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{{#Wiki_filter:10/07/2015 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report P~PanelPart 21 (PAR)Event# 51458Rep Org: DRESDEN Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06 (EDT)Supplier:
{{#Wiki_filter:10/07/2015 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report P~Panel Part 21 (PAR)Event# 51458 Rep Org: DRESDEN Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06 (EDT)Supplier:
GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00 (CDT)Last Modification:
GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00 (CDT)Last Modification:
10/06/20 15Region: 3 Docket #:City: MORRIS Agreement State: YesCounty: License #:State: ILNRC Notified by: AARON THOMPSON Notifications:
10/06/20 15 Region: 3 Docket #: City: MORRIS Agreement State: Yes County: License #: State: IL NRC Notified by: AARON THOMPSON Notifications:
ANN MARIE STONE R3DOHQ Ops Officer:
ANN MARIE STONE R3DO HQ Ops Officer: JEFF HERRERA PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i)
JEFF HERRERA PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAILEmergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:21.21(d)(3)(i)
DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH"Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3."The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring."Identification of Facility and Component:
DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH"Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General ElectricHitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. Ithas been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station],
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001"Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
Units 2 and 3."The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of thefailure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factorswere discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant ofthese factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which preventproper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changedlever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in thetension spring."Identification of Facility and Component:
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 "Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function"Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could resultin a loss of safety function.
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station." Part 21  
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System(RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function"Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station."
Part 21  


==Reference:==
==Reference:==


EN #51386 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
EN #51386 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)
NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)
OPERATIONS CENTERREACTOR PLANTEVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN # 51458NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY -301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469",
OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN # 51458 NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY -301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469", BACKUPS -[j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*301-415-0550 and [3 rd 301-415-0553  
BACKUPS -[j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*301-415-0550 and [3rd 301-415-0553  
*'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #2206 EDT Dresden 2/3 Aaron Thompson (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 97% ModelI -Unit 2 97% ModelI -Unit 2 1200 CDT 10/05/2015 100% Model1 -Unit 3 100% ModelI -Unit 3 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1)
*'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #2206 EDT Dresden 2/3 Aaron Thompson (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER97% ModelI -Unit 2 97% ModelI -Unit 21200 CDT 10/05/2015 100% Model1 -Unit 3 100% ModelI -Unit 3EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1)
EJ (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA-] GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC [] TS Deviation ADEV El (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB-] SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2)
EJ (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA-] GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC  
L] j(v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC-1 ALERT ALE/AAEC [1 (i) TS Required S/D ASHU El (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND-I UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC 17) (iv)IA) ECCS Dischargle to RCS ACCS [] (xii) Offsite Medical AMED-I 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns) [] (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS El (xiii) Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp ACOM-1 PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD l[j (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)"J MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)  
[] TS Deviation ADEV El (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB-] SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2)
L] j(v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC-1 ALERT ALE/AAEC  
[1 (i) TS Required S/D ASHU El (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND-I UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC  
: 17) (iv)IA) ECCS Dischargle to RCS ACCS [] (xii) Offsite Medical AMED-I 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns)  
[] (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS El (xiii) Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp ACOM-1 PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD l[j (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)
"J MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)  
[]l Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV-I FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT EIJ (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)
[]l Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV-I FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT EIJ (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)
SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (see last column) 17) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA [] 101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect NONR7) INFORMATION ONLY NNF [] (iv)IA) Specified System Actuation ASEF 0] NONRDESCRIPTION Include:
SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (see last column) 17) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA [] 101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect NONR 7) INFORMATION ONLY NNF [] (iv)IA) Specified System Actuation ASEF 0] NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH"This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH)notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.Identification of Facility and Component:
Systems affected, actuations and their initiating  
: signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH"This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.
Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH)notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of thecutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered whichcould have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in leverarm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Designchanges to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.Identification of Facility and Component:
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier:
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier:
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safetyfunction.
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief FunctionNOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR L._.i YES (Explain above) I x NONRC Resident x _______NOT UNDERSTOOD?
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR L._.i YES (Explain above) I x NO NRC Resident x _______NOT UNDERSTOOD?
State~s)
State~s) ___ X _____DID ALL SYSTEMS L x YES I I. NO (Explain above)Local ___ X _____FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?Other Gov Agencies ___ X MODE OF OPERATION FSTIMATFD IADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK Media/Press Release x UNTIL CORRECTED:
___ X _____DID ALL SYSTEMS L x YES I I. NO (Explain above)Local ___ X _____FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?
Mode I {Mv/D/)NATE IYs WN NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)
Other Gov Agencies
REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)
___ X MODE OF OPERATION FSTIMATFD IADDITIONAL INFO ON BACKMedia/Press Release x UNTIL CORRECTED:
Mode I {Mv/D/)NATE IYs WNNRC FORM 361 (12-2000)
PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 361(12-2000)
REACTOR PLANTEVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS Dri: ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I ;f;,. rlTallvha a; Ieh~i,. l~lk...I.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS Dri: ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I ;f;,. rlTallvha a; Ieh~i,. l~lk...I.
k~ p~u ir ;n aun lerrtrRelease Rate (Cilsec)  
k~ p~u ir ;n aun lerrtr Release Rate (Cilsec) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Total Activity (Ci) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Noble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 Ci Iodine ' "10 ijCilsec 0.01 Ci Particulate 1 pCi/sec 1_____ mCi Liquid (excluding tritium 10 giCi/min 0.1 Ci& dissolved noble gas)Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cilmin __________5 Ci Total Activity,______
% T. S. Limit HOO Guide Total Activity (Ci) % T. S. Limit HOO GuideNoble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 CiIodine ' "10 ijCilsec 0.01 CiParticulate 1 pCi/sec 1_____ mCiLiquid (excluding tritium 10 giCi/min 0.1 Ci& dissolved noble gas)Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cilmin __________5 CiTotal Activity,______
P~.o.o o l ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown Other ALARM SETPOINTS% T. S. LIMIT if a RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the event description)
P~.o.o o l ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown OtherALARM SETPOINTS
LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG #. valve, pipe, etc.)LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY & UNITS PRIMARY /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15 Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation):
% T. S. LIMIT if a RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the eventdescription)
10105/15 Recommended Actions: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on the cutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly."Number and Locations of All Defective Components:
LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG #. valve, pipe, etc.)LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY  
1 -EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory."Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travel exists on the EMRV cutout switch."Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 " The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
& UNITS PRIMARY /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation):
10105/15Recommended Actions:
Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on thecutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly.
"Number and Locations of All Defective Components:
1 -EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory.
"Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travelexists on the EMRV cutout switch."Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden NuclearPower Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 "The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2 PAGE 2 OF 2 10/07/2015 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report P~PanelPart 21 (PAR)Event# 51458Rep Org: DRESDEN Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06 (EDT)Supplier:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2 PAGE 2 OF 2 10/07/2015 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report P~Panel Part 21 (PAR)Event# 51458 Rep Org: DRESDEN Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06 (EDT)Supplier:
GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00 (CDT)Last Modification:
GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00 (CDT)Last Modification:
10/06/20 15Region: 3 Docket #:City: MORRIS Agreement State: YesCounty: License #:State: ILNRC Notified by: AARON THOMPSON Notifications:
10/06/20 15 Region: 3 Docket #: City: MORRIS Agreement State: Yes County: License #: State: IL NRC Notified by: AARON THOMPSON Notifications:
ANN MARIE STONE R3DOHQ Ops Officer:
ANN MARIE STONE R3DO HQ Ops Officer: JEFF HERRERA PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i)
JEFF HERRERA PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAILEmergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:21.21(d)(3)(i)
DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH"Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3."The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring."Identification of Facility and Component:
DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH"Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General ElectricHitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. Ithas been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station],
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001"Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
Units 2 and 3."The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of thefailure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factorswere discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant ofthese factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which preventproper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changedlever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in thetension spring."Identification of Facility and Component:
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 "Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function"Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could resultin a loss of safety function.
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station." Part 21  
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System(RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function"Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station."
Part 21  


==Reference:==
==Reference:==


EN #51386 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
EN #51386 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)
NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)
OPERATIONS CENTERREACTOR PLANTEVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN # 51458NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY -301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469",
OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN # 51458 NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY -301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469", BACKUPS -[j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*301-415-0550 and [3 rd 301-415-0553  
BACKUPS -[j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*301-415-0550 and [3rd 301-415-0553  
*'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #2206 EDT Dresden 2/3 Aaron Thompson (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 97% ModelI -Unit 2 97% ModelI -Unit 2 1200 CDT 10/05/2015 100% Model1 -Unit 3 100% ModelI -Unit 3 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1)
*'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #2206 EDT Dresden 2/3 Aaron Thompson (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER97% ModelI -Unit 2 97% ModelI -Unit 21200 CDT 10/05/2015 100% Model1 -Unit 3 100% ModelI -Unit 3EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1)
EJ (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA-] GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC [] TS Deviation ADEV El (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB-] SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2)
EJ (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA-] GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC  
L] j(v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC-1 ALERT ALE/AAEC [1 (i) TS Required S/D ASHU El (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND-I UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC 17) (iv)IA) ECCS Dischargle to RCS ACCS [] (xii) Offsite Medical AMED-I 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns) [] (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS El (xiii) Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp ACOM-1 PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD l[j (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)"J MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)  
[] TS Deviation ADEV El (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB-] SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2)
L] j(v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC-1 ALERT ALE/AAEC  
[1 (i) TS Required S/D ASHU El (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND-I UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC  
: 17) (iv)IA) ECCS Dischargle to RCS ACCS [] (xii) Offsite Medical AMED-I 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns)  
[] (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS El (xiii) Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp ACOM-1 PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD l[j (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)
"J MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)  
[]l Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV-I FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT EIJ (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)
[]l Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV-I FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT EIJ (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)
SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (see last column) 17) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA [] 101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect NONR7) INFORMATION ONLY NNF [] (iv)IA) Specified System Actuation ASEF 0] NONRDESCRIPTION Include:
SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (see last column) 17) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA [] 101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect NONR 7) INFORMATION ONLY NNF [] (iv)IA) Specified System Actuation ASEF 0] NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH"This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH)notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.Identification of Facility and Component:
Systems affected, actuations and their initiating  
: signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH"This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.
Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH)notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of thecutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered whichcould have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in leverarm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Designchanges to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.Identification of Facility and Component:
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier:
DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier:
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safetyfunction.
Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief FunctionNOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR L._.i YES (Explain above) I x NONRC Resident x _______NOT UNDERSTOOD?
Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR L._.i YES (Explain above) I x NO NRC Resident x _______NOT UNDERSTOOD?
State~s)
State~s) ___ X _____DID ALL SYSTEMS L x YES I I. NO (Explain above)Local ___ X _____FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?Other Gov Agencies ___ X MODE OF OPERATION FSTIMATFD IADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK Media/Press Release x UNTIL CORRECTED:
___ X _____DID ALL SYSTEMS L x YES I I. NO (Explain above)Local ___ X _____FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?
Mode I {Mv/D/)NATE IYs WN NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)
Other Gov Agencies
REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)
___ X MODE OF OPERATION FSTIMATFD IADDITIONAL INFO ON BACKMedia/Press Release x UNTIL CORRECTED:
Mode I {Mv/D/)NATE IYs WNNRC FORM 361 (12-2000)
PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 361(12-2000)
REACTOR PLANTEVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS Dri: ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I ;f;,. rlTallvha a; Ieh~i,. l~lk...I.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS Dri: ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I ;f;,. rlTallvha a; Ieh~i,. l~lk...I.
k~ p~u ir ;n aun lerrtrRelease Rate (Cilsec)  
k~ p~u ir ;n aun lerrtr Release Rate (Cilsec) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Total Activity (Ci) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Noble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 Ci Iodine ' "10 ijCilsec 0.01 Ci Particulate 1 pCi/sec 1_____ mCi Liquid (excluding tritium 10 giCi/min 0.1 Ci& dissolved noble gas)Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cilmin __________5 Ci Total Activity,______
% T. S. Limit HOO Guide Total Activity (Ci) % T. S. Limit HOO GuideNoble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 CiIodine ' "10 ijCilsec 0.01 CiParticulate 1 pCi/sec 1_____ mCiLiquid (excluding tritium 10 giCi/min 0.1 Ci& dissolved noble gas)Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cilmin __________5 CiTotal Activity,______
P~.o.o o l ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown Other ALARM SETPOINTS% T. S. LIMIT if a RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the event description)
P~.o.o o l ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown OtherALARM SETPOINTS
LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG #. valve, pipe, etc.)LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY & UNITS PRIMARY /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15 Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation):
% T. S. LIMIT if a RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the eventdescription)
10105/15 Recommended Actions: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on the cutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly."Number and Locations of All Defective Components:
LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG #. valve, pipe, etc.)LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY  
1 -EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory."Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travel exists on the EMRV cutout switch."Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 " The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
& UNITS PRIMARY /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation):
10105/15Recommended Actions:
Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on thecutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly.
"Number and Locations of All Defective Components:
1 -EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory.
"Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travelexists on the EMRV cutout switch."Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden NuclearPower Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 "The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2 PAGE 2 OF 2}}
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2 PAGE 2 OF 2}}

Revision as of 21:53, 8 July 2018

Part 21 Report - Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) Cutout Switch, Dresden, Units 2 and 3
ML15280A387
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/07/2015
From: Thompson A
Exelon Corp
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML15280A387 (4)
v • d • e


Text

10/07/2015 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report P~Panel Part 21 (PAR)Event# 51458 Rep Org: DRESDEN Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06 (EDT)Supplier:

GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00 (CDT)Last Modification:

10/06/20 15 Region: 3 Docket #: City: MORRIS Agreement State: Yes County: License #: State: IL NRC Notified by: AARON THOMPSON Notifications:

ANN MARIE STONE R3DO HQ Ops Officer: JEFF HERRERA PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i)

DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH"Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3."The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring."Identification of Facility and Component:

DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001"Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):

Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.

Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function"Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station." Part 21

Reference:

EN#51386 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)

OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN 51458 NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY -301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469", BACKUPS -[j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*301-415-0550 and [3 rd 301-415-0553

  • 'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #2206 EDT Dresden 2/3 Aaron Thompson (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 97% ModelI -Unit 2 97% ModelI -Unit 2 1200 CDT 10/05/2015 100% Model1 -Unit 3 100% ModelI -Unit 3 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1)

EJ (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA-] GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC [] TS Deviation ADEV El (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB-] SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2)

L] j(v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC-1 ALERT ALE/AAEC [1 (i) TS Required S/D ASHU El (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND-I UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC 17) (iv)IA) ECCS Dischargle to RCS ACCS [] (xii) Offsite Medical AMED-I 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns) [] (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS El (xiii) Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp ACOM-1 PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD l[j (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)"J MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)

[]l Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV-I FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT EIJ (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)

SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (see last column) 17) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA [] 101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect NONR 7) INFORMATION ONLY NNF [] (iv)IA) Specified System Actuation ASEF 0] NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH"This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH)notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.Identification of Facility and Component:

DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier:

GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):

Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.

Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR L._.i YES (Explain above) I x NO NRC Resident x _______NOT UNDERSTOOD?

State~s) ___ X _____DID ALL SYSTEMS L x YES I I. NO (Explain above)Local ___ X _____FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?Other Gov Agencies ___ X MODE OF OPERATION FSTIMATFD IADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK Media/Press Release x UNTIL CORRECTED:

Mode I {Mv/D/)NATE IYs WN NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)

REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS Dri: ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I ;f;,. rlTallvha a; Ieh~i,. l~lk...I.

k~ p~u ir ;n aun lerrtr Release Rate (Cilsec) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Total Activity (Ci) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Noble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 Ci Iodine ' "10 ijCilsec 0.01 Ci Particulate 1 pCi/sec 1_____ mCi Liquid (excluding tritium 10 giCi/min 0.1 Ci& dissolved noble gas)Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cilmin __________5 Ci Total Activity,______

P~.o.o o l ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown Other ALARM SETPOINTS% T. S. LIMIT if a RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the event description)

LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG #. valve, pipe, etc.)LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY & UNITS PRIMARY /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15 Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation):

10105/15 Recommended Actions: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on the cutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly."Number and Locations of All Defective Components:

1 -EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory."Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travel exists on the EMRV cutout switch."Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 " The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2 PAGE 2 OF 2 10/07/2015 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report P~Panel Part 21 (PAR)Event# 51458 Rep Org: DRESDEN Notification Date!I Time: 10/06/2015 22:06 (EDT)Supplier:

GENERAL ELECTRIC HITACHI Event Date!/ Time: 10/05/2015 12:00 (CDT)Last Modification:

10/06/20 15 Region: 3 Docket #: City: MORRIS Agreement State: Yes County: License #: State: IL NRC Notified by: AARON THOMPSON Notifications:

ANN MARIE STONE R3DO HQ Ops Officer: JEFF HERRERA PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i)

DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE (EMRV) CUTOUT SWITCH"Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 1804 [CDT], General Electric Hitachi (GEH) notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS [Dresden Nuclear Power Station], Units 2 and 3."The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring."Identification of Facility and Component:

DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001"Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):

Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.

Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function"Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station." Part 21

Reference:

EN#51386 10/07/2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)

OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN 51458 NRC Operation Telephone Number: PRIMARY -301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469", BACKUPS -[j1t] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*301-415-0550 and [3 rd 301-415-0553

  • 'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #2206 EDT Dresden 2/3 Aaron Thompson (815)942-0402 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 97% ModelI -Unit 2 97% ModelI -Unit 2 1200 CDT 10/05/2015 100% Model1 -Unit 3 100% ModelI -Unit 3 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(1)

EJ (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA-] GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC [] TS Deviation ADEV El (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB-] SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-emerglency I0CFR50.72(b)(2)

L] j(v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC-1 ALERT ALE/AAEC [1 (i) TS Required S/D ASHU El (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND-I UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC 17) (iv)IA) ECCS Dischargle to RCS ACCS [] (xii) Offsite Medical AMED-I 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns) [] (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS El (xiii) Lost Comm/Asmt/Resp ACOM-1 PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD l[j (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-DAY Optionall0CFRE0.73(a)(1)"J MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)

[]l Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV-I FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT EIJ (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)

SOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (see last column) 17) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA [] 101CFR21.21 (d) 3)(i) Defect NONR 7) INFORMATION ONLY NNF [] (iv)IA) Specified System Actuation ASEF 0] NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)PART 21 REPORT -ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCH"This is a non-emergency notification from Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) required Under 10 CFR Part 21 concerning the design of Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) actuators Cutout Switches.Following the return of the actuator that failed bench testing to GEH, on 6/12/15 at 18:04, General Electric Hitachi (GEH)notified Dresden Station of a potential parts quality Potential Failure of the EMRV Cutout Switch. It has been determined the notification is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3.The GEH investigation concluded that the EMRV actuator assemblies failed to change state because of the failure of the cutout switch to fully close and provide the appropriate current path. Multiple contributing factors were discovered which could have led to the presence of the gaps in the cutout switch. The most significant of these factors is a change in lever arm positioning causing increased forces in the tension spring which prevent proper closure of the cutout switch. Design changes to reduce wear caused by vibration on the actuators changed lever arm position and also allowed for additional dimensional tolerance which tended to increase force in the tension spring.Identification of Facility and Component:

DNPS / EMRV Actuator, GEH Part Number 352B2632G001 Identification of Component Manufacturer and/or Supplier:

GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy.Nature of Defect: Cutout switch fails to close.Safety Significance (e.g., substantial hazard that is or could be created):

Identified condition is a Potential Substantial Safety Hazard since it could cause affected EMRVs to fail to operate as designed, which could result in a loss of safety function.

Potential to affect the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR), Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Set Relief Function NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHIING UNUSUAL OR L._.i YES (Explain above) I x NO NRC Resident x _______NOT UNDERSTOOD?

State~s) ___ X _____DID ALL SYSTEMS L x YES I I. NO (Explain above)Local ___ X _____FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?Other Gov Agencies ___ X MODE OF OPERATION FSTIMATFD IADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK Media/Press Release x UNTIL CORRECTED:

Mode I {Mv/D/)NATE IYs WN NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)

REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (CONTINUED)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONS Dri: ri 11.1i ADDI IIADE Ir ITrIZD I ;f;,. rlTallvha a; Ieh~i,. l~lk...I.

k~ p~u ir ;n aun lerrtr Release Rate (Cilsec) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Total Activity (Ci) % T. S. Limit HOO Guide Noble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 Ci Iodine ' "10 ijCilsec 0.01 Ci Particulate 1 pCi/sec 1_____ mCi Liquid (excluding tritium 10 giCi/min 0.1 Ci& dissolved noble gas)Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cilmin __________5 Ci Total Activity,______

P~.o.o o l ansa, cnen ,r ,je~olains e~mneflsoBowdown Other ALARM SETPOINTS% T. S. LIMIT if a RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific details/explanations should be covered in the event description)

LOCATION OF LEAK (e.g., SG #. valve, pipe, etc.)LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY & UNITS PRIMARY /SECONDARY LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued from front)Date of Discovery of Initial Condition (taken from the IR): 06/12/15 Date of Discovery of the Substantial Safety Hazard (date of approval of the technical evaluation):

10105/15 Recommended Actions: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that proper over travel exists on the cutout switch and that the associated EMRV actuates properly."Number and Locations of All Defective Components:

1 -EMRV Unit 5 (SN 15433-5) was in Inventory."Any Advice Related to the Defect: Perform inspection at the next available opportunity to verify that positive over travel exists on the EMRV cutout switch."Contacts (Name, Title, Location, Phone Number, etc): Daniel Sipple, Sr Staff I&C Design Engineer, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, daniel .sippletexeloncorp.com, (815) 416-3631 " The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Plants with similar GEH cutout switches:

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station.NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)PAE2O2 PAGE 2 OF 2

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