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{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:Enclosure toNhiP2L1448NXNEMILEPOPtT-UVlT2SAFETYEVALUATION SYREPORT1993DocketNo.50-410LicenseNo.NPF-6993110400hS 931029PDRADOCK05000410K"PDR | ||
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage1of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-015,Rev.0&1Mod.PN2Y88MX194 Sections1.2,8.3,9.2,9.4,9.5,9A.3,12.3SystemsTitleofChange:Description ofchange:VariousCafeteria BuildingThismodification constructed atwo-story, steel-framed (approximately 7,500sq.ft.)cafeteria buildingwithitsownfoundation andstructural elementsadjacenttothewestwalloftheturbinebuildingbetweentheexisting-chillwaterbuildingandthefoamroom.Powerfeedforthenewcafeteria panel2NJS-PNL302 wasfromloadcenter2NJS-US3, locatedintheturbinebuildingatelevation 277'.Toenableconstruction ofthecafeteria anditsfoundation, modifications toexistingplantstructures andcomponents werenecessary intheyardarea,foamroom,I&Cshop,passageway, turbinebuilding, andthechillwaterbuilding. | |||
Affectedsystemsincludedfireprotection water,domesticwater,HVAC,andlighting. | |||
The6-inchblockwallontheeastendofthecafeteria building(sidefacingtheUnit2turbinebuilding) wasfilledwithconcrete, therebyproviding radiation protection fromgammaradiation resulting fromhydrogeninjection. | |||
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification resulted.intheadditionofanonsafety-related structure. | |||
Evaluations wereperformed todetermine potential effectsonsafety-related systemsandstructures, ALARAconcerns, fireprotection, thesitefloodanalysis, andelectrical powersupply.Theevaluations concluded thattherewerenoadverseeffectsresulting fromthismodification. | |||
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. | |||
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage2of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!SystemsTitleofChange!90-039Mod.PN2Y89MX083 Section3.7ASeismicMonitoring Permanent Relocation ofAccelerographs 2ERS-PAC2C andPAC2BDescription ofChangesThismodification relocated seismicmonitor2ERS-PAC2C fromtherecirculation pumpmotortothereactorpedestal. | |||
Thismodification alsorelocated seismicmonitor2ERS-PAC2B toalocationonthesameCSHlinebutclosertotheCSHpenetration attheprimarycontainment wall.Xthadbeendetermined thatboth-units failed,inpart,duetohighbackground vibration. | |||
Bothofthenewlocations wereselectedbasedonanticipated lowbackground vibration. | |||
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification established anewlocationforatriaxialpeakaccelerograph tomaintaincompliance toRegulatory Guide1.12andenabledtheinstrument toaccurately monitorseismicactivity. | |||
Therelocation ofthisinstrument willnotaffecttheoperation ofanysafetysystemsorthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Theplacement oftheaccelerograph onthereactorpedestaldoesnotconflictwiththeoriginaldesignintent.Thenewinstrument requirescalibration inaccordance withthemanufacturer's recommendations. | |||
Thenewlocationonthereactorpedestalallowstheinstrument tomeasureseismicmovements thatcanbecomparedtotheanalytical seismicresponsewithouttheseismictracesbeingmaskedbynonseismic tracesfrombackground vibration. | |||
Amendment No.39tothefacilityoperating licenserevisedTechnical Specification Tables3.3.7.2-1 and4.3.7.2-1 toreflecttherelocation ofseismicmonitor2ERS-PAC2C. | |||
2ERS-PAC2B Therelocation ofaccelerograph 2ERS-PAC2B toanewlocationonthesameprimarycontainment CSHlineastheoriginallocationdidnotchangetheUSARorTechnical Specifications. | |||
Thenewlocationisexpectedtominimizetheaccelerograph's exposuretobothbackground vibration andpersonnel contact. | |||
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage3of93SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary!90-039(cont'd.) | |||
(cont'd.) | |||
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. | |||
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage4of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:90-076Dwg.No.001.6550-076-092,093; EDC2E00528USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.1SpentFuelPoolCoolingandCleanup(SFPC)SFPCFilter/Demin. | |||
EffluentFlowSwitchSetpointChangeDescription ofChange:Flowswitch2SFC-FAL47A/B initiates asystemtroublealarmandstartsfilter/demineralizer holdingpump2SFC-P4A/B automatically whentheflowinSFPCfilter/demineralizer FLT1A/Bdropsbelowthelowflowsetpoint. | |||
Thischangeincreased thelowflowsetpointfrom360gpmto700gpmtoallowforproperinstrument calibration. | |||
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Raisingthelowflowsetpointfrom360gpmto700gpmdoesnotadversely impactnuclearsafety.Flowswitch2SFC | |||
Revision as of 21:57, 29 June 2018
| ML17059A088 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1993 |
| From: | NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17059A087 | List: |
| References | |
| NMP2L-1448, NUDOCS 9311040065 | |
| Download: ML17059A088 (96) | |
Text
Enclosure toNhiP2L1448NXNEMILEPOPtT-UVlT2SAFETYEVALUATION SYREPORT1993DocketNo.50-410LicenseNo.NPF-6993110400hS 931029PDRADOCK05000410K"PDR
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage1of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-015,Rev.0&1Mod.PN2Y88MX194 Sections1.2,8.3,9.2,9.4,9.5,9A.3,12.3SystemsTitleofChange:Description ofchange:VariousCafeteria BuildingThismodification constructed atwo-story, steel-framed (approximately 7,500sq.ft.)cafeteria buildingwithitsownfoundation andstructural elementsadjacenttothewestwalloftheturbinebuildingbetweentheexisting-chillwaterbuildingandthefoamroom.Powerfeedforthenewcafeteria panel2NJS-PNL302 wasfromloadcenter2NJS-US3, locatedintheturbinebuildingatelevation 277'.Toenableconstruction ofthecafeteria anditsfoundation, modifications toexistingplantstructures andcomponents werenecessary intheyardarea,foamroom,I&Cshop,passageway, turbinebuilding, andthechillwaterbuilding.
Affectedsystemsincludedfireprotection water,domesticwater,HVAC,andlighting.
The6-inchblockwallontheeastendofthecafeteria building(sidefacingtheUnit2turbinebuilding) wasfilledwithconcrete, therebyproviding radiation protection fromgammaradiation resulting fromhydrogeninjection.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification resulted.intheadditionofanonsafety-related structure.
Evaluations wereperformed todetermine potential effectsonsafety-related systemsandstructures, ALARAconcerns, fireprotection, thesitefloodanalysis, andelectrical powersupply.Theevaluations concluded thattherewerenoadverseeffectsresulting fromthismodification.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage2of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!SystemsTitleofChange!90-039Mod.PN2Y89MX083 Section3.7ASeismicMonitoring Permanent Relocation ofAccelerographs 2ERS-PAC2C andPAC2BDescription ofChangesThismodification relocated seismicmonitor2ERS-PAC2C fromtherecirculation pumpmotortothereactorpedestal.
Thismodification alsorelocated seismicmonitor2ERS-PAC2B toalocationonthesameCSHlinebutclosertotheCSHpenetration attheprimarycontainment wall.Xthadbeendetermined thatboth-units failed,inpart,duetohighbackground vibration.
Bothofthenewlocations wereselectedbasedonanticipated lowbackground vibration.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification established anewlocationforatriaxialpeakaccelerograph tomaintaincompliance toRegulatory Guide1.12andenabledtheinstrument toaccurately monitorseismicactivity.
Therelocation ofthisinstrument willnotaffecttheoperation ofanysafetysystemsorthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Theplacement oftheaccelerograph onthereactorpedestaldoesnotconflictwiththeoriginaldesignintent.Thenewinstrument requirescalibration inaccordance withthemanufacturer's recommendations.
Thenewlocationonthereactorpedestalallowstheinstrument tomeasureseismicmovements thatcanbecomparedtotheanalytical seismicresponsewithouttheseismictracesbeingmaskedbynonseismic tracesfrombackground vibration.
Amendment No.39tothefacilityoperating licenserevisedTechnical Specification Tables3.3.7.2-1 and4.3.7.2-1 toreflecttherelocation ofseismicmonitor2ERS-PAC2C.
2ERS-PAC2B Therelocation ofaccelerograph 2ERS-PAC2B toanewlocationonthesameprimarycontainment CSHlineastheoriginallocationdidnotchangetheUSARorTechnical Specifications.
Thenewlocationisexpectedtominimizetheaccelerograph's exposuretobothbackground vibration andpersonnel contact.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage3of93SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary!90-039(cont'd.)
(cont'd.)
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage4of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:90-076Dwg.No.001.6550-076-092,093; EDC2E00528USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.1SpentFuelPoolCoolingandCleanup(SFPC)SFPCFilter/Demin.
EffluentFlowSwitchSetpointChangeDescription ofChange:Flowswitch2SFC-FAL47A/B initiates asystemtroublealarmandstartsfilter/demineralizer holdingpump2SFC-P4A/B automatically whentheflowinSFPCfilter/demineralizer FLT1A/Bdropsbelowthelowflowsetpoint.
Thischangeincreased thelowflowsetpointfrom360gpmto700gpmtoallowforproperinstrument calibration.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Raisingthelowflowsetpointfrom360gpmto700gpmdoesnotadversely impactnuclearsafety.Flowswitch2SFC-FSL47A/B continues toperformthealarmandstartfunctions oftheholdingpumpinthesamemannerastheexistingdesign.Thenormalflowrateseenby2SFC-FT47A/B iseither1200gpmor2400gpm.Thedifference betweenthenormalflowrateandthelowflowsetpointisadequatetoavoidspuriousactuation.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage5of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:Systems"TitleofChange:Description ofChange:90-081EDC2M00306,FDDRKG1-0866-1 Sections3.9B,4.6ControlRodDrive(CRD)AdditionofControlRodDrive(CRD)Model7RDB144EG001 NewCRDs(ModelNo.7RDB144EG001) werepurchased asreplacement partstobeinstalled inthereactor'vesselaspartoftheroutineCRDMaintenance Program.ThedesignofthenewCRDincorporates thefollowing designchanges:Thematerialforthestrainer, innerfilter,andouterfilterwaschangedfromstainless steeltype304totype304Ltoenhancetheirresistance toIntergranular StressCorrosion Cracking(IGSCC).2~3~Thedesignoftheuncoupling rodwaschangedfromtwopieces(uncoupling rodandtube)weldedtogether, toasinglepiecemadeofsolidbar.Asegmentoftheuncoupling rodhasatriangular cross-section toassureproperinstallation inthecenterholeofthespud,therebyeliminating thepossibility forhumanerrorduringtheassemblyoftheCRD.Thesetscrewplugwhichcontained asinglethrough-hole coolantpassagewasreplacedwithacoolingorificecontaining eightsideholestoreducethepossibility ofcoolantflowblockagebyforeignmaterial.
Thisdesignchangeresultsinasmallincreaseofapproximately 0.02gpminthecoolantflowthrougheachCRD(3.7gpmforthetotalof185CRDs).4.Thepositionindicator probeisnotincludedasapartofthenewCRD,butratherissuppliedseparately.
Inaddition, asmallernumberofthenewdriveswillbesubjected tothe5-yearmaintenance lifetestsduetothelowerproduction volumeexpectedforthismodel.TheCRDsareusedforpositioning thecontrolrodsinthereactorcore.Changesdescribed inthissafetyevaluation willnothaveanyadverseimpactoneitherthenormalorthesafety-related CRDfunctions, including scramcapability orscramspeedoftheCRD.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage6of93SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:90-081(cont!d.)
CRDModel7RDB144EG001 hasbeenreviewedagainst"BWRScramDischarge SystemSafetyEvaluation,"
issuedbytheNRCinDecember1980,andfoundtohavenoimpactontheevaluation orconclusions.
Theslightincreaseinflowcausedbythedesignchangeofthecoolingorificeiswithinhydraulic capacityofthecontrolroddrivehydraulic system(RDS).Performance ofoperating procedures fortheRDSwillverifychargingrequirements aremet.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage7of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System!TitleofChange:90-099SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0006-90 Sections1.2,4.6,9.3,12.3ControlRodDrive(RDS)ControlRodDriveMaintenance RoomDescription ofChange:Thefollowing changesweremadeintheCRDmaintenance roomlocatedinthesecondary containment.
TheexistingCRDflushtankwasremovedandreplacedwithanew,shieldedflushtankthatincludesaneffluentfiltration system,pump,andbottleaccumulator.
Thetankwasalsorelocated withintheroom.2.Theexistingflushtankdrainlineandvalveswereremovedandthepipingwascapped.3.Thecontrolcabinetfortheultrasonic cleanerwaspermanently mountedonthenorthwalloftheroom.SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThesechangestotheCRDmaintenance roomwillgreatlyimproveCRDhandling, maintenance andstorageforrefueling outages,andreducethepossibility'f
'creating highradiation areasintheCRDmaintenance roomandonelevation 261'fthesecondary containment.
TheCRDmaintenance roomequipment isnotrequiredtosupportsafeshutdownoftheplant.Thechangesaddressed inthissafetyevaluation arenonsafety relatedanddonotadversely affecttheabilityofanysystemsorcomponents important tosafetytoperformtheirsafetyfunction.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage8of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:Systeme~TitleofChanges90-103Mod.PN2Y86MX085 Section9.3Instrument Nitrogen(GSN)ControlRoomNuisanceAlarmsCEC601505, CEC601506 Description ofChange:Thenitrogensystemtroublealarm(annunciator window601506)andtheprimarycontainment purgetemperature lowalarm(annunciator window601505)activateunderlowprocesstemperatures toindicateaproblemwiththetrimheatersand/orelectricvaporizers.
Nuisancealarmswerebeinggenerated whentherewasnoorlownitrogenflowbecausethesourceofthesignalforannunciation islocatedoutside(subjecttolowambientairtemperature),
whereheatwasbeinglostfromnoninsulated processpiping.Toeliminate thesenuisancealarms,electricheattracing/insulation wasaddedonthenitrogeninertingsystempipingfromthetrimheaters/electric vaporizers, intheyard(nitrogen tank)area,toapointpriortoadjoining thecontainment purgesystem,inthestandbygasbuilding.
SafetyEvaluation Summary!Thischangeeliminates nuisancealarmsbymaintaining nitrogenlinetemperature andreducingheattransferlossesfromtheprocess.Thealarmlogicasdesignedstillprovidesthefunctional capability ofalarmingiftheheatersareinoperable.
Theabilitytomaintainthenitrogentemperature abovetheminimumdesirable temperature isalsoenhancedbythischange.Basedontheevaluation performed',
itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage9of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-112,Rev.3&4N/AN/AVariousOfficeandStorageFacilities inSupportofOutagesattheNineMilePoint.SiteDescription ofChange:AsreportedinletterNMP2L1324,datedOctober30,1991,underSafety"Evaluation 90-112,Rev.1and2,temporary officeandstoragefacilities wereinstalled forusebythecontractor staffduringUnit2refueling outages.Revision3toSafetyEvaluation 90-112includedanadditional temporary
- facility, adieseltankstorageberm.Thisstoragebermprovidesenvironmental protection againstspillageofdieselfuelfromthreefuelstoragetankerslocatedwithintheboundaries oftheberm.Revision4toSafetyEvaluation 90-112includedanewly-proposed designforapermanent accesscontrolbuildingforreplacement oftheexistingtemporary radiation protection portalfacility.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theseconstruction activities andtemporary, sitechangesdonotadversely impactthesitefloodinganalysis(probable maximumprecipitation).
Electrical powerforthesouthauxiliary bayexitportalistakenfromtheconstruction powerloopandwillnotadversely affectpermanent plantpowersystems.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage10of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:91-029,Rev.1&2SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0205-91 USARAffectedPages!S'stemeTitleofChange:Sections9.3,11.3Offgas(OFG)OffgasFreeze-Out DryerBypassandDrainLineReroute.Description ofChange:Thisdesignchangewastwofold.First,topreventthepossibility oforganicmaterialfromenteringthecondenser, andthusthereactor,throughthecondensate system(intheevent.offreeze-out dryerrefrigerant tubeleaks),thefreeze-out dryerdrainwasreroutedtoradwastedraintank2DFT-TK1B.
Thisinvolvedtheadditionofanewdrainline,andisolation oftheexistingdrainlinebyclosingvalve2OFG-V43atcondenser nozzle135A,andbyclosinganewsecondisolation valve,20FG-V300.
- Secondly, foreachfreeze-out dryer(20FG-DRYlA, 1Band1C)inletprocessline,abypassdrainlinewasaddedtocontinuously removeentrapped moisture.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangewillnotimpacttheoperation ofanysafety-related systemsoraffectthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant,andwillnotimpactanyequipment associated withtheoffgasprocess.Hydrogendetonation designcriteriaarenotimpacted.
Offgasdrainfluidwillbeanalyzed, andanyfreonand/oroil,ifdetected, willbeprocessed byanenvironmentally andradiologically approvedmethod.Newpipeinstalled meetstheoriginaldesign,specifications andmaterialrequirements.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage11of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-034'Mod.PN2Y86MX085 Sections7.3,9.3ReactorWaterCleanup,ReactorPlantSamplingControlRodNuisanceAlarmWindows602315,602317,602318Description ofChange:Wheneverthereactorwatercleanup(RWCU)filter/demineralizers areoutofservice,conductivity goeshighduetoprocessfluidstagnation.
Thiscausesnuisancealarmssincecontrol'roomoperators areonlyconcerned withhigh/lowconductivity levelswhentheassociated demineralizer trainisinoperation.
Toeliminate thesenuisancealarms,theRWCUfilterdemineralizer effluentconductivity high/lowalarminputwasinterlocked withtheassociated filterdemineralizer operation logicsuchthatthealarmisinhibited whenthedemineralizer isnotinservice.Inaddition, theredundant highconductivity alarminput,totheassociated filterdemineralizer "trouble" annunciator windowwasdeletedbyreprogramming theprogrammable controller associated witheachfilterdemineralizer trainandconnecting itsoutputtotheexisting"high/low" annunciator window.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification correctsthenuisancealarmswithoutadversely affecting theRWCUsystemorthereactorsamplingsystem,andwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage12of93SafetyEvaluation No.cImplementation DocumentNo.:USARAffeotedPages!System!TitleofChanges91-038EDC2E10345Section10.4LowPressureHeaterDrains(HDL)LevelIndicating Controller IDChangeout Description ofChange:Thischangereidentified the.fourthpointheaterwaterlevelcontrollers from2HDL-LIC4A,B,
&Cto2HDL-LIK4A,B
&Ctocorrectly identifytheirformandfunction.
TheLICtoLIKdesignation changecorrectly identifies thatthecontrollers arecapableofproviding thelevelsetpointautomatically ormanuallywithoperatorcontrolasoriginally specified.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangedoesnotaffectthedesignorfunctionofthefourthpointheaterwaterlevelcontrollers.
Thecontrollers werereidentified toproperlyindicatethattheypossesstheauto/manual transfercapability asoriginally specified andpurchased.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage13of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-042,Rev.2,3&5Mod.PN2Y89MX078 Sections1.2,5.2,10.1,10.4OxygenFeedwater Injection (OFI)Installation oftheOxygenFeedwater Injection SystemDescription ofChange:Thismodification addedtheoxygenfeedwater injection (OFI)system.ThepurposeoftheOFIsystemistomaintain20to50ppbofoxygeninthecondensate/feedwater systems.Theinjection ofoxygeninthesuctionsideofthecondensate pumpswillminimizecorrosion andcorrosion productsreleasedfromthecondensate/feedwater systemmaterials.
TheOFIsystemconsistsoftwoparts.ThefirstpartistheOFIsupplywhichconsistsofsixoxygencylinders, anoxygencontrolmanifold, excessflowcheckvalveandreliefvalve.Thesecondpartistheinjection portion,whichisoperatedinamanualormanualbypassmodeandiscomposedofisolation andbypassvalves,flowcontroller, solenoidandcheckvalves,backpressure regulator, andoxygenandcondensate flowindicators.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheOFIsystemdoesnotperformanysafety-related functions.
Failureofthesystemtoperformitsintendedfunctionwillnothaveanadverseimpactonthecondensate andfeedwater systems,norwillithaveanyimpactontheperformance, availability andreliability ofanyothersafety-related system.Theadditionofoxygeninthecondensate/feedwater systemswillreducetherateofcorrosion andcorrosion productsreleasedfromthesystem'scarbonsteelandstainless steelcomponents, andwillassisttheNMP2designinmeetingALARArequirements.
Theaddedoxygenwillnotaffectthechlorideconcentration, conductivity, pH,orspecificactivityintheprimarycoolant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage14of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange!91-043,Rev.1&2MajorOrderNo.0546Sections1.2,2.4N/ANewYorkTelephone SwitchBuildingatNineMilePointUnit2Description ofChange:Theoriginaltelephone systemonsitewasinadecjuate tomeettheneedsofsitepersonnel.
Anewsingleswitchreplacedthetwoswitchespreviously inuseatUnits1and2.Thenewsystemishousedinanewbuildingoutsidetheprotected area,westoftheeastfloodcontrolbermatUnit2.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thenewsingleswitchfacilitates theentiresitetelephone systemaswell.asmeetingthefutureofdatacommunication.
Thenewbuildingisnotwithinthedirectflowpathoffloodwaters,andthuswillhavenoadverseimpactontheprobablemaximumprecipitation (PMP)floodstudy.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport,Page15of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:91-052Mod.PN2Y86MX085 Figure9.2-2Sh.5ServiceWater(SWP)ControlRoomNuisanceAlarmWindows601134,601222WhenpowertooneoftheSWPstrainers (2SWP*STR4A,B,C,D,E,F) isdisconnected, amotoroverloadsignalissenttothecontrolroomannunciator windows601134and601222causingfalseandunwantednuisancealarms.Thismodification eliminated thenuisancealarmsbyinterlocking themotoroverloadcircuitswiththeloss-of-power circuitsforeachofthestrainers sothatthemotoroverloadalarmissenttothecontrolroomannunciators onlywhenpowerisonandthemotorisactuallyoverloaded.
TheeffectsofSafetyEvaluation 91-052wereincorporated inFigure9.2-2Sh.5,USARRevision4.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thedesignchangeassociated withtheSWPstrainermotorcontrolcircuitwillnotcompromise thedesignfortheexistingbypass/inoperable statusindication andannunciation forthesecircuits.
Theelectrical separation betweendivisional andnondivisional circuitswillbemaintained, andthedesignassociated withtheSWPstrainermotorcontrolcircuitchangewillbe"fail-safe" suchthatasinglefailurewillnotcompromise theSWPsystem'sabilitytoperformit'sprotective function.
TheSWPstrainers'peration andfunctionwillnotchange.Thismodification corrected'he nuisancealarmswithoutadversely affecting theSWPsystemandwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage16of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Zmplementatfi.on DooumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange!.91-054,Rev.1Mod.PN2Y86MX085 Section9.2ServiceWater(SWP)ControlRoomNuisanceAlarmWindows601115,601218Description ofChange:Eachoftheservicewaterpumps,2SWP*P1A, 1B,1C,1D,1E,1F,havealowsuctionpressurealarmtonotifytheoperators ofalowsuctionpressurecondition.
Whenapumpistakenoutofserviceatthepresenttimeformaintenance, thepressureswitchsensesalowsuctionpressureandsendsasignaltothecontrolroomannunciator windows601115or601218,causingfalseandunwantednuisancealarms.Toeliminate thesenuisancealarms,theservicewaterpumplowsuctionpressurecircuitswereinterlocked withtheassociated servicewaterpumpcontrolswitchcircuitstoinhibitthealarminputwhentheswitchisinthePULL-TO-LOCK orSTOPpositions.
Theswitchactsasapermissive toallowthealarmtoperformasrequiredwhenplacedintheSTART,NORMAL-AFTER-START, orNORMAL-AFTER-STOP positions.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theoperators areconcerned withtheservicewaterpumplowsuctionpressureonlywhentheassociated pumpisinoperation orinthestandbymode.Thischangeeliminates theactuation ofthisnuisancealarmwhenamaintenance activityisperformed onaservicewaterpumptrainresulting inthiscondition.
Theservicewaterpumps'peration andfunctiondonotchange.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
F SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage17of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:91-055EDC2F00342Procedures N2-0P-48, N2CSPQ620gN2CSPD621gN2-CSP-W622 USARAffectedPages:System!Section9.5Auxiliary BoilerChemicalFeed(ABH)TitleofChange:Auxiliary BoilerChemicalFeedSystemDescription ofChange:Thischangerevisedthedescription oftheauxiliary boilerchemicalfeedsystemtoaccurately reflecttheexistingplantoperational andconfiguration status.Thepreviousdescription statedthatthesystemutilizedsodiumsulfiteintank2ABH-TK1andsodiumhydroxide intank2ABH-TK2.
Thischangerevisedthedescription toreflectthattank2ABH-TK1containssodiumphosphate andtank2ABH-TK2containssodiumsulfite.Thecorresponding pumpsforthesetankshavealsobeencorrectly described consistent withthetankcontents.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theauxiliary electricboilersystemisnonsafety relatedandisnotrequiredtosupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperation ofreactorsafetyfeatures.
Thisdocumentation changereflectstheactualoperational configuration oftheauxiliary boilerchemicalfeedsystemandisconsistent withindustrystandards andvendorrecommendations.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage18of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-062Temporary Mod.91-056N/AFireProtection Water(FPW)Temporary ClosureofValve2FPW-V215 Description ofChange:Thistemporary changeallowedtheextendedclosureoffireprotection watersupplyvalve2FPW-V215 andjumperedoutthetroubleindication, computeralarm,andnuisancealarmsignalinitiated fromthisvalve'spositionswitch(2FPW-ZS415).
Valve2FPW-V215 supplieswatertothesprinkler pipingonmaintransformer 2MTX-XM1B (firezone502SW).It'sclosurewasrequiredforthedisassembly ofthesprinkler pipingtoallowremovalofthetransformer forrepair/replacement.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thistemporary changedoesnotaffectthesafeoperation orsafeshutdowncapabilities oftheplant.Valve2FPW-V215 supplieswatertoonlyonefirezone(502SW);andtransformer 2MTX-XM1B istheonlycomponent infirezone502SW.Theremaining maintransformers (2MTX-XM1A/C/D) eachhavetheirindividual firezonesandwaterdelugesystemscontrolled bytheirindividual watersupplyvalves.Themaintransformers areseparated fromeachotherbyconcretefirewalls.Theclosureofthewatersupplytofirezone502SW,therefore, willnotplaceatriskanyothercomponents infirezone502SWorinanyadjoining firezones.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthistemporary changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed,safety question.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage19of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPagess91-069MajorOrderNo.0545Sections1.2,2.4System!TitleofChange:N/ANineMilePointUnit2SitePavingandDrainageDescription ofChange:Thischangeregradedandpavedtheparkinglotsouthofthe"P>>building(anareaofapproximately 16,000sq.yds.).Drainageoftheswalesouthoftheparkingarea,runningtotheeastandthentothenorth,wasalsoimprovedbyliningwithgeotexalfabricandcobblestone, andtheexistingculvertundertheeastserviceroadwasabandoned.
A12'-0"'pavedturninglanewasalsoaddedtoLakeRoadbetweenthewarehouse roadandtheeastserviceroad.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangetotheparkinglotsaswellasturninglaneintotheeastserviceroadimprovestheflowoftrafficintoandoutoftheplant.Improving thecondition oftheparkinglotseliminates thepossibility ofpersonnel injuryduetolooserocksandstandingwaterconditions.
Areviewofthefloodstudycalculations determined thatthischangeimprovessitedrainageandhasnoadverseeffectontheprobablemaximumprecipitation (PMP)floodelevation.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage20of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange!91-072,Rev.1Mod.PN2Y86MX085 Section7.4ReactorCoreIsolation Cooling(RCIC)ControlRoomNuisanceAlarmWindow601320Description ofChange:TheRCICturbineexhaustheaderdrainpotisequippedwithalevelswitch(2ICS*LS206) thatactivates controlroomannunciator 601320,andprovidesasignaltoopenair-operated valve(AOV)2ICS*AOV110 onhighwaterlevelsimultaneously.
Withvalve2ICS*AOV110 open,waterdrainsfromthedrainpottothereactorbuildingfloordrainsthroughAOVs2ICS*AOV109 and2ICS*AOV110.
Presently whenvalve2ICS*AOV110 opens,thewaterlevelquicklydrops,theswitchresets,thealarmclears,andthevalvecloses.Thisoccursfrequently andmakesannunciator window601320anuisancealarmthatcontinuously alarmsandresetsinresponsetonormalevents.Thismodification addedtwotimedelayrelaystolevelswitch2ICS*LS206.
Thefirsttimedelayrelaykeepsvalve2ICS*AOV110 openforadesignedperiodoftime.Thesecondtimedelayrelaywasconnected inthecircuitthatactuatesannunciator window601320.Itallowstheactuation ofannunciator window601320onhighdrainpotlevelonlyafterthedesignated periodoftimehaspassedandthelevelswitchhasnotreset.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification correctsanuisancealarmwithoutadversely affecting theoperation orfunctionoftheRCICsystem.Therevisedalarmcircuitwillalerttheoperatortotheabnormalcondition thatthewaterlevelinthedrainpothasnotdecreased sufficiently oncethedrainvalvehasbeensignalled toopenduetodrainpothighlevel.Thecurrentlogicwhichcloses2ICS*AOV110 uponopeningofsteamsupplyvalve2ICS*MOV120 remainsintactandisnotbeingchanged.Thiswillassurethat2ICS*AOV110 willbecloseduponsteamsupplythrough2ICS*MOV120.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnot,involveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage21of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:'91-074,Rev.1,2&3Mod.PN2Y88MX059 Sections4.6,5.4ReactorWaterCleanup(RWCU),ControlRodDrive(CRD)TitleofChange:CRDtoRWCUPumpsPipingInstallation Description ofChange:Thismodification installed asupplyofsealinjection waterfromtheCRDsystemtothe,sealinjection pipingoftheRWCUpumps.Thisresultsindemineralized qualitywaterbeingutilizedforRWCUpumpsealinjection, whichisamuchbetterqualitywaterthanpresently used.Recommendation toinstallthismodification, knownas"sealpurge,"wasprovidedtoutilities inGeneralElectric(GE)ServiceInformation Letter(SIL)Number258,Supplement 1.Inaddition, a3/4-inchbypassvalvewasinstalled foreachRWCUpumpdischarge checkvalveasrecommended inGESILNumber258,Supplement 2.Thebypassvalvecanbeusedforwarmupofanidlepumpusingbleedbackflowfromanoperating pump.Theexistingsealinjection systemwasnotdisabled, butwasvalvedoutfornormaloperation.
ThisallowsRWCUpumpoperation withthepresently existingsealinjection system(aftervalverealignment) shouldtheCRDsystembeunavailable foranyreason(e.g.,duringoutages).
Thischangealsopermanently removedaRWCUsystemthermalreliefvalve,2WCS-RV143, whichhadpreviously beentemporarily removedunderTemporary Modification 92-007(SafetyEvaluation 92-004).SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThenewRWCUpumpsealinjection systemisexpectedtoincreaseseallife.andimprovesystemoperability.
Radiation exposureofoperations andmaintenance personnel shouldbereducedduetolongerseallifeandimprovedpumpwarmupprocedures.
CRDsystemdesignandperformance requirements arenotimpactedandRWCUsystemdesignrequirements remainfulfilled bythismodification.
Pipinginstalled istoASMEandANSICoderequirements andisseismically supported soasnottoimpacttheoperation ofanyequipment considered important tosafety.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage22of93SafetyEvaluation No.:91-074,Rev.1,2&3(cont'd.)
SafetyEvaluation Summary:(cont'd.)
Thismodification resultsinthediversion ofupto16gpmofCRDflowtotheRWCUpumpseals.Thisadditional demandwillreducesystempressures butpressures willstillbesufficient tomaintaintheminimumscramaccumulator pressurewithoutrequiring anyCRDsystemadjustments.
Theanalytical limitforthedifferential RWCUflowTechnical Specification setpointwasincreased toallowfortheadditional unmonitored inletflowintroduced bythismodification.
Adequatemarginexistsinthebasisforthesetpointsuchthattheanalytical valuecanbeincreased by20gpmwithoutimpacting theallowable valueorsetpoint.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage23of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DooumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:91-077,Rev.',2,&3Mod.PN2Y89MX042 Sections1.2,8.3,9.5,9A.3,9B.10System:Uninterruptible PowerSupply(UPS)TitleofChange:Replace2VBB-UPS1C and2VBB-UPS1D Description ofChange:Thepurposeofthischangewastoeliminate theoverloaded conditions onnormalUPSs2VBB-UPSlC and1Dinordertomaximizethereliability, maintainability, andperformance oftheseunits(reference LER89-014).Thescopeofthismodification wasto:1.Replace2VBB-UPS1C and1Dwithnewequipment toimprovereliability andmaintainability.
2.Shedloadstoremoveoverloaded condition ofthisequipment by:a.Reducingwattageofessential lightingfixturesinturbineandscreenwell buildings.
b.Powerthoseessential lightingfixtureslocatedadjacentto8-hourbattery-pack lightsfromnormallighting.
c.Changereceptacle powerfeedsfromessential tonormalpower.USARdescriptions ofthelightingsystemshavealsobeenrevisedtomoreclearlyindicatethoselightingsystemsthatareavailable tosafelyshutdowntheplantduringabnormalorfireevents.Theplantemergency and8-hourbattery-pack lightingsystemsarerequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplantintheeventofanemergency condition evaluated intheUSAR.Thismodification doesnotalterthepresentconfigurations oftheemergency or8-hourbattery-pack lightingsystemsthatarerequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage24of93SafetyEvaluation No.:91-077,Rev.1,2,&3(cont'd.)
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theessential lightingsystemprovidespartialillumination forcertaincriticalareasoftheplantsuchascontrolroom,relayandcomputerroom,standbydieselgenerator rooms,emergency switchgear rooms,servicewaterpumprooms,andtoandfromareaswheresafety-related equipment islocated.Thechangestotheplantessential lightingsystemarestillwithinthedesignbasisoftheplantbecause:1.Theminimumrequiredillumination of0.5foot-candle forallexitpathsismaintained.
2~Wherevertheessential lightingisconverted tonormallighting, theemergency and/or8-hourbattery-pack lightingisstillavailable forsafeshutdownoftheplantintheeventofafireinanyfireareaoftheplantorintheeventofanaccidentortransient described intheUSAR.3.Thesafeshutdowncapability oftheplanteitherfromcontrolroomorotherareasoftheplant(suchasremoteshutdownroom)isnotcompromised.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage25of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.!91-078SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0141-90, EDC2F00418USARAffectedPages:SystemoTitleofChange:Section10.4Circulating Water(CWS)Circulating WaterSystemConductivity Equipment Description ofChange:Equipment existedatthedischarge flumewithinthecoolingtowerscreenhouse tomeasurecirculating waterconductivity.
Theconductivity element(2CWS-CE103) andassociated'quipment (2CWS-CIT103) wereno.longerusedtocalculate blowdownrequirements bymeansofaconductivity measurement.
Thischangeremovedtheconductivity element(2CWS-CE103) andretiredinplacethetransmitter (2CWS-CIT103).
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thecirculating watersystemisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperation ofreactorsafetyfeatures.
Elimination oftheconductivity analysisequipment willnotimpactthefunctionortheperformance oftheCWSsystem.ThedesignbasiswaterqualityoftheCWSsystemismadeupofvariousconcentrations ofdifferent constituents.
Actualoperating constituent concentrations intheclosedlooparemaintained atlessthantwotimestheactuallakewaterconcentrations asaresultoftheconstantmakeupandacontrolled blowdownflow.Circulating wateranalysisisprocedurally controlled bytheChemistry Department onaregularbasis.TheChemistry Department hasstrictprocedural controlsinrelationtoblowdownrequirements.
Copperdischarge limitsarenowthecontrolling factorindetermining blowdownrequirements.
Conductivity canbedetermined bytheChemistry Department bymeansofgrabsamplewhennecessary.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage26of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange:91-084Mod.PN2Y89MX094 Sections3.9A,6.2Containment Atmosphere Monitoring (CMS)Elimination of2CMS*SOV25A, B,C,DDescription ofChange:Thedesignofthehydrogen/oxygen monitoring systemprovidesforbothmanualandautomatic samplingofprimarycontainment bytwofullyindependent hydrogen/oxygen analyzertrains.Thismonitoring canbeaccomplished bymanuallyselecting asamplefromfivedifferent areas(perdivision);
threefromthedrywell,andtwofromthesuppression chamber.Thesamplingpointcouldalsooriginally beautomatically selectedandsequenced byacycletimeropeningandclosingselectorvalvesforthefivedifferent areas,alternating betweendrywellandthesuppression chamber.Thismodification removedthevalveinternals fromthesuppression chamberselectorvalves,2CMS*SOV25A, B,C,D,functionally eliminating thesevalvesfromthesamplepath.Thischangeeliminated thecapability forautomatically selecting andsequencing ofsample'ocation, alternating betweendrywellandsuppression chamber.Thecapability forautomatically selecting andsequencing betweendrywellareasremains.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theelimination oftheselectorvalvesinthesuppression chamberdoesnotaffectthesafety-related functionofthehydrogen/oxygen monitoring system.Thecapability stillexiststosamplethedrywellandsuppression chamber,arepresentative sampleisstillbeingtaken,andthetransport andaccuracyofthesampleisnotaffected.
Valves2CMS*SOV25A, B,C,Ddidnotperformacontainment isolation function.
Theisolation functionbetweensuppression chamberanddrywellsamplingthatwaspreviously performed bythesevalvescanbeprovidedbytheassociated CMSsystemcontainment isolation valves.Basedon'heevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage27of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Zmplementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:91-087,Rev.1&2Mod.PN2Y88MX058 Sections3.6A,5.4,8.3,10.1,10.4System:TitleofChange:ReactorWaterCleanup(WCS)Feedwater Stratification-Reduction ofLong-Term EffectsDescription ofChange:Thismodification consisted ofaddingan8-inchmotor-operated globevalvetoeachWCSlinebeforeitjoinsthefeedwater (FWS)lineatthethermaltee,andimplementation ofanewoperating procedure topermitdirection ofallWCSflowthroughonefeedwater linewithfeedwater flowthroughtwofeedwater linesatreactorpowerlevelsunder204.Thiscapability willreducethemaximumdifferential temperature withincreased WCSflow,resulting inanincreaseintheallowable cyclesandcorresponding lifeofthepipe.Asaminimum,theshiftingoftheWCSflowtoeitherofthetwofeedwater lineswilldoubletheexistingpredicted lifeofthepipeasitrelatestoWCSinjection.
Twenty-two thermocouples werealsoprovided, twoontheWCSsystemandtwentyontheFWSsystem,tomonitorthealarmstratification inthefeedwater pipingthermalteeregion.SafetyEvaluation Summary:'TheWCSsystemisnotsafetyrelatedandisnotrequiredforsafeshutdown.
Thenewvalveoperators andallcontrolsarealsononsafety related.Allnonsafety-related equipment in.safety-related areasareseismically supported.
Theadditionofthevalvestolines2-WCS-008-89-1 and2-WCS-008-250-1 createsanegligible increaseinpressuredropinthesystemwhenthevalvesarefullopen.Whenthesevalvesareatotherthanfullopen,theWCSsystemdesignisboundedbytheexistingsystemanalysis.
Totalcombinedmassflowsandenthalpyoffeedwater andRWCUwaterdonotchange.ThechangesinWCSflowcontroloccuronlyatreactorpowerlevelsunder204.Thereactorpressureboundaryisunaffected bythischangesincetheoriginalcontainment isolation valvesandassociated pipingremainunchanged.
Designtemperatures andpressures remainunchanged asdonormaloperating temperatures.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage28of93SafetyEvaluation No.:.SafetyEvaluation Summary:91-087,Rev.1&2(cont'd.)
(cont'd.)
Analysisoftheaffectedpiping.andsupportsisinaccordance withtherequirements ofSectionIIXoftheASMECode1974Edition,andincompliance withtherequirements specified inthe,USAR.Eachvalveweighedinexcessof1000lbs.;therefore, whenthevalveswereloadedintothereactorbuildingandmainsteamtunneltheyweretreatedasheavyloads.Thisrequiredthattheriggingarrangements andloadpathschosenmettherequirements oftheHeavyLoadsStudy(USARAppendix9C)andNUREG-0612.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage29of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:91-094SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0391-91 USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.4ControlBuildingHVACRemoteShutdownRoomAirConditioner FilterDifferential PressureHighAlarmsDescription ofChange:Originally, theinstrument sensinglinesfortheremoteshutdownroomairconditioning units(2HVC*ACU3A/B) airfilterdifferential pressure(D/P)switches(2HVC-PDIS66A/B) wereinstalled suchthatthelowsideoftheD/Pswitchsensedthefilterdischarge whilethehighsideoftheD/Pswitchsensedroompressure.
Thisconfiguration didnotsensetruefilterD/Pandresultedinfrequentcontrolroomtroublealarms.Thischangeconnected theinstrument sensinglinesforthehighsideoftheD/PswitchtoductworkonthesuctionsideoftheairfiltertoallowtruefilterD/Ptobesensed.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theremoteshutdownroom2HVC*ACU3A/B filterdifferential pressureswitches(2HVC-PDIS66A/B) servenosafetyfunction.
Theyarerequiredtoalertthemaincontrolroomthattheairfiltersshouldbechangedouttomaintainproperoperation of2HVC*ACU3A/B.
Theirdesignfunctionisnotalteredbythischangetothesensinglinelocation.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage'30of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Xmplementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemTitleofChange:91-097Temporary Mod.91-093N/AMakeupWaterTreating(WTS)Ecolochem PurgeBypassLineDescription ofChange:TheWTSsystemcontinues toemploythetemporary trailer-contained demineralizer (Ecolochem) tosupplement theexistingsystem.Thistemporary modification installed apurgeline(flexible hose)fromtheEcolochem trailertoventvalveconnection 2WTS-V263.
Theadditionofthispurgelineprovidesarouteforinjection oftheinitialEcolochem effluent(predemineralized water)directlyintothewasteneutralizing tank(2WTS-TK1),
thusbypassing theexistingwastesumpandreducingtheworkloadonthesumppumps.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thetemporary additionofthepurgebypasshosewillhavenoadverseimpactontheWTSsystemoperation oranyothercomponent orsystemrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactor,ortoperformintheoperation ofreactorsafetyfeatures.
Hoseinstallation followedallsafetyprecautions, andallworkwasinaccordance withapprovedspecifications andprocedures.
Theflowtothemakeupwasteneutralizing tankwillcontainnoradiological contaminated fluid.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthistemporary changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage31of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange!92-007EDC2M10281Section4.6ControlRodDrive(RDS)CRDPumpSuctionFilters-NormalLineupDescription ofChange:TheoriginalRDSsystemdesignintendedforbothCRDpumpsuctionfilters(2RDS-FLT1A, 1B)tobeinservice.Thischangemodifiedthesystemconfiguration suchthatonefilterisnormallyinservice,withtheotherinstandby.Thischangewasaccomplished bymaintaining valve2RDS-V3Bnormallyclosed.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Therevisedsystemlineupallowsthestandbyfiltertobeplacedinservicewhenahighfilterdifferential pressurealarmisreached.Pastexperience andconsultation withGeneralElectricindicatethatthislineupisacceptable andeachfilteriscapableofhandlingfullsystemflow.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage32of93SafetyEvaluation Mo.sImplementation DocumentNo.sUSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChanges92-015,Temporary Mod.92-024N/AFireProtection
-Water(FPW)Connecting FireProtection SystemtoCondenser TubeFlushingRigDescription ofChangesThistemporary modification involvedtheinstallation ofatemporary firehosefromfirehosereel2FPW-FHR14 fortheflushingofthemaincondenser tubesduringRefueling Outage2.Theconnection atthefirehosereelrequiredtheinstallation ofanangleY-gatewithtwovalves;onetoisolatethefire-fighting hoseandtheothertoisolatethetemporary firehoseusedfortubeflushing.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thistemporary modification willhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orcapability tokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdowncondition.
Fireprotection capabilities arenotdegradedatanytime,becausesystempressureandflowwillbemaintained inthefireprotection systemwhilethistemporary modification isineffect.Themakeupcapabilities ofthefireprotection systemfarexceedthedemandsrequiredbythetubeflushingrigfortheintermittent usageexpectedforthedurationofflushing.
Basedontheevaluation performed, it.isconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotdecreasetheeffectiveness ofthefireprotection program.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage33of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-016,Rev.1Procedure NIP-ECA-01 Sections1.10,13.4N/AOperations Experience Assessment Description ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation takescreditfortheDeviation/Event Reporting (DER)processasanequivalent methodforensuringtheproperdissemination anduseofinternalandexternaloperating experience.
TheDERprocesseliminates theneedfortheOEACommittee.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Revision1ofthissafetyevaluation accountsforthefactthatprocedure NIP-SRE-01 wasneverissued.NIP-SRE-01 wasreferenced bySafetyEvaluation 92-016ascontaining thenecessary procedural
- controls, inpart,for'heprocessing ofoperating experience information.
Thediscontinuation ofNIP-SRE-01 isacceptable becausetheportionsofNIP-SRE-01 thatweretakencreditforintheoriginalsafetyevaluation wereincorporated intothecurrentrevisionofDERprocedure NIP-ECA-01.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage34of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARMfectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-021SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0247-91, EDC2F00467ASection9.2Circulating WaterSystem(CWS),MakeupWaterTreatingSystem(WTS)Circulating WaterPump2CWS-P1AthroughP1FSealWaterLineReplacement Description ofChange:Thischangereplacedthecarbonsteelcirculating waterpumpsealwaterlines,including valves,withstainless steelmaterial.
Thischangewasnecessary becausethepipingwasexperiencing reducedflowasaresultofMicrobiologically-Influenced Corrosion, ironoxidesandsediment.
Tofacilitate thischange,amanualisolation valvewasaddedtothemakeupwatersealwatersupplyheader.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thecirculating waterandmakeuptreatingsystemsarenotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperation ofreactorsafetyfeatures.
Changesmadeasdescribed willenhancepumpandsystemperformance.
Systemfunction, operability, andintegrity arenotaffected.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation.
SummaryReportPage35of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-034DER2-92-Q-0144 N/AServiceAir(SAS),Condensate Demineralizer (CND)TitleofChange:Connecting theServiceAirSystemtotheCondensate Demineralizer SystemDescription ofChange:Thischangeinvolvedtheuseofamechanical jumper,i.e.,redrubberhose,fromtheserviceairsystem(SAS)tothecondensate demineralizer system(CND)inordertoblowairintothepipingonthelowconductivity wastepumps,2CND-P5AandP5B,iftheybecameresinbound.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheSASandCNDsystemsarenotrequiredtoeffectorsupportthesafeshutdownofthereactorortofunctioninconjunction withanyreactorsafetyfeatures.
Theportionsofthesystemsaffectedbythischangearelocatedinanareaoftheplantwhichdoesnotrequirecomponents tobeseismically supported.
Connecting thetwosystemstounplugthelowconductivity wasteconductivity pumpsdoesnotdegradethedesign,function, ormethodbywhichthesystemsperformtheirdesignfunctions.
Thehose(s)whichareusedfor,themechanical jumperareratedforapressuregreaterthanthedesignpressures oftheaffectedSASandCNDpipingtoensurethatnofailureswouldcauseanyradiological spills.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation-SummaryReportPage36of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-036SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0077-92 USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Sections9.3,11.4Radioactive SolidWaste(WSS)Radioactive WasteDewatering SystemDescription ofChange:Thischangeaddedaradioactive wastedewatering systemtoreducethevolumeofwastetobedisposed.
ThesystemisknownasRDS-1000, suppliedbyChemNuclearSystems,Inc.(CNSI).Theequipment associated withRDS-1000waslocatedintheradwastebuildingtruckbay.RDS-1000isaself-contained, freestanding portablesystemfordewatering radioactive spentbeadresinsandfiltersludgeinavarietyoflinerstomeetthecurrentdisposalcriteriaatlow-level wastedisposalfacilities.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheNRChasreviewedthedesignandoperation oftheRDS-1000system,asdescribed inCNSITopicalReportNo.RDS-25506-01-P/NP, Revision1,andhasconcluded thatthetopicalreportisacceptable forreferencing.
NMPCreviewedtheCNSI-supplied information forplant-specific impactsincluding design,testing,processcontrol,ALARAconsiderations, floorloading,fireprotection, plantservicesrequirements, andwastehandlinganddisposal.
Noadverseplantimpactswereidentified.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage37of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-038,Rev.2&3Procedures GAP-OPS-01 Rev.00,GAP-POL-Ol Rev.01,GAP-RPP-01 Rev.00,NEP-POL-300 Rev.01,NIP-FPP-Ol Rev.01USARAffectedPages:Sections9A.3,12.1,12.5,13~lg13~2g13~5System:TitleofChange:N/ANineMilePointUnit2Reorganization Description ofChange:Chapter13oftheUSARdescribes theorganization responsible foroperation ofNineMilePointUnit2.Thischangeaddresses revisions totheNuclearDivisionorganizational structure.
Departments andpositions wereredefined andreorganized toenhancetheflowofcommunication andproductivity oftheNuclearDivision.
AffectedareasoftheDivisionorganization includeExecutive, Generation andQualityAssurance.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theorganizational changesprovidetheNuclearDivisionorganization withresources tobebothefficient andeffective whilemeetingNRCguidance.
Nonewfunctional areasorchainsofcommandwerecreatedcontrarytothisguidance.
Thechangesdidnotreducetheeffectiveness ofsupervision ortheabilityofgroupsorindividuals toperformactivities necessary toensuresafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Positions specifictoUnit2meetANSI/ANS-3.1-1978 requirements asendorsedbyRegulatory Guide1.8.Positions withsite-related responsibilities meetbothANSI/ANS-3.1-1978 andANSI/N18.1-1971 asendorsedbyRegulatory Guide1.8.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage38of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-040,Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0119-92 USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/ANeutronMonitoring SRMCountRateUpscaleAlarmSetpointChangeDescription ofChange:Thischangerevisesthecountrateupscalealarmofthesourcerangemonitors(SRMs)duringcoreoffload/reload.
Specifically, theupscalealarmsetpointwillbechangedfrom1x10~cpsto100cps(withananalytical limitof200cps).Thischangewillbeimplemented onlyduringrefueling outagesinvolving acompletecoreoffload/reload, andallowstheSRMcountrateupscalealarmtofulfillthecontinuous audiblealarmfunctionrequiredbyTechnical Specification 3.9.2b.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheSRMshortperiodaudiblealarmhadpreviously beenconsidered assatisfying thecontinuous audiblealarmrequirement ofTechnical Specification 3.9.2b.However,duringcompletecoreoffload/reload, whenthereactorcoreisnearlyempty,SRMshortperiodalarmsoccurfrequently eventhoughthereactivity condition ofthereactorisnotchanging.
Thisrepresents anuisancealarm.Reducingthesetpointofthecountrateupscalealarmprovidesthecontrolroomwithanadequateindication ofthecorestatus,andprovidesanaudiblealarmtomeettheintentofTechnical Specification 3.9.2b.NochangeismadetotheSRMchanneltripunitoutputswhichperformtripfunctions.
Notransient oraccidentanalysestakecreditforanyalarmfromtheSRMsystem.Basedonthe'valuation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage39of93SafetyEvaluation No.!Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange!92-041Mod.PN2Y92MX006 Section9.2ServiceWaterReviseLogicforServiceWaterValvesMOV95A/BandMOV66A/BDescription ofChange:JThismodification wasinitiated topreventdisabling theDivisionIIIdieselduetoservicewaterpressureperturbations fromsequential singledivisional lossofpowerorcompleteLOOPaftertheDivisionIIdieselwasrunning.Thischangeinstalled anewtimedelayrelayforthesupplyheader(SWP)transmitter allowingapproximately 78secondspriortoclosingthesevalvesonlossofheaderpressure.
Theexistingtimedelayintheaboverelaywasremoved,thuspreventing thelossoftheHPCSdieselonanylowpressureheadersignal.Inadditiontothesechanges,theexistingtimedelaysettingsfortheDivisionIandIISWPdischarge valveswasincreased todelayclosureofthedischarge valvesonlowSWPheaderpressure.
ThisdelayallowstimefortheservicewatersupplyvalvestotheDivisionIIdieseltoclosepriortothedischarge valvesintheeventoflowservicewaterheaderpressure.
Thisallowstimefortheservicewaterheadertorepressurize intheeventofalinebreakdownstream oftheDivisionIIIservicewatersupplyvalves.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification allowstheservicewatersystemtherequiredtimetorepressurize thesupplyheaderinresponsetoaLOOP,priortoisolating, theHPCSdieselcoolingwatersupply.Intheeventofal'ine;rupture,intheservicewaterpipingdownstream of2SWP*MOV95A/B',-
it-'alsoallowstimefortheisolation ofthatpipingandthetimerequiredtorepressurize thesupplyheadertotheDivisionIandIIdieselpriortoisolating thecoolingwatersupplyto'hosediesels.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage40of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-042EDC2M00365Sections9.2,9.3,11.2ServiceWater,Radioactive LiquidWasteandInstrument AirTitleofChange:RevisethePositionofaSeriesofValvesonFigurestoAgreewiththeOperating Procedures Description ofChange:Thefollowing valveswerediagrammatically shownincorrectly intheUSARfiguresandcorresponding systemP&IDs:ServiceWaterSystem:2SWP-V933, 2SWP-V934 Radioactive LiquidWasteSystem:2LWSV83IV276IV281gV306gV328~V329gV330gV331gV359gV360gV361gV362gV374gV375gV378gV379gV557gV558,V570andV571Instrument AirSystem:2IAS-V176, 2IAS-V177 Theservicewatersystemvalveshavebeenrevisedfromnormallyclosedtonormallyopen.Theradioactive liquidwastesystemvalveshavebeenrevisedfromnormallyopentonormallyclosed.Theinstrument airsystemvalveshavebeenrevisedfromnormallyclosed.tolockedclosed.Thesechangesweremadetoreflectactualvalveconfigurations andtoagreewiththeassociated operating procedures.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThechangestosystemPEIDsandcorresponding USARfiguresreflectthepositionofvariousvalvesinperforming theirintendeddesignfunction.
Thereviseddrawingsagreewithdesignrequirements, normalplantconfiguration andoperating procedures.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthisdocumentation changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage41of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-044DER2-92-Q-1740, EDC2F00572Section9.5Auxiliary BoilerSystem(ABM)Auxiliary BoilerConductivity Specification ChangesDescription ofChange:ThischangeupdatedHydroSteamIndustries (HSI)vendormanualN2H32800HTEXCH001 (N20843)andtheUSARtoreflectthecurrentconductivity rangeofauxiliary boiler(2ABM-B1A and2ABM-BlB) wateratlowsteamdemands.Theboilersmustoperateatlevelsbelowthosepreviously referenced intheabovedocuments duetolowsteamdemand.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangerevisedtheacceptable conductivity operating rangetoreflectcurrentboileroperation.
Nochangesweremadewhichwouldimpactanysafety-related components, systemsorstructures requiredforsafeoperation orrequiredtomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage42of93SafetyEvaluation No.!Implementation DocumentNo.!USARAffectedPages:System!TitleofChange:92-045,Rev.0&1Procedures ARC-CSA2, ARC-CS02N/AN/AAcceptability of>>CAVSPAN>>
Gantry/Manlift atNMP2Description ofChange!Thistemporary changeinvolvestheuseofthe>>CAVSPAN>>
systemforoutagedecontamination activities.
The>>CAVSPAN>>
isareactorrefueling cavity-spanning gantrygdesignedbyAppliedRadiological Control,Inc.(ARC),andusedforsuspending workcagesinsupportofdecontaminating thereactorcavityandinternals storagepool.The>>CAVSPAN>>
hastwomanliftsattachedtothebeamandtwogantrieswithrailwheelswhichtravelalongtherefueling bridgerails.Movementoftheunitisdonemanually.
Themaximumloadwhichisallowedtobesuspended ineitherofthetwoworkcagesis800poundsincluding personnel weightandequipment.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theuseofthe>>CAVSPAN>>
systemforthedecontamination ofthereactorcavityandinternals storagepooliswiththeplantincoldshutdowncondition afterthereactorvesselheadisinplaceandpriortoplantrestart.Stressanalysesofthebeam,manlift,anddriveassemblyhavebeenperformed todemonstrate adequatesafetyfactors,andaloadtestofthestructure for125percentofratedloadwasalsoconducted.
Appropriate criteriafromUSARAppendix9C,"ControlofHeavyLoads,"werealsoapplied.Duringaseismicevent,iftheCAVSPANwastojumpfromtherefueling bridgerailsandfallintothereactorcavityorthereactorinternals storagepool,nosystems,equipment orcomponents requiredtomaintainthesafeshutdownoftheplantwouldbedamaged.hfBasedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthistemporary changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage43of93SafetyEvaluation No.:1mplementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange:92-046,Rev.0&1MajorOrderNo.1644Sections1.2,2.4N/ANineMilePointCompressed BottledGasStorageFacilityDescription ofChange:Thischangeconsistsoftheconstruction ofanewbottledgasstoragefacility.
Thenewstoragefacilityisanonsafety-related structure andislocatedoutsidetheprotected areasouthoftheUnit2warehouse.
Theareaofthenewfacilityisabout2500sq.ft.withinteriorceilingheightabout15ft.,andisdesignedtoaccommodate 550bottlesofvariouscompressed gases.Thefacilityconsistsoftwoareasitheeastareaisdesignated forstorageoftheflammable bottles,andthewestareaisdesignedforstorageofthenonflammable bottles.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theconstruction ofthenewstoragefacilitydoesnotdisturbthoseattributes ofthesiteintheimmediate vicinityoftheplant,whichsafelydivert.thelocalprobablemaximumprecipitation (PMP)runoffoverlandtoLakeOntario.Also,sincethenewfacilityislowinelevation andoutsidetheprotected area,thislocationwillnotcreateanywinddisturbances whichmayaffecttheatmospheric dispersion factorstudy.Theeffectsofanaccidental nitrogengasreleasefromthefacilityoncontrolroomhabitability wereevaluated.
The.potential formissilesasaresultoffireorexplosion wasalsoconsidered; Noadverseimpactswereidentified.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage44of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-049Procedure N2-OP-55Section9.4TurbineBuildingVentilation Alternate Operation oftheTurbineBuildingVentilation SystemDescription ofChange:Thischangepermitsvariousfanconfigurations anddampercontrolsontheturbinebuildingventilation systemtoprovideadditional capability tomaintainthebuildingatsubatmospheric pressure.
Thechangeallowsmanualmanipulation ofdampersHVT-AOD101
&102,and/oroperation withonesupplyfanandtwoexhaustfanstoensuretheabilitytomaintainslightnegativepressureintheturbinebuilding.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thechangetoturbinebuildingventilation systemopera'tion enhancestheabilitytomaintainslightnegativepressureintheturbinebuildingwithrespecttoatmospheric, thusmaintaining thedesignbasesoftheturbinebuildingasdescribed intheUSAR.Thisisanonsafety-related system,andthischangehasnoimpactonsafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Thischangewillnotresultinanyadditional radioactive releasesfromtheplantand,infact,willenhancetheabilitytopreventanunmonitored releasefromtheplant.Noequipment hasbeenadded,deletedormodifiedasaresultofthischange.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage45of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-050,Rev.1Temporary Mods.92-053and92-055USARAffectedPages!System:TitleofChange:N/AVitalBus(VBB)Temporary Bypassof2VBB-UPS1C and2VBB-UPS1D Description ofChange:Thesetemporary modifications connected theloadsofuninterruptible powersupplies(UPSs)2VBB-UPS1C and2VBB-UPS1D directlytothealternate powersourcesoftheindividual UPSunits,whicharethe600-Vacstubbuses(2NJS-US5 and2NJS-US6).
Thepurposeofthischangewastopermitreplacement ofthesubjectUPSunitsunderModification PN2Y89MX042, whilemaintaining operabletheplantcommunications andessential lightingloadsthataresuppliedbytheUPSunits.Onlyoneofthesetemporary modifications wasinplaceatanyonetime.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheloadsoftheaffectedUPSunits(2VBB-UPS1C and2VBB-UPS1D) areessential lightingandcommunication circuits.
Thesetemporary changeseliminated the125-Vdcbatterybackupbyconnecting theUPSloadsdirectlywiththe'alternate powersupplies(the600-Vacstubbuses2NJS-US5and2NJS-US6) whicharenormallyfedfromthestationtransformer 2STX-XNS1.
Intheeventofalossofnormalpower,thesestubbuseswouldbeconnected tooffsitepowerthroughthereservestationtransformers 2RTX-XSR1A/B.
Intheeventoflossofnormalandoffsitepower,thesestubbusescouldbemanuallyconnected totheemergency dieselgenerators (exceptinaLOCAsituation).
Theemergency andthe8-hourbattery-pack lightingsystemswhicharerequiredforthesafeshutdownequipment areasoftheplant,including theaccessandegressroutesthereto(required per10CFR50AppendixR),arenotaffectedbythesetemporary modifications.
Alternate methodsofcommunication arealsoavailable duringthetimethatthepageparty/public addresssystemiswithouttheuninterruptible powersource.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesetemporary changesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage46of93SafetyEvaluati.on No.:Xmplementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-052Temporary Mod.92-044N/AN/AReroutetheSecurityFencetoSupporttheDemolition of"AreaComplex"BuildingandtheConstruction oftheSwingBuildingDescription ofChange:Thistemporary modification installed a"bubblefence"andreroutedthesecurityfencetosegregate theareacomplexsitefromtheprotected areaofNineMilePointsothatactivities associated withconstruction oftheswingbuildingwouldbeoutsidethesecurityzone.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thistemporary modification doesnotresultinasignificant elevation changeinthefloodinglevelswithinthebermareaoftheNineMilePointsite.Therefore, rerouting thesecurityfenceandconstruction ofthe"bubblefence"donotdisturbthoseattributes ofthesiteintheimmediate vicinityoftheplantwhichsafelydivertthelocalprobablemaximumprecipation (PMP)runoffoverlandtoLakeOntario.Thetemporary "bubblefence"wasconstructed following securityprocedures andregulation.
Thefenceisequippedwithsecurityintrusion detection, andaclosed-circuit TVcamera(CCTV)wasinstalled inaccordance withlOCFRPart73.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage47of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-056Technical TestProcedure N2-TTP-LTC-9001 USARAffectedPages:System:N/ANormalandReserveStationServiceTransformers TitleofChange:Description ofChange:SetupandTestingofLoadTapChangersThischangeconsisted oftestingtoverifysetupoftheloadtapchangers(LTC)automatic controlsforbothreservestationservice(RSS)transformers andthenormalstationservice(NSS)transformer, andtofunctionally verifytheLTC'sabilitytocontrolbusvoltagewhenoperatedinautomatic.
ThecontrolsoftheLTCshadbeenleftinthemanualmodeofoperation sincethestartupoftheplant.Thetestswereperformed duringnormalplantoperation.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:BoththeRSStransformers (2RTX-XSR1A and1B)andtheNSStransformer (2STX-XNS1A) arenonsafety related.Development andperformance oftheLTCtestsconsidered thefollowing:
1.Thetestisperformed onetransformer atatime.2.Thetestfollowsthevendor-recommended alternate methodoftesting.3.Allprecautions andprerequisites ofthetestprocedure arestrictlyadheredto.4.Lossofvoltage/sustained degradedvoltagewillstartthestandbydieselgenerator andcarrytheemergency loads.5.Anovervoltage condition ismonitored andcorrective actiontakenasrequiredbythetestprocedure.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthistestdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage48of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:.92-057,Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0018-92 USARAffectedPages!System:TitleofChange:Section5.4ReactorCoreIsolation Cooling(RCIC)RCICTurbineExhaustPressureTripSetpointModification Description ofChange:Thismodification increased thenominalRCICturbineexhaustpressuretripsetpointfrom25psigto50psig.ThischangeprovidesalongerperiodofRCICoperation beforeitsturbineistrippedoffbyhighexhaustpressureduetoincreased primarycontainment pressurefollowing postulated StationBlackout(SBO)events.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Operation ofUnit2withtheincreased RCICturbineexhaustpressuretripsetpointdoesnotaffectanyoftheUSARaccidentand/ortransient analyses.
Thenewexhaustpressuretripsetpointof50psigiswellwithinthedesignratingof165psigfortheRCICturbineexhaustcasingandthedesignratingof150psig,fortheRCICexhaustpiping.ThenewsetpointwillnothaveanadverseimpactontheRCICsystempumpingperformance asdiscussed inSection4ofGEReportNEDE-22017.
Thismodification willresultinanincreased RCICturbineglandsealleakagerate.Theradiological effectsofthishigherleakageratewillnotexceedthelimitsof10CFR20.Evaluation ofequipment qualification dataconcludes thattheRCICsystemwillcontinuetooperateattheelevatedRCICroomtemperatures resulting fromtheglandsealleakage.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage49of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-058Temporary Mods.92-071,92-072N/APrimaryContainment Purge(CPS)TitleofChange:Temporary Replacement of2CPS*AOV111 Description ofChange:Thesetemporary modifications removedsuppression chamberpurgelinecontainment isolation valve2CPS*AOV111 forrepairsandreplaceditwithtwoblankflanges.After2CPS*AOV111 wasrepaired, itwasreinstalled, tested,andreturnedtoservice.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thesetemporary modifications allow2CPS*AOV111 toberemovedforrepairsandatthesametimeprovidecontainment isolation inaccordance withTechnical Specification 3.6.3.Theblankflangemeetsorexceedsthedesignpressure, temperature, andleakagerequirements thatweremetby2CPS*AOV111.
Installation oftheblankflangesresultsintheunavailability
.ofthenormalsuppression chamberpurgeflowpath.Intheeventofanaccidentoccurring whiletheblankflangesareinstalled, alternate pathwaysareavailable tocontrolhydrogenconcentration inthesuppression chamber,performemergency containment venting,andconductpostaccident cleanupoperations.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthistemporary changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage50of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange:92-059,Rev.1Unit1Mod.No.N1-86-026 N/ATSCEmergency Ventilation (Systemf212)AdditiontoTSCVentilation ControlPanelDescription ofChange:Thismodification installed indication lightsforTechnical SupportCenter(TSC)emergency ventilation fanFN-1anddampers212-42,212-31and212-87,locatedinthecharcoalfilterroom,aswellasindication lightsfornormal/emergency powersource.AdigitaltimerwasalsowiredtokeyswitchKS-2.ThetimerrunsonlywhentheTSCventilation systemisintheemergency modeofoperation.
Allindication isprovidedontheTSCventilation controlpanelATPC-1,locatedintheTSC.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification providesindication attheTSCventilation controlpaneltomonitorstatusofventilation equipment relatedtotheTSC,withoutrequiring occupants toexittheTSC.Allowingpersonnel toremainintheTSCduringemergency conditions decreases thepossibility ofpersonnel contamination andlossofvaluableTSC'personnel time.Thenewequipment/material introduced bythismodification onlyaffectstheTSCemergency ventilation system.ItisisolatedfromotherareasofNMP1andNMP2whichcouldaffectthesafeshutdownofeitherplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoes.notinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
Safety.Evaluation SummaryReportPage51of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-062Simple.DesignChangeSC2-168-92 USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.2ServiceWater(SWP),Reactor,BuildingVentilation (HVR)SimpleDesignChangetoEnhanceUnitCoolerTesting-RelatedtoSecondary Containment DrawdownDescription ofChange:Thischangeaddedflangestotheservicewaterpipelinestounitcoolers2HVR*UC404B and2HVR*UC407E tofacilitate performance testingofthisequip'ment.
Testingisperformed toensureunit,cooleroperability.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangeenhancestheabilitytoperformance testunitcoolers2HVR*UC404B and2HVR*UC407E.
Theoriginaldesignbasisofthepipingsupportsismaintained.
Pipinginstallation andmaterialisASMEIIIClass3underthejurisdiction ofASMEXI.Thus,themodification willnotadversely affectthesafetyfunctionofanyofthestructures, systemsorcomponents.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage52of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-063SimpleDesignChangeSC2-281-92 USARAffectedPages:System!TitleofChange:Section9.3Instrument AirSystemReviseUpdatedSafety'Analysis ReportInstrument Air/Nitrogen ParticleSizeLimitfrom3Micronsto40MicronsDescription ofChange:AsaresultofGenericLetter88-14,theparticlesizelimitforinstrument air/nitrogen hasbeenrevisedfrom3micronsto40microns.The3-micronparticlesizelimitwasbasedonANSIMC11.1-1976, "QualityStandards forInstrument Air"(nowStandardISA-S7.3).
Thenew40-micron limitisbaseduponactualvendorrequirements statedinthevendorinstruction manualstoprotectequipment frombeingdamagedbyparticulate intrusion.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:The40-micron limitestablished bytheequipment vendorswillavoidpluggingandwear/erosion ofairpassagesandorificesofequipment duetoparticulate intrusion.
Thischangetookexception to*the3-micronlimitcontained inStandardISA-S7.3andestablished anew40-micron limitbasedonvendorrecommendations.
Allplantinstrument airandnitrogenuserswillfunctionasdesignedwiththenewparticlesizelimitof40micronswithnoadverseeffects.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage53of93SafetyEvaluati.on No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:92-064,Rev.1LDCNU-1674Section3A.34N/AAdditionofIMAGESComputerSoftwaretoUSARAppendix3AforStructural/Equipment AnalysisThischangepermitstheuseofIMAGEScomputersoftwareinqualifying safety-related structures andequipment, asanalternative tootherwell-known mainframe computerprograms.
IMAGESisacompletedesktopFiniteElementsAnalysisPackageforthePC(byCelestial
- Software, Inc.),withthecapability toperformstatic,thermal,modalanddynamicanalysesinwayssimilartoSTRUDL,STARDYNE, andANSYSmainframe computerprograms.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheIMAGEScomputersoftwarehasbeenbenchmarked totheanalytical resultspublished intheliterature inaccordance withCSI'sQualityAssurance ProgramandStandardReviewPlan3.9.ThisQAProgramhasbeenauditedandacceptedbyNMPCQA.ItmeetstheintentofNMPC'sNuclearDivisionSoftwareQAProgramPlan.Inaddition, NMPCperformed limitedprogramverification onIMAGESbysatisfactorily comparing itssolutions tosolutions obtainedfromtherecognized, widely-known STRUDLprogram.TheIMAGESprogrammeetsthemethodologies andcommitments described inUSARSections3.7,3.9,3.10andAppendix6A.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage54of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:92-066Procedure N2-OP-10A N/ACirculating Water(CWS)DefeatLowSuctionPressureTripInterlock forCWSPumpsThistemporary changedefeatsthelowsuctionpressuretripfortheoperating CWSpumpswhilestartingastandbypump.LeadsareliftedattheCWSpumpswitchgear todefeatthistripfunction, whileatthesametimemaintaining thelowsuctionpressurealarmandcomputerpointoperable.
Following successful pumpstart,theliftedleadsarerelandedtorestorethesystemtoitsdesignconfiguration.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepurposeofthischangeistopreventinadvertent operating pumptripfromamomentary lowsuctionpressurecondition whilestartingastandbypump.Sufficient instrumentation willremainavailable toalerttheOperators shouldasustained degradedcondition exist.Thisactivityisprocedurally controlled andrequiresindependent verification forliftingandrelanding theleads.Thelowsuctionpressuretrip,aswellastheentireCWSsystem,doesnotperformasafety-related function.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthistemporary changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage55of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-067,Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0253-92 USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.2ServiceWaterSDCgSC2-0253-92, DeleteServiceWatertoCirculating WaterMakeupHeaderPressureLowAnnunciator (Nuisance Alarm)Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangedeletedcontrolroomannunciators CEC601123 andCEC601213.
Pressureswitches2SWP*PSL142A, 2SWP*PSLX142A, 2SWP*PSL142B, 2SWP*PSLX142B andtheirassociated alarmcircuitsweredisconnected andsparedinplace.2SWP*PT142A and2SWP*PT142B continuetoprovideservicewatertocirculating watermakeupheaderpressuresignalsavailable forinformation onlyread-outonthePMScomputerdisplayinthecontrolroom.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissimpledesignchangeeliminated controlroomannunciators whicharecontinuously inalarmandanuisanceanddistraction tothecontrolroomoperators.
Thischangehasnoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Adequateindication existswithouttheseannunciators, tokeep,operators informedastothestatusoftheservicewatersystemtocirculating watersystemmakeupheaders.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage56of93SafetyEvaluation No.!Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-070N/ASections9A.2,9A.3,13.1N/AReduction FireBrigadeStaffingthroughPartialCombination oftheUnitFireBrigadesDescription ofChange:ThischangereducestheunitFireBrigadestaffingtoaminimumofaFireChiefandtwoFireFighters.
Thisresultsinaminimumsiteresponseorganization offiveBrigademembers.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Establishing aunitstaffsizeofaFireChiefandtwoFireFightersachievestherequirements of10CFR50AppendixRandBTPCMEB9.5-1,'hich requiresthatatleastfiveBrigademembersrespondtoafire.Ofthesefiveresponders, theFireChiefandtwomembersmustbefamiliarwiththeeffectsoffireandfiresuppression activities onplantsystems.Thereduction inunit-dedicated FireBrigadestaffinglevelswillnowtresultinalesserresponsetoafire(eitherinnumberofpersonnel fightingthefireorinasignificant increaseintheirresponsetime),orinalossoffirewatchorsurveillance/maintenance activities.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionanddoesnotdecreasetheeffectiveness ofthefireprotection program.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage57of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange:92-071Procedure N2-OP-1N/AMainSteam(MSS),ReactorCoreIsolation Cooling(RCIC)DefeatInterlock ofMSSDrainValve2MSS*MOV189 Description ofChange:Valve2MSS*MOV189 isadrainvalvefromtheRCICsteamsupplylinethatconnectsintoacommondrainlineforthemainsteamlines.Thevalvehasaninterlock thatmaintains itopenwheneveroneoftheRCICisolation valvesisshut,toremoveanycondensation fromtheRCICsteamsupplyheader.Thistemporary alteration defeatsthisinterlock toallowvalveclosurewhenamainsteamline(MSL)isisolated.
Defeating the2MSS*MOV189 interlock isaccomplished byliftingtheleadonterminalpoint.AA-7,2CEC-PNL856 BayD.Thisremovestheautomatic openfunctiononly.'emote manualcontrolofthevalveandtheautoclosefunctionisunaffected.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:WithaMSLisolated, adrainpathisestablished toallowsteam/condensate inthemainsteampipingtodraintothemaincondenser, asrecommended inGeneralElectricServiceInformation LetterNumber404.IftheRCICsystembecomesisolatedduetoclosureofvalves2ICS*MOV121 or2ICS*MOV128, 2MSS*MOV189 willautomatically opentoestablish adrainpath.Thesubsequent resultant pressureinthecombinedMSLdrainheadercouldaffecttheproperdrainageofthemainsteamlines.Thedefeating oftheinterlock for2MSS*MOV189 isonlyrequiredwhenRCICisalreadyisolatedandconsidered inoperable.
Technical Specification 3/4.7.4alreadydirectsactionstobetakeninthecaseofaninoperable RCICsystem.Controlofdefeating andrestoring thisinterlock willbeinaccordance withapprovedprocedures.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage58of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-072,Rev.1SpecialOperating Procedures N2-SOP-01, 02,03USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/AN/AStationBlackout(Complete LossofACPower)Description ofChange:Threespecialoperating procedures (SOPs)havebeendeveloped forcopingwithastationblackout(SBO).TheseSOPsmaybeexecutedconcurrently withtheapplicable emergency operating procedures (EOPs)~1~N2-SOP-01 isaflowchart-based procedure designedtoguidetheoperators throughtheactionsrequiredtocopewiththeSBOeventaswellastogivedirection forrecovery.
2.N2-SOP-02 isasupportprocedure forN2-SOP-01, andprovidesspecificdirections foroperators inresponsetoaSBOeventtoachievestableshutdownconditions.
3~N2-SOP-03 wascreatedinordertoconsolidate theactionsneededforpowerrestoration intoasingleprocedure.
AlthoughN2-SOP-03 containssomeSBOspecificsteps(i.e.,canonlybeperformed duringanSBO),itcanalsobeusedfor,anylossofoffsiteacpowerorlossofonsiteemergency acpower(i.e.,non-SBOpowerlosses).SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheresultsoftheSBOanalysisshowthatwithcertainspecificoperatoractions,NMP2canoperatelongerthan4hourswithoutjeopardizing corecoolingorthecontainment capability.
Operatoractionsneededtoachievethiscapability includesheddingofnonessential batteryloads,maintaining manualRCICflowcontrol,andthebypassing ofcertainRCICisolation logics.Theseactionsareaddressed inN2-SOP-01, 02,and03,whichdirectoperators tomakeuseofavailable plantsystemstocopewithaSBOanddo.notconflictinanywaywithestablished EOPs.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage59of93SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:92-072,Rev.1(cont'd.)
(cont'd.)
Theactions'pecified inN2-SOP-01, 02and03areinaccordance withcommitments madebyNMPCtotheNRC.NRCacceptance ofNMPC'sresponses andcommitments regarding theSBOissueweredocumented intheNRCsafetyevaluation datedMay29,1991,andsupplements datedNovember21,1991,andFebruary7,1992.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage60of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-074,Rev.0,1&2SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0387-91 USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.3Instrument Air(IAS)IASStrainer40BlowdownValveReplacement Description ofChange:Thissimpledesignchangereplacedtheblowdownconnection fromstrainer2IAS-STR40, including globevalve2IAS-V355.
Theweightoftheassembly, inadditiontotheforcerequiredtoopenandclosethevalve,hadproventoogreatforthe1/4"NPTconnection atthebottomofthestrainerbody.Thereplacement connection utilizedtubeproductsandcompression
- fittings, andtheglobevalvewasreplacedwithaNUPROplugvalve.Thismaterialislighter,andoperation oftheblowdownisolation valverequireslesstorque.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orsafeshutdowncapability oftheplant.Thedesignofthereplacement connection exceedsthatoftheexistingconnection andprovidesaleak-tight, easilymaintained andoperatedstrainerblowdownconnection, thusmaintaining systemintegrity.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage61of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!System:92-076,Rev.0,1&2Mod.PN2Y89MX133 Section9.2ServiceWater(SWP),ReactorBuildingVentilation (HVR),YardStructures Ventilation (HVY),ControlBuildingA/C(HVC),DieselGenerator Bui:lding Ventilation (HVP)TitleofChange!ProvideBreakoutSpoolsforUnitCoolersnotRelated'to DrawdownDescription ofChange:NRCGenericLetter89-13requiresthatsafety-related components cooledbyservicewaterbeadequately maintained andtested.Currently atNMP2,thecapability doesnotexisttoisolateandtestsomesafety-related unitcoolers.Thescopeofthemodification includesprovision ofbreakoutspoolstothesupplyand/orreturnlinesofsafety-related unitcoolersthatarenotrelatedtosecondary containment drawdown.
Revision1tothesafetyevaluation wasissuedtoindicatechangesinthelocationofcentralflanges.Revision2tothesafetyevaluation wasissuedtorevisetheresponsetoquestionDontheCertificate ofCompliance toNRCstandards.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Themodifiedpipingissafety-related andtherequirements of10CFR50AppendixBapply.Theoriginaldesignbasisofthepipingandsupportsismaintained.
Pipinginstallation andmaterialisASMEIIIClass3underthejurisdiction ofASMEXI.Themodification willnotadversely affectthesafetyfunctionofanyofthestructures, systemsorcomponents.
Inaddition, thecapability tosafelyshutdowntheplantandmaintainitinasafeshutdowncondition willnotbeadversely affected.
Themodification doesnotaffectthePlantTechnical Specifications, andcomponents addedormodifiedbythismodification arenotsubjecttoanyTechnical Specification surveillances.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage62of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleoiChange:92-077Procedure N2-CTP-CWS-807 N/ACirculating WaterSystem(CWS)WaterTreatment Hypochlorite (WTH)Justification ofCirculating WaterSodiumHypochlorite AdditionDescription ofChange:Thischangeallowsforaprocedurally-controlled temporary alteration tobeusedinlieuofthepermanent plantWTHsystemtoaccomplish hypochlorite injection intotheCWSsystem.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theadditionofsodiumhypochlorite tothecirculating water,bydirectpumpingfrombarrelsintothecoolingtowerflumes,allowscontinued controlofbiological growthwithinthecirculating waterandthecoolingtowerwhiletheWTHsystemisinoperative.
Securingthecirculating waterblowdownallowssiteChemistry toachievechlorinelevelsinthecirculating waterbelowlimitssetbytheSPDESpermitpriortoreopening
- blowdown, ortoenactpropercontrolsasdelineated withinsiteprocedures.
TheWTHsystemisnotrequiredforsafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Themethodofaddingsodiumhypochlorite tothecirculating waterdoesnotimpactcontinued operation oftheCWSsystem.Thismethodofaddingsodiumhypochlorite tocirculating waterprovidesanalternate meansofperforming anonsafety-relatedfunctionthathasnonegativeimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage63of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-079SimpleDesignChangeSC2-282-92 USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.2ServiceWater(SWP)&ReactorBuildingVentilation (HVR)SimpleDesignChangetoEnhanceUnitCoolerTesting-RelatedtoSecondary Containment DrawdownDescription ofChange:ThischangeaddedunionstotheSWPpipelinestounitcooler2HVR*UC406 tofacilitate flushingandperformance testingofthisequipment.
Testingisrequiredtoensureunitcooleroperability.'afety Evaluation Summary:Thischangeenhancedtheabilitytoflushandperformance testunitcooler2HVR*UC406.
Thecapability tocounteract variousheatloadsisdependent ontheperformance oftheunitcoolers.Themodification willnotadversely affectthesafetyfunctionofanyofthestructures, systemsorcomponents.
Theoriginaldesignbasisofthepipingandpipesupportswillbemaintained.
Themodification willnotadversely impactsafeshutdownoftheplantorthecapability tomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage64of93SafetyEvaluation No.sImplementation DocumentNo.sUSARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChangesDescription ofChange:92-080,.Rev.0&1Calculation EC-032Section8.3N/AUpdateDieselLoadingTablesTables8.3-1,8.3-2and8.3-3oftheUSARtabulatethedesignbasisaccidentdieselgenerator loadingpossibilities fortheDivisionI,IIandIIIdieselgenerators.
Tables8.3-5and8.3-6arethetotalsoftheseloadingtables.Thebasisforthesetablesiscalculation EC-032.Table8.3-4liststhesafety-related loadsbypowersource;thebasesforthesenumbersweretestreportsprovidedbyvendorsduringplantconstruction.
Thefollowing changesweremade:1~AlltheloadslistedinthetableswerereviewedagainsttheGENEtestdatasheetsforthemotorsandcorrections weremadeasneeded.Anycorrections inloadinginTables8;3-1and8.3-2werealsoreflected inthetotalloadingTables8.3-5and8.3-6.2.Thepowerfactorsforthe4-kVmotorswererevisedtoprovideconsistency betweenthevariouselectrical analyses.
3.ThischangedisplayssomeofthedatainTables8.3-1,8.3-2and8.3-3inadifferent formatbutallofthesamebasicinformation isstillavailable fromthetables.4~5.Corrections toTable8.3-3weremadeasnotalltheloadspoweredbytheDiv.IIIdieselgenerator wereoriginally listed.Itiscurrently assumedthat204ofmotor-operated valve(MOV)runningloadsareonaftertheinitial2minutesofdieselgenerator loadingsequence.
Thisassumption ischangedtoassume104oftherunningloadsareoperating.
6.Revisions toTables8.3-5and8.3-6weremadetoaddressadministratively controlling theloadingofthedieselgenerators.
Tables8.3-1and8.3-2showallthesameloadsasbefore;onlytheformatforpresenting thisinformation haschanged.Table8.3-3includessomeexistingloadsthatwerenotpreviously includedintheloadtabulations.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage65of93SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:92-080,Rev.0&1(cont'd.)
Thelayoutofthetableinformation hasbeenchangedtoprovidemoreinformation.
Thisdatahasalsobeencheckedagainsttheas-builtdataandupdatedwherenecessary.
ThetotalkWloadonthedieselgenerators isshowntohavechanged.ThetotalkWloadforallthreedieselgenerators isstillunderthecontinuous ratingof4400kWfortheDiv.IandIIdieselgenerators and2600kWfortheDiv.IIIdieselgenerator.
Itisnowassumedthat10%oftheMOVsarerunningafterthefirst2minutesofdieselloading,whichisstillconservative.
AnoteforTables8.3-5and8.3-6waschangedtoallowtheuseofNMP2operating procedures toprovidedirection forcontrolling loadingofthedieselgenerators duringaloss-of-offsite powerwithdelayedloss-of-coolant accident.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage66of93SafetyEvaluation No.:1mplementatkon DocumentNo.:92-081SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0289-091 USARAffectedPages:System:Section9.5Engine-Driven FirePumpFuelOi:1TitleofChange:DieselFirePumpValveDescription ofChange:Thismodification permanently replacedthespringreturnballvalveonthefueloilsupplypipingtothedieselfirepumpwithamanualplugvalve.TheuseofthemanualvalveinthelockedopenpositioncomplieswithNFPA20andisinaccordance withtheregulatory guidanceofBranchTechnical Position(BTP)9.5-1.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangeassuresreliableoperation ofthedieselfirepumpbyeliminating thepotential forclosingthefueloilsupplyvalveduringafireemergency.
ThischangecomplieswithNFPA20andBTP9.5-1requirements.
Theabilitytosafelyoperate,orshutdowntheplantintheeventofafire,hasnotbeenadversely affectedbythischange.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage67of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-083,Rev.1Procedures N2-OP-13, N2-OP-14N/AReactorBuildingClosedLoopCooling(CCP),TurbineBuildingClosedLoopCooling(CCS),MakeupWater(MWS)TitleofChange:Temporary HoseInstallations ontheMakeupWaterSystemto'upportFreezeSealActivities Description ofChange:Freezesealswereinstalled toisolateasmallportionofthemakeupwatersystemtoallowmaintenance onleakingflowtotalizer indicator switches2MWS-FQIS121 and2MWS-FQIS122.
InordertomaintaintheCCPandCCSsystemsoperablewhilethefreezesealswereestablished, hoseswereroutedtobypassthefreezeseallocation, allowingmakeupwaterflowtosurgetanks2CCP-TK1and2CCS-TK1asdemandnecessitated.
Thehoseswereconnected toeitherventordrain'onnections oneachsideofthefreezeseals.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thetemporary hoseinstallations andfreezesealswillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperation orsafeshutdowncapability oftheplant.Failureofatemporary hoseorpipingwithinthefreezeareawillnotaffectnuclearsafety.Essential equipment receivescoolingwaterfromthesafety-related servicewatersystem.Useoffreezesealsandthetemporary hosesisprocedurally controlled.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthistemporary changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage68of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-085SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0335-92 USARAffectedPages:System:Section9.5Miscellaneous Equipment andFloorDrains(DFM)TitleofChange:Auxiliary BoilerBuildingEquipment DrainsDescription ofChange:Thisevaluation addressed twoissuesconcerning pipinganddrainsassociated withtheauxiliary boilerbuilding.
Thefirstissuewasadocumentation-only changetoshowsmallborefeedwater pumpdrainline2-ABF-001-83-4 discharging toequipment drain2DFM-ED2002 insteadof2DFM-ED2003.
Thesecondissueinvolvedtheinstallation ofan8"x4"concentric pipereducertoconvertequipment drain2DFM-ED2003 toafunnelequipment drain.Thedocumentation changewasmadetoaccurately reflectexistingplantconditions.
Theconversion ofequipment drain2DFM-ED2003 toafunneldrainincreased thedrainopeningsizesoastopreventwaterspillageandpotential slabcontamination.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thedocumentation changeprovidesclarification oftheactualplantconfiguration anddoesnotrepresent anyphysicalchangetotheplant.Themodification todrain2DFM-ED2003 willenhancetheoperation andfunctionofthedrainandreducethelikelihood ofwaterspillageandpossibleslabcontamination.
Theoriginalequipment draindesignisnotaffectedbythesechangesasnonewwatersourcesforthedrainarebeingintroduced.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage69of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-086Procedures NTP-TQS-201 Rev.1,NTP-TQS-505 Rev.0USARAffectedPages:System:Section13.2NuclearTrainingProcedures (NTP)TitleofChange:RadwasteOperatorTrainingSupervisor ChangeDescription ofchange:ThischangeallowsRadwasteOperatorTrainingtobeunderthesupervision ofeithertheGeneralSupervisoi Operations TrainingortheGeneralSupervisor Technical Training.
Thisoptionallowsflexibility ofprogramadministration inthemostefficient andcost-effective manner.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangeimprovesdistribution ofadministrative workloadforNuclearTrainingbyallowingtheGeneralSupervisor Technical Trainingtosupervise theRadwasteOperatorTrainingprogram,whilenotprecluding theGeneralSupervisor Operations Trainingfromsupervising theprograminthefuture.Thischangeisstrictlyadministrative andwillnotaffectconductofRadwasteOperatortraining.
TrainingwillcontinuetomeetINPOaccredited trainingprogramstandards.
RadwasteOperators arenotLicensedReactorOperators and,assuch,theINPOcriteriaforanaccredited trainingprogramarethesameasfortherestoftheTechnical Traininggroups.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage70of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange:92-087N/ASection8.3ReactorBuildingLighting(LAR),ControlBuildingLighting(LAC),ReactorBuildingDrains(DER)RevisiontotheNMP2USARTables8.3-16,PrimaryContainment Electrical Penetrations andPenetration Conductors WhichAreNotRequiredDuringReactorOperation andAreProtected byDe-energization, and8.3-17,Overcurrent Protective DevicesforNonclass1ELighting*FixturesonClass1EEmergency SystemDescription ofChange:ThischangerevisedUSARTable8.3-16toreflectas-installed.
plantconditions forthosecircuitsassociated withelectrical penetrations andelectrical penetration conductors.
whicharerequiredtobede-energized duringreactoroperation.
Inaddition, USARTable8.3-17wasrevisedtoremoveextraneous information.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThischangerevisedTable8.3-16toincludealightingcircuitwhichisrequiredtobede-energized forelectrical penetration andpenetration protection duringreactoroperation, andremovedthosecircuitswhicharenolongerrequiredtobede-energized duetoplantconfiguration changes.Additionally, Table8.3-17wasrevisedtoremovesuperfluous information, suchasbreakermanufacturer andbreakersize,whichisnotrequiredforatabulation ofthoselightingcircuitswhichisolatesafety-andnonsafety-related circuitry.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage71of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:92-089N/A'SARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/A115-kVOffsitePowerSourcesTemporary ChangetoScribaSubstation to'Jumper EitherBreakerR50,R60,R115orR225Description ofChange:Thisevaluation addressed theeffectofinstalling atemporary changeattheScribaSubstation tobypasseitherbreakerR50,R115,R60orR225ifanyoneofthemshouldfail.Thisbypassallowstheoffsite115-kVsourcetobereenergized ifoneofthebreakersshouldfail.Onebreakerforeachsourcemaybebypassed, butnotboth.IfbreakerR50orR60isbypassed, thenthetransfertripsignalwillbewiredtoR115orR225,respectively.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheexistingUnit2protection schemeswillnotbechanged.Theonlydifference iswhichbreakerintheScribaSubstation willbetrippedbythetransfertripschemefromUnit2.Thereliability andprotection ofthetwooffsitesourcesforUnit2,lines5and6(sourcesAandB),willnotbeaffected.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthistemporary changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage72of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!93-001Temporary Mod.93-00510.4-20,Figures10.4-8Sh.8,10.4-7dSystem!TitleofChange:Circulating WaterSystem(CWS)BypassofFailedCoolingTowerBasinRTDDescription ofChange:Thisevaluation addressed thetemporary removalofafailedcoolingtowertemperature detector.
Signalwiresfromthedefective coolingtowerbasinwatertemperature detectorwereliftedtoprevent.potential spuriousautomatic ModeIVoperation (warmwaterbypass)ofthecoolingtower.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thetwo-out-of-four lowbasinwatertemperature logicwhichautomatically initiates theModeIVoperation ofthecoolingtowertoatwo-out-of-three logicwasfoundacceptable.
Thechangeprevented afaultyinstrument, fromspuriously initiating theautomatic function.
- Operations personnel stillmaintained adequatemonitoring andcontrolcapabilities oftheinstruments, temperatures, andsystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage73of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo;:93-006,Rev.1Specification P304SA,Procedure NMP2-IST-001 Rev.3,2PPD-GL-89-10 Rev.1USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:Section3.9ADBAHydrogenRecombiner SystemUpdateUSAR.Table 3.9A-12"ActiveValves(BOP)"ThischangerevisedUSARTable3.9A-12,listofactivevalves,.to agreewithdescriptions intheUSAR;withNMP2-IST-001 Rev.3,"PumpandValveFirstTen-YearIn-service TestingProgramPlan"gand2PPD-GL-89-10 Rev.1,"Motor-Operated ValveProgramPlanDescription for-NineMilePointNuclearStationUnitg2."SafetyEvaluation Summary:Table3.9A-12wasrevisedtochangethevalvetypeandmanufacturer for2HCS*MOVlA, 2HCS*MOV1B,
'2HCS*MOV3A, 2HCS*MOV3Bg 2HCS*MOV4A, 2HCS*MOV4B, 2HCS*MOV6A, and2HCS*MOV6B fromVelanglobetoWestinghouse gate.Also,thevalveoperatormodelnumberfor2HCS*MOV1A, 2HCS*MOV1B, 2HCS*MOV3A and2HCS*MOV3B waschangedfromSMB-000-5 toSMB-00-10.
Thetableisnowconsistent withas-builtplantconditions anddesignbasisdocuments (designspecification NMP2-P304SA).
Thischangehasnoimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Nophysicalhardwarechangesarerequired; therefore, thefunctionandoperability ofthevalvesis,notaffected.
Thechangefromglobetogatevalveswaspreviously reportedinsubmittal letterdatedApril28,1989,underSafetyEvaluation 88U-008.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage74of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System!TitleofChange:93-009Procedures GAP-POL-01 Rev.01,NEP-POL-300 Rev.01Sections13.1,13.2N/ARestructuring ofNuclearSupportOrganization Functions inAccordance withRevisedProcedures GAP-POL-01 andNEP-POL-300 Description ofChange:Changeshavebeenmadetothecorporate levelmanagement andt;echnical supportstructure ofNMPC'sNuclearDivisionincluding:
reorganizing theLicensing BranchandInformation Management BranchoftheNuclearSupportOrganization back*under theNuclearEngineering Organization; reorganizing theTrainingBranchandEmergency Preparedness BranchoftheNuclearSupportOrganization backundertheNuclearGeneration Organization; reorganizing theProcurement BranchofNuclearSupportundertheNuclearGeneration Organization; dissolving theNuclearSupportOrganization andeliminating thepositionofVicePresident NuclearSupport.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theneworganizational structure providesfortheintegrated management ofactivities that.supporttheoperation andmaintenance ofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2.TheVicePresident NuclearGeneration willhaveoverallresponsibility forthesupportfunctions ofTraining, Emergency Preparedness, andProcurement, inadditiontohisotherresponsibilities.
TheVicePresident NuclearEngineering willhaveoverallresponsibility forthesupportfunctions ofLicensing andInformation Management, inadditiontohisotherresponsibilities.
Thesechangesprovideclearcorporate management control/direction ofonsiteandoffsitesupportfunctions.
Thesechangesallowfordissolving the-NuclearSupportOrganization andeliminating thepositionofVicePresident NuclearSupport.Basedontheanalysisperformed, theneworganizational structure forthesupportfunctions ofLicensing, Information Management,
- Training, Emergency Preparedness, andProcurement doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage75of93SafetyEvaluation No.sImplementation DocumentNo.sUSARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChanges93-014ProcessControlProgram,GAP-POL-01, GAP-OPS-01 Sections13.1,13.5N/ARadwasteOperations Reorganization Description ofChange:Responsibilities forRadwasteOperations wastransferred fromtheManagerOperations totheManagerRadiation Protection.
Thechangeprovidessingle-point accountability forradioactive wasteshippingandimprovestheefficiency ofradwasteprocessing.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thereorganization providesacloserworkrelationship betweenRadwasteOperators andRadiation Protection workers.Thisreorganization doesnotaffectTechnical Specifications,
'thesafeoperation, orthesafeshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed; itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage76of93SafetyEvaluation No.sImplementation DooumentNo.:USARMfectedPages:93-015Temp.Mod.93-017Figure10.1-6CSystem:TitleofChange:RemovalofReactorWaterFeedPumpP1B,PumpSealVentValvesDescription ofChange:Thischangerelatestothereactorfeedpumpsealwatersystem(FWP),whichsuppliessealwatertothereactorfeedpumpsmechanical sealstominimizefeedwater outleakage.
Temporary Modification 93-017documents andcontrolsthetemporary removalofvalves2FWP-V2000B and2FWP-V2001B andtheinstallation ofthreadedcapsintheirplaceuntilthevalvesarereinstalled.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisreview,whichincludedtheeffectsofthechangeonthesystemsoperability, reliability, maintainability, structural integrity, andsysteminteractions, hasfoundthattheimplementation ofthischangewillnotcauseanysignificant safetyoroperability issues.Theycanbeloosenedtoventanyentrapped airand,duetotheirweight,havenoeffectonstructural integrity.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage77of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange!93-016Procedure NIP-TQS-01 Section13.1N/AChangestoNIP-TQS-01 toDescribeNineMilePointUnit1andNineMilePointUnit2StaffPositions Comparable toANSIN18.1-1971 andANSI/ANS3.1-1978Description ofChange:Thischangecross-references titlesusedforstaffmembersatNineMilePointUnit1andNineMilePointUnit2tocomparable positions asshowninANSI/ANS3.1-1978.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangeclarifies thestaffmembertitlesandtheirqualifications asrequiredbyANSI/ANS3.1-1978andascommitted tointheTechnical Specifications andUSAR.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage78of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:93-021,Rev.1Calculations HVC-072andHVC-073USARAffectedPages:System!TitleofChange:Section9.4ControlBuildingUnitCoolersTechnical Specification Interpretation f25,USARandEQDChangesDescription ofChange:USARTable9.4-1wasrevisedtoreflectnewdesigntemperatures toallowunitcoolers2HVC*UC104, 105,106E107tobeoutofservicewithoutimposinganLCO.Theequipment locatedinthezonesaffectedbyunavailability oftheaboveunitcoolerswilleithercontinuetofunction, orifitfails,itwillfailsafeandwillnotinterfere withothersafetyfunctions.
Ifanyoneoftheunitcoolers(2HVC*UC104, 105,106,107)isinoperable, thetemperature oftheaffectedareasmustbemonitored.
Ifthetemperature exceeds1044F,anequipment operability reviewshallberequired.
Inoperability ofunitcoolers2HVC*UC103A/B requiresLCO3.7.3(sevendays).Inanyoperational condition, theassociated chillershouldbetaken.outofserviceifunitcooler2HVC*UC103A orBisoutof.service.
TheproposedTechnical Specification Interpretation (TSI)f25,Rev.11,canbeusedfortheplantoperation.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Technical Specification Interpretation f25allowedcontrolbuildingunitcoolers2HVC*UC103A/B and2HVC*UC104, 105,106and107tobeoutofservicebasedonthefactthattheareascooledbytheseunitcoolerswereanalyzedforlossofcoolingandthattheconsequences willbewithinthedesignlimit.Furtherreviewindicates that2HVC*103A/B arerequiredtobeoperable.
Unitcoolers2HVC*UC104, 105,106and107canbetakenoutofservicewithoutenteringanLCO.Thefollowing providesthebasisfortheabovechanges:Inareascooledby2HVC*UC104, 106and107,itwasdetermined that,althoughtemperatures mayexceedthemaximumdesigntemperature whentheunitcoolersareoutofserviceandLOCA SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage79of93SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:93-021,Rev.1(cont'd.)
(cont'd.)
occurs,equipment willeitherwithstand thehighertemperatures, orfailsafe,orwillhaveaccomplished theirsafetyfunctionpriortoexceeding thetemperature forwhichtheyarequalified.
In230'lectrical tunnel(Div.II),cooledby2HVC*UC105, itwasdetermined thatthemaximumdesigntemperature of104'FwillnotbeexceedediftheunitcoolerisoutofserviceandLOCAoccurs.Duringnormalplantoperation withunitcoolersoperating, theareatemperatures arelowerthantheabove-defined LOCAtemperatures.
Therefore, equipment operability isnotimpacted.
However,ifduringnormalplantoperation anysafety-related unitcooler(2HVC*UC104, 105,106,107)shouldbeinoperable, andtheareatemperature exceeds104'F,anengineering evaluation willberequiredtoensureequipment operability.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage80of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages':System:TitleofChange:93-024DER2-92-4027 Section9A.3FireProtection Water(FPW)24VdcStartingBatteries Operability CriteriaDescription ofChange:Batteries 2FPW-BAT1A and1Bareusedtostartdiesel-driven firepump2FPWQ-P1.
Thischangerevisedthesurveillance requirement ofverifying.
every92daysthatthedifference inspecificgravityoftheelectrolyte betweencellsdoesnotexceed.0.015, toanewvalueof0.040.Thenewacceptance criteriaof0.040isbasedonthebatterymanufacturer's recommendation toensuresufficient chargeofthecellstostartthefirepump.Thepumpmanufacturer, whoestablished theoriginal0.015criteria, concurred withthechangeto0.040.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangeestablishes amorerealistic criterion of0.040forthespecificgravitydifference forthediesel-driven firepumpstartingbatteries.
Thenewcriterion ensuresasufficient degreeofchargeandtheoperability ofthebatteries toprovideproperstartingofthedieselfirepump.Thefireprotection systemcontinues tofunctionasdesigned, ensuringtheavailability ofequipment important tosafetyintheeventofafire.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage81of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChanges93-025,Rev.1Procedure N2-OP-53A N/AResolution ofDER2-93-0032 Operating procedure N2-OP-53A requiredthatwhenanoperating coolingunitinthecontrolroomorrelayroomisputintoPull-To-Lock (PTL)modetotestoperability, oftheredundant unit,theoperating unitisdeclaredinoperable.
Thisisnotrequiredaslongascoolingcanberestoredin10minutes.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Forsituations described inDER2-93-0032, thetimetoreachthedesigntemperature of90'Fiscalculated tobeabout13to15minutes.Ifcoolingisrestoredwithin10minutes,thenthetemperature withineitherthecontrolroomorrelayroomwillbewithinthedesignlimit,andcomponent operability isnotimpacted.
Therefore, Operating Procedure N2-OP-53A wasrevisedsuchthattheHVC*ACUsmaybeplacedinPTLfor10minuteswithoutdeclaring theoperating unitinoperable.
Basedonthe,evaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage82of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!SystemsTitleofChange:93-026GenericLetter89-13N/AHVCPerformance TestingofUnitCoolersDescription ofChangersGenericLetter89-13requiresthatheatexchangers cooledbyservicewaterberegularly testedtoevaluatetheirdesigncapacity.
Thissafetyevaluation addresses testingoftheunitcoolersusingservicewater.Sincetheunitcoolersdonothaveflowinstrumentation permanently installed, atemporary testloopwillbeconnected usingfirehose.Thetestloopwillbeinstalled inplaceofspoolpiecesinstalled forflushingandtestingunitcoolers.Testresultswillbeanalyzedtoproviderepositioning ofservicewaterflowcontrolvalveswherenecessary.'afety Evaluation Summary:Thistestprogramaddsatestlooptoaunitcooler.Theadditionofthetestloopisonlyforthedurationofeachtestandnootherchanges(pressure, pipingarrangements) arerequired.
Localized floodingfromruptureofthetestloopisboundedbypreviousfloodinganalysis.
Therefore, thetestprogramdoesnotimpairthesafeoperation oftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage83of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-031Procedures NEP-POL-300, NIP-IRG-01, NIP-ECA-04 Section13.1N/ANuclearLicensing Organizational Structure andResponsibilities
-RevisedProcedures NEP-POL-300, NIP-IRG-01 andNIP-ECA-04 Description ofChange:Theorganizational structure oftheNuclearLicensing Organization haschangedsuchthat,theManagerLicensing reportsdirectlytotheExecutive VicePresident Nuclear.Priortothischange,theManagerLicensing reporteddirectlytotheVicePresident NuclearEngineering.
Inaddition, theManagerLicensing hasassumedtheresponsibilities forinterfacing withINPO,andimplementing theQualityFirstProgram.Theseresponsibilities weretransferred fromtheManagerExecutive Staff.TheManagerExecutive Staffpositionhasbeeneliminated.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thechangesmadetotheorganizational structure oftheNuclearEngineering andNuclearLicensing Organizations continuetoprovidefortheintegrated management ofactivities thatsupporttheoperation andmaintenance ofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2.Thesechangesalsocontinuetoprovideclearmanagement controlandeffective linesofauthority andcommunications betweentheorganizational unitsinvolvedinthemanagement, operation, andtechnical supportoftheoperation ofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2.Basedonthisevaluation, theorganizational structure oftheNuclearEngineering andNuclearLicensing Organizations continues tosatisfytheacceptance criteriaofSRP13.1.1,anddoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage84of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-033,Rev.1Procedure N2-OP-94Section6.2Traversing In-CoreProbe(TIP)SystemTreatment ofTIPLeakageinLOCAAnalysisDescription ofChange:ThischangerevisedNote19ofUSARTable6.2-56asfollows:1~Thestatement thattheTIP.leakagepathconsidered intheChapter15.6.5LOCAanalysisaccountsforabreakinaTIPline"occurring simultaneously withorbecauseofadesignbasisLOCA>>wasdeleted.20Thestatement thatonlyoneoffiveTIPballvalvesisopenatatimetoconductLPRMcalibrations wasrevisedtoindicatethatamaximumoffivevalvesmaybeopenedatanyonetime.SafetyEvaluation Summary:1.Deletingthestatement thattheTIPlinebreakoccurswith.orbecauseofadesignbasisLOCAremovedaneditorial changemadeinUSARRev.0byLDCNU-238.LDCNU-983madeadditional changestoNote19inthesamerevision, withsubstantial technical explanation.
LDCNU-983indicated thatthesamestatement revisedbyLDCNU-238shouldbedeleted.Changestothesamestatement frombothLDCNswereinadvertently incorporated intoNote19.Thedeletionofthestatement resolvesthispriorinconsistency.
LeakageviaabrokenTIPguidetubeisstillconsidered intheLOCAanalysis.
2~NEDC-22253,
>>BWROGEvaluation ofContainment Isolation Concerns,"
October1982,and.NMP2compliance withtheNEDCcriteria, havebeenacceptedbytheNRC.Thissafetyevaluation summarized threetopicsinparticular from-theNEDC-22253 analysisthatprovidethebasisforallowingallfiveTIPballvalvestobeopenatatime-eventprobability, instrument linebreakconsiderations, andtheLOCAandfailureoffiveTIPguidetubes.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage85of93SafetyEvaluation No.:SafetyEvaluation Summary:93-033,Rev.1(cont'd.)
(cont'd.)
Thesechangesdidnotrequireplantmodifications.
Operating procedure N2-0P-94, "Traversing IncoreProbe",changedstepD.16toallowamaximumoffiveballvalvestobeopenedatatime.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage86of93SafetyEvaluation No.!Implementation DocumentNo.:93-034Procedures GAP-POL-01, NEP-POL-300 USARAffectedPages:Sections9A.3,13.1,13.5,AppendixBSystemsTitleofChangersN/ARestructuring ofNuclearGeneration andNuclearEngineering Organizations perRevisedProcedures GAP-POL-01 andNEP-POL-300 Description ofChange:TheNuclearGeneration andNuclearEngineering organizations arecontrolled administratively byprocedures GAP-POL-01 andNEP-POL-300, respectively.
Theseprocedures establish functional positions andresponsibilities necessary toensurethesafeandefficient operation, maintenance, modification, andtestingoftheNineMilePointNuclearStationandaredescribed inUSARChapter13.Therestructuring expandstheexistingSiteServicesorganization toincludeNuclearSecurity, Technical Services(including FireProtection, CentralMaintenance, Environmental Protection, andProcedures),
Procurement, andConstruction Services.
Relevantprocedural changes,USARchanges,andNRCapprovedPlanandProgramchangesrequiredtoimplement theneworganizational structure havebeenmade.SafetyEvaluati.on Summary:Theneworganizational structure providesfortheintegrated management ofcommonactivities tosupporttheoperation andmaintenance oftheNineMilePointNuclearStation.Thisorganizational changealteredthereporting structure ofpreviousexistingpositions but.doesnotaffecttheperformance offunctions orresponsibilities.
Thenewreporting structure providesclearmanagement controlandeffective linesofauthority andcommunications betweentheorganizational unitsinvolvedinthemanagement, operation, andtechnical supportfortheoperation ofthefacility.
Thesechangesmeettheacceptance criteriaofBranchTechnical PositionCMEB9.5.1,StandardReviewPlanChapter13.1,andTechnical Specification 6.2.1.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thattherestructured organization doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.'
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport'age87of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitlecfChange:93-049Appendix.J ProgramReviewSection6.2ResidualHeatRemovalVentingofShutdownCooling,Containment Sprayand.Suppression PoolCoolingDuringtheILRTDescription ofChange:Thischangecorrectsadiscrepancy betweentheAppendixJTypeATest(ILRT)configuration andtheUSARdescription.
Theshutdowncooling,containment sprayandsuppression poolcoolingsubsystems oftheresidualheatremovalsystemhavebeenaddedtothelistofsystemsintheUSARwhichpenetrate primarycontainment thatmaynotbeventedtotheprimarycontainment atmosphere duringtheILRT.Thischangeprovidesconsistency betweentheUnit2AppendixJProgramandtheUSARwhiletakingcreditforanexception providedby10CFR50AppendixJ.SafetyEvaluation Summary:AppendixJprovidesforanexception totheventingrequirements forsystemsthatarerequiredtomaintaintheplantinasafecondition duringtheILRT,andforthosesystemsthatarenormallyfilledwithwaterandoperateunderpostaccident conditions.
This.changetakescreditfortheAppendixJexception andhas.addedshutdowncooling,containment sprayandsuppression poolcoolingtotheappropriate listintheUSARofsystemswhichmaynotbeventedduringtheILRT.,Thischangedoesnotimpact'the capability ofthesesystemstoachieveormaintainsafeshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage88of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:93-072LER93-04Section6.2Traversing In-coreProbe(TIP)TypeBTestingofTIPBellowsAppendixJof10CFR50requiresaTypeBtestforthetraversing in-coreprobe(TIP)penetrations Z31A-Eduetothemetalbellowsarrangement.
Itwasrevealedduringanindependent reviewoftheNMP2Appendix.J programthatthesepenetrations havenotbeenTypeBtestedbuthavebeenincludedintheTypeAtest.LDCN1458,datedNovember29,1984,addedNote34toUSARTable6.2-56,whichstatedthatduetothemetalbellowsarrangement onTIPdrywellpenetration flanges,theywillbeincludedinTypeAtestingratherthanTypeBtesting.Thisnotewasinterpreted toapplytothetestingofthemetalbellowsthemselves.
Therefore, duetothisnote,theTIPpenetration bellowswerenotTypeBtestedbutwereincludedintheTypeAtest.However,noformalexemption requestfromAppendixJTypeBtestrequirements wasgenerated.
Itwasincorrectly assumedwhentheoperating licensewasissuedthattheUSARassumption ofTypeAtestingwasacceptable.
TheUSARhasbeenrevisedtocorrectly identifyTypeBtestingfortheTIPpenetration bellows.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheStandardReviewPlan(NUREG-0800) statesthattheprimarycontainment leaktestingprogram,asdescribed intheUSAR,willbeacceptable ifitmeetstherequirements of10CFR50'ppendix J.Asstatedinparagraph II.G.1ofAppendixJ,containment penetrations, whosedesignincorporates pipingpenetrations fittedwithexpansion bellowsandelectrical penetrations fittedwithflexiblemetalsealassemblies, areincludedinTypeBtesting.Conformance withtherequirements ofAppendixJconstitutes anacceptable basisforsatisfying therequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria53asitpertainstopenetrations havingresilient sealsandexpansion bellows.TheTIPpenetration bellowsarebeingincludedinTypeBtestingaswellasTypeAtestingtomeettherequirements of10CFR50AppendixJ.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage89of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!System!TitleofChange:93-084NMP2-RG197-01 Section7.5Postaccident Monitoring andDisplayInstrumentation RevisionofUnit2FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Updated)
Subsection 7.5.2.1andAssociated Table7.5-2Description ofChange:USARTable7.5-2wasrevisedtocontainonly(1)aplant-specific listingofthevariables forwhichpostaccident monitoring instrumentation istobeprovidedatNMP2,and'2)theidentification ofvariabletype(s)andthedesignation ofinstrument categoryforeachofthesevariables.
Instrument-specificdatasuchascomponent EPNnumbers,instrument scaleranges,andinstrument looppowersupplies, havebeendeletedfromthetable.Alldeviations frominstrument categorydesignations, andalldeviations
'frominstrument designandqualification criteriarecommended byRG1.97foreachofthelistedvariables, continues tobeexplicitly identified and)ustified inreferenced notes.Theplant-specific listofRG1.97variables, andtheidentified typeforeach,areunchanged.
Withtheexception ofneutronfluxvariables, theinstrument categoryspecified foreachRG1.97variableisunchanged.
ChangesmadetoUSARSection7.5.2.1reflecttherevisedscopeandcontentofrevisedTable7.5-2.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thelevelofdetailprovidedintherevisedtableisstillsufficient forreviewers toassessNMP2conformance withtherecommendations ofRG1.97.Changestothedesignated categoryforneutronfluxinstrumentation areconsistent withinformation previously identified totheNRCbyNMPCinLetterNo.NMP2L-1394, datedJune18,1993.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage90of93SafetyEvaluation No.!SafetyEvaluation Summary:93-084(cont'd.)
(cont'd.)
Theinstrument-specific datawhichwasdeletedfromtheUSARhasbeenrelocated toanewNMPCdocument, NMP2-RG197-01, "Important DesignFeaturesofRegulatory Guide1.97Instruments forNineMilePointUnit2."ThechangestoUSARSection7.5.2.1andTable7.5-2wereimplemented uponapprovalofNMP2-RG197-01.
Thesechangesdidnotphysically addanynewinstrumentation, norwereanyexistingplantstructures, systemsorcomponents deletedorinanywayphysically modified.
Implementation ofthechangesdidnotrequirechangestoTechnical Specifications.
Also,implementation ofthechangesdidnotrequirechangestoanyoperating instructions ortoanymaintenance orcalibration instructions currently specified inanyexistingplantprocedures.
Implementation ofthesechangeshasnoadverseimpactonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandareinfullcompliance withNRCstandards.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage91of93SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-086N/ASection9A.3N/A1993FireHazardsAnalysisUpdateDescription ofChangesThischangerevisedfireloadingtableinformation toshowupdatedcalculation resultsandaddtransient combustible allowance.
SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thischangerevisedinformation inthefirehazardsanalysissummarytablesduetoupdatedcalculation resultsandtheadditionofanallowable transient combustible loadingfactortoaccountforprocedurally-controlled transient combustibles.
Thefirehazardanalysis, whichisperformed inaccordance with10CFR50AppendixR,SectionII.B,andBTPCMEB9.5-1,PositionC.1.b,continues toverifythatthefirehazardsassociated withUnit2havebeenappropriately considered.
Therevisedanalysisdoesnotimpacttheabilitytosafelyshutdowntheplantintheeventofafire,andnoTechnical Specifications areimpacted.
Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage92of93USARTEXT,TABLEANDFIGURECHANGES(BASEDONPREVIOUSLY REPORTEDSAFETYEVALUATIONS)
Anumberoftextandfigurerevisions weremadetotheUSARtoincludeadditional changesthatarebasedonpreviously reportedsafetyevaluations.
Thesechangesareidentified below.SafetyEvaluation No.:87-080Previously Reported:
10/26/88ThepowersupplytotheHPCSdieselaircompressor motor(2EGA-C3) waschangedfromClass1Etonon-1E.Thefollowing additional USARfigurehasbeenupdatedaccordingly:
Figure:9.5-40aSafetyEvaluation No.:88U-077,Rev.1Previously Reported:
6/27/89Standbydieselgenerator roomemergency-duty outdoorairventilation systemairflowswitchesforapplicable exhaustfanswerepreviously relocated totheintakesideofthefansafterdetermining thelocationatthedischarge producedinaccurate monitoring capability.
Thefollowing additional USARsectionandtablehavebeenupdatedaccordingly:
Section:7.3Table:7.3-16Sh1SafetyEvaluation No.:89-044,Rev.1Previously Reported:
10/29/92Asetofstairswith'landing replacedtheladderfortheel.320~-31/4"platformusedforaccessing thescreenwell buildingHVACequipment room.Thefollowing additional USARfigurehasbeenupdatedaccordingly:
Figure:12.3-69Sh4 SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage93of93USARTEXT,TABLEANDFIGURECHANGES(BASEDONPREVIOUSLY REPORTEDSAFETYEVALUATIONS)
(Cont'd.)
SafetyEvaluation No.:8$-075,Rev.5(currently Rev.8)Previously Reported:
10/30/91Additional modifications totheGaitronics communications systemhavebeencompleted inaccordance withModification PN2Y87MX038, asdescribed inSafetyEvaluation 89-075.Thefollowing USARsectionandfigureshavebeenupdatedaccordingly:
Sections:
9.5Figures:9~55Sh1&29~56g9~579~58Sh2g9~59Sh29.5-10Sh29.5-11;9.5-14;9.5-15(9.5-179.5-189.5-20Sh1/9'-21)9'-249'-299.5-339.5-34;9.5-36SafetyEvaluation No.:90-096,Rev.1(currently Rev.2)Previously Reported:
10/30/91Additional modifications tothenuisanceannunciator windowshavebeencompleted inaccordance withModification PN2Y86MX085.
Thefollowing additional USARfigureshavebeenupdatedaccordingly:
Figures:10.1-9a;10.1-9b;10.1-9c e