table 2.3.1-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the parameters 2.3.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. in the MCR. MCR.

Table 2.3.1-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location CCS Pump A CCS-MP-01A Turbine Building CCS Pump B CCS-MP-01B Turbine Building CCS Heat Exchanger A CCS-ME-01A Turbine Building CCS Heat Exchanger B CCS-ME-01B Turbine Building C-190

Figure 2.3.1-1 Component Cooling Water System C-191

2.3.2 Chemical and Volume Control System Design Description The chemical and volume control system (CVS) provides reactor coolant system (RCS) purification, RCS inventory control and makeup, chemical shim and chemical control, oxygen control, and auxiliary pressurizer spray. The CVS performs these functions during normal modes of operation including power generation and shutdown.

The CVS is as shown in Figure 2.3.2-1 and the component locations of the CVS are as shown in Table 2.3.2-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the CVS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.2.
2. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
6. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between CVS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

7. The CVS provides the following safety-related functions:

a) The CVS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CVS lines penetrating the containment.

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b) The CVS provides termination of an inadvertent RCS boron dilution by isolating demineralized water from the RCS.

c) The CVS provides isolation of makeup to the RCS.

8. The CVS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The CVS provides makeup water to the RCS.

b) The CVS provides the pressurizer auxiliary spray.

9. Safety-related displays in Table 2.3.2-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
10. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

11. a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After a loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

12. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.2-3 to perform the listed function.

b) The pumps identified in Table 2.3.2-3 start after receiving a signal from the PLS.

13. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.2-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.
14. The nonsafety-related piping located inside containment and designated as reactor coolant pressure boundary, as identified in Table 2.3.2-2 (pipe lines with "No" in the ASME Code column), has been designed to withstand a seismic design basis event and maintain structural integrity.

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Table 2.3.2-1 Class 1E/ Loss of ASME Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position RCS Purification Motor- CVS-PL-V001 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes Transfer As Is operated Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

RCS Purification Motor- CVS-PL-V002 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes Transfer As Is operated Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

RCS Purification Motor- CVS-PL-V003 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes Transfer As Is operated Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

CVS Resin Flush Line CVS-PL-V040 Yes Yes No -/- - - - -

Containment Isolation Valve CVS Resin Flush Line CVS-PL-V041 Yes Yes No -/- - - - -

Containment Isolation Valve CVS Demineralizer Resin CVS-PL-V042 Yes Yes No -/- - - Transfer -

Flush Line Containment Open/

Isolation Thermal Relief Transfer Valve Closed CVS Letdown Containment CVS-PL-V045 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes Transfer Closed Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

CVS Letdown Containment CVS-PL-V047 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Transfer Closed Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

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Table 2.3.2-1 Class 1E/ Loss of ASME Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position CVS Letdown Line CVS-PL-V058 Yes Yes No -/- - - Transfer -

Containment Isolation Open/

Thermal Relief Valve Transfer Closed CVS Purification Return Line CVS-PL-V080 Yes Yes No -/- - - Transfer -

Pressure Boundary Check Closed Valve CVS Purification Return Line CVS-PL-V081 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Pressure Boundary Isolation Closed Check Valve CVS Purification Return Line CVS-PL-V082 Yes Yes No -/- - - Transfer -

Pressure Boundary Check Closed Valve CVS Auxiliary Pressurizer CVS-PL-V084 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes Transfer Closed Spray Line Pressure (Valve Closed Boundary Valve Position)

CVS Auxiliary Pressurizer CVS-PL-V085 Yes Yes No Yes/Yes - - Transfer -

Spray Line Pressure Closed Boundary Check Valve CVS Makeup Line CVS-PL-V090 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Transfer As Is Containment Isolation Motor- (Valve Closed operated Valve Position)

CVS Makeup Line CVS-PL-V091 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes Transfer As Is Containment Isolation Motor- (Valve Closed operated Valve Position)

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Table 2.3.2-1 Class 1E/ Loss of ASME Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position CVS Hydrogen Addition Line CVS-PL-V092 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Transfer Closed Containment Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

CVS Hydrogen Addition Line CVS-PL-V094 Yes Yes No -/- - - Transfer -

Containment Isolation Check Closed Valve CVS Makeup Line CVS-PL-V100 Yes Yes No -/- - - Transfer -

Containment Isolation Open/

Thermal Relief Valve Transfer Closed CVS Demineralized Water CVS-PL-V136A Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Transfer Closed Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

CVS Demineralized Water CVS-PL-V136B Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Transfer Closed Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.3.2-2 Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III CVS Purification Line L001 Yes L040 Yes CVS Resin Flush Containment Penetration Line L026 Yes CVS Purification Line Return L038 Yes CVS Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Connection L070 Yes L071 Yes CVS Letdown Containment Penetration Line L051 Yes CVS Makeup Containment Penetration Line L053 Yes CVS Hydrogen Addition Containment Penetration L061 Yes Line CVS Supply Line to Regenerative Heat Exchanger L002 No CVS Return Line from Regenerative Heat L018 No Exchanger L036 Yes L073 No CVS Line from Regenerative Heat Exchanger to L003 No Letdown Heat Exchanger CVS Lines from Letdown Heat Exchanger to L004 No Demin. Tanks L005 No L072 No CVS Lines from Demin Tanks to RC Filters and L006(1) No Connected Lines L007(1) No L010(1) No L011(1) No L012 No L015(1) No L016(1) No L020 No L021 No L022 No L023(1) No L024(1) No L029 No L037 No CVS Lines from RC Filters to Regenerative Heat L030 No Exchanger L031 No L034 No L050 No CVS Resin Fill Lines to Demin. Tanks L008(1) No L013(1) No L025(1) No C-197

Note:

1. Special seismic requirements include only the portion of piping normally exposed to RCS pressure. Piping beyond the first normally closed isolation valve is evaluated as seismic Category II piping extending to either an interface anchor, a rigid support following a six-way anchor, or the last seismic support of a rigidly supported region of the piping system as necessary to satisfy analysis requirements for piping connected to seismic Category I piping systems.

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Table 2.3.2-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function CVS Makeup Pump A CVS-MP-01A Yes Start (Run Status)

CVS Makeup Pump B CVS-MP-01B Yes Start (Run Status)

Purification Flow Sensor CVS-001 Yes -

Purification Return Flow Sensor CVS-025 Yes -

CVS Purification Return Line (Position CVS-PL-V081 Yes -

Indicator)

Auxiliary Spray Line Isolation Valve CVS-PL-V084 Yes -

(Position Indicator)

Boric Acid Storage Tank Level Sensor CVS-109 Yes -

Boric Acid Flow Sensor CVS-115 Yes -

Makeup Blend Valve (Position Indicator) CVS-PL-V115 Yes -

CVS Demineralized Water Isolation Valve CVS-PL-136A Yes -

(Position Indicator)

CVS Demineralized Water Isolation Valve CVS-PL-136B Yes -

(Position Indicator)

Makeup Pump Discharge Flow Sensor CVS-157 Yes -

Makeup Flow Control Valve (Position CVS-PL-V157 Yes -

Indicator)

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.3.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 285 2.3.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built CVS conforms CVS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.2. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.2.

286 2.3.02.02a 2.a) The components identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section the as-built components as design reports exist for the as-III are designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design built components identified in accordance with ASME Code Section reports. Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code III requirements. Section III.

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Table 2.3.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 287 2.3.02.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section the as-built piping as design reports exist for the as-III is designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design built piping identified in accordance with ASME Code Section reports. Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code III requirements. Section III.

288 2.3.02.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Section as ASME Code Section III meet ASME performed in accordance with III requirements are met for Code Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

289 2.3.02.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Section Code Section III meet ASME Code performed in accordance with III requirements are met for Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

290 2.3.02.04a 4.a) The components identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section performed on the components that the results of the III retain their pressure boundary required by the ASME Code hydrostatic test of the integrity at their design pressure. Section III to be hydrostatically components identified in tested. Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

291 2.3.02.04b 4.b) The piping identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section performed on the piping required that the results of the III retains its pressure boundary by the ASME Code Section III to hydrostatic test of the piping integrity at its design pressure. be hydrostatically tested. identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

292 2.3.02.05.i 5. The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand to verify that the seismic equipment identified in seismic design basis loads without loss Category I equipment identified Table 2.3.2-1 is located on the of safety function. in Table 2.3.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Nuclear Island.

293 2.3.02.05.ii 5. The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis loads without loss analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.

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Table 2.3.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 294 2.3.02.05.iii 5. The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built seismic design basis loads without loss verifying that the as-built equipment including of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

295 2.3.02.06a.i 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified i) Type tests, analyses, or a i) A report exists and in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a combination of type tests and concludes that the Class 1E harsh environment can withstand the analyses will be performed on equipment identified in Table environmental conditions that would Class 1E equipment located in a 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a exist before, during, and following a harsh environment. harsh environment can design basis accident without loss of withstand the environmental safety function for the time required to conditions that would exist perform the safety function. before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

296 2.3.02.06a.ii 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a of the as-built Class 1E concludes that the as-built harsh environment can withstand the equipment and the associated Class 1E equipment and the environmental conditions that would wiring, cables, and terminations associated wiring, cables, and exist before, during, and following a located in a harsh environment. terminations identified in design basis accident without loss of Table 2.3.2-1 as being safety function for the time required to qualified for a harsh perform the safety function. environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

297 2.3.02.06b 6.b) The Class 1E components Testing will be performed on the A simulated test signal exists identified in Table 2.3.2-1 are powered CVS by providing a simulated at the Class 1E equipment from their respective Class 1E division. test signal in each Class 1E identified in Table 2.3.2-1 division. when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

298 2.3.02.06c 6.c) Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, CVS Class 1E divisions, and between item 7.d. item 7.d.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

299 2.3.02.07a 7.a) The CVS preserves containment See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, integrity by isolation of the CVS lines item 7. item 7.

penetrating the containment.

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Table 2.3.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 300 2.3.02.07b 7.b) The CVS provides termination of See item 10b in this table. See item 10b in this table.

an inadvertent RCS boron dilution by isolating demineralized water from the RCS.

301 2.3.02.07c 7.c) The CVS provides isolation of See item 10b in this table. See item 10b in this table.

makeup to the RCS.

302 2.3.02.08a.i 8.a) The CVS provides makeup water i) Testing will be performed by i) Each CVS makeup pump to the RCS. aligning a flow path from each provides a flow rate of greater CVS makeup pump, actuating than or equal to 100 gpm.

makeup flow to the RCS at pressure greater than or equal to 2000 psia, and measuring the flow rate in the makeup pump discharge line with each pump suction aligned to the boric acid storage tank.

303 2.3.02.08a.ii 8.a) The CVS provides makeup water ii) Inspection of the boric acid ii) The volume in the boric to the RCS. storage tank volume will be acid storage tank is at least performed. 70,000 gallons between the tank outlet connection and the tank overflow.

304 2.3.02.08a.iii 8.a) The CVS provides makeup water iii) Testing will be performed to iii) The total CVS makeup to the RCS. measure the delivery rate from flow to the RCS is less than or the DWS to the RCS. Both CVS equal to 200 gpm.

makeup pumps will be operating and the RCS pressure will be below 6 psig.

305 2.3.02.08b 8.b) The CVS provides the pressurizer Testing will be performed by Each CVS makeup pump auxiliary spray. aligning a flow path from each provides spray flow to the CVS makeup pump to the pressurizer.

pressurizer auxiliary spray and measuring the flow rate in the makeup pump discharge line with each pump suction aligned to the boric acid storage tank and with RCS pressure greater than or equal to 2000 psia.

306 2.3.02.09 9. Safety-related displays identified in Inspection will be performed for Safety-related displays Table 2.3.2-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can MCR. related displays in the MCR. be retrieved in the MCR.

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Table 2.3.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 307 2.3.02.10a 10.a) Controls exist in the MCR to Stroke testing will be performed Controls in the MCR operate cause the remotely operated valves on the remotely operated valves to cause the remotely operated identified in Table 2.3.2-1 to perform identified in Table 2.3.2-1 using valves identified in Table active functions. the controls in the MCR. 2.3.2-1 to perform active functions.

308 2.3.02.10b.i 10.b) The valves identified in i) Testing will be performed i) The valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control using real or simulated signals Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS perform an active safety function after into the PMS. control perform the active receiving a signal from the PMS. function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

309 2.3.02.10b.ii 10.b) The valves identified in ii) Testing will be performed to ii) These valves close within Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control demonstrate that the remotely the following times after perform an active safety function after operated CVS isolation valves receipt of an actuation signal:

receiving a signal from the PMS. CVS-V090, V091, V136A/B V090, V091 < 30 sec close within the required V136A/B < 20 sec response time.

310 2.3.02.11a.i 11.a) The motor-operated and check i) Tests or type tests of i) A test report exists and valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 motor-operated valves will be concludes that each motor-perform an active safety-related performed that demonstrate the operated valve function to change position as indicated capability of the valve to operate changes position as indicated in the table. under its design conditions. in Table 2.3.2-1 under design conditions.

311 2.3.02.11a.ii 11.a) The motor-operated and check ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built perform an active safety-related verifying that the as-built motor- motor-operated valves are function to change position as indicated operated valves are bounded by bounded by the tests or type in the table. the tested conditions. tests.

312 2.3.02.11a.iii 11.a) The motor-operated and check iii) Tests of the motor-operated iii) Each motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 valves will be performed under valve changes position as perform an active safety-related pre-operational flow, differential indicated in Table 2.3.2-1 function to change position as indicated pressure, and temperature under pre-operational test in the table. conditions. conditions.

313 2.3.02.11a.iv 11.a) The motor-operated and check iv) Exercise testing of the check iv) Each check valve changes valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 valves with active safety position as indicated in perform an active safety-related functions identified in Table 2.3.2-1.

function to change position as indicated Table 2.3.2-1 will be performed in the table. under pre-operational test pressure, temperature and fluid flow conditions.

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Table 2.3.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 314 2.3.02.11b 11.b) After loss of motive power, the Testing of the remotely operated Upon loss of motive power, remotely operated valves identified in valves will be performed under each remotely operated valve Table 2.3.2-1 assume the indicated loss the conditions of loss of motive identified in Table 2.3.2-1 of motive power position. power. assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

315 2.3.02.12a 12.a) Controls exist in the MCR to Testing will be performed to Controls in the MCR cause cause the pumps identified in actuate the pumps identified in pumps identified in Table 2.3.2-3 to perform the listed Table 2.3.2-3 using controls in Table 2.3.2-3 to perform the function. the MCR. listed function.

316 2.3.02.12b 12.b) The pumps identified in Table Testing will be performed to The pumps identified in 2.3.2-3 start after receiving a signal confirm starting of the pumps Table 2.3.2-3 start after a from the PLS. identified in Table 2.3.2-3. signal is generated by the PLS.

317 2.3.02.13 13. Displays of the parameters Inspection will be performed for Displays identified in Table identified in Table 2.3.2-3 can be retrievability of the displays 2.3.2-3 can be retrieved in the retrieved in the MCR. identified in Table 2.3.2-3 in the MCR.

MCR.

318 2.3.02.14 14. The nonsafety-related piping Inspection will be conducted of The CVS Seismic Analysis located inside containment and the as-built components as Reports exist for the non-designated as reactor coolant pressure documented in the CVS Seismic safety related piping located boundary, as identified in Table 2.3.2-2, Analysis Report. inside containment and has been designed to withstand a designated as reactor coolant seismic design basis event and maintain pressure boundary as structural integrity. identified in Table 2.3.2-2.

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Table 2.3.2-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location CVS Makeup Pump A CVS-MP-01A Auxiliary Building CVS Makeup Pump B CVS-MP-01B Auxiliary Building Boric Acid Storage Tank CVS-MT-01 Yard Regenerative Heat Exchanger CVS-ME-01 Containment Letdown Heat Exchanger CVS-ME-02 Containment Mixed Bed Demineralizer A CVS-MV-01A Containment Mixed Bed Demineralizer B CVS-MV-01B Containment Cation Bed Demineralizer CVS-MV-02 Containment Reactor Coolant Filter A CVS-MV-03A Containment Reactor Coolant Filter B CVS-MV-03B Containment C-205

Figure 2.3.2-1 Chemical and Volume Control System C-206

2.3.3 Standby Diesel Fuel Oil System Design Description The standby diesel fuel oil system (DOS) supplies diesel fuel oil for the onsite standby power system. The diesel fuel oil is supplied by two above-ground fuel oil storage tanks. The DOS also provides fuel oil for the ancillary diesel generators. A single fuel oil storage tank services both ancillary diesel generators.

The DOS is as shown in Figure 2.3.3-1 and the component locations of the DOS are as shown in Table 2.3.3-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the DOS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.3.
2. The ancillary diesel generator fuel tank can withstand a seismic event.
3. The DOS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) Each fuel oil storage tank provides for at least 7 days of continuous operation of the associated standby diesel generator.

b) Each fuel oil day tank provides for at least four hours of continuous operation of the associated standby diesel engine generator.

c) The fuel oil flow rate to the day tank of each standby diesel generator provides for continuous operation of the associated diesel generator.

d) The ancillary diesel generator fuel tank is sized to supply power to long-term safety-related post-accident monitoring loads and control room lighting through a regulating transformer and one PCS recirculation pump for a period of 4 days.

4. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.3.3-1 to perform the listed function.
5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.3.3-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Diesel Fuel Oil Pump 1A (Motor) DOS-MP-01A Yes Start (Run Status)

Diesel Fuel Oil Pump 1B (Motor) DOS-MP-01B Yes Start (Run Status)

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank A Level DOS-016A Yes -

Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank B Level DOS-016B Yes -

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.3.3-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 319 2.3.03.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built DOS conforms DOS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.3. arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.3.

320 2.3.03.02 2. The ancillary diesel generator fuel Inspection will be performed for A report exists and concludes tank can withstand a seismic event. the existence of a report that the as-built ancillary verifying that the as-built diesel generator fuel tank and ancillary diesel generator fuel its anchorage are designed tank and its anchorage are using seismic Category II designed using seismic methods and criteria.

Category II methods and criteria.

321 2.3.03.03a 3.a) Each fuel oil storage tank provides Inspection of each fuel oil The volume of each fuel oil for at least 7 days of continuous storage tank will be performed. storage tank available to the operation of the associated standby standby diesel generator is diesel generator. greater than or equal to 55,000 gallons.

322 2.3.03.03b 3.b) Each fuel oil storage day tank Inspection of the fuel oil day The volume of each fuel oil provides for at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of tank will be performed. day tank is greater than or operation of the associated standby equal to 1300 gallons.

diesel generator.

323 2.3.03.03c 3.c) The fuel oil flow rate to the day Testing will be performed to The flow rate delivered to tank of each standby diesel generator determine the flow rate. each day tank is 8 gpm or provides for continuous operation of the greater.

associated diesel generator.

324 2.3.03.03d 3.d) The ancillary diesel generator fuel Inspection of the ancillary diesel The volume of the ancillary tank is sized to supply power to long- generator fuel tank will be diesel generator fuel tank is term safety-related post accident performed. greater than or equal to monitoring loads and control room 650 gallons.

lighting through a regulating transformer and one PCS recirculation pump for four days.

325 2.3.03.04 4. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed on the Controls in the MCR operate the components identified in Table components in Table 2.3.3-1 to cause the components listed 2.3.3-1 to perform the listed function. using controls in the MCR. in Table 2.3.3-1 to perform the listed functions.

326 2.3.03.05 5. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.3.3-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of parameters in Table 2.3.3-1 can be retrieved MCR. the MCR. in the MCR.

C-208

Table 2.3.3-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Diesel Oil Transfer Package A DOS-MS-01A Yard Diesel Oil Transfer Package B DOS-MS-01B Yard Fuel Oil Storage Tank A DOS-MT-01A Yard Fuel Oil Storage Tank B DOS-MT-01B Yard Diesel Generator A Fuel Oil Day Tank DOS-MT-02A Diesel Building Diesel Generator B Fuel Oil Day Tank DOS-MT-02B Diesel Building Ancillary Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank DOS-MT-03 Annex Building C-209

Figure 2.3.3-1 Standby Diesel Fuel Oil System C-210

2.3.4 Fire Protection System Design Description The fire protection system (FPS) detects and suppresses fires in the plant. The FPS consists of water distribution systems, automatic and manual suppression systems, a fire detection and alarm system, and portable fire extinguishers. The FPS provides fire protection for the nuclear island, the annex building, the turbine building, the radwaste building and the diesel generator building.

The FPS is as shown in Figure 2.3.4-1 and the component locations of the FPS are as shown in Table 2.3.4-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the FPS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.4.
2. The FPS piping identified in Table 2.3.4-4 remains functional following a safe shutdown earthquake.
3. The FPS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the FPS line penetrating the containment.
4. The FPS provides for manual fire fighting capability in plant areas containing safety-related equipment.
5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.4-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
6. The FPS provides nonsafety-related containment spray for severe accident management.
7. The FPS provides two fire water storage tanks, each capable of holding at least 300,000 gallons of water.
8. Two FPS fire pumps provide at least 2000 gpm each at a total head of at least 300 ft.
9. The fuel tank for the diesel-driven fire pump is capable of holding at least 240 gallons.
10. Individual fire detectors provide fire detection capability and can be used to initiate fire alarms in areas containing safety-related equipment.
11. The FPS seismic standpipe subsystem can be supplied from the FPS fire main by opening the normally closed cross-connect valve to the FPS plant fire main.

Table 2.3.4-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Motor-driven Fire Pump FPS-MP-01A Yes (Run Status) Start Diesel-driven Fire Pump FPS-MP-01B Yes (Run Status) Start Jockey Pump FPS-MP-02 Yes (Run Status) Start C-211

Table 2.3.4-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 327 2.3.04.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built FPS conforms FPS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.4. arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.4.

328 2.3.04.02.i 2. The FPS piping identified in i) Inspection will be performed i) The piping identified in Table 2.3.4-4 remains functional to verify that the piping Table 2.3.4-4 is located on following a safe shutdown earthquake. identified in Table 2.3.4-4 is the Nuclear Island.

located on the Nuclear Island.

329 2.3.04.02.ii 2. The FPS piping identified in ii) A reconciliation analysis ii) The as-built piping stress Table 2.3.4-4 remains functional using the as-designed and as- report exists and concludes following a safe shutdown earthquake. built piping information will be that the piping remains performed, or an analysis of the functional following a safe as-built piping will be shutdown earthquake.

performed.

330 2.3.04.03 3. The FPS provides the safety-related See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, function of preserving containment items 1 and 7. items 1 and 7.

integrity by isolation of the FPS line penetrating the containment.

331 2.3.04.04.i 4. The FPS provides for manual fire i) Inspection of the passive i) The volume of the PCS fighting capability in plant areas containment cooling system tank above the standpipe containing safety-related equipment. (PCS) storage tank will be feeding the FPS and below the performed. overflow is at least 18,000 gal.

332 2.3.04.04.ii 4. The FPS provides for manual fire ii) Testing will be performed by ii) Water is simultaneously fighting capability in plant areas measuring the water flow rate as discharged from each of the containing safety-related equipment. it is simultaneously discharged two highest fire-hose stations from the two highest fire-hose in plant areas containing stations and when the water for safety-related equipment at the fire is supplied from the PCS not less than 75 gpm.

storage tank.

333 2.3.04.05 5. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.3.4-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the parameters Table 2.3.4-1 can be retrieved MCR. in the MCR. in the MCR.

334 2.3.04.06 6. The FPS provides nonsafety-related Inspection of the containment The FPS has spray headers containment spray for severe accident spray headers will be performed. and nozzles as follows:

management. At least 44 nozzles at plant elevation of at least 260 feet, and 24 nozzles at plant elevation of at least 275 feet.

335 2.3.04.07 7. The FPS provides two fire water Inspection of each fire water The volume of each fire water storage tanks, each capable of holding storage tank will be performed. storage tank supplying the at least 300,000 gallons of water. FPS is at least 300,000 gallons.

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Table 2.3.4-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 336 2.3.04.08 8. Two FPS fire pumps provide at least Testing and/or analysis of each The tests and/or analysis 2000 gpm each at a total head of at least fire pump will be performed. concludes that each fire pump 300 ft. provides a flow rate of at least 2000 gpm at a total head of at least 300 ft.

337 2.3.04.09 9. The fuel tank for the diesel-driven Inspection of the diesel-driven The volume of the diesel fire pump is capable of holding at least fire pump fuel tank will be driven fire pump fuel tank is 240 gallons. performed. at least 240 gallons.

338 2.3.04.10 10. Individual fire detectors provide Testing will be performed on the The tested individual fire fire detection capability and can be used as-built individual fire detectors detectors respond to simulated to initiate fire alarms in areas containing in the fire areas identified in fire conditions.

safety-related equipment. subsection 3.3, Table 3.3-3.

(Individual fire detectors will be tested using simulated fire conditions.)

339 2.3.04.11 11. The FPS seismic standpipe Inspection for the existence of a Valve FPS-PL-V101 exists subsystem can be supplied from the cross-connect valve from the and can connect the FPS FPS fire main by opening the normally FPS seismic standpipe seismic standpipe subsystem closed cross-connect valve to the FPS subsystem to FPS plant fire main to the FPS plant fire main.

plant fire main. will be performed.

Table 2.3.4-3 Component Name Tag No. Location Motor-driven Fire Pump FPS-MP-01A Turbine Building Diesel-driven Fire Pump FPS-MP-01B Yard Jockey Pump FPS-MP-02 Turbine Building Primary Fire Water Tank FPS-MT-01A Yard Secondary Fire Water/Clearwell Storage Tank FPS-MT-01B Yard Fire Pump Diesel Fuel Day Tank FPS-MT-02 Yard C-213

Table 2.3.4-4 FPS Piping Which Must Remain Functional Following a Safe Shutdown Earthquake L049 L114 L142 L188 L090A L115 L143 L189 L090B L116 L144 L190 L091A L117 L145 L191 L091B L118 L146 L192 L091C L119 L147 L193 L092A L120 L148 L194 L092B L121 L149 L195 L092C L122 L150 L196 L093 L123 L151 L197 L094 L124 L152 L198 L095 L125 L153 L199 L096 L126 L154 L301 L102 L127 L155 L701 L103 L128 L156 L702 L105 L129 L159 L703 L106 L130 L180 L704 L107 L131 L181 L705 L108 L132 L182 L706 L109 L133A L183 L707 L110 L133B L184 L708 L111 L133C L185 L709 L112 L140 L186 L113 L141 L187 C-214

Figure 2.3.4-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Fire Protection System C-215

Figure 2.3.4-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Fire Protection System C-216

2.3.5 Mechanical Handling System Design Description The mechanical handling system (MHS) provides for lifting heavy loads. The MHS equipment can be operated during shutdown and refueling.

The component locations of the MHS are as shown in Table 2.3.5-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the MHS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.5.
2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
3. The MHS components listed below are single failure proof:

a) Polar crane b) Cask handling crane c) Equipment hatch hoist d) Maintenance hatch hoist

4. The cask handling crane cannot move over the spent fuel pool.

Table 2.3.5-1 Class 1E/

Seismic Qual. for Equipment Name Tag No. Cat. I Harsh Envir. Safety Function Containment Polar Crane MHS-MH-01 Yes No/No Avoid uncontrolled lowering of heavy load.

Cask Handling Crane MHS-MH-02 Yes No/No Avoid uncontrolled lowering of heavy load.

Equipment Hatch Hoist MHS-MH-05 Yes No/No Avoid uncontrolled lowering of heavy load.

Maintenance Hatch Hoist MHS-MH-06 Yes No/No Avoid uncontrolled lowering of heavy load.

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Table 2.3.5-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 340 2.3.05.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built MHS conforms MHS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.5. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.5.

341 2.3.05.02.i 2. The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.3.5-1 can withstand to verify that the seismic equipment identified in seismic design basis loads without loss Category I equipment identified Table 2.3.5-1 is located on the of safety function. in Table 2.3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Nuclear Island.

342 2.3.05.02.ii 2. The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.5-1 can combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic withstand seismic design basis loads analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can without loss of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

343 2.3.05.02.iii 2. The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.5-1 can for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built withstand seismic design basis loads verifying that the as-built equipment including without loss of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

344 2.3.05.03a.i 3.a) The polar crane is single failure i) Validation of double design i) A report exists and proof. factors is provided for hooks concludes that the polar crane where used as load bearing is single failure proof. A components. Validation of certificate of conformance redundant factors is provided for from the vendor exists and load bearing components such concludes that the polar crane as: is single failure proof.

  • Hoisting ropes
  • Sheaves
  • Equalizer assembly
  • Holding brakes 345 2.3.05.03a.ii 3.a) The polar crane is single failure ii) Testing of the polar crane is ii) The polar crane shall be proof. performed. static-load tested to 125% of the rated load.

346 2.3.05.03a.iii 3.a) The polar crane is single failure iii) Testing of the polar crane is iii) The polar crane shall lift a proof. performed. test load that is 100% of the rated load. Then it shall lower, stop, and hold the test load.

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Table 2.3.5-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 347 2.3.05.03b.i 3.b) The cask handling crane is single i) Validation of double design i) A report exists and failure proof. factors is provided for hooks concludes that the cask where used as load bearing handling crane is single failure components. Validation of proof. A certificate of redundant factors is provided for conformance from the vendor load bearing components such exists and concludes that the as: cask handling crane is single

  • Hoisting ropes failure proof.
  • Sheaves
  • Equalizer assembly
  • Holding brakes 348 2.3.05.03b.ii 3.b) The cask handling crane is single ii) Testing of the cask handling ii) The cask handling crane failure proof. crane is performed. shall be static load tested to 125% of the rated load.

349 2.3.05.03b.iii 3.b) The cask handling crane is single iii) Testing of the cask handling iii) The cask handling crane failure proof. crane is performed. shall lift a test load that is 100% of the rated load. Then it shall lower, stop, and hold the test load.

350 2.3.05.03c.i 3.c) The equipment hatch hoist is i) Validation of double design i) A report exists and single failure proof. factors is provided for hooks concludes that the equipment where used as load bearing hatch hoist is single failure components. Validation of proof. A certificate of redundant factors is provided for conformance from the vendor load bearing components such exists and concludes that the as: equipment hatch hoist is

  • Hoisting ropes single failure proof.
  • Sheaves
  • Equalizer assembly
  • Holding brakes 351 2.3.05.03c.ii 3.c) The equipment hatch hoist is ii) Testing of the equipment ii) The equipment hatch hoist single failure proof. hatch hoist is performed. holding mechanism shall stop and hold the hatch.

352 2.3.05.03d.i 3.d) The maintenance hatch hoist is i) Validation of double design i) A report exists and single failure proof. factors is provided for hooks concludes that the where used as load bearing maintenance hatch hoist is components. Validation of single failure proof. A redundant factors is provided for certificate of conformance load bearing components such from the vendor exists and as: concludes that the

  • Hoisting ropes maintenance hatch hoist is
  • Sheaves single failure proof.
  • Equalizer assembly
  • Holding brakes C-219

Table 2.3.5-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 353 2.3.05.03d.ii 3.d) The maintenance hatch hoist is ii) Testing of the maintenance ii) The maintenance hatch single failure proof. hatch hoist is performed. hoist holding mechanism shall stop and hold the hatch.

354 2.3.05.04 4. The cask handling crane cannot Testing of the cask handling The cask handling crane does move over the spent fuel pool. crane is performed. not move over the spent fuel pool.

Table 2.3.5-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Containment Polar Crane MHS-MH-01 Containment Cask Handling Crane MHS-MH-02 Auxiliary Building Equipment Hatch Hoist MHS-MH-05 Containment Maintenance Hatch Hoist MHS-MH-06 Containment C-220

2.3.6 Normal Residual Heat Removal System Design Description The normal residual heat removal system (RNS) removes heat from the core and reactor coolant system (RCS) and provides RCS low temperature over-pressure (LTOP) protection at reduced RCS pressure and temperature conditions after shutdown. The RNS also provides a means for cooling the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) during normal plant operation.

The RNS is as shown in Figure 2.3.6-1 and the RNS component locations are as shown in Table 2.3.6-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the RNS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.6.
2. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.6-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. Each of the as-built lines identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as designed for leak before break (LBB) meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.
7. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

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c) Separation is provided between RNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

8. The RNS provides the following safety-related functions:

a) The RNS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the RNS lines penetrating the containment.

b) The RNS provides a flow path for long-term, post-accident makeup to the RCS.

9. The RNS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The RNS provides low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) for the RCS during shutdown operations.

b) The RNS provides heat removal from the reactor coolant during shutdown operations.

c) The RNS provides low pressure makeup flow from the SFS cask loading pit to the RCS for scenarios following actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS).

d) The RNS provides heat removal from the in-containment refueling water storage tank.

10. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
11. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform active safety functions after receiving a signal from the PMS.

12. a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

13. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.6-3 to perform the listed function.
14. Displays of the RNS parameters identified in Table 2.3.6-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

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Table 2.3.6-1 Class 1E

/ Qual. Loss of ASME Remotely for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position RNS Pump A (Pressure RNS-MP-01A Yes Yes - -/- - - No -

Boundary)

RNS Pump B (Pressure RNS-MP-01B Yes Yes - -/- - - No -

Boundary)

RNS Heat Exchanger A (Tube RNS-ME-01A Yes Yes - -/- - - - -

Side)

RNS Heat Exchanger B (Tube RNS-ME-01B Yes Yes - -/- - - - -

Side)

RCS Inner Hot Leg Suction RNS-PL-V001A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes Transfer As Is Motor-operated Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

RCS Inner Hot Leg Suction RNS-PL-V001B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes Transfer As Is Motor-operated Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

RCS Outer Hot Leg Suction RNS-PL-V002A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes Transfer As Is Motor-operated Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

RCS Outer Hot Leg Suction RNS-PL-V002B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes Transfer As Is Motor-operated Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

RCS Pressure Boundary RNS-PL-V003A Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Thermal Relief Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed C-223

Table 2.3.6-1 Class 1E

/ Qual. Loss of ASME Remotely for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position RCS Pressure Boundary RNS-PL-V003B Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Thermal Relief Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed RNS Discharge Motor-operated RNS-PL-V011 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Transfer As Is Containment Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

RNS Discharge Containment RNS-PL-V012 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer -

Isolation Test Connection Open RNS Discharge Header RNS-PL-V013 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Containment Isolation Check Open/

Valve Transfer Closed RNS Discharge RCS Pressure RNS-PL-V015A Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Boundary Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed RNS Discharge RCS Pressure RNS-PL-V015B Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Boundary Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed RNS Discharge RCS Pressure RNS-PL-V017A Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Boundary Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed C-224

Table 2.3.6-1 Class 1E

/ Qual. Loss of ASME Remotely for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position RNS Discharge RCS Pressure RNS-PL-V017B Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Boundary Check Valve Open/

Transfer Closed RNS Hot Leg Suction Pressure RNS-PL-V021 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Relief Valve Open/

Transfer Closed RNS Suction Header RNS-PL-V022 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Transfer As Is Motor-operated Containment (Valve Closed Isolation Valve Position)

RNS Suction from IRWST RNS-PL-V023 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes Transfer As Is Motor-operated Isolation Valve (Valve Closed Position)

RNS Discharge to IRWST RNS-PL-V024 Yes Yes Yes -/- No No No As Is Motor-operated Isolation Valve RNS Discharge Header Relief RNS-PL-V045 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Valve Open/

Transfer Closed RNS Suction from Cask Loading RNS-PL-V055 Yes Yes Yes No/No No No No As Is Pit Motor-operated Isolation Valve RNS Suction from Cask Loading RNS-PL-V056 Yes Yes No -/- No - No -

Pit Check Valve C-225

Table 2.3.6-1 Class 1E

/ Qual. Loss of ASME Remotely for Safety- Motive Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position RNS Pump Miniflow RNS-PL-V057A Yes Yes Yes No/No No No No Open Air-Operated Isolation Valve RNS Pump Miniflow RNS-PL-V057B Yes Yes Yes No/No No No No Open Air-Operated Isolation Valve RNS Return from Chemical and RNS-PL-V061 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Transfer Closed Volume Control System (CVS) (Valve Closed Containment Isolation Valve Position)

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.3.6-2 ASME Code Leak Before Functional Capability Line Name Line No. Section III Break Required RNS Suction Lines, from the RCS Hot Leg Connection RNS-L001 Yes Yes No to the RCS Side of Valves RNS PL-V001A and RNS-L002A RNS-PL-V001B RNS-L002B RNS Suction Lines, from the RCS Pressure Boundary RNS-L004A Yes No Yes Valves, RNS-PL-V001A and RNS-PL-V001B, to the RNS-L004B Yes RNS pumps RNS-L005 Yes RNS-L006 No RNS-L007A No RNS-L007B No RNS-L009A No RNS-L009B No RNS Suction Line from CVS RNS-L061 Yes No No RNS Suction Line from IRWST RNS-L029 Yes No No C-226

Table 2.3.6-2 ASME Code Leak Before Functional Capability Line Name Line No. Section III Break Required RNS Suction Line LTOP Relief RNS-L040 Yes No Yes RNS Discharge Lines, from the RNS Pumps to the RNS RNS-L011A Yes No Yes Heat Exchangers RNS-ME-01A and RNS-ME-01B RNS-L011B RNS Discharge Lines, from RNS Heat Exchanger RNS-L012A Yes No Yes RNS-ME-01A to Containment Isolation Valve RNS-L014 RNS-PL-V011 RNS Discharge Line, from RNS Heat Exchanger RNS-L012B Yes No Yes RNS-ME-01B to Common Discharge Header RNS-DBC-L014 RNS Discharge Lines, Containment Isolation Valve RNS-L016 Yes No Yes RNS-PL-V011 to Containment Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V013 RNS Suction Line from Cask Loading Pit RNS-L065 Yes No No RNS Discharge Lines, from Containment Isolation RNS-L017 Yes No Yes Valve RNS-PL-V013 to RCS Pressure Boundary RNS-L018A Isolation Valves RNS-PL-V015A and RNS-PL-V015B RNS-L018B RNS Discharge Lines, from Direct Vessel Injection RNS-L020 Yes No No (DVI) Line RNS-BBC-L018A to Passive Core Cooling System (PXS) IRWST Return Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V024 RNS Discharge Lines, from RCS Pressure Boundary RNS-L019A Yes No Yes Isolation Valves RNS-PL-V015A and RNS-PL-V015B RNS-L019B to Reactor Vessel DVI Nozzles RNS Heat Exchanger Bypass RNS-L008A Yes No No RNS-L008B RNS Suction from Spent Fuel Pool RNS-L052 Yes No No C-227

Table 2.3.6-2 ASME Code Leak Before Functional Capability Line Name Line No. Section III Break Required RNS Pump Miniflow Return RNS-L030A Yes No No RNS-L030B RNS Discharge to Spent Fuel Pool RNS-L051 Yes No No RNS Discharge to CVS Purification RNS-L021 Yes No No C-228

Table 2.3.6-3 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function RNS Pump 1A (Motor) RNS-MP-01A Yes Start (Run Status)

RNS Pump 1B (Motor) RNS-MP-01B Yes Start (Run Status)

RNS Flow Sensor RNS-01A Yes -

RNS Flow Sensor RNS-01B Yes -

RNS Suction from Cask Loading RNS-PL-V055 Yes -

Pit Isolation Valve (Position Indicator)

RNS Pump Miniflow Isolation RNS-PL-V057A Yes -

Valve (Position Indicator)

RNS Pump Miniflow Isolation RNS-PL-V057B Yes -

Valve (Position Indicator)

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 355 2.3.06.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built RNS conforms RNS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.6. arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.6.

356 2.3.06.02a 2.a) The components identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section the as-built components as design reports exist for the as-III are designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design built components identified in accordance with ASME Code reports. Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III requirements. Section III.

357 2.3.06.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section the as-built piping as design reports exist for the as-III is designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design built piping identified in accordance with ASME Code reports. Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III requirements. Section III.

358 2.3.06.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Section as ASME Code Section III meet ASME performed in accordance with III requirements are met for Code Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

C-229

Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 359 2.3.06.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Section Code Section III meet ASME Code performed in accordance with III requirements are met for Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

360 2.3.06.04a 4.a) The components identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code performed on the components that the results of the Section III retain their pressure required by the ASME Code hydrostatic test of the boundary integrity at their design Section III to be hydrostatically components identified in pressure. tested. Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

361 2.3.06.04b 4.b) The piping identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code performed on the piping required that the results of the Section III retains its pressure boundary by the ASME Code Section III to hydrostatic test of the piping integrity at its design pressure. be hydrostatically tested. identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

362 2.3.06.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand to verify that the seismic equipment identified in seismic design basis loads without loss Category I equipment identified Table 2.3.6-1 is located on the of safety function. in Table 2.3.6-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Nuclear Island.

363 2.3.06.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis loads without loss analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

364 2.3.06.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built seismic design basis loads without loss verifying that the as-built equipment including of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

C-230

Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 365 2.3.06.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Inspection will be performed for A report exists and concludes Table 2.3.6-2 for which functional the existence of a report that each of the as-built lines capability is required is designed to verifying that the as-built piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 for withstand combined normal and seismic meets the requirements for which functional capability is design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability. required meets the functional capability. requirements for functional capability.

366 2.3.06.06 6. Each of the as-built lines identified Inspection will be performed for An LBB evaluation report in Table 2.3.6-2 as designed for LBB the existence of an LBB exists and concludes that the meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation evaluation report or an LBB acceptance criteria are is performed of the protection from the evaluation report on the met by the as-built RCS dynamic effects of a rupture of the line. protection from dynamic effects piping and piping materials, or of a pipe break. Section 3.3, a pipe break evaluation report Nuclear Island Buildings, exists and concludes that contains the design descriptions protection from the dynamic and inspections, tests, analyses, effects of a line break is and acceptance criteria for provided.

protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.

367 2.3.06.07a.i 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified i) Type tests, analyses, or a i) A report exists and in Tables 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a combination of type tests and concludes that the Class 1E harsh environment can withstand the analyses will be performed on equipment identified in Table environmental conditions that would Class 1E equipment located in a 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a exist before, during, and following a harsh environment. harsh environment can design basis accident without loss of withstand the environmental safety function for the time required to conditions that would exist perform the safety function. before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

368 2.3.06.07a.ii 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and in Tables 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a of the as-built Class 1E concludes that the as-built harsh environment can withstand the equipment and the associated Class 1E equipment and the environmental conditions that would wiring, cables, and terminations associated wiring, cables, and exist before, during, and following a located in a harsh environment. terminations identified in design basis accident without loss of Table 2.3.6-1 as being safety function for the time required to qualified for a harsh perform the safety function. environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

369 2.3.06.07b 7.b) The Class 1E components Testing will be performed on the A simulated test signal exists identified in Table 2.3.6-1 are powered RNS by providing a simulated at the Class 1E equipment from their respective Class 1E division. test signal in each Class 1E identified in Table 2.3.6-1 division. when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

C-231

Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 370 2.3.06.07c 7.c) Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, RNS Class 1E divisions, and between item 7.d. item 7.d.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

371 2.3.06.08a 8.a) The RNS preserves containment See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, integrity by isolation of the RNS lines item 7. item 7.

penetrating the containment.

372 2.3.06.08b 8.b) The RNS provides a flow path for See item 1 in this table. See item 1 in this table.

long-term, post-accident makeup to the RCS.

373 2.3.06.09a.i 9.a) The RNS provides LTOP for the i) Inspections will be conducted i) The rated capacity recorded RCS during shutdown operations. on the low temperature on the valve vendor code plate overpressure protection relief is not less than the flow valve to confirm that the required to provide low-capacity of the vendor code plate temperature overpressure rating is greater than or equal to protection for the RCS, as system relief requirements. determined by the LTOPS evaluation based on the pressure-temperature curves developed for the as-procured reactor vessel material.

374 2.3.06.09a.ii 9.a) The RNS provides LTOP for the ii) Testing and analysis in ii) A report exists and RCS during shutdown operations. accordance with the ASME Code concludes that the relief valve Section III will be performed to opens at a pressure not greater determine set pressure. than the set pressure required to provide low-temperature overpressure protection for the RCS, as determined by the LTOPS evaluation based on the pressure-temperature curves developed for the as-procured reactor vessel material.

375 2.3.06.09b.i 9.b) The RNS provides heat removal i) Inspection will be performed i) A report exists and from the reactor coolant during for the existence of a report that concludes that the product of shutdown operations. determines the heat removal the overall heat transfer capability of the RNS heat coefficient and the effective exchangers. heat transfer area, UA, of each RNS heat exchanger is greater than or equal to 2.2 million Btu/hr-°F.

C-232

Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 376 2.3.06.09b.ii 9.b) The RNS provides heat removal ii) Testing will be performed to ii) Each RNS pump provides from the reactor coolant during confirm that the RNS can at least 1400 gpm net flow to shutdown operations. provide flow through the RNS the RCS when the hot leg heat exchangers when the pump water level is at an elevation suction is aligned to the RCS hot 15.5 inches +/- 2 inches above leg and the discharge is aligned the bottom of the hot leg.

to both PXS DVI lines with the RCS at atmospheric pressure.

377 2.3.06.09b.iii 9.b) The RNS provides heat removal iii) Inspection will be performed iii) The RCS cold legs piping from the reactor coolant during of the reactor coolant loop centerline is 17.5 inches +/- 2 shutdown operations. piping. inches above the hot legs piping centerline.

378 2.3.06.09b.iv 9.b) The RNS provides heat removal iv) Inspection will be performed iv) The RNS pump suction from the reactor coolant during of the RNS pump suction piping. piping from the hot leg to the shutdown operations. pump suction piping low point does not form a local high point (defined as an upward slope with a vertical rise greater than 3 inches).

379 2.3.06.09b.v 9.b) The RNS provides heat removal v) Inspection will be performed v) The RNS suction line from the reactor coolant during of the RNS pump suction nozzle connection to the RCS is shutdown operations. connection to the RCS hot leg. constructed from 20-inch Schedule 140 pipe.

380 2.3.06.09c 9.c) The RNS provides low pressure Testing will be performed to Each RNS pump provides at makeup flow from the cask loading pit confirm that the RNS can least 1100 gpm net flow to the to the RCS for scenarios following provide low pressure makeup RCS when the water level actuation of the ADS. flow from the cask loading pit to above the bottom of the cask the RCS when the pump suction loading pit is 1 foot is aligned to the cask loading pit +/- 6 inches.

and the discharge is aligned to both PXS DVI lines with RCS at atmospheric pressure.

381 2.3.06.09d 9.d) The RNS provides heat removal Testing will be performed to Two operating RNS pumps from the in-containment refueling water confirm that the RNS can provide at least 2000 gpm to storage tank (IRWST). provide flow through the RNS the IRWST.

heat exchangers when the pump suction is aligned to the IRWST and the discharge is aligned to the IRWST.

382 2.3.06.10 10. Safety-related displays identified in Inspection will be performed for Safety-related displays Table 2.3.6-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can MCR. related displays in the MCR. be retrieved in the MCR.

C-233

Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 383 2.3.06.11a 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to Stroke testing will be performed Controls in the MCR operate cause those remotely operated valves on the remotely operated valves to cause those remotely identified in Table 2.3.6-1 to perform identified in Table 2.3.6-1 using operated valves identified in active functions. the controls in the MCR. Table 2.3.6-1 to perform active functions.

384 2.3.06.11b 11.b) The valves identified in Testing will be performed using The valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as having PMS control real or simulated signals into the Table 2.3.6-1 as having PMS perform active safety functions after PMS. control perform the active receiving a signal from the PMS. function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

385 2.3.06.12a.i 12.a) The motor-operated and check i) Tests or type tests of i) A test report exists and valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 motor-operated valves will be concludes that each motor-perform an active safety-related performed that demonstrate the operated valve changes function to change position as indicated capability of the valve to operate position as indicated in in the table. under its design conditions. Table 2.3.6-1 under design conditions.

386 2.3.06.12a.ii 12.a) The motor-operated and check ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built perform an active safety-related verifying that the as-built motor- motor-operated valves are function to change position as indicated operated valves are bounded by bounded by the tested in the table. the tested conditions. conditions.

387 2.3.06.12a.iii 12.a) The motor-operated and check iii) Tests of the motor-operated iii) Each motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 valves will be performed under valve changes position as perform an active safety-related preoperational flow, differential indicated in Table 2.3.6-1 function to change position as indicated pressure and temperature under preoperational test in the table. conditions. conditions.

388 2.3.06.12a.iv 12.a) The motor-operated and check iv) Exercise testing of the check iv) Each check valve changes valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 valves active safety functions position as indicated in perform an active safety-related identified in Table 2.3.6-1 will Table 2.3.6-1.

function to change position as indicated be performed under in the table. preoperational test pressure, temperature and fluid flow conditions.

389 2.3.06.12b 12.b) After loss of motive power, the Testing of the remotely operated Upon loss of motive power, remotely operated valves identified in valves will be performed under each remotely operated valve Table 2.3.6-1 assume the indicated loss the conditions of loss of motive identified in Table 2.3.6-1 of motive power position. power. assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

390 2.3.06.13 13. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed to Controls in the MCR cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.6-3 to actuate the pumps identified in pumps identified in perform the listed function. Table 2.3.6-3 using controls in Table 2.3.6-3 to perform the the MCR. listed action.

C-234

Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 391 2.3.06.14 14. Displays of the RNS parameters Inspection will be performed for Displays of the RNS identified in Table 2.3.6-3 can be retrievability in the MCR of the parameters identified in retrieved in the MCR. displays identified in Table 2.3.6-3 are retrieved in Table 2.3.6-3. the MCR.

Table 2.3.6-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location RNS Pump A RNS-MP-01A Auxiliary Building RNS Pump B RNS-MP-01B Auxiliary Building RNS Heat Exchanger A RNS-ME-01A Auxiliary Building RNS Heat Exchanger B RNS-ME-01B Auxiliary Building C-235

Figure 2.3.6-1 Normal Residual Heat Removal System C-236

2.3.7 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Design Description The spent fuel pool cooling system (SFS) removes decay heat from spent fuel by transferring heat from the water in the spent fuel pool to the component cooling water system during normal modes of operation. The SFS purifies the water in the spent fuel pool, fuel transfer canal, and in-containment refueling water storage tank during normal modes of operation. Following events such as earthquakes, or fires, if the normal heat removal method is not available, decay heat is removed from spent fuel by boiling water in the pool. In the event of long-term station blackout, makeup water is supplied to the spent fuel pool from onsite storage tanks.

The SFS is as shown in Figure 2.3.7-1 and the component locations of the SFS are as shown in Table 2.3.7-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the SFS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.7.
2. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. Pressure boundary welds in piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.
4. The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
6. a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

b) Separation is provided between SFS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

7. The SFS performs the following safety-related functions:

a) The SFS preserves containment integrity by isolating the SFS piping lines penetrating the containment.

b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site water storage tanks.

c) The SFS provides check valves in the drain line from the refueling cavity to prevent flooding of the refueling cavity during containment flooding.

8. The SFS provides the nonsafety-related function of removing spent fuel decay heat using pumped flow through a heat exchanger.

C-237

9. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
10. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.7-3 to perform their listed functions.

11.Displays of the SFS parameters identified in Table 2.3.7-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-238

Table 2.3.7-1 Class 1E/ Loss of ASME Remotely Qual for Safety- Motive Component Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Name Tag No.Section III Cat 1 Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position Spent Fuel Pool Level SFS-019A No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Sensor Spent Fuel Pool Level SFS-019B No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Sensor Spent Fuel Pool Level SFS-019C No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

Sensor Refueling Cavity Drain SFS-PL-V031 Yes Yes No -/- Yes - - -

to SGS Compartment Isolation Valve Refueling Cavity to SFS SFS-PL-V032 Yes Yes No -/- No - - -

Pump Suction Isolation Valve Refueling Cavity Drain SFS-PL-V033 Yes Yes No -/- Yes - - -

to Containment Sump Isolation Valve IRWST to SFS Pump SFS-PL-V039 Yes Yes No -/- No - - -

Suction Line Isolation Valve Fuel Transfer Canal to SFS-PL-V040 Yes Yes No -/- No - - -

SFS Pump Suction Iso.

Valve Cask Loading Pit to SFS SFS-PL-V041 Yes Yes No -/- No - - -

Pump Suction Isolation Valve Cask Loading Pit to SFS SFS-PL-V042 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Pump Suction Isolation Closed Valve C-239

Table 2.3.7-1 Class 1E/ Loss of ASME Remotely Qual for Safety- Motive Component Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Name Tag No.Section III Cat 1 Valve Envir. Display PMS Function Position SFS Pump Discharge SFS-PL-V045 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Line to Cask Loading Closed Pit Isolation Valve Cask Loading Pit to SFS-PL-V049 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

WLS Isolation Valve Closed Spent Fuel Pool to Cask SFS-PL-V066 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Washdown Pit Isolation Open Valve Cask Washdown Pit SFS-PL-V068 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Drain Isolation Valve Open Refueling Cavity Drain SFS-PL-V071 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Line Check Valve Open Transfer Closed Refueling Cavity Drain SFS-PL-V072 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer -

Line Check Valve Open Transfer Closed SFS Containment SFS-PL-V075 Yes Yes No -/- Yes - - -

Floodup Isolation Valve Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-240

Table 2.3.7-2 Piping Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Spent Fuel Pool to RNS Pump Suction L014 Yes Cask Loading Pit to RNS Pump Suction L015 Yes Refueling Cavity Drain L033 Yes PXS IRWST to SFS Pump Suction L035 Yes Refueling Cavity Skimmer to SFS Pump L036 Yes Suction Refueling Cavity Drain L037 Yes Refueling Cavity Drain L044 Yes Fuel Transfer Canal Drain L047 Yes Cask Washdown Pit Drain L068 Yes Cask Loading Pit Drain L043 Yes Cask Pit Transfer Branch Line L045 Yes Refueling Cavity Drain L030 Yes Refueling Cavity Drain L040 Yes Spent Fuel Pool Drain L066 Yes Cask Loading Pit to WLS L067 Yes RNS Return to Spent Fuel Pool L100 Yes SFS Containment Floodup Line L120 Yes Table 2.3.7-3 Component Name Tag No. Display Control Function SFS Pump 1A SFS-MP-01A Yes Start (Run Status)

SFS Pump 1B SFS-MP-01B Yes Start (Run Status)

SFS Flow Sensor SFS-13A Yes -

SFS Flow Sensor SFS-13B Yes -

Spent Fuel Pool Temperature Sensor SFS-018 Yes -

Cask Loading Pit Level Sensor SFS-022 Yes -

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-241

Table 2.3.7-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 392 2.3.07.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built SFS conforms SFS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.7. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.7.

393 2.3.07.02a 2.a) The components identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.3.7-1 as ASME Code the ASME as-built components design reports exist for the as-Section III are designed and constructed as documented in the ASME built components identified in in accordance with ASME Code design reports. Table 2.3.7-1 as ASME Code Section III requirements. Section III.

394 2.3.07.02b 2.b) The piping lines identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code the as-built piping lines as design reports exist for the as-Section III are designed and constructed documented in the ASME design built piping lines identified in in accordance with ASME Code reports. Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III requirements. Section III.

395 2.3.07.03 3. Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code ASME Code Section III meet ASME performed in accordance with Section III requirements are Code Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

396 2.3.07.04 4. The piping lines identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code performed on the piping lines that the results of the Section III retain their pressure required by the ASME Code hydrostatic test of the piping boundary integrity at their design Section III to be hydrostatically lines identified in pressure. tested. Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

397 2.3.07.05.i 5. The seismic Category I components i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand to verify that the seismic components identified in seismic design basis loads without loss Category I components Table 2.3.7-1 are located on of safety functions. identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are the Nuclear Island.

located on the Nuclear Island.

398 2.3.07.05.ii 5. The seismic Category I components ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis loads without loss analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can of safety functions. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

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Table 2.3.7-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 399 2.3.07.05.iii 5. The seismic Category I components iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built seismic design basis loads without loss verifying that the as-built equipment including of safety functions. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

400 2.3.07.06a 6.a) The Class 1E components Testing will be performed on the A simulated test signal exists identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are powered SFS by providing a simulated at the Class 1E components from their respective Class 1E division. test signal in each Class 1E identified in Table 2.3.7-1 division. when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

401 2.3.07.06b 6.b) Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, SFS Class 1E divisions, and between item 7.d. item 7.d.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

402 2.3.07.07a 7.a) The SFS preserves containment See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, integrity by isolation of the SFS lines items 1 and 7. items 1 and 7.

penetrating the containment.

403 2.3.07.07b.i 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel i) Inspection will be performed i) The volume of the spent cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent to verify that the spent fuel pool fuel pool and fuel transfer fuel pool water and makeup water from includes a sufficient volume of canal above the fuel and to the on-site storage tanks. water. elevation 6 feet below the operating deck is greater than or equal to 129,500 gallons.

404 2.3.07.07b.ii 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel ii) Inspection will be performed ii) The water volume of the cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent to verify the cask washdown pit cask washdown pit is greater fuel pool water and makeup water from includes sufficient volume of than or equal to on-site storage tanks. water. 30,900 gallons.

405 2.3.07.07b.iii 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel iii) A safety-related flow path iii) See item 1 of this table.

cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent exists from the cask washdown fuel pool water and makeup water from pit to the spent fuel pool.

on-site storage tanks.

406 2.3.07.07b.iv 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel iv) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, iv) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent item 7.f for inspection, testing, item 7.f for inspection, testing, fuel pool water and makeup water from and acceptance criteria for the and acceptance criteria for the on-site storage tanks. makeup water supply from the makeup water supply from the passive containment cooling PCS water storage tank to the system (PCS) water storage tank spent fuel pool.

to the spent fuel pool.

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Table 2.3.7-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 407 2.3.07.07b.v 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel v) Inspection will be performed v) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent to verify that the passive item 7.f for the volume of the fuel pool water and makeup water from containment cooling system passive containment cooling on-site storage tanks. water storage tank includes a system water storage tank.

sufficient volume of water.

408 2.3.07.07b.vi 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel vi) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, vi) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent items 8.a and 8.b for inspection, items 8.a and 8.b for fuel pool water and makeup water from testing, and acceptance criteria inspection, testing, and on-site storage tanks. to verify that the passive acceptance criteria for the containment cooling system volume of the passive ancillary water storage tank containment cooling system includes a sufficient volume of ancillary water storage tank.

water.

409 2.3.07.07c 7c) The SFS provides check valves in Exercise testing of the check Each check valve changes the drain line from the refueling cavity valves with active safety- position as indicated on to prevent flooding of the refueling functions identified in Table Table 2.3.7-1.

cavity during containment flooding. 2.3.7-1 will be performed under pre-operational test pressure, temperature and flow conditions.

410 2.3.07.08.i 8. The SFS provides the nonsafety- i) Inspection will be performed i) A report exists and related function of removing spent fuel for the existence of a report that concludes that the heat decay heat using pumped flow through determines the heat removal transfer characteristic, UA, of a heat exchanger. capability of the SFS heat each SFS heat exchanger is exchangers. greater than or equal to 2.2 million Btu/hr-°F.

411 2.3.07.08.ii 8. The SFS provides the nonsafety- ii) Testing will be performed to ii) Each SFS pump produces related function of removing spent fuel confirm that each SFS pump at least 900 gpm through its decay heat using pumped flow through provides flow through its heat heat exchanger.

a heat exchanger. exchanger when taking suction from the SFP and returning flow to the SFP.

412 2.3.07.09 9. Safety-related displays identified in Inspection will be performed for Safety-related displays Table 2.3.7-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can MCR. related displays in the MCR. be retrieved in the MCR.

413 2.3.07.10 10. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed to Controls in the MCR cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.7-3 to actuate the pumps identified in pumps identified in perform their listed functions. Table 2.3.7-3 using controls in Table 2.3.7-3 to perform the the MCR. listed functions.

414 2.3.07.11 11. Displays of the SFS parameters Inspection will be performed for Displays of the SFS identified in Table 2.3.7-3 can be retrievability in the MCR of the parameters identified in retrieved in the MCR. displays identified in Table 2.3.7-3 are retrieved in Table 2.3.7-3. the MCR.

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Table 2.3.7-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location SFS Pump A SFS-MP-01A Auxiliary Building SFS Pump B SFS-MP-01B Auxiliary Building SFS Heat Exchanger A SFS-ME-01A Auxiliary Building SFS Heat Exchanger B SFS-ME-01B Auxiliary Building C-245

Figure 2.3.7-1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System C-246

2.3.8 Service Water System Design Description The service water system (SWS) transfers heat from the component cooling water heat exchangers to the atmosphere. The SWS operates during normal modes of plant operation, including startup, power operation (full and partial loads), cooldown, shutdown, and refueling.

The SWS is as shown in Figure 2.3.8-1 and the component locations of the SWS are as shown Table 2.3.8-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the SWS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.8.
2. The SWS provides the nonsafety-related function of transferring heat from the component cooling water system (CCS) to the surrounding atmosphere to support plant shutdown and spent fuel pool cooling.
3. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.3.8-1 to perform the listed function.
4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.8-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

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Table 2.3.8-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Service Water Pump A (Motor) SWS-MP-01A Yes Start (Run Status)

Service Water Pump B (Motor) SWS-MP-01B Yes Start (Run Status)

Service Water Cooling Tower Fan A (Motor) SWS-MA-01A Yes Start (Run Status)

Service Water Cooling Tower Fan B (Motor) SWS-MA-01B Yes Start (Run Status)

Service Water Pump 1A Flow Sensor SWS-004A Yes -

Service Water Pump 1B Flow Sensor SWS-004B Yes -

Service Water Pump A Discharge Valve SWS-PL-V002A Yes Open (Valve Position)

Service Water Pump B Discharge Valve SWS-PL-V002B Yes Open (Valve Position)

Service Water Pump A Discharge Temperature SWS-005A Yes -

Sensor Service Water Pump B Discharge Temperature SWS-005B Yes -

Sensor Service Water Cooling Tower Basin Level SWS-009 Yes -

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.3.8-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 415 2.3.08.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built SWS conforms SWS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.8. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.8.

416 2.3.08.02.i 2. The SWS provides the nonsafety- i) Testing will be performed to i) Each SWS pump can related function of transferring heat confirm that the SWS can provide at least 10,000 gpm of from the component cooling water provide cooling water to the cooling water through its CCS system to the surrounding atmosphere CCS heat exchangers. heat exchanger.

to support plant shutdown and spent fuel pool cooling.

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Table 2.3.8-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 417 2.3.08.02.ii 2. The SWS provides the nonsafety- ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and related function of transferring heat for the existence of a report that concludes that the heat from the component cooling water determines the heat transfer transfer rate of each cooling system to the surrounding atmosphere capability of each cooling tower tower cell is greater than or to support plant shutdown and spent cell. equal to 170 million Btu/hr at fuel pool cooling. a 80.1°F ambient wet bulb temperature and a cold water temperature of 90°F.

418 2.3.08.02.iii 2. The SWS provides the nonsafety- iii) Testing will be performed to iii) The SWS tower basin related function of transferring heat confirm that the SWS cooling contains a usable volume of at from the component cooling water tower basin has adequate reserve least 230,000 gallons at the system to the surrounding atmosphere volume. basin low level alarm setpoint.

to support plant shutdown and spent fuel pool cooling.

419 2.3.08.03 3. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed on the Controls in the MCR operate the components identified in Table components in Table 2.3.8-1 to cause the components listed 2.3.8-1 to perform the listed function. using controls in the MCR. in Table 2.3.8-1 to perform the listed functions.

420 2.3.08.04 4. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.3.8-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of parameters in Table 2.3.8-1 can be retrieved MCR. the MCR. in the MCR.

Table 2.3.8-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Service Water Pump A SWS-MP-01A Turbine Building or yard Service Water Pump B SWS-MP-01B Turbine Building or yard Service Water Cooling Tower SWS-ME-01 Yard C-249

Figure 2.3.8-1 Service Water System C-250

2.3.9 Containment Hydrogen Control System Design Description The containment hydrogen control system (VLS) limits hydrogen gas concentration in containment during accidents.

The VLS has catalytic hydrogen recombiners (VLS-MY-E01A and VLS-MY-E01B) that are located inside containment. The VLS has hydrogen igniters located as shown on Table 2.3.9-2.

1. The functional arrangement of the VLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.9.
2. a) The hydrogen monitors identified in Table 2.3.9-1 are powered by the non-Class 1E dc and UPS system.

b) The components identified in Table 2.3.9-2 are powered from their respective non-Class 1E power group.

3. The VLS provides the non-safety related function to control the containment hydrogen concentration for beyond design basis accidents.
4. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.3.9-2 to perform the listed function.

b) The components identified in Table 2.3.9-2 perform the listed function after receiving a manual signal from the diverse actuation system (DAS).

5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.9-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.3.9-1 Equipment Tag No. Display Containment Hydrogen Monitor VLS-001 Yes Containment Hydrogen Monitor VLS-002 Yes Containment Hydrogen Monitor VLS-003 Yes C-251

Table 2.3.9-2 Power Group Room Equipment Name Tag Number Function Number Location No.

Hydrogen Igniter 01 VLS-EH-01 Energize 1 Tunnel connection loop compartments 11204 Hydrogen Igniter 02 VLS-EH-02 Energize 2 Tunnel connection loop compartments 11204 Hydrogen Igniter 03 VLS-EH-03 Energize 1 Tunnel connection loop compartments 11204 Hydrogen Igniter 04 VLS-EH-04 Energize 2 Tunnel connection loop compartments 11204 Hydrogen Igniter 05 VLS-EH-05 Energize 1 Loop compartment 02 11402 Hydrogen Igniter 06 VLS-EH-06 Energize 2 Loop compartment 02 11502 Hydrogen Igniter 07 VLS-EH-07 Energize 2 Loop compartment 02 11402 Hydrogen Igniter 08 VLS-EH-08 Energize 1 Loop compartment 02 11502 Hydrogen Igniter 09 VLS-EH-09 Energize 1 In-containment refueling water storage 11305 tank (IRWST)

Hydrogen Igniter 10 VLS-EH-10 Energize 2 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 11 VLS-EH-11 Energize 2 Loop compartment 01 11401 Hydrogen Igniter 12 VLS-EH-12 Energize 1 Loop compartment 01 11501 Hydrogen Igniter 13 VLS-EH-13 Energize 1 Loop compartment 01 11401 Hydrogen Igniter 14 VLS-EH-14 Energize 2 Loop compartment 01 11501 Hydrogen Igniter 15 VLS-EH-15 Energize 2 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 16 VLS-EH-16 Energize 1 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 17 VLS-EH-17 Energize 2 Northeast valve room 11207 Hydrogen Igniter 18 VLS-EH-18 Energize 1 Northeast accumulator room 11207 Hydrogen Igniter 19 VLS-EH-19 Energize 2 East valve room 11208 Hydrogen Igniter 20 VLS-EH-20 Energize 2 Southeast accumulator room 11206 Hydrogen Igniter 21 VLS-EH-21 Energize 1 Southeast valve room 11206 Hydrogen Igniter 22 VLS-EH-22 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (core makeup 11400 tank [CMT] and valve area)

Hydrogen Igniter 23 VLS-EH-23 Energize 2 Lower compartment area (CMT and 11400 valve area)

Hydrogen Igniter 24 VLS-EH-24 Energize 2 Lower compartment area (CMT and 11400 valve area)

Hydrogen Igniter 25 VLS-EH-25 Energize 2 Lower compartment area (CMT and 11400 valve area)

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Table 2.3.9-2 Power Group Room Equipment Name Tag Number Function Number Location No.

Hydrogen Igniter 26 VLS-EH-26 Energize 2 Lower compartment area (CMT and 11400 valve area)

Hydrogen Igniter 27 VLS-EH-27 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (CMT and 11400 valve area)

Hydrogen Igniter 28 VLS-EH-28 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (CMT and 11400 valve area)

Hydrogen Igniter 29 VLS-EH-29 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (CMT and 11400 valve area)

Hydrogen Igniter 30 VLS-EH-30 Energize 2 Lower compartment area (CMT and 11400 valve area)

Hydrogen Igniter 31 VLS-EH-31 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (CMT and 11400 valve area)

Hydrogen Igniter 32 VLS-EH-32 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (CMT and 11400 valve area)

Hydrogen Igniter 33 VLS-EH-33 Energize 2 North CVS equipment room 11209 Hydrogen Igniter 34 VLS-EH-34 Energize 1 North CVS equipment room 11209 Hydrogen Igniter 35 VLS-EH-35 Energize 1 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 36 VLS-EH-36 Energize 2 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 37 VLS-EH-37 Energize 1 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 38 VLS-EH-38 Energize 2 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 39 VLS-EH-39 Energize 1 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 40 VLS-EH-40 Energize 2 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 41 VLS-EH-41 Energize 2 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 42 VLS-EH-42 Energize 1 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 43 VLS-EH-43 Energize 1 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 44 VLS-EH-44 Energize 1 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 45 VLS-EH-45 Energize 2 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 46 VLS-EH-46 Energize 2 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 47 VLS-EH-47 Energize 1 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 48 VLS-EH-48 Energize 2 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 49 VLS-EH-49 Energize 1 Pressurizer compartment 11503 Hydrogen Igniter 50 VLS-EH-50 Energize 2 Pressurizer compartment 11503 C-253

Table 2.3.9-2 Power Group Room Equipment Name Tag Number Function Number Location No.

Hydrogen Igniter 51 VLS-EH-51 Energize 1 Upper compartment mid-region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 52 VLS-EH-52 Energize 2 Upper compartment mid-region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 53 VLS-EH-53 Energize 2 Upper compartment mid-region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 54 VLS-EH-54 Energize 1 Upper compartment mid-region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 55 VLS-EH-55 Energize 1 Refueling cavity 11504 Hydrogen Igniter 56 VLS-EH-56 Energize 2 Refueling cavity 11504 Hydrogen Igniter 57 VLS-EH-57 Energize 2 Refueling cavity 11504 Hydrogen Igniter 58 VLS-EH-58 Energize 1 Refueling cavity 11504 Hydrogen Igniter 59 VLS-EH-59 Energize 2 Pressurizer compartment 11503 Hydrogen Igniter 60 VLS-EH-60 Energize 1 Pressurizer compartment 11503 Hydrogen Igniter 61 VLS-EH-61 Energize 1 Upper compartment-upper region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 62 VLS-EH-62 Energize 2 Upper compartment-upper region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 63 VLS-EH-63 Energize 1 Upper compartment-upper region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 64 VLS-EH-64 Energize 2 Upper compartment-upper region 11500 Table 2.3.9-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 421 2.3.09.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built VLS conforms VLS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.9. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.9.

422 2.3.09.02a 2.a) The hydrogen monitors identified Testing will be performed by A simulated test signal exists in Table 2.3.9-1 are powered by the providing a simulated test signal at the hydrogen monitors non-Class 1E dc and UPS system. in each power group of the identified in Table 2.3.9-1 non-Class 1E dc and UPS when the non-Class 1E dc and system. UPS system is provided the test signal.

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Table 2.3.9-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 423 2.3.09.02b 2.b) The components identified in Testing will be performed by A simulated test signal exists Table 2.3.9-2 are powered from their providing a simulated test signal at the equipment identified in respective non-Class 1E power group. in each non-Class 1E power Table 2.3.9-2 when the group. assigned non-Class 1E power group is provided the test signal.

424 2.3.09.03.i 3. The VLS provides the nonsafety- i) Inspection for the number of i) At least 64 hydrogen related function to control the igniters will be performed. igniters are provided inside containment hydrogen concentration for containment at the locations beyond design basis accidents. specified in Table 2.3.9-2.

425 2.3.09.03.ii 3. The VLS provides the nonsafety- ii) Operability testing will be ii) The surface temperature of related function to control the performed on the igniters. the igniter exceeds 1700°F.

containment hydrogen concentration for beyond design basis accidents.

426 C.2.3.09.03.iii 3. The VLS provides the nonsafety- iii) An inspection of the as-built iii) The equipment access related function to control the containment internal structures opening and CMT-A opening containment hydrogen concentration for will be performed. constitute at least 98% of vent beyond design basis accidents. paths within Room 11206 that vent to Room 11300. The minimum distance between the equipment access opening and containment shell is at least 24.3 feet. The minimum distance between the CMT-A opening and the containment shell is at least 9.4 feet. The CMT-B opening constitutes at least 98% of vent paths within Room 11207 that vent to Room 11300 and is a minimum distance of 24.6 feet away from the containment shell. Other openings through the ceilings of these rooms must be at least 3 feet from the containment shell.

427 2.3.09.03.iv 3. The VLS provides the nonsafety- iv) An inspection will be iv) The discharge from each related function to control the performed of the as-built IRWST of these IRWST vents is containment hydrogen concentration for vents that are located in the roof oriented generally away from beyond design basis accidents. of the IRWST along the side of the containment shell.

the IRWST next to the containment shell.

428 2.3.09.04a 4.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed on the Controls in the MCR operate the components identified in Table igniters using the controls in the to energize the igniters.

2.3.9-2 to perform the listed function. MCR.

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Table 2.3.9-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 429 2.3.09.04b 4.b) The components identified in Testing will be performed on the The igniters energize after Table 2.3.9-2 perform the listed igniters using the DAS controls. receiving a signal from DAS.

function after receiving manual a signal from DAS.

430 2.3.09.05 5. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for Displays identified in in Table 2.3.9-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the displays Table 2.3.9-1 can be retrieved MCR. identified in Table 2.3.9-1 in the in the MCR.

MCR.

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2.3.10 Liquid Radwaste System Design Description The liquid radwaste system (WLS) receives, stores, processes, samples and monitors the discharge of radioactive wastewater.

The WLS has components which receive and store radioactive or potentially radioactive liquid waste. These are the reactor coolant drain tank, the containment sump, the effluent holdup tanks and the waste holdup tanks. The WLS components store and process the waste during normal operation and during anticipated operational occurrences. Monitoring of the liquid waste is performed prior to discharge.

The WLS is as shown in Figure 2.3.10-1 and the component locations of the WLS are as shown in Table 2.3.10-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the WLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.10.
2. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.10-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. The WLS provides the following safety-related functions:

a) The WLS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the WLS lines penetrating the containment.

b) Check valves in drain lines to the containment sump limit cross flooding of compartments.

7. The WLS provides the nonsafety-related functions of:

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a) Detecting leaks within containment to the containment sump.

b) Controlling releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents.

8. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.3.10-3 to perform its active function.
9. The check valves identified in Table 2.3.10-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.
10. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.10-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

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Table 2.3.10-1 Class 1E/

Remotely Qual. for Safety-ASME Code Seismic Operated Harsh Related Active Equipment Name Tag No.Section III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display Function WLS Containment Sump Level Sensor WLS-LT-034 No Yes No No/No No -

WLS Containment Sump Level Sensor WLS-LT-035 No Yes No No/No No -

WLS Containment Sump Level Sensor WLS-LT-036 No Yes No No/No No -

WLS Drain from Passive Core Cooling WLS-PL-V071B Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer System (PXS) Compartment A (Room Closed 11206) Check Valve WLS Drain from PXS Compartment A WLS-PL-V072B Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer (Room 11206) Check Valve Closed WLS Drain from PXS Compartment B WLS-PL-V071C Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer (Room 11207) Check Valve Closed WLS Drain from PXS Compartment B WLS-PL-V072C Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer (Room 11207) Check Valve Closed WLS Drain from Chemical and Volume WLS-PL-V071A Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer Control System (CVS) Compartment Closed (Room 11209) Check Valve WLS Drain from CVS Compartment WLS-PL-V072A Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer (Room 11209) Check Valve Closed Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.3.10-2 Line Name Line No. ASME Section III Functional Capability Required WLS Drain from PXS WLS-PL-L062 Yes Yes Compartment A WLS-PL-L078 WLS Drain from PXS WLS-PL-L063 Yes Yes Compartment B WLS-PL-L079 WLS Drain from CVS WLS-PL-L061 Yes Yes Compartment WSL-PL-L077 WLS-PL-L020 Table 2.3.10-3 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function WLS Effluent Discharge Isolation WLS-PL-V223 - Close Valve Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Level WLS-JE-LT002 Yes -

Letdown Flow from CVS to WLS WLS-JE-FT020 Yes -

Table 2.3.10-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 431 2.3.10.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built WLS conforms WLS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.10. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.10.

432 2.3.10.02a 2.a) The components identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section the as-built components as design report exists for the as III are designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design built components identified in accordance with ASME Code reports. Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III requirements. Section III.

433 2.3.10.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section the as-built piping as design reports exist for the as-III is designed and constructed in documented in the ASME design built piping identified in accordance with ASME Code reports. Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III requirements. Section III.

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Table 2.3.10-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 434 2.3.10.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Section as ASME Code Section III meet ASME performed in accordance with III requirements are met for Code Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

435 2.3.10.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Code Section III meet ASME Code performed in accordance with Section III requirements are Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

436 2.3.10.04a 4.a) The components identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code performed on the components that the results of the Section III retain their pressure required by the ASME Code hydrostatic test of the boundary integrity at their design Section III to be hydrostatically components identified in pressure. tested. Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

437 2.3.10.04b 4.b) The piping identified in A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section performed on the piping required that the results of the III retains its pressure boundary by the ASME Code Section III to hydrostatic test of the piping integrity at its design pressure. be hydrostatically tested. identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

438 2.3.10.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can to verify that the seismic equipment identified in withstand seismic design basis loads Category I equipment identified Table 2.3.10-1 is located on without loss of safety function. in Table 2.3.10-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

the Nuclear Island.

439 2.3.10.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic withstand seismic design basis loads analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can without loss of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

440 2.3.10.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built withstand seismic design basis loads verifying that the as-built equipment including without loss of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

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Table 2.3.10-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 441 2.3.10.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Inspection will be performed for A report exists and concludes Table 2.3.10-2 for which functional the existence of a report that each of the as-built lines capability is required is designed to verifying that the as-built piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 for withstand combined normal and seismic meets the requirements for which functional capability is design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability. required meets the functional capability. requirements for functional capability.

442 2.3.10.06a 6.a) The WLS preserves containment See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, integrity by isolation of the WLS lines items 1 and 7. items 1 and 7.

penetrating the containment.

443 2.3.10.06b 6.b) Check valves in drain lines to the Refer to item 9 in this table. Refer to item 9 in this table.

containment sump limit cross flooding of compartments.

444 2.3.10.07a.i 7.a) The WLS provides the nonsafety- i) Inspection will be performed i) Nonsafety-related displays related function of detecting leaks for retrievability of the displays of WLS containment sump within containment to the containment of containment sump level level channels WLS-LT-034, sump. channels WLS-LT-034, WLS-LT-035, and WLS-LT-035, and WLS-LT-036 WLS-LT-036 can be retrieved in the MCR. in the MCR.

445 2.3.10.07a.ii 7.a) The WLS provides the nonsafety- ii) Testing will be performed by ii) A report exists and related function of detecting leaks adding water to the sump and concludes that sump level within containment to the containment observing display of sump level. channels WLS-LT-034, sump. WLS-LT-035, and WLS-LT-036 can detect a change of 1.75 +/- 0.1 inches.

446 2.3.10.07b 7.b) The WLS provides the nonsafety- Tests will be performed to A simulated high radiation related function of controlling releases confirm that a simulated high signal causes the discharge of radioactive materials in liquid radiation signal from the control isolation valve effluents. discharge radiation monitor, WLS-PL-V223 to close.

WLS-RE-229, causes the discharge isolation valve WLS-PL-V223 to close.

447 2.3.10.08 8. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Stroke testing will be performed Controls in the MCR operate the remotely operated valve identified on the remotely operated valve to cause the remotely operated in Table 2.3.10-3 to perform its active listed in Table 2.3.10-3 using valve to perform its active function. controls in the MCR. function.

448 2.3.10.09 9. The check valves identified in Exercise testing of the check Each check valve changes Table 2.3.10-1 perform an active safety- valves with active safety position as indicated on related function to change position as functions identified in Table 2.3.10-1.

indicated in the table. Table 2.3.10-1 will be performed under pre-operational test pressure, temperature and flow conditions.

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Table 2.3.10-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 449 2.3.10.10 10. Displays of the parameters Inspection will be performed for Displays identified in identified in Table 2.3.10-3 can be retrievability of the displays Table 2.3.10-3 can be retrieved in the MCR. identified in Table 2.3.10-3 in retrieved in the MCR.

the MCR.

Table 2.3.10-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location WLS Reactor Coolant Drain Tank WLS-MT-01 Containment WLS Containment Sump WLS-MT-02 Containment WLS Degasifier Column WLS-MV-01 Auxiliary Building WLS Effluent Holdup Tanks WLS-MT-05A Auxiliary Building WLS-MT-05B WLS Waste Holdup Tanks WLS-MT-06A Auxiliary Building WLS-MT-06B WLS Waste Pre-Filter WLS-MV-06 Auxiliary Building WLS Ion Exchangers WLS-MV-03 Auxiliary Building WLS-MV-04A WLS-MV-04B WLS-MV-04C WLS Waste After-Filter WLS-MV-07 Auxiliary Building WLS Monitor Tanks WLS-MT-07A Auxiliary Building WLS-MT-07B WLS-MT-07C WLS-MT-07D Radwaste Building WLS-MT-07E WLS-MT-07F C-263

Figure 2.3.10-1 Liquid Radwaste System C-264

2.3.11 Gaseous Radwaste System Design Description The gaseous radwaste system (WGS) receives, processes, and discharges the radioactive waste gases received within acceptable off-site release limits during normal modes of plant operation including power generation, shutdown and refueling.

The WGS is as shown in Figure 2.3.11-1 and the component locations of the WGS are as shown in Table 2.3.11-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the WGS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.11.
2. The equipment identified in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand the appropriate seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.
3. The WGS provides the nonsafety-related functions of:
a. Processing radioactive gases prior to discharge.
b. Controlling the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents.
c. The WGS is purged with nitrogen on indication of high oxygen levels in the system.

Table 2.3.11-1 Seismic Equipment Name Tag No. Category I WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed A WGS-MV-02A No(1)

WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed B WGS-MV-02B No(1)

WGS Discharge Isolation Valve WGS-PL-V051 No Note:

1. The WGS activated carbon delay beds (WGS-MV-02A and B) are designed to one-half SSE.

Table 2.3.11-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 450 2.3.11.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built WGS conforms WGS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.11. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.11.

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Table 2.3.11-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 451 2.3.11.02.i 2. The equipment identified as having i) Inspection will be performed i) The equipment identified as seismic design requirements in to verify that the equipment having seismic design Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic identified as having seismic requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 design basis loads without loss of its design requirements in is located on the Nuclear structural integrity function. Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Island.

Nuclear Island.

452 2.3.11.02.ii 2. The equipment identified as having ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and seismic design requirements in combination of type tests and concludes that the seismically Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic analyses of seismically designed designed equipment can design basis loads without loss of its equipment will be performed. withstand appropriate seismic structural integrity function. design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.

453 2.3.11.02.iii 2. The equipment identified as having iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and seismic design requirements in for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic verifying that the as-built equipment including design basis loads without loss of its equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically structural integrity function. is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

454 2.3.11.03a 3.a) The WGS provides the nonsafety- Inspection will be performed to A report exists and concludes related function of processing verify the contained volume of that the contained volume in radioactive gases prior to discharge. each of the activated carbon each of the activated carbon delay beds, WGS-MV02A and delay beds, WGS-MV02A and WGS-MV02B. WGS-MV02B, is at least 80 ft3.

455 2.3.11.03b 3.b) The WGS provides the nonsafety- Tests will be performed to A simulated high radiation related function of controlling the confirm that the presence of a signal causes the discharge releases of radioactive materials in simulated high radiation signal control isolation valve gaseous effluents. from the discharge radiation WGS-PL-V051 to close.

monitor, WGS-017, causes the discharge control isolation valve WGS-PL-V051 to close.

456 2.3.11.03c 3.c) The WGS is purged with nitrogen Tests will be performed to A simulated high oxygen level on indication of high oxygen levels in confirm that the presence of a signal causes the nitrogen the system. simulated high oxygen level purge valve (WGS-PL-V002) signal from the oxygen monitors to open and the WLS (WGS-025A, -025B) causes degasifier vacuum pumps the nitrogen purge valve (WLS-MP-03A, -03B) to stop.

(WGS-PL-V002) to open and the WLS degasifier vacuum pumps (WLS-MP-03A, -03B) to stop.

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Table 2.3.11-3 Equipment Name Tag No. Component Location WGS Gas Cooler WGS-ME-01 Auxiliary Building WGS Moisture Separator WGS-MV-03 Auxiliary Building WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed A WGS-MV-02A Auxiliary Building WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed B WGS-MV-02B Auxiliary Building C-267

Figure 2.3.11-1 Gaseous Radwaste System C-268

2.3.12 Solid Radwaste System Design Description The solid radwaste system (WSS) receives, collects, and stores the solid radioactive wastes received prior to their processing and packaging by mobile equipment for shipment off-site.

The component locations of the WSS are as shown in Table 2.3.12-2.

1. The functional arrangement of the WSS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.12.
2. The WSS provides the nonsafety-related function of storing radioactive spent resins prior to processing or shipment.

Table 2.3.12-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 457 2.3.12.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built WSS conforms WSS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.12. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.12.

458 2.3.12.02 2. The WSS provides the nonsafety- Inspection will be performed to A report exists and concludes related function of storing radioactive verify that the volume of each of that the volume of each of the solids prior to processing or shipment. the spent resin tanks, spent resin tanks, WSS-WSS-MV01A and MV01A and WSS-MV01B, is WSS-MV01B, is at least 250 ft3. at least 250 ft3.

Table 2.3.12-2 Component Name Tag No. Component Location WSS Spent Resin Tank A WSS-MV-01A Auxiliary Building WSS Spent Resin Tank B WSS-MV-01B Auxiliary Building C-269

2.3.13 Primary Sampling System Design Description The primary sampling system collects samples of fluids in the reactor coolant system (RCS) and the containment atmosphere during normal operations.

The PSS is as shown in Figure 2.3.13-1. The PSS Grab Sampling Unit (PSS-MS-01) is located in the Auxiliary Building.

1. The functional arrangement of the PSS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.13.
2. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
3. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.
4. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
6. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between PSS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E divisions.

7. The PSS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the PSS lines penetrating the containment.
8. The PSS provides the nonsafety-related function of providing the capability of obtaining reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples.
9. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.
10. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.13-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

11. a) The check valve identified in Table 2.3.13-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

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b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.13-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

12. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the valves identified in Table 2.3.13-2 to perform the listed function.

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Table 2.3.13-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Safety- Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS/DAS Function Position Liquid Sample Line PSS-PL-V011 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer Closed Containment Isolation (Valve Closed Valve Outside Reactor Position)

Containment (ORC)

Liquid Sample Line PSS-PL- Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/No Transfer Closed Containment Isolation V010A (Valve Closed Valve Inside Reactor Position)

Containment (IRC)

Liquid Sample Line PSS-PL- Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/No Transfer Closed Containment Isolation V010B (Valve Closed Valve IRC Position)

Containment Air PSS-PL-V008 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes Yes/No Transfer Closed Sample Containment (Valve Closed Isolation Valve IRC Position)

Air Sample Line PSS-PL-V046 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer Closed Containment Isolation (Valve Closed Valve ORC Position)

Sample Return Line PSS-PL-V023 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer Closed Containment Isolation (Valve Closed Valve ORC Position)

Sample Return PSS-PL-V024 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer Closed Containment Isolation Closed Check Valve IRC Note: A dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.3.13-2 Equipment Name Tag No. Control Function Hot Leg 1 Sample Isolation Valve PSS-PL-V001A Transfer Open/Transfer Closed Hot Leg 2 Sample Isolation Valve PSS-PL-V001B Transfer Open/Transfer Closed Table 2.3.13-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 459 2.3.13.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built PSS conforms PSS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.13. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.13.

460 2.3.13.02 2. The components identified in Table Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III are the as-built components as design reports exist for the as-designed and constructed in accordance documented in the ASME design built components identified in with ASME Code Section III reports. Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code requirements. Section III.

461 2.3.13.03 3. Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Section as ASME Code Section III meet ASME performed in accordance with III requirements are met for Code Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

462 2.3.13.04 4. The components identified in Table A hydrostatic test will be A report exists and concludes 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III performed on the components that the results of the retain their pressure boundary integrity required by the ASME Code hydrostatic test of the at their design pressure. Section III to be hydrostatically components identified in tested. Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

463 2.3.13.05.i 5. The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can to verify that the seismic equipment identified in withstand seismic design basis loads Category I equipment and valves Table 2.3.13-1 is located on without loss of its safety function. identified in Table 2.3.13-1 are the Nuclear Island.

located on the Nuclear Island.

464 2.3.13.05.ii 5. The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic withstand seismic design basis loads analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can without loss of its safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

C-273

Table 2.3.13-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 465 2.3.13.05.iii 5. The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built withstand seismic design basis loads verifying that the as-built equipment including without loss of its safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

466 2.3.13.06a.i 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified i) Type tests, analyses, or a i) A report exists and in Tables 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for combination of type tests and concludes that the Class 1E a harsh environment can withstand the analyses will be performed on equipment identified in environmental conditions that would Class 1E equipment located in a Table 2.3.13-1 as being exist before, during, and following a harsh environment. qualified for a harsh design basis accident without loss of environment can withstand the their safety function, for the time environmental conditions that required to perform the safety function. would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of its safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

467 2.3.13.06a.ii 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and in Tables 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for of the as-built Class 1E concludes that the as-built a harsh environment can withstand the equipment and the associated Class 1E equipment and the environmental conditions that would wiring, cables, and terminations associated wiring, cables, and exist before, during, and following a located in a harsh environment. terminations identified in design basis accident without loss of Table 2.3.13-1 as being their safety function, for the time qualified for a harsh required to perform the safety function. environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

468 2.3.13.06b 6.b) The Class 1E components Testing will be performed on the A simulated test signal exists identified in Table 2.3.13-1 are powered PSS by providing a simulated at the Class 1E equipment from their respective Class 1E division. test signal in each Class 1E identified in Table 2.3.13-1 division. when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

469 2.3.13.06c 6.c) Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, PSS Class 1E divisions, and between item 7.d. item 7.d.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E divisions.

470 2.3.13.07 7. The PSS provides the safety- related See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, function of preserving containment item 7. item 7.

integrity by isolation of the PSS lines penetrating the containment.

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Table 2.3.13-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 471 2.3.13.08 8. The PSS provides the nonsafety- Testing will be performed to A sample is drawn from the related function of providing the obtain samples of the reactor reactor coolant and the capability of obtaining reactor coolant coolant and containment containment atmosphere.

and containment atmosphere samples. atmosphere.

472 2.3.13.09 9. Safety-related displays identified in Inspection will be performed for The safety-related displays Table 2.3.13-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.3.13-1 MCR. related displays in the MCR. can be retrieved in the MCR.

473 2.3.13.10a 10.a) Controls exist in the MCR to Stroke testing will be performed Controls in the MCR operate cause those remotely operated valves on the remotely operated valves to cause those remotely identified in Table 2.3.13-1 to perform identified in Table 2.3.13-1 using operated valves identified in active functions. the controls in the MCR. Table 2.3.13-1 to perform active functions.

474 2.3.13.10b 10.b) The valves identified in Testing will be performed on The remotely operated valves Table 2.3.13-1 as having PMS control remotely operated valves listed identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as perform an active function after in Table 2.3.13-1 using real or having PMS control perform the receiving a signal from the PMS. simulated signals into the PMS. active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

475 2.3.13.11a 11.a) The check valve identified in Exercise testing of the check The check valve changes Table 2.3.13-1 performs an active valve with an active safety position as indicated in safety-related function to change function identified in Table 2.3.13-1.

position as indicated in the table. Table 2.3.13-1 will be performed under preoperational test pressure, temperature, and fluid flow conditions.

476 2.3.13.11b 11.b) After loss of motive power, the Testing of the remotely operated After loss of motive power, remotely operated valves identified in valves will be performed under each remotely operated valve Table 2.3.13-1 assume the indicated loss the conditions of loss of motive identified in Table 2.3.13-1 of motive power position. power. assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

477 2.3.13.12 12. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed on the Controls in the MCR cause the valves identified in Table 2.3.13-2 components in Table 2.3.13-2 valves identified in to perform the listed function. using controls in the MCR. Table 2.3.13-2 to perform the listed functions.

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Figure 2.3.13-1 Primary Sampling System C-276

2.3.14 Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System Design Description The demineralized water transfer and storage system (DWS) receives water from the demineralized water treatment system (DTS), and provides a reservoir of demineralized water to supply the condensate storage tank and for distribution throughout the plant. Demineralized water is processed in the DWS to remove dissolved oxygen. In addition to supplying water for makeup of systems which require pure water, the demineralized water is used to sluice spent radioactive resins from the ion exchange vessels in the chemical and volume control system (CVS), the spent fuel pool cooling system (SFS), and the liquid radwaste system (WLS) to the solid radwaste system (WSS).

The component locations of the DWS are as shown in Table 2.3.14-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the DWS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.14.
2. The DWS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the DWS lines penetrating the containment.
3. The DWS condensate storage tank (CST) provides the nonsafety-related function of water supply to the FWS startup feedwater pumps.
4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.14-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.3.14-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Condensate Storage Tank Water Level DWS-006 Yes -

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.3.14-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 478 2.3.14.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built DWS conforms DWS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.14. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.14.

479 2.3.14.02 2. The DWS provides the safety-related See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, function of preserving containment items 1 and 7. items 1 and 7.

integrity by isolation of the DWS lines penetrating the containment.

480 2.3.14.03 3. The DWS CST provides the Inspection of the DWS CST will The volume of the CST nonsafety-related function of water be performed. between the tank overflow and supply to the FWS startup feedwater the startup feedwater pumps tanks. supply connection is greater than or equal to 325,000 gallons.

481 2.3.14.04 4. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.3.14-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability or parameters in Table 2.3.14-1 can be MCR. the MCR. retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.3.14-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Demineralizer Water Storage Tank DWS-MS-01 Annex Building Degasification System Package Condensate Storage Tank Degasification DWS-MS-02 Turbine Building System Package Demineralized Water Storage Tank DWS-MT-01 Yard Condensate Storage Tank DWS-MT-02 Yard C-278

2.3.15 Compressed and Instrument Air System Design Description The compressed and instrument air system (CAS) consists of three subsystems: instrument air, service air, and high-pressure air. The instrument air subsystem supplies compressed air for air-operated valves and dampers. The service air subsystem supplies compressed air at outlets throughout the plant to power air-operated tools and is used as a motive force for air-powered pumps. The service air subsystem is also utilized as a supply source for breathing air. The high-pressure air subsystem supplies air to the main control room emergency habitability system (VES), the generator breaker package, and fire fighting apparatus recharge station.

The CAS is required for normal operation and startup of the plant.

The component locations of the CAS are as shown in Table 2.3.15-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the CAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.15.
2. The CAS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the CAS lines penetrating the containment.
3. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.15-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.3.15-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Instrument Air Pressure CAS-011 Yes -

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

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Table 2.3.15-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 482 2.3.15.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built CAS conforms CAS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.15. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.15.

483 2.3.15.02 2. The CAS provides the safety-related See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, function of preserving containment items 1 and 7. items 1 and 7.

integrity by isolation of the CAS lines penetrating the containment.

484 2.3.15.03 3. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.3.15-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of parameters in Table 2.3.15-1 can be MCR. the MCR. retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.3.15-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Instrument Air Compressor Package A CAS-MS-01A Turbine Building Instrument Air Compressor Package B CAS-MS-01B Turbine Building Instrument Air Dryer Package A CAS-MS-02A Turbine Building Instrument Air Dryer Package B CAS-MS-02B Turbine Building Service Air Compressor Package A CAS-MS-03A Turbine Building Service Air Compressor Package B CAS-MS-03B Turbine Building Service Air Dryer Package A CAS-MS-04A Turbine Building Service Air Dryer Package B CAS-MS-04B Turbine Building High Pressure Air Compressor and Filter CAS-MS-05 Turbine Building Package Instrument Air Receiver A CAS-MT-01A Turbine Building Instrument Air Receiver B CAS-MT-01B Turbine Building Service Air Receiver CAS-MT-02 Turbine Building C-280

2.3.16 Potable Water System No entry for this system.

2.3.17 Waste Water System No entry for this system.

2.3.18 Plant Gas System No entry. Covered in Section 3.3, Buildings.

2.3.19 Communication System Design Description The communication system (EFS) provides intraplant communications during normal, maintenance, transient, fire, and accident conditions, including loss of offsite power.

1. a) The EFS has handsets, amplifiers, loudspeakers, and siren tone generators connected as a telephone/page system.

b) The EFS has sound-powered equipment connected as a system.

2. The EFS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The EFS telephone/page system provides intraplant, station-to-station communications and area broadcasting between the main control room (MCR) and the locations listed in Table 2.3.19-1.

b) The EFS provides sound-powered communications between the MCR, the remote shutdown workstation (RSW), the Division A, B, C, D dc equipment rooms (Rooms 12201/12203/12205/12207), the Division A, B, C, D I&C rooms (Rooms 12301/12302/12304/12305), and the diesel generator building (Rooms 60310/60320) without external power.

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Table 2.3.19-1 Telephone/Page System Equipment Location Fuel Handling Area 12562 Division A, B, C, D dc Equipment Rooms 12201/12203/12205/12207 Division A, B, C, D I&C Rooms 12301/12302/12304/12305 Maintenance Floor Staging Area 12351 Containment Maintenance Floor 11300 Containment Operating Deck 11500 Table 2.3.19-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 485 2.3.19.01a 1.a) The EFS has handsets, amplifiers, Inspection of the as-built system The as-built EFS has handsets, loudspeakers, and siren tone generators will be performed. amplifiers, loudspeakers, and connected as a telephone/page system. siren tone generators connected as a telephone/page system.

486 2.3.19.01b 1.b) The EFS has sound-powered Inspection of the as-built system The as-built EFS has sound-equipment connected as a system. will be performed. powered equipment connected as a system.

487 2.3.19.02a 2.a) The EFS telephone/page system An inspection and test will be Telephone/page equipment is provides intraplant, station-to-station performed on the telephone/page installed and voice communications and area broadcasting communication equipment. transmission and reception between the MCR and the locations from the MCR are listed in Table 2.3.19-1. accomplished.

488 2.3.19.02b 2.b) EFS provides sound-powered An inspection and test will be Sound-powered equipment is communications between the MCR, the performed of the sound-powered installed and voice RSW, the Division A, B, C, D dc communication equipment. transmission and reception are equipment rooms accomplished.

(Rooms 12201/12203/12205/ 12207),

the Division A, B, C, D I&C rooms (Rooms 12301/12302/ 12304/12305),

and the diesel generator building (Rooms 60310/60320) without external power.

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2.3.20 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System No entry for this system.

2.3.21 Secondary Sampling System No entry for this system.

2.3.22 Containment Leak Rate Test System No entry. Covered in Section 2.2.1, Containment System.

2.3.23 This section intentionally blank 2.3.24 Demineralized Water Treatment System No entry for this system.

2.3.25 Gravity and Roof Drain Collection System No entry for this system.

2.3.26 This section intentionally blank 2.3.27 Sanitary Drainage System No entry for this system.

2.3.28 Turbine Island Vents, Drains, and Relief System No entry for this system.

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2.3.29 Radioactive Waste Drain System Design Description The radioactive waste drain system (WRS) collects radioactive and potentially radioactive liquid wastes from equipment and floor drains during normal operation, startup, shutdown, and refueling. The liquid wastes are then transferred to appropriate processing and disposal systems.

Nonradioactive wastes are collected by the waste water system (WWS). The WRS is as shown in Figure 2.3.29-1.

1. The functional arrangement of the WRS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.29.
2. The WRS collects liquid wastes from the equipment and floor drainage of the radioactive portions of the auxiliary building, annex building, and radwaste building and directs these wastes to a WRS sump or WLS waste holdup tanks located in the auxiliary building.
3. The WRS collects chemical wastes from the auxiliary building chemical laboratory drains and the decontamination solution drains in the annex building and directs these wastes to the chemical waste tank of the liquid radwaste system.
4. The WWS stops the discharge from the turbine building sump upon detection of high radiation in the discharge stream to the oil separator.

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Table 2.3.29-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 489 2.3.29.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built WRS conforms WRS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.3.29. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.29.

490 2.3.29.02 2. The WRS collects liquid wastes from A test is performed by pouring The water poured into these the equipment and floor drainage of the water into the equipment and drains is collected either in the radioactive portions of the auxiliary floor drains in the radioactive auxiliary building radioactive building, annex building, and radwaste portions of the auxiliary drains sump or the WLS waste building and directs these wastes to a building, annex building, and holdup tanks.

WRS sump or WLS waste holdup tanks radwaste building.

located in the auxiliary building.

491 2.3.29.03 3. The WRS collects chemical wastes A test is performed by pouring The water poured into these from the auxiliary building chemical water into the auxiliary building drains is collected in the laboratory drains and the chemical laboratory and the chemical waste tank of the decontamination solution drains in the decontamination solution drains liquid radwaste system.

annex building and directs these wastes in the annex building.

to the chemical waste tank of the liquid radwaste system.

492 2.3.29.04 4. The WWS stops the discharge from Tests will be performed to A simulated high radiation the turbine building sump upon confirm that a simulated high signal causes the turbine detection of high radiation in the radiation signal from the turbine building sump pumps discharge stream to the oil separator. building sump discharge (WWS-MP-01A and B) to radiation monitor, WWS-021 stop operating, stopping the causes the sump pumps spread of radiation outside of (WWS-MP-01A and B) to stop the turbine building.

operating, stopping the spread of radiation outside of the turbine building.

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Figure 2.3.29-1 Radioactive Waste Drain System C-286

2.3.30 Storm Drain System No entry for this system.

2.3.31 Raw Water System No entry for this system.

2.3.32 Yard Fire Water System No entry for this system.

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2.4 Steam and Power Conversion Systems 2.4.1 Main and Startup Feedwater System See Section 2.2.4 for information on the main feedwater system.

Design Description The startup feedwater system supplies feedwater to the steam generators during plant startup, hot standby and shutdown conditions, and during transients in the event of main feedwater system unavailability.

1. The functional arrangement of the startup feedwater system is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.4.1.
2. The FWS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

The FWS provides startup feedwater flow from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the steam generator system (SGS) for heat removal from the RCS.

3. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 to perform the listed function.
4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.4.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.4.1-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Startup Feedwater Pump A (Motor) FWS-MP-03A Yes Start (Run Status)

Startup Feedwater Pump B (Motor) FWS-MP-03B Yes Start (Run Status)

Startup Feedwater Pump A Isolation Valve FWS-PL-V013A Yes Open (Valve Position)

Startup Feedwater Pump B Isolation Valve FWS-PL-V013B Yes Open (Valve Position)

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Table 2.4.1-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 493 2.4.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built startup feedwater startup feedwater system is as described will be performed. system conforms with the in the Design Description of this functional arrangement as Section 2.4.1. described in the Design Description of this Section 2.4.1.

494 2.4.01.02 2. The FWS provides startup feedwater Testing will be performed to Each FWS startup feedwater flow from the CST to the SGS for heat confirm that each of the startup pump provides a flow rate removal from the RCS. feedwater pumps can provide greater than or equal to water from the CST to both 260 gpm to each steam steam generators. generator system at a steam generator secondary side pressure of at least 1106 psia.

495 2.4.01.03 3. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed on the Controls in the MCR operate the components identified in components in Table 2.4.1-1 to cause the components listed Table 2.4.1-1 to perform the listed using controls in the MCR. in Table 2.4.1-1 to perform the function. listed functions.

496 2.4.01.04 4. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.4.1-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of parameters in Table 2.4.1-1 can be retrieved MCR. the MCR. in the MCR.

Table 2.4.1-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Startup Feedwater Pump A FWS-MP-03A Turbine Building Startup Feedwater Pump B FWS-MP-03B Turbine Building C-289

Figure 2.4.1-1 Main and Startup Feedwater System C-290

2.4.2 Main Turbine System Design Description The main turbine system (MTS) is designed for electric power production consistent with the capability of the reactor and the reactor coolant system.

The component locations of the MTS are as shown in Table 2.4.2-2.

1. The functional arrangement of the MTS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.4.2.
2. a) Controls exist in the MCR to trip the main turbine-generator.

b) The main turbine-generator trips after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The main turbine-generator trips after receiving a signal from the DAS.

3. The overspeed trips for the AP1000 turbine are set for 110% and 111% (+/-1% each). Each trip is initiated electrically in separate systems. The trip signals from the two turbine electrical overspeed protection trip systems are isolated from, and independent of, each other.

Table 2.4.2-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 497 2.4.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built MTS conforms MTS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.4.2. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.4.2.

498 2.4.02.02a 2.a) Controls exist in the MCR to trip Testing will be performed on the Controls in the MCR operate the main turbine-generator. main turbine-generator using to trip the main turbine-controls in the MCR. generator.

499 2.4.02.02b 2.b) The main turbine-generator trips Testing will be performed using The main turbine-generator after receiving a signal from the PMS. real or simulated signals into the trips after receiving a signal PMS. from the PMS.

500 2.4.02.02c 2.c) The main turbine-generator trips Testing will be performed using The main turbine-generator after receiving a signal from the DAS. real or simulated signals into the trips after receiving a signal DAS. from the DAS.

501 2.4.02.03.i 3) The trip signals from the two turbine i) The system design will be i) The system design review electrical overspeed protection trip reviewed. shows that the trip signals of systems are isolated from, and the two electrical overspeed independent of, each other. protection trip systems are isolated from, and independent of, each other.

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Table 2.4.2-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 502 2.4.02.03.ii 3) The trip signals from the two turbine ii) Testing of the as-built system ii) The main turbine-electrical overspeed protection trip will be performed using generator trips after overspeed systems are isolated from, and simulated signals from the signals are received from the independent of, each other. turbine speed sensors. speed sensors of the 110%

emergency electrical overspeed trip system, and the main turbine-generator trips after overspeed signals are received from the speed sensors of the 111% backup electrical overspeed trip system.

503 2.4.02.03.iii 3) The trip signals from the two turbine iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and electrical overspeed protection trip for the existence of a report concludes that the two systems are isolated from, and verifying that the two turbine electrical overspeed protection independent of, each other. electrical overspeed protection systems have diverse systems have diverse hardware hardware and and software/firmware. software/firmware.

Table 2.4.2-2 Component Name Tag No. Component Location HP Turbine MTS-MG-01 Turbine Building LP Turbine A MTS-MG-02A Turbine Building LP Turbine B MTS-MG-02B Turbine Building LP Turbine C MTS-MG-02C Turbine Building Gland Steam Condenser GSS-ME-01 Turbine Building Gland Condenser Vapor Exhauster 1A GSS-MA-01A Turbine Building Gland Condenser Vapor Exhauster 1B GSS-MA-01B Turbine Building Electrical Overspeed Trip Device -- Turbine Building Emergency Electrical Overspeed -- Turbine Building Trip Device C-292

2.4.3 Main Steam System No entry. Covered in Section 2.2.4, Steam Generator System.

2.4.4 Steam Generator Blowdown System No entry. Containment isolation function covered in Section 2.2.1, Containment System and 2.2.4, Steam Generator System.

No entry. Steam generator isolation function covered in Section 2.2.4, Steam Generator System.

2.4.5 Condenser Air Removal System No entry. Covered in Section 3.5, Radiation Monitoring.

(Note: Monitor is TDS-RE001.)

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2.4.6 Condensate System Design Description The condensate system (CDS) provides feedwater at the required temperature, pressure, and flow rate to the deaerator. Condensate is pumped from the main condenser hotwell by the condensate pumps and passes through the low-pressure feedwater heaters to the deaerator.

The circulating water system (CWS) removes heat from the condenser and is site specific starting from the interface at the locations where the CWS piping enters and exits the turbine building.

The CDS operates during plant startup and power operations (full and part loads).

The component locations of the CDS are as shown in Table 2.4.6-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the CDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.4.6.
2. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.4.6-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.4.6-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Condenser Backpressure CDS-056A Yes Condenser Backpressure CDS-056B Yes Condenser Backpressure CDS-056C Yes Table 2.4.6-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 504 2.4.06.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built CDS conforms CDS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.4.6. arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.4.6.

505 2.4.06.02 2. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.4.6-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the parameters Table 2.4.6-1 can be retrieved MCR. in the MCR. in the MCR.

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Table 2.4.6-3 Component Name Component Location Low Pressure Feedwater Heaters Turbine Building Deaerator Feedwater Heater and Storage Tank Turbine Building Main Condenser Shell A Turbine Building Main Condenser Shell B Turbine Building Main Condenser Shell C Turbine Building Condensate Pump A Turbine Building Condensate Pump B Turbine Building Condensate Pump C Turbine Building C-295

2.4.7 Circulating Water System No entry for this system.

2.4.8 Auxiliary Steam Supply System No entry for this system.

2.4.9 Condenser Tube Cleaning System No entry for this system.

2.4.10 Turbine Island Chemical Feed System No entry for this system.

2.4.11 Condensate Polishing System No entry for this system.

2.4.12 Gland Seal System No entry. Covered in Section 2.4.2, Main Turbine System.

2.4.13 Generator Hydrogen and CO2 System No entry for this system.

2.4.14 Heater Drain System No entry for this system.

2.4.15 Hydrogen Seal Oil System No entry for this system.

2.4.16 Main Turbine and Generator Lube Oil System No entry for this system.

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2.5 Instrumentation and Control Systems 2.5.1 Diverse Actuation System Design Description The diverse actuation system (DAS) initiates reactor trip, actuates selected functions, and provides plant information to the operator.

The component locations of the DAS are as shown in Table 2.5.1-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the DAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.
2. The DAS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The DAS provides an automatic reactor trip on low wide-range steam generator water level, or on low pressurizer water level, or on high hot leg temperature, separate from the PMS.

b) The DAS provides automatic actuation of selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-1, separate from the PMS.

c) The DAS provides manual initiation of reactor trip and selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-2, separate from the PMS. These manual initiation functions are implemented in a manner that bypasses the control room multiplexers, if any; the PMS cabinets; and the signal processing equipment of the DAS.

d) The DAS provides main control room (MCR) displays of selected plant parameters, as identified in Table 2.5.1-3, separate from the PMS.

3. The DAS has the following features:

a) The signal processing hardware of the DAS uses input modules, output modules, and microprocessor or special purpose logic processor boards that are different than those used in the PMS.

b) The display hardware of the DAS uses a different display device than that used in the PMS.

c) Software diversity between DAS and PMS will be achieved through the use of different algorithms, logic, program architecture, executable operating system, and executable software/logic.

d) The DAS has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that exist where the DAS equipment is located in the plant.

e) The sensors identified on Table 2.5.1-3 are used for DAS input and are separate from those being used by the PMS and plant control system.

f) The DAS is powered by non-Class 1E uninterruptible power supplies that are independent and separate from the power supplies which power the PMS.

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g) The DAS signal processing cabinets are provided with the capability for channel testing without actuating the controlled components.

h) The DAS equipment can withstand the room ambient temperature and humidity conditions that will exist at the plant locations in which the DAS equipment is installed at the times for which the DAS is designed to be operational.

4. The DAS hardware and any software are developed using a planned design process which provides for specific design documentation and reviews during the following life cycle stages:

a) Development phase for hardware and any software b) System test phase c) Installation phase The planned design process also provides for the use of commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software.

5. The DAS manual actuation of ADS, IRWST injection, and containment recirculation can be executed correctly and reliably.

Table 2.5.1-1 Functions Automatically Actuated by the DAS

1. Reactor and Turbine Trip on Low Wide-range Steam Generator Water Level or Low Pressurizer Water Level or High Hot Leg Temperature
2. Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Actuation and In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) Gutter Isolation on Low Wide-range Steam Generator Water Level or on High Hot Leg Temperature
3. Core Makeup Tank (CMT) Actuation and Trip All Reactor Coolant Pumps on Low Wide-Range Steam Generator Water Level or Low Pressurizer Water Level
4. Isolation of Selected Containment Penetrations and Initiation of Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) on High Containment Temperature C-298

Table 2.5.1-2 Functions Manually Actuated by the DAS

1. Reactor and Turbine Trip
2. PRHR Actuation and IRWST Gutter Isolation
3. CMT Actuation and Trip All Reactor Coolant Pumps
4. First-stage Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Valve Actuation
5. Second-stage ADS Valve Actuation
6. Third-stage ADS Valve Actuation
7. Fourth-stage ADS Valve Actuation
8. PCS Actuation
9. Isolation of Selected Containment Penetrations
10. Containment Hydrogen Ignitor Actuation
11. IRWST Injection Actuation
12. Containment Recirculation Actuation
13. Actuate IRWST Drain to Containment Table 2.5.1-3 DAS Sensors and Displays Equipment Name Tag Number Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg Temperature RCS-300A RCS Hot Leg Temperature RCS-300B Steam Generator 1 Wide-range Level SGS-044 Steam Generator 1 Wide-range Level SGS-045 Steam Generator 2 Wide-range Level SGS-046 Steam Generator 2 Wide-range Level SGS-047 Pressurizer Water Level RCS-305A Pressurizer Water Level RCS-305B Containment Temperature VCS-053A Containment Temperature VCS-053B Core Exit Temperature IIS-009 Core Exit Temperature IIS-013 Core Exit Temperature IIS-030 Core Exit Temperature IIS-034 Rod Control Motor Generator Voltage PLS-ET001 Rod Control Motor Generator Voltage PLS-ET002 C-299

Table 2.5.1-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 506 2.5.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built DAS conforms DAS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.5.1. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.

507 2.5.01.02a 2.a) The DAS provides an automatic Electrical power to the PMS The field breakers of the reactor trip on low wide-range steam equipment will be disconnected control rod motor-generator generator water level, or on low and an operational test of the as- sets open after the test signal pressurizer water level, or on high hot built DAS will be performed reaches the specified limit.

leg temperature, separate from the using real or simulated test PMS. signals.

508 2.5.01.02b 2.b) The DAS provides automatic Electrical power to the PMS Appropriate DAS output actuation of selected functions, as equipment will be disconnected signals are generated after the identified in Table 2.5.1-1, separate and an operational test of the as- test signal reaches the from the PMS. built DAS will be performed specified limit.

using real or simulated test signals.

509 2.5.01.02c.i 2.c) The DAS provides manual Electrical power to the control i) The field breakers of the initiation of reactor trip, and selected room multiplexers, if any, and control rod motor-generator functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-2, PMS equipment will be sets open after reactor and separate from the PMS. These manual disconnected and the outputs turbine trip manual initiation initiation functions are implemented in from the DAS signal processing controls are actuated.

a manner that bypasses the control equipment will be disabled.

room multiplexers, if any; the PMS While in this configuration, an cabinets; and the signal processing operational test of the as-built equipment of the DAS. system will be performed using the DAS manual actuation controls.

510 2.5.01.02c.ii 2.c) The DAS provides manual Electrical power to the control ii) DAS output signals are initiation of reactor trip, and selected room multiplexers, if any, and generated for the selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-2, PMS equipment will be functions, as identified in separate from the PMS. These manual disconnected and the outputs Table 2.5.1-2, after manual initiation functions are implemented in from the DAS signal processing initiation controls are a manner that bypasses the control equipment will be disabled. actuated.

room multiplexers, if any; the PMS While in this configuration, an cabinets; and the signal processing operational test of the as-built equipment of the DAS. system will be performed using the DAS manual actuation controls.

511 2.5.01.02d 2.d) The DAS provides MCR displays Electrical power to the PMS The selected plant parameters of selected plant parameters, as equipment will be disconnected can be retrieved in the MCR.

identified in Table 2.5.1-3, separate and inspection will be performed from the PMS. for retrievability of the selected plant parameters in the MCR.

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Table 2.5.1-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 512 2.5.01.03a 3.a) The signal processing hardware of Inspection of the as-built DAS The DAS signal processing the DAS uses input modules, output and PMS signal processing equipment uses input modules, and microprocessor or special hardware will be performed. modules, output modules, and purpose logic processor boards that are micro-processor or special different than those used in the PMS. purpose logic processor boards that are different than those used in the PMS. The difference may be a different design, use of different component types, or different manufacturers.

513 2.5.01.03b 3.b) The display hardware of the DAS Inspection of the as-built DAS The DAS display hardware is uses a different display device than that and PMS display hardware will different than the display used in the PMS. be performed. hardware used in the PMS.

The difference may be a different design, use of different component types, or different manufacturers.

514 2.5.01.03c 3.c) Software diversity between the Inspection of the DAS and PMS Any DAS algorithms, logic, DAS and PMS will be achieved through design documentation will be program architecture, the use of different algorithms, logic, performed. executable operating systems, program architecture, executable and executable software/logic operating system, and executable are different than those used software/logic. in the PMS.

515 2.5.01.03d 3.d) The DAS has electrical surge Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes withstand capability (SWC), and can combination of type tests and that the DAS equipment can withstand the electromagnetic analyses will be performed on withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI interference (EMI), radio frequency the equipment. and ESD conditions that exist (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) where the DAS equipment is conditions that exist where the DAS located in the plant.

equipment is located in the plant.

516 2.5.01.03e 3.e) The sensors identified on Table Inspection of the as-built system The sensors identified on 2.5.1-3 are used for DAS input and are will be performed. Table 2.5.1-3 are used by separate from those being used by the DAS and are separate from PMS and plant control system. those being used by the PMS and plant control system.

517 2.5.01.03f 3.f) The DAS is powered by non-Class Electrical power to the PMS A simulated test signal exists 1E uninterruptible power supplies that equipment will be disconnected. at the DAS equipment when are independent and separate from the While in this configuration, a the assigned non-Class 1E power supplies which power the PMS. test will be performed by uninterruptible power supply providing simulated test signals is provided the test signal.

in the non-Class 1E uninterruptible power supplies.

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Table 2.5.1-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 518 2.5.01.03g 3.g) The DAS signal processing Channel tests will be performed The capability exists for cabinets are provided with the on the as built system. testing individual DAS capability for channel testing without channels without propagating actuating the controlled components. an actuation signal to a DAS controlled component.

519 2.5.01.03h 3.h) The DAS equipment can withstand Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes the room ambient temperature and combination of type tests and that the DAS equipment can humidity conditions that will exist at analyses will be performed on withstand the room ambient the plant locations in which the DAS the equipment. temperature and humidity equipment is installed at the times for conditions that will exist at the which the DAS is designed to be plant locations in which the operational. DAS equipment is installed at the times for which the DAS is designed to be operational.

520 2.5.01.04 4. The DAS hardware and any software Inspection will be performed of A report exists and concludes are developed using a planned design the process used to design the that the process defines the process which provides for specific hardware and any software. organizational responsibilities, design documentation and reviews activities, and configuration during the following life cycle stages: management controls for the a) Development phase for hardware and following:

any software a) Documentation and review b) System test phase of hardware and any software.

c) Installation phase b) Performance of tests and the documentation of test The planned design process also results during the system test provides for the use of commercial off-phase.

the-shelf hardware and software.

c) Performance of tests and inspections during the installation phase.

The process also defines requirements for the use of commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software.

521 2.5.01.05 5. The DAS manual actuation of ADS, See ITAAC Table 3.2-1, item 1. See ITAAC 3.2-1, item 1.

IRWST injection, and containment recirculation can be executed correctly and reliably.

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Table 2.5.1-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location DAS Processor Cabinet 1 DAS-JD-001 Annex Building DAS Processor Cabinet 2 DAS-JD-002 Annex Building DAS Squib Valve Control Cabinet DAS-JD-003 Auxiliary Building DAS Instrument Cabinet DAS-JD-004 Auxiliary Building C-303

2.5.2 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Design Description The protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) initiates reactor trip and actuation of engineered safety features in response to plant conditions monitored by process instrumentation and provides safety-related displays. The PMS has the equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1. The PMS has four divisions of Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Features Actuation, and two divisions of safety-related post-accident parameter displays. The functional arrangement of the PMS is depicted in Figure 2.5.2-1 and the component locations of the PMS are as shown in Table 2.5.2-9.

1. The functional arrangement of the PMS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.2.
2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
3. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
4. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
5. a) The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, is powered from its respective Class 1E division.

b) Separation is provided between PMS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

6. The PMS provides the following safety-related functions:

a) The PMS initiates an automatic reactor trip, as identified in Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process signals reach specified limits.

b) The PMS initiates automatic actuation of engineered safety features, as identified in Table 2.5.2-3, when plant process signals reach specified limits.

c) The PMS provides manual initiation of reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4.

7. The PMS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The PMS provides process signals to the plant control system (PLS) through isolation devices.

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b) The PMS provides process signals to the data display and processing system (DDS) through isolation devices.

c) Data communication between safety and nonsafety systems does not inhibit the performance of the safety function.

d) The PMS ensures that the automatic safety function and the Class 1E manual controls both have priority over the non-Class 1E soft controls.

e) The PMS receives signals from non-safety equipment that provides interlocks for PMS test functions through isolation devices.

8. The PMS, in conjunction with the operator workstations, provides the following functions:

a) The PMS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.2-5. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). The fixed position controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided in the MCR.

b) The PMS provides for the transfer of control capability from the MCR to the remote shutdown workstation (RSW) using multiple transfer switches. Each individual transfer switch is associated with only a single safety-related group or with nonsafety-related control capability.

c) Displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.

9. a) The PMS automatically removes blocks of reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation when the plant approaches conditions for which the associated function is designed to provide protection. These blocks are identified in Table 2.5.2-6.

b) The PMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MCR.

c) The PMS does not allow simultaneous bypass of two redundant channels.

d) The PMS provides the interlock functions identified in Table 2.5.2-7.

10. Setpoints are determined using a methodology which accounts for loop inaccuracies, response testing, and maintenance or replacement of instrumentation.
11. The PMS hardware and software is developed using a planned design process which provides for specific design documentation and reviews during the following life cycle stages:

a) Design requirements phase, may be referred to as conceptual or project definition phase (Complete) b) System definition phase c) Hardware and software development phase, consisting of hardware and software design and implementation C-305

d) System integration and test phase e) Installation phase

12. The PMS software is designed, tested, installed, and maintained using a process which incorporates a graded approach according to the relative importance of the software to safety and specifies requirements for:

a) Software management including documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action.

b) Software configuration management including historical records of software and control of software changes.

c) Verification and validation including requirements for reviewer independence.

13. The use of commercial grade hardware and software items in the PMS is accomplished through a process that specifies requirements for:

a) Review of supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting, and change control.

b) Review of product performance.

c) Receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item.

d) Final acceptance based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.

14. The Component Interface Module (CIM) is developed using a planned design process which provides for specific design documentation and reviews.

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Table 2.5.2-1 PMS Equipment Name and Classification Qual. for Equipment Name Seismic Cat. I Class 1E Harsh Envir.

PMS Cabinets, Division A Yes Yes No PMS Cabinets, Division B Yes Yes No PMS Cabinets, Division C Yes Yes No PMS Cabinets, Division D Yes Yes No Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division A Yes Yes No Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division B Yes Yes No Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division C Yes Yes No Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division D Yes Yes No MCR/RSW Transfer Panels Yes Yes No MCR Safety-related Display, Division B Yes Yes No MCR Safety-related Display, Division C Yes Yes No MCR Safety-related Controls Yes Yes No Table 2.5.2-2 PMS Automatic Reactor Trips Source Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Intermediate Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux (Low Setpoint) Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux (High Setpoint) Trip Power Range High Positive Flux Rate Trip Reactor Coolant Pump High Bearing Water Temperature Trip Overtemperature Delta-T Trip Overpower Delta-T Trip Pressurizer Low Pressure Trip Pressurizer High Pressure Trip Pressurizer High Water Level Trip Low Reactor Coolant Flow Trip Low Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Trip Low Steam Generator Water Level Trip High-2 Steam Generator Water Level Trip Automatic or Manual Safeguards Actuation Trip Automatic or Manual Depressurization System Actuation Trip Automatic or Manual Core Makeup Tank (CMT) Injection Trip Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Actuation Reactor Trip C-307

Table 2.5.2-3 PMS Automatically Actuated Engineered Safety Features Safeguards Actuation Containment Isolation Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Actuation Main Feedwater Isolation Reactor Coolant Pump Trip CMT Injection Turbine Trip (Isolated signal to nonsafety equipment)

Steam Line Isolation Steam Generator Relief Isolation Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Passive Containment Cooling Actuation Startup Feedwater Isolation Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Heat Exchanger Alignment Block of Boron Dilution Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) Makeup Line Isolation Steam Dump Block (Isolated signal to nonsafety equipment)

MCR Isolation, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De-energization Auxiliary Spray and Letdown Purification Line Isolation Containment Air Filtration System Isolation Normal Residual Heat Removal Isolation Refueling Cavity Isolation In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) Injection IRWST Containment Recirculation CVS Letdown Isolation Pressurizer Heater Block (Isolated signal to nonsafety equipment)

Containment Vacuum Relief Table 2.5.2-4 PMS Manually Actuated Functions Reactor Trip Safeguards Actuation Containment Isolation Depressurization System Stages 1, 2, and 3 Actuation Depressurization System Stage 4 Actuation Feedwater Isolation Core Makeup Tank Injection Actuation Steam Line Isolation Passive Containment Cooling Actuation Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Alignment IRWST Injection Containment Recirculation Actuation MCR Isolation, Air Supply Initiation and Electrical Load De-energization Steam Generator Relief Isolation Chemical and Volume Control System Isolation Normal Residual Heat Removal System Isolation Containment Vacuum Relief C-308

Table 2.5.2-5 Minimum Inventory of Displays, Alerts, and Fixed Position Controls in the MCR Description Control Display Alert(1)

Neutron Flux - Yes Yes Neutron Flux Doubling(2) - No Yes Startup Rate - Yes Yes Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure - Yes Yes Wide-range Hot Leg Temperature - Yes No Wide-range Cold Leg Temperature - Yes Yes RCS Cooldown Rate Compared to the Limit Based on RCS - Yes Yes Pressure Wide-range Cold Leg Temperature Compared to the Limit - Yes Yes Based on RCS Pressure Change of RCS Temperature by more than 5°F in the last - No Yes 10 minutes Containment Water Level - Yes Yes Containment Pressure - Yes Yes Pressurizer Water Level - Yes Yes Pressurizer Water Level Trend - Yes No Pressurizer Reference Leg Temperature - Yes No Reactor Vessel-Hot Leg Water Level - Yes Yes Pressurizer Pressure - Yes No Core Exit Temperature - Yes Yes RCS Subcooling - Yes Yes RCS Cold Overpressure Limit - Yes Yes IRWST Water Level - Yes Yes PRHR Flow - Yes Yes PRHR Outlet Temperature - Yes Yes Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

1. These parameters are used to generate visual alerts that identify challenges to the critical safety functions. For the main control room, the visual alerts are embedded in the safety-related displays as visual signals.

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Table 2.5.2-5 (cont.)

Minimum Inventory of Displays, Alerts, and Fixed Position Controls in the MCR Description Control Display Alert(1)

Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) Storage Tank - Yes No Water Level PCS Cooling Flow - Yes No IRWST to Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS) - Yes Yes Suction Valve Status(2)

Remotely Operated Containment Isolation Valve Status(2) - Yes No Containment Area High-range Radiation Level - Yes Yes Containment Pressure (Extended Range) - Yes No CMT Level - Yes No Manual Reactor Trip (also initiates turbine trip) Yes - -

Manual Safeguards Actuation Yes - -

Manual CMT Actuation Yes - -

Manual MCR Emergency Habitability System Actuation Yes - -

Manual ADS Stages 1, 2, and 3 Actuation Yes - -

Manual ADS Stage 4 Actuation Yes - -

Manual PRHR Actuation Yes - -

Manual Containment Cooling Actuation Yes - -

Manual IRWST Injection Actuation Yes - -

Manual Containment Recirculation Actuation Yes - -

Manual Containment Isolation Yes - -

Manual Main Steam Line Isolation Yes - -

Manual Feedwater Isolation Yes - -

Manual Containment Hydrogen Igniter (Nonsafety-related) Yes - -

Manual Containment Vacuum Relief Yes Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

2. These instruments are not required after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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Table 2.5.2-6 PMS Blocks Reactor Trip Functions:

Source Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Intermediate Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux (Low Setpoint) Trip Pressurizer Low Pressure Trip Pressurizer High Water Level Trip Low Reactor Coolant Flow Trip Low Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Trip High Steam Generator Water Level Trip Engineered Safety Features:

Automatic Safeguards Containment Isolation Main Feedwater Isolation Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Core Makeup Tank Injection Steam Line Isolation Startup Feedwater Isolation Block of Boron Dilution Chemical and Volume Control System Isolation Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown Isolation Steam Dump Block Auxiliary Spray and Letdown Purification Line Isolation Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Alignment Normal Residual Heat Removal System Isolation Table 2.5.2-7 PMS Interlocks RNS Suction Valves PRHR Heat Exchanger Inlet Isolation Valve CMT Cold Leg Balance Line Isolation Valves Containment Vacuum Relief Isolation Valves Table 2.5.2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 522 2.5.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built PMS conforms PMS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.5.2. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.2.

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Table 2.5.2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 523 2.5.02.02.i 2. The seismic Category I equipment, i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can to verify that the seismic equipment identified in withstand seismic design basis loads Category I equipment identified Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the without loss of safety function. in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Nuclear Island.

524 2.5.02.02.ii 2. The seismic Category I equipment, ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic withstand seismic design basis loads analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can without loss of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

525 2.5.02.02.iii 2. The seismic Category I equipment, iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built withstand seismic design basis loads verifying that the as-built equipment including without loss of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

526 2.5.02.03 3. The Class 1E equipment, identified Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes in Table 2.5.2-1, has electrical surge combination of type tests and that the Class 1E equipment withstand capability (SWC), and can analyses will be performed on identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the electromagnetic the equipment. withstand the SWC, EMI, interference (EMI), radio frequency RFI, and ESD conditions that interference (RFI), and electrostatic would exist before, during, discharge (ESD) conditions that would and following a design basis exist before, during, and following a accident without loss of safety design basis accident without loss of function for the time required safety function for the time required to to perform the safety function.

perform the safety function.

527 2.5.02.04 4. The Class 1E equipment, identified Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand the room combination of type tests and that the Class 1E equipment ambient temperature, humidity, analyses will be performed on identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can pressure, and mechanical vibration the Class 1E equipment withstand the room ambient conditions that would exist before, identified in Table 2.5.2-1. temperature, humidity, during, and following a design basis pressure, and mechanical accident without loss of safety function vibration conditions that for the time required to perform the would exist before, during, safety function. and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

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Table 2.5.2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 528 2.5.02.05a 5.a) The Class 1E equipment, identified Tests will be performed by A simulated test signal exists in Table 2.5.2-1, is powered from its providing a simulated test signal at the Class 1E equipment respective Class 1E division. in each Class 1E division. identified in Table 2.5.2-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

529 2.5.02.05b 5.b) Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, PMS Class 1E divisions, and between items 7.d and 7.e. items 7.d and 7.e.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

530 2.5.02.06a.i 6.a) The PMS initiates an automatic An operational test of the as- i) The reactor trip switchgear reactor trip, as identified in built PMS will be performed opens after the test signal Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process using real or simulated test reaches the specified limit.

signals reach specified limits. signals. This only needs to be verified for one automatic reactor trip function.

531 2.5.02.06a.ii 6.a) The PMS initiates an automatic An operational test of the as- ii) PMS output signals to the reactor trip, as identified in built PMS will be performed reactor trip switchgear are Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process using real or simulated test generated after the test signal signals reach specified limits. signals. reaches the specified limit.

This needs to be verified for each automatic reactor trip function.

532 2.5.02.06b 6.b) The PMS initiates automatic An operational test of the as- Appropriate PMS output actuation of engineered safety features, built PMS will be performed signals are generated after the as identified in Table 2.5.2-3, when using real or simulated test test signal reaches the plant process signals reach specified signals. specified limit. These output limits. signals remain following removal of the test signal.

Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis, and acceptance criteria.

533 2.5.02.06c.i 6.c) The PMS provides manual An operational test of the as- i) The reactor trip switchgear initiation of reactor trip and selected built PMS will be performed opens after manual reactor trip engineered safety features as identified using the PMS manual actuation controls are actuated.

in Table 2.5.2-4. controls.

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Table 2.5.2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 534 2.5.02.06c.ii 6.c) The PMS provides manual An operational test of the as- ii) PMS output signals are initiation of reactor trip and selected built PMS will be performed generated for reactor trip and engineered safety features as identified using the PMS manual actuation selected engineered safety in Table 2.5.2-4. controls. features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.

535 2.5.02.07a 7.a) The PMS provides process signals Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes to the PLS through isolation devices. combination of type tests and that the isolation devices analyses of the isolation devices prevent credible faults from will be performed. propagating into the PMS.

536 2.5.02.07b 7.b) The PMS provides process signals Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes to the DDS through isolation devices. combination of type tests and that the isolation devices analyses of the isolation devices prevent credible faults from will be performed. propagating into the PMS.

537 2.5.02.07c 7.c) Data communication between Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes safety and nonsafety systems does not combination of type tests and that data communication inhibit the performance of the safety analyses of the PMS gateways between safety and nonsafety function. will be performed. systems does not inhibit the performance of the safety function.

538 2.5.02.07d 7.d) The PMS ensures that the Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes automatic safety function and the combination of type tests and that the automatic safety Class 1E manual controls both have analyses of the PMS manual function and the Class 1E priority over the non-Class 1E soft control circuits and algorithms manual controls both have controls. will be performed. priority over the non-Class 1E soft controls.

539 2.5.02.07e 7.e) The PMS receives signals from Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes non-safety equipment that provides combination of type tests and that the isolation devices interlocks for PMS test functions analyses of the isolation devices prevent credible faults from through isolation devices. will be performed. propagating into the PMS.

540 2.5.02.08a.i 8.a) The PMS provides for the i) An inspection will be i) The plant parameters listed minimum inventory of displays, visual performed for retrievability of in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" alerts, and fixed position controls, as plant parameters in the MCR. in the "Display" column, can identified in Table 2.5.2-5. The plant be retrieved in the MCR.

parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved in the MCR.

The fixed position controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided in the MCR.

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Table 2.5.2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 541 2.5.02.08a.ii 8.a) The PMS provides for the ii) An inspection and test will be ii) The plant parameters listed minimum inventory of displays, visual performed to verify that the plant in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" alerts, and fixed position controls, as parameters are used to generate in the "Alert" column are used identified in Table 2.5.2-5. The plant visual alerts that identify to generate visual alerts that parameters listed with a "Yes" in the challenges to critical safety identify challenges to critical "Display" column and visual alerts functions. safety functions. The visual listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" alerts actuate in accordance column can be retrieved in the MCR. with their correct logic and The fixed position controls listed with a values.

"Yes" in the "Control" column are provided in the MCR.

542 2.5.02.08a.iii 8.a) The PMS provides for the iii) An operational test of the iii) For each test of an as-built minimum inventory of displays, visual as-built system will be fixed position control listed in alerts, and fixed position controls, as performed using each MCR Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in identified in Table 2.5.2-5. The plant fixed position control. the "Control" column, an parameters listed with a "Yes" in the actuation signal is generated.

"Display" column and visual alerts Tests from the actuation signal listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" to the actuated device(s) are column can be retrieved in the MCR. performed as part of the The fixed position controls listed with a system-related inspection, test, "Yes" in the "Control" column are analysis and acceptance provided in the MCR. criteria.

543 2.5.02.08b.i 8.b) The PMS provides for the transfer i) An inspection will be i) A transfer switch exists for of control capability from the MCR to performed to verify that a each safety-related division the RSW using multiple transfer transfer switch exists for each and the nonsafety-related switches. Each individual transfer safety-related division and the control capability.

switch is associated with only a single nonsafety-related control safety-related group or with nonsafety- capability.

related control capability.

544 2.5.02.08b.ii 8.b) The PMS provides for the transfer ii) An operational test of the as- ii) Actuation of each transfer of control capability from the MCR to built system will be performed to switch results in an alarm in the RSW using multiple transfer demonstrate the transfer of the MCR and RSW, the switches. Each individual transfer control capability from the MCR activation of operator control switch is associated with only a single to the RSW. capability from the RSW, and safety-related group or with nonsafety- the deactivation of operator related control capability. control capability from the MCR for the associated safety-related division and nonsafety-related control capability.

545 2.5.02.08c 8.c) Displays of the open/closed status Inspection will be performed for Displays of the open/closed of the reactor trip breakers can be retrievability of displays of the status of the reactor trip retrieved in the MCR. open/closed status of the reactor breakers can be retrieved in trip breakers in the MCR. the MCR.

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Table 2.5.2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 546 2.5.02.09a 9.a) The PMS automatically removes An operational test of the as- The PMS blocks are blocks of reactor trip and engineered built PMS will be performed automatically removed when safety features actuation when the plant using real or simulated test the test signal reaches the approaches conditions for which the signals. specified limit.

associated function is designed to provide protection. These blocks are identified in Table 2.5.2-6.

547 2.5.02.09b 9.b) The PMS two-out-of-four An operational test of the as- The PMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of- built PMS will be performed. initiation logic reverts to a three coincidence logic if one of the two-out-of-three coincidence four channels is bypassed. All bypassed logic if one of the four channels are alarmed in the MCR. channels is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MCR.

548 2.5.02.09c 9.c) The PMS does not allow An operational test of the as- The redundant channel cannot simultaneous bypass of two redundant built PMS will be performed. be placed in bypass.

channels. With one channel in bypass, an attempt will be made to place a redundant channel in bypass.

549 2.5.02.09d 9.d) The PMS provides the interlock An operational test of the as- Appropriate PMS output functions identified in Table 2.5.2-7. built PMS will be performed signals are generated as the using real or simulated test interlock conditions are signals. changed.

550 2.5.02.10 10. Setpoints are determined using a Inspection will be performed for A report exists and concludes methodology which accounts for loop a document that describes the that the PMS setpoints are inaccuracies, response testing, and methodology and input determined using a maintenance or replacement of parameters used to determine the methodology which accounts instrumentation. PMS setpoints. for loop inaccuracies, response testing, and maintenance or replacement of instrumentation.

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Table 2.5.2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 551 2.5.02.11 11. The PMS hardware and software is Inspection will be performed of A report exists and concludes developed using a planned design the process used to design the that the process defines the process which provides for specific hardware and software. organizational responsibilities, design documentation and reviews activities, and configuration during the following life cycle stages: management controls for the a) Not used following:

b) System definition phase a) Not used.

c) Hardware and software development b) Specification of functional phase, consisting of hardware and requirements.

software design and implementation c) Documentation and review d) System integration and test phase of hardware and software.

e) Installation phase d) Performance of system tests and the documentation of system test results, including a response time test performed under maximum CPU loading to demonstrate that the PMS can fulfill its response time criteria.

e) Performance of installation tests and inspections.

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Table 2.5.2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 552 2.5.02.12 12. The PMS software is designed, Inspection will be performed of A report exists and concludes tested, installed, and maintained using a the process used to design, test, that the process establishes a process which incorporates a graded install, and maintain the PMS method for classifying the approach according to the relative software. PMS software elements importance of the software to safety and according to their relative specifies requirements for: importance to safety and a) Software management including specifies requirements for documentation requirements, standards, software assigned to each review requirements, and procedures safety classification. The for problem reporting and corrective report also concludes that action. requirements are provided for the following software b) Software configuration management development functions:

including historical records of software and control of software changes. a) Software management including documentation c) Verification and validation including requirements, standards, requirements for reviewer review requirements, and independence.

procedures for problem reporting and corrective action. Software management requirements may be documented in the software quality assurance plan, software management plan, software development plan, software safety plan, and software operation and maintenance plan; or these requirements may be combined into a single software management plan.

b) Software configuration management including historical records of software and control of software changes. Software configuration management requirements are provided in the software configuration management plan.

c) Verification and validation including requirements for reviewer independence.

Verification and validation requirements are provided in the verification and validation plan.

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Table 2.5.2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 553 2.5.02.13 13. The use of commercial grade Inspection will be performed of A report exists and concludes computer hardware and software items the process defined to use that the process has in the PMS is accomplished through a commercial grade components in requirements for:

process that specifies requirements for: the application. a) Review of supplier design a) Review of supplier design control, control, configuration configuration management, problem management, problem reporting, and change control. reporting, and change control.

b) Review of product performance. b) Review of product c) Receipt acceptance of the performance.

commercial grade item. c) Receipt acceptance of the d) Acceptance based on equipment commercial grade item.

qualification and software validation in d) Acceptance based on the integrated system. equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.

554 2.5.02.14 14. The Component Interface Module An inspection and or an audit A report exists and concludes (CIM) is developed using a planned will be performed of the that CIM meets the below design process which provides for processes used to design the listed life cycle stages.

specific design documentation and hardware, development Life cycle stages:

reviews. software, qualification and testing. a. Design requirements phase, may be referred to as conceptual or project definition phase

b. System definition phase
c. Hardware and software development phase, consisting of hardware and software design and implementation
d. System integration and test phase
e. Installation phase

{Design Acceptance Criteria}

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Table 2.5.2-9 Component Name Component Location PMS Cabinets, Division A Auxiliary Building PMS Cabinets, Division B Auxiliary Building PMS Cabinets, Division C Auxiliary Building PMS Cabinets, Division D Auxiliary Building Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division A Auxiliary Building Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division B Auxiliary Building Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division C Auxiliary Building Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division D Auxiliary Building MCR/RSW Transfer Panels Auxiliary Building MCR Safety-related Displays Auxiliary Building MCR Safety-related Controls Auxiliary Building C-320

Figure 2.5.2-1 Protection and Safety Monitoring System C-321

2.5.3 Plant Control System Design Description The plant control system (PLS) provides for automatic and manual control of nonsafety-related plant components during normal and emergency plant operations. The PLS has distributed controllers and operator controls interconnected by computer data links or data highways.

1. The functional arrangement of the PLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.3.
2. The PLS provides control interfaces for the control functions listed in Table 2.5.3-1.

Table 2.5.3-1 Control Functions Supported by the PLS

1. Reactor Power 5. Steam Generator Feedwater
2. Reactor Rod Position 6. Steam Dump
3. Pressurizer Pressure 7. Rapid Power Reduction
4. Pressurizer Water Level Table 2.5.3-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 555 2.5.03.01 1. The functional arrangement Inspection of the as-built system The as-built PLS conforms with of the PLS is as described in the will be performed. the functional arrangement as Design Description of this described in the Design Section 2.5.3. Description of this Section 2.5.3.

556 2.5.03.02 2. The PLS provides control An operational test of the system The PLS provides control interfaces for the control will be performed using simulated interfaces for the control functions functions listed in Table 2.5.3-1. input signals. System outputs or listed in Table 2.5.3-1.

component operations will be monitored to determine the operability of the control functions.

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2.5.4 Data Display and Processing System Design Description The data display and processing system (DDS) provides nonsafety-related alarms and displays, analysis of plant data, plant data logging and historical storage and retrieval, and operational support for plant personnel. The DDS has distributed computer processors and video display units to support the data processing and display functions.

1. The functional arrangement of the DDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.4.
2. The DDS, in conjunction with the operator workstations, provides the following function:

The DDS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.4-1. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved at the remote shutdown workstation (RSW). The controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided at the RSW.

3. The DDS provides information pertinent to the status of the protection and safety monitoring system.
4. The plant operating instrumentation installed for feedwater flow measurement is one that has been specifically approved by the NRC; the power calorimetric uncertainty calculation includes uncertainties for the associated instrumentation based on an NRC approved methodology; and the calculated calorimetric values are bounded by the uncertainty value assumed for the initial reactor power in the safety analysis.

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Table 2.5.4-1 Minimum Inventory of Controls, Displays, and Alerts at the RSW Description Control Display Alert(1)

Neutron Flux - Yes Yes Neutron Flux Doubling - No Yes Startup Rate - Yes Yes Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure - Yes Yes Wide-range Hot Leg Temperature - Yes No Wide-range Cold Leg Temperature - Yes Yes RCS Cooldown Rate Compared to the Limit Based on - Yes Yes RCS Pressure Wide-range Cold Leg Temperature Compared to the Limit - Yes Yes Based on RCS Pressure Change of RCS Temperature by more than 5°F in the last - No Yes 10 minutes Containment Water Level - Yes Yes Containment Pressure - Yes Yes Pressurizer Water Level - Yes Yes Pressurizer Water Level Trend - Yes No Pressurizer Reference Leg Temperature - Yes No Reactor Vessel-Hot Leg Water Level - Yes Yes Pressurizer Pressure - Yes No Core Exit Temperature - Yes Yes RCS Subcooling - Yes Yes RCS Cold Overpressure Limit - Yes Yes In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) - Yes Yes Water Level Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Flow - Yes Yes Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

1. These parameters are used to generate visual alerts that identify challenges to the critical safety functions. For the RSW, the visual alerts are embedded in the nonsafety-related displays as visual signals.

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Table 2.5.4-1 (cont.)

Minimum Inventory of Controls, Displays, and Alerts at the RSW Description Control Display Alert(1)

PRHR Outlet Temperature - Yes Yes Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) Storage Tank - Yes No Water Level PCS Cooling Flow - Yes No IRWST to Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS) - Yes Yes Suction Valve Status Remotely Operated Containment Isolation Valve Status - Yes No Containment Area High-range Radiation Level - Yes Yes Containment Pressure (Extended Range) - Yes No Core Makeup Tank (CMT) Level - Yes No Manual Reactor Trip (also initiates turbine trip) Yes - -

Manual Safeguards Actuation Yes - -

Manual CMT Actuation Yes - -

Manual Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Stages 1, Yes - -

2, and 3 Actuation Manual ADS Stage 4 Actuation Yes - -

Manual PRHR Actuation Yes - -

Manual Containment Cooling Actuation Yes - -

Manual IRWST Injection Actuation Yes - -

Manual Containment Recirculation Actuation Yes - -

Manual Containment Isolation Yes - -

Manual Main Steam Line Isolation Yes - -

Manual Feedwater Isolation Yes - -

Manual Containment Hydrogen Igniter (Nonsafety-related) Yes - -

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

1. These parameters are used to generate visual alerts that identify challenges to the critical safety functions. For the RSW, the visual alerts are embedded in the nonsafety-related displays as visual signals.

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Table 2.5.4-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 557 2.5.04.01 1. The functional arrangement of Inspection of the as-built system The as-built DDS conforms with the DDS is as described in the will be performed. the functional arrangement as Design Description of this described in the Design Section 2.5.4. Description of this Section 2.5.4.

558 2.5.04.02.i 2. The DDS provides for the i) An inspection will be performed i) The plant parameters listed in minimum inventory of displays, for retrievability of plant Table 2.5.4-1 with a "Yes" in the visual alerts, and fixed position parameters at the RSW. "Display" column can be retrieved controls, as identified in Table at the RSW.

2.5.4-1. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved at the RSW. The controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided at the RSW.

559 2.5.04.02.ii 2. The DDS provides for the ii) An inspection and test will be ii) The plant parameters listed in minimum inventory of displays, performed to verify that the plant Table 2.5.4-1 with a "Yes" in the visual alerts, and fixed position parameters are used to generate "Alert" column are used to controls, as identified in visual alerts that identify generate visual alerts that identify Table 2.5.4-1. The plant challenges to critical safety challenges to critical safety parameters listed with a "Yes" in functions. functions. The visual alerts the "Display" column and visual actuate in accordance with their alerts listed with a "Yes" in the logic and values.

"Alert" column can be retrieved at the RSW. The controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided at the RSW.

560 2.5.04.02.iii 2. The DDS provides for the iii) An operational test of the as- iii) For each test of a control listed minimum inventory of displays, built system will be performed in Table 2.5.4-1 with a "Yes" in visual alerts, and fixed position using each RSW control. the "Control" column, an actuation controls, as identified in signal is generated. Tests from the Table 2.5.4-1. The plant actuation signal to the actuated parameters listed with a "Yes" in device(s) are performed as part of the "Display" column and visual the system-related inspection, test, alerts listed with a "Yes" in the analysis and acceptance criteria.

"Alert" column can be retrieved at the RSW. The controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided at the RSW.

561 2.5.04.03 3. The DDS provides Tests of the as-built system will be The as-built system provides information pertinent to the performed. displays of the bypassed and status of the protection and operable status of the protection safety monitoring system. and safety monitoring system.

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Table 2.5.4-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 562 C.2.5.04.04a 4. The plant calorimetric Inspection will be performed of a) The as-built system takes input uncertainty and plant the plant operating instrumentation for feedwater flow measurement instrumentation performance is installed for feedwater flow from a Caldon [Cameron] LEFM bounded by the 1% calorimetric measurement, its associated power CheckPlus' System; uncertainty value assumed for calorimetric uncertainty the initial reactor power in the calculation, and the calculated safety analysis. calorimetric values.

563 C.2.5.04.04b 4. The plant calorimetric Inspection will be performed of b) The power calorimetric uncertainty and plant the plant operating instrumentation uncertainty calculation instrumentation performance is installed for feedwater flow documented for that bounded by the 1% calorimetric measurement, its associated power instrumentation is based on an uncertainty value assumed for calorimetric uncertainty accepted Westinghouse the initial reactor power in the calculation, and the calculated methodology and the uncertainty safety analysis. calorimetric values. values for that instrumentation are not lower than those for the actual installed instrumentation; and 564 C.2.5.04.04c 4. The plant calorimetric Inspection will be performed of c) The calculated calorimetric uncertainty and plant the plant operating instrumentation power uncertainty measurement instrumentation performance is installed for feedwater flow values are bounded by the bounded by the 1% calorimetric measurement, its associated power 1% uncertainty value assumed for uncertainty value assumed for calorimetric uncertainty the initial reactor power in the the initial reactor power in the calculation, and the calculated safety analysis.

safety analysis. calorimetric values.

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2.5.5 In-Core Instrumentation System Design Description The in-core instrumentation system (IIS) provides safety-related core exit thermocouple signals to the protection and safety monitoring system (PMS). The IIS also provides nonsafety-related core exit thermocouple signals to the diverse actuation system (DAS). The core exit thermocouples are housed in the core instrument assemblies. Multiple core instrument assemblies are used to provide radial coverage of the core. At least three core instrument assemblies are provided in each core quadrant.

1. The functional arrangement of the IIS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.5.
2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
3. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E cables between the Incore Thermocouple elements and the connector boxes located on the integrated head package have sheaths.

c) For cables other than those covered by 3.b, separation is provided between IIS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

4. Safety-related displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.5.5-1 Seismic ASME Code Qual. for Safety-Related Equipment Name Cat. I Classification Class 1E Harsh Envir. Display Incore Thimble Yes - Yes(1) Yes(1) Core Exit Assemblies (at least Temperature(1) three assemblies in each core quadrant)

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

1. Only applies to the safety-related assemblies. There are at least two safety-related assemblies in each core quadrant.

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Table 2.5.5-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 565 2.5.05.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built IIS conforms with IIS is as described in the Design will be performed. the functional arrangement as Description of this Section 2.5.5. described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.5.

566 2.5.05.02.i 2. The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand to verify that the seismic equipment identified in seismic design basis dynamic loads Category I equipment identified Table 2.5.5-1 is located on the without loss of safety function. in Table 2.5.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Nuclear Island.

567 2.5.05.02.ii 2. The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis dynamic loads analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can without loss of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.

568 2.5.05.02.iii 2. The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built seismic design basis dynamic loads verifying that the as-built equipment including without loss of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

569 2.5.05.03a.i 3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified i) Type tests, analysis, or a i) A report exists and in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a combination of type tests and concludes that the Class 1E harsh environment can withstand the analysis will be performed on equipment identified in environmental conditions that would Class 1E equipment located in a Table 2.5.5-1 as being exist before, during, and following a harsh environment. qualified for a harsh design basis accident without loss of environment. This equipment safety function, for the time required to can withstand the perform the safety function. environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

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Table 2.5.5-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 570 2.5.05.03a.ii 3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a of the as-built Class 1E concludes that the as-built harsh environment can withstand the equipment and the associated Class 1E equipment and the environmental conditions that would wiring, cables, and terminations associated wiring, cables, and exist before, during, and following a located in a harsh environment. terminations identified in design basis accident without loss of Table 2.5.5-1 as being safety function, for the time required to qualified for a harsh perform the safety function. environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

571 2.5.05.03b 3.b) The Class 1E cables between the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built Class 1E cables Incore Thermocouple elements and the will be performed. between the Incore connector boxes located on the Thermocouple elements and integrated head package have sheaths. the connector boxes located on the integrated head package have sheaths.

572 2.5.05.03c 3.c) For cables other than those See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, covered by 3.b, separation is provided item 7.d. item 7.d.

between IIS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

573 2.5.05.04 4. Safety-related displays of the Inspection will be performed for Safety-related displays parameters identified in Table 2.5.5-1 retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can can be retrieved in the MCR. related displays in the MCR. be retrieved in the MCR.

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2.5.6 Special Monitoring System Design Description The special monitoring system (SMS) monitors the reactor coolant system (RCS) for the occurrence of impacts characteristic of metallic loose parts. Metal impact monitoring sensors are provided to monitor the RCS at the upper and lower head region of the reactor pressure vessel, and at the reactor coolant inlet region of each steam generator.

1. The functional arrangement of the SMS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.6.
2. Data obtained from the metal impact monitoring sensors can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.5.6-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 574 2.5.06.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built SMS conforms SMS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.5.6. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.6.

575 2.5.06.02 2. Data obtained from the metal impact Inspection will be performed for Data obtained from the metal monitoring sensors can be retrieved in retrievability of data from the impact monitoring sensors can the MCR. metal impact monitoring sensors be retrieved in the MCR.

in the MCR.

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2.5.7 Operation and Control Centers System Design Description The operation and control centers system (OCS) is developed and implemented based upon a human factors engineering (HFE) program. The human system interface (HSI) scope includes the design of the OCS and each of the HSI resources. For the purposes of the HFE program, the OCS includes the main control room, remote shutdown workstation, the local control stations, and the associated workstations for each of these centers. Implementation of the HFE program involves the completion of the human factors engineering analyses and plans described in Tier 1 Material Section 3.2, Human Factors Engineering.

2.5.8 Radiation Monitoring System No entry. Radiation monitoring function covered in Section 3.5, Radiation Monitoring.

2.5.9 Seismic Monitoring System Design Description The seismic monitoring system (SJS) provides for the collection of seismic data in digital format, analysis of seismic data, notification of the operator if the ground motion exceeds a threshold value, and notification of the operator (after analysis of data) that a predetermined cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) has been exceeded. The SJS has at least four triaxial acceleration sensor units and a time-history analyzer and recording system. The time-history analyzer and recording system are located in the auxiliary building.

1. The functional arrangement of the SJS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.9.
2. The SJS can compute CAV and the 5 percent of critical damping response spectrum for frequencies between 1 and 10 Hertz.
3. The SJS has a dynamic range of 0.001g to 1.0g and a frequency range of 0.2 to 50 Hertz.

Table 2.5.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 576 2.5.09.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built SJS conforms SJS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.5.9. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.9.

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Table 2.5.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 577 2.5.09.02 2. The SJS can compute CAV and the 5 Type tests using simulated input A report exists and concludes percent of critical damping response signals, analyses, or a that the SJS time-history spectrum for frequencies between 1 and combination of type tests and analyzer and recording system 10 Hz. analyses, of the SJS time-history can record data at a sampling analyzer and recording system rate of at least 200 samples will be performed. per second, that the pre-event recording time is adjustable from less than or equal to 1.2 seconds to greater than or equal to 15.0 seconds, and that the initiation value is adjustable from less than or equal to 0.002g to greater than or equal to 0.02g.

578 2.5.09.03 3. The SJS has a dynamic range of Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes 0.001g to 1.0g and a frequency range of combination of type tests and that the SJS triaxial 0.2 to 50 Hertz. analyses, of the SJS triaxial acceleration sensors have a acceleration sensors will be dynamic range of at least performed. 0.001g to 1.0g and a frequency range of at least 0.2 to 50 Hertz.

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2.5.10 Main Turbine Control and Diagnostic System No entry. Covered in Section 2.4.2, Main Turbine System.

2.5.11 Meteorological and Environmental Monitoring System No entry for this system.

2.5.12 Closed Circuit TV System No entry for this system.

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2.6 Electrical Power Systems 2.6.1 Main ac Power System Design Description The main ac power system (ECS) provides electrical ac power to nonsafety-related loads and non-Class 1E power to the Class 1E battery chargers and regulating transformers during normal and off-normal conditions.

The ECS is as shown in Figures 2.6.1-1 and the component locations of the ECS are as shown in Table 2.6.1-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the ECS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.1.
2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
3. a) The Class 1E breaker control power for the equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

b) Separation is provided between ECS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

4. The ECS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The ECS provides the capability for distributing non-Class 1E ac power from onsite sources (ZOS) to nonsafety-related loads listed in Table 2.6.1-2.

b) The 6900 Vac circuit breakers in switchgear ECS-ES-1 and ECS-ES-2 open after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power system.

c) Each standby diesel generator 6900 Vac circuit breaker closes after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power system.

d) Each ancillary diesel generator unit is sized to supply power to long-term safety-related post-accident monitoring loads and control room lighting and ventilation through a regulating transformer; and for one passive containment cooling system (PCS) recirculation pump.

e) The ECS provides two loss-of-voltage signals to the onsite standby power system (ZOS), one for each diesel-backed 6900 Vac switchgear bus.

f) The ECS provides a reverse-power trip of the generator circuit breaker which is blocked for at least 15 seconds following a turbine trip.

5. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the circuit breakers identified in Table 2.6.1-3 to perform the listed functions.
6. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.6.1-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

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Table 2.6.1-1 Class 1E/

Seismic Qual. for Safety-Related Equipment Name Tag No. Category I Harsh Envir. Display Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Circuit ECS-ES-31 Yes Yes/No No Breaker (Trip open only)

RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-32 Yes Yes/No No (Trip open only)

RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-41 Yes Yes/No No (Trip open only)

RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-42 Yes Yes/No No (Trip open only)

RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-51 Yes Yes/No No (Trip open only)

RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-52 Yes Yes/No No (Trip open only)

RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-61 Yes Yes/No No (Trip open only)

RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-62 Yes Yes/No No (Trip open only)

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Table 2.6.1-2 Load Description Power Source Load Center Transformers EK-11, EK-12, EK-13, EK-14 ZOS-MG-02A Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A Electric Unit Heater ZOS-MG-02A Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A Fan ZOS-MG-02A Class 1E Division A Regulating Transformer ZOS-MG-02A Class 1E Division C Regulating Transformer ZOS-MG-02A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 1A ZOS-MG-02A Diesel Generator Room A Building Standby Exhaust Fans 1A and 2A ZOS-MG-02A Diesel Generator Service Module A Air Handling Unit (AHU) ZOS-MG-02A 01A Fan Startup Feedwater Pump A ZOS-MG-02A Service Water Pump A ZOS-MG-02A Service Water Cooling Tower Fan A ZOS-MG-02A MCR/Control Support Area (CSA) AHU A Supply and ZOS-MG-02A Return Fans Divisions A/C Class 1E Electrical Room AHU A Supply and ZOS-MG-02A Return Fans Divisions B/D Class 1E Electrical Room AHU D Supply and ZOS-MG-02A Return Fans Air-cooled Chiller Pump 2 ZOS-MG-02A Component Cooling Water Pump 1A ZOS-MG-02A Air-cooled Chiller 2 ZOS-MG-02A Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) Makeup Pump 1A ZOS-MG-02A CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan A ZOS-MG-02A Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS) Pump 1A ZOS-MG-02A RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan A ZOS-MG-02A Equipment Room AHU Supply and Return Fans VXS-MA-01A/02A ZOS-MG-02A Switchgear Room A AHU Supply and Return Fans VXS-MA-05A/06A ZOS-MG-02A Non-1E Battery Charger EDS1-DC-1 ZOS-MG-02A Non-1E Battery Room A Exhaust Fan ZOS-MG-02A Non-1E Battery Charger EDS3-DC-1 ZOS-MG-02A C-337

Table 2.6.1-2 (cont.)

Load Description Power Source Class 1E Division A Battery Charger 1 (24-hour) ZOS-MG-02A Class 1E Division C Battery Charger 1 (24-hour) ZOS-MG-02A Class 1E Division C Battery Charger 2 (72-hour) ZOS-MG-02A Divisions A/C Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust Fan A ZOS-MG-02A Supplemental Air Filtration Unit Fan A ZOS-MG-02A Backup Group 4A Pressurizer Heaters ZOS-MG-02A Spent Fuel Cooling Pump 1A ZOS-MG-02A Load Center Transformers EK-21, EK-22, EK-23, EK-24 ZOS-MG-02B Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B Electric Unit Heater ZOS-MG-02B Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B Fan ZOS-MG-02B Class 1E Division B Regulating Transformer ZOS-MG-02B Class 1E Division D Regulating Transformer ZOS-MG-02B Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 1B ZOS-MG-02B Diesel Generator Room B Building Standby Exhaust Fans 1B and 2B ZOS-MG-02B Diesel Generator Service Module B AHU 01B Fan ZOS-MG-02B Startup Feedwater Pump B ZOS-MG-02B Service Water Pump B ZOS-MG-02B Service Water Cooling Tower Fan B ZOS-MG-02B MCR/CSA AHU B Supply and Return Fans ZOS-MG-02B Divisions B/D Class 1E Electrical Room AHU B Supply and ZOS-MG-02B Return Fans Divisions A/C Class 1E Electrical Room AHU C Supply and ZOS-MG-02B Return Fans Air-cooled Chiller Pump 3 ZOS-MG-02B Component Cooling Water Pump 1B ZOS-MG-02B Air-cooled Chiller 3 ZOS-MG-02B CVS Makeup Pump 1B ZOS-MG-02B CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan B ZOS-MG-02B RNS Pump 1B ZOS-MG-02B RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan B ZOS-MG-02B Equipment Room B AHU Supply and Return Fans VXS-MA-01B/02B ZOS-MG-02B C-338

Table 2.6.1-2 (cont.)

Load Description Power Source Switchgear Room B AHU Supply and Return Fans VXS-MA-05B/06B ZOS-MG-02B Non-1E Battery Charger EDS2-DC-1 ZOS-MG-02B Non-1E Battery Charger EDS4-DC-1 ZOS-MG-02B Non-1E Battery Room B Exhaust Fan ZOS-MG-02B Class 1E Division B Battery Charger 1 (24-hour) ZOS-MG-02B Class 1E Division B Battery Charger 2 (72-hour) ZOS-MG-02B Class 1E Division D Battery Charger 1 (24-hour) ZOS-MG-02B Divisions B/D Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust Fan B ZOS-MG-02B Supplemental Air Filtration Unit Fan B ZOS-MG-02B Backup Group 4B Pressurizer Heaters ZOS-MG-02B Spent Fuel Cooling Pump 1B ZOS-MG-02B Table 2.6.1-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function 6900 V Switchgear Bus 1 ECS-ES-1 Yes Yes (Bus voltage, breaker position for (Breaker open/close) all breakers on bus) 6900 V Switchgear Bus 2 ECS-ES-2 Yes Yes (Bus voltage, breaker position for (Breaker open/close) all breakers on bus)

Unit Auxiliary ZAS-ET-2A Yes No Transformer A (Secondary Voltage)

Unit Auxiliary ZAS-ET-2B Yes No Transformer B (Secondary Voltage)

Reserve Auxiliary ZAS-ET-4A Yes No Transformer A (Secondary Voltage)

Reserve Auxiliary ZAS-ET-4B Yes No Transformer B (Secondary Voltage)

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Table 2.6.1-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 579 2.6.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built ECS conforms ECS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.6.1. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.1.

580 2.6.01.02.i 2. The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand to verify that the seismic equipment identified in seismic design basis loads without loss Category I equipment identified Table 2.6.1-1 is located on the of safety function. in Table 2.6.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Nuclear Island.

581 2.6.01.02.ii 2. The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis loads without loss analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

582 2.6.01.02.iii 2. The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built seismic design basis loads without loss verifying that the as-built equipment including of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

583 2.6.01.03a 3.a) The Class 1E breaker control Testing will be performed on the A simulated test signal exists power for the equipment identified in ECS by providing a simulated at the Class 1E equipment Table 2.6.1-1 are powered from their test signal in each Class 1E identified in Table 2.6.1-1 respective Class 1E division. division. when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

584 2.6.01.03b 3.b) Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, ECS Class 1E divisions, and between item 7.d. item 7.d.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

585 2.6.01.04a 4.a) The ECS provides the capability Tests will be performed using a A test signal exists at the for distributing non-Class 1E ac power test signal to confirm that an terminals of each selected from onsite sources (ZOS) to nonsafety- electrical path exists for each load.

related loads listed in Table 2.6.1-2. selected load listed in Table 2.6.1-2 from an ECS-ES-1 or ECS-ES-2 bus. Each test may be a single test or a series of over-lapping tests.

586 2.6.01.04b 4.b) The 6900 Vac circuit breakers in See ITAAC Table 2.6.4-1, See ITAAC Table 2.6.4-1, switchgear ECS-ES-1 and ECS-ES-2 item 2.a. item 2.a.

open after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power load system.

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Table 2.6.1-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 587 2.6.01.04c 4.c) Each standby diesel generator Testing will be performed using Each standby diesel generator 6900 Vac circuit breaker closes after real or simulated signals from 6900 Vac circuit breaker receiving a signal from the onsite the standby diesel load system. closes after receiving a signal standby power system. from the standby diesel system.

588 2.6.01.04d 4.d) Each ancillary diesel generator Each ancillary diesel generator Each diesel generator provides unit is sized to supply power to long- will be operated with fuel power to the load with a term safety-related post-accident supplied from the ancillary generator terminal voltage of monitoring loads and control room diesel generator fuel tank and 480 +/- 10% volts and a lighting and ventilation through a with a load of 35 kW or greater frequency of 60 +/- 5% Hz.

regulating transformer; and for one PCS and a power factor between recirculation pump. 0.9 and 1.0 for a time period required to reach engine temperature equilibrium plus 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

589 2.6.01.04e 4.e) The ECS provides two loss-of- Tests on the as-built ECS system A loss-of-voltage signal is voltage signals to the onsite standby will be conducted by simulating generated when the loss-of-power system (ZOS), one for each a loss-of-voltage condition on voltage condition is simulated.

diesel-backed 6900 Vac switchgear bus. each diesel-backed 6900 Vac switchgear bus.

590 2.6.01.04f 4.f) The ECS provides a reverse-power Tests on the as-built ECS system The generator circuit breaker trip of the generator circuit breaker will be conducted by simulating trip signal does not occur until which is blocked for at least 15 seconds a turbine trip signal followed by at least 15 seconds after the following a turbine trip. a simulated reverse-power simulated turbine trip.

condition. The generator circuit breaker trip signal will be monitored.

591 2.6.01.05 5. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Tests will be performed to verify Controls in the MCR cause the circuit breakers identified in that controls in the MCR can the circuit breakers identified Table 2.6.1-3 to perform the listed operate the circuit breakers in Table 2.6.1-3 to operate.

functions. identified in Table 2.6.1-3.

592 2.6.01.06 6. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for Displays identified in in Table 2.6.1-3 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the displays Table 2.6.1-3 can be retrieved MCR. identified in Table 2.6.1-3 in the in the MCR.

MCR.

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Table 2.6.1-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-31 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-32 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-41 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-42 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-51 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-52 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-61 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-62 Auxiliary Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 1 ECS-ES-1 Annex Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 2 ECS-ES-2 Annex Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 3 ECS-ES-3 Turbine Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 4 ECS-ES-4 Turbine Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 5 ECS-ES-5 Turbine Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 6 ECS-ES-6 Turbine Building Main Generator ZAS-MG-01 Turbine Building Generator Circuit Breaker ZAS-ES-01 Turbine Building Main Step-up Transformer ZAS-ET-1A Yard Main Step-up Transformer ZAS-ET-1B Yard Main Step-up Transformer ZAS-ET-1C Yard Unit Auxiliary Transformer A ZAS-ET-2A Yard Unit Auxiliary Transformer B ZAS-ET-2B Yard Reserve Auxiliary Transformer A ZAS-ET-4A Yard Reserve Auxiliary Transformer B ZAS-ET-4B Yard Ancillary Diesel Generator #1 ECS-MG-01 Annex Building Ancillary Diesel Generator #2 ECS-MG-02 Annex Building Ancillary Diesel Generator Distribution Panel 1 ECS-ED-01 Annex Building Ancillary Diesel Generator Distribution Panel 1 ECS-ED-02 Annex Building C-342

Figure 2.6.1-1 (Sheet 1 of 4)

Main ac Power System C-343

Figure 2.6.1-1 (Sheet 2 of 4)

Main ac Power System C-344

Figure 2.6.1-1 (Sheet 3 of 4)

Main ac Power System C-345

Figure 2.6.1-1 (Sheet 4 of 4)

Main ac Power System C-346

2.6.2 Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System Design Description The non-Class 1E dc and uninterruptible power supply system (EDS) provides dc and uninterruptible ac electrical power to nonsafety-related loads during normal and off-normal conditions.

The EDS is as shown in Figure 2.6.2-1 and the component locations of the EDS are as shown in Table 2.6.2-2.

1. The functional arrangement of the EDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.2.
2. The EDS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 battery charger supplies the corresponding dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged.

b) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 battery supplies the corresponding dc switchboard bus load for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> without recharging.

c) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 inverter supplies the corresponding ac load.

Table 2.6.2-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 593 2.6.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built EDS conforms EDS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.6.2. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.2.

594 2.6.02.02a 2.a) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and Testing of each as-built battery Each battery charger provides 4 battery charger supplies the charger will be performed by an output current of at least corresponding dc switchboard bus load applying a simulated or real 550 amps with an output while maintaining the corresponding load, or a combination of voltage in the range 105 to battery charged. simulated or real loads. 140 V.

595 2.6.02.02b 2.b) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and Testing of each as-built battery The battery terminal voltage is 4 battery supplies the corresponding dc will be performed by applying a greater than or equal to 105 V switchboard bus load for a period of simulated or real load, or a after a period of no less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> without recharging. combination of simulated or real 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, with an equivalent loads. The test will be load greater than 500 amps.

conducted on a battery that has been fully charged and has been connected to a battery charger maintained at 135 +/- 1 V for a period of no less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the test.

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Table 2.6.2-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 596 2.6.02.02c 2.c) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and Testing of each as-built inverter Each inverter provides a line-4 inverter supplies the corresponding ac will be performed by applying a to-line output voltage of load. simulated or real load, or a 208 +/- 2% V at a frequency of combination of simulated or real 60 +/- 0.5% Hz.

loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 35 kW.

Table 2.6.2-2 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Load Group 1 Battery EDS1-DB-1 Annex Building Load Group 2 Battery EDS2-DB-1 Annex Building Load Group 3 Battery EDS3-DB-1 Annex Building Load Group 4 Battery EDS4-DB-1 Annex Building Load Group 1 Battery Charger EDS1-DC-1 Annex Building Load Group 2 Battery Charger EDS2-DC-1 Annex Building Load Group 3 Battery Charger EDS3-DC-1 Annex Building Load Group 4 Battery Charger EDS4-DC-1 Annex Building Load Group 1 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS1-DS-1 Annex Building Load Group 1 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS1-DS-11 Annex Building Load Group 2 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS2-DS-1 Annex Building Load Group 2 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS2-DS-11 Annex Building Load Group 3 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS3-DS-1 Annex Building Load Group 3 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS3-DS-11 Annex Building Load Group 4 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS4-DS-1 Annex Building Load Group 4 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS4-DS-11 Annex Building Load Group 1 Inverter EDS1-DU-1 Annex Building Load Group 2 Inverter EDS2-DU-1 Annex Building Load Group 3 Inverter EDS3-DU-1 Annex Building Load Group 4 Inverter EDS4-DU-1 Annex Building C-348

Figure 2.6.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System C-349

Figure 2.6.2-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System C-350

2.6.3 Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System Design Description The Class 1E dc and uninterruptible power supply system (IDS) provides dc and uninterruptible ac electrical power for safety-related equipment during normal and off-normal conditions.

The IDS is as shown in Figure 2.6.3-1 and the component locations of the IDS are as shown in Table 2.6.3-4.

1. The functional arrangement of the IDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.3.
2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
3. Separation is provided between Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables.
4. The IDS provides the following safety-related functions:

a) The IDS provides electrical independence between the Class 1E divisions.

b) The IDS provides electrical isolation between the non-Class 1E ac power system and the non-Class 1E lighting in the MCR.

c) Each IDS 24-hour battery bank supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> without recharging.

d) Each IDS 72-hour battery bank supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> without recharging.

e) The IDS spare battery bank supplies a dc load equal to or greater than the most severe switchboard bus load for the required period without recharging.

f) Each IDS 24-hour inverter supplies its ac load.

g) Each IDS 72-hour inverter supplies its ac load.

h) Each IDS 24-hour battery charger provides the protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) with two loss-of-ac input voltage signals.

i) The IDS supplies an operating voltage at the terminals of the Class 1E motor-operated valves identified in subsections 2.1.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.3.2, and 2.3.6 that is greater than or equal to the minimum specified voltage.

5. The IDS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) Each IDS 24-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged.

b) Each IDS 72-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged.

c) Each IDS regulating transformer supplies an ac load when powered from the 480 V motor control center (MCC).

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d) The IDS Divisions B and C regulating transformers supply their post-72 hour ac loads when powered from an ancillary diesel generator.

6. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.
7. The IDS dc battery fuses and battery charger circuit breakers, and dc distribution panels, MCCs, and their circuit breakers and fuses, are sized to supply their load requirements.
8. Circuit breakers and fuses in IDS battery, battery charger, dc distribution panel, and MCC circuits are rated to interrupt fault currents.
9. The IDS batteries, battery chargers, dc distribution panels, and MCCs are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.
10. The IDS electrical distribution system cables are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.
11. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.6.3-2 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.6.3-1 Class 1E/ Safety-Seismic Qual. for Related Equipment Name Tag No. Cat. I Harsh Envir. Display Division A 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank IDSA-DB-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank 1 IDSB-DB-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 250 Vdc 72-Hour Battery Bank 2 IDSB-DB-2 Yes Yes/No No Division C 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank 1 IDSC-DB-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 250 Vdc 72-Hour Battery Bank 2 IDSC-DB-2 Yes Yes/No No Division D 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank IDSD-DB-1 Yes Yes/No No Spare 250 Vdc Battery Bank IDSS-DB-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 24-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSA-DC-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 24-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSB-DC-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 72-Hour Battery Charger 2 IDSB-DC-2 Yes Yes/No No Division C 24-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSC-DC-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 72-Hour Battery Charger 2 IDSC-DC-2 Yes Yes/No No Division D 24-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSD-DC-1 Yes Yes/No No Spare Battery Charger 1 IDSS-DC-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSA-DD-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSB-DD-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSC-DD-1 Yes Yes/No No C-352

Table 2.6.3-1 Class 1E/ Safety-Seismic Qual. for Related Equipment Name Tag No. Cat. I Harsh Envir. Display Division D 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSD-DD-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSA-EA-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSA-EA-2 Yes Yes/No No Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSB-EA-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSB-EA-2 Yes Yes/No No Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 3 IDSB-EA-3 Yes Yes/No No Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSC-EA-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSC-EA-2 Yes Yes/No No Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 3 IDSC-EA-3 Yes Yes/No No Division D 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSD-EA-1 Yes Yes/No No Division D 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSD-EA-2 Yes Yes/No No Division A Fuse Panel 4 IDSA-EA-4 Yes Yes/No No Division B Fuse Panel 4 IDSB-EA-4 Yes Yes/No No Division B Fuse Panel 5 IDSB-EA-5 Yes Yes/No No Division B Fuse Panel 6 IDSB-EA-6 Yes Yes/No No Division C Fuse Panel 4 IDSC-EA-4 Yes Yes/No No Division C Fuse Panel 5 IDSC-EA-5 Yes Yes/No No Division C Fuse Panel 6 IDSC-EA-6 Yes Yes/No No Division D Fuse Panel 4 IDSD-EA-4 Yes Yes/No No Division A Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSA-DF-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSB-DF-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B Fused Transfer Switch Box 2 IDSB-DF-2 Yes Yes/No No Division C Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSC-DF-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C Fused Transfer Switch Box 2 IDSC-DF-2 Yes Yes/No No Division D Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSD-DF-1 Yes Yes/No No Spare Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSS-DF-1 Yes Yes/No No Spare Battery 125/250 Vdc Disconnect IDSS-SW-1 Yes Yes/No No Switch Division A 250 Vdc MCC IDSA-DK-1 Yes Yes/No No C-353

Table 2.6.3-1 Class 1E/ Safety-Seismic Qual. for Related Equipment Name Tag No. Cat. I Harsh Envir. Display Division B 250 Vdc MCC IDSB-DK-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 250 Vdc MCC IDSC-DK-1 Yes Yes/No No Division D 250 Vdc MCC IDSD-DK-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSA-DS-1 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage)

Division B 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSB-DS-1 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage)

Division B 250 Vdc Switchboard 2 IDSB-DS-2 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage)

Division C 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSC-DS-1 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage)

Division C 250 Vdc Switchboard 2 IDSC-DS-2 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage)

Division D 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSD-DS-1 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage)

Division A Regulating Transformer IDSA-DT-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B Regulating Transformer IDSB-DT-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C Regulating Transformer IDSC-DT-1 Yes Yes/No No Division D Regulating Transformer IDSD-DT-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 24-Hour Inverter 1 IDSA-DU-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 24-Hour Inverter 1 IDSB-DU-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 72-Hour Inverter 2 IDSB-DU-2 Yes Yes/No No Division C 24-Hour Inverter 1 IDSC-DU-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 72-Hour Inverter 2 IDSC-DU-2 Yes Yes/No No Division D 24-Hour Inverter 1 IDSD-DU-1 Yes Yes/No No Spare Termination Box 2 IDSS-DF-2 Yes Yes/No No Spare Termination Box 3 IDSS-DF-3 Yes Yes/No No Spare Termination Box 4 IDSS-DF-4 Yes Yes/No No Spare Termination Box 5 IDSS-DF-5 Yes Yes/No No Spare Termination Box 6 IDSS-DF-6 Yes Yes/No No C-354

Table 2.6.3-2 Equipment Tag No. Display/Status Indication Division A Battery Monitor IDSA-DV-1 Yes (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division B 24-Hour Battery IDSB-DV-1 Yes Monitor (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division B 72-Hour Battery IDSB-DV-2 Yes Monitor (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division C 24-Hour Battery IDSC-DV-1 Yes Monitor (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division C 72-Hour Battery IDSC-DV-2 Yes Monitor (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division D Battery Monitor IDSD-DV-1 Yes (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division A Fused Transfer Switch IDSA-DF-1 Yes Box (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division B 24-Hour Fused Transfer IDSB-DF-1 Yes Switch Box (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division B 72-Hour Fused Transfer IDSB-DF-2 Yes Switch Box (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division C 24-Hour Fused Transfer IDSC-DF-1 Yes Switch Box (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division C 72-Hour Fused Transfer IDSC-DF-2 Yes Switch Box (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division D Fused Transfer IDSD-DF-1 Yes Switch Box (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division A Battery Charger IDSA-DC-1 Yes (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble(1))

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Table 2.6.3-2 Equipment Tag No. Display/Status Indication Division B 24-Hour Battery IDSB-DC-1 Yes Charger (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble(1))

Division B 72-Hour Battery IDSB-DC-2 Yes Charger (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble(1))

Division C 24-Hour Battery IDSC-DC-1 Yes Charger (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble(1))

Division C 72-Hour Battery IDSC-DC-2 Yes Charger (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble(1))

Division D Battery Charger IDSD-DC-1 Yes (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble(1))

Note: (1) Battery charger trouble includes charger dc output under/over voltage Table 2.6.3-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 597 2.6.03.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built IDS conforms IDS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.6.3. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.3.

598 2.6.03.02.i 2. The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand to verify that the seismic equipment identified in seismic design basis loads without loss Category I equipment identified Table 2.6.3-1 is located on the of safety function. in Table 2.6.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Nuclear Island.

599 2.6.03.02.ii 2. The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis loads without loss analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

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Table 2.6.3-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 600 2.6.03.02.iii 2. The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built seismic design basis loads without loss verifying that the as-built equipment including of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

601 2.6.03.03 3. Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, Class 1E divisions, and between item 7.d. item 7.d.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables.

602 2.6.03.04a 4.a) The IDS provides electrical Testing will be performed on the A simulated test signal exists independence between the Class 1E IDS by providing a simulated at the Class 1E equipment divisions. test signal in each Class 1E identified in Table 2.6.3-1 division. when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

603 2.6.03.04b 4.b) The IDS provides electrical Type tests, analyses, or a A report exists and concludes isolation between the non-Class 1E ac combination of type tests and that the battery chargers, power system and the non-Class 1E analyses of the isolation devices regulating transformers, and lighting in the MCR. will be performed. isolation fuses prevent credible faults from propagating into the IDS.

604 2.6.03.04c 4.c) Each IDS 24-hour battery bank Testing of each 24-hour as-built The battery terminal voltage is supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a battery bank will be performed greater than or equal to 210 V period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> without recharging. by applying a simulated or real after a period of no less than load, or a combination of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with an equivalent simulated or real loads which load that equals or exceeds the envelope the battery bank design battery bank design duty cycle duty cycle. The test will be capacity.

conducted on a battery bank that has been fully charged and has been connected to a battery charger maintained at 270+/-2 V for a period of no less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the test.

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Table 2.6.3-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 605 2.6.03.04d 4.d) Each IDS 72-hour battery bank Testing of each 72-hour as-built The battery terminal voltage is supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a battery bank will be performed greater than or equal to 210 V period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> without recharging. by applying a simulated or real after a period of no less than load, or a combination of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with an equivalent simulated or real loads which load that equals or exceeds the envelope the battery bank design battery bank design duty cycle duty cycle. The test will be capacity.

conducted on a battery bank that has been fully charged and has been connected to a battery charger maintained at 270+/-2 V for a period of no less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the test.

606 2.6.03.04e 4.e) The IDS spare battery bank Testing of the as-built spare The battery terminal voltage is supplies a dc load equal to or greater battery bank will be performed greater than or equal to 210 V than the most severe switchboard bus by applying a simulated or real after a period with a load and load for the required period without load, or a combination of duration that equals or recharging. simulated or real loads which exceeds the most severe envelope the most severe of the battery bank design duty cycle division batteries design duty capacity.

cycle. The test will be conducted on a battery bank that has been fully charged and has been connected to a battery charger maintained at 270+/-2 V for a period of no less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the test.

607 2.6.03.04f 4.f) Each IDS 24-hour inverter supplies Testing of each 24-hour as-built Each 24-hour inverter supplies its ac load. inverter will be performed by a line-to-line output voltage of applying a simulated or real 208 +/- 2% V at a frequency of load, or a combination of 60 +/- 0.5% Hz.

simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 12 kW. The inverter input voltage will be no more than 210 Vdc during the test.

608 2.6.03.04g 4.g) Each IDS 72-hour inverter Testing of each 72-hour as-built Each 72-hour inverter supplies supplies its ac load. inverter will be performed by a line-to-line output voltage of applying a simulated or real 208 +/- 2% V at a frequency of load, or a combination of 60 +/- 0.5% Hz.

simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 7 kW. The inverter input voltage will be no more than 210 Vdc during the test.

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Table 2.6.3-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 609 2.6.03.04h 4.h) Each IDS 24-hour battery charger Testing will be performed by Two PMS input signals exist provides the PMS with two loss-of-ac simulating a loss of input voltage from each 24-hour battery input voltage signals. to each 24-hour battery charger. charger indicating loss of ac input voltage when the loss-of-input voltage condition is simulated.

610 2.6.03.04i 4.i) The IDS supplies an operating Testing will be performed by The motor starter input voltage at the terminals of the Class 1E stroking each specified motor- terminal voltage is greater motor operated valves identified in operated valve and measuring than or equal 200 Vdc with subsections 2.1.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, the terminal voltage at the motor the motor operating.

2.2.4, 2.3.2, and 2.3.6 that is greater starter input terminals with the than or equal to the minimum specified motor operating. The battery voltage. terminal voltage will be no more than 210 Vdc during the test.

611 2.6.03.05a 5.a) Each IDS 24-hour battery charger Testing of each as-built 24-hour Each 24-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load battery charger will be provides an output current of while maintaining the corresponding performed by applying a at least 150 A with an output battery charged. simulated or real load, or a voltage in the range 210 to combination of simulated or real 280 V.

loads.

612 2.6.03.05b 5.b) Each IDS 72-hour battery charger Testing of each 72-hour as-built Each 72-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load battery charger will be provides an output current of while maintaining the corresponding performed by applying a at least 125 A with an output battery charged. simulated or real load, or a voltage in the range 210 to combination of simulated or real 280 V.

loads.

613 2.6.03.05c 5.c) Each IDS regulating transformer Testing of each as-built Each regulating transformer supplies an ac load when powered from regulating transformer will be supplies a line-to-line output the 480 V MCC. performed by applying a voltage of 208 +/- 2% V.

simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 30 kW when powered from the 480 V MCC.

614 2.6.03.05d.i 5.d) The IDS Divisions B and C Inspection of the as-built system i) Ancillary diesel generator 1 regulating transformers supply their will be performed. is electrically connected to post-72-hour ac loads when powered regulating transformer from an ancillary diesel generator. IDSC-DT-1 615 2.6.03.05d.ii 5.d) The IDS Divisions B and C Inspection of the as-built system ii) Ancillary diesel generator regulating transformers supply their will be performed. 2 is electrically connected to post-72-hour ac loads when powered regulating transformer from an ancillary diesel generator. IDSB-DT-1.

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Table 2.6.3-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 616 2.6.03.06 6. Safety-related displays identified in Inspection will be performed for Safety-related displays Table 2.6.3-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can MCR. related displays in the MCR. be retrieved in the MCR.

617 2.6.03.07 7. The IDS dc battery fuses and battery Analyses for the as-built IDS dc Analyses for the as-built IDS charger circuit breakers, and dc electrical distribution system to dc electrical distribution distribution panels, MCCs, and their determine the capacities of the system exist and conclude that circuit breakers and fuses, are sized to battery fuses and battery charger the capacities of as-built IDS supply their load requirements. circuit breakers, and dc battery fuses and battery distribution panels, MCCs, and charger circuit breakers, and their circuit breakers and fuses, dc distribution panels, MCCs, will be performed. and their circuit breakers and fuses, as determined by their nameplate ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements.

618 2.6.03.08 8. Circuit breakers and fuses in IDS Analyses for the as-built IDS dc Analyses for the as-built IDS battery, battery charger, dc distribution electrical distribution system to dc electrical distribution panel, and MCC circuits are rated to determine fault currents will be system exist and conclude that interrupt fault currents. performed. the analyzed fault currents do not exceed the interrupt capacity of circuit breakers and fuses in the battery, battery charger, dc distribution panel, and MCC circuits, as determined by their nameplate ratings.

619 2.6.03.09 9. The IDS batteries, battery chargers, Analyses for the as-built IDS dc Analyses for the as-built IDS dc distribution panels, and MCCs are electrical distribution system to dc electrical distribution rated to withstand fault currents for the determine fault currents will be system exist and conclude that time required to clear the fault from its performed. the fault current capacities of power source. as-built IDS batteries, battery chargers, dc distribution panels, and MCCs, as determined by manufacturers ratings, exceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses.

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Table 2.6.3-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 620 2.6.03.10 10. The IDS electrical distribution Analyses for the as-built IDS dc Analyses for the as-built IDS system cables are rated to withstand electrical distribution system to dc electrical distribution fault currents for the time required to determine fault currents will be system exist and conclude that clear the fault from its power source. performed. the IDS dc electrical distribution system cables will withstand the analyzed fault currents, as determined by manufacturers ratings, for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses.

621 2.6.03.11 11. Displays of the parameters Inspection will be performed for Displays identified in identified in Table 2.6.3-2 can be retrievability of the displays Table 2.6.3-2 can be retrieved retrieved in the MCR. identified in Table 2.6.3-2 in the in the MCR.

MCR.

Table 2.6.3-4 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Division A 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank IDSA-DB-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank 1 IDSB-DB-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 250 Vdc 72-Hour Battery Bank 2 IDSB-DB-2 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank 1 IDSC-DB-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc 72-Hour Battery Bank 2 IDSC-DB-2 Auxiliary Building Division D 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank IDSD-DB-1 Auxiliary Building Spare 125 Vdc Battery Bank IDSS-DB-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 24-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSA-DC-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 24-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSB-DC-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 72-Hour Battery Charger 2 IDSB-DC-2 Auxiliary Building Division C 24-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSC-DC-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 72-Hour Battery Charger 2 IDSC-DC-2 Auxiliary Building Division D 24-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSD-DC-1 Auxiliary Building Spare Battery Charger 1 IDSS-DC-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSA-DD-1 Auxiliary Building C-361

Table 2.6.3-4 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Division B 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSB-DD-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSC-DD-2 Auxiliary Building Division D 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSD-DD-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSA-EA-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSA-EA-2 Auxiliary Building Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSB-EA-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSB-EA-2 Auxiliary Building Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 3 IDSB-EA-3 Auxiliary Building Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSC-EA-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSC-EA-2 Auxiliary Building Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 3 IDSC-EA-3 Auxiliary Building Division D 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSD-EA-1 Auxiliary Building Division D 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSD-EA-2 Auxiliary Building Division A Fuse Panel 4 IDSA-EA-4 Auxiliary Building Division B Fuse Panel 4 IDSB-EA-4 Auxiliary Building Division B Fuse Panel 5 IDSB-EA-5 Auxiliary Building Division B Fuse Panel 6 IDSB-EA-6 Auxiliary Building Division C Fuse Panel 4 IDSC-EA-4 Auxiliary Building Division C Fuse Panel 5 IDSC-EA-5 Auxiliary Building Division C Fuse Panel 6 IDSC-EA-6 Auxiliary Building Division D Fuse Panel 4 IDSD-EA-4 Auxiliary Building Division A Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSA-DF-1 Auxiliary Building Division B Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSB-DF-1 Auxiliary Building Division B Fused Transfer Switch Box 2 IDSB-DF-2 Auxiliary Building Division C Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSC-DF-1 Auxiliary Building Division C Fused Transfer Switch Box 2 IDSC-DF-2 Auxiliary Building Division D Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSD-DF-1 Auxiliary Building Spare Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSS-DF-1 Auxiliary Building Spare Battery 125/240 Vdc Disconnect Switch IDSS-SW-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 250 Vdc MCC IDSA-DK-1 Auxiliary Building C-362

Table 2.6.3-4 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Division B 250 Vdc MCC IDSB-DK-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc MCC IDSC-DK-1 Auxiliary Building Division D 250 Vdc MCC IDSD-DK-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSA-DS-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSB-DS-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 250 Vdc Switchboard 2 IDSB-DS-2 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSC-DS-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc Switchboard 2 IDSC-DS-2 Auxiliary Building Division D 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSD-DS-1 Auxiliary Building Division A Regulating Transformer IDSA-DT-1 Auxiliary Building Division B Regulating Transformer IDSB-DT-1 Auxiliary Building Division C Regulating Transformer IDSC-DT-1 Auxiliary Building Division D Regulating Transformer IDSD-DT-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 24-Hour Inverter 1 IDSA-DU-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 24-Hour Inverter 1 IDSB-DU-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 72-Hour Inverter 2 IDSB-DU-2 Auxiliary Building Division C 24-Hour Inverter 1 IDSC-DU-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 72-Hour Inverter 2 IDSC-DU-2 Auxiliary Building Division D 24-Hour Inverter 1 IDSD-DU-1 Auxiliary Building Spare Termination Box 2 IDSS-DF-2 Auxiliary Building Spare Termination Box 3 IDSS-DF-3 Auxiliary Building Spare Termination Box 4 IDSS-DF-4 Auxiliary Building Spare Termination Box 5 IDSS-DF-5 Auxiliary Building Spare Termination Box 6 IDSS-DF-6 Auxiliary Building C-363

Figure 2.6.3-1 (Sheet 1 of 4)

Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System (Division A)

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Figure 2.6.3-1 (Sheet 2 of 4)

Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System (Division B)

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Figure 2.6.3-1 (Sheet 3 of 4)

Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System (Division C)

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Figure 2.6.3-1 (Sheet 4 of 4)

Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System (Division D)

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2.6.4 Onsite Standby Power System Design Description The onsite standby power system (ZOS) provides backup ac electrical power for nonsafety-related loads during normal and off-normal conditions.

The ZOS has two standby diesel generator units and the component locations of the ZOS are as shown in Table 2.6.4-2. The centerline of the diesel engine exhaust gas discharge is located more than twenty (20) feet higher than that of the combustion air intake.

1. The functional arrangement of the ZOS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.4.
2. The ZOS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) On loss of power to a 6900 volt diesel-backed bus, the associated diesel generator automatically starts and produces ac power at rated voltage and frequency. The source circuit breakers and bus load circuit breakers are opened, and the generator is connected to the bus.

b) Each diesel generator unit is sized to supply power to the selected nonsafety-related electrical components.

c) Automatic-sequence loads are sequentially loaded on the associated buses.

3. Displays of diesel generator status (running/not running) and electrical output power (watts) can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
4. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop each diesel generator.

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Table 2.6.4-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 622 2.6.04.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built ZOS conforms ZOS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.6.4. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.4.

623 2.6.04.02a 2.a) On loss of power to a 6900 volt Tests on the as-built ZOS system Each as-built diesel generator diesel-backed bus, the associated diesel will be conducted by providing a automatically starts on generator automatically starts and simulated loss-of-voltage signal. receiving a simulated loss-of-produces ac power at rated voltage and The starting air supply receiver voltage signal and attains a frequency. The source circuit breakers will not be replenished during voltage of 6900 + 10% V and and bus load circuit breakers are the test. frequency 60 + 5% Hz after opened, and the generator is connected the start signal is initiated and to the bus. opens ac power system breakers on the associated 6900 V bus.

624 2.6.04.02b 2.b) Each diesel generator unit is sized Each diesel generator will be Each diesel generator provides to supply power to the selected operated with a load of 4000 kW power to the load with a nonsafety-related electrical or greater and a power factor generator terminal voltage of components. between 0.9 and 1.0 for a time 6900 +/- 10% V and a period required to reach engine frequency of 60 + 5% Hz.

temperature equilibrium plus 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

625 2.6.04.02c 2.c) Automatic-sequence loads are An actual or simulated signal is The load sequencer initiates a sequentially loaded on the associated initiated to start the load closure signal within buses. sequencer operation. Output +/-5 seconds of the set intervals signals will be monitored to to connect the loads.

determine the operability of the load sequencer. Time measurements are taken to determine the load stepping intervals.

626 2.6.04.03 3. Displays of diesel generator status Inspection will be performed for Displays of diesel generator (running/not running) and electrical retrievability of the displays in status and electrical output output power (watts) can be retrieved in the MCR. power can be retrieved in the the MCR. MCR.

627 2.6.04.04 4. Controls exist in the MCR to start A test will be performed to Controls in the MCR operate and stop each diesel generator. verify that controls in the MCR to start and stop each diesel can start and stop each diesel generator.

generator.

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Table 2.6.4-2 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Onsite Diesel Generator A Package ZOS-MS-05A Diesel Generator Building Onsite Diesel Generator B Package ZOS-MS-05B Diesel Generator Building C-370

2.6.5 Lighting System Design Description The lighting system (ELS) provides the normal and emergency lighting in the main control room (MCR) and at the remote shutdown workstation (RSW).

1. The functional arrangement of the ELS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.5.
2. The ELS has six groups of emergency lighting fixtures located in the MCR and at the RSW.

Each group is powered by one of the Class 1E inverters. The ELS has four groups of panel lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the MCR. Each group is powered by one of the Class 1E inverters in Divisions B and C (one 24-hour and one 72-hour inverter in each Division).

3. The lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports.
4. The panel lighting circuits are classified as associated and treated as Class 1E. These lighting circuits are routed with the Divisions B and C Class 1E circuits. Separation is provided between ELS associated divisions and between associated divisions and non-Class 1E cable.
5. The normal lighting can provide 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW.
6. The emergency lighting can provide 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW.

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Table 2.6.5-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 628 2.6.05.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built ELS conforms ELS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.6.5. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.5.

629 2.6.05.02.i 2. The ELS has six groups of i) Inspection of the as-built i) The as-built ELS has six emergency lighting fixtures located in system will be performed. groups of emergency lighting the MCR and at the RSW. Each group fixtures located in the MCR is powered by one of the Class 1E and at the RSW. The ELS has inverters. The ELS has four groups of four groups of panel lighting panel lighting fixtures located on or fixtures located on or near near safety panels in the MCR. Each safety panels in the MCR.

group is powered by one of the Class 1E inverters in Divisions B and C (one 24-hour and one 72-hour inverter in each Division).

630 2.6.05.02.ii 2. The ELS has six groups of ii) Testing of the as-built system ii) Each of the six as-built emergency lighting fixtures located in will be performed using one emergency lighting groups is the MCR and at the RSW. Each group Class 1E inverter at a time. supplied power from its is powered by one of the Class 1E respective Class 1E inverter inverters. The ELS has four groups of and each of the four as-built panel lighting fixtures located on or panel lighting groups is near safety panels in the MCR. Each supplied power from its group is powered by one of the respective Class 1E inverter.

Class 1E inverters in Divisions B and C (one 24-hour and one 72-hour inverter in each Division).

631 2.6.05.03.i 3. The lighting fixtures located in the i) Inspection will be performed i) The lighting fixtures MCR utilize seismic supports. to verify that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located in the MCR are located located on the Nuclear Island.

on the Nuclear Island.

632 2.6.05.03.ii 3. The lighting fixtures located in the ii) Analysis of seismic supports ii) A report exists and MCR utilize seismic supports. will be performed. concludes that the seismic supports can withstand seismic design basis loads.

633 2.6.05.04 4. The panel lighting circuits are See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, classified as associated and treated as item 7.d. item 7.d.

Class 1E. These lighting circuits are routed with the Divisions B and C Class 1E circuits. Separation is provided between ELS associated divisions and between associated divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

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Table 2.6.5-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 634 2.6.05.05.i 5. The normal lighting can provide i) Testing of the as-built normal i) When adjusted for 50 foot candles at the safety panel and lighting in the MCR will be maximum illumination and at the workstations in the MCR and at performed. powered by the main ac power the RSW. system, the normal lighting in the MCR provides at least 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations.

635 2.6.05.05.ii 5. The normal lighting can provide ii) Testing of the as-built normal ii) When adjusted for 50 foot candles at the safety panel and lighting at the RSW will be maximum illumination and at the workstations in the MCR and at performed. powered by the main ac power the RSW. system, the normal lighting in the RSW provides at least 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations.

636 2.6.05.06.i 6. The emergency lighting can provide i) Testing of the as-built i) When adjusted for 10 foot candles at the safety panel and emergency lighting in the MCR maximum illumination and at the workstations in the MCR and at will be performed. powered by the six Class 1E the RSW. inverters, the emergency lighting in the MCR provides at least 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations.

637 2.6.05.06.ii 6. The emergency lighting can provide ii) Testing of the as-built ii) When adjusted for 10 foot candles at the safety panel and emergency lighting at the RSW maximum illumination and at the workstations in the MCR and at will be performed. powered by the six Class 1E the RSW. inverters, the emergency lighting provides at least 10 foot candles at the RSW.

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2.6.6 Grounding and Lightning Protection System Design Description The grounding and lightning protection system (EGS) provides electrical grounding for instrumentation grounding, equipment grounding, and lightning protection during normal and off-normal conditions.

1. The EGS provides an electrical grounding system for: (1) instrument/computer grounding; (2) electrical system grounding of the neutral points of the main generator, main step-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center transformers, and onsite standby diesel generators; and (3) equipment grounding of equipment enclosures, metal structures, metallic tanks, ground bus of switchgear assemblies, load centers, motor control centers, and control cabinets. Lightning protection is provided for exposed structures and buildings housing safety-related and fire protection equipment. Each grounding system and lightning protection system is grounded to the station grounding grid.

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Table 2.6.6-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 638 2.6.06.01.i 1. The EGS provides an electrical i) An inspection for the i) A connection exists grounding system for: instrument/computer grounding between the (1) instrument/computer grounding; system connection to the station instrument/computer (2) electrical system grounding of the grounding grid will be grounding system and the neutral points of the main generator, performed. station grounding grid.

main step-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center transformers, auxiliary and onsite standby diesel generators; and (3) equipment grounding of equipment enclosures, metal structures, metallic tanks, ground bus of switchgear assemblies, load centers, motor control centers, and control cabinets. Lightning protection is provided for exposed structures and buildings housing safety-related and fire protection equipment. Each grounding system and lighting protection system is grounded to the station grounding grid.

639 2.6.06.01.ii 1. The EGS provides an electrical ii) An inspection for the ii) A connection exists grounding system for: electrical system grounding between the electrical system (1) instrument/computer grounding; connection to the station grounding and the station (2) electrical system grounding of the grounding grid will be grounding grid.

neutral points of the main generator, performed.

main step-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center transformers, auxiliary and onsite standby diesel generators; and (3) equipment grounding of equipment enclosures, metal structures, metallic tanks, ground bus of switchgear assemblies, load centers, motor control centers, and control cabinets. Lightning protection is provided for exposed structures and buildings housing safety-related and fire protection equipment. Each grounding system and lighting protection system is grounded to the station grounding grid.

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Table 2.6.6-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 640 2.6.06.01.iii 1. The EGS provides an electrical iii) An inspection for the iii) A connection exists grounding system for: equipment grounding system between the equipment (1) instrument/computer grounding; connection to the station grounding system and the (2) electrical system grounding of the grounding grid will be station grounding grid.

neutral points of the main generator, performed.

main step-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center transformers, auxiliary and onsite standby diesel generators; and (3) equipment grounding of equipment enclosures, metal structures, metallic tanks, ground bus of switchgear assemblies, load centers, motor control centers, and control cabinets. Lightning protection is provided for exposed structures and buildings housing safety-related and fire protection equipment. Each grounding system and lighting protection system is grounded to the station grounding grid.

641 2.6.06.01.iv 1. The EGS provides an electrical iv) An inspection for the iv) A connection exists grounding system for: lightning protection system between the lighting (1) instrument/computer grounding; connection to the station protection system and the (2) electrical system grounding of the grounding grid will be station grounding grid.

neutral points of the main generator, performed.

main step-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center transformers, auxiliary and onsite standby diesel generators; and (3) equipment grounding of equipment enclosures, metal structures, metallic tanks, ground bus of switchgear assemblies, load centers, motor control centers, and control cabinets. Lightning protection is provided for exposed structures and buildings housing safety-related and fire protection equipment. Each grounding system and lighting protection system is grounded to the station grounding grid.

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2.6.7 Special Process Heat Tracing System No entry for this system.

2.6.8 Cathodic Protection System No entry.

2.6.9 Plant Security System Design Description The physical security system provides physical features to detect, delay, assist response to, and defend against the design basis threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage. The physical security system consists of physical barriers and an intrusion detection system. The details of the physical security system are categorized as Safeguards Information. The physical security system provides protection for vital equipment and plant personnel.

1. The external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet-resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.
2. Not used.
3. Secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment is located within a vital area.
4. Vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area.
5. a) Security alarm annunciation and video assessment information is displayed concurrently in the central alarm station and the secondary alarm station, and the video image recording with real time playback capability can provide assessment of activities before and after each alarm annunciation within the perimeter barrier.

b) The central and secondary alarm stations are located inside the protected area, and the interior of each alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area.

c) The central and secondary alarm stations are designed and equipped such that, in the event of a single act, in accordance with the design basis threat of radiological sabotage, the design enables the survivability of equipment needed to maintain the functional capability of either alarm station to detect and assess alarms and communicate with onsite and offsite response personnel.

6. The vehicle barrier system is installed and located at the necessary stand-off distance to protect against the DBT vehicle bombs.
7. a) Vital equipment is located only within a vital area.

b) Access to vital equipment requires passage through the vital area barrier.

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8. Isolation zones and exterior areas within the protected area are provided with illumination to permit observation of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles.
9. Emergency exits through the vital area boundaries are locked, alarmed, and equipped with a crash bar to allow for emergency egress.
10. Not used.
11. Not used.
12. Not used.
13. a) The central and secondary alarm stations have conventional (landline) telephone service with the main control room and local law enforcement authorities.

b) The central and secondary alarm stations are capable of continuous communications with security personnel.

c) Non-portable communication equipment in the central and secondary alarm stations remains operable from an independent power source in the event of loss of normal power.

14. Not used.
15. a) Security alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators are tamper indicating and self-checking (e.g., an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when on standby power). Alarm annunciation shall indicate the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarms and emergency exit alarm) and location.

b) Intrusion detection and assessment systems concurrently provide visual displays and audible annunciation of alarms in the central and secondary alarm station.

16. Equipment exists to record onsite security alarm annunciation, including the location of the alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication; and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.

Table 2.6.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 642 2.6.09.01 1. The external walls, doors, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 14. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 14.

ceiling, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.

2. Not used C-378

Table 2.6.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 643 2.6.09.03 3. Secondary security power See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 16. See ITAACTable 3.3-6, item 16.

supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment is located within the vital area.

644 2.6.09.04 4. Vital areas are locked and See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 17. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 17.

alarmed with active intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area.

645 2.6.09.05a 5.a) Security alarm annunciation Test, inspection, or a combination Security alarm annunciation and and video assessment of test and inspections of the video assessment information is information is displayed installed systems will be displayed concurrently in the concurrently in the central alarm performed. central alarm station and the station and the secondary alarm secondary alarm station, and the station, and the video image video image recording with real recording with real time time playback capability provides playback capability can provide assessment of activities before and assessment of activities before after alarm annunciation within the and after each alarm perimeter barrier.

annunciation within the perimeter area barrier.

646 2.6.09.05b 5.b) The central and secondary Inspections of the central and The central and secondary alarm alarm stations are located inside secondary alarm stations will be stations are located inside the the protected area and the performed. protected area and the interior of interior of each alarm station is each alarm station is not visible not visible from the perimeter of from the perimeter of the protected the protected area. area.

647 2.6.09.05c 5.c) The central and secondary Inspections and/or analysis of the The central and secondary alarm alarm stations are designed and central and secondary alarm stations are designed and equipped equipped such that, in the event station will be performed. such that, in the event of a single of a single act, in accordance act, in accordance with the design with the design basis threat of basis threat of radiological radiological sabotage, the design sabotage, equipment needed to enables the survivability of maintain the functional capability equipment needed to maintain of either alarm station to detect the functional capability of and assess alarms and either alarm station to detect and communicate with onsite and assess alarms and communicate offsite response personnel exists.

with onsite and offsite response personnel.

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Table 2.6.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 648 2.6.09.06 6. The vehicle barrier system is Inspections and analysis will be The vehicle barrier system will installed and located at the performed for the vehicle barrier protect against the DBT vehicle necessary stand-off distance to system. bombs based upon the stand-off protect against the DBT vehicle distance of the system.

bombs.

649 2.6.09.07a 7.a) Vital equipment is located Inspection will be performed to All vital equipment is located only only within a vital area. confirm that vital equipment is within a vital area.

located within a vital area.

650 2.6.09.07b 7.b) Access to vital equipment Inspection will be performed to Vital equipment is located within a requires passage through the confirm that access to vital protected area such that access to vital area barrier. equipment requires passage vital equipment requires passage through the vital area barrier. through the vital area barrier.

651 2.6.09.08 8. Isolation zones and exterior Inspection of the illumination in The illumination in isolation zones areas within the protected area the isolation zones and external and exterior areas within the are provided with illumination to areas of the protected area will be protected area is 0.2 foot candles permit observation of abnormal performed. measured horizontally at ground presence or activity of persons or level or, alternatively, sufficient to vehicles. permit observation.

652 2.6.09.09 9. Emergency exits through the Test, inspection, or a combination The emergency exits through the vital area boundaries are locked, of tests and inspections of the vital area boundaries are locked, alarmed, and equipped with a emergency exits through the vital alarmed, and equipped with a crash bar to allow for emergency area boundaries will be performed. crash bar to allow for emergency egress. egress.

10. Not used
11. Not used
12. Not used 653 2.6.09.13a 13.a) The central and secondary Tests, inspections, or a The central and secondary alarm alarm stations have conventional combination of tests and stations are equipped with (landline) telephone service with inspections of the central and conventional (landline) telephone the main control room and local secondary alarm stations service with the main control room law enforcement authorities. conventional telephone services and local law enforcement will be performed. authorities.

654 2.6.09.13b 13.b) The central and secondary Tests, inspections, or a The central and secondary alarm alarm stations are capable of combination of tests and stations are equipped with the continuous communication with inspections of the central and capability to continuously security personnel. secondary alarm stations communicate with security continuous communication officers, watchmen, armed capabilities will be performed. response individuals, or any security personnel that have responsibilities during a contingency event.

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Table 2.6.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 655 2.6.09.13c 13.c) Non-portable Tests, inspections, or a Non-portable communication communication equipment in the combination of tests and devices (including conventional central and secondary alarm inspections of the non-portable telephone systems) in the central stations remains operable from communications equipment will and secondary alarm stations are an independent power source in be performed. wired to an independent power the event of loss of normal supply that enables the system to power. remain operable in the event of loss of normal power.

14. Not used.

656 2.6.09.15a 15.a) Security alarm devices, A test will be performed to verify A report exists and concludes that including transmission lines to that security alarms, including security alarm devices, including annunciators, are tamper transmission lines to annunciators, transmission lines to annunciators, indicating and self-checking are tamper indicating and are tamper indicating and (e.g., an automatic indication is self-checking (e.g., an automatic self-checking (e.g., an automatic provided when failure of the indication is provided when failure indication is provided when failure alarm system or a component of the alarm system or a of the alarm system or a occurs, or when on standby component occurs, or when on component occurs, or when the power). Alarm annunciation standby power) and that alarm system is on standby power) and shall indicate the type of alarm annunciation indicates the type of that alarm annunciation indicates (e.g., intrusion alarms and alarm (e.g., intrusion alarms and the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion emergency exit alarm) and emergency exit alarms) and alarms and emergency exit alarms) location. location. and location.

657 2.6.09.15b 15.b) Intrusion detection and Tests will be performed on The intrusion detection system assessment systems concurrently intrusion detection and assessment concurrently provides visual provide visual displays and equipment. displays and audible annunciations audible annunciation of alarms of alarms in both the central and in the central and secondary secondary alarm stations.

alarm stations.

658 2.6.09.16 16. Equipment exists to record Test, analysis, or a combination of A report exists and concludes that onsite security alarm test and analysis will be performed equipment is capable of recording annunciation, including the to ensure that equipment is each onsite security alarm location of the alarm, false capable of recording each onsite annunciation, including the alarm, alarm check, and tamper security alarm annunciation, location of the alarm, false alarm, indication; and the type of alarm, including the location of the alarm, alarm check, and tamper location, alarm circuit, date, and false alarm, alarm check, and indication; and the type of alarm, time. tamper indication; and the type of location, alarm circuit, date, and alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, time.

and time.

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C.2.6.9 Physical Security Table C.2.6.9-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 659 C.2.6.09.01 1. The external walls, doors, ceiling, Type test, analysis, or a The external walls, doors, and floors in the location within combination of type test and ceilings, and floors in the which the last access control function analysis will be performed for location within which the last for access to the protected area is the external walls, doors, access control function for performed are bullet-resistant to at ceilings, and floors in the access to the protected area is least Underwriters Laboratory location within which the last performed are bullet-resistant Ballistic Standard 752, level 4. access control function for to at least Underwriters access to the protected area is Laboratory Ballistic performed. Standard 752, level 4.

660 C.2.6.09.02 2. Physical barriers for the protected An inspection of the protected Physical barriers at the area perimeter are not part of vital area perimeter barrier will be perimeter of the protected area area barriers. performed. are separated from any other barrier designated as a vital area barrier.

661 C.2.6.09.03a 3.a) Isolation zones exist in Inspections will be performed of Isolation zones exist in outdoor areas adjacent to the the isolation zones in outdoor outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of areas adjacent to the physical physical barrier at the the protected area that allows 20 feet barrier at the perimeter of the perimeter of the protected area of observation on either side of the protected area. and allow 20 feet of barrier. Where permanent buildings observation and assessment of do not allow a 20 foot observation the activities of people on distance on the inside of the either side of the barrier.

protected area, the building walls are Where permanent buildings immediately adjacent to, or an do not allow a 20-foot integral part of, the protected area observation and assessment barrier. distance on the inside of the protected area, the building walls are immediately adjacent to, or an integral part of, the protected area barrier and the 20-foot observation and assessment distance does not apply.

662 C.2.6.09.03b 3.b) The isolation zones are Inspections will be performed of The isolation zones are monitored with intrusion detection the intrusion detection equipped with intrusion equipment that provides the equipment within the isolation detection equipment that capability to detect and assess zones. provides the capability to unauthorized persons. detect and assess unauthorized persons.

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Table C.2.6.9-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 663 C.2.6.09.04a 4. The intrusion detection and Tests, inspections or a The intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the combination of tests and assessment equipment at the protected area perimeter: inspections of the intrusion protected area perimeter:

a) detects penetration or attempted detection and assessment a) detects penetration or penetration of the protected area equipment at the protected area attempted penetration of barrier and concurrently alarms perimeter and its uninterruptible the protected area barrier in both the Central Alarm Station power supply will be performed. and concurrently alarms in and Secondary Alarm Station; the Central Alarm Station and Secondary Alarm Station; 664 C.2.6.09.04b 4. The intrusion detection and Tests, inspections or a The intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the combination of tests and assessment equipment at the protected area perimeter: inspections of the intrusion protected area perimeter:

b) remains operable from an detection and assessment b) remains operable from an uninterruptible power supply in equipment at the protected area uninterruptible power the event of the loss of normal perimeter and its uninterruptible supply in the event of the power. power supply will be performed. loss of normal power.

665 C.2.6.09.05a 5. Access control points are Tests, inspections, or The access control points for established to: combination of tests and the protected area:

a) control personnel and vehicle inspections of installed systems a) are configured to control access into the protected area. and equipment at the access personnel and vehicle control points to the protected access.

area will be performed.

666 C.2.6.09.05b 5. Access control points are Tests, inspections, or The access control points for established to: combination of tests and the protected area:

b) detect firearms, explosives, and inspections of installed systems b) include detection incendiary devices at the and equipment at the access equipment that is capable protected area personnel access control points to the protected of detecting firearms, points. area will be performed. incendiary devices, and explosives at the protected area personnel access points.

667 C.2.6.09.06 6. An access control system with A test of the access control The access authorization numbered picture badges is installed system with numbered picture system with numbered picture for use by individuals who are badges will be performed. badges can identify and authorized access to protected areas authorize protected area and and vital areas without escort. vital area access only to those personnel with unescorted access authorization.

668 C.2.6.09.07 7. Access to vital equipment Inspection will be performed to Vital equipment is located physical barriers requires passage confirm that access to vital within a protected area such through the protected area perimeter equipment physical barriers that access to vital equipment barrier. requires passage through the physical barriers requires protected area perimeter barrier. passage through the protected area perimeter barrier.

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Table C.2.6.9-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 669 C.2.6.09.08a 8.a) Penetrations through the Inspections will be performed of Penetrations and openings protected area barrier are secured and penetrations through the through the protected area monitored. protected area barrier. barrier are secured and monitored.

670 C.2.6.09.08b 8.b) Unattended openings (such as Inspections will be performed of Unattended openings (such as underground pathways) that intersect unattended openings that underground pathways) that the protected area boundary or vital intersect the protected area intersect the protected area area boundary will be protected by a boundary or vital area boundary. boundary or vital area physical barrier and monitored by boundary are protected by a intrusion detection equipment or physical barrier and monitored provided surveillance at a frequency by intrusion detection sufficient to detect exploitation. equipment or provided surveillance at a frequency sufficient to detect exploitation.

671 C.2.6.09.09 9. Emergency exits through the Tests, inspections, or a Emergency exits through the protected area perimeter are alarmed combination of tests and protected area perimeter are and secured with locking devices to inspections of emergency exits alarmed and secured by allow for emergency egress. through the protected area locking devices that allow perimeter will be performed. prompt egress during an emergency.

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2.6.10 Main Generation System No entry. Covered in Section 2.6.1, Main ac Power System.

2.6.11 Excitation and Voltage Regulation System No entry for this system.

C.2.6.12 Transmission Switchyard and Offsite Power System Table C.2.6.12-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 672 C.2.6.12.01 1. A minimum of one offsite circuit Inspections of the as-built offsite At least one offsite circuit is supplies electric power from the circuit will be performed. provided from the transmission network to the interface transmission switchyard with the onsite alternating current (ac) interface to the interface with power system. the onsite ac power system.

673 C.2.6.12.02 2. Each offsite power circuit Analyses of the offsite power A report exists and concludes interfacing with the onsite ac power system will be performed to that each as-built offsite system is adequately rated to supply evaluate the as-built ratings of circuit is rated to supply the assumed loads during normal, abnormal each offsite circuit interfacing load assumptions during and accident conditions. with the onsite ac power system normal, abnormal and against the load assumptions. accident conditions.

674 C.2.6.12.03 3. During steady state operation, each Analyses of the as-built offsite A report exists and concludes offsite power source is capable of circuit will be performed to that during steady state supplying required voltage to the evaluate the capability of each operation each as-built offsite interface with the onsite ac power offsite circuit to supply the circuit is capable of supplying system that will support operation of voltage requirements at the the voltage at the interface assumed loads during normal, abnormal interface with the onsite ac with the onsite ac power and accident conditions. power system. system that will support operation of assumed loads during normal, abnormal and accident conditions.

675 C.2.6.12.04 4. During steady state operation, each Analyses of the as-built offsite A report exists and concludes offsite circuit is capable of supplying circuit will be performed to that during steady state required frequency to the interface with evaluate the capability of each operation each as-built offsite the onsite ac power system that will offsite circuit to supply the circuit is capable of supplying support operation of assumed loads frequency requirements at the the frequency at the interface during normal, abnormal and accident interface with the onsite ac with onsite ac power system conditions. power system. that will support operation of assumed loads during normal, abnormal and accident conditions.

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Table C.2.6.12-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 676 C.2.6.12.05 5. The fault current contribution of Analyses of the as-built offsite A report exists and concludes each offsite circuit is compatible with circuit will be performed to the short circuit contribution the interrupting capability of the onsite evaluate the fault current of each as-built offsite circuit short circuit interrupting devices. contribution of each offsite at the interface with the onsite circuit at the interface with the ac power system is compatible onsite ac power system. with the interrupting capability of the onsite fault current interrupting devices.

677 C.2.6.12.06 6. The reactor coolant pumps continue Analyses of the as-built offsite A report exists and concludes to receive power from either the main power system will be performed that voltage at the high-side of generator or the grid for a minimum of to confirm that power will be the generator stepup 3 seconds following a turbine trip. available to the reactor coolant transformer (GSU), and the pumps for a minimum of RATs, does not drop more 3 seconds following a turbine than 0.15 per unit (pu) from trip when the buses powering the the pre-trip steady-state reactor coolant pumps are voltage for a minimum of aligned to either the unit 3 seconds following a turbine auxiliary transformers (UATs) or trip when the buses powering the reserve auxiliary the reactor coolant pumps are transformers (RATs). aligned to either the UATs or the RATs.

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Table C.2.6.12-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 678 C.2.6.12.07.i 7) The credited GDC 17 off-site power i) Analysis shall be used to i) Alarm set points for the source is monitored by an open phase determine the required alarm set open phase condition condition monitoring system that can points for the open phase monitoring system to indicate detect the following at the high voltage condition monitoring system to the presence of open phase terminals of the transformer connecting indicate the presence of open conditions as described in the to the off-site source, over the full range phase conditions described in the design commitment have been of transformer loading from no load to design commitment. determined by analysis.

full load:

(1) loss of one of the three phases of the offsite power source

a. with a high impedance ground fault condition, or
b. without a high impedance ground fault condition; or (2) loss of two of the three phases of the offsite power source
a. with a high impedance ground fault condition, or
b. without a high impedance ground fault condition.

Upon detection of any condition described above, the system will actuate an alarm in the main control room.

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Table C.2.6.12-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 679 C.2.6.12.07.ii 7) The credited GDC 17 off-site power ii) Testing of the credited ii) Testing demonstrates the source is monitored by an open phase GDC-17 off-site power source credited GDC 17 off-site condition monitoring system that can open phase condition monitoring power source open phase detect the following at the high voltage system will be performed using condition monitoring system terminals of the transformer connecting simulated signals to verify that detects open phase conditions to the off-site source, over the full range the as-built open phase condition described in the design of transformer loading from no load to monitoring system detects open commitment and at the full load: phase conditions described in the established set points actuates design commitment and at the an alarm in the main control (1) loss of one of the three phases of the established set points actuates an room.

offsite power source alarm in the main control room.

a. with a high impedance ground fault condition, or
b. without a high impedance ground fault condition; or (2) loss of two of the three phases of the offsite power source
a. with a high impedance ground fault condition, or
b. without a high impedance ground fault condition.

Upon detection of any condition described above, the system will actuate an alarm in the main control room.

2.6.13 Offsite Retail Power System No entry for this system.

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2.7 HVAC Systems 2.7.1 Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System Design Description The nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) serves the main control room (MCR), control support area (CSA), Class 1E dc equipment rooms, Class 1E instrumentation and control (I&C) rooms, Class 1E electrical penetration rooms, Class 1E battery rooms, remote shutdown room (RSR), reactor coolant pump trip switchgear rooms, adjacent corridors, and passive containment cooling system (PCS) valve room during normal plant operation. The VBS consists of the following independent subsystems: the main control room/control support area HVAC subsystem, the class 1E electrical room HVAC subsystem, and the passive containment cooling system valve room heating and ventilation subsystem. The VBS provides heating, ventilation, and cooling to the areas served when ac power is available. The system provides breathable air to the control room and maintains the main control room and control support area areas at a slightly positive pressure with respect to the adjacent rooms and outside environment during normal operations. The VBS monitors the main control room supply air for radioactive particulate and iodine concentrations and provides filtration of main control room/control support area air during conditions of abnormal (high) airborne radioactivity. In addition, the VBS isolates the HVAC penetrations in the main control room boundary on "High-2" particulate or iodine radioactivity in the main control room supply air duct or on a loss of ac power for more than 10 minutes. The Sanitary Drainage System (SDS) also isolates a penetration in the main control room boundary on High-2 particulate or iodine radioactivity in the main control room supply air duct or on a loss of ac power for more than 10 minutes. Additional penetrations from the SDS and Potable Water System (PWS) into the main control room boundary are maintained leak tight using a loop seal in the piping, and the Waste Water System (WWS) is isolated using a normally closed safety related manual isolation valve. These features support operation of the main control room emergency habitability system (VES), and have been included in Tables 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2.

The VBS is as shown in Figure 2.7.1-1 and the component locations of the VBS are as shown in Table 2.7.1-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the VBS is as described in the Design Description of this subsection 2.7.1.
2. a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

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4. a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
6. a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

b) Separation is provided between VBS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

7. The VBS and SDS provide the safety-related function to isolate the pipes that penetrate the MCR pressure boundary.
8. The VBS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The VBS provides cooling to the MCR, CSA, RSR, and Class 1E electrical rooms.

b) The VBS provides ventilation cooling to the Class 1E battery rooms.

c) The VBS maintains MCR and CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected.

d) The VBS provides ventilation cooling via the ancillary equipment in Table 2.7.1-3 to the MCR and the division B&C Class 1E I&C rooms.

9. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.
10. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 to perform their active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

11. After loss of motive power, the valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.
12. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed function.
13. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.1-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.
14. The background noise level in the MCR and RSR does not exceed 65 dB(A) when the VBS is operating.

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Table 2.7.1-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Safety-Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS/DAS(1) Function Position MCR Supply Air Isolation VBS-PL-V186 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer As Is Valve (Valve Position) Closed MCR Supply Air Isolation VBS-PL-V187 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer As Is Valve (Valve Position) Closed MCR Return Air VBS-PL-V188 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer As Is Isolation Valve (Valve Position) Closed MCR Return Air VBS-PL-V189 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer As Is Isolation Valve (Valve Position) Closed MCR Exhaust Air VBS-PL-V190 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer As Is Isolation Valve (Valve Position) Closed MCR Exhaust Air VBS-PL-V191 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer As Is Isolation Valve (Valve Position) Closed PWS MCR Isolation Valve PWS-PL-V418 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer -

Closed PWS MCR Isolation Valve PWS-PL-V420 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer -

Closed PWS MCR Vacuum Relief PWS-PL-V498 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer -

Open MCR SDS (Vent) Isolation SDS-PL-V001 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer As Is Valve (Valve Position) Closed MCR SDS (Vent) Isolation SDS-PL-V002 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes/No Transfer As Is Valve (Valve Position) Closed C-391

Table 2.7.1-1 ASME Class 1E/ Loss of Code Remotely Qual. for Motive Section Seismic Operated Harsh Safety-Related Control Active Power Equipment Name Tag No. III Cat. I Valve Envir. Display PMS/DAS(1) Function Position MCR WWS Isolation WWS-PL-V506 Yes Yes No - No No - -

Valve

1. DAS = diverse actuation system C-392

Table 2.7.1-2 ASME Code Leak Functional Capability Line Name Line Number Section III Before Break Required Main Control Room VBS-L311 Yes No No Supply Main Control Room VBS-L312 Yes No No Exhaust Main Control Room VBS-L313 Yes No No Toilet Exhaust Main Control Room SDS-PL-L035 Yes No No Sanitary Vent Line Main Control Room SDS-PL-L030 Yes No No Sanitary Drain Line Main Control Room PWS-PL-L319 Yes No No Water Line Main Control Room PWS-PL-L320 Yes No No Water Line Main Control Room WWS-PL-L808 Yes No No Waste Water Line Main Control Room WWS-PL-L851 Yes No No Water Line Table 2.7.1-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function Supplemental Air Filtration Unit VBS-MA-03A Yes Start Fan A (Run Status)

Supplemental Air Filtration Unit VBS-MA-03B Yes Start Fan B (Run Status)

MCR/CSA Supply Air Handling VBS-MA-01A Yes Start Units (AHU) A Fans VBS-MA-02A (Run Status)

MCR/CSA Supply AHU B Fans VBS-MA-01B Yes Start VBS-MA-02B (Run Status)

Division "A" and "C" Class 1E VBS-MA-05A Yes Start Electrical Room AHU A Fans VBS-MA-06A (Run Status)

Division "A" and "C" Class 1E VBS-MA-05C Yes Start Electrical Room AHU C Fans VBS-MA-06C (Run Status)

Division "B" and "D" Class 1E VBS-MA-05B Yes Start Electrical Room AHU B Fans VBS-MA-06B (Run Status)

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Table 2.7.1-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function Division "B" and "D" Class 1E VBS-MA-05D Yes Start Electrical Room AHU D Fans VBS-MA-06D (Run Status)

Division "A" and "C" Class 1E VBS-MA-07A Yes Start Battery Room Exhaust Fans VBS-MA-07C (Run Status)

Division "B" and "D" Class 1E VBS-MA-07B Yes Start Battery Room Exhaust Fans VBS-MA-07D (Run Status)

MCR Ancillary Fans VBS-MA-10A No Run VBS-MA-10B Division B Room Ancillary Fan VBS-MA-11 No Run Division C Room Ancillary Fan VBS-MA-12 No Run Table 2.7.1-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 680 2.7.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built VBS conforms VBS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this subsection 2.7.1 arrangement described in the Design Description of this subsection 2.7.1.

681 2.7.01.02a 2.a) The components identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME Code Section III Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code the as-built components as design reports exist for the as-Section III are designed and constructed documented in the ASME design built components identified in in accordance with ASME Code reports. Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III requirements. Section III.

682 2.7.01.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Inspection will be conducted of The ASME code Section III Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code the as-built components as design reports exist for the Section III is designed and constructed documented in the ASME design as-built piping identified in in accordance with ASME Code reports. Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III requirements. Section III.

683 2.7.01.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code as ASME Code Section III meet ASME performed in accordance with Section III requirements are Code Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

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Table 2.7.1-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 684 2.7.01.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME pressure boundary welds will be that the ASME Code Code Section III meet ASME Code performed in accordance with Section III requirements are Section III requirements. the ASME Code Section III. met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

685 2.7.01.04a 4.a) The components identified in A pressure test will be performed A report exists and concludes Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code on the components required by that the results of the pressure Section III retain their pressure the ASME Code Section III to be test of the components boundary integrity at their design pressure tested. identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as pressure. ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

686 2.7.01.04b 4.b) The piping identified in A pressure test will be performed A report exists and concludes Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code on the piping required by the that the results of the pressure Section III retains its pressure boundary ASME Code Section III to be test of the piping identified in integrity at its design pressure. pressure tested. Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

687 2.7.01.05.i 5. The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand to verify that the seismic equipment identified in seismic design basis loads without loss Category I equipment identified Table 2.7.1-1 is located on the of safety function. in Table 2.7.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Nuclear Island.

688 2.7.01.05.ii 5. The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis loads without loss analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

689 2.7.01.05.iii 5. The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built seismic design basis loads without loss verifying that the as-built equipment including of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

690 2.7.01.06a 6.a) The Class 1E components Testing will be performed on the A simulated test signal exists identified in Table 2.7.1-1 are powered VBS by providing a simulated at the Class 1E equipment from their respective Class 1E division. test signal in each Class 1E identified in Table 2.7.1-1 division. when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

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Table 2.7.1-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 691 2.7.01.06b 6.b) Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, VBS Class 1E divisions, and between item 7.d. item 7.d.

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

692 2.7.01.07 7. The VBS and SDS provide the See item 10.b in this table. See item 10.b in this table.

safety-related function to isolate the pipe that penetrates the MCR pressure boundary.

693 2.7.01.08a 8.a) The VBS provides cooling to the See item 12 in this table. See item 12 in this table.

MCR, CSA, RSR, and Class 1E electrical rooms.

694 2.7.01.08b 8.b) The VBS provides ventilation See item 12 in this table. See item 12 in this table.

cooling to the Class 1E battery rooms.

695 2.7.01.08c 8.c) The VBS maintains MCR and See item 12 in this table. See item 12 in this table.

CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected.

696 2.7.01.08d 8.d) The VBS provides ventilation Testing will be performed on the The fans start and run.

cooling via the ancillary equipment in components in Table 2.7.1-3.

Table 2.7.1-3 to the MCR and the division B&C Class 1E I&C rooms.

697 2.7.01.09 9. Safety-related displays identified in Inspection will be performed for Safety-related displays Table 2.7.1-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the safety- identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can MCR. related displays in the MCR. be retrieved in the MCR.

698 2.7.01.10a 10.a) Controls exist in the MCR to Stroke testing will be performed Controls in the MCR operate cause the remotely operated valves on the remotely operated valves to cause the remotely operated identified in Table 2.7.1-1 to perform identified in Table 2.7.1-1 using valves identified in their active functions. the controls in the MCR. Table 2.7.1-1 to perform their active functions.

699 2.7.01.10b 10.b) The valves identified in Table Testing will be performed using The valves identified in 2.7.1-1 as having PMS control perform real or simulated signals into the Table 2.7.1-1 as having PMS their active safety function after PMS. control perform their active receiving a signal from the PMS. safety function after receiving a signal from PMS.

700 2.7.01.11 11. After loss of motive power, the Testing of the remotely operated Upon loss of motive power, remotely operated valves identified in valves will be performed under each remotely operated valves Table 2.7.1-1 assume the indicated loss the conditions of loss of motive identified in Table 2.7.1-1 of motive power position. power. assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

C-396

Table 2.7.1-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 701 2.7.01.12 12. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed on the Controls in the MCR operate the components identified in Table components in Table 2.7.1-3 to cause the components listed 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed function. using controls in the MCR. in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed functions.

702 2.7.01.13 13. Displays of the parameters Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in identified in Table 2.7.1-3 can be retrievability of the parameters Table 2.7.1-3 can be retrieved retrieved in the MCR. in the MCR. in the MCR.

703 2.7.01.14 14. The background noise level in the The as-built VBS will be The background noise level in MCR and RSR does not exceed operated, and background noise the MCR and RSR does not 65 dB(A) when the VBS is operating. levels in the MCR and RSR will exceed 65 dB(A) when the be measured. VBS is operating.

C-397

Table 2.7.1-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Supplemental Air Filtration Unit A VBS-MS-01A Auxiliary Building Supplemental Air Filtration Unit B VBS-MS-01B Auxiliary Building MCR/CSA Supply Air Handling Unit A VBS-MS-02A Auxiliary Building MCR/CSA Supply Air Handling Unit B VBS-MS-02B Annex Building Division "A" and "C" Class 1E Electrical Room VBS-MS-03A Auxiliary Building AHU A Division "A" and "C" Class 1E Electrical Room VBS-MS-03C Auxiliary Building AHU C Division "B" and "D" Class 1E Electrical Room VBS-MS-03B Auxiliary Building AHU B Division "B" and "D" Class 1E Electrical Room VBS-MS-03D Auxiliary Building AHU D MCR Toilet Exhaust Fan VBS-MA-04 Auxiliary Building Division "A&C" Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust VBS-MA-07A Auxiliary Building Fan Division "A&C" Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust VBS-MA-07C Auxiliary Building Fan Division "B&D" Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust VBS-MA-07B Auxiliary Building Fan Division "B&D" Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust VBS-MA-07D Auxiliary Building Fan PCS Valve Room Vent Fan VBS-MA-08 Containment Shield Building CSA Toilet Exhaust Fan VBS-MA-09 Annex Building MCR Ancillary Fan A VBS-MA-10A Auxiliary Building MCR Ancillary Fan B VBS-MA-10B Auxiliary Building Division B Ancillary Fan VBS-MA-11 Auxiliary Building Division C Ancillary Fan VBS-MA-12 Auxiliary Building C-398

Figure 2.7.1-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System C-399

Figure 2.7.1-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System C-400

2.7.2 Central Chilled Water System Design Description The plant heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems require chilled water as a cooling medium to satisfy the ambient air temperature requirements for the plant. The central chilled water system (VWS) supplies chilled water to the HVAC systems and is functional during reactor full-power and shutdown operation. The VWS also provides chilled water to selected process systems.

The VWS is as shown in Figure 2.7.2-1 and the component locations of the VWS are as shown Table 2.7.2-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the VWS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.2.
2. The VWS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VWS lines penetrating the containment.
3. The VWS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The VWS provides chilled water to the supply air handling units serving the MCR, the Class 1E electrical rooms, and the unit coolers serving the RNS and CVS pump rooms.

b) The VWS air-cooled chillers transfer heat from the VWS to the surrounding atmosphere.

4. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.2-1 to perform the listed function.
5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.2-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-401

Table 2.7.2-1 Control Equipment Name Tag No. Display Function Air-cooled Chiller VWS-MS-02 Yes Start (Run Status)

Air-cooled Chiller VWS-MS-03 Yes Start (Run Status)

Air-cooled Chiller Pump VWS-MP-02 Yes Start (Run Status)

Air-cooled Chiller Pump VWS-MP-03 Yes Start (Run Status)

CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan A VAS-MA-07A Yes Start (Run Status)

CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan B VAS-MA-07B Yes Start (Run Status)

RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan A VAS-MA-08A Yes Start (Run Status)

RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan B VAS-MA-08B Yes Start (Run Status)

Air-cooled Chiller Water Valve VWS-PL-V210 Yes Open (Position Status)

Air-cooled Chiller Water Valve VWS-PL-V253 Yes Open (Position Status)

C-402

Table 2.7.2-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 704 2.7.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built VWS conforms VWS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.7.2. arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.2.

705 2.7.02.02 2. The applicable portions of the VWS See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, provide the safety-related function of items 1 and 7. items 1 and 7.

preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VWS lines penetrating the containment.

706 2.7.02.03a 3.a) The VWS provides chilled water Testing will be performed by The water flow to each to the supply air handling units serving measuring the flow rates to the cooling coil equals or exceeds the MCR, the Class 1E electrical rooms, chilled water cooling coils. the following:

and the unit coolers serving the RNS Coil Flow (gpm) and CVS pump rooms. VBS MY C01A/B 138 VBS MY C02A/C 108 VBS MY C02B/D 84 VAS MY C07A/B 24 VAS MY C12A/B 15 VAS MY C06A/B 15 707 2.7.02.03b 3.b) The VWS air-cooled chillers Inspection will be performed for A report exists and concludes transfer heat from the VWS to the the existence of a report that that the heat transfer rate of surrounding atmosphere. determines the heat transfer each air-cooled chiller is capability of each air-cooled greater than or equal to chiller. 230 tons.

708 2.7.02.04 4. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed on the Controls in the MCR operate the components identified in Table components in Table 2.7.2-1 to cause the components listed 2.7.2-1 to perform the listed function. using controls in the MCR. in Table 2.7.2-1 to perform the listed functions.

709 2.7.02.05 5. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.7.2-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of parameters in Table 2.7.2-1 can be retrieved MCR. the MCR. in the MCR.

C-403

Table 2.7.2-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Water Chiller Pump A VWS-MP-01A Turbine Building Water Chiller Pump B VWS-MP-01B Turbine Building Air Cooled Chiller Pump 2 VWS-MP-02 Auxiliary Building Air Cooled Chiller Pump 3 VWS-MP-03 Auxiliary Building Water Chiller A VWS-MS-01A Turbine Building Water Chiller B VWS-MS-01B Turbine Building Air Cooled Chiller 2 VWS-MS-02 Auxiliary Building Air Cooled Chiller 3 VWS-MS-03 Auxiliary Building C-404

Figure 2.7.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Central Chilled Water System C-405

Figure 2.7.2-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Central Chilled Water System C-406

2.7.3 Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System Design Description The annex/auxiliary buildings nonradioactive HVAC system (VXS) serves the nonradioactive personnel and equipment areas, electrical equipment rooms, clean corridors, the ancillary diesel generator room and demineralized water deoxygenating room in the annex building, and the main steam isolation valve compartments, reactor trip switchgear rooms, and piping and electrical penetration areas in the auxiliary building. The VXS consists of the following independent subsystems: the general area HVAC subsystem, the switchgear room HVAC subsystem, the equipment room HVAC subsystem, the MSIV compartment HVAC subsystem, the mechanical equipment areas HVAC subsystem and the valve/piping penetration room HVAC subsystem.

The VXS is as shown in Figure 2.7.3-1 and the component locations of the VXS are as shown in Table 2.7.3-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the VXS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.3.
2. The VXS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The VXS provides cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms.

b) The VXS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates during a loss of offsite power coincident with loss of chilled water.

3. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.3-1 to perform the listed function.
4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.7.3-1 Control Equipment Name Tag No. Display Function Switchgear Room Air Handling Units VXS-MA-05A VXS-MA-06A Yes (Run Status) Start (AHU) A Fans Switchgear Room AHU B Fans VXS-MA-05B VXS-MA-06B Yes (Run Status) Start Equipment Room AHU A Fans VXS-MA-01A VXS-MA-02A Yes (Run Status) Start Equipment Room AHU B Fans VXS-MA-01B VXS-MA-02B Yes (Run Status) Start C-407

Table 2.7.3-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 710 2.7.03.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built VXS conforms VXS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.7.3. arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.3.

711 2.7.03.02a 2.a) The VXS provides cooling to the See item 3 in this table. See item 3 in this table.

electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates and chilled water is available.

712 2.7.03.02b 2.b) The VXS provides ventilation See item 3 in this table. See item 3 in this table.

cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates during a loss of offsite power coincident with loss of chilled water.

713 2.7.03.03 3. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed on the Controls in the MCR operate the components identified in components in Table 2.7.3-1 to cause the components listed Table 2.7.3-1 to perform the listed using controls in the MCR. in Table 2.7.3-1 to perform the function. listed functions.

714 2.7.03.04 4. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.7.3-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the parameters Table 2.7.3-1 can be retrieved MCR. in the MCR. in the MCR.

C-408

Table 2.7.3-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Annex Building General Area AHU A VXS-MS-01A Annex Building Annex Building General Area AHU B VXS-MS-01B Annex Building Annex Building Equipment Room AHU A VXS-MS-02A Annex Building Annex Building Equipment Room AHU B VXS-MS-02B Annex Building MSIV Compartment A AHU-A VXS-MS-04A Auxiliary Building MSIV Compartment B AHU-B VXS-MS-04B Auxiliary Building MSIV Compartment B AHU-C VXS-MS-04C Auxiliary Building MSIV Compartment A AHU-D VXS-MS-04D Auxiliary Building Switchgear Room AHU A VXS-MS-05A Annex Building Switchgear Room AHU B VXS-MS-05B Annex Building Mechanical Equipment Area AHU Unit A VXS-MS-07A Annex Building Mechanical Equipment Area AHU Unit B VXS-MS-07B Annex Building Valve/Piping Penetration Room AHU A VXS-MS-08A Auxiliary Building Valve/Piping Penetration Room AHU B VXS-MS-08B Auxiliary Building Battery Room #1 Exhaust Fan VXS-MA-09A Annex Building Battery Room #2 Exhaust Fan VXS-MA-09B Annex Building Toilet Exhaust Fan VXS-MA-13 Annex Building Annex Building Nonradioactive Air Handling VXS-MY-W01A Annex Building Equipment Room Unit Heater A Annex Building Nonradioactive Air Handling VXS-MY-W01B Annex Building Equipment Room Unit Heater B Annex Building Nonradioactive Air Handling VXS-MY-W01C Annex Building Equipment Room Unit Heater C C-409

Figure 2.7.3-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System C-410

Figure 2.7.3-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System C-411

2.7.4 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System Design Description The diesel generator building ventilation system (VZS) provides ventilation cooling of the diesel generator building for the onsite standby power system. The VZS also provides heating and ventilation within the diesel oil transfer module enclosure. The VZS consists of the following subsystems: the normal diesel building heating and ventilation subsystem, the standby diesel building exhaust ventilation subsystem, the fuel oil day tank vault exhaust subsystem and the diesel oil transfer module enclosures ventilation and heating subsystem.

The VZS is as shown in Figure 2.7.4-1 and the component locations of the VZS are as shown in Table 2.7.4-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the VZS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.4.
2. The VZS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The VZS provides ventilation cooling to the diesel generator rooms when the diesel generators are operating.

b) The VZS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical equipment service modules when the diesel generators are operating.

c) The VZS provides normal heating and ventilation to the diesel oil transfer module enclosure.

3. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.4-1 to perform the listed functions.
4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.4-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.7.4-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Diesel Generator Room A Standby VZS-MY-V01A Yes Start Exhaust Fans VZS-MY-V02A (Run Status)

Diesel Generator Room B Standby VZS-MY-V01B Yes Start Exhaust Fans VZS-MY-V02B (Run Status)

Service Module A Air Handling Units VZS-MA-01A Yes Start (AHU) Supply Fan (Run Status)

Service Module B AHU Supply Fan VZS-MA-01B Yes Start (Run Status)

Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A VZS-MY-V03A Yes Start Exhaust Fan (Run Status)

C-412

Table 2.7.4-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A VZS-MY-U03A Yes Energize Electric Unit Heater (Run Status)

Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B VZS-MY-V03B Yes Start Exhaust Fan (Run Status)

Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B VZS-MY-U03B Yes Energize Electric Unit Heater (Run Status)

Table 2.7.4-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 715 2.7.04.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built VZS conforms VZS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.7.4. arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.4.

716 2.7.04.02a 2.a) The VZS provides ventilation See item 3 in this table. See item 3 in this table.

cooling to the diesel generator rooms when the diesel generators are operating.

717 2.7.04.02b 2.b) The VZS provides ventilation See item 3 in this table. See item 3 in this table.

cooling to the electrical equipment service modules when the diesel generators are operating.

718 2.7.04.02c 2.c) The VZS provides normal heating See item 3 in this table. See item 3 in this table.

and ventilation to the diesel oil transfer module enclosure.

719 2.7.04.03 3. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed on the Controls in the MCR operate the components identified in components in Table 2.7.4-1 to cause the components listed Table 2.7.4-1 to perform the listed using controls in the MCR. in Table 2.7.4-1 to perform the function. listed functions.

720 2.7.04.04 4. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.7.4-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the parameters Table 2.7.4-1 can be retrieved MCR. in the MCR. in the MCR.

C-413

Table 2.7.4-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Service Module AHU A VZS-MS-01A Diesel-Generator Building Service Module AHU B VZS-MS-01B Diesel-Generator Building Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A Unit Heater VZS-MY-U03A Yard Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B Unit Heater VZS-MY-U03B Yard D/G Building Standby Exhaust Fan 1A VZS-MY-V01A Diesel-Generator Building D/G Building Standby Exhaust Fan 1B VZS-MY-V01B Diesel-Generator Building D/G Building Standby Exhaust Fan 2A VZS-MY-V02A Diesel-Generator Building D/G Building Standby Exhaust Fan 2B VZS-MY-V02B Diesel-Generator Building Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A Exhaust Fan VZS-MY-V03A Yard Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B Exhaust Fan VZS-MY-V03B Yard Fuel Oil Day Tank Vault Exhaust Fan VZS-MA-02A Diesel-Generator Building Fuel Oil Day Tank Vault Exhaust Fan VZS-MA-02B Diesel-Generator Building C-414

Figure 2.7.4-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System C-415

Figure 2.7.4-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System C-416

2.7.5 Radiologically Controlled Area Ventilation System Design Description The radiologically controlled area ventilation system (VAS) serves the fuel handling area of the auxiliary building, and the radiologically controlled portions of the auxiliary and annex buildings, except for the health physics and hot machine shop areas, which are provided with a separate ventilation system (VHS). The VAS consists of two subsystems: the auxiliary/annex building ventilation subsystem and the fuel handling area ventilation subsystem. The subsystems provide ventilation to maintain occupied areas, and access and equipment areas within their design temperature range. They provide outside air for plant personnel and prevent the unmonitored release of airborne radioactivity to the atmosphere or adjacent plant areas. The VAS automatically isolates selected building areas by closing the supply and exhaust duct isolation dampers and starts the containment air filtration system (VFS) when high airborne radioactivity in the exhaust air duct or high ambient pressure differential is detected.

The component locations of the VAS are as shown in Table 2.7.5-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the VAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.5.
2. The VAS maintains each building area at a slightly negative pressure relative to the atmosphere or adjacent clean plant areas.
3. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.5-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.7.5-1 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function Annex Building Pressure Differential Indicator VAS-032 Yes -

Auxiliary Building Pressure Differential Indicator VAS-033 Yes -

Fuel Handling Area Pressure Differential Indicator VAS-030 Yes -

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-417

Table 2.7.5-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 721 2.7.05.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built VAS conforms VAS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.7.5. arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.5.

722 2.7.05.02.i 2. The VAS maintains each building i) Testing will be performed to i) The time average pressure area at a slightly negative pressure confirm that the VAS maintains differential in the served areas relative to the atmosphere or adjacent each building at a slightly of the annex, fuel handling clean plant areas. negative pressure when and radiologically controlled operating all VAS supply AHUs auxiliary buildings as and all VAS exhaust fans. measured by each of the instruments identified in Table 2.7.5-1 is negative.

723 2.7.05.02.ii 2. The VAS maintains each building ii) Testing will be performed to ii) A report exists and area at a slightly negative pressure confirm the ventilation flow rate concludes that the calculated relative to the atmosphere or adjacent through the auxiliary building exhaust flow rate based on the clean plant areas. fuel handling area when measured flow rates is greater operating all VAS supply AHUs than or equal to 15,300 cfm.

and all VAS exhaust fans.

724 2.7.05.02.iii 2. The VAS maintains each building iii) Testing will be performed to iii) A report exists and area at a slightly negative pressure confirm the auxiliary building concludes that the calculated relative to the atmosphere or adjacent radiologically controlled area exhaust flow rate based on the clean plant areas. ventilation flow rate when measured flow rates is greater operating all VAS supply AHUs than or equal to 22,500 cfm.

and all VAS exhaust fans.

725 2.7.05.03 3. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.7.5-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the parameters Table 2.7.5-1 can be retrieved MCR. in the MCR. in the MCR.

C-418

Table 2.7.5-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Auxiliary/Annex Building Supply AHU A VAS-MS-01A Annex Building Auxiliary/Annex Building Supply AHU B VAS-MS-01B Annex Building Fuel Handling Area Supply AHU A VAS-MS-02A Annex Building Fuel Handling Area Supply AHU B VAS-MS-02B Annex Building CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler A VAS-MS-05A Auxiliary Building CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler B VAS-MS-05B Auxiliary Building RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler A VAS-MS-06A Auxiliary Building RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler B VAS-MS-06B Auxiliary Building Auxiliary/Annex Building Exhaust Fan A VAS-MA-02A Auxiliary Building Auxiliary/Annex Building Exhaust Fan B VAS-MA-02B Auxiliary Building Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan A VAS-MA-06A Auxiliary Building Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan B VAS-MA-06B Auxiliary Building C-419

2.7.6 Containment Air Filtration System Design Description The containment air filtration system (VFS) provides intermittent flow of outdoor air to purge and filter the containment atmosphere of airborne radioactivity during normal plant operation, and continuous flow during hot or cold plant shutdown conditions to reduce airborne radioactivity levels for personnel access. The VFS can also provide filtered exhaust for the radiologically controlled area ventilation system (VAS) during abnormal conditions.

The VFS is as shown in Figure 2.7.6-1 and the component locations of the VFS are as shown in Table 2.7.6-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the VFS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.6.
2. The VFS provides the safety-related functions of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VFS lines penetrating containment and providing vacuum relief for the containment vessel.
3. The VFS provides the intermittent flow of outdoor air to purge the containment atmosphere during normal plant operation, and continuous flow during hot or cold plant shutdown conditions.
4. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.6-1 to perform the listed function.
5. Displays of the parameters in Table 2.7.6-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.7.6-1 Control Equipment Tag No. Display Function Containment Air Handling Units (AHU) Supply VFS-MA-01A Yes Start Fan A (Run Status)

Containment AHU Supply Fan B VFS-MA-01B Yes Start (Run Status)

Containment AHU Supply Fan A Flow Sensor VFS-012A Yes -

Containment AHU Supply Fan B Flow Sensor VFS-012B Yes -

Containment Exhaust Fan A VFS-MA-02A Yes Start (Run Status)

Containment Exhaust Fan B VFS-MA-02B Yes Start (Run Status)

Containment Exhaust Fan A Flow Sensor VFS-011A Yes -

Containment Exhaust Fan B Flow Sensor VFS-011B Yes -

C-420

Table 2.7.6-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 726 2.7.06.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built VFS conforms VFS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.7.6. arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.6.

727 2.7.06.02.i 2. The VFS provides the safety-related i) See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, i) See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, functions of preserving containment items 1 and 7. items 1 and 7.

integrity by isolation of the VFS lines penetrating containment and providing vacuum relief for the containment vessel.

728 2.7.06.02.ii 2. The VFS provides the safety-related ii) Testing will be performed to ii) The containment vacuum functions of preserving containment demonstrate that remotely relief isolation valves integrity by isolation of the VFS lines operated containment vacuum (VFS-PL-V800A and penetrating containment and providing relief isolation valves open VFS-PL-V800B) open within vacuum relief for the containment within the required response 30 seconds.

vessel. time.

729 2.7.06.03.i 3. The VFS provides the intermittent i) Testing will be performed to i) The flow rate measured at flow of outdoor air to purge the confirm that containment supply each fan is greater than or containment atmosphere during normal AHU fan A when operated with equal to 3,600 scfm.

plant operation, and continuous flow containment exhaust fan A during hot or cold plant shutdown provides a flow of outdoor air.

conditions.

730 2.7.06.03.ii 3. The VFS provides the intermittent ii) Testing will be performed to ii) The flow rate measured at flow of outdoor air to purge the confirm that containment supply each fan is greater than or containment atmosphere during normal AHU fan B when operated with equal to 3,600 scfm.

plant operation, and continuous flow containment exhaust fan B during hot or cold plant shutdown provides a flow of outdoor air.

conditions.

731 2.7.06.03.iii 3. The VFS provides the intermittent iii) Inspection will be conducted iii) The nominal line size is flow of outdoor air to purge the of the containment purge 36 in.

containment atmosphere during normal discharge line (VFS-L204) plant operation, and continuous flow penetrating the containment.

during hot or cold plant shutdown conditions.

732 2.7.06.04 4. Controls exist in the MCR to cause Testing will be performed on the Controls in the MCR operate the components identified in components in Table 2.7.6-1 to cause the components listed Table 2.7.6-1 to perform the listed using controls in the MCR. in Table 2.7.6-1 to perform the function. listed functions.

733 2.7.06.05 5. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.7.6-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the parameters Table 2.7.6-1 can be retrieved MCR. in the MCR. in the MCR.

C-421

Table 2.7.6-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Containment Air Filtration Supply AHU A VFS-MS-01A Annex Building Containment Air Filtration Supply AHU B VFS-MS-01B Annex Building Containment Air Filtration Exhaust Unit A VFS-MS-02A Annex Building Containment Air Filtration Exhaust Unit B VFS-MS-02B Annex Building C-422

Figure 2.7.6-1 Containment Air Filtration System C-423

2.7.7 Containment Recirculation Cooling System Design Description The containment recirculation cooling system (VCS) controls the containment air temperature and humidity during normal operation, refueling and shutdown.

The locations of the VCS are as shown in Table 2.7.7-3.

1. The functional arrangement of the VCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.7.
2. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.7-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.7.7-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Containment Temperature Channel VCS-061 Yes Containment Fan Cooler Fan VCS-MA-01A Yes (Run Status)

VCS-MA-01C Yes (Run Status)

VCS-MA-01B Yes (Run Status)

VCS-MA-01D Yes (Run Status)

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.7.7-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 734 2.7.07.01 1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system The as-built VCS conforms VCS is as described in the Design will be performed. with the functional Description of this Section 2.7.7. arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.7.

735 2.7.07.02 2. Displays of the parameters identified Inspection will be performed for The displays identified in in Table 2.7.7-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the parameters Table 2.7.7-1 are retrieved in MCR. in the MCR. the MCR.

C-424

Table 2.7.7-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Reactor Containment Recirculation Fan Coil Unit VCS-MS-01A Containment Assembly A Reactor Containment Recirculation Fan Coil Unit VCS-MS-01B Containment Assembly B 2.7.8 Radwaste Building HVAC System No ITAAC for this system.

2.7.9 Turbine Island Building Ventilation System No entry for this system.

2.7.10 Health Physics and Hot Machine Shop HVAC System No ITAAC for this system.

2.7.11 Hot Water Heating System No entry for this system.

C-425

3.0 Non-System Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC 3.1 Emergency Response Facilities Design Description The technical support center (TSC) is a facility from which management and technical support is provided to main control room (MCR) personnel during emergency conditions. The operations support center (OSC) provides an assembly area where operations support personnel report in an emergency. The control support area (CSA) is an area nearby the main control room from which support can be provided to the main control room.

1. The TSC has floor space of at least 75 ft2 per person for a minimum of 25 persons.
2. The TSC has voice communication equipment for communication with the MCR, emergency operations facility, OSC, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
3. The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.4-1, minimum inventory table, in subsection 2.5.4, Data Display and Processing System (DDS), with a "Yes" in the "Display" column, can be retrieved in the TSC.
4. The OSC has voice communication equipment for communication with the MCR and TSC.
5. The TSC and OSC are in different locations.
6. The CSA provides a habitable workspace environment.

Table 3.1-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 736 3.1.00.01 1. The TSC has floor space of at An inspection will be performed The TSC has at least 1875 ft2 of least 75 ft2 per person for a of the TSC floor space. floor space.

minimum of 25 persons.

737 3.1.00.02 2. The TSC has voice An inspection and test will be Communications equipment is communication equipment for performed of the TSC voice installed, and voice transmission communication with the MCR, communication equipment. and reception are accomplished.

emergency operations facility, OSC, and the NRC.

738 3.1.00.03 3. The plant parameters listed in An inspection will be performed The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.4-1, minimum inventory for retrievability of the plant Table 2.5.4-1, minimum table, in subsection 2.5.4, DDS, parameters in the TSC. inventory table, in with a "Yes" in the "Display" subsection 2.5.4, DDS, with a column, can be retrieved in the "Yes" in the "Display" column, TSC. can be retrieved in the TSC.

739 3.1.00.04 4. The OSC has voice Inspection will be performed of Communications equipment is communication equipment for the OSC voice communication installed, and voice transmission communication with the MCR and equipment. and reception are accomplished.

TSC.

C-426

Table 3.1-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 740 3.1.00.05 5. The TSC and OSC are in An inspection will be performed The TSC and OSC are in different different locations. of the location of the TSC and locations.

OSC.

741 3.1.00.06 6. The CSA provides a habitable See ITAAC Table 2.7.1-4, See ITAAC Table 2.7.1-4, workspace environment. items 1, 8.a), 8.c), 12, and 13, items 1, 8.a), 8.c), 12, and 13, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System. Ventilation System.

3.2 Human Factors Engineering Design Description The AP1000 human-system interface (HSI) will be developed and implemented based upon a human factors engineering (HFE) program. Figure 3.2-1 illustrates the HFE program elements.

The HSI scope includes the design of the operation and control centers system (OCS) and each of the HSI resources. For the purposes of the HFE program, the OCS includes the main control room (MCR), the remote shutdown workstation (RSW), the local control stations, and the associated workstations for each of these centers. The HSI resources include the wall panel information system, alarm system, plant information system (nonsafety-related displays),

qualified data processing system (safety-related displays), and soft and dedicated controls.

Minimum inventories of controls, displays, and visual alerts are specified as part of the HSI for the MCR and the RSW.

The MCR provides a facility and resources for the safe control and operation of the plant. The MCR includes a minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts and fixed-position controls. Refer to item 8.a and Table 2.5.2-5 of subsection 2.5.2 for this minimum inventory.

The remote shutdown room (RSR) provides a facility and resources to establish and maintain safe shutdown conditions for the plant from a location outside of the MCR. The RSW includes a minimum inventory of displays, controls, and visual alerts. Refer to item 2 and Table 2.5.4-1 of subsection 2.5.4 for this minimum inventory. As stated in item 8.b of subsection 2.5.2, the protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) provides for the transfer of control capability from the MCR to the RSW.

The mission of local control stations is to provide the resources, outside of the MCR, for operations personnel to perform monitoring and control activities.

Implementation of the HFE program includes activity 1 below. The MCR includes design features specified by items 2 through 4 below. The RSW includes the design features specified by items 5 through 8 below. Local control stations include the design feature of item 9.

1. The HFE program verification and validation implementation plans are developed in accordance with the programmatic level description of the AP1000 human factors verification and validation plan. The implementation plans establish the methods for C-427

conducting evaluations of the integrated HSI design. The development of the HFE verification and validation plans are complete. The following documents were developed:

a) HSI task support verification - APP-OCS-GEH-220, AP1000 Human Factors Engineering Task Support Verification Plan, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC b) HFE design verification - APP-OCS-GEH-120, AP1000 Human Factors Engineering Design Verification Plan, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC c) Integrated system validation - APP-OCS-GEH-320, AP1000 Human Factors Engineering Integrated System Validation Plan, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC d) Issue resolution verification - APP-OCS-GEH-420, AP1000 Human Factors Engineering Discrepancy Resolution Process, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC e) Plant HFE/HSI (as designed at the time of plant startup) verification - APP-OCS-GEH-520, AP1000 Plant Startup Human Factors Engineering Verification Plan, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC

2. The MCR includes reactor operator workstations, supervisor workstation(s), safety-related displays, and safety-related controls.
3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by MCR operators.
4. The HSI resources available to the MCR operators include the alarm system, plant information system (nonsafety-related displays), wall panel information system, nonsafety-related controls (soft and dedicated), and computerized procedure system.
5. The RSW includes reactor operator workstation(s) from which licensed operators perform remote shutdown operations.
6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.
7. The HSI resources available at the RSW include the alarm system displays, the plant information system, and the controls.
8. The RSW and the available HSI permit execution of tasks by licensed operators to establish and maintain safe shutdown.
9. The capability to access displays and controls is provided (controls as assigned by the MCR operators) for local control and monitoring from selected locations throughout the plant.

C-428

Table 3.2.-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 742 3.2.00.01a 1. The HFE verification and validation a) An evaluation of the a) A report exists and program is performed in accordance implementation of the HSI task concludes that: Task support with the HFE verification and support verification will be verification was conducted in validation implementation plan and performed. conformance with the includes the following activities: implementation plan and a) HSI Task support verification includes verification that the information and controls provided by the HSI match the display and control requirements generated by the function-based task analyses and the operational sequence analyses.

743 3.2.00.01b 1. The HFE verification and validation b) An evaluation of the b) A report exists and program is performed in accordance implementation of the HFE concludes that: HFE design with the HFE verification and design verification will be verification was conducted in validation implementation plan and performed. conformance with the includes the following activities: implementation plan and b) HFE design verification includes verification that the HSI design is consistent with the AP1000 specific design guidelines (compiled as specified in the third acceptance criteria of design commitment 3) developed for each HSI resource.

744 3.2.00.01c.i 1. The HFE verification and validation c) (i) An evaluation of the c) (i) A report exists and program is performed in accordance implementation of the integrated concludes that: The test with the HFE verification and system validation will be scenarios listed in the validation implementation plan and performed. implementation plan for includes the following activities: integrated system validation c) Integrated system validation were executed in conformance with the plan and noted human deficiencies were addressed.

C-429

Table 3.2.-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 745 3.2.00.01c.ii 1. The HFE verification and validation c) (ii) Tests and analyses of the c) (ii) A report exists and program is performed in accordance following plant evolutions and concludes that: The test and with the HFE verification and transients, using a facility that analysis results demonstrate validation implementation plan and physically represents the MCR that the MCR operators can includes the following activities: configuration and dynamically perform the following:

c) Integrated system validation represents the MCR HSI and the - Heat up and start up the operating characteristics and plant to 100% power responses of the AP1000 design,

- Shut down and cool will be performed:

down the plant to cold

- Normal plant heatup and shutdown startup to 100% power

- Bring the plant to safe

- Normal plant shutdown and shutdown following the cooldown to cold shutdown specified transients

- Transients: reactor trip and - Bring the plant to a safe, turbine trip stable state following the

- Accidents: specified accidents

- Small-break LOCA

- Large-break LOCA

- Steam line break

- Feedwater line break

- Steam generator tube rupture 746 3.2.00.01d 1. The HFE verification and validation d) An evaluation of the d) A report exists and program is performed in accordance implementation of the HFE concludes that: HFE design with the HFE verification and design issue resolution issue resolution verification validation implementation plan and verification will be performed. was conducted in includes the following activities: conformance with the d) Issue resolution verification implementation plan and includes verification that human factors issues documented in the design issues tracking system have been addressed in the final design.

747 3.2.00.01e 1. The HFE verification and validation e) An evaluation of the e) A report exists and program is performed in accordance implementation of the plant concludes that: The plant with the HFE verification and HFE/HSI (as designed at the HFE/HSI, as designed at the validation implementation plan and time of plant startup) verification time of plant startup, is includes the following activities: will be performed. consistent with the HFE/HSI e) Plant HFE/HSI (as designed at the verified in 1.a) through 1.d).

time of plant startup) verification C-430

Table 3.2.-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 748 3.2.00.02 2. The MCR includes reactor operator An inspection of the MCR The MCR includes reactor workstations, supervisor workstation(s), workstations and control panels operator workstations, safety-related displays, and safety- will be performed. supervisor workstation(s),

related controls. safety-related displays, and safety-related controls.

749 3.2.00.03.i 3. The MCR provides a suitable i) See subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear i) See subsection 2.7.1, workspace environment for use by the Island Nonradioactive Nuclear Island Nonradioactive MCR operators. Ventilation System. Ventilation System.

750 3.2.00.03.ii 3. The MCR provides a suitable ii) See subsection 2.2.5, MCR ii) See subsection 2.2.5, MCR workspace environment for use by the Emergency Habitability System. Emergency Habitability MCR operators. System.

751 3.2.00.03.iii 3. The MCR provides a suitable iii) See subsection 2.6.3, Class iii) See subsection 2.6.3, workspace environment for use by the 1E dc and UPS System. Class 1E dc and UPS system.

MCR operators.

752 3.2.00.03.iv 3. The MCR provides a suitable iv) See subsection 2.6.5, iv) See subsection 2.6.5, workspace environment for use by the Lighting System. Lighting System.

MCR operators.

753 3.2.00.03.v 3. The MCR provides a suitable v) See subsection 2.3.19, v) See subsection 2.3.19, workspace environment for use by the Communication System. Communication System.

MCR operators.

754 3.2.00.04 4. The HSI resources available to the An inspection of the HSI The HSI (at the time of plant MCR operators include the alarm resources available in the MCR startup) includes an alarm system, plant information system for the MCR operators will be system, plant information (nonsafety-related displays), wall panel performed. system (nonsafety-related information system, nonsafety-related displays), wall panel controls (soft and dedicated), and information system, computerized procedure system. nonsafety-related controls (soft and dedicated), and computerized procedure system.

755 3.2.00.05 5. The RSW includes reactor operator An inspection of the RSW will The RSW includes reactor workstation(s) from which licensed be performed. operator workstation(s).

operators perform remote shutdown operations.

756 3.2.00.06.i 6. The RSR provides a suitable i) See subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear i) See subsection 2.7.1, workspace environment, separate from Island Nonradioactive Nuclear Island Nonradioactive the MCR, for use by the RSW Ventilation System. Ventilation System.

operators.

757 3.2.00.06.ii 6. The RSR provides a suitable ii) See subsection 2.6.5, ii) See subsection 2.6.5, workspace environment, separate from Lighting System. Lighting System.

the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.

C-431

Table 3.2.-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 758 3.2.00.06.iii 6. The RSR provides a suitable iii) See subsection 2.3.19, iii) See subsection 2.3.19, workspace environment, separate from Communication System. Communication System.

the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.

759 3.2.00.07 7. The HSI resources available at the An inspection of the HSI The as-built HSI at the RSW RSW include the alarm system displays, resources available at the RSW includes the alarm system the plant information system, and the will be performed. displays, the plant information controls. system, and the controls.

760 3.2.00.08 8. The RSW and the available HSI Test and analysis, using a A report exists and concludes permit execution of tasks by licensed workstation that physically that the test and analysis operators to establish and maintain safe represents the RSW and results demonstrate that shutdown. dynamically represents the RSW licensed operators can achieve HSI and the operating and maintain safe shutdown characteristics and responses of conditions from the RSW.

the AP1000, will be performed.

761 3.2.00.09 9. The capability to access displays and An inspection of the local The capability for local controls is provided (controls as control and monitoring control and monitoring from assigned by the MCR operators) for capability is provided. selected locations throughout local control and monitoring from the plant exists.

selected locations throughout the plant.

C-432

Human Factors Engineering (HFE)

Design and Implementation Process Planning Analysis Design V&V Operation Operating Experience Review Interface Design Functional Design Requirements Implementation Analysis and Functional Procedure Verification and HFE Program Allocation Management Development Validation Human Task Performance Analysis Monitoring Training Staffing Development Human Reliability Analysis Figure 3.2-1 Human Factors Engineering (HFE)

Design and Implementation Process C-433

3.3 Buildings Design Description The nuclear island structures include the containment (the steel containment vessel and the containment internal structure) and the shield and auxiliary buildings. The containment, shield and auxiliary buildings are structurally integrated on a common basemat which is embedded below the finished plant grade level. The containment vessel is a cylindrical welded steel vessel with elliptical upper and lower heads, supported by embedding a lower segment between the containment internal structures concrete and the basemat concrete. The containment internal structure is reinforced concrete with structural modules used for some walls and floors. The shield building cylinder is a composite steel and concrete (SC) structure except for the portion surrounded by the auxiliary building, which is reinforced concrete (RC). The shield building, in conjunction with the internal structures of the containment building, provides shielding for the reactor coolant system and the other radioactive systems and components housed in the containment. The shield building roof is a reinforced concrete structure containing an integral, steel lined passive containment cooling water storage tank. The auxiliary building is reinforced concrete and houses the safety-related mechanical and electrical equipment located outside the containment and shield buildings.

The portion of the annex building adjacent to the nuclear island is a structural steel and reinforced concrete seismic Category II structure and houses the control support area, non-1E electrical equipment, and hot machine shop.

The radwaste building is a steel framed structure and houses the low level waste processing and storage.

The turbine building is a non-safety related structure that houses the main turbine generator and the power conversion cycle equipment and auxiliaries. There is no safety-related equipment in the turbine building. The turbine building is located on a separate foundation. The turbine building structure is adjacent to the nuclear island structures consisting of the auxiliary building to the south and the annex building to the south and east. The turbine building consists of two separate superstructures, the first bay and the main area, both supported on a common reinforced concrete basemat. The first bay, next to the auxiliary building, consists of a combination of reinforced concrete walls and steel framing with reinforced concrete and steel grated floors. It is classified as a seismic Category II structure due to its immediate proximity to the auxiliary building. The main area of the turbine building, immediately to the north of the first bay, is a steel framed building with reinforced concrete and steel grated floors. It is classified as a non-seismic structure. The non-seismic portion of the turbine building is designed with eccentrically braced framing (EBF).

The diesel generator building is a non-safety related structure that houses the two standby diesel engine powered generators and the power conversion cycle equipment and auxiliaries.

There is no safety-related equipment in the diesel generator building. The diesel generator building is located on a separate foundation at a distance from the nuclear island structures.

The plant gas system (PGS) provides hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and nitrogen gases to the plant systems as required. The component locations of the PGS are located in the yard areas.

C-434

1. The physical arrangement of the nuclear island structures, the annex building, and the turbine building is as described in the Design Description of this Section 3.3, and as shown on Figures 3.3-1 through 3.3-14. The physical arrangement of the radwaste building and the diesel generator building is as described in the Design Description of this Section 3.3.
2. a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads, as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safety-related functions. The design bases loads are those loads associated with:
  • Normal plant operation (including dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure loads, and equipment loads, including hydrodynamic loads, temperature and equipment vibration);
  • Internal events (including flood, pipe rupture, equipment failure, and equipment failure generated missiles).

b) Site grade level is located relative to floor elevation 100-0 per Table 3.3-5. Floor elevation 100-0 is defined as the elevation of the floor at design plant grade.

c) The containment and its penetrations are designed and constructed to ASME Code Section III, Class MC.(1) d) The containment and its penetrations retain their pressure boundary integrity associated with the design pressure.

e) The containment and its penetrations maintain the containment leakage rate less than the maximum allowable leakage rate associated with the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident.

f) The key dimensions of the nuclear island structures are as defined on Table 3.3-5.

g) The containment vessel greater than 7 feet above the operating deck provides a heat transfer surface. A free volume exists inside the containment shell above the operating deck.

h) The containment free volume below elevation 108 provides containment floodup during a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.

3. Walls and floors of the nuclear island structures as defined on Table 3.3-1, except for designed openings and penetrations, provide shielding during normal operations.
4. a) Walls and floors of the annex building as defined on Table 3.3-1, except for designed openings and penetrations, provide shielding during normal operations.

b) The walls on the outside of the waste accumulation room in the radwaste building provide shielding from accumulated waste.

1. Containment isolation devices are addressed in subsection 2.2.1, Containment System.

C-435

c) The walls on the outside of the packaged waste storage room in the radwaste building provide shielding from stored waste.

5. a) Exterior walls and the basemat of the nuclear island have a water barrier up to site grade.

b) The boundaries between mechanical equipment rooms and the electrical and instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment rooms of the auxiliary building as identified in Table 3.3-2 are designed to prevent flooding of rooms that contain safety-related equipment up to the maximum flood level for each room defined in Table 3.3-2.

c) The boundaries between the following rooms, which contain safety-related equipment -

passive core cooling system (PXS) valve/accumulator room A (11205),

PXS valve/accumulator room B (11207), and chemical and volume system (CVS) room (11209) - are designed to prevent flooding between these rooms.

6. a) The radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building between floor elevations 66-6 and 82-6 contains adequate volume to contain the liquid volume of faulted liquid radwaste system (WLS) storage tanks. The available room volumes of the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building between floor elevations 66-6 and 82-6 exceeds the volume of the liquid radwaste storage tanks (WLS-MT-05A, MT-05B, MT-06A, MT-06B, MT-07A, MT-07B, MT-07C, MT-11).

b) The radwaste building packaged waste storage room has a volume greater than or equal to 1293 cubic feet.

7. a) Class 1E electrical cables, fiber optic cables associated with only one division, and raceways are identified according to applicable color-coded Class 1E divisions.

b) Class 1E divisional electrical cables and communication cables associated with only one division are routed in their respective divisional raceways.

c) Separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions in accordance with the fire areas as identified in Table 3.3-3.

d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables.

e) Class 1E communication cables which interconnect two divisions are routed and separated such that the Protection and Safety Monitoring System voting logic is not defeated by the loss of any single raceway or fire area.

8. Systems, structures, and components identified as essential targets are protected from the dynamic and environmental effects of postulated pipe ruptures.
9. The reactor cavity sump has a minimum concrete thickness as shown on Table 3.3-5 between the bottom of the sump and the steel containment.
10. The shield building roof and the passive containment cooling system (PCS) storage tank support and retain the PCS water. The passive containment cooling system tank has a stainless steel liner which provides a barrier on the inside surfaces of the tank. Leak chase channels are provided over the tank boundary liner welds.

C-436

11. Deleted.
12. The extended turbine generator axis intersects the shield building.
13. Separation is provided between the structural elements of the turbine, annex, and radwaste buildings and the nuclear island structure. This separation permits horizontal motion of the buildings in a safe shutdown earthquake without impact between structural elements of the buildings.
14. The external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet-resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.
15. Deleted.
16. Secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment is located within a vital area.
17. Vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area.
18. Deleted.

C-437

Table 3.3-1 Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building(1)

Applicable Radiation Floor Elevation or Concrete Shielding Wall Wall or Section Description Column Lines Elevation Range Thickness(2)(3)(4)(5) (Yes/No)

Containment Building Internal Structure Shield Wall between Reactor Vessel Cavity and RCDT E-W wall parallel with column line 7 From 71'-6" to 83'-0" 3'-0" Yes Room West Reactor Vessel Cavity Wall N-S wall parallel with column line N From 83'-0" to 98'-0" 7'-6" Yes North Reactor Vessel Cavity Wall E-W wall parallel with column line 7 From 83'-0" to 98'-0" 9'-0" Yes East Reactor Vessel Cavity Wall N-S wall parallel with column line N From 83'-0" to 98'-0" 7'-6" Yes West Refueling Cavity Wall N-S wall parallel with column line N From 98'-0" to 135'-3" 4'-0" Yes North Refueling Cavity Wall E-W wall parallel with column line 7 From 98'-0" to 135'-3" 4'-0" Yes East Refueling Cavity Wall N-S wall parallel with column line N From 98'-0" to 135'-3" 4'-0" Yes South Refueling Cavity Wall E-W wall parallel with column line 7 From 98'-0" to 135'-3" 4'-0" Yes South wall of west steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 103'-0" to 153'-0" 2'-6" Yes West wall of west steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 103'-0" to 153'-0" 2'-6" Yes North wall of west steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 103'-0" to 153'-0" 2'-6" Yes South wall of pressurizer compartment Not Applicable From 103'-0" to 153'-6" 2'-6" Yes West wall of pressurizer compartment Not Applicable From 107'-2" to 160'-0" 2'-6" Yes North wall of pressurizer compartment Not Applicable From 107'-2" to 160'-0" 2'-6" Yes East wall of pressurizer compartment Not Applicable From 118'-6" to 160'-0" 2'-6" Yes North-east wall of in-containment refueling water storage Parallel to column line N From 103'-0" to 135'-3" 2'-6" No tank West wall of in-containment refueling water storage tank Not applicable From 103'-0" to 135'-3" 5/8" steel plate with No stiffeners South wall of east steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 87'-6" to 153'-0" 2'-6" Yes

1. The column lines and floor elevations are identified and included on Figures 3.3-1 through 3.3-13.
2. These wall (and floor) thicknesses have a construction tolerance of + 1 inch, except for exterior walls below grade where the tolerance is +12 inches, - 1 inch.
3. For walls that are part of structural modules, the concrete thickness also includes the steel face plates.
4. For floors with steel surface plates, the concrete thickness also includes the plate thickness.
5. Where a wall (or a floor) has openings, the concrete thickness does not apply at the opening.
6. The elevation ranges for the shield building items are rounded to the nearest inch.

C-438

Table 3.3-1 (cont.)

Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building(1)

Applicable Radiation Floor Elevation or Concrete Shielding Wall Wall or Section Description Column Lines Elevation Range Thickness(2)(3) (Yes/No)

East wall of east steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 94'-0" to 153'-0" 2'-6" Yes North wall of east steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 87'-6" to 153'-0" 2'-6" Yes Shield Building (6)

Shield Building Cylinder Not Applicable From 100'-0" to 248-6" 3'-0" (including Yes 3/4 inch thick min.

steel plate liner on each face on portion not protected by auxiliary building)

Air Inlet Not Applicable From 248-6 to 251'-6" 3-0" (including Yes 3/4 inch thick min.

steel plate liner on each face)

From 251-6 to 254-6 3'-0" to 4'-6" Yes (including 1 inch thick steel plate liner on each face)

From 254-6 to 266'-4" 4'-6" (including 1 inch Yes thick min. steel plate liner on each face)

Tension Ring Not Applicable From 266'-4" to 271'-6 (at top of 4'-6" (including Yes plate) 1-1/2 inch thick steel plate liner on each face)

Conical Roof Not Applicable From 271'-6" to 293'-9" 3'-0" (including Yes 1/2 inch thick min.

steel plate liner on bottom face), outside of PCS tank exterior wall PCS Tank External Cylindrical Wall Not Applicable From 293'-9" to 328'-9" 2'-0" Yes PCS Tank Internal Cylindrical Wall Not Applicable From 309'-4" to 329'-0" 1'-6" Yes PCS Tank Roof Not Applicable 328'-9" (Lowest) 329'-0" (Highest) 1'-3" No C-439

Table 3.3-1 (cont.)

Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building(1)

Applicable Radiation Floor Elevation or Concrete Shielding Wall Wall or Section Description Column Lines Elevation Range Thickness(2)(3) (Yes/No)

Nuclear Island Basemat Below shield building From 60'-6" to containment vessel 6'-0" to 22'-0" (varies) No or 82'-6" Auxiliary Building Walls/Floors Radiologically Controlled Column Line 1 wall From I to N From 66'-6" to 100'-0" 3'-0" No Column Line 1 wall From I to 5'-6" east of L-2 From 100'-0" to 180'-0" 2'-3" Yes Column Line 1 wall From 5'-6" east of L-2 to N From 100'-0" to 125'-0" 3'-0" Yes Column Line 1 wall From 5'-6" east of L-2 to N From 125'-0" to 180'-0" 2'-3" Yes Column Line 2 wall From I to K-2 From 66'-6" to 135'-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 2 wall From K-2 to L-2 From 66'-6" to 135'-3" 5'-0" Yes Column Line 2 wall From L-2 to N From 98'-1" to 135'-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 2 wall From I to J-1 From 135'-3" to 153'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 3 wall From J-1 to J-2 From 66'-6" to 82'-6" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 3 wall From J-1 to J-2 From 100'-0" to 135'-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 3 wall From J-2 to K-2 From 66'-6" to 135'-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 3 wall From K-2 to L-2 From 66'-6" to 92'-8 1/2" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 4 wall From I to J-1 From 66'-6" to 153'-0" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 4 wall From J-1 to J-2 From 66'-6" to 92'-6" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 4 wall From J-1 to J-2 From 107'-2" to 135'-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 4 wall From J-2 to K-2 From 66'-6" to 135'-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 4 wall From I to intersection with shield From 135'-3" to 180'-0" 2'-0" Yes building wall Column Line 5 wall From I to shield building; with From 66'-6" to 160'-6" 2'-0" Yes opening east of J-1 (below 107'-2" floor).

Column Line 7.1 wall From I to 8' east of J-1 From 66'-6" to 82'-6" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 7.2 wall From I to 5'-6"east of J-1 From 66'-6" to 100'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line I wall From 1 to 7.3 From 66'-6" to 100'-0" 3'-0" No Column Line I wall From 1 to 4 From 100'-0" to 180'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line I wall From 4 to 5 From 100'-0" to 160'-6" 2'-0" No C-440

Table 3.3-1 (cont.)

Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building(1)

Applicable Radiation Floor Elevation or Concrete Shielding Wall Wall or Section Description Column Lines Elevation Range Thickness(2)(3) (Yes/No)

Column Line J-1 wall From 1 to 2 From 82'-6" to 100'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line J-1 wall From 2 to 4 From 66'-6" to 135'-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line J-1 wall From 2 to 4 From 135'-3" to 153'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line J-1 wall From 4 to shield building From 66'-6" to 107'-2" 2'-0" Yes Column Line J-2 wall From 2 to 4 From 66'-6" to 135'-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line J-2 wall From 4 to intersection with shield From 66'-6" to 135'-3" 2'-0" Yes building wall Column Line K-2 wall From 2 to 4 From 66'-6" to 135'-3" 4'-9" Yes Column Line L-2 wall From 2 to 4 From 66'-6" to 135'-3" 4'-0" Yes Column Line N wall From 1 to 2 From 66'-6" to 100'-0" 3'-0" No Column Line N wall From 1 to 12'-9" north of 1 From 100'-0" to 125'-0" 3'-9" No Column Line N wall From 1 to 12'-9" north of 1 From 125'-0" to 135'-0" 2'-0" No Column Line N wall From 12'-9" north of 1 to 2 From 100'-0" to 118'-2 1/2" 3'-0" No Column Line N wall From 12'-9" north of 1 to 2 From 118'-2 1/2" to 135'-3" 2'-0" No Column Line N wall From 1 to 2 From 118'-2 1/2" to 135'-3" 2'-0" Yes Column Line N wall From 2 to 4 From 66'-6" to 98'-1" 3'-0" No Column Line N wall From 2 to 4 From 98'-1" to 135'-3" 5'-6" Yes Column Line N wall From 1 to 4 From 135'-3" to 180'-0" 2'-0" Yes Labyrinth Wall between Col. Line 3 and 4 and J-1 to 7'-3" Not Applicable From 82'-6" to 92'-6" 2'-6" Yes from J-2 N-S Shield Wall (low wall) Between K-2 and L-2 extending From 100'-0" to 107'-2" 2'-6" Yes from column line 1 north N-S Shield Wall Between K-2 and L-2 extending From 100'-0" to 125'-0" 2'-3" Yes from column line 1 north E-W Shield Wall Between 1 and 2 extending from From 100'-0" to 125'-0" 2'-9" Yes column line N east Auxiliary Area Basemat From 1-7.3 and I-N, excluding shield From 60'-6" to 66'-6" 6'-0" No building Floor From 1 to 2 and I to N 82'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 2 to 4 and J-1 to J-2 82'-6" 2'-0" Yes C-441

Table 3.3-1 (cont.)

Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building(1)

Applicable Radiation Floor Elevation or Concrete Shielding Wall Wall or Section Description Column Lines Elevation Range Thickness(2)(3) (Yes/No)

Floor From 4 to 5 and J-1 to J-2 82'-6" 0'-9" Yes Pipe Chase Floor From 2 to 5 and J-1 to J-2 92'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 2 to 3 and J-2 to K-2 90'-3" 3'-0" Yes Floor From 3 to 4 and J-2 to K-2 92'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 4 to 7.3 and I to J-1 82'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 1 to 2 and I to N 100'-0" 3'-0" Yes Floor From 2 to 4 and K-2 to L-2 92'-8 1/2" 3'-2 1/2" Yes Floor From I to J-2 and 4 to intersecting 107'-2" 2'-0" Yes vertical wall before column line 5 Floor From I to shield building wall and 105'-0" 0'-9" Yes from intersecting vertical wall before column line 5 to column line 5 Floor From 1 to 10'-0" north of 1 and L-2 125'-0" 3'-0" Yes to N Floor From 10'-0" north of 1 to 2 and L-2 118'-2 1/2" 2'-0" Yes to N Floor From 3 to 4 and J-2 to K-2 117'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 2 to 4 and I to J-1 153'-0" 0'-9" Yes Roof From 1 to 4 and I to N 180'-0" 1'-3" Yes Floor From 4 to short of column line 5 and 135'-5" 0'-9" Yes from I to intersection with shield building wall Floor From short of column line 5 to 133'-0" 0'-9" Yes column line 5 and from I to intersection with shield building wall Auxiliary Building Walls/Floors Non-Radiologically Controlled Column Line 11 wall From I to Q From 66'-6" to 100'-0" 3'-0" No Column Line 11 wall From I to Q From 100'-0" to 117'-6" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 11 wall From I to L From 117'-6" to 153'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 11 wall From L to M From 117'-6" to 135'-3" 4'-0" Yes Column Line 11 wall From M to P From 117'-6" to 135'-3" 2'-0" Yes C-442

Table 3.3-1 (cont.)

Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building(1)

Applicable Radiation Floor Elevation or Concrete Shielding Wall Wall or Section Description Column Lines Elevation Range Thickness(2)(3) (Yes/No)

Column Line 11 wall From P to Q From 117'-6" to 135'-3" 4'-0" Yes Column Line 11 wall From L to Q From 135'-3" to 153'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 7.3 wall From I to shield building From 66'-6" to 100'-0" 3'-0" Yes Column Line 7.3 wall From I to shield building From 100'-0" to 160'-6" 2'-0" No Column Line I wall From 7.3 to 11 From 66'-6" to 100'-0" 3'-0" No Column Line I wall From 7.3 to 11 From 100'-0" to 153'-0" 2'-0" No Column Line I wall From 5 to 7.3 From 100'-0" to 160'-6" 2'-0" No Column Line J wall From 7.3 to 11 From 66'-6" to 117'-6" 2'-0" No Column Line K wall From 7.3 to 11 From 60'-6" to 135'-3" 2'-0" Yes Column Line L wall From shield building wall to 11 From 60'-6" to 153'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line M wall From shield building wall to 11 From 66'-6" to 153'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line P wall From shield building wall to 11 From 66'-6" to 153'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line Q wall From shield building wall to 11 From 66'-6" to 100'-0" 3'-0" No Column Line Q wall From shield building wall to 11 From 100'-0" to 153'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 9.2 wall From I to J and K to L From 117'-6" to 135'-3" 2'-0" Yes Labyrinth Wall between Column Line 7.3 and 9.2 and J to J to K From 117'-6" to 135'-3" 2'-0" Yes K

Auxiliary Area Basemat From 7.3-11 and I-Q, excluding From 60'-6" to 66'-6" 6'-0" No shield building Floor From 5 to 7.3 and I to shield 100'-0" 2'-0" Yes building wall Floor From K to L and shield building wall 100'-0" 0'-9" Yes to column line 10 Main Control Room Floor From 9.2 to 11 and I to L 117'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor Bounded by shield bldg, 7.3, J, 9.2 117'-6" 2'-0" Yes and L Floor From 9.2 to 11 and L to Q 117'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 5 to 7.3 and from I to 135'-3" 0'-9" Yes intersection with shield building wall C-443

Table 3.3-1 (cont.)

Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building(1)

Applicable Radiation Floor Elevation or Concrete Shielding Wall Wall or Section Description Column Lines Elevation Range Thickness(2)(3) (Yes/No)

Annex Building Column line 2 wall From E to H From 107'-2" to 135'-3" 19 3/4" Yes Column line 4 wall From E to H From 107'-2" to 162'-6" & 166'-0" 2'-0" Yes N-S Shield Wall between E and F From 2 to 4 From 107'-2" to 135'-3" 1'-0" Yes Column line 4.1 wall From E to H From 107'-2" to 135'-3" 2'-0" Yes E-W Labyrinth Wall between column Not Applicable From 100'-0" to 112'-0" 2'-0" line 7.1 and 7.8 and G to H N-S Labyrinth Wall between column Not Applicable From 100'-0" to 112'-0" 2'-0" line 7.8 and 9 and G to H E-W Labyrinth Wall between column Not Applicable From 100'-0" to 112'-0" 2'-0" Yes line 7.1 and 7.8 and G to H N-S Shield Wall on Column line. F From 4.1 North From 100'-0" to 117'-6" 1'-0" Yes Column Line 9 wall From E to connecting wall From 107'-2" to 117'-6" 2'-0" Yes between G and H Column Line E wall From 9 to 13 From 100'-0" to 135'-3" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 13 wall From E to I.1 From 100'-0" to 135'-3" 2'-0" Yes Column Line I.1 wall From 11.09 to 13 From 100'-0" to 135'-3" 2'-0" Yes Corridor Wall between G and H From 9 to 13 From 100'-0" to 135'-3" 1'-6" Yes Column Line 9 wall From I to H From 117'-6" to 158'-0" 2'-0" Yes Floor 2 to 4 from shield wall between E 135'-3" 0'-6" Yes and F to column line H Floor From 4 to 4.1 and E to H 135'-3" 1'-0" Yes Floor From 9 to 13 and E to I.1 117'-6" 0'-6" Yes Floor From 9 to 13 and E to I.1 135'-3" 0'-8" Yes Containment Filtration Rm A (North Wall) Between column line E to H From 135'-3" to 158'-0" 1'-0" Yes Containment Filtration Rm A (East wall) Between column line E to F From 135'-3" to 158'-0" 1'-0" Yes Containment Filtration Rm A (West wall) Between column line G to H From 135'-3" to 158'-0" 1'-0" Yes Containment Filtration Rm A (Floor) Between column line E to H 135'-3" 1'-0" Yes Containment Filtration Rm B (Floor) Between column line E to H 146'-3" 0'-6" Yes Containment Filtration Rm B (West wall) Between column line G to H From 146'-3" to 158'-0" 1'-0" Yes C-444

Table 3.3-1 (cont.)

Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building(1)

Applicable Radiation Floor Elevation or Concrete Shielding Wall Wall or Section Description Column Lines Elevation Range Thickness(2)(3) (Yes/No)

Turbine Building Wall adjacent to Column Line I.2 From Col. Line 11.05 to 11.2 From 100'-0" to 161'-0" 2'-0" No Wall along Column Line 11.2 From near I.2 to near Col. Line R From 100'-0" to 161'-0" 2'-0" No Wall adjacent to Column Line R From Col. Line 11.2 to Col. Line From 100'-0" to 161'-0" 2'-0" No 11.05 Wall along Column Line 11.05 From near Col. Line R to Col. From 100'-0" to 161'-0" 2'-0" No Line Q From Col. Line K.4 to near Col. From 100'-0" to 161'-0" 2'-0" No Line I.2 C-445

Table 3.3-2 Nuclear Island Building Room Boundaries Required to Have Flood Barrier Floors and Walls Between Room Number to Room Number Boundary/ Room with Postulated Maximum Flood Level (inches) Flooding Source Adjacent Room Floor/36 12306 12211 Floor/3 12303 12203/12207 Floor/3 12313 12203/12207 Floor/1 12300 12201/12202/12207 12203/12204/12205 Floor/3 12312 12212 Wall/36 12306 12305 Floor/1 12401 12301/12302/12303 12312/12313 Wall/1 12401 12411/12412 Floor/36 12404 12304 Floor/4 12405 12305 Floor/36 12406 12306 Wall/36 12404 12401 Wall/1 12421 12452 Floor/3 12501 12401/12411/12412 Floor/3 12555 12421/12423/12422 Wall/36 12156/12158 12111/12112 C-446

Table 3.3-3 Class 1E Divisions in Nuclear Island Fire Areas Class 1E Divisions Fire Area Number A C B D Auxiliary Building Radiologically Controlled 1200 AF 01 Yes Yes - -

1204 AF 01 Yes - - -

Auxiliary Building Non-Radiologically Controlled 1200 AF 03 - - Yes Yes 1201 AF 02 - - Yes -

1201 AF 03 - - - Yes 1201 AF 04 - - Yes Yes 1201 AF 05 - - Yes Yes 1201 AF 06 - - Yes Yes 1202 AF 03 - Yes - -

1202 AF 04 Yes - - -

1220 AF 01 - - Yes Yes 1220 AF 02 - - - Yes 1230 AF 01 Yes Yes - -

1230 AF 02 - - Yes Yes 1240 AF 01 Yes Yes - -

1242 AF 02 Yes -

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 3.3-4 is not used.

C-447

Table 3.3-5 Key Dimensions of Nuclear Island Building Features Reference Dimension Key Dimension (Figure 3.3-14) Nominal Dimension Tolerance Distance between Outside Surface of X1 91 ft-0 in +3 ft walls at Column Line I & N when -1 ft Measured at Column Line 1 Distance from Outside Surface of wall at X2 138 ft-0 in +3 ft Column Line 1 to Column Line 7 when -1 ft Measured at Column Line I Distance from Outside Surface of wall at X3 118 ft-0 in +3 ft Column Line 11 to Column Line 7 when -1 ft Measured at Column Line I Distance between Outside Surface of X4 117 ft-6 in +3 ft walls at Column Line I & Q when -1 ft Measured at Column Line 11 Distance from Outside Surface of wall at X5 29 ft-0 in +3 ft Column Line Q to Column Line N when -1 ft Measured at Column Line 11 Distance between Outside Surface of X6 72 ft-6 in +3 ft shield building wall to shield building -1 ft centerline when Measured on West Edge of Shield Building Distance between shield building X7 7 ft-6 in +/- 3 in centerline to Reactor Vessel centerline when Measured along Column Line N in North-South Direction Distance from Bottom of Containment - 2 ft-8 in +/- 3 in Sump to Top Surface of Embedded Containment Shell Distance from top of Basemat to Design - 33 ft-6 in +/- 1 ft Plant Grade Distance of Design Plant Grade (Floor - 0 ft +/- 3 ft-6 in elevation 100'-0") relative to Site Grade Distance from Design Plant Grade to Top - 229 ft-0 in +/- 1 ft Surface of Shield Building Roof C-448

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 762 3.3.00.01 1. The physical arrangement of the An inspection of the nuclear The as-built nuclear island nuclear island structures and the annex island structures, the annex structures, the annex building, building is as described in the Design building, the radwaste building, the radwaste building, the Description of this Section 3.3 and the turbine building, and the turbine building, and the Figures 3.3-1 through 3.3-14. The diesel generator building will be diesel generator building physical arrangement of the radwaste performed. conform with the physical building, the turbine building, and the arrangement as described in diesel generator building is as the Design Description of this described in the Design Description of Section 3.3 and Figures 3.3-1 this Section 3.3. through 3.3-14.

763 3.3.00.02a.i.a 2.a) The nuclear island structures, i) An inspection of the nuclear i.a) A report exists which including the critical sections listed in island structures will be reconciles deviations during Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and performed. Deviations from the construction and concludes are designed and constructed to design due to as-built conditions that the as-built containment withstand design basis loads as will be analyzed for the design internal structures, including specified in the Design Description, basis loads. the critical sections, conform without loss of structural integrity and to the approved design and the safety-related functions. will withstand the design basis loads specified in the Design Description without loss of structural integrity or the safety-related functions.

764 3.3.00.02a.i.b 2.a) The nuclear island structures, i) An inspection of the nuclear i.b) A report exists which including the critical sections listed in island structures will be reconciles deviations during Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and performed. Deviations from the construction and concludes that are designed and constructed to design due to as-built conditions the as-built shield building withstand design basis loads as will be analyzed for the design structures, including the critical specified in the Design Description, basis loads. sections, conform to the without loss of structural integrity and approved design and will the safety-related functions. withstand the design basis loads specified in the Design Description without loss of structural integrity or the safety-related functions.

C-449

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 765 3.3.00.02a.i.c 2.a) The nuclear island structures, i) An inspection of the nuclear i.c) A report exists which including the critical sections listed in island structures will be reconciles deviations during Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and performed. Deviations from the construction and concludes that are designed and constructed to design due to as-built conditions the as-built structures in the withstand design basis loads as will be analyzed for the design non-radiologically controlled specified in the Design Description, basis loads. area of the auxiliary building, without loss of structural integrity and including the critical sections, the safety-related functions. conform to the approved design and will withstand the design basis loads specified in the Design Description without loss of structural integrity or the safety-related functions.

766 3.3.00.02a.i.d 2.a) The nuclear island structures, i) An inspection of the nuclear i.d) A report exists which including the critical sections listed in island structures will be reconciles deviations during Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and performed. Deviations from the construction and concludes are designed and constructed to design due to as-built conditions that the as-built structures in withstand design basis loads as will be analyzed for the design the radiologically controlled specified in the Design Description, basis loads. area of the auxiliary building, without loss of structural integrity and including the critical sections, the safety-related functions. conform to the approved design and will withstand the design basis loads specified in the Design Description without loss of structural integrity or the safety-related functions.

767 3.3.00.02a.ii.a 2.a) The nuclear island structures, ii) An inspection of the as-built ii.a) A report exists that including the critical sections listed in concrete thickness will be concludes that the Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and performed. containment internal are designed and constructed to structures as-built concrete withstand design basis loads as thicknesses conform to the specified in the Design Description, building sections defined in without loss of structural integrity and Table 3.3-1.

the safety-related functions.

768 3.3.00.02a.ii.b 2.a) The nuclear island structures, ii) An inspection of the as-built ii.b) A report exists that including the critical sections listed in concrete thickness will be concludes that the as-built Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and performed. concrete thicknesses of the are designed and constructed to shield building sections withstand design basis loads as conform to the building specified in the Design Description, sections defined in without loss of structural integrity and Table 3.3-1.

the safety-related functions.

C-450

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 769 3.3.00.02a.ii.c 2.a) The nuclear island structures, ii) An inspection of the as-built ii.c) A report exists that including the critical sections listed in concrete thickness will be concludes that as-built Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I performed. concrete thicknesses of the and are designed and constructed to non-radiologically controlled withstand design basis loads as area of the auxiliary building specified in the Design Description, sections conform to the without loss of structural integrity and building sections defined in the safety-related functions. Table 3.3-1.

770 3.3.00.02a.ii.d 2.a) The nuclear island structures, ii) An inspection of the as-built ii.d) A report exists that including the critical sections listed in concrete thickness will be concludes that the as-built Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I performed. concrete thicknesses of the and are designed and constructed to radiologically controlled area withstand design basis loads as of the auxiliary building specified in the Design Description, sections conform to the without loss of structural integrity and building sections defined in the safety-related functions. Table 3.3-1.

771 3.3.00.02a.ii.e 2.a) The nuclear island structures, ii) An inspection of the as-built ii.e) A report exists that including the critical sections listed in concrete thickness will be concludes that the as-built Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I performed. concrete thicknesses of the and are designed and constructed to annex building sections withstand design basis loads as conform with the building specified in the Design Description, sections defined in without loss of structural integrity and Table 3.3-1.

the safety-related functions.

772 3.3.00.02a.ii.f 2.a) The nuclear island structures, ii) An inspection of the as-built ii.f) A report exists that including the critical sections listed in concrete thickness will be concludes that the as-built Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I performed. concrete thicknesses of the and are designed and constructed to turbine building sections withstand design basis loads as conform to the building specified in the Design Description, sections defined in without loss of structural integrity and Table 3.3-1.

the safety-related functions.

773 3.3.00.02b 2.b) Site grade level is located relative Inspection of the as-built site Site grade is consistent with to floor elevation 100'-0" per grade will be conducted. design plant grade within the Table 3.3-5. dimension defined on Table 3.3-5.

774 3.3.00.02c 2.c) The containment and its See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, penetrations are designed and Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, and 3.b. Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, and 3.b.

constructed to ASME Code Section III, Class MC.(2)

2. Containment isolation devices are addressed in subsection 2.2.1, Containment System.

C-451

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 775 3.3.00.02d 2.d) The containment and its See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, penetrations retain their pressure Items 4.a and 4.b. Items 4.a and 4.b.

boundary integrity associated with the design pressure.

776 3.3.00.02e 2.e) The containment and its See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, penetrations maintain the containment Items 4.a, 4.b, and 7. Items 4.a, 4.b, and 7.

leakage rate less than the maximum allowable leakage rate associated with the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident.

777 3.3.00.02f 2.f) The key dimensions of nuclear An inspection will be performed A report exists and concludes island structures are defined on of the as-built configuration of that the key dimensions of the Table 3.3-5. the nuclear island structures. as-built nuclear island structures are consistent with the dimensions defined on Table 3.3-5.

778 3.3.00.02g 2.g) The containment vessel greater The maximum containment The containment vessel than 7 feet above the operating deck vessel inside height from the maximum inside height from provides a heat transfer surface. A free operating deck is measured and the operating deck is 146'-7" volume exists inside the containment the inner radius below the spring (with tolerance of +12", -6"),

shell above the operating deck. line is measured at two and the inside diameter is orthogonal radial directions at 130 feet nominal (with one elevation. tolerance of +12", -6").

779 3.3.00.02h 2.h) The free volume in the An inspection will be performed A report exists and concludes containment allows for floodup to of the as-built containment that the floodup volume of support long-term core cooling for structures and equipment. The this portion of the containment postulated loss-of-coolant accidents. portions of the containment is less than 73,500 ft3 to an included in this inspection are elevation of 108'.

the volumes that flood with a loss-of-coolant accident in passive core cooling system valve/equipment room B (11207). The in-containment refueling water storage tank volume is excluded from this inspection.

C-452

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 780 3.3.00.03a 3. Walls and floors of the nuclear Inspection of the as-built nuclear a) A report exists and island structures as defined on island structures wall and floor concludes that the shield walls Table 3.3-1 except for designed thicknesses will be performed. and floors of the containment openings or penetrations provide internal structures as defined shielding during normal operations. in Table 3.3-1, except for designed openings or penetrations, are consistent with the concrete wall thicknesses provided in Table 3.3-1.

781 3.3.00.03b 3. Walls and floors of the nuclear Inspection of the as-built nuclear b) A report exists and island structures as defined on island structures wall and floor concludes that the shield walls Table 3.3-1 except for designed thicknesses will be performed. of the shield building openings or penetrations provide structures as defined in Table shielding during normal operations. 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the concrete wall thicknesses provided in Table 3.3-1.

782 3.3.00.03c 3. Walls and floors of the nuclear Inspection of the as-built nuclear c) A report exists and island structures as defined on island structures wall and floor concludes that the shield walls Table 3.3-1 except for designed thicknesses will be performed. and floors of the openings or penetrations provide non-radiologically controlled shielding during normal operations. area of the auxiliary building as defined in Table 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the concrete wall thicknesses provided in Table 3.3-1.

783 3.3.00.03d 3. Walls and floors of the nuclear Inspection of the as-built nuclear d) A report exists and island structures as defined on island structures wall and floor concludes that the shield walls Table 3.3-1 except for designed thicknesses will be performed. and floors of the openings or penetrations provide radiologically controlled area shielding during normal operations. of the auxiliary building as defined in Table 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the concrete wall thicknesses provided in Table 3.3-1.

C-453

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 784 3.3.00.04a 4.a) Walls and floors of the annex Inspection of the as-built annex A report exists and concludes building as defined on Table 3.3-1 building wall and floor that the shield walls and floors except for designed openings or thicknesses will be performed. of the annex building as penetrations provide shielding during defined on Table 3.3-1 except normal operations. for designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the minimum concrete wall thicknesses provided in Table 3.3-1.

785 3.3.00.04b 4.b) Walls of the waste accumulation Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes room in the radwaste building except radwaste building wall that the shield walls of the for designed openings or penetrations thicknesses will be performed. waste accumulation room in provide shielding during normal the radwaste building except operations. for designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the minimum concrete wall thicknesses of 1'-4".

786 3.3.00.04c 4.c) Walls of the packaged waste Inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes storage room in the radwaste building radwaste building wall that the shield walls of the except for designed openings or thicknesses will be performed. packaged waste storage room penetrations provide shielding during in the radwaste building normal operations. except for the wall shared with the waste accumulation room and designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the minimum concrete wall thicknesses of 2'.

787 3.3.00.05a 5.a) Exterior walls and the basemat of An inspection of the as-built A report exists that confirms the nuclear island have a water barrier water barrier will be performed that a water barrier exists on up to site grade. during construction. the nuclear island exterior walls up to site grade.

788 3.3.00.05b 5.b) The boundaries between rooms An inspection of the auxiliary A report exists that confirms identified in Table 3.3-2 of the building rooms will be floors and walls as identified auxiliary building are designed to performed. on Table 3.3-2 have provisions prevent flooding of rooms that contain to prevent flooding between safety-related equipment. rooms up to the maximum flood levels for each room defined in Table 3.3-2.

C-454

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 789 3.3.00.05c 5.c) The boundaries between the An inspection of the boundaries A report exists that confirms following rooms, which contain between the following rooms that flooding of the PXS safety-related equipment - PXS which contain safety-related Valve/ Accumulator Room A valve/accumulator room A (11205), equipment - PXS Valve/ (11205), and the PXS valve/accumulator room B Accumulator Room A (11205), PXS/Accumulator Room B (11207), and CVS room (11209) - are PXS Valve/Accumulator (11207) is prevented to a designed to prevent flooding between Room B (11207), and maximum flood level as these rooms. CVS Room (11209) - will be follows: PXS A 110'-2",

performed. PXS B 110'-1"; and of the CVS room (11209) to a maximum flood level of 110'-0".

790 3.3.00.06a 6.a) The available room volumes of An inspection will be performed A report exists and concludes the radiologically controlled area of of the as-built radiologically that the as-built available the auxiliary building between floor controlled area of the auxiliary room volumes of the elevations 66'-6" and 82'-6" exceed the building between floor radiologically controlled area volume of the liquid radwaste storage elevations 66'-6" and 82'-6" to of the auxiliary building tanks (WLS-MT-05A, MT-05B, define volume. between floor elevations MT-06A, MT-06B, MT-07A, MT-07B, 66'-6" and 82'-6" exceed the MT-07C, MT-11). volume of the liquid radwaste storage tanks (WLS-MT-05A, MT-05B, MT-06A, MT-06B, MT-07A, MT-07B, MT-07C, MT-11).

791 3.3.00.06b 6.b) The radwaste building package An inspection of the radwaste The volume of the radwaste waste storage room has a volume building packaged waste storage building packaged waste greater than or equal to 1293 cubic room (50352) is performed. storage room (50352) is feet. greater than or equal to 1293 cubic feet.

792 3.3.00.07aa 7.a) Class 1E electrical cables, Inspections of the as-built a) Class 1E electrical cables, communication cables associated with Class 1E cables and raceways and communication cables only one division, and raceways are will be conducted. inside containment associated identified according to applicable with only one division, and color-coded Class 1E divisions. raceways are identified by the appropriate color code.

793 3.3.00.07ab 7.a) Class 1E electrical cables, Inspections of the as-built b) Class 1E electrical cables, communication cables associated with Class 1E cables and raceways and communication cables in only one division, and raceways are will be conducted. the non-radiologically identified according to applicable controlled area of the auxiliary color-coded Class 1E divisions. building associated with only one division, and raceways are identified by the appropriate color code.

C-455

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 794 3.3.00.07ac 7.a) Class 1E electrical cables, Inspections of the as-built c) Class 1E electrical cables, communication cables associated with Class 1E cables and raceways and communication cables in only one division, and raceways are will be conducted. the radiologically controlled identified according to applicable area of the auxiliary building color-coded Class 1E divisions. associated with only one division, and raceways are identified by the appropriate color code.

795 3.3.00.07ba 7.b) Class 1E divisional electrical Inspections of the as-built a) Class 1E electrical cables cables and communication cables Class 1E divisional cables and and communication cables associated with only one division are raceways will be conducted. inside containment associated routed in their respective divisional with only one division are raceways. routed in raceways assigned to the same division. There are no other safety division electrical cables in a raceway assigned to a different division.

796 3.3.00.07bb 7.b) Class 1E divisional electrical Inspections of the as-built b) Class 1E electrical cables cables and communication cables Class 1E divisional cables and and communication cables in associated with only one division are raceways will be conducted. the non-radiologically routed in their respective divisional controlled area of the auxiliary raceways. building associated with only one division are routed in raceways assigned to the same division. There are no other safety division electrical cables in a raceway assigned to a different division.

797 3.3.00.07bc 7.b) Class 1E divisional electrical Inspections of the as-built c) Class 1E electrical cables cables and communication cables Class 1E divisional cables and and communication cables in associated with only one division are raceways will be conducted. the radiologically controlled routed in their respective divisional area of the auxiliary building raceways. associated with only one division are routed in raceways assigned to the same division. There are no other safety division electrical cables in a raceway assigned to a different division.

C-456

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 798 3.3.00.07c.i.a 7.c) Separation is maintained between i) Inspections of the as-built i.a) Results of the inspection Class 1E divisions in accordance with Class 1E division electrical will confirm that the the fire areas as identified in cables, communication cables separation between Class 1E Table 3.3-3. associated with only one divisions in the non-division, and raceways located in radiologically controlled area the fire areas identified in of the auxiliary building is Table 3.3-3 will be conducted. consistent with Table 3.3-3.

799 3.3.00.07c.i.b 7.c) Separation is maintained between i) Inspections of the as-built i.b) Results of the inspection Class 1E divisions in accordance with Class 1E division electrical will confirm that the the fire areas as identified in cables, communication cables separation between Class 1E Table 3.3-3. associated with only one divisions in the radiologically division, and raceways located in controlled area of the auxiliary the fire areas identified in building is consistent with Table 3.3-3 will be conducted. Table 3.3-3.

800 3.3.00.07c.ii.a 7.c) Separation is maintained between ii) Inspections of the as-built ii.a) Results of the inspection Class 1E divisions in accordance with fire barriers between the fire will confirm that fire barriers the fire areas as identified in areas identified in Table 3.3-3 exist between fire areas Table 3.3-3. will be conducted. identified in Table 3.3-3 inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building.

801 3.3.00.07c.ii.b 7.c) Separation is maintained between ii) Inspections of the as-built ii.b) Results of the inspection Class 1E divisions in accordance with fire barriers between the fire will confirm that fire barriers the fire areas as identified in areas identified in Table 3.3-3 exist between fire areas Table 3.3-3. will be conducted. identified in Table 3.3-3 inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building.

802 3.3.00.07d.i 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: i) Within the main control i) Within the main control room room and remote shutdown and remote shutdown room, the room, the vertical separation minimum vertical separation is is 3 inches or more and the 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch horizontal separation is 1 inch. or more.

C-457

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 803 3.3.00.07d.ii.a 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: ii.a) Within other plant areas ii) Within other plant areas inside containment (limited (limited hazard areas), the hazard areas), the separation minimum separation is defined meets one of the following:

by one of the following: 1) The vertical separation is

1) The minimum vertical 5 feet or more and the separation is 5 feet and the horizontal separation is 3 feet minimum horizontal separation or more except.

is 3 feet. 2) The minimum vertical

2) The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal minimum horizontal separation separation is 6 inches for is 6 inches for raceways raceways containing only containing only instrumentation instrumentation and control and control and low-voltage and low-voltage power cables power cables <2/0 AWG. <2/0 AWG.
3) For configurations that 3) For configurations that involve exclusively limited involve exclusively limited energy content cables energy content cables (instrumentation and control), (instrumentation and control),

the minimum vertical separation the minimum vertical is 3 inches and the minimum separation is 3 inches and the horizontal separation is 1 inch. minimum horizontal

4) For configurations involving separation is 1 inch.

an enclosed raceway and an 4) For configurations that open raceway, the minimum involve an enclosed raceway vertical separation is 1 inch if and an open raceway, the the enclosed raceway is below minimum vertical separation the open raceway. is 1 inch if the enclosed

5) For configuration involving raceway is below the raceway.

enclosed raceways, the 5) For configurations that minimum separation is 1 inch in involve enclosed raceways, both horizontal and vertical the minimum vertical and directions. horizontal separation is 1 inch.

C-458

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 804 3.3.00.07d.ii.b 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: ii.b) Within other plant areas ii) Within other plant areas inside the non-radiologically (limited hazard areas), the controlled area of the auxiliary minimum separation is defined building (limited hazard by one of the following: areas), the separation meets

1) The minimum vertical one of the following:

separation is 5 feet and the 1) The vertical separation is minimum horizontal separation 5 feet or more and the is 3 feet. horizontal separation is 3 feet

2) The minimum vertical or more except.

separation is 12 inches and the 2) The minimum vertical minimum horizontal separation separation is 12 inches and the is 6 inches for raceways minimum horizontal containing only instrumentation separation is 6 inches for and control and low-voltage raceways containing only power cables <2/0 AWG. instrumentation and control

3) For configurations that and low-voltage power cables involve exclusively limited < 2/0 AWG.

energy content cables 3) For configurations that (instrumentation and control), involve exclusively limited the minimum vertical separation energy content cables is 3 inches and the minimum (instrumentation and control),

horizontal separation is 1 inch. the minimum vertical

4) For configurations involving separation is 3 inches and the an enclosed raceway and an minimum horizontal open raceway, the minimum separation is 1 inch.

vertical separation is 1 inch if 4) For configurations that the enclosed raceway is below involve an enclosed raceway, the open raceway. the minimum vertical

5) For configuration involving separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceways, the enclosed raceway is below the minimum separation is 1 inch in raceway.

both horizontal and vertical 5) For configurations that directions. involve enclosed raceways, the minimum vertical and horizontal separation is 1 inch.

C-459

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 805 3.3.00.07d.ii.c 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: ii.c) Within other plant areas ii) Within other plant areas inside the radiologically (limited hazard areas), the controlled area of the auxiliary minimum separation is defined building (limited hazard by one of the following: areas), the separation meets

1) The minimum vertical one of the following:

separation is 5 feet and the 1) The vertical separation is minimum horizontal separation 5 feet or more and the is 3 feet. horizontal separation is 3 feet

2) The minimum vertical or more except.

separation is 12 inches and the 2) The minimum vertical minimum horizontal separation separation is 12 inches and the is 6 inches for raceways minimum horizontal containing only instrumentation separation is 6 inches for and control and low-voltage raceways containing only power cables <2/0 AWG. instrumentation and control

3) For configurations that and low-voltage power cables involve exclusively limited < 2/0 AWG.

energy content cables 3) For configurations that (instrumentation and control), involve exclusively limited the minimum vertical separation energy content cables is 3 inches and the minimum (instrumentation and control),

horizontal separation is 1 inch. the minimum vertical

4) For configurations involving separation is 3 inches and the an enclosed raceway and an minimum horizontal open raceway, the minimum separation is 1 inch.

vertical separation is 1 inch if 4) For configurations that the enclosed raceway is below involve an enclosed raceway the open raceway. and an open raceway, the

5) For configuration involving minimum vertical separation enclosed raceways, the is 1 inch if the enclosed minimum separation is 1 inch in raceway is below the raceway.

both horizontal and vertical 5) For configurations that directions. involve enclosed raceways, the minimum vertical and horizontal separation is 1 inch.

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Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 806 3.3.00.07d.iii.a 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: iii.a) Where minimum iii) Where minimum separation separation distances are not distances are not maintained, the met inside containment, the circuits are run in enclosed circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are raceways or barriers are provided. provided.

807 3.3.00.07d.iii.b 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: iii.b) Where minimum iii) Where minimum separation separation distances are not distances are not maintained, the met inside the circuits are run in enclosed non-radiologically controlled raceways or barriers are area of the auxiliary building, provided. the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.

808 3.3.00.07d.iii.c 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: iii.c) Where minimum iii) Where minimum separation separation distances are not distances are not maintained, the met inside the radiologically circuits are run in enclosed controlled area of the auxiliary raceways or barriers are building, the circuits are run in provided. enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.

C-461

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 809 3.3.00.07d.iv.a 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: iv.a) For areas inside iv) Separation distances less containment, a report exists than those specified above and and concludes that separation not run in enclosed raceways or distances less than those provided with barriers are based specified above and not on analysis provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.

810 3.3.00.07d.iv.b 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: iv.b) For areas inside the iv) Separation distances less non-radiologically controlled than those specified above and area of the auxiliary building, not run in enclosed raceways or a report exists and concludes provided with barriers are based that separation distances less on analysis than those specified above and not provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.

C-462

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 811 3.3.00.07d.iv.c 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: iv.c) For areas inside the iv) Separation distances less radiologically controlled area than those specified above and of the auxiliary building, a not run in enclosed raceways or report exists and concludes provided with barriers are based that separation distances less on analysis than those specified above and not provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.

812 3.3.00.07d.v.a 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: v.a) For areas inside v) Non-Class 1E wiring that is containment, non-Class 1E not separated from Class 1E or wiring that is not separated associated wiring by the from Class 1E or associated minimum separation distance or wiring by the minimum by a barrier or analyzed is separation distance or by a considered as associated circuits barrier or analyzed is treated and subject to Class 1E as Class 1E wiring.

requirements.

C-463

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 813 3.3.00.07d.v.b 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: v.b) For areas inside the v) Non-Class 1E wiring that is non-radiologically controlled not separated from Class 1E or area of the auxiliary building, associated wiring by the non-Class 1E wiring that is minimum separation distance or not separated from Class 1E by a barrier or analyzed is or associated wiring by the considered as associated circuits minimum separation distance and subject to Class 1E or by a barrier or analyzed is requirements. treated as Class 1E wiring.

814 3.3.00.07d.v.c 7.d) Physical separation is maintained Inspections of the as-built Results of the inspection will between Class 1E divisions and Class 1E raceways will be confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions and non- performed to confirm that the between Class 1E raceways of Class 1E cables. separation between Class 1E different divisions and raceways of different divisions between Class 1E raceways and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

consistent with the following: v.c) For areas inside the v) Non-Class 1E wiring that is radiologically controlled area not separated from Class 1E or of the auxiliary building, non-associated wiring by the Class 1E wiring that is not minimum separation distance or separated from Class 1E or by a barrier or analyzed is associated wiring by the considered as associated circuits minimum separation distance and subject to Class 1E or by a barrier or analyzed is requirements. treated as Class 1E wiring.

815 3.3.00.07e 7.e) Class 1E communication cables Inspections of the as-built Class 1E communication which interconnect two divisions are Class 1E communication cables cables which interconnect two routed and separated such that the will be conducted. divisions are routed and Protection and Safety Monitoring separated such that the System voting logic is not defeated by Protection and Safety the loss of any single raceway or fire Monitoring System voting area. logic is not defeated by the loss of any single raceway or fire area.

C-464

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 816 3.3.00.08 8. Systems, structures, and Following as-built An as-built Pipe Rupture components identified as essential reconciliation, an inspection will Hazard Analysis Report exists targets are protected from the dynamic be performed of the as-built high and concludes that systems, and environmental effects of and moderate energy pipe structures, and components postulated pipe ruptures. rupture mitigation features for identified as essential targets systems, structures, and can withstand the effects of components identified as postulated pipe rupture essential targets. without loss of required safety function.

817 3.3.00.09 9. The reactor cavity sump has a An inspection of the as-built A report exists and concludes minimum concrete thickness as shown containment building internal that the reactor cavity sump in Table 3.3-5 between the bottom of structures will be performed. has a minimum concrete the sump and the steel containment. thickness as shown on Table 3.3-5 between the bottom of the sump and the steel containment.

818 3.3.00.10.i 10. The shield building roof and PCS i) A test will be performed to i) A report exists and storage tank support and retain the measure the leakage from the concludes that total water flow PCS water sources. The PCS storage PCS storage tank based on from the leak chase collection tank has a stainless steel liner which measuring the water flow out of system does not exceed provides a barrier on the inside the leak chase collection system. 10 gal/hr.

surfaces of the tank. Leak chase channels are provided on the tank boundary liner welds.

819 3.3.00.10.ii 10. The shield building roof and PCS ii) An inspection of the PCS ii) A report exists and storage tank support and retain the storage tank exterior tank concludes that inspection and PCS water sources. The PCS storage boundary and shield building measurement of the PCS tank has a stainless steel liner which tension ring will be performed storage tank and the tension provides a barrier on the inside before and after filling of the ring structure, before and after surfaces of the tank. Leak chase PCS storage tank to the overflow filling of the tank, shows channels are provided on the tank level. The vertical elevation of structural behavior under boundary liner welds. the shield building roof will be normal loads to be acceptable.

measured at a location at the outer radius of the roof (tension ring) and at a location on the same azimuth at the outer radius of the PCS storage tank before and after filling the PCS storage tank.

C-465

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 820 3.3.00.10.iii 10. The shield building roof and PCS iii) An inspection of the PCS iii) A report exists and storage tank support and retain the storage tank exterior tank concludes that there is no PCS water sources. The PCS storage boundary and shield building visible water leakage from the tank has a stainless steel liner which tension ring will be performed PCS storage tank through the provides a barrier on the inside before and after filling of the concrete and that there is no surfaces of the tank. Leak chase PCS storage tank to the overflow visible excessive cracking in channels are provided on the tank level. The boundaries of the PCS the boundaries of the PCS boundary liner welds. storage tank and the shield storage tank and the shield building roof above the tension building roof above the ring will be inspected visually tension ring.

for excessive concrete cracking.

11. Deleted 821 3.3.00.12 12. The extended turbine generator An inspection of the as-built The extended axis of the axis intersects the shield building. turbine generator will be turbine generator intersects performed. the shield building.

822 3.3.00.13 13. Separation is provided between An inspection of the separation The minimum horizontal the structural elements of the turbine, of the nuclear island from the clearance above floor annex and radwaste buildings and the annex, radwaste and turbine elevation 100-0 between the nuclear island structure. This building structures will be structural elements of the separation permits horizontal motion performed. The inspection will annex and radwaste buildings of the buildings in the safe shutdown verify the specified horizontal and the nuclear island is earthquake without impact between clearance between structural 4 inches. The minimum structural elements of the buildings. elements of the adjacent horizontal clearance above buildings, consisting of the floor elevation 100-0 reinforced concrete walls and between the structural slabs, structural steel columns elements of the turbine and floor beams. building and the nuclear island is 4 inches.

823 3.3.00.14 14. The external walls, doors, ceiling, Type test, analysis, or a A report exists and concludes and floors in the main control room, combination of type test and that the external walls, doors, the central alarm station, and the analysis will be performed for ceilings, and floors in the secondary alarm station are the external walls, doors, main control room, the central bullet-resistant to at least Underwriters ceilings, and floors in the main alarm station, and the Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, control room, the central alarm secondary alarm station are level 4. station, and the secondary alarm bullet-resistant to at least station. Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.

15. Deleted C-466

Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 824 3.3.00.16 16. Secondary security power supply An inspection will be performed Secondary security power system for alarm annunciator to ensure that the location of the supply equipment for alarm equipment and non-portable secondary security power supply annunciator equipment and communications equipment is located equipment for alarm annunciator non-portable communication within a vital area. equipment and non-portable equipment is located within a communications equipment is vital area.

within a vital area.

825 3.3.00.17 17. Vital areas are locked and alarmed An inspection of the as-built Vital areas are locked and with active intrusion detection systems vital areas, and central and alarmed with active intrusion that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations are detection systems and secondary alarm stations upon performed. intrusion is detected and intrusion into a vital area. annunciated in both the central and secondary alarm stations.

18. Deleted C-467

Table 3.3-7 Nuclear Island Critical Structural Sections Containment Internal Structures South west wall of the refueling cavity South wall of the west steam generator cavity North east wall of the in-containment refueling water storage tank In-containment refueling water storage tank steel wall Column supporting the operating floor Auxiliary and Shield Building South wall of auxiliary building (column line 1), elevation 66'-6" to elevation 180'-0" Interior wall of auxiliary building (column line 7.3), elevation 66'-6" to elevation 160'-6" West wall of main control room in auxiliary building (column line L), elevation 117'-6" to elevation 153'-0" North wall of MSIV east compartment (column line 11 between lines L and M), elevation 117'-6" to elevation 153'-0" Roof slab at elevation 180'-0" adjacent to shield building cylinder Floor slab on metal decking at elevation 135'-3" 2'-0" slab in auxiliary building (tagging room ceiling) at elevation 135'-3" Finned floor in the main control room at elevation 135'-3" Shield building roof, exterior wall of the PCS water storage tank Shield building roof, interior wall of the PCS water storage tank Shield building roof, tension ring and air inlets Divider wall between the spent fuel pool and the fuel transfer canal Shield building SC cylinder Shield building SC to RC connection Nuclear Island Basemat Below Auxiliary Building Bay between reference column lines 9.1 and 11, and K and L Bay between reference column lines 1 and 2 and K-2 and N Figures 3.3-1 through 3.3-14 contain Security-Related Information. (See Attachment 1 to Turkey Point Unit 7 COL Appendix C)

C-468

3.4 Initial Test Program No ITAAC for this system.

3.5 Radiation Monitoring Design Description Radiation monitoring is provided for those plant areas where there is a significant potential for airborne contamination, for those process and effluent streams where contamination is possible, and in accessible areas to provide indication of unusual radiological events as identified in Tables 3.5-1, 3.5-2, 3.5-3, 3.5-4, and 3.5-5. The radiation monitoring component locations are as shown in Table 3.5-7.

1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
3. Separation is provided between system Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.
4. Safety-related displays identified in Table 3.5-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).
5. The process radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5-2 are provided.
6. The effluent radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5-3 are provided.
7. The airborne radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5-4 are provided.
8. The area radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5-5 are provided.

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Table 3.5-1 Qual. for Safety-Seismic Harsh Related Equipment Name Tag No. Cat. I Class 1E Envir. Display Containment High Range PXS-RE160 Yes Yes Yes Yes Monitor Containment High Range PXS-RE161 Yes Yes Yes Yes Monitor Containment High Range PXS-RE162 Yes Yes Yes Yes Monitor Containment High Range PXS-RE163 Yes Yes Yes Yes Monitor MCR Radiation Monitoring VBS-JS01A Yes Yes No No Package A(1)

MCR Radiation Monitoring VBS-JS01B Yes Yes No No Package B(1)

Containment Atmosphere PSS-RE026 Yes No No No Monitor (Gaseous)

Containment Atmosphere PSS-RE027 Yes No No No Monitor (gaseous, for RCS pressure boundary leakage detection)

Notes: (1) Each MCR Radiation Monitoring Package includes particulate, iodine and gaseous radiation monitors.

C-470

Table 3.5-2 Process Radiation Monitors Equipment List Equipment No.

Steam Generator Blowdown BDS-RE010 Steam Generator Blowdown BDS-RE011 Component Cooling Water CCS-RE001 Main Steam Line(1) SGS-RY026 Main Steam Line(1) SGS-RY027 Service Water Blowdown SWS-RE008 Primary Sampling System Liquid Sample PSS-RE050 Primary Sampling System Gaseous Sample PSS-RE052 Containment Air Filtration Exhaust VFS-RE001 Gaseous Radwaste Discharge WGS-RE017 Note:

1. Each main steam line monitor includes a noble gas detector and primary-to-secondary side leak detector.

Table 3.5-3 Effluent Radiation Monitors Equipment List Equipment No.

Plant Vent (Normal Range Particulate) VFS-RE101 Plant Vent (Normal Range Iodine) VFS-RE102 Plant Vent (Normal Range Radiogas) VFS-RE103 Plant Vent (Mid Range Radiogas) VFS-RE104A Plant Vent (High Range Radiogas) VFS-RE104B Turbine Island Vent(1) TDS-RY001 Liquid Radwaste Discharge WLS-RE229 Wastewater Discharge WWS-RE021 Note:

1. The turbine island vent includes a low and a high range detector.

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Table 3.5-4 Airborne Radiation Monitors Equipment List Equipment No.

Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE001 Auxiliary Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE002 Annex Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE003 Health Physics and Hot Machine Shop Exhaust VHS-RE001 Radiation Monitor Radwaste Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VRS-RE023 Table 3.5-5 Area Radiation Monitors Primary Sampling Room RMS-RE008 Containment Area - Personnel Hatch RMS-RE009 Operating Deck (135'-3" Elevation)

Main Control Room RMS-RE010 Chemistry Laboratory RMS-RE011 Fuel Handling Area 1 RMS-RE012 Rail Car Bay/Filter Storage Area (Auxiliary Building RMS-RE013 Loading Bay)

Liquid and Gaseous Radwaste Area(1) RMS-RY014 Control Support Area RMS-RE016 Radwaste Building Mobile Systems Facility RMS-RE017 Hot Machine Shop RMS-RE018 Annex Staging and Storage Area RMS-RE019 Fuel Handling Area 2 RMS-RE020 Containment Area - Personnel Hatch RMS-RE021 Maintenance Level (100'-0" Elevation)

Note:

1. This monitor includes multiple detectors to monitor the areas of interest.

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Table 3.5-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 826 3.5.00.01.i 1. The seismic Category I equipment i) Inspection will be performed i) The seismic Category I identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand to verify that the seismic equipment identified in seismic design basis loads without loss Category I equipment identified Table 3.5-1 is located on the of safety function. in Table 3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Nuclear Island.

827 3.5.00.01.ii 1. The seismic Category I equipment ii) Type tests, analyses, or a ii) A report exists and identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand combination of type tests and concludes that the seismic seismic design basis loads without loss analyses of seismic Category I Category I equipment can of safety function. equipment will be performed. withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

828 3.5.00.01.iii 1. The seismic Category I equipment iii) Inspection will be performed iii) A report exists and identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand for the existence of a report concludes that the as-built seismic design basis loads without loss verifying that the as-built equipment including of safety function. equipment including anchorage anchorage is seismically is seismically bounded by the bounded by the tested or tested or analyzed conditions. analyzed conditions.

829 3.5.00.02.i 2. The Class 1E equipment identified in i) Type tests, analyses, or a i) A report exists and Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a combination of type tests and concludes that Class 1E harsh environment can withstand the analyses will be performed on equipment identified in environmental conditions that would Class 1E equipment located in a Table 3.5-1 as being located in exist before, during, and following a harsh environment. a harsh environment can design basis accident without loss of withstand the environmental safety function for the time required to conditions that would exist perform the safety function. before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

830 3.5.00.02.ii 2. The Class 1E equipment identified in ii) Inspection will be performed ii) A report exists and Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a of the as-built Class 1E concludes that the as-built harsh environment can withstand the equipment and the associated Class 1E equipment and the environmental conditions that would wiring, cables, and terminations associated wiring, cables, and exist before, during, and following a located in a harsh environment. terminations identified in design basis accident without loss of Table 3.5-1 as being qualified safety function for the time required to for a harsh environment are perform the safety function. bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

831 3.5.00.03 3. Separation is provided between See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, system Class 1E divisions, and between item 7.d). item 7.d).

Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

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Table 3.5-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 832 3.5.00.04 4. Safety-related displays identified in Inspection will be performed for Safety-related displays Table 3.5-1 can be retrieved in the retrievability of the displays in identified in Table 3.5-1 can MCR. the MCR. be retrieved in the MCR.

833 3.5.00.05 5. The process radiation monitors listed Inspection for the existence of Each of the monitors listed in in Table 3.5-2 are provided. the monitors will be performed. Table 3.5-2 exists.

834 3.5.00.06 6. The effluent radiation monitors listed Inspection for the existence of Each of the monitors listed in in Table 3.5-3 are provided. the monitors will be performed. Table 3.5-3 exists.

835 3.5.00.07 7. The airborne radiation monitors Inspection for the existence of Each of the monitors listed in listed in Table 3.5-4 are provided. the monitors will be performed. Table 3.5-4 exists.

836 3.5.00.08 8. The area radiation monitors listed in Inspection for the existence of Each of the monitors listed in Table 3.5-5 are provided. the monitors will be performed. Table 3.5-5 exists.

Table 3.5-7 Component Component Name Tag No. Location Containment High Range Radiation Monitor PXS-RE160 Containment Containment High Range Radiation Monitor PXS-RE161 Containment Containment High Range Radiation Monitor PXS-RE162 Containment Containment High Range Radiation Monitor PXS-RE163 Containment MCR Radiation Monitoring Package A VBS-RY01A Auxiliary Building MCR Radiation Monitoring Package B VBS-RY01B Auxiliary Building Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor (Gaseous) PSS-RE026 Auxiliary Building Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor (gaseous, PSS-RE027 Auxiliary Building for RCS pressure boundary leakage detection)

Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor BDS-RE010 Turbine Building Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor BDS-RE011 Turbine Building Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitor CCS-RE001 Turbine Building Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor SGS-RY026 Auxiliary Building Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor SGS-RY027 Auxiliary Building Service Water Blowdown Radiation Monitor SWS-RE008 Turbine Building C-474

Table 3.5-7 Component Component Name Tag No. Location Primary Sampling System Liquid Sample Radiation PSS-RE050 Auxiliary Building Monitor Primary Sampling System Gaseous Sample Radiation PSS-RE052 Auxiliary Building Monitor Containment Air Filtration Exhaust Radiation Monitor VFS-RE001 Annex Building Gaseous Radwaste Discharge Radiation Monitor WGS-RE017 Auxiliary Building Plant Vent (Normal Range Particulate) Radiation VFS-RE101 Auxiliary Building Monitor Plant Vent (Normal Range Iodine) Radiation Monitor VFS-RE102 Auxiliary Building Plant Vent (Normal Range Radiogas) Radiation Monitor VFS-RE103 Auxiliary Building Plant Vent (Mid Range Radiogas) Radiation Monitor VFS-RE104A Auxiliary Building Plant Vent (High Range Radiogas) Radiation Monitor VFS-RE104B Auxiliary Building Turbine Island Vent Radiation Monitor TDS-RY001 Turbine Building Liquid Radwaste Discharge Monitor WLS-RE229 Radwaste Building Wastewater Discharge Radiation Monitor WWS-RE021 Turbine Building Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE001 Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE002 Auxiliary Building Annex Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE003 Auxiliary Building Health Physics and Hot Machine Shop Exhaust VHS-RE001 Annex Building Radiation Monitor Radwaste Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VRS-RE023 Radwaste Building Primary Sampling Room RMS-RE008 Auxiliary Building Containment Area - Personnel Hatch - Operating Deck RMS-RE009 Auxiliary Building Main Control Room RMS-RE010 Auxiliary Building Chemistry Laboratory RMS-RE011 Auxiliary Building Fuel Handling Area 1 RMS-RE012 Auxiliary Building Rail Car Bay/Filter Storage Area (Auxiliary Building RMS-RE013 Auxiliary Building Loading Bay)

Liquid and Gaseous Radwaste Area RMS-RY014 Radwaste Building Control Support Area RMS-RE016 Annex Building Radwaste Building Mobile Systems Facility RMS-RE017 Radwaste Building C-475

Table 3.5-7 Component Component Name Tag No. Location Hot Machine Shop RMS-RE018 Annex Building Annex Staging and Storage Area RMS-RE019 Annex Building Fuel Handling Area 2 RMS-RE020 Auxiliary Building Containment Area - Personnel Hatch - Maintenance RMS-RE021 Auxiliary Building Level 3.6 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection Design Description The reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage detection monitoring provides a means of detecting and quantifying the reactor coolant leakage. To detect unidentified leakage inside containment, the following diverse methods are provided to quantify and assist in locating the leakage:

  • Containment Sump Level
  • Containment Atmosphere Radiation Leakage detection monitoring is accomplished using instrumentation and other components of several systems.
1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

Table 3.6-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 837 3.6.00.01.i 1. The diverse leak detection methods See sections: See sections:

provide the nonsafety-related function i) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, i) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, of detecting small leaks when RCS Item 7.a for the sump level Item 7.a for the sump level leakage indicates possible reactor measuring instruments WLS-034 measuring instruments coolant pressure boundary degradation. and WLS-035. WLS-034 and WLS-035.

838 3.6.00.01.ii 1. The diverse leak detection methods See sections: See ITAAC sections:

provide the nonsafety-related function ii) See ITAAC Table 3.5-6, ii) See ITAAC Table 3.5-6, of detecting small leaks when RCS Item 1 for the containment Item 1 for the containment leakage indicates possible reactor atmosphere radioactivity atmosphere radioactivity coolant pressure boundary degradation. monitor PSS-RE027. monitor PSS-RE027.

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Table 3.6-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 839 3.6.00.01.iii 1. The diverse leak detection methods See sections: See sections:

provide the nonsafety-related function iii) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, iii) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, of detecting small leaks when RCS Items 5a, 7a, and 10 for the Items 5a, 7a, and 10 for the leakage indicates possible reactor pressurizer level measuring pressurizer level measuring coolant pressure boundary degradation. instruments RCS-195A, instruments RCS-195A, RCS-195B, RCS-195C, and RCS-195B, RCS-195C, and RCS-195D. RCS-195D.

840 3.6.00.01.iv 1. The diverse leak detection methods See sections: See sections:

provide the nonsafety-related function iv) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, iv) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, of detecting small leaks when RCS Items 5a and 7a for the RCS hot Items 5a and 7a for the RCS leakage indicates possible reactor and cold leg temperature hot and cold leg temperature coolant pressure boundary degradation. instruments RCS-121A, instruments RCS-121A, RCS-121B, RCS-121C, RCS-121B, RCS-121C, RCS-121D, RCS-122A, RCS-121D, RCS-122A, RCS-122B, RCS-122C, RCS-122B, RCS-122C, RCS-122D, RCS-131A, RCS-122D, RCS-131A, RCS-131B, RCS-131C, RCS-131B, RCS-131C, RCS-131D, RCS-132A, RCS-131D, RCS-132A, RCS-132B, RCS-132C, and RCS-132B, RCS-132C, and RCS-132D. RCS-132D.

841 3.6.00.01.v 1. The diverse leak detection methods See sections: See sections:

provide the nonsafety-related function v) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, v) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, of detecting small leaks when RCS Items 5a, 7a, and 10 for the RCS Items 5a, 7a, and 10 for the leakage indicates possible reactor pressure instruments RCS-140A, RCS pressure instruments coolant pressure boundary degradation. RCS-140B, RCS-140C, and RCS-140A, RCS-140B, RCS-140D. RCS-140C, and RCS-140D.

842 3.6.00.01.vi 1. The diverse leak detection methods See sections: See sections:

provide the nonsafety-related function vi) See ITAAC Table 2.3.2-4, vi) See ITAAC Table 2.3.2-4, of detecting small leaks when RCS Item 13 for the letdown and Item 13 for the letdown and leakage indicates possible reactor makeup flow instruments makeup flow instruments coolant pressure boundary degradation. CVS-001 and CVS-025. CVS-001 and CVS-025.

843 3.6.00.01.vii 1. The diverse leak detection methods vii) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, vii) See ITAAC provide the nonsafety-related function Item 10 for the reactor coolant Table 2.3.10-4, Item 10 for the of detecting small leaks when RCS drain tank level instrument reactor coolant drain tank leakage indicates possible reactor WLS-002. level instrument WLS-002.

coolant pressure boundary degradation.

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3.7 Design Reliability Assurance Program The Design Reliability Assurance Program (D-RAP) is a program that will be performed during the detailed design and equipment specification phase prior to initial fuel load. The D-RAP evaluates and sets priorities for the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in the design, based on their degree of risk significance. The risk-significant components are listed in Table 3.7-1.

The objective of the D-RAP program is to provide reasonable assurance that risk-significant SSCs (Table 3.7-1) are designed such that: (1) assumptions from the risk analysis are utilized, (2) SSCs (Table 3.7-1) when challenged, function in accordance with the assumed reliability, (3) SSCs (Table 3.7-1) whose failure results in a reactor trip, function in accordance with the assumed reliability, and (4) maintenance actions to achieve the assumed reliability are identified.

1. The D-RAP ensures that the design of SSCs within the scope of the reliability assurance program (Table 3.7-1) is consistent with the risk insights and key assumptions (e.g., SSC design, reliability, and availability).

Table 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components Equipment Name Tag No.

Component Cooling Water System (CCS)

Component Cooling Water Pumps CCS-MP-01A/B Containment System (CNS)

Containment Vessel CNS-MV-01 Hydrogen Igniters VLS-EH-1 through -64 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS)

Makeup Pumps CVS-MP-01A/B Makeup Pump Suction and Discharge Check Valves CVS-PL-V113 CVS-PL-V160A/B Letdown Discharge Isolation Valves CVS-PL-V045 CVS-PL-V047 Diverse Actuation System (DAS)

DAS Processor Cabinets and Control Panel (used to provide DAS-JD-001 automatic and manual actuation) DAS-JD-002 DAS-JD-003 DAS-JD-004 OCS-JC-020 Annex Building UPS Distribution Panels EDS1-EA-1, EDS1-EA-14, (provide power to DAS) EDS2-EA-1, EDS2-EA-14 Rod Drive MG Sets (Field Breakers) PLS-MG-01A/B C-478

Table 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components Equipment Name Tag No.

Containment Isolation Valves Controlled by DAS CVS-PL-V045, -V047 VFS-PL-V003, -V004, -V009, -V010 WLS-PL-V055, -V057 Main ac Power System (ECS)

Reactor Coolant Pump Switchgear ECS-ES-31, -32, -41, -42,

-51, -52, -61, -62 Ancillary Diesel Generators ECS-MS-01, -02 6900 Vac Buses ECS-ES-1, -2 Main and Startup Feedwater System (FWS)

Startup Feedwater Pumps FWS-MP-03A/B General I&C IRWST Level Sensors PXS-045, -046, -047, -048 RCS Hot Leg Level Sensors RCS-160A/B Pressurizer Pressure Sensors RCS-191A/B/C/D Pressurizer Level Sensors RCS-195A/B/C/D Steam Generator Narrow-Range Level Sensors SGS-001, -002, -003, -004,

-005, -006, -007, -008 Steam Generator Wide-Range Level Sensors SGS-011, -012, -013, -014,

-015, -016, -017, -018 Main Steam Line Pressure Sensors SGS-030, -031, -032, -033,

-034, -035, -036, -037 Main Feedwater Wide-Range Flow Sensors FWS-050B/D/F, -051B/D/F Startup Feedwater Flow Sensors SGS-055A/B, -056A/B CMT Level Sensors PXS-011A/B/C/D, -012A/B/C/D,

-013A/B/C/D, -014A/B/C/D Class 1E dc Power and Uninterruptible Power System (IDS) 250 Vdc 24-Hour Batteries IDSA-DB-1A/B, IDSB-DB-1A/B, IDSC-DB-1A/B, IDSD-DB-1A/B 250 Vdc 24-Hour Buses IDSA-DS-1, IDSB-DS-1 IDSC-DS-1, IDSD-DS-1 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Chargers IDSA-DC-1, IDSB-DC-1, IDSC-DC-1, IDSD-DC-1 250 Vdc and 120 Vac Distribution Panels IDSA-DD-1, IDSA-EA-1/-2, IDSB-DD-1, IDSB-EA-1/-2/-3, IDSC-DD-1, IDSC-EA-1/-2/-3, IDSD-DD-1, IDSD-EA-1/-2 C-479

Table 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components Equipment Name Tag No.

Fused Transfer Switch Boxes IDSA-DF-1, IDSB-DF-1/-2, IDSC-DF-1/-2, IDSD-DF-1 250 Vdc Motor Control Centers IDSA-DK-1, IDSB-DK-1, IDSC-DK-1, IDSD-DK-1 250 Vdc 24-Hour Inverters IDSA-DU-1, IDSB-DU-1, IDSC-DU-1, IDSD-DU-1 Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS)

Recirculation Pumps PCS-MP-01A/B PCCWST Drain Isolation Valves PCS-PL-V001A/B/C Plant Control System (PLS)

PLS Actuation Software (used to provide control functions) Refer to Table 3.7-2 PLS Actuation Hardware (used to provide control Refer to Table 3.7-2 functions)

Protection and Monitoring System (PMS)

PMS Actuation Software (used to provide automatic control Refer to Tables 2.5.2-2 and 2.5.2-3 functions)

PMS Actuation Hardware (used to provide automatic Refer to Tables 2.5.2-2 and 2.5.2-3 control functions)

MCR 1E Displays and System Level Controls OCS-JC-010, -011 Reactor Trip Switchgear PMS-JD-RTS A01/02, B01/02, C01/02, D01/02 Passive Core Cooling System (PXS)

IRWST Vents PXS-MT-03 IRWST Screens PXS-MY-Y01A/B/C Containment Recirculation Screens PXS-MY-Y02A/B CMT Discharge Isolation Valves PXS-PL-V014A/B, -V015A/B CMT Discharge Check Valves PXS-PL-V016A/B, -V017A/B Accumulator Discharge Check Valves PXS-PL-V028A/B, -V029A/B PRHR HX Control Valves PXS-PL-V108A/B Containment Recirculation Squib Valves PXS-PL-V118A/B, -V120A/B IRWST Injection Check Valves PXS-PL-V122A/B, -V124A/B IRWST Injection Squib Valves PXS-PL-V123A/B, -V125A/B IRWST Gutter Bypass Isolation Valves PXS-PL-V130A/B C-480

Table 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components Equipment Name Tag No.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

ADS Stage 1/2/3 Valves (MOVs) RCS-PL-V001A/B, -V011A/B RCS-PL-V002A/B, -V012A/B RCS-PL-V003A/B, -V013A/B ADS Stage 4 Valves (Squibs) RCS-PL-V004A/B/C/D Pressurizer Safety Valves RCS-PL-V005A/B Reactor Vessel Insulation Water Inlet and Steam Vent RCS-MN-01 Devices Reactor Cavity Doorway Damper -

Fuel Assemblies 157 assemblies with tag numbers beginning with RXS-FA Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS)

Residual Heat Removal Pumps RNS-MP-01A/B RNS Motor-Operated Valves RNS-PL-V011, -V022, -V023, -V055 RNS Stop Check Valves RNS-PL-V015A/B RNS Check Valves RNS-PL-V017A/B RNS Check Valves RNS-PL-V007A/B, -V013, -V056 Spent Fuel Cooling System (SFS)

Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps SFS-MP-01A/B Steam Generator System (SGS)

Main Steam Safety Valves SGS-PL-V030A/B, -V031A/B,

-V032A/B, -V033A/B,

-V034A/B, -V035A/B Main Steam Line Isolation Valves SGS-PL-V040A/B Main Feedwater Isolation Valves SGS-PL-V057A/B Service Water System (SWS)

Service Water Cooling Tower Fans SWS-MA-01A/B Service Water Pumps SWS-MP-01A/B Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System (VBS)

MCR Ancillary Fans VBS-MA-10A/B I&C Room B/C Ancillary Fans VBS-MA-11, -12 C-481

Table 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components Equipment Name Tag No.

Containment Air Filtration System (VFS)

Containment Purge Isolation Valves VFS-PL-V003 VFS-PL-V004 VFS-PL-V009 VFS-PL-V010 Chilled Water System (VWS)

Air Cooled Chiller Pumps VWS-MP-02, -03 Air Cooled Chillers VWS-MS-02, -03 Liquid Radwaste System (WLS)

Sump Containment Isolation Valves WLS-PL-V055 WLS-PL-V057 Onsite Standby Power System (ZOS)

Engine Room Exhaust Fans VZS-MY-V01A/B, -V02A/B Onsite Diesel Generators ZOS-MS-05A/B Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-482

Table 3.7-2 PLS D-RAP Control Functions CVS Reactor Makeup RNS Reactor Injection from cask loading pit Startup Feedwater from CST Spent Fuel Cooling Component Cooling of RNS and SFS Heat Exchangers Service Water Cooling of CCS Heat Exchangers Onsite Diesel Generators Hydrogen Ignitors C-483

Table 3.7-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 844 3.7.00.01 1. The D-RAP ensures that the design An analysis will confirm that An analysis report documents of SSCs within the scope of the the design of RAP SSCs that safety-related SSCs reliability assurance program identified in Table 3.7-1 has identified in Table 3.7-1 have (Table 3.7-1) is consistent with the risk been completed in accordance been designed in accordance insights and key assumptions (e.g., SSC with applicable D-RAP with a 10 CFR 50 Appendix B design, reliability, and availability). activities. quality program.

An analysis report documents that non-safety-related SSCs identified in Table 3.7-1 have been designed in accordance with a program that satisfies quality assurance requirements for SSCs important to investment protection.

C-484

C.3.8 Emergency Planning ITAAC C.3.8.1.1 Emergency Classification System Table C.3.8-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 845 C.3.8.01.01.01 1.1 A standard emergency 1.1.1 An inspection of the main 1.1.1 The specified parameters classification and emergency control room, Technical Support are retrievable in the main action level (EAL) scheme exists, Center (TSC), and Emergency control room, TSC and EOF, and identifies facility system and Operations Facility (EOF) will and the ranges of the displays effluent parameters constituting be performed to verify that they encompass the values specified the bases for the classification have displays for retrieving in the Emergency Classification scheme. [D.1**] facility system and effluent and EAL technical basis

[**D.1 corresponds to NUREG- parameters as specified in the document for the unit.

0654/ FEMA-REP-1 evaluation Emergency Classification and criteria.] EAL technical basis document for the unit, and the displays are functional.

846 C.3.8.01.01.02 1.1 A standard emergency 1.1.2 An analysis of the EAL 1.1.2 The ranges available in classification and emergency technical bases will be the main control room, TSC, action level (EAL) scheme exists, performed to verify as-built, site- and EOF envelop the values for and identifies facility system and specific implementation of the the specific parameters effluent parameters constituting EAL scheme. identified in the EALs in the bases for the classification Emergency Plan, Annex 2 and scheme. [D.1**] 3, Attachment 1.

[**D.1 corresponds to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 evaluation criteria.]

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C.3.8.1.2 Notification Methods and Procedures Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 847 C.3.8.01.02.01 2.1 The means exist to notify 2.1 A test will be performed to 2.1 The State of Florida and the responsible State and local demonstrate the capabilities for counties of Miami-Dade, and organizations within 15 minutes providing initial notification to Monroe received notification after the licensee declares an the offsite authorities after a within 15 minutes after the emergency. [E.1] simulated emergency declaration of an emergency in classification. the main control room and the EOF.

848 C.3.8.01.02.02 2.2 The means exist to notify 2.2 A test of the primary and 2.2 A test of the primary and emergency response personnel. backup emergency response backup ERO notification

[E.2] organization (ERO) notification systems results in:

systems will be performed.

  • ERO personnel received the notification message;
  • Mobilization communication was validated by personnel response to the notification system or by telephone
  • Response to electronic notification and plant page system was demonstrated during normal working hours, and off hours.

849 C.3.8.01.02.03 2.3 The means exists to notify and 2.3 A full test of the alert and 2.3 Notification and clear provide instructions to the notification system and instructions to the public are populace within the plume emergency alert system accomplished in accordance exposure emergency planning capabilities will be conducted. with the emergency plan zone (EPZ). [E.6] requirements.

C-486

C.3.8.1.3 Emergency Communications Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 850 C.3.8.01.03.01 3.1 The means exists for 3.1 A test will be performed 3.1 Communications (both communications between the of the capabilities. The test primary and secondary main control room, TSC, EOF, for the contact with the methods/systems) are principal State and local principal EOCs and the field established among the main emergency operations centers monitoring teams will be from control room and the EOF (EOCs), and field monitoring the main control room and the with the State of Florida teams. [F.1.d] EOF. The TSC Division of Emergency communication with the main Management warning point control room and the EOF and EOC, Miami-Dade will be performed. County warning point and EOC, and Monroe County warning point and EOC.

Communications are established between the main control room and the EOF with the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (PTN) field monitoring teams.

851 C.3.8.01.03.02 3.2 The means exists for 3.2 A test is performed of the 3.2 Communications are communications from the main capabilities to communicate established from the main control room, TSC and EOF to using the emergency control room, TSC and EOF the Nuclear Regulatory notification system from the to the NRC headquarters and Commission (NRC) main control room, TSC and regional office EOCs using headquarters and regional EOF to the NRC headquarters the emergency notification office EOCs (including and regional office EOCs. system. The TSC and EOF establishment of the The health physics network is demonstrated emergency response data tested to ensure communications with the system (ERDS) or its successor communications between the NRC operations center using system between the onsite TSC and EOF with the NRC the health physics network.

computer system and the NRC operations center. The ERDS The access port for ERDS, or operations center). [F.1.f] is established, or its successor its successor system, is system, between the onsite provided and successfully computer systems and the completes a transfer of data NRC operations center. from the unit to the NRC operations center.

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C.3.8.1.4 Public Education and Information Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 852 C.3.8.01.04.01 4.1 The licensee has provided 4.1 An inspection of the 4.1 The ENC includes space that may be used for a facility/area provided for the equipment to support the ENC limited number of news media. news media will be performed operations, including

[G.3.b] in the emergency news center communications with the EOF (ENC). The space provides and State and county EOCs.

adequate equipment to support Designated space is available the ENC operation, including for news media briefings.

communications with the site and with the EOCs in the State and counties as well as a limited number of news media.

C.3.8.1.5 Emergency Facilities and Equipment Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 853 C.3.8.01.05.01.01 5.1 The licensee has 5.1 An inspection of the TSC 5.1.1 The TSC has at least established a TSC and onsite and OSC will be performed, 3,000 square feet of floor operations support center including a test of their space consistent with (OSC). [H.1] capabilities. NUREG-0696 (75 square feet/person) and is large enough for required systems, equipment, records and storage.

854 C.3.8.01.05.01.02 5.1 The licensee has 5.1 An inspection of the TSC 5.1.2 The TSC is located established a TSC and onsite and OSC will be performed, outside the Protected Area, operations support center including a test of their and procedures are in place to (OSC). [H.1] capabilities. enhance passage through security checkpoints expeditiously.

855 C.3.8.01.05.01.03 5.1 The licensee has 5.1 An inspection of the TSC 5.1.3 Communications established a TSC and onsite and OSC will be performed, equipment is installed and operations support center including a test of their voice transmission and (OSC). [H.1] capabilities. reception are accomplished between the main control room, the OSC, and EOF.

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Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 856 C.3.8.01.05.01.04 5.1 The licensee has 5.1 An inspection of the TSC 5.1.4 The TSC ventilation established a TSC and onsite and OSC will be performed, system includes a high-operations support center including a test of their efficiency particulate air (OSC). [H.1] capabilities. (HEPA), and charcoal filter and radiation monitors are installed. Controls and displays exist in the TSC to control and monitor the status of the TSC ventilation system including heating and cooling, and the activation of the HEPA and charcoal filter system upon detection of high radiation in the TSC.

857 C.3.8.01.05.01.05 5.1 The licensee has 5.1 An inspection of the TSC 5.1.5 The TSC has the means established a TSC and onsite and OSC will be performed, to receive, store, process, and operations support center including a test of their display plant and (OSC). [H.1] capabilities. environmental information, as listed in design control document (DCD) Table 7.5-1 and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Table 7.5-201, and to initiate emergency measures and conduct emergency assessment.

858 C.3.8.01.05.01.06 5.1 The licensee has 5.1 An inspection of the TSC 5.1.6 A reliable and backup established a TSC and onsite and OSC will be performed, electrical power supply is operations support center including a test of their available for the TSC.

(OSC). [H.1] capabilities.

859 C.3.8.01.05.01.07 5.1 The licensee has 5.1 An inspection of the TSC 5.1.7 There is an OSC located established a TSC and onsite and OSC will be performed, inside the Protected Area. It operations support center including a test of their is separate from the main (OSC). [H.1] capabilities. control room.

860 C.3.8.01.05.01.08 5.1 The licensee has 5.1 An inspection of the TSC 5.1.8 Communications established a TSC and onsite and OSC will be performed, equipment is installed, and operations support center including a test of their voice transmission and (OSC). [H.1] capabilities. reception are accomplished between the OSC and OSC teams, the TSC and the main control room.

C-489

Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 861 C.3.8.01.05.02.01 5.2 The licensee has 5.2 An inspection of the EOF 5.2.1 The EOF working space established an EOF. [H.2] will be performed, including is a minimum of 5625 square a test of the capabilities. feet consistent with NUREG-0696 (75 square feet/person) and is large enough for required systems, equipment, records, and storage.

862 C.3.8.01.05.02.02 5.2 The licensee has 5.2 An inspection of the EOF 5.2.2 Communications established an EOF. [H.2] will be performed, including equipment is installed, and a test of the capabilities. voice transmission and reception are accomplished between the main control room, TSC, EOF, field monitoring teams, NRC, State and county agencies, and ENC.

863 C.3.8.01.05.02.03 5.2 The licensee has 5.2 An inspection of the EOF 5.2.3 Radiological data established an EOF. [H.2] will be performed, including identified in each Plan Annex, a test of the capabilities. meteorological data, and plant system data pertinent to determining offsite protective measures as listed in DCD Table 7.5-1 and FSAR Table 7.5-201 are available and displayed in the EOF, when activated.

C.3.8.1.6 Accident Assessment Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 864 C.3.8.01.06.01 6.1 The means exist to provide 6.1 A test will be performed to 6.1 The means are available to initial and continuing demonstrate that the means provide initial and radiological assessment exist to provide initial and continuing radiological throughout the course of an continuing radiological assessment through displays accident. [I.2] assessment throughout the of instrumentation indicators course of an accident through in the main control room, the plant computer or TSC and EOF during the communications with the main course of drills and/or control room, TSC, and EOF exercises.

during the course of drills and/or exercises.

C-490

Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 865 C.3.8.01.06.02 6.2 The means exist to 6.2 A test will be performed to 6.2 Emergency plan determine the source term of demonstrate that the means implementing procedures releases of radioactive material exist to determine the source (EPIPs), through use in within plant systems, and the term of releases of radioactive training and drills, provide magnitude of the release of material within plant systems, direction to accurately radioactive materials based on and the magnitude of the calculate the source terms and plant system parameters and release of radioactive materials the magnitude of the release of effluent monitors. [I.3] based on plant system postulated accident scenario parameters and effluent releases.

monitors.

866 C.3.8.01.06.03 6.3 The means exist to 6.3 A test will be performed to 6.3 Demonstrate that the continuously assess the impact provide evidence that the means exist to continuously of the release of radioactive impact of a radiological release assess the impact of the release materials to the environment, to the environment is able to be of radioactive materials to the accounting for the relationship assessed by using the environment, accounting for between effluent monitor relationship between effluent the relationship between readings, and onsite and offsite monitor readings, and onsite effluent monitor readings, and exposures and contamination for and offsite exposures and onsite and offsite exposures various meteorological contamination for various and contamination for various conditions. [I.4] meteorological conditions. meteorological conditions under drill conditions.

867 C.3.8.01.06.04 6.4 The means exist to acquire 6.4 A test will be performed to 6.4 Meteorological data exists and evaluate meteorological acquire and evaluate at the EOF, TSC, main control information. [I.5] meteorological data/ room, offsite NRC operations information. center, and the State of Florida, and that this data is in the format needed for the appropriate EPIPs.

868 C.3.8.01.06.05 6.5 The means exist to 6.5 A test will be performed of 6.5 The release rate and determine the release rate and the capabilities to determine the projected doses can be projected doses if the release rate and projected doses determined with off-scale or instrumentation used for if the instrumentation used for inoperable instrumentation assessment is off-scale or assessment is off-scale or during training or a drill.

inoperable. [I.6] inoperable.

869 C.3.8.01.06.06 6.6 The means exist for field 6.6 A test will be performed of 6.6 The field monitoring teams monitoring within the plume the capabilities for field were dispatched and exposure EPZ. [I.7] monitoring within the plume demonstrated ability to locate exposure EPZ. and monitor a radiological release within the plume exposure EPZ.

870 C.3.8.01.06.07 6.7 The means exist to make 6.7 A test will be performed of 6.7 The field monitoring teams rapid assessments of actual or the capabilities to make rapid were activated. They potential magnitude and assessments of actual or demonstrate an ability to make locations of radiological hazards potential magnitude and rapid assessment of actual or C-491

Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria through liquid or gaseous release locations of radiological potential magnitude and pathways, including activation, hazards through liquid or locations of any radiological notification means, field team gaseous release pathways, hazards through simulated composition, transportation, including activation, liquid or gaseous release communication, monitoring notification means, field team pathways. A qualified field equipment, and estimated composition, transportation, monitoring team was notified, deployment times. [I.8] communication, monitoring activated, briefed, and equipment, and estimated dispatched from the EOF deployment times. during a radiological release scenario. The team demonstrated the procedural guidance in team composition, use of monitoring equipment, communication from the field, and locating specific sampling locations.

871 C.3.8.01.06.08 6.8 The capability exists to 6.8 A test will be performed of 6.8 A field monitoring team detect and measure radioiodine the capabilities to detect and was dispatched during a concentrations in air in the measure radioiodine radiological release scenario plume exposure EPZ, as low as concentrations in air in the and demonstrated the use of 10-7 µCi/cc (microcuries per plume exposure EPZ, as low as sampling and detection cubic centimeter) under field 10-7 µCi/cc under field equipment for air conditions. [I.9] conditions. concentrations in the plume exposure EPZ, as low as 10-7

µCi/cc.

872 C.3.8.01.06.09 6.9 The means exist to estimate 6.9 A test will be performed of 6.9 The means are available to integrated dose from the the capabilities to estimate estimate integrated dose from projected and actual dose rates, integrated dose from the the dose assessment program and for comparing these projected and actual dose rates, and the field monitoring team estimates with the and for comparing these reading during a radioactive Environmental Protection estimates with the EPA release scenario. The results Agency (EPA) protective action protective action guides. were compared with the EPA guides. [I.10] protective action guides.

C-492

C.3.8.1.7 Protective Response Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 873 C.3.8.01.07.01 7.1 The means exist to warn and 7.1 A test will be performed of 7.1 Means exist to advise onsite individuals of an the capabilities to warn and successfully warn and advise emergency, including those in areas advise onsite individuals of an onsite individuals including:

controlled by the operator, including: emergency, including those in

[J.1] the Owner-Controlled Area, and

  • nonessential employees the immediate vicinity.
  • employees not having emergency
  • visitors assignments
  • contractor and construction
  • visitors personnel
  • contractor and construction personnel
  • other personnel within the Owner-Controlled Area, and
  • other persons who may be in the the immediate vicinity.

public access areas, on or passing through the site, or within the Owner-Controlled Area.

C-493

C.3.8.1.8 Exercises and Drills Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 874 C.3.8.01.08.01. 8.1 Licensee conducts a full 8.1 A full participation exercise 8.1.1 The exercise is 01 participation exercise to evaluate (test) will be conducted within completed within the specified major portions of emergency response the specified time periods of time periods of 10 CFR Part capabilities, which includes Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

50, Appendix E; onsite participation by the State and local agency within the plume exposure exercise objectives listed EPZ, and the State within the below have been met, and ingestion control EPZ. [N.1] there are no uncorrected onsite exercise deficiencies.

A. Accident Assessment and Classification

1. Demonstrate the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine emergency action level (EAL) parameters, and correctly classify the emergency throughout the exercise.

Standard Criteria:

a. Determine the correct highest emergency classification level based on events which were in progress, considering past events and their impact on the current conditions, within 15 minutes from the time the initiating condition(s) or EAL is identified.

B. Notifications

1. Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize site emergency response personnel.

Standard Criteria:

a. Complete the designated checklist and perform the C-494

Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria announcement concerning the initial event classification of Alert or higher.

b. Activate the emergency recall system within 5 minutes of the initial event classification for an Alert or higher.
2. Demonstrate the ability to notify responsible State and local government agencies within 15 minutes and the NRC within 60 minutes after declaring an emergency.

Standard Criteria:

a. Transmit information using the designated checklist in accordance with approved EPIPs within 15 minutes of event classification.
b. Transmit information using the designated checklist in accordance with approved EPIPs within 60 minutes of last transmittal for a follow-up notification to State and local authorities.
c. Transmit information using designated checklist within 60 minutes of event classification for an initial notification of the NRC.
3. Demonstrate the ability to warn or advise onsite individuals of emergency conditions.

Standard Criteria:

a. Initiate notification of onsite individuals (via plant C-495

Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria page or telephone) using designated checklist.

4. Demonstrate the capability of the Alert and Notification System (ANS) for the public, to operate properly when required.

Standard Criteria:

a. 94 percent of the sirens operate properly as indicated by the siren feedback system.

C. Emergency Response

1. Demonstrate the capability to direct and control emergency operations.

Standard Criteria:

a. Command and control is demonstrated by the main control room in the early phase of the emergency and by the TSC within 60 minutes from notification of an Alert or higher event classification with at least minimum staffing.
2. Demonstrate the ability to transfer emergency direction from the main control room (simulator) to the TSC.

Standard Criteria:

a. Evaluation of briefings that were conducted prior to turnover responsibility.

Personnel document transfer of duties.

3. Demonstrate the ability to prepare for 24-hour staffing requirements.

C-496

Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Standard Criteria:

a. Complete 24-hour staff assignments.
4. Demonstrate the ability to perform assembly and accountability for all personnel in the Protected Area within 30 minutes of an emergency requiring Protected Area assembly and accountability.

Standard Criteria:

a. Protected Area personnel assembly and accountability completed within 30 minutes of an emergency requiring Protected Area assembly and accountability.

D. Emergency Response Facilities

1. Demonstrate activation of the OSC and the TSC and EOF within 60 minutes of event classification with at least minimum staffing.

Standard Criteria:

a. The TSC and OSC are activated within 60 minutes from notification of an Alert or higher event classification with at least minimum staffing.
b. The EOF is activated within 60 minutes from notification of a Site Area Emergency or higher event classification with at least minimum staffing.
2. Demonstrate the adequacy of equipment, security C-497

Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria provisions, and habitability precautions for the TSC, OSC, EOF and ENC, as appropriate.

Standard Criteria:

a. Evaluation of the adequacy of the emergency equipment in the emergency response facilities including availability and general consistency with the EPIPs.
b. The security manager implements and follows applicable EPIPs.
c. The radiation protection manager (TSC) implements the designated checklist if an onsite/offsite release has occurred.
d. Demonstrate the capability of TSC and EOF equipment and data displays to clearly identify and reflect the affected unit.
3. Demonstrate the adequacy of communications for all emergency support resources.

Standard Criteria:

a. Emergency response communications listed in the EPIPs are available and operational.
b. Communications systems are tested in accordance with the TSC, OSC, EOF and ENC activation checklists.
c. Emergency response facility personnel are able to operate all specified communications systems.

C-498

Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

d. Clear primary and backup communications links are established and maintained for the duration of the exercise.

E. Radiological Assessment and Control

1. Demonstrate the ability to obtain onsite radiological surveys and samples.

Standard Criteria:

a. Radiation Protection Technicians demonstrate the ability to obtain appropriate instruments (range and type) and perform surveys.
b. Airborne samples are taken when the conditions indicate the need for the information.
2. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency workers.

Standard Criteria:

a. Emergency workers are issued self-reading dosimeters when radiation levels require, and exposures are controlled to 10 CFR Part 20 limits (unless the emergency coordinator authorizes emergency limits for onsite ERO personnel and the emergency offsite manager authorizes emergency exposures for offsite ERO personnel).
b. Exposure records are available either from the Site database or a hard copy dose report.

C-499

Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

c. Emergency workers include Security and personnel within all emergency facilities.
3. Demonstrate the ability to assemble and dispatch field monitoring teams within 60 minutes from the decision to do so.

Standard Criteria:

a. One field monitoring team is ready to be deployed within 60 minutes of being requested and no later than 90 minutes from the declaration of an Alert or higher.
4. Demonstrate the ability to satisfactorily collect and disseminate field team data.

Standard Criteria:

a. Field team data to be collected is dose rate or counts per minute (cpm) from the plume, both open and closed window, and air sample (gross/net cpm) for particulate and iodine, if applicable.
b. Radiological data is satisfactorily disseminated from the field team to the dose assessment coordinator.
5. Demonstrate the ability to develop dose projections.

Standard Criteria:

a. The on-shift Chemistry Technician performs timely and accurate dose projections, in accordance with the EPIPs.
6. Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate Protective C-500

Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Action Recommendations (PARs), and notify appropriate authorities within 15 minutes of a General Emergency declaration or changes in parameters that affect the previously issued PARs.

Standard Criteria:

a. Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) and Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) dose projections from the dose assessment computer code or a backup method are established in accordance with the EPIPs.
b. PARs are developed within 15 minutes of data availability.
c. PARs are transmitted via voice, fax, or electronically within 15 minutes as required by the EPIPs.

875 C.3.8.01.08.01. 8.1 Licensee conducts a full 8.1 A full participation exercise 8.1.2 Onsite emergency 02 participation exercise to evaluate (test) will be conducted within response personnel were major portions of emergency response the specified time periods of mobilized in sufficient capabilities, which includes Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. numbers to fill emergency participation by the State and local response positions identified agency within the plume exposure in the Radiological EPZ, and the State within the Emergency Plan, Part 2, ingestion control EPZ. [N.1] Section B, Emergency Response Organization, and they successfully performed their assigned responsibilities.

C-501

Table C.3.8-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 876 C.3.8.01.08.01. 8.1 Licensee conducts a full 8.1 A full participation exercise 8.1.3 The exercise was 03 participation exercise to evaluate (test) will be conducted within completed within the specified major portions of emergency response the specified time periods of time periods of Appendix E to capabilities, which includes Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. 10 CFR Part 50, offsite participation by the State and local exercise objectives were met, agency within the plume exposure and there were no uncorrected EPZ, and the State within the offsite exercise deficiencies, ingestion control EPZ. [N.1] or a license condition requires offsite deficiencies to be corrected prior to operation above 5 percent of rated power.

C.3.8.1.9 Implementing Procedures Table C.3.8-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 877 C.3.8.01.09.01 9.1 The licensee has submitted 9.1 Confirm that the submittal 9.1 The date of the submittal detailed implementing procedures letter was submitted on time. letter from the licensee for its emergency plan no less demonstrates that the detailed than 180 days prior to fuel load. EPIPs for the onsite emergency plan were submitted no less than 180 days prior to fuel load.

C-502

C.3.8.2 Pipe Rupture Hazard Analysis Table C.3.8-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 878 C.3.8.02.01 1. Systems, structures, and components Inspection of the as-designed An as-designed pipe rupture (SSCs), that are required to be pipe rupture hazard analysis hazard analysis report exists functional during and following a report will be conducted. The and concludes that the design basis event shall be protected report documents the analyses to analysis performed for high against or qualified to withstand the determine where protection and moderate energy piping dynamic and environmental effects features are necessary to confirms the protection of associated with analyses of postulated mitigate the consequence of a systems, structures, and failures in high and moderate energy pipe break. Pipe break events components required to be piping. involving high-energy fluid functional during and systems are analyzed for the following a design basis effects of pipe whip, jet event.

impingement, flooding, room pressurization, and temperature effects. Pipe break events involving moderate-energy fluid systems are analyzed for wetting from spray, flooding, and other environmental effects, as appropriate.

C-503

C.3.8.3 Piping Design Table C.3.8-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 879 C.3.8.03.01 1. The ASME Code Section III piping Inspection of ASME Code ASME Code Design Report(s) is designed in accordance with ASME Design Reports (NCA- 3550) (NCA-3550) (certified, when Code Section III requirements. and required documents will be required by ASME Code) conducted for the set of lines exist and conclude that the chosen to demonstrate design of the piping for lines compliance. chosen to demonstrate all aspects of the piping design complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

C-504

C.3.8.4 Waterproof Membrane Table C.3.8-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 880 C.3.8.04.01 1. The friction coefficient to resist Testing will be performed to A report exists and documents sliding is 0.55. confirm that the mudmat- that the as-built waterproof waterproofing-mudmat interface system (mudmat-beneath the Nuclear Island waterproofing-mudmat basemat has a coefficient of interface) has a coefficient of friction to resist sliding friction of 0.55 as of 0.55. demonstrated through material qualification testing.

C.3.8.5 Concrete Fill Table C.3.8-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 881 C.3.8.05.01 1. First lift of concrete fill placed under Delivery tickets will be prepared The first lift of concrete fill the nuclear island basemat, containment according to ACI 311.5 and (minimum thickness of 2.5 building, shield building, and auxiliary inspected to ensure that the first feet) meets durability building meets durability requirements lift of concrete fill (minimum requirements of ACI 201.2R-of ACI 201.2R-08, Table 6.3 for Class thickness of 2.5 feet) meets 08, Table 6.3 for Class 2 2 sulfate exposure. durability requirements of ACI sulfate exposure.

201.2R-08, Table 6.3 for Class 2 sulfate exposure.

882 C.3.8.05.02a 2. Concrete fill placed under the (a) Testing will be performed in (a) The mean 28-day nuclear island basemat, containment accordance with ACI 311.5 to compressive strength of the building, shield building, and auxiliary determine the mean compressive concrete fill is equal to or building is designed, constructed, and strength of the concrete fill. greater than 1500 psi.

tested as specified in ACI 207.1R-05.

883 C.3.8.05.02b 2. Concrete fill placed under the (b) Inspection will be performed (b) Methods used to control nuclear island basemat, containment to ensure that methods used to thermal cracking are in building, shield building, and auxiliary control thermal cracking are in accordance with ACI 207.1R-building is designed, constructed, and accordance with ACI 207.1R-05. 05.

tested as specified in ACI 207.1R-05.

C-505

C.3.8.6 Seismic Category I Structure Foundation Grouting (i)

Table C.3.8-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 884 C.3.8.06.01.i 1. Inside the region defined by the i) Testing and analysis will be i) The grout closure criteria, diaphragm walls, drilling and pressure performed through a grout test when used in conjunction with grouting is performed. The grout program to define grout closure the specified borehole closure criteria, when used in criteria for both the Grouted spacing, will ensure that any conjunction with the specified grout Zone and Extended Grouted voids remaining in the borehole spacing: Zone, as follows: Grouted Zone are structurally insignificant and ensure that

  • Will result in any remaining voids
  • For both the Grouted Zone and any voids remaining in the between El. -35 +/- 2 feet and El. -60 Extended Grouted Zone, the Extended Grouted Zone are

+/- 2 feet (the Grouted Zone) being grout test program will equal to or less than 20 feet.

structurally insignificant, which is identify and define grout accomplished through drilling and closure criteria for grout pressure grouting of primary and consistency to ensure the grout secondary grout boreholes, and, if flows into and fills potential necessary, as indicated by site data, voids in the vicinity of each tertiary and quaternary grout grout borehole, and boreholes; and

  • For the Grouted Zone, the
  • Will result in any remaining voids grout test program will between El. -60 +/- 2 feet and El. -110 identify and define grout

+/- 2 feet (the Extended Grouted Zone) closure criteria for identifying having a maximum equivalent when each grout borehole has spherical diameter of equal to or less been filled and pressurized than 20 feet, which is accomplished with grout and filling may through drilling and pressure cease or tertiary or quaternary grouting of primary grout boreholes grout boreholes are necessary, and, if necessary, as indicated by site and data, secondary grout boreholes.

  • For the Extended Grouted Zone, the grout test program will identify and define grout closure criteria for identifying when each grout borehole has been filled and pressurized with grout and filling may cease or secondary grout boreholes are necessary.

C-506

Table C.3.8-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 885 C.3.8.06.01.ii 1. Inside the region defined by the ii) Inspections and analysis will ii) Grout closure criteria as diaphragm walls, drilling and pressure be performed of the as-built established in the grout test grouting is performed. The grout locations, depth and spacing of program are met inside the closure criteria, when used in all grout boreholes, both with region defined by the conjunction with the specified grout respect to the Grouted Zone and diaphragm walls and the grout borehole spacing: the Extended Grouted Zone, and boreholes meet the following the grout data associated with requirements:

  • Will result in any remaining voids each grout borehole and zone.

between El. -35 +/- 2 feet and El. -60 +/- 2

  • For the Grouted and feet (the Grouted Zone) being Extended Grouted Zones, structurally insignificant, which is primary grout boreholes are accomplished through drilling and drilled throughout the entire pressure grouting of primary and interior region defined by the secondary grout boreholes, and, if diaphragm walls and with necessary, as indicated by site data, spacing of less than or equal tertiary and quaternary grout boreholes; to 20 feet on center at the and ground surface,
  • Will result in any remaining voids
  • For the Grouted Zone, between El. -60 +/- 2 feet and El. -110 +/- secondary grout boreholes are 2 feet (the Extended Grouted Zone) drilled throughout the entire having a maximum equivalent spherical interior region defined by the diameter of equal to or less than 20 feet, diaphragm walls and are offset which is accomplished through drilling from primary grout boreholes and pressure grouting of primary grout such that a secondary grout boreholes and, if necessary, as indicated borehole is at the center of the by site data, secondary grout boreholes. square formed by four adjacent primary grout boreholes at the ground surface, and
  • Each additional grout borehole (tertiary or quaternary) drilled to meet grout closure criteria for the Grouted Zone is located based on a documented engineering evaluation consistent with the grout closure criteria
  • Each additional grout borehole (secondary) drilled to meet grout closure criteria for the Extended Grouted Zone is located based on a documented engineering evaluation consistent with the grout closure criteria.

(i) All elevations are presented in the North American Vertical Datum of 1988 (NAVD88).

C-507

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