ML17227A316

St Lucie Annual 10CFR50.59 Rept for 1991

ML17227A316
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	12/31/1991
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
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ML17227A317	List: ML17227A316 ML17227A319 ML17309A673
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NUDOCS 9203030215
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SECTIONST~LUCIEANNUAL10CFR50'9REPORTAsummaryofchangestothefacilityasdescribedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)(10CFR50.59(A)(1)(i))issubmittedbyseparatelettersatthesametimeastheannualFSARupdateforeachunit(July22forSt.LucieUnit1andApril6forSt.LucieUnit2).SafetyEvaluations(for1991)thatwereapprovedbytheFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)andthoseassociatedwithJumper/LiftedLeadsareattached.P2030302i5920225lPDR*DOCK05000335RPDR 10CFR50.59EvaluationsSummariesofEvaluationsApprovedbytheSt.LucieFacilityRevievGroup ST~LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFORAUXZL1ARYFEEDWATERPUMP2CTURBINECOUPLINGBEARINGLUBEOILPIPINGTEMPORARYMODIFICATIONZNTRODUCTIONIThisSafetyEvaluationispreparedtodocumenttheacceptabilityofthetemporaryuseofpipingandfittingsinplaceoftheoriginallyinstalledtubingonthe2CAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpTurbineCouplingBearingLubeOilsystem.Theoriginaltubingwasdamagedduringmaintenanceactivitiesandexactreplacementsarenotreadilyavailable.TheAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpperformsasafetyrelatedfunctionandisdesignedasaQualityGroupCcomponent.Thisevaluationconcludesthatthetemporarymodificationdescribeshereindoesnotrepresentanunreviewedsafetyquestionandhasnoimpactonplantsafetyoroperations.AreviewofthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheFSARhasshownthattherearenoTechnicalSpecificationchangesinvolved.Thisevaluationisvalidthroughtheendofthe1992refuelingoutage.SAFETYEVALUATION:Thetemporarymodifiedconfigurationdoesnotcreateanewpathforuncontrolledradioactivereleasesandwillnotadverselyaffectanyradiationmonitoringequipmentorequipmentwhichperformsacontainmentisolationfunction.Thetemporarymodifiedpipingconfigurationwillnotadverselyimpacttheabilityofthe2CAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump(oranyotherequipment)toperformitsaccidentmitigatingdesignfunctionandwillnotcreateanynewfailuremodesforthe2CAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump.Themodifiedconfigurationwillnotinhibitorotherwiseadverselyaffecttheoperationofanyequipmentimportanttosafety.Therefore:1)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.2)TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreased.3)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.Thetemporarilymodifiedpipingconfigurationisequivalenttotheoriginaltubingconfiguration,andmeetsorexceedsthesystemdesignpressure,temperature,material,andflowcharacteristicsanddoesnotmodifyanyactivecomponents.4)TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreased.

ST~LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATZONFORAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMP2CTURBINECOUPLINGBEARINGLUBEOILPIPINGTEMPORARYMODIFICATIONPAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION(Continued):5)ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethetemporarilymodifiedconfigurationdoesnotaddoraffectanyequipmentcapableofinitiatinganaccident.6)ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasnotbeencreated.7)TheexistingconfigurationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationsincethetemporarilymodifiedcouplingbearingpipingconfigurationwillnotimpacttheoperationofthe2CAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpasrequiredpertheTechnicalSpecificationsortheFSAR.Thetemporarilymodifiedconfigurationisfunctionallyequivalenttotheoriginalconfiguration,flowcharacteristicsoftheoilsystemarenotchanged.

STLUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORCONTAINMENTFANCOOLERUNQUALIFIEDCOATINGS-REVISION1INTRODUCTION:Thissafetyevaluationaddressesthepresenceofunqualifiedcoatingsonthe1A,1B,1Cand1DContainmentFanCoolercoilflanges.NewcoolingcoilswereinstalledunderPC/M081-189duringtheUnit11990refuelingoutage.Uponinspectionofthecoilspriortoinstallation,thecoatingonthecoilflangeswasdeterminedtobeimproperlyapplied(i.e.-unqualified).Someoftheseunqualifiedcoatingscouldnotberemovedandreplacedduetotheirproximitytothecoppercoilsandtheresultantpotentialfordamageofthecoppercoils.ThepresenceoftheunqualifiedcoatingsinsidecontainmentwillnotaffectPlantsafetyoroperationsincetheiris'opotentialforfailureofthecoatingsduringalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)toadverselyaffecttheoperationofanystructure,system,orcomponentimportanttosafety.AreviewoftheTechnicalSpecificationsandtheFSARhasshownthattherearenounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesinvolved.Duringthe1991Unit1refuelingoutage,theContainmentFanCoolercoilflangeswereinspected.Thisrevisionincorporatesthefindingsoftheinspection.AreviewoftheplantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheFSARhasshownthattherearenounresolvedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationschangesinvolvedinthisrevision.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheunqualifiedcoatingsdonotperformasafetyfunctionandtheirfailureduringaLOCAwillnotadverselyaffectthefunctionofanystructure,system,orcomponentimportanttosafety,oraffectanyaccidentinitiatingevents.ThefailedcoatingscannotadverselyaffecttheECCSsincetheywillnotclogthecontainmentsump,oraffecttheperformanceofECCSpumpsandcontainmentspraynozzles.Degradationofthecomponentcoolingwatersystemisnotaconcernsinceappreciablecorrosionoftheflangesduetothelackofaprotectivecoatingwouldbeidentifiedandaddressedbeforealossoffunctionoftheflangeoccurred.Therefore:1)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.2)TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreased.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORCONTAINMENTFANCOOLERUNQUALIFIEDCOATINGS-REVISION1PAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION(Continued):3)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.4)ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeencreated.5)TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreased.6)ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasnotbeencreated.7)TheproposedmodificationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationsincetheunqualifiedcoatingscannotaffectthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORMV-07-3BSTEMREPLACEMENTREVISIONINTRODUCTION:ThevalvestemofContainmentSprayBHeaderIsolationValveMV-07-3Bisdamagedandmustbereplaced.TheexistingvalvestemmaterialisASTMA473type316stainlesssteel.Aninspectionoftheproposedreplacementiteminstock(M&S577-67526-7)identifiedthematerialtobeASTMA276type410stainlesssteel.ThisSafetyEvaluationisarevisionandwasissuedtoextendthedurationoftheevaluationuntilthe1993refuelingoutageandrevisestheadministrativeportionsoftheevaluationtocomplywithcurrentrequirements.TheconclusionsoftheSafetyEvaluationremainvalidandhavenotchangedasaresultofthisrevision.ThisevaluationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionnordoesitrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications.SAFETYEVALUATION:ThecontainmentspraysystemisdesignedtoassistinthemitigationofaLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA),assumingasingleactiveorpassivefailure.Furthermore,thevalvethatisthesubjectofthisevaluationisdesignedtoQualityGroupBandSeismicClassIrequirements.Basedontheabovedescription,thisevaluationandassociatedmodificationsareconsideredNuclearSafetyRelated.Thisreportdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionbasedonthefollowingconclusions:1)TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotincreased.Theuseofthe410SSwillnotchangetheoperationalabilityortheseismicqualificationofthesubjectvalveinthatthecorrosionexperiencedduringonerefuelingcyclewillnotsignificantlydegradetheintegrityofthevalvestem.2)ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofatypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotcreatedsincethetemporarymodificationdoesnotchangetheoperationaldesignofthesystem.3)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotaffectedbythischangesincethetemporarymodificationdoesnotcompromisethevalveintegrity,reliability,oraffectitsoperationalcharacteristics.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1CVCSANDWASTEMANAGEMENTBORICACIDHEATTRACINGCIRCUITDE-ENERGIZATIONINTRODUCTIONSThissafetyevaluationaddressestheeffectofde-energizingspecificcircuitsoftheheattracingsystemassociatedwiththeBoricAcidMakeupSystem.EngineeringpackagesPC/M336-189Revision2,"BoricAcidConcentrationReductionModifications",andPC/M094-188Revision0,"BoricAcidConcentrationReduction"reducedtheboricacidconcentrationintheBoricAcidMakeupSystem.PortionsoftheBoricAcidMakeupSystemwithboricacidconcentrationsof3.5weightpercentorlessdonotrequireheattracing.ThisevaluationfocusesinontheChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)andWasteManagementSystem(WMS)(orBoricAcidMakeupandRecoverySystems)forthepurposeofde-energizingheattracecircuitsthathavebeenidentifiedbySt.LuciePlantMaintenanceasnotbeingrequired.PerFSARsection9.3.4.1portionsoftheBoricAcidMakeupSystemaredesignedandbuilttomeettherequirementsofseismicclassI,hencethissafetyevaluationisclassifiedassafetyrelated.SAFETYEVALUATIONBasedontheSt.LucieUnit1FSAR,theChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)isdesignedtoperformthefollowing:a)maintainthechemistryandpurityofthereactorcoolantwithinthelimitsspecifiedinFSARTable9.3-8.b)maintaintherequiredvolumeofwaterinthereactorcoolantsystembycompensatingforcoolantcontractionorexpansionduetoplantsteploadchangesof(+/-)104offullpowerandrampchangesof(+/-)54offullpowerperminutebetween15and1004powerandforreactorcoolantlossesoradditions.c)acceptout-flowfromthereactorcoolantsystemwhenthereactorcoolantisheatedattheadministrativerateof75degreesF/hrandtoprovidetherequiredmakeupwhenthereactorcoolantiscooledattheadministrativerateof75degreesf/hrusingtwochargingpumps.d)accommodatethereactorcoolantsystemwaterinventorychangeforafull-to-zeropowerdecreasewithnomakeupsystemoperationandwiththevolumecontroltankinitiallyatthenormaloperatinglevelband.e)injectconcentratedboricacidintothereactorcoolantsystemuponasafetyinjectionactuationsignal(SIAS).

ST~LUCZEUNIT1CVCSAND%ASTEMANAGEMENTBORICACIDHEATTRACINGCIRCUITDE-ENERGIMTZONPAGE2INTRODUCTION(Continued):f)controltheboronconcentrationinthereactorcoolantsystemtoobtainoptimumcontrolelementassembly(CEA)positioningtocompensateforreactivitychangesassociatedwithlargechangesinreactorcoolanttemperature,coreburnup,andxenonconcentrationvariations,andtoprovideshutdownmarginformaintenanceandrefuelingoperations.g)injectboroninsufficientquantitytocounteractthemaximumreactivityincreaseduetocooldownat75degrees/hrandxenondecayusingonechargingpump.h)automaticallydiverttheletdownflowtothewastemanagementsystem(HMS)whenthevolumecontroltankisatthehighestpermissiblelevel.assurethattheradioactivityduetocorrosionandfissionproductsinthereactorcoolantsystemdoesnotexceedTechnicalSpecificationlimitsforanassumed1%failedfuelcondition.i)providecontinuouson-linemeasurementofreactorcoolantboronconcentrationandradioactivityduetofissionandcorrosionproducts.j)k)provideauxiliarypressurizersprayforoperatorcontrolofthereactorcoolantsystempressureduringthefinalstagesofshutdownandtoallowforthecoolingofthepressurizer.Basedonareviewoftheaboveitems,theeffectofde-energizingheattracecircuitshasbeendeterminedtohavenoimpactonsafetyfunctionsorregulatoryrequirements.TheprobabilityofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreasedbecausede-energizingheattracecircuitsdonotaffecttheinitiationofanaccidentevaluatedintheFSARnorincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrence.Desiredboricacidconcentrationismaintainedevenwiththede-energizingofheattracingcircuits.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARarenotincreasedbythede-energizingheattracingcircuits.Asdescribedabove,de-energizingheattracecircuitswillnotchange,degrade,orpreventsystemfunctionsdescribedin,orassumedtooccurinthemitigationofanyFSARaccident.

ST~LUCIEUNITCVCSANDWASTEMANAGEMENTBORICACIDHEATTRACINGCIRCUITDE-ENERGIZATIONPAGE3SAFETYEVALUATION(Continuect):ThisproposedactivityhasnoimpactontheLOCAanalysisandtheradiologicalconsequencesofanaccidentevaluatedintheFSARwillnotbeincreased.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipment,importanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreasedbecausetheproposedactivitywillnotresultinnewperformancerequirementsbeingimposedonanysystemorcomponentssuchthatanydesigncriteriawillbeexceeded.TheBoricAcidMakeupSystemfunctionalrequirementsareunchanged,thereforenonewprobabilityofmalfunctionhasbeenimposed.Asdescribedabove,de-energizingheattracecircuitsdonotchange,degrade,orpreventactionsdescribedin,orassumedtooccurinthemitigationofanyFSARaccident.Therefore,de-energizingheattracingcircuitswillnotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.Thede-energizingofheattracecircuitshasbeenevaluatedanddoesnotimpactthestructuralintegrityorperformancecapabilityofCVCSandWasteManagementSystem.ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotincreasedbythisproposedactivity.Theproposedactivitytode-energizesomeheattracecircuitsintheboricacidsystemat,St.LucieUnit1doesnotintroducefailuremodesofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyanalyzedintheFSAR.Thesystemconfigurationandthedesignbasisoftheboricacidsystemhasnotbeenchangedoraffected,thereforetheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilitythatanaccidentmaybecreatedthatisdifferentfromanyalreadyevaluatedintheFSAR.Removalofheattracinginareascontainingboricacidconcentrationof3.5weightpercentorlessdoesnotreduceanymarginsofsafetyforborationsourcesandflowpathrequirementssincetheconcentrationofboricacidiswithintherequirementsoftheTechnicalSpecification.De-energizingheattracingdoesnotaffecttheTechnicalSpecificationbasisforboratedwatersources.

8T~LUCIEUNIT18AFETYEVALUATIONOFABLINDFLANGEONLINEI-3"-CW-1608PENTFUELPOOLMAKEUP8ALTWATERBACKUPINTRODUCTIONThissafetyevaluationispreparedtodocumenttheacceptabilityoftheinstallationofablindflangeonlineI-3"-CW-160atvalveI-SB-21386.ThislineisthebackupsaltwatersupplyforSpentFuelPoolMakeup.TheproposedconfigurationisacceptableonatemporarybasistosupportmaintenanceonlineI-21/2"-CW-176.ThissafetyevaluationisrequiredtoallowtheimplementationofthenecessaryrepairswithintheconstraintsoftheLimitingConditionsofOperation(LCO)fortheICWsystem.TheICWandSpentFuelPoolMakeupsystemsaresafetyrelatedandaredesignatedasSeismicClass1andQualityGroupCsystems.Thisevaluationconcludesthattheproposedconfigurationdescribedhereindoesnotrepresentanunreviewedsafetyquestionandhasnoimpactonplantsafetyoroperations.AreviewofthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheFSARhasshownthattherearenoTechnicalSpecificationchangesinvolved.Thisevaluationisvalidthroughtheendofthe1991refuelingoutage.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreas'edsincetheproposedconfigurationdoesnotaffectanyaccidentinitiatingcomponents.Theproposedconfigurationdoesnotcreateanynewfailuremodesforanyequipmentorsystemscapableofinitiatinganaccident.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedsincetheproposedconfigurationdoesnotcreateanewpathforuncontrolledradioactivereleasesandwillnotadverselyaffectanyradiationmonitoringequipmentorequipmentwhichperformsacontainmentisolationfunction.Theproposedconfigurationdoesnotimpactanyequipmentwhichisrequiredtoinitiateactuationofanysafetysystems.TheproposedconfigurationwillnotadverselyimpacttheabilityoftheSpentFuelPoolMakeuporICWsystemstoperformtheirsafetyrelateddesignfunctions.Thedesignfunctionoftheaffectedlineistoprovideaminimumof150gallonsperminute(GPM)ofsaltwatermakeuptothespentfuelpoolintheeventthatalossoffuelpoolcoolingcapabilityoccurs.ThisfunctionwillberetainedbyuseofahoseconnectiontoI-SH-21241orI-SH-21338.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipment.importanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.Nonewfailuremodesforactiveequipmentareintroducedbytheproposedconfiguration.ValveI-SH-21241orvalveI-SH-21338isnowrequiredtoopentosupplyspentfuelpoolmakeup.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONOFABLINDFLANGEONLINEI-3"-CW-160SPENTFUELPOOLMAKEUPSALTWATERBACKUPPAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION(Continued):However,theprobabilityofamalfunctionofthatvalveisnogreaterthanthatofI-SB-21386.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedsincetheproposedconfigurationdoesnotcreateanewpathforuncontrolledradioactivereleasesandwillnotadverselyaffectanyradiationmonitoringequipmentorequipmentwhichperformsacontainmentisolationfunction.Theproposedconfigurationwillnotimpactanyequipmentwhichisrequiredtoinitiateactuationofanysafetysystems.TheproposedpipingconfigurationwillnotadverselyimpacttheabilityoftheSpentFuelPoolMakeuporICWsystemstoperformtheirsafetyrelateddesignfunctions.AfailureofthealternatespentfuelpoolmakeupflowpathhasbeenevaluatedanddeterminedtohavenosignificantimpactontheabilityoftheICWsystemtoperformitsotherSafetyRelatedfunctions.ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincetheproposedconfigurationdoesnotaddoraffectanyequipmentcapableofinitiatinganaccident.ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincetheproposedconfigurationwillnotinhibitorotherwiseadverselyaffecttheoperationofanyequipmentimportanttosafety.Amalfunctionofthepassiveblindflangeisnotlikely.Thealternatespentfuelpoolmakeupflowpathiseffectivelyequivalent(ballvalvevs.butterflyvalve)totheflangedlineanddoesnotcreatethepossibilityofadifferenttypeofmalfunction.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationsincetheproposedconfigurationofthepipingsystemwillnotimpacttheoperationoftheICWorSpentFuelPoolMakeupsystemsasrequiredpertheTechnicalSpecificationsortheFSAR.Theproposedconfiguration,withidentifiedbackupsaltwatersupplytotheSpentFuelPoolMakeupsystem,isfunctionallyequivalenttotheoriginalconfiguration.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONOFCOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGER1A"TUBEGARDS"INTRODUCTION:Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistoallowtheinstallationof"Tubegards"intothe1AComponentCoolingWaterHeatExchanger(CCWHX).TheTubeGardsareinstalledintoeachunpluggedtubeattheupstreamtubesheettoreducetheeffects'fmacrofouling(marinegrowth)ontheHXtubes.TheTubegardswillbeinstalledonatestbasisforaperiodnottoexceedoneoperatingfuelcycle(Cycle11).,TheperformanceoftheTubegardswillthenbeevaluatedtodetermineifpermanentinstallationintooneorboth(1Aand1B)CCWHX'siswarranted.TheinstallationofTubeGardsintothe1ACCWHXwillhavenoimpactonplantoperationandsafety.Therefore,NRCapprovalisnotrequiredpriortoimplementation.ThisevaluationconcludesthattheinstallationoftheTubeGardsdoesnotrepresentanunreviewedsafetyquestion,norrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.TheCCWHX'sareutilizedforaccidentmitigationandarenotconsideredtobeaccidentinitiatingcomponents.TheTubeGardsactasastrainer,similarinfunctiontostrainersalreadyinstalledintheICWsystem.InstallationoftheTubegardswithinthe1ACCWHXphysicallyprohibitstheTubegardsfromincreasingtheprobabilityofpreviouslyevaluatedaccidents.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedbytheinstallationofTubeGardsintothe1ACCWHX.NofailuremodesofTubegardshavebeenidentifiedwhichpreventtheICWandCCWsystemsfromperformingtheirdesignSafetyRelatedfunctions.Tubegardsaredesignedforuseinheatexchangerapplications.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreasedbytheinstallationofTubegards.TheTubegardsarepassivedevicescontainedwithintheICWsideofthe1ACCWheatexchangerandarephysicallyseparatedfromanyequipmentoutsidetheICWsystem.NocrediblefailuremechanismsoftheTubegardshavebeenidentifiedwhichwouldcausethefailureofthe1ACCWHXorthemalfunctionofanyICWsystemcomponents.AdditionallytheinstallationofTubegardsdoesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONOFCOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERHEATEXCHANGER1A"TUBEGARDS"PAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION(Continued):TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedbytheinstallationoftheTubeGards.TheTubeGardsandassociatedfailuremodesareisolatedwithintheICWpipingsystem.ThefailuremodesandtheireffectsareenvelopedbytheexistingfailureanalysisintheFSAR.TheTubegardfailuremodesandeffectshavebeenevaluatedforthepotentialtocreateanaccidentofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.TheTugegardsarecontainedwithintheICWsystematthechannelheadofthe1ACCWHX,andneithertheICWsystemorthe1ACCWHXareconsideredtobeaccidentinitiatingcomponents.TheinstallationofTubegardsdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSAR,since,allcrediblefailuremodesareenvelopedbyexistinganalyseswhichconsiderslossofanICWtrain.TheinstallationofTubegardswithinthe1ACCWHXdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecificationsincetheTubegardsdonotnegativelyaffectthecapabilityoftheICWandCCWsystemstoprovidetherequiredcoolingcapacityforthecontinuedoperationofvitalcomponentsandEngineeredSafetyFeatureequipmentduringnormalandaccidentconditions.TheoverallpositivebenefitsdemonstratedintheuseofTubegardswithinthecondenserwaterboxes,i.e.,reducedtubedamageduetomicrofoulinginducedpitting,andincreasedsystemavailabilityduetoreducedfoulingrates,providereasonableassurancetheTubegardswillperformasintendedinthe1ACCWHXandprovidesimilarpositiveresults.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORTHEUSEOFP-54ANDE-4FORSTEAMGENERATORDURINGOUTAGEINTRODUCTIONTheuseofP-54toprovideaccesstocablesandhosesusedtosupportsteamgeneratoractivitiessuchasECTandsludgelancinghasbeenpreviouslyevaluatedandFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)concurrenceobtainedanddocumented.DuringtheUnit1outage,asimilarconfigurationisbeingutilizedonP-54andE-4withminormodificationstotheclosureblindflangeforP-54.ThemodificationonP-54entailstheuseofanextendedspoolpiecewithaflangeadaptertoserveastheblindflange.Theintendedpurposeoftheblindflangeisstillbeingmetbythemodified"spool-pieceblind".TheuseofP-54andE-4duringrefuelingMode:ThebasisfortheTechnicalSpecificationistoprovideairtightclosuresuchthatthereisnodirectpathbetweenthecontainmentatmosphereandtheoutsideatmosphere.ThepresentclosureconfigurationofP-54andE-4complieswiththeTechnicalSpecificationbyprovidingaseal(RTVseal)onP-54attheoutsidecontainmentsideandairtested,andbyprovidingaseal(RTVseal)onE-4atthecontainmentandoutsidecontainmentsidesofthepenetration.UseofP-54andE-4duringreducedinventory:TheuseofP-54andE-4duringreducedinventoryisaddressedingeneralmaintenanceprocedure1-M-0060whichprovidesspecificinstructionstorapidlyclosethesepenetrationsduringlossofshutdowncoolingwhileatreducedinventory.SAFETYEVALUATIONSTheoriginalintentontheuseofP-54aspreviouslyevaluatedduringthepreviousoutagehasnotbeenaltered.Inconclusion,thepresentarrangementofP-54andE-4doesnot:1)Increasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,2)Createthepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyanalyzed,or3)ReducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanyTechnicalSpecification.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORRABELECTRICALEQUIPMENTANDBATTERYROOMHVACINTRODUCTION:ThissafetyevaluationaddresseschangestothedescriptionoftheSt.LucieUnit1ReactorAuxiliaryBuilding(RAB)ElectricalEquipmentandBatteryRoomVentilationSystemaspresentlystatedintheFSARSection9.4.2.2.2.ThechangesarearesultofinconsistenciesbetweentheFSARandotherdesigndocumentswhichwerediscoveredduringpreparationfortheElectricalDistributionSystemFunctionalInspection(EDSFI)andareasfollows:Systemflowratesprovidedondrawing8770-G-862(FSARFigure9.4-1)werenotadjustedfollowingtheadditionoffiredampersinstalledbyPC/M269-183andPC/M260-183inthesubjectventilationsystemtomeetAppendixRrequirements.Theinstallationoffiredampersincreasedsystemresistancewhichreducedthesupplyfans'apacitiesofthereducedsystemflowrates.Uponlossofoffsitepower(LOOP),onlythebatteryroomexhaustfansareautomaticallyconnectedtotheemergencydieselgenerators.Theelectricalequipmentroomssupplyandexhaustfansaremanuallyrestartedbyadministrativecontrol.PresentlytheFSARstates,"Uponlossofoff-sitepower,thesystemisautomaticallyconnectedtotheon-siteemergencydieselgeneratorsets".Thisimpliesallthefansinthesystemareautomaticallyconnectedtotheemergencygeneratorsets,whichisnotcorrect,pertheEDGElectricalLoadCalculation.AnFSARChangePackage(FCP)hasbeendevelopedthatcorrectsFSARSection9.4.2.2.2toagreewithplantCWD'sandwillaccuratelydescribethesystemoperationuponaLOOP.Duringanemergencycondition,whichinvolvesaLOOP,thetemperatureintheelectricalequipment,staticinverter,andbatteryroomsmayexceed104degreesfahrenheit.TheFSARcurrentlydoesnotaddresstheacceptabilityofthiscondition.AnFCPhadbeendevelopedtoprovideadditionaldescriptiontoFSARSection9.4.2.2.2andstatesit'sacceptability.ThedescriptionintheFSARdoesnotagreewiththeas-builtconditionconcerningthenumberofroomsventilated,theflowpath,andtheuseofnon-safetyrelatedairconditioningunits.AnFCPhasbeendevelopedwithFSAR9.4.2.2.2revisedtoprovidethecorrectdescriptionofthesystem.TheFSARstates,"Electricalequipmentroomtemperaturesexceeding110degreesFahrenheitareannunciatedinthecontrolroom".Thebasisforthe110degreesfahrenheitsetpointisnotprovidedintheFSAR.AFCPhasbeendevelopedwhichaddstotheFSARSection

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORRABELECTRICALEQUIPMENTANDBATTERYROOMHVACPAGE2INTRODUCTION(Continued):9.4.2.2.2thebasesforthe110degreesFahrenheitsetpoint.Thisinformationwillprecludefutureconfusionconcerningthissetpoint.SAFETYEVALUATIONTheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincethischangedoesnotaffectanyaccidentinitiatingcomponents.TheRABElectricalEquipmentandBatteryRoomVentilationSystemdoesnotcontainoraffectanyaccidentinitiatingcomponent.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythischangesincethischangedoesnothaveadetrimentalaffectonanyequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.TheRABElectricalEquipmentandBatteryRoomVentilationSystemhasbeenshowntostillperformitssafetyrelatedfunctionassumingasingleactivefailureofasupplyfanandwillnotaltertheradiologicalconsequencesofanaccidentevaluatedintheFSAR.Allsafetyrelatedequipmentservicedbythisventilationsystemhavebeenevaluatedfortheexpectedroomtemperaturesundernormalandemergencyconditionsandshowntobeacceptable.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreasedsincethischangedoesnotaffectthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents,andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibilityoftheirfailure.ThesafetyrelatedelectricalequipmentinElectricalEquipmentRooms1A,1B,1C,thestaticinverterroomandBatteryRooms1Aand1Bhavenotbeenimpactedbythischange.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedsincethischangedoesnothaveadetrimentaleffectonanysafetyrelatedequipmentorcomponents.ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethischangewillnotinhibitorotherwiseadverselyaffecttheoperationoftheRABElectricalEquipmentandBatteryVentilationSystem.ThecomponentsofthechangeareincompliancewiththeFSARrequirementsforthesystemelements.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORRABELECTRICALEQUIPMENTANDBATTERYROOMHVACPAGE3SAFETYEVALUATION(Continued):TheproposedchangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationsincetheRABElectricalEquipmentandBatteryRoomVentilationSystemisnotaddressedintheTechnicalspecifications.Thechangeshavebeenshowntonothaveadetrimentaleffectonthesafetyrelatedequipmentservicedbythisventilationsystem.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORREMOVALOFVALVEI-TCV-14-4AAND-4B45DEGREESSTOPDEVICEINTRODUCTION:AiroperatedtemperaturecontrolvalvesI-TCV-14-4A,-4BarebutterflytypevalveslocatedinlinesI-,30"-CW-77attheoutletoftheComponentCoolingWaterHeatExchangers(CCWHE)1Aand1B.ThevalvesautomaticallycontrolICWflowfromtheexchangers.TheyaremodulatedopenedandclosedaccordingtotheoutletwatertemperatureoftheshellsideoftheCCWHE.Valveclosureislimitedto254fromfullclosedposition(bypneumaticrelay)topreventturbulentflowandvalvedamage.Thereisnodesignlimitationonthemaximumvalveopening,howeveramechanicalstopdeviceisinstalledonthevalvestolimitthevalveopeningtoamaximumof45degrees(90degreesrepresentsvalvefullyopen).TheplantdesiresthatthemechanicalstopsberemovedduringCCWheatexchangertestingandforthedurationoftheoutage.ThetestingisbeingperformedinresponsetoGenericLetter89-13.Thepurposeofthischangeinvolvesremovalofthe45degreemechanicalstopassociatedwithICWtemperaturecontrolvalves(I-TCV-14-4A&B).TheproposedchangeisnecessarytoensurepropertestingoftheCCWheatexchangerheatremovalcapability.Theplantintendstomaintainthecurrentcalibrationonthecontrollersforthesevalves.Thus,thevalvewillstillmodulatebetween45degreesopenand254open.However,fortestingpurposestheplantintendstofailthevalvetothefullopenposition.St.LucieUnit2currentlysuccessfullyoperateswiththesevalvesmodulatingbetweenfullopenandtheminimumstop.SAFETYEVALUATION~TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARbecausethesubjectTCV'sarenotaccidentinitiatingdevices.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentbecausetheICWflowrateisincreased,andthesystemremainscapableofdeliveringtheminimumflowrequirementsforaccidentconditions.Allcomponentsretaintheirfunctionsandcapabilitieswiththeincreasedflow.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetybecausetheICWpumpsremaincapableofoperatingwithintheirperformance-curveandthevalves'etpointsandoperationarenotaffected.

ST~LUCIEUNIT1SAFETYEVALUATIONFORREMOVALOFVALVEI-TCV-14-4AAND-4B45DEGREESSTOPDEVICEPage2SAFETYEVALUATION(continued):Theproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetybecausetheprimaryequipment,ICWpumps,andtheTCVsstillperformwithintheirdesignwithnonewfailuremodesintroduced.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedbecausecomponentreplacementdoesnottakeplaceandtheoperationoftheTCV'sisunchangedinthatvalveopeningbasedontemperatureismaintained.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARbecausecomponentreplacementdoesnottakeplaceandfunctionallythereisnochangetotheresponseofthesystem.Theproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationbecausethevalves'etpointsremainthesameandtheflowrateincreasesprovidinggreaterheatsinkcapabilitiesduringaccidentconditions.

ST~LUCZEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFORCLAMPFOR4-WAYHYDRAULICVALVESONMAINFEEDWATERISOLATIONVALVESINTRODUCTIONSeveraloftheendcapcapcrewsonthe4-wayhydraulicvalveshavebeenfoundbrokenontheSt.LucieUnit2MainFeedwaterIsolationValves(MFIV,HCV-09-1A/2A/1B/2B).PreliminaryinspectionofthecapscrewsbytheZPN-ESIlabindicateoverloadasthefailuremechanism.Asaresultofthispreliminaryinvestigation,theremainingcapscrewsaredeemedsuspectorindeterminateuntilathoroughinvestigationofrootcausecanbecompleted.Asaprudentmeasure,aclamphasbeendesignedtoreplacethefunctionofthecapscrews,toassuretheMFIV4-wayhydraulicvalvewillremainoperablepertheoriginaldesign.Installationofthisclampwillhavenoimpactonplantsafetyoroperation.AreviewoftheplantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheFSARhasshownthattherearenounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesinvolved.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreasedsinceinstallationoftheclampdoesnotaffectanyaccidentinitiatingcomponents.Installationoftheclampactstoreplacethefunctionoftheoriginalendcapcapscrewsandisconsideredequivalent.ContinuedreliablenondegradedoperabilityoftheMFIV4-wayhydraulicvalveisthereforeassured.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedsinceinstallationofthisclampdoesnotchangeoraltertheabilityoftheMFIVtorespondtoaMSISorAFASsignal(i.e.,tocloseandremainclosed).Installationoftheclampdoesnotadverselyaffectanyotherequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreased.Theclampandtheeffectoftheadditionalweightonthe4-wayhydraulicvalvemountingcapscrewshavebeenevaluatedasacceptabletoassurethevalvecanperformitsfunctionduringaDBEevent.Installationoftheclampdoesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingcomponentsandthusdoesnotincreasethepossibilityoftheirfailure.

ST~LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFORCLAMPFOR4-RAYHYDRAULICVALVESONMAINFEEDMATERISOLATIONVALVESPAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION(continued):TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedsincetheclampdoesnotaltertheresponseorfunctionoftheMFIV'sduringanaccident,norinteractwithanyotherequipmentimportanttosafety.ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsinceinstallationoftheclampdoesnotaddoraffectanyequipmentcapableofinitiatinganaccident.Theclampfunctionisequivalenttothefunctionoftheendcapcapscrews.TheadditionalweightoftheclamphasbeenevaluatedforseismicconsiderationswithrespecttotheMFIVvalveandactuator,andwasdeterminedtobeacceptable.ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincetheadditionoftheclampwillnotinhibitorotherwiseadverselyaffecttheoperationoftheMFIVorthe4-wayhydraulicvalve.Theclampisexternaltothemovingpartsinthe4-wayhydraulicvalve.Theclampwillnotadverselyaffectthefunctionofanycomponentswithinthevalve,i.e.,thevalvecomponentsaremetaltometalalongtheaxis,andthevalvecomponentsareofsufficientthickness.TheadditionoftheclampdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationsincetheclampfunctionistoensurethe4-wayhydraulicvalvesremainoperableaspertheoriginaldesign.ThisisaprudentmeasurewhichprovidesgreaterassurancethatthefunctionoftheMFIVismaintained.

4 ST~LUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFORINSTALLATIONOFBLINDFLANGEONPIPINGATCONTAINMENTPENETRATIONP-56INTRODUCTIONRecentLocalLeakRateTest(LLRT)resultsonPSLUnit2PenetrationP-56haveshownincreasingleakageratesthroughvalveFCV-25-26and/orFCV-25-36,whichhavebeenwithintheacceptablelimitsforthispenetration.However,upcomingLLRTsurveillancemayresultinanunsatisfactoryleakagerateforthepenetration.Aspartofacontingencyplanforrestorationofthepenetration,thissafetyevaluationwillevaluateinstallationofablindflange(s)asnecessarytoachieveasatisfactoryLLRT.Thispenetrationisthemakeuppathforthecontinuouscontainmentpurge/hydrogenpurgesystem.Theimplementationofthistemporarymodificationwillhavenoadverseaffectonplantsafetyoroperation.AreviewoftheplantTechnicalSpecificationsandtheFSARhasshownthattherearenounresolvedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationschangesinvolved.PenetrationP-56andtheassociatedvalvesarerequiredforcontainmentisolation,thereforethisSafetyevaluationisclassifiedasSafetyRelated.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincethistemporarymodificationdoesnotaffectinitiatingcomponents.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythistemporarymodificationsincethismodificationdoesnotaffectanyequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.TheSafetyRelatedfunctionofthesystemistomaintaincontainmentintegrityatpenetrationP-56.ThisfunctionisaccomplishedbytheinstallationoftheblindflangeandasuccessfulLLRT.ThepenetrationwillstillberequiredtomeettheLLRTandcontainmentisolationrequirements.Installationofablindflangeinlieuofavalveisacceptableasapassivebarrierforcontainmentisolation.Theblindflangeconfigurationisproperlyspecifiedforthesystemdesignconditionsandthemakeupfunctionofthesystemmaybeaccomplishedbyuseofthecontainmentvacuumreliefsystem.Theexhaustfunctionofthesystemremainsintactandoperational.Therefore,theTechnicalSpecificationsrelatingtocontainmentisolationandcontainmentpressureremainunaffected.Thistemporarymodificationdoesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingequipmentimportanttosafety,andthusdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityoftheirfailure.Theinstallationoftheblind STLUCIEUNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONFORINSTALLATIONOFBLINDFLANGEONPIPINGATCONTAINMENTPENETRATIONP-56PAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION(Continued):flangedoesnotincreasetheloading(weight)onthepenetration,thereforetheanalysisforthepenetrationloadingisunchanged.Theinstallationoftheblindflangeservestoenhancethecontainmentisolationfunctionsinceitisapassivedevice.Theriggingoffofthe48"penetrationdoesnotadverselyaffecttheanalysisofthispenetration.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedsincethevalvesarenormallyopen,failclosedvalveswhichcloseonCIASsignal.Installationoftheblindflangeisapassivebarrierforcontainmentisolation.Noadditionalfailuremodesareintroduced,sincethepotentialforleakagethroughthegasketcurrentlyexistsforthevalveandseatleakagewouldbeeliminated.ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethistemporarymodificationdoesnotaddoraffectanyequipmentcapableofinitiatinganaccident.ThepenetrationisstillsubjecttothesameLLRTacceptancecriteriaforcontainmentisolation.ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheFSARhasnotbeencreatedsincethistemporarymodificationwillnotinhibitorotherwiseadverselyaffecttheoperationofothercomponents.Thevalvesarefailclosed,theblindflangepassivelyservesthissamefunction.ThistemporarymodificationmaintainsthemarginofsafetyoftheContainmentIsolationValveTechnicalSpecificationsinceitreplacesanactivedevicewithapassivedevicethatisdesignedtothesystemdesignparameters.WithregardstotheContainmentPressure(normal)TechnicalSpecification,thisTechnicalSpecificationisunaffectedsincetheexhaustportionofthesystemwillstillfunctiontoreducepressureinsidecontainment.

ST~LUCIEUNITS1&2SAFETYEVALUATIONFORCVCSPURIFICATIONFILTERPARTICULATERATINGUPGRADEINTRODUCTION:ThisSafetyEvaluationaddressesthetechnicalimplicationsfortheuseof6,2or1(1)micronabsolutefilterelementsintheUnit'1andUnit2ChemicalandVolumeControlSystems(CVCS)PurificationFiltersonatestbasis.Thecurrentdesignrequirementscallfor95%and984,forUnit1and2respectively,retentionbyweightofparticulate2micronsandlargerperSt.LucieUnit1FSARAmendment10andSt.LucieUnit2FSARAmendment6.Thehigherefficiency1micronabsolutefilterelementswillcaptureallparticulatelargerthan1microninsize,pluscapture99%oftheparticulatebetween0.6micronsand1.0micron.TheeliminationofthisparticulatewillhavethefollowingpositiveeffectsonbothUnitssystems:1.)2.)3.)4~)reduceout-of-coreradiation,reducetheformationofcruddeposits,minimizeresinfouling,reducepersonnelradiationexposure.AlthoughtheCVCSPurificationFilter1Aand2A,forUnit1and2respectively,doesnotperformanysafetyfunction,itislocatedinaQualityGroupCsystem.Therefore,thisSafetyEvaluationisclassifiedasNuclearSafetyRelated.Theuseofsmallerparticulaterated,higherefficiency,filterelementsintheCVCSPurificationFilter1Adoesnotadverselyimpactplantsafetynoroperation.ThisSafetyEvaluationconcludesthattherearenounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesinvolvedwiththismodification.SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhasnotbeenincreasedsincethetestbasismodificationdoesnotadverselyaffectanyaccidentinitiatingcomponents.Thedifferentialpressuredropofthenewfiltersislessthanthepressuredropoftheoriginalfilters.Thetestbasismodificationdoesnotalterthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents,andthusdoesnotincreasethepossibilityoffailure.Theinstallationof6,2or1(1)micronabsolutefilterswillresultinareductionofparticulateintheRCSandtheCVCS,leadingtoincreasedreliabilityofsystemcomponents.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedbythistestbasismodificationsinceitdoesnotadverselyaffectanyequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident.

ST.LUCIEUNITS182SAFETYEVALUATIONFORCVCSPURIFICATIONFZLTERPARTICULATERATINGUPGRADEPAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION(Continued):Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeenincreasedbecausethetestbasismodificationdoesnotimpactthefunctionofanyexistingcomponents,doesnotalterthehighdifferentialpressuredropacrossthefilteralarmsetpointanddoesnotincreasethepossibilityoftheirfailure.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARhavenotbeenincreasedsincethistestbasismodificationdoesnotcreateanewpathforuncontrolledradioactivereleasesandwillnotadversely=affectanyequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheconsequencesofanequipmentmalfunction.Thepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincethistestbasismodificationhasnoadverseeffectonanyequipmentcapableofinitiatinganaccidentandnonewfailuremodesareintroducedthroughtheinstallationoftheabove-mentionedabsolutefilters.Thepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreporthasnotbeencreatedsincethistestbasismodificationwillnotinhibitorotherwiseadverselyaffecttheoperationofanyequipmentimportanttosafety.Thetestbasisinstallationoftheabove-mentionedabsolutefilterelementsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationsincethefunctionofthesystemcomponentsremainthesame.Thenewfiltersprovidebetterfiltrationthantheoriginaldesigncallsforandthefilterswillbechangedatthesamedifferentialpressurerequirements.

ST~LUCZEUNITS1AND2GAGGINGOFSAFETYRELIEFVALVEV3483THATPROVIDESOVERPRESSUREPROTECTIONOFSHUTDOWNCOOLINGPIPINGINTRODUCTIONOnOctober20,1991,Unit1ShutdownCooling(SDC)returnreliefvalveV3483wasreportedtobeleakingRCSinventorywhiletheunitwasinmode4forrefueling.AleakingSDCreliefcouldnotbe,repairedquicklyinthefield,andpreventedtheuseofthe"A"trainofSDC,andsubsequentplantcooldown.ToterminatethereportedlossofRCSinventoryandtomakebothSDCtrainsavailable,a50.59wasrequiredtoevaluatetheplantresponsetotemporarygaggingthisreliefvalve.FSARsection6.3.2.2.6.ddescribestheSDCreturnreliefvalvesV3468andV3483asredundantoverpressureprotectiondevicesfortheshutdowncoolingsystemduringsolidRCSoperationswithallchargingpumpsrunning.Thesetpointofthesevalvesis300psigandeachvalvehasacapacityof155gpm.Thisvalueislessthantotalchargingpumpcapacityof132gpm.Section9.3oftheUnit1FSAR,table9.3-27liststhedesignpressureofthesuctionlinetotheLowPressureSafetyInjectionpumpstobe300psig,thesamevalueastherelief'ssetpoint.ThehydropressurefortheSDCsuctionlineis440psia.FSARsection9.3.5.2.2statesthat"(theSDCsuctionisolation)valvesV3651andV3652inthe1BloopandV3480andV3481in,the1AloopautomaticallyclosewhenevertheRCSpressureexceedsthedesignpressureoftheshutdowncoolingsystem."SAFETYEVALUATION:TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentisnotincreasedbythegaggingofasingleSDCrelief.TheaccidentofconcernisthefailureofthebackpressureregulatingvalveswhileinsolidRCSplantoperations.ThismaypossiblyrupturetheSDCsystemsuctionpipingduringanoverpressurizationoftheRCSwhileSDCisinservice,whichwouldresultinthelossofdecayheatremovalcapabilitythroughSDC.TheprobabilityofthisaccidentispredicatedonthefailureofthebackpressureregulatingvalvesduringsolidRCSoperation,thestartofchargingpumps,HPSIpumpsorRCSpumps,ortheenergizationofPressurizerheaters.Asacompensatorymeasure,HPSI,RCSpumpsandPressurizerheatersarede-energizedbyprocedureOP1-0020127priortosolidoperation.Therefore,theonlycredibleaccidentofconcernisthefailingclosedofthebackpressureregulatorswiththepressurizerfilledsolidwithwaterandoneormorechargingpumpsstillinoperation.TheinitiationofthisscenarioisindependentofSDCreliefvalvestatus.

ST~LUCIEUNITS1AND2GAGGINGOFSAFETYRELIEFVALVEV3483THATPROVIDESOVERPRESSUREPROTECTIONOFSHUTDOWNCOOLINGPIPINGPAGE2SAFETYEVALUATION(Continued):ThegaggingofasingleSDCreliefdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetybecausetheSDCsystemstillretainsoverpressureprotectionfromtheotheroperabletrain'sSDCreliefvalve.AdditionaloverpressureprotectionisaffordedbytheLowTemperatureOverpressureProtectionsystem,whichrelievesRCSpressureatlessthan350psiaasperTechnicalSpecifications.TheconsequencesofanaccidentisnotincreasedbythegaggingofasingleSDCrelief.FSARsection6.3.2.2.6dstatesthateachSDCvalvehasthecapacitytorelievetheflowfromthreechargingpumpsoperating.Therefore,withthecompensatorymeasureofhavingbothSDCtrainsinservice,atleastoneSDCreliefvalvecanrelievepressureforbothSDCtrainsbeforetheSDCsuctionisolationvalvesfullystrokeclosedinapproximately50seconds.Therateofpressureincreaseinthisscenarioisdependentuponthecompressibilityofwater,andtheamountofcompressiblegasesinsystemhighpoints.Therefore,theconsequencesareindependentofgaggingasingleSDCreliefvalvebecauseoftheoppositetrain'sSDCreliefvalve.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotincreasedbythegaggingofasingleSDCreliefvalve.Assumingthegaggingofonereliefvalveandthefailureoftheotherreliefvalve,overpressureprotectionoftheSDCsystemisaffordedbytheLTOPsystem.DuringnormalSDCoperation,withthepressurizersolid,RCStemperaturewillrequiretheLTOPsetpointtoinstantaneouslyopenbothPORV'satapressurenottoexceed350psia.ThisisbelowtheSDCsystemhydropressureof440psia.Therefore,thePORV'sprovideoverpressureprotectionuntiltheSDCsuctionisolationvalvesshut.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARisnotcreatedbygaggingasingleSDCreliefbasedupontheaboveinformation.ThemarginofsafetyfortheSDCsystemisnotexplicitlystatedintheTechnicalSpecifications.ThemarginisassuredtobethecontinuedavailabilityofhavinganoperableSDCsystemtouseinremovingdecayheatfromtheRCS.

10CFR50.59EvaluationsTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsRecpxests 10CFR50'9EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-9Components/SystemsAffected:RadiationMonitorCabinet.InstalljumpertoobtaincontrolofFCV-6627X.DescriptionofChange:ThisjumperremovesthesignaltoFCV-6627XfromtheLiquidRadwasteEffluentLine'sgrossradioactivitymonitor.ThismonitorisdiscussedinTechnicalSpecification3.3-12whichstatesthatiftheminimumchannelsoperableislessthanrequired,effluentreleasesmaycontinueforupto14daysprovidedthatatleasttwodifferentindependentsamplesareanalyzedandatleasttwoqualifiedstaffmembersverifythereleaseratecalculationsanddischargelinevalving.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSARTheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.ThejumperremovesthesignalfromtheradwastemonitorwhichperFSARcontinuouslymonitorsdischargeandautoterminatesifexceeded.HoweveractionperTechnicalSpecificationforanoutofserviceradwastemonitorwastakenpriortorelease.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.Calculationofreleasewereperformedpriortoreleaseensuringradioactivitywouldbetolowtorequireverificationofrelease.

10CFR5059EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-9SafetyEvaluationSummary(Continued):TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.Actiontakenwerethesameprecautionsasthoseforanoutofservicemonitor.

10CFR50.59EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-18Components/SystemsAffected:FeedwaterRegulatingControlSystemDescriptionofChange:Thereasonforthisjumperwastoisolatealeakingtransmitterline.ThisjumperwillisolatealeadingsectionofinstrumenttubingsupplyingFT-8011.InstallationofthisjumperwillretainallfunctionsofFT-8011,asitwillstillbeinservice.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.Thischangewillisolatealeakinginstrumentlinewhilemaintainingtheoperabilityofthatinstrument.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.Theflowtransmitterwillremainoperablewiththisjumperinstalled.TheproposedactivitydoesnotcreatetheprobabilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.TheproposedactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.Nolossofplantfunctionorcontrolwilloccurasaresultofthisjumper.

10CFR50.59Eva1uationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-54Components/SystemsAffected:SafetyEvaluationtoallowtheuseofspareCEDMReactorHeadPowerCablessuppliedbyABB-CE.DescriptionofChange:ThisevaluationallowstheuseofnewspareControlElementDriveMechanism(CEDM)ReactorHeadPowerCablesbetweenthedriveandtheRefuelingDisconnectPanels(RDPs).Thesparecablesaretobeusedonlyifone(ormore)oftheexistingcablesfailandrequiresreplacement.ThesecablesarenotsafetyrelatedandarenotrequiredtobeseismicclassI,butarelocatedoverandaroundsafetyrelatedequipmentandmustbeseismicclassII.TheyarethereforeclassifiedasQualityRelated.Basedonthefollowingevaluation,theuseofthesesparecablesduringthenextoperatingcyclewillnotposeanysafetyhazardtotheplant.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThepurposeofthisevaluationistoallowtheuseofthenewspareCEDMReactorHeadPowerCablesifone(ormore)oftheexistingcablesfailsandrequiresreplacementbeforeorduringthenextoperatingcycle(afterthe1991refuelingoutage).TheonlyaccidentevaluatedintheFSARthatcouldbeaffectedbythesparecablesisaControlElementAssembly(CEA)drop.ThisaccidentisevaluatedinFSARsection15.2.3.AfailureofoneofthesesparecablescouldcauseaCEAtodrop.TheprobabilityofaCEAdropeventwillnotincreaseasaresultofusingthesesparecablesbecausethesparecablesmeetorexceedtherequirementsofFPLSpecificationsEN-2.14exceptasnotedandevaluatedinABB/CECertificateofConformance.ThisspecificationwaswrittenandapprovedtoensurethatthereplacementCEDMpowercableswouldcomplywithalloperatingrequirementsfortheirintendeduse.Thisasaresult,thesparecableswillbebetterabletoperformtheirintendedfunctionthenthecablestheyreplaceand,willbelesslikelytofail.Also,thesesparecableswillprovidethesamefunctioninthesamemannerastheoriginalcablesandhavethesameelectricalcharacteristics.Therefore,usingthesparecableswillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.

0 10CFR50'9EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-54SafetyEvaluationSummary(Continued):ThefailureofoneofthesesparecablescouldcauseaCEAdropevent.However,theplantresponsetothistransientisnotalteredbythereplacementofthesecables.Thenewcablesaredesignedtowithstandaseismiceventandnotdegradetothepointthattheywillaffectanysafetyrelatedequipmentandarealsodesignedtowithstandtheeffectsofalossofcoolantaccidentwithoutalossofintegrity.Thus,thesparecableswillnotblockthecontainmentsumpscreensandwillnotimpacttheavailableNPSHfortheECCSpumps.Therefore,theuseofthesparecableswillnotincreasetheconsequencesofaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.TheCEDMcablesareusedtoprovidecontrolledmovementofthecontrolelementassemblies(CEA's)intoandoutofthecore.However,theCEDM'sarefailsafe.Thatis,theyaredesignedtofallintothecoreuponfailureofaCEDM(includinginterruptionofpowertothereactortripswitchgearbreakers).ThereisnocrediblecablefailurethatwouldpreventtheCEA'sfromfallingintothecore.ThefiberglassbraidwillmaintainthecableintegritybecauseitiscapableofwithstandingtheeffectsofaLOCAwhilekeepingtheconductorstogetherandkeepingthecablefillerandbindertapecontainedinside.Thisprecludesthepossibilityofcontainmentsumpscreenblockagebythecablefillerand/orbindertape.Thisbraidwillalsoprovideadditionalabrasionprotectiontotheindividualconductorinsulation.Therefore,usingthesparecableswillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.Thesenewsparecableswillperformthesamefunctioninthesamemannerastheoriginalcables.Thesparecableswillnotinteractwithanyequipmentinanymannerthattheoriginalcablesdidnotinteractwith.Assuch,useofthesparecableswillhavenoeffectonthefunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.Therefore,usingthesparecableswillnotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.Again,thesenewsparecableswillperformthesamefunctioninthesamemannerastheexistingcables.Assuch,allequipmentandsystemswillfunctioninthesamemannerasiscurrentlydescribedintheFSAR.Therefore,usingthesparecableswillnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.

0 10CFR50'9EvaluationforTemporaryChangesviaJumper/LiftedLeadsUnit:1RequestNumber:1-1-54SafetyEvaluationSummary(Continued):Thesecableswillnotdegradeandaffectanysafetyrelatedequipment.TheywillfunctionthesameastheexistingcablesandthefailuremodesfortheexistingcableshavebeenanalyzedintheFSAR.orhavebeenprotectedagainstbyusingthefiberglassbraid.Therefore,usingthesparecableswillnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR.TheoperationoftheCEDMsystemwillnotchangeasaresultofusingthenewsparecables.Therefore,themethodsusedtomeettherequirementsoftheTechnicalSpecificationsarenotchanged.ThebasesbehindtheTechnicalSpecificationsarestillvalidandthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthosebasesisnotreduced.