ML17227A316

St Lucie Annual 10CFR50.59 Rept for 1991

ML17227A316
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	12/31/1991
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17227A317	List: ML17227A316 ML17227A319 ML17309A673
References
NUDOCS 9203030215
Download: ML17227A316 (48)

Text

SECTIONST~LUCIEANNUAL10CFR50'9REPORTAsummaryofchangestothefacilityasdescribed intheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)(10CFR50.59(A)(1)(i))issubmitted byseparatelettersatthesametimeastheannualFSARupdateforeachunit(July22forSt.LucieUnit1andApril6forSt.LucieUnit2).SafetyEvaluations (for1991)thatwereapprovedbytheFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)andthoseassociated withJumper/Lifted Leadsareattached.

P2030302i5 920225lPDR*DOCK05000335RPDR 10CFR50.59Evaluations Summaries ofEvaluations ApprovedbytheSt.LucieFacilityRevievGroup ST~LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORAUXZL1ARY FEEDWATER PUMP2CTURBINECOUPLINGBEARINGLUBEOILPIPINGTEMPORARY MODIFICATION ZNTRODUCTIONI ThisSafetyEvaluation ispreparedtodocumenttheacceptability ofthetemporary useofpipingandfittingsinplaceoftheoriginally installed tubingonthe2CAuxiliary Feedwater PumpTurbineCouplingBearingLubeOilsystem.Theoriginaltubingwasdamagedduringmaintenance activities andexactreplacements arenotreadilyavailable.

TheAuxiliary Feedwater PumpperformsasafetyrelatedfunctionandisdesignedasaQualityGroupCcomponent.

Thisevaluation concludes thatthetemporary modification describes hereindoesnotrepresent anunreviewed safetyquestionandhasnoimpactonplantsafetyoroperations.

AreviewofthePlantTechnical Specifications andtheFSARhasshownthattherearenoTechnical Specification changesinvolved.

Thisevaluation isvalidthroughtheendofthe1992refueling outage.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Thetemporary modifiedconfiguration doesnotcreateanewpathforuncontrolled radioactive releasesandwillnotadversely affectanyradiation monitoring equipment orequipment whichperformsacontainment isolation function.

Thetemporary modifiedpipingconfiguration willnotadversely impacttheabilityofthe2CAuxiliary Feedwater Pump(oranyotherequipment) toperformitsaccidentmitigating designfunctionandwillnotcreateanynewfailuremodesforthe2CAuxiliary Feedwater Pump.Themodifiedconfiguration willnotinhibitorotherwise adversely affecttheoperation ofanyequipment important tosafety.Therefore:

1)Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.

2)Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased.

3)Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.

Thetemporarily modifiedpipingconfiguration isequivalent totheoriginaltubingconfiguration, andmeetsorexceedsthesystemdesignpressure, temperature,

material, andflowcharacteristics anddoesnotmodifyanyactivecomponents.

4)Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased.

ST~LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATZON FORAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP2CTURBINECOUPLINGBEARINGLUBEOILPIPINGTEMPORARY MODIFICATION PAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION (Continued):

5)Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethetemporarily modifiedconfiguration doesnotaddoraffectanyequipment capableofinitiating anaccident.

6)Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARhasnotbeencreated.7)Theexistingconfiguration doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification sincethetemporarily modifiedcouplingbearingpipingconfiguration willnotimpacttheoperation ofthe2CAuxiliary Feedwater PumpasrequiredpertheTechnical Specifications ortheFSAR.Thetemporarily modifiedconfiguration isfunctionally equivalent totheoriginalconfiguration, flowcharacteristics oftheoilsystemarenotchanged.

STLUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORCONTAINMENT FANCOOLERUNQUALIFIED COATINGS-REVISION 1INTRODUCTION:

Thissafetyevaluation addresses thepresenceofunqualified coatingsonthe1A,1B,1Cand1DContainment FanCoolercoilflanges.Newcoolingcoilswereinstalled underPC/M081-189duringtheUnit11990refueling outage.Uponinspection ofthecoilspriortoinstallation, thecoatingonthecoilflangeswasdetermined tobeimproperly applied(i.e.-unqualified).

Someoftheseunqualified coatingscouldnotberemovedandreplacedduetotheirproximity tothecoppercoilsandtheresultant potential fordamageofthecoppercoils.Thepresenceoftheunqualified coatingsinsidecontainment willnotaffectPlantsafetyoroperation sincetheiris'opotential forfailureofthecoatingsduringalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)toadversely affecttheoperation ofanystructure, system,orcomponent important tosafety.AreviewoftheTechnical Specifications andtheFSARhasshownthattherearenounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesinvolved.

Duringthe1991Unit1refueling outage,theContainment FanCoolercoilflangeswereinspected.

Thisrevisionincorporates thefindingsoftheinspection.

AreviewoftheplantTechnical Specifications andtheFSARhasshownthattherearenounresolved safetyquestions orTechnical Specifications changesinvolvedinthisrevision.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theunqualified coatingsdonotperformasafetyfunctionandtheirfailureduringaLOCAwillnotadversely affectthefunctionofanystructure, system,orcomponent important tosafety,oraffectanyaccidentinitiating events.Thefailedcoatingscannotadversely affecttheECCSsincetheywillnotclogthecontainment sump,oraffecttheperformance ofECCSpumpsandcontainment spraynozzles.Degradation ofthecomponent coolingwatersystemisnotaconcernsinceappreciable corrosion oftheflangesduetothelackofaprotective coatingwouldbeidentified andaddressed beforealossoffunctionoftheflangeoccurred.

Therefore:

1)Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.

2)Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORCONTAINMENT FANCOOLERUNQUALIFIED COATINGS-REVISION 1PAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION (Continued):

3)Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.

4)Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeencreated.5)Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased.

6)Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARhasnotbeencreated.7)Theproposedmodification doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification sincetheunqualified coatingscannotaffectthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORMV-07-3BSTEMREPLACEMENT REVISIONINTRODUCTION:

ThevalvestemofContainment SprayBHeaderIsolation ValveMV-07-3Bisdamagedandmustbereplaced.

TheexistingvalvestemmaterialisASTMA473type316stainless steel.Aninspection oftheproposedreplacement iteminstock(M&S577-67526-7) identified thematerialtobeASTMA276type410stainless steel.ThisSafetyEvaluation isarevisionandwasissuedtoextendthedurationoftheevaluation untilthe1993refueling outageandrevisestheadministrative portionsoftheevaluation tocomplywithcurrentrequirements.

Theconclusions oftheSafetyEvaluation remainvalidandhavenotchangedasaresultofthisrevision.

Thisevaluation doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionnordoesitrequireachangetotheTechnical Specifications.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Thecontainment spraysystemisdesignedtoassistinthemitigation ofaLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA),assumingasingleactiveorpassivefailure.Furthermore, thevalvethatisthesubjectofthisevaluation isdesignedtoQualityGroupBandSeismicClassIrequirements.

Basedontheabovedescription, thisevaluation andassociated modifications areconsidered NuclearSafetyRelated.Thisreportdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionbasedonthefollowing conclusions:

1)Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased.

Theuseofthe410SSwillnotchangetheoperational abilityortheseismicqualification ofthesubjectvalveinthatthecorrosion experienced duringonerefueling cyclewillnotsignificantly degradetheintegrity ofthevalvestem.2)Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofatypethananypreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotcreatedsincethetemporary modification doesnotchangetheoperational designofthesystem.3)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification isnotaffectedbythischangesincethetemporary modification doesnotcompromise thevalveintegrity, reliability, oraffectitsoperational characteristics.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1CVCSANDWASTEMANAGEMENT BORICACIDHEATTRACINGCIRCUITDE-ENERGIZATION INTRODUCTIONS Thissafetyevaluation addresses theeffectofde-energizing specificcircuitsoftheheattracingsystemassociated withtheBoricAcidMakeupSystem.Engineering packagesPC/M336-189Revision2,"BoricAcidConcentration Reduction Modifications",

andPC/M094-188Revision0,"BoricAcidConcentration Reduction" reducedtheboricacidconcentration intheBoricAcidMakeupSystem.PortionsoftheBoricAcidMakeupSystemwithboricacidconcentrations of3.5weightpercentorlessdonotrequireheattracing.Thisevaluation focusesinontheChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)andWasteManagement System(WMS)(orBoricAcidMakeupandRecoverySystems)forthepurposeofde-energizing heattracecircuitsthathavebeenidentified bySt.LuciePlantMaintenance asnotbeingrequired.

PerFSARsection9.3.4.1portionsoftheBoricAcidMakeupSystemaredesignedandbuilttomeettherequirements ofseismicclassI,hencethissafetyevaluation isclassified assafetyrelated.SAFETYEVALUATION BasedontheSt.LucieUnit1FSAR,theChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)isdesignedtoperformthefollowing:

a)maintainthechemistry andpurityofthereactorcoolantwithinthelimitsspecified inFSARTable9.3-8.b)maintaintherequiredvolumeofwaterinthereactorcoolantsystembycompensating forcoolantcontraction orexpansion duetoplantsteploadchangesof(+/-)104offullpowerandrampchangesof(+/-)54offullpowerperminutebetween15and1004powerandforreactorcoolantlossesoradditions.

c)acceptout-flowfromthereactorcoolantsystemwhenthereactorcoolantisheatedattheadministrative rateof75degreesF/hrandtoprovidetherequiredmakeupwhenthereactorcoolantiscooledattheadministrative rateof75degreesf/hrusingtwochargingpumps.d)accommodate thereactorcoolantsystemwaterinventory changeforafull-to-zero powerdecreasewithnomakeupsystemoperation andwiththevolumecontroltankinitially atthenormaloperating levelband.e)injectconcentrated boricacidintothereactorcoolantsystemuponasafetyinjection actuation signal(SIAS).

ST~LUCZEUNIT1CVCSAND%ASTEMANAGEMENT BORICACIDHEATTRACINGCIRCUITDE-ENERGIMTZON PAGE2INTRODUCTION (Continued):

f)controltheboronconcentration inthereactorcoolantsystemtoobtainoptimumcontrolelementassembly(CEA)positioning tocompensate forreactivity changesassociated withlargechangesinreactorcoolanttemperature, coreburnup,andxenonconcentration variations, andtoprovideshutdownmarginformaintenance andrefueling operations.

g)injectboroninsufficient quantitytocounteract themaximumreactivity increaseduetocooldownat75degrees/hr andxenondecayusingonechargingpump.h)automatically diverttheletdownflowtothewastemanagement system(HMS)whenthevolumecontroltankisatthehighestpermissible level.assurethattheradioactivity duetocorrosion andfissionproductsinthereactorcoolantsystemdoesnotexceedTechnical Specification limitsforanassumed1%failedfuelcondition.

i)providecontinuous on-linemeasurement ofreactorcoolantboronconcentration andradioactivity duetofissionandcorrosion products.

j)k)provideauxiliary pressurizer sprayforoperatorcontrolofthereactorcoolantsystempressureduringthefinalstagesofshutdownandtoallowforthecoolingofthepressurizer.

Basedonareviewoftheaboveitems,theeffectofde-energizing heattracecircuitshasbeendetermined tohavenoimpactonsafetyfunctions orregulatory requirements.

Theprobability ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased becausede-energizing heattracecircuitsdonotaffecttheinitiation ofanaccidentevaluated intheFSARnorincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence.

Desiredboricacidconcentration ismaintained evenwiththede-energizing ofheattracingcircuits.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARarenotincreased bythede-energizing heattracingcircuits.

Asdescribed above,de-energizing heattracecircuitswillnotchange,degrade,orpreventsystemfunctions described in,orassumedtooccurinthemitigation ofanyFSARaccident.

ST~LUCIEUNITCVCSANDWASTEMANAGEMENT BORICACIDHEATTRACINGCIRCUITDE-ENERGIZATION PAGE3SAFETYEVALUATION (Continuect):

ThisproposedactivityhasnoimpactontheLOCAanalysisandtheradiological consequences ofanaccidentevaluated intheFSARwillnotbeincreased.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment, important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased becausetheproposedactivitywillnotresultinnewperformance requirements beingimposedonanysystemorcomponents suchthatanydesigncriteriawillbeexceeded.

TheBoricAcidMakeupSystemfunctional requirements areunchanged, therefore nonewprobability ofmalfunction hasbeenimposed.Asdescribed above,de-energizing heattracecircuitsdonotchange,degrade,orpreventactionsdescribed in,orassumedtooccurinthemitigation ofanyFSARaccident.

Therefore, de-energizing heattracingcircuitswillnotincreasetheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Thede-energizing ofheattracecircuitshasbeenevaluated anddoesnotimpactthestructural integrity orperformance capability ofCVCSandWasteManagement System.Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased bythisproposedactivity.

Theproposedactivitytode-energize someheattracecircuitsintheboricacidsystemat,St.LucieUnit1doesnotintroduce failuremodesofadifferent typethananypreviously analyzedintheFSAR.Thesystemconfiguration andthedesignbasisoftheboricacidsystemhasnotbeenchangedoraffected, therefore theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility thatanaccidentmaybecreatedthatisdifferent fromanyalreadyevaluated intheFSAR.Removalofheattracinginareascontaining boricacidconcentration of3.5weightpercentorlessdoesnotreduceanymarginsofsafetyforborationsourcesandflowpathrequirements sincetheconcentration ofboricacidiswithintherequirements oftheTechnical Specification.

De-energizing heattracingdoesnotaffecttheTechnical Specification basisforboratedwatersources.

8T~LUCIEUNIT18AFETYEVALUATION OFABLINDFLANGEONLINEI-3"-CW-1608PENTFUELPOOLMAKEUP8ALTWATERBACKUPINTRODUCTION Thissafetyevaluation ispreparedtodocumenttheacceptability oftheinstallation ofablindflangeonlineI-3"-CW-160 atvalveI-SB-21386.

ThislineisthebackupsaltwatersupplyforSpentFuelPoolMakeup.Theproposedconfiguration isacceptable onatemporary basistosupportmaintenance onlineI-21/2"-CW-176.

Thissafetyevaluation isrequiredtoallowtheimplementation ofthenecessary repairswithintheconstraints oftheLimitingConditions ofOperation (LCO)fortheICWsystem.TheICWandSpentFuelPoolMakeupsystemsaresafetyrelatedandaredesignated asSeismicClass1andQualityGroupCsystems.Thisevaluation concludes thattheproposedconfiguration described hereindoesnotrepresent anunreviewed safetyquestionandhasnoimpactonplantsafetyoroperations.

AreviewofthePlantTechnical Specifications andtheFSARhasshownthattherearenoTechnical Specification changesinvolved.

Thisevaluation isvalidthroughtheendofthe1991refueling outage.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreas'ed sincetheproposedconfiguration doesnotaffectanyaccidentinitiating components.

Theproposedconfiguration doesnotcreateanynewfailuremodesforanyequipment orsystemscapableofinitiating anaccident.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased sincetheproposedconfiguration doesnotcreateanewpathforuncontrolled radioactive releasesandwillnotadversely affectanyradiation monitoring equipment orequipment whichperformsacontainment isolation function.

Theproposedconfiguration doesnotimpactanyequipment whichisrequiredtoinitiateactuation ofanysafetysystems.Theproposedconfiguration willnotadversely impacttheabilityoftheSpentFuelPoolMakeuporICWsystemstoperformtheirsafetyrelateddesignfunctions.

Thedesignfunctionoftheaffectedlineistoprovideaminimumof150gallonsperminute(GPM)ofsaltwatermakeuptothespentfuelpoolintheeventthatalossoffuelpoolcoolingcapability occurs.Thisfunctionwillberetainedbyuseofahoseconnection toI-SH-21241 orI-SH-21338.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment.

important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.

Nonewfailuremodesforactiveequipment areintroduced bytheproposedconfiguration.

ValveI-SH-21241 orvalveI-SH-21338 isnowrequiredtoopentosupplyspentfuelpoolmakeup.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION OFABLINDFLANGEONLINEI-3"-CW-160SPENTFUELPOOLMAKEUPSALTWATERBACKUPPAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION (Continued):

However,theprobability ofamalfunction ofthatvalveisnogreaterthanthatofI-SB-21386.

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased sincetheproposedconfiguration doesnotcreateanewpathforuncontrolled radioactive releasesandwillnotadversely affectanyradiation monitoring equipment orequipment whichperformsacontainment isolation function.

Theproposedconfiguration willnotimpactanyequipment whichisrequiredtoinitiateactuation ofanysafetysystems.Theproposedpipingconfiguration willnotadversely impacttheabilityoftheSpentFuelPoolMakeuporICWsystemstoperformtheirsafetyrelateddesignfunctions.

Afailureofthealternate spentfuelpoolmakeupflowpathhasbeenevaluated anddetermined tohavenosignificant impactontheabilityoftheICWsystemtoperformitsotherSafetyRelatedfunctions.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincetheproposedconfiguration doesnotaddoraffectanyequipment capableofinitiating anaccident.

Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincetheproposedconfiguration willnotinhibitorotherwise adversely affecttheoperation ofanyequipment important tosafety.Amalfunction ofthepassiveblindflangeisnotlikely.Thealternate spentfuelpoolmakeupflowpathiseffectively equivalent (ballvalvevs.butterfly valve)totheflangedlineanddoesnotcreatethepossibility ofadifferent typeofmalfunction.

TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification sincetheproposedconfiguration ofthepipingsystemwillnotimpacttheoperation oftheICWorSpentFuelPoolMakeupsystemsasrequiredpertheTechnical Specifications ortheFSAR.Theproposedconfiguration, withidentified backupsaltwatersupplytotheSpentFuelPoolMakeupsystem,isfunctionally equivalent totheoriginalconfiguration.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION OFCOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGER 1A"TUBEGARDS" INTRODUCTION:

Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation istoallowtheinstallation of"Tubegards" intothe1AComponent CoolingWaterHeatExchanger (CCWHX).TheTubeGards areinstalled intoeachunplugged tubeattheupstreamtubesheet toreducetheeffects'f macrofouling (marinegrowth)ontheHXtubes.TheTubegards willbeinstalled onatestbasisforaperiodnottoexceedoneoperating fuelcycle(Cycle11).,Theperformance oftheTubegards willthenbeevaluated todetermine ifpermanent installation intooneorboth(1Aand1B)CCWHX'siswarranted.

Theinstallation ofTubeGards intothe1ACCWHXwillhavenoimpactonplantoperation andsafety.Therefore, NRCapprovalisnotrequiredpriortoimplementation.

Thisevaluation concludes thattheinstallation oftheTubeGards doesnotrepresent anunreviewed safetyquestion, norrequireachangetotheTechnical Specifications.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.

TheCCWHX'sareutilizedforaccidentmitigation andarenotconsidered tobeaccidentinitiating components.

TheTubeGards actasastrainer, similarinfunctiontostrainers alreadyinstalled intheICWsystem.Installation oftheTubegards withinthe1ACCWHXphysically prohibits theTubegards fromincreasing theprobability ofpreviously evaluated accidents.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased bytheinstallation ofTubeGards intothe1ACCWHX.NofailuremodesofTubegards havebeenidentified whichpreventtheICWandCCWsystemsfromperforming theirdesignSafetyRelatedfunctions.

Tubegards aredesignedforuseinheatexchanger applications.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased bytheinstallation ofTubegards.

TheTubegards arepassivedevicescontained withintheICWsideofthe1ACCWheatexchanger andarephysically separated fromanyequipment outsidetheICWsystem.Nocrediblefailuremechanisms oftheTubegards havebeenidentified whichwouldcausethefailureofthe1ACCWHXorthemalfunction ofanyICWsystemcomponents.

Additionally theinstallation ofTubegards doesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION OFCOMPONENT COOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGER 1A"TUBEGARDS" PAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION (Continued):

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased bytheinstallation oftheTubeGards.

TheTubeGards andassociated failuremodesareisolatedwithintheICWpipingsystem.Thefailuremodesandtheireffectsareenveloped bytheexistingfailureanalysisintheFSAR.TheTubegardfailuremodesandeffectshavebeenevaluated forthepotential tocreateanaccidentofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.TheTugegards arecontained withintheICWsystematthechannelheadofthe1ACCWHX,andneithertheICWsystemorthe1ACCWHXareconsidered tobeaccidentinitiating components.

Theinstallation ofTubegards doesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheFSAR,since,allcrediblefailuremodesareenveloped byexistinganalyseswhichconsiders lossofanICWtrain.Theinstallation ofTubegards withinthe1ACCWHXdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification sincetheTubegards donotnegatively affectthecapability oftheICWandCCWsystemstoprovidetherequiredcoolingcapacityforthecontinued operation ofvitalcomponents andEngineered SafetyFeatureequipment duringnormalandaccidentconditions.

Theoverallpositivebenefitsdemonstrated intheuseofTubegards withinthecondenser waterboxes, i.e.,reducedtubedamageduetomicrofouling inducedpitting,andincreased systemavailability duetoreducedfoulingrates,providereasonable assurance theTubegards willperformasintendedinthe1ACCWHXandprovidesimilarpositiveresults.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORTHEUSEOFP-54ANDE-4FORSTEAMGENERATOR DURINGOUTAGEINTRODUCTION TheuseofP-54toprovideaccesstocablesandhosesusedtosupportsteamgenerator activities suchasECTandsludgelancinghasbeenpreviously evaluated andFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)concurrence obtainedanddocumented.

DuringtheUnit1outage,asimilarconfiguration isbeingutilizedonP-54andE-4withminormodifications totheclosureblindflangeforP-54.Themodification onP-54entailstheuseofanextendedspoolpiecewithaflangeadaptertoserveastheblindflange.Theintendedpurposeoftheblindflangeisstillbeingmetbythemodified"spool-piece blind".TheuseofP-54andE-4duringrefueling Mode:ThebasisfortheTechnical Specification istoprovideairtightclosuresuchthatthereisnodirectpathbetweenthecontainment atmosphere andtheoutsideatmosphere.

Thepresentclosureconfiguration ofP-54andE-4complieswiththeTechnical Specification byproviding aseal(RTVseal)onP-54attheoutsidecontainment sideandairtested,andbyproviding aseal(RTVseal)onE-4atthecontainment andoutsidecontainment sidesofthepenetration.

UseofP-54andE-4duringreducedinventory:

TheuseofP-54andE-4duringreducedinventory isaddressed ingeneralmaintenance procedure 1-M-0060whichprovidesspecificinstructions torapidlyclosethesepenetrations duringlossofshutdowncoolingwhileatreducedinventory.

SAFETYEVALUATIONS TheoriginalintentontheuseofP-54aspreviously evaluated duringthepreviousoutagehasnotbeenaltered.Inconclusion, thepresentarrangement ofP-54andE-4doesnot:1)Increasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety,2)Createthepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously

analyzed, or3)ReducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnical Specification.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORRABELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ANDBATTERYROOMHVACINTRODUCTION:

Thissafetyevaluation addresses changestothedescription oftheSt.LucieUnit1ReactorAuxiliary Building(RAB)Electrical Equipment andBatteryRoomVentilation Systemaspresently statedintheFSARSection9.4.2.2.2.

Thechangesarearesultofinconsistencies betweentheFSARandotherdesigndocuments whichwerediscovered duringpreparation fortheElectrical Distribution SystemFunctional Inspection (EDSFI)andareasfollows:Systemflowratesprovidedondrawing8770-G-862 (FSARFigure9.4-1)werenotadjustedfollowing theadditionoffiredampersinstalled byPC/M269-183andPC/M260-183inthesubjectventilation systemtomeetAppendixRrequirements.

Theinstallation offiredampersincreased systemresistance whichreducedthesupplyfans'apacities ofthereducedsystemflowrates.Uponlossofoffsitepower(LOOP),onlythebatteryroomexhaustfansareautomatically connected totheemergency dieselgenerators.

Theelectrical equipment roomssupplyandexhaustfansaremanuallyrestarted byadministrative control.Presently theFSARstates,"Uponlossofoff-sitepower,thesystemisautomatically connected totheon-siteemergency dieselgenerator sets".Thisimpliesallthefansinthesystemareautomatically connected totheemergency generator sets,whichisnotcorrect,pertheEDGElectrical LoadCalculation.

AnFSARChangePackage(FCP)hasbeendeveloped thatcorrectsFSARSection9.4.2.2.2 toagreewithplantCWD'sandwillaccurately describethesystemoperation uponaLOOP.Duringanemergency condition, whichinvolvesaLOOP,thetemperature intheelectrical equipment, staticinverter, andbatteryroomsmayexceed104degreesfahrenheit.

TheFSARcurrently doesnotaddresstheacceptability ofthiscondition.

AnFCPhadbeendeveloped toprovideadditional description toFSARSection9.4.2.2.2 andstatesit'sacceptability.

Thedescription intheFSARdoesnotagreewiththeas-builtcondition concerning thenumberofroomsventilated, theflowpath,andtheuseofnon-safety relatedairconditioning units.AnFCPhasbeendeveloped withFSAR9.4.2.2.2 revisedtoprovidethecorrectdescription ofthesystem.TheFSARstates,"Electrical equipment roomtemperatures exceeding 110degreesFahrenheit areannunciated inthecontrolroom".Thebasisforthe110degreesfahrenheit setpointisnotprovidedintheFSAR.AFCPhasbeendeveloped whichaddstotheFSARSection

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORRABELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ANDBATTERYROOMHVACPAGE2INTRODUCTION (Continued):

9.4.2.2.2 thebasesforthe110degreesFahrenheit setpoint.

Thisinformation willprecludefutureconfusion concerning thissetpoint.

SAFETYEVALUATION Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased sincethischangedoesnotaffectanyaccidentinitiating components.

TheRABElectrical Equipment andBatteryRoomVentilation Systemdoesnotcontainoraffectanyaccidentinitiating component.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased bythischangesincethischangedoesnothaveadetrimental affectonanyequipment requiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.

TheRABElectrical Equipment andBatteryRoomVentilation Systemhasbeenshowntostillperformitssafetyrelatedfunctionassumingasingleactivefailureofasupplyfanandwillnotaltertheradiological consequences ofanaccidentevaluated intheFSAR.Allsafetyrelatedequipment servicedbythisventilation systemhavebeenevaluated fortheexpectedroomtemperatures undernormalandemergency conditions andshowntobeacceptable.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased sincethischangedoesnotaffectthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents, andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibility oftheirfailure.Thesafetyrelatedelectrical equipment inElectrical Equipment Rooms1A,1B,1C,thestaticinverterroomandBatteryRooms1Aand1Bhavenotbeenimpactedbythischange.Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased sincethischangedoesnothaveadetrimental effectonanysafetyrelatedequipment orcomponents.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethischangewillnotinhibitorotherwise adversely affecttheoperation oftheRABElectrical Equipment andBatteryVentilation System.Thecomponents ofthechangeareincompliance withtheFSARrequirements forthesystemelements.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORRABELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ANDBATTERYROOMHVACPAGE3SAFETYEVALUATION (Continued):

TheproposedchangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification sincetheRABElectrical Equipment andBatteryRoomVentilation Systemisnotaddressed intheTechnical specifications.

Thechangeshavebeenshowntonothaveadetrimental effectonthesafetyrelatedequipment servicedbythisventilation system.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORREMOVALOFVALVEI-TCV-14-4A AND-4B45DEGREESSTOPDEVICEINTRODUCTION:

Airoperatedtemperature controlvalvesI-TCV-14-4A,

-4Barebutterfly typevalveslocatedinlinesI-,30"-CW-77 attheoutletoftheComponent CoolingWaterHeatExchangers (CCWHE)1Aand1B.Thevalvesautomatically controlICWflowfromtheexchangers.

Theyaremodulated openedandclosedaccording totheoutletwatertemperature oftheshellsideoftheCCWHE.Valveclosureislimitedto254fromfullclosedposition(bypneumatic relay)topreventturbulent flowandvalvedamage.Thereisnodesignlimitation onthemaximumvalveopening,howeveramechanical stopdeviceisinstalled onthevalvestolimitthevalveopeningtoamaximumof45degrees(90degreesrepresents valvefullyopen).Theplantdesiresthatthemechanical stopsberemovedduringCCWheatexchanger testingandforthedurationoftheoutage.Thetestingisbeingperformed inresponsetoGenericLetter89-13.Thepurposeofthischangeinvolvesremovalofthe45degreemechanical stopassociated withICWtemperature controlvalves(I-TCV-14-4A&B).Theproposedchangeisnecessary toensurepropertestingoftheCCWheatexchanger heatremovalcapability.

Theplantintendstomaintainthecurrentcalibration onthecontrollers forthesevalves.Thus,thevalvewillstillmodulatebetween45degreesopenand254open.However,fortestingpurposestheplantintendstofailthevalvetothefullopenposition.

St.LucieUnit2currently successfully operateswiththesevalvesmodulating betweenfullopenandtheminimumstop.SAFETYEVALUATION~

Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARbecausethesubjectTCV'sarenotaccidentinitiating devices.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentbecausetheICWflowrateisincreased, andthesystemremainscapableofdelivering theminimumflowrequirements foraccidentconditions.

Allcomponents retaintheirfunctions andcapabilities withtheincreased flow.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetybecausetheICWpumpsremaincapableofoperating withintheirperformance-curve andthevalves'etpoints andoperation arenotaffected.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION FORREMOVALOFVALVEI-TCV-14-4A AND-4B45DEGREESSTOPDEVICEPage2SAFETYEVALUATION (continued):

Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetybecausetheprimaryequipment, ICWpumps,andtheTCVsstillperformwithintheirdesignwithnonewfailuremodesintroduced.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated becausecomponent replacement doesnottakeplaceandtheoperation oftheTCV'sisunchanged inthatvalveopeningbasedontemperature ismaintained.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFSARbecausecomponent replacement doesnottakeplaceandfunctionally thereisnochangetotheresponseofthesystem.Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification becausethevalves'etpoints remainthesameandtheflowrateincreases providing greaterheatsinkcapabilities duringaccidentconditions.

ST~LUCZEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORCLAMPFOR4-WAYHYDRAULIC VALVESONMAINFEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVESINTRODUCTION Severaloftheendcapcapcrewsonthe4-wayhydraulic valveshavebeenfoundbrokenontheSt.LucieUnit2MainFeedwater Isolation Valves(MFIV,HCV-09-1A/2A/1B/2B).

Preliminary inspection ofthecapscrews bytheZPN-ESIlabindicateoverloadasthefailuremechanism.

Asaresultofthispreliminary investigation, theremaining capscrews aredeemedsuspectorindeterminate untilathoroughinvestigation ofrootcausecanbecompleted.

Asaprudentmeasure,aclamphasbeendesignedtoreplacethefunctionofthecapscrews, toassuretheMFIV4-wayhydraulic valvewillremainoperablepertheoriginaldesign.Installation ofthisclampwillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.

AreviewoftheplantTechnical Specifications andtheFSARhasshownthattherearenounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesinvolved.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased sinceinstallation oftheclampdoesnotaffectanyaccidentinitiating components.

Installation oftheclampactstoreplacethefunctionoftheoriginalendcapcapscrews andisconsidered equivalent.

Continued reliablenondegraded operability oftheMFIV4-wayhydraulic valveistherefore assured.Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased sinceinstallation ofthisclampdoesnotchangeoraltertheabilityoftheMFIVtorespondtoaMSISorAFASsignal(i.e.,tocloseandremainclosed).Installation oftheclampdoesnotadversely affectanyotherequipment requiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.

Theclampandtheeffectoftheadditional weightonthe4-wayhydraulic valvemountingcapscrews havebeenevaluated asacceptable toassurethevalvecanperformitsfunctionduringaDBEevent.Installation oftheclampdoesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibility oftheirfailure.

ST~LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORCLAMPFOR4-RAYHYDRAULIC VALVESONMAINFEEDMATER ISOLATION VALVESPAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION (continued):

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased sincetheclampdoesnotaltertheresponseorfunctionoftheMFIV'sduringanaccident, norinteractwithanyotherequipment important tosafety.Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsinceinstallation oftheclampdoesnotaddoraffectanyequipment capableofinitiating anaccident.

Theclampfunctionisequivalent tothefunctionoftheendcapcapscrews.

Theadditional weightoftheclamphasbeenevaluated forseismicconsiderations withrespecttotheMFIVvalveandactuator, andwasdetermined tobeacceptable.

Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincetheadditionoftheclampwillnotinhibitorotherwise adversely affecttheoperation oftheMFIVorthe4-wayhydraulic valve.Theclampisexternaltothemovingpartsinthe4-wayhydraulic valve.Theclampwillnotadversely affectthefunctionofanycomponents withinthevalve,i.e.,thevalvecomponents aremetaltometalalongtheaxis,andthevalvecomponents areofsufficient thickness.

TheadditionoftheclampdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification sincetheclampfunctionistoensurethe4-wayhydraulic valvesremainoperableaspertheoriginaldesign.Thisisaprudentmeasurewhichprovidesgreaterassurance thatthefunctionoftheMFIVismaintained.

4 ST~LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORINSTALLATION OFBLINDFLANGEONPIPINGATCONTAINMENT PENETRATION P-56INTRODUCTION RecentLocalLeakRateTest(LLRT)resultsonPSLUnit2Penetration P-56haveshownincreasing leakageratesthroughvalveFCV-25-26 and/orFCV-25-36, whichhavebeenwithintheacceptable limitsforthispenetration.

However,upcomingLLRTsurveillance mayresultinanunsatisfactory leakagerateforthepenetration.

Aspartofacontingency planforrestoration ofthepenetration, thissafetyevaluation willevaluateinstallation ofablindflange(s)asnecessary toachieveasatisfactory LLRT.Thispenetration isthemakeuppathforthecontinuous containment purge/hydrogen purgesystem.Theimplementation ofthistemporary modification willhavenoadverseaffectonplantsafetyoroperation.

AreviewoftheplantTechnical Specifications andtheFSARhasshownthattherearenounresolved safetyquestions orTechnical Specifications changesinvolved.

Penetration P-56andtheassociated valvesarerequiredforcontainment isolation, therefore thisSafetyevaluation isclassified asSafetyRelated.SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased sincethistemporary modification doesnotaffectinitiating components.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased bythistemporary modification sincethismodification doesnotaffectanyequipment requiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.

TheSafetyRelatedfunctionofthesystemistomaintaincontainment integrity atpenetration P-56.Thisfunctionisaccomplished bytheinstallation oftheblindflangeandasuccessful LLRT.Thepenetration willstillberequiredtomeettheLLRTandcontainment isolation requirements.

Installation ofablindflangeinlieuofavalveisacceptable asapassivebarrierforcontainment isolation.

Theblindflangeconfiguration isproperlyspecified forthesystemdesignconditions andthemakeupfunctionofthesystemmaybeaccomplished byuseofthecontainment vacuumreliefsystem.Theexhaustfunctionofthesystemremainsintactandoperational.

Therefore, theTechnical Specifications relatingtocontainment isolation andcontainment pressureremainunaffected.

Thistemporary modification doesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingequipment important tosafety,andthusdoesnotincreasetheprobability oftheirfailure.Theinstallation oftheblind STLUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATION FORINSTALLATION OFBLINDFLANGEONPIPINGATCONTAINMENT PENETRATION P-56PAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION (Continued):

flangedoesnotincreasetheloading(weight)onthepenetration, therefore theanalysisforthepenetration loadingisunchanged.

Theinstallation oftheblindflangeservestoenhancethecontainment isolation functionsinceitisapassivedevice.Theriggingoffofthe48"penetration doesnotadversely affecttheanalysisofthispenetration.

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased sincethevalvesarenormallyopen,failclosedvalveswhichcloseonCIASsignal.Installation oftheblindflangeisapassivebarrierforcontainment isolation.

Noadditional failuremodesareintroduced, sincethepotential forleakagethroughthegasketcurrently existsforthevalveandseatleakagewouldbeeliminated.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethistemporary modification doesnotaddoraffectanyequipment capableofinitiating anaccident.

Thepenetration isstillsubjecttothesameLLRTacceptance criteriaforcontainment isolation.

Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethistemporary modification willnotinhibitorotherwise adversely affecttheoperation ofothercomponents.

Thevalvesarefailclosed,theblindflangepassively servesthissamefunction.

Thistemporary modification maintains themarginofsafetyoftheContainment Isolation ValveTechnical Specification sinceitreplacesanactivedevicewithapassivedevicethatisdesignedtothesystemdesignparameters.

WithregardstotheContainment Pressure(normal)Technical Specification, thisTechnical Specification isunaffected sincetheexhaustportionofthesystemwillstillfunctiontoreducepressureinsidecontainment.

ST~LUCIEUNITS1&2SAFETYEVALUATION FORCVCSPURIFICATION FILTERPARTICULATE RATINGUPGRADEINTRODUCTION:

ThisSafetyEvaluation addresses thetechnical implications fortheuseof6,2or1(1)micronabsolutefilterelementsintheUnit'1andUnit2ChemicalandVolumeControlSystems(CVCS)Purification Filtersonatestbasis.Thecurrentdesignrequirements callfor95%and984,forUnit1and2respectively, retention byweightofparticulate 2micronsandlargerperSt.LucieUnit1FSARAmendment 10andSt.LucieUnit2FSARAmendment 6.Thehigherefficiency 1micronabsolutefilterelementswillcaptureallparticulate largerthan1microninsize,pluscapture99%oftheparticulate between0.6micronsand1.0micron.Theelimination ofthisparticulate willhavethefollowing positiveeffectsonbothUnitssystems:1.)2.)3.)4~)reduceout-of-core radiation, reducetheformation ofcruddeposits, minimizeresinfouling,reducepersonnel radiation exposure.

AlthoughtheCVCSPurification Filter1Aand2A,forUnit1and2respectively, doesnotperformanysafetyfunction, itislocatedinaQualityGroupCsystem.Therefore, thisSafetyEvaluation isclassified asNuclearSafetyRelated.Theuseofsmallerparticulate rated,higherefficiency, filterelementsintheCVCSPurification Filter1Adoesnotadversely impactplantsafetynoroperation.

ThisSafetyEvaluation concludes thattherearenounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesinvolvedwiththismodification.

SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhasnotbeenincreased sincethetestbasismodification doesnotadversely affectanyaccidentinitiating components.

Thedifferential pressuredropofthenewfiltersislessthanthepressuredropoftheoriginalfilters.Thetestbasismodification doesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents, andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibility offailure.Theinstallation of6,2or1(1)micronabsolutefilterswillresultinareduction ofparticulate intheRCSandtheCVCS,leadingtoincreased reliability ofsystemcomponents.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased bythistestbasismodification sinceitdoesnotadversely affectanyequipment requiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.

ST.LUCIEUNITS182SAFETYEVALUATION FORCVCSPURIFICATION FZLTERPARTICULATE RATINGUPGRADEPAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION (Continued):

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreased becausethetestbasismodification doesnotimpactthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents, doesnotalterthehighdifferential pressuredropacrossthefilteralarmsetpointanddoesnotincreasethepossibility oftheirfailure.Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSARhavenotbeenincreased sincethistestbasismodification doesnotcreateanewpathforuncontrolled radioactive releasesandwillnotadversely

=affectanyequipment requiredtomitigatetheconsequences ofanequipment malfunction.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincethistestbasismodification hasnoadverseeffectonanyequipment capableofinitiating anaccidentandnonewfailuremodesareintroduced throughtheinstallation oftheabove-mentioned absolutefilters.Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincethistestbasismodification willnotinhibitorotherwise adversely affecttheoperation ofanyequipment important tosafety.Thetestbasisinstallation oftheabove-mentioned absolutefilterelementsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification sincethefunctionofthesystemcomponents remainthesame.Thenewfiltersprovidebetterfiltration thantheoriginaldesigncallsforandthefilterswillbechangedatthesamedifferential pressurerequirements.

ST~LUCZEUNITS1AND2GAGGINGOFSAFETYRELIEFVALVEV3483THATPROVIDESOVERPRESSURE PROTECTION OFSHUTDOWNCOOLINGPIPINGINTRODUCTION OnOctober20,1991,Unit1ShutdownCooling(SDC)returnreliefvalveV3483wasreportedtobeleakingRCSinventory whiletheunitwasinmode4forrefueling.

AleakingSDCreliefcouldnotbe,repairedquicklyinthefield,andprevented theuseofthe"A"trainofSDC,andsubsequent plantcooldown.

Toterminate thereportedlossofRCSinventory andtomakebothSDCtrainsavailable, a50.59wasrequiredtoevaluatetheplantresponsetotemporary gaggingthisreliefvalve.FSARsection6.3.2.2.6.d describes theSDCreturnreliefvalvesV3468andV3483asredundant overpressure protection devicesfortheshutdowncoolingsystemduringsolidRCSoperations withallchargingpumpsrunning.Thesetpointofthesevalvesis300psigandeachvalvehasacapacityof155gpm.Thisvalueislessthantotalchargingpumpcapacityof132gpm.Section9.3oftheUnit1FSAR,table9.3-27liststhedesignpressureofthesuctionlinetotheLowPressureSafetyInjection pumpstobe300psig,thesamevalueastherelief'ssetpoint.

ThehydropressurefortheSDCsuctionlineis440psia.FSARsection9.3.5.2.2 statesthat"(theSDCsuctionisolation) valvesV3651andV3652inthe1BloopandV3480andV3481in,the1Aloopautomatically closewhenevertheRCSpressureexceedsthedesignpressureoftheshutdowncoolingsystem."SAFETYEVALUATION:

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentisnotincreased bythegaggingofasingleSDCrelief.Theaccidentofconcernisthefailureofthebackpressure regulating valveswhileinsolidRCSplantoperations.

ThismaypossiblyrupturetheSDCsystemsuctionpipingduringanoverpressurization oftheRCSwhileSDCisinservice,whichwouldresultinthelossofdecayheatremovalcapability throughSDC.Theprobability ofthisaccidentispredicated onthefailureofthebackpressure regulating valvesduringsolidRCSoperation, thestartofchargingpumps,HPSIpumpsorRCSpumps,ortheenergization ofPressurizer heaters.Asacompensatory measure,HPSI,RCSpumpsandPressurizer heatersarede-energized byprocedure OP1-0020127 priortosolidoperation.

Therefore, theonlycredibleaccidentofconcernisthefailingclosedofthebackpressure regulators withthepressurizer filledsolidwithwaterandoneormorechargingpumpsstillinoperation.

Theinitiation ofthisscenarioisindependent ofSDCreliefvalvestatus.

ST~LUCIEUNITS1AND2GAGGINGOFSAFETYRELIEFVALVEV3483THATPROVIDESOVERPRESSURE PROTECTION OFSHUTDOWNCOOLINGPIPINGPAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION (Continued):

ThegaggingofasingleSDCreliefdoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetybecausetheSDCsystemstillretainsoverpressure protection fromtheotheroperabletrain'sSDCreliefvalve.Additional overpressure protection isaffordedbytheLowTemperature Overpressure Protection system,whichrelievesRCSpressureatlessthan350psiaasperTechnical Specifications.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentisnotincreased bythegaggingofasingleSDCrelief.FSARsection6.3.2.2.6 dstatesthateachSDCvalvehasthecapacitytorelievetheflowfromthreechargingpumpsoperating.

Therefore, withthecompensatory measureofhavingbothSDCtrainsinservice,atleastoneSDCreliefvalvecanrelievepressureforbothSDCtrainsbeforetheSDCsuctionisolation valvesfullystrokeclosedinapproximately 50seconds.Therateofpressureincreaseinthisscenarioisdependent uponthecompressibility ofwater,andtheamountofcompressible gasesinsystemhighpoints.Therefore, theconsequences areindependent ofgaggingasingleSDCreliefvalvebecauseoftheoppositetrain'sSDCreliefvalve.Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyaspreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotincreased bythegaggingofasingleSDCreliefvalve.Assumingthegaggingofonereliefvalveandthefailureoftheotherreliefvalve,overpressure protection oftheSDCsystemisaffordedbytheLTOPsystem.DuringnormalSDCoperation, withthepressurizer solid,RCStemperature willrequiretheLTOPsetpointtoinstantaneously openbothPORV'satapressurenottoexceed350psia.ThisisbelowtheSDCsystemhydropressureof440psia.Therefore, thePORV'sprovideoverpressure protection untiltheSDCsuctionisolation valvesshut.Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSARisnotcreatedbygaggingasingleSDCreliefbasedupontheaboveinformation.

ThemarginofsafetyfortheSDCsystemisnotexplicitly statedintheTechnical Specifications.

Themarginisassuredtobethecontinued availability ofhavinganoperableSDCsystemtouseinremovingdecayheatfromtheRCS.

10CFR50.59Evaluations Temporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsRecpxests 10CFR50'9Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-9Components/Systems Affected:

Radiation MonitorCabinet.InstalljumpertoobtaincontrolofFCV-6627X.

Description ofChange:ThisjumperremovesthesignaltoFCV-6627X fromtheLiquidRadwasteEffluentLine'sgrossradioactivity monitor.Thismonitorisdiscussed inTechnical Specification 3.3-12whichstatesthatiftheminimumchannelsoperableislessthanrequired, effluentreleasesmaycontinueforupto14daysprovidedthatatleasttwodifferent independent samplesareanalyzedandatleasttwoqualified staffmembersverifythereleaseratecalculations anddischarge linevalving.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSARTheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.ThejumperremovesthesignalfromtheradwastemonitorwhichperFSARcontinuously monitorsdischarge andautoterminates ifexceeded.

HoweveractionperTechnical Specification foranoutofserviceradwastemonitorwastakenpriortorelease.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Calculation ofreleasewereperformed priortoreleaseensuringradioactivity wouldbetolowtorequireverification ofrelease.

10CFR5059Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-9SafetyEvaluation Summary(Continued):

TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

Actiontakenwerethesameprecautions asthoseforanoutofservicemonitor.

10CFR50.59Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-18Components/Systems Affected:

Feedwater Regulating ControlSystemDescription ofChange:Thereasonforthisjumperwastoisolatealeakingtransmitter line.Thisjumperwillisolatealeadingsectionofinstrument tubingsupplying FT-8011.Installation ofthisjumperwillretainallfunctions ofFT-8011,asitwillstillbeinservice.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Thischangewillisolatealeakinginstrument linewhilemaintaining theoperability ofthatinstrument.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Theflowtransmitter willremainoperablewiththisjumperinstalled.

Theproposedactivitydoesnotcreatetheprobability ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

Nolossofplantfunctionorcontrolwilloccurasaresultofthisjumper.

10CFR50.59Eva1uation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-54Components/Systems Affected:

SafetyEvaluation toallowtheuseofspareCEDMReactorHeadPowerCablessuppliedbyABB-CE.Description ofChange:Thisevaluation allowstheuseofnewspareControlElementDriveMechanism (CEDM)ReactorHeadPowerCablesbetweenthedriveandtheRefueling Disconnect Panels(RDPs).Thesparecablesaretobeusedonlyifone(ormore)oftheexistingcablesfailandrequiresreplacement.

ThesecablesarenotsafetyrelatedandarenotrequiredtobeseismicclassI,butarelocatedoverandaroundsafetyrelatedequipment andmustbeseismicclassII.Theyaretherefore classified asQualityRelated.Basedonthefollowing evaluation, theuseofthesesparecablesduringthenextoperating cyclewillnotposeanysafetyhazardtotheplant.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoallowtheuseofthenewspareCEDMReactorHeadPowerCablesifone(ormore)oftheexistingcablesfailsandrequiresreplacement beforeorduringthenextoperating cycle(afterthe1991refueling outage).Theonlyaccidentevaluated intheFSARthatcouldbeaffectedbythesparecablesisaControlElementAssembly(CEA)drop.Thisaccidentisevaluated inFSARsection15.2.3.AfailureofoneofthesesparecablescouldcauseaCEAtodrop.Theprobability ofaCEAdropeventwillnotincreaseasaresultofusingthesesparecablesbecausethesparecablesmeetorexceedtherequirements ofFPLSpecifications EN-2.14exceptasnotedandevaluated inABB/CECertificate ofConformance.

Thisspecification waswrittenandapprovedtoensurethatthereplacement CEDMpowercableswouldcomplywithalloperating requirements fortheirintendeduse.Thisasaresult,thesparecableswillbebetterabletoperformtheirintendedfunctionthenthecablestheyreplaceand,willbelesslikelytofail.Also,thesesparecableswillprovidethesamefunctioninthesamemannerastheoriginalcablesandhavethesameelectrical characteristics.

Therefore, usingthesparecableswillnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.

0 10CFR50'9Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-54SafetyEvaluation Summary(Continued):

ThefailureofoneofthesesparecablescouldcauseaCEAdropevent.However,theplantresponsetothistransient isnotalteredbythereplacement ofthesecables.Thenewcablesaredesignedtowithstand aseismiceventandnotdegradetothepointthattheywillaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment andarealsodesignedtowithstand theeffectsofalossofcoolantaccidentwithoutalossofintegrity.

Thus,thesparecableswillnotblockthecontainment sumpscreensandwillnotimpacttheavailable NPSHfortheECCSpumps.Therefore, theuseofthesparecableswillnotincreasetheconsequences ofaccidentpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.TheCEDMcablesareusedtoprovidecontrolled movementofthecontrolelementassemblies (CEA's)intoandoutofthecore.However,theCEDM'sarefailsafe.Thatis,theyaredesignedtofallintothecoreuponfailureofaCEDM(including interruption ofpowertothereactortripswitchgearbreakers).

ThereisnocrediblecablefailurethatwouldpreventtheCEA'sfromfallingintothecore.Thefiberglass braidwillmaintainthecableintegrity becauseitiscapableofwithstanding theeffectsofaLOCAwhilekeepingtheconductors togetherandkeepingthecablefillerandbindertapecontained inside.Thisprecludes thepossibility ofcontainment sumpscreenblockagebythecablefillerand/orbindertape.Thisbraidwillalsoprovideadditional abrasionprotection totheindividual conductor insulation.

Therefore, usingthesparecableswillnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Thesenewsparecableswillperformthesamefunctioninthesamemannerastheoriginalcables.Thesparecableswillnotinteractwithanyequipment inanymannerthattheoriginalcablesdidnotinteractwith.Assuch,useofthesparecableswillhavenoeffectonthefunctionofequipment important tosafety.Therefore, usingthesparecableswillnotincreasetheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Again,thesenewsparecableswillperformthesamefunctioninthesamemannerastheexistingcables.Assuch,allequipment andsystemswillfunctioninthesamemannerasiscurrently described intheFSAR.Therefore, usingthesparecableswillnotcreatethepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheFSAR.

0 10CFR50'9Evaluation forTemporary ChangesviaJumper/Lifted LeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-54SafetyEvaluation Summary(Continued):

Thesecableswillnotdegradeandaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment.

TheywillfunctionthesameastheexistingcablesandthefailuremodesfortheexistingcableshavebeenanalyzedintheFSAR.orhavebeenprotected againstbyusingthefiberglass braid.Therefore, usingthesparecableswillnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Theoperation oftheCEDMsystemwillnotchangeasaresultofusingthenewsparecables.Therefore, themethodsusedtomeettherequirements oftheTechnical Specifications arenotchanged.ThebasesbehindtheTechnical Specifications arestillvalidandthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthosebasesisnotreduced.