Regulatory Guide 5.31: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML13350A241
| number = ML003740081
| issue date = 06/30/1974
| issue date = 04/30/1975
| title = Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special Nuclear Material
| title = Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special Nuclear Material
| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
| author affiliation = NRC/RES
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation =  
Line 10: Line 10:
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = RG-5.031
| document report number = RG-5.31 Rev 1
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| page count = 3
| page count = 4
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:Jime 1974 June 1974 U.S. ATOMIC EMERY COMMISSION
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGULATORY GUIDE
REGULATORY GUIDE  
DIRECTORATE Of REGULATORY STAINDARDS
OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31 SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31 SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR  
ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL


==A. INTRODUCTION==
==A. INTRODUCTION==
Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physcal Protection of Plants and Materials." requires that road movements of  
Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," requires that road movements of special nuclear material (SNM) in quanti ties identified in paragraph 73.1(bX2) be protected by one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least two armed guards accompanying the shipment in a sepa rate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to di version by design features that permit immobilization of the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed guards are used with the specially designed vehicle, immobiliza tion is not required. Paragraph 73.30(d) requires that the qualification, of individuals to act as guards used pur suant to paragraph 73.31(c) be documented. This guide describes features acceptable to the NRC staff for a vehi cle operated by armed guards to ship special nuclear material by road and for the qualification of the armed guards.
5pecial nucleal material (SNM)
in quantities identified in §73.l(bI(2) be protected by one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least two armed guards accompanirng the shipment in a separate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to diversion by design features that permit irnmtobiiiia- tion of the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed guards are used with the specially designed vehicle, immobilization is not required. Paragraph 7330(d).
requires that the qualification of individuals to act as guards used pursuant to §73.3 I(c) be documented. This guide describes features accvptabl to the Regplatory staff for a vehicle operated by armed guards to ship special nuclear material by road and for the quiific"ation of the armed guards.


==B. DISCUSSION==
==B. DISCUSSION==
There are two approaches that can be taken to satisfy
There are two approaches that can be taken to satis fy paragraph 73.31(cX2), i.e., specially designed truck or trailer. One method would be the use of a specially de signed secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to resist entry for a substantial period of time by unauthor ized personnel using a wide variety of tools and weap ons. The penetration time would be commensurate with the time needed for law enforcement agencies to re spond to the scene of an emergency. The vehicle would be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of a diversion attempt.
§73.31(c)2), i.e., specially designed truck or trailer.


One method would be the use of a specially designed secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to resist entry for a substantial period of time by unauthorized personnel using 3. wide variety of tools and weapons. The penetration time would be commensurate with the time needed for law enforcement agencies to respond to the scene of an emergency. The vehicle would be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of a diversion attempt.
The other method would be through the use of ar mored car service. In this case, resistance to unauthorized entry is provided, in part, by the armed personnel within the vehicle who are in turn protected by the inherent design of the armored vehicle.


The othl'r method would be through the use of armored car service. In this case resistance to unauthor- ized entry tis provided, in part, by the armed picsonnel within the vehicle who axe in turn protected by the inhercnt design of the armored vebIiclc.
Acceptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel used in armored car service are provided in this guide.


Acc.eptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel used in armored car s;erxe arc provided in this guide.
This revision reflects comments received from the public and other factors.


I. ARMOR
1. Armor Armored vehicles are supplied to the industry by a very small number of manufacturers. The specific design of the armor supplied by each company is considered proprietary information. The armor can generally be de scribed with respect to its resistance to projectile pene tration. All manufacturers provide armor that will re sist initial penetration by bullets from readily available small arms. The armor is usually affixed to the vehicle in such a way as to provide protection to the occupants against attack from any external direction.
Armored vehicles ate supplied to the industry by a very small number of manufactuters. The six-cific design of the armor supplied by each comrpany is coiisidered proprietary information. The armor can generally he desribed With respect to its fesistance to projectile penetration. All inanufacturers provide armor which will resist initial penetration by bullets frum readily available small urns. The armor is usually altxicd to the vehicle in such a "v as to provide prultection to the occupants agains'r attlac from any external direction.


2. CAlB-CARGU INTERFACE
2. Cab-Cargo Interface The cab-cargo interface can be provided with several options. In most cases, the separating wall between cab and cargo compartment is armored to provide protection in case either compartment is compromised. A window of bullet resistant material that allows the crew in one compartment to have a clear view of the access doos of the other compartment is also provided. Some models have a door that. allows passage from the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle. Other models are equipped with gunports that permit firing from cab to cargo compartment.
The cab-caigo interface can be provided with several options. In mrt cases the xparnting wall bttween cab and cargo compz? tment is armored to provide protection in case either conpartment is -compromised. A window of bullet-resistzs-t material which allows the crew in one compartment to have . clear view of the access doors of the ofther compirtmeni is ao provitied. Some models have a door tLat allows passage from the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the vchicle. Ohiler models are e4quipped with gunports that permit ftirng from cab to cargo compartmett.


===3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS===
3. Guards and Drivers Normally an armored vehicle crew consists of tWo or three individuals divided between the cab and cargo compartments. For long-distance trips the crew.is often USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES
Normally vi armored vehicle crew consists of two or three individuals divided between the cab and cargo tompnntrtnts. For long-d"tance trips the ciew is often increased to xllow nst periods for drivers and guards.
Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commlseeien. U.S. Ntuclaw Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C. N00.


USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES
Attention: Docketing *nd methods ccpble to the NC staff of implementing specific prtsService Section.
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4. Environmental and Siting
9. Antitrust Review Comments and suggestions for improvements in these guides are encouraged
5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate. to accommnodate com ments and to reflect new information or experience. This guide was revised as a Copies of published guides may be obtained by written request Indicaling the result of substantive comments received from the public and additional staff divisions desired to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comeloeion. WasnIngton. D.C.


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Attention: Director. Office of Sandaerds Developement.
2. Falls and Mogemif Faciliuties Onetml Iafetht P~iai~ld p~dn sill ba irri psyhatfl~y. so mpprOtwta.


to mtwwnIod
Revision 1 April 1975


===4. fokm w awd ShiM ===
increased to allow rest periods for drivers and guards.
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SNIA shipments we expected to involve frequent loaq distance trips of two or mome days. In order to uxintal the full protective capacity of the armored service dune then trips, it Is important that adequate crews fc continuous manning of both compartments dude normal operation be supplied. Considerable flexibility I
SNM shipments are expected to involve frequent long distance trips of two or more days. In order to maintain the full-protective capacity of the armored service during these trips, it is important that adequate crews for continuous manning of both compartments during normal operation be supplied. Considerable flexibility in achieving this end would be provided if both guards and drivers were qualified and permitted to perform either function (guard or driver)
achieving this end would be provided if both guards an driven were qualified and permitted to perform eitht function (guard or driver).
4. Door Locks All armored vehicles are supplied with compartment locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cases, access to the cargo compartment requires positive action by personnel in both compartments when the cargo compartment is occupied by a guard.


===4. DOOR LOCKS===
5. Alarm System Many of the armored cars presently in service are equipped with audible alarms or flashing lights similar to those used by police and emergency vehicles. The aware ness of attack that such alarms elicit in the general pub lic can facilitate response to attack or recovery of di verted material.
All armored vehicles are supplied with compartmu:
locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cam access to the cargo compuntment requires positive actio by personne, in both compartments when the carg compartment is occupied by a guard.


S. ALARM SYSTEM
6. Securing the Cargo Armored cars have no standard provision for tying down cargo. This is understandable in view of the types of cargo normally handled by these carrier
Many '4 the armored cars presently in service ar equipped
;ith audible alarms and/or flashing tighi similar to ti ;so used by police and emergency vehicle!
The awarencs of attack that such alarms elicit in th general public can facilitate response to attack c recovery of diverted material.


===6. SECURING OF CARGO===
====s. For SNM ====
Armored cars have no standard provision for tyin down cargo. This Is understandable In view of the type of cargo normally handled by these carrier
cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected, some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will be required to provide for cargo integrity and personnel safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expense would be required to equip existing vehicles with tie down fittings.


====s. For SNM====
"17. Gas Protection Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow through (front-to-back) air system for heating and cool ing the vehicle interior. Typically, these systems draw outside air from the front (cab area) of the vehicle and expel exhaust air through vents in the upper areas of the vehicle. A slight positive internal pressure provided by the air system offers some resistance to the introduction of gaseous substances. The air intake is under occupant control and can be closed. S6me vehicles are normally equipped with gas masks. The use of gas masks, filters, and internal air supplies for carriers of SNM would en hance the ability of vehicle crew members to resist gas attacks.
cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will b required to provide for cargo integrity and personne safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expens would be required to equip existing vehicles wit]
tie-down fittings.


7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS
8. Antenna Protection Almost all armored vehicles are equipped with communication systems of some kind. Each vehicle is equipped by the purchaser of the vehicle although the manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access areas for the communication system components. In some instances, the purchaser may provide the corn
Each siipment will be configured at origin to be bi compliance with Department of Transportation (DOT
*Lines indicate substantive changes from previous issue.
general packaging and safety requirements (DOT regu lation 49 CFR 173.393). Additionally. in order ti monitor total radiation absorbed by personnel, som type of personnel dosimetry should be considered Types of personnel dosimeters are the filtm badge anw pocket dosimeter for gamma radiation, and the thei moluminescent neutron dosimeter (TLD) for neutroi radiation. The film badge consists of a film packet in plastic holder. The film badge or TLD provide a&
accurate Indication of exposure to radiation over a Ion period of time. Since the film has to be developed ani read on a densitometer, it may take some time to obtaii a radiation reading. The pocket dosimeter, on the othe hand provides a quick estimate of radiation received ove a short period of time, but is not as accurate as the filt badge for gamma radiation.


& GAS PROTECTION
munication equipment to the manufacturer who will in stall the equipment at the time the vehicle is con structed. Both radio and radiotelephone systems are in use. Each system is dependent on the use of radio signals received and transmitted from a vehicle-mounted antenna that could logically become the first target of an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would pre clude the vehicle occupants from either notifying ex ternal agents of the attack or from seeking aid or as sistance. To provide for sufficient delay during an attack for a vehicle crew to transmit emergency messages, antenna protection is desirable. Such protection could be provided in the form of concealment, multiplicity, or hardening. The actual antenna could be concealed or designed to appear as some other object while con ventionally appearing dummy antennas would be conspicuously located on the vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal switching could offer a delay sufficient to enable emergency messages to be transmitted. Hardened, attack-resistant antennas could be designed and used to provide a delay time. Combinations of these or other similar methods could enhance the viability of trans mission.
Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow through (front.to-back)
air system for heating ani cooling the vehicle interior. Typically, these system
1- draw outside air from the fioat (cab area) of the vehicle in wd expl exhaut &ir tbroqh vests in the upper wa o4 Z
the vehicle. A alight postive iinterial pmwao provided U
by the air system offten some resistance to the intro-
8 ductlon of gaseous subtaces. The &ss intake it under an occupat control and can be close


====d. Soew vehic aie d ====
==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
normally equipped with gas masks. The use of ps mas*
The characterisitcs listed below are acceptable to the NRC staff for a road vehicle operated by armed guards in order to comply with NRC regulations pertain ing to SNM shipments. Additional Federal, State, and local requirements pertaining to safe interstate and local transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments and compliance with these requirements is expected.
er filters, and internal afr supplies for carrit of SNi would enhance the abibity of vehickle crew members to tesist gas attacks.
 
it
 
===9. ANTENNA PROTECTION===
Almost all arnored vehicles am equipped with com- n
munication systems of same kind Each eicle is o
equipped by the purchase of the vehicle althaqb h the manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access areas for the communication system comnponmt&. In some instnces, the parchamer may proviWe the can- e
munication equipment to the manufacturer who will ts install the equipment at the tim the vehicle is con-
.
structed. Both radio and radjotelephone systems are in e
use. Each tystem is dependent on the use of radio sgnals ir received and transmitted from a vehicle-montied an- tenna which could logically become the first target of an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would pred"e the vehicle occupants from either notifying extetral g
agents of the attack or firnn secking aid or mistanc
 
====e. To s ====
provide for sufficient delay during an attack for a vehicle
4 crew to transmit emergency massages, antenna protec-
.
tion is desirable. Such protection could be provided in e
the form of concealment. multiplicity, ot hardeniz
 
====g. The I ====
actual antenna could be concealed or designd to appear e
as some other object while conventionaly appearing h
dummy antennas would be conspicuously located on the vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal switching could offer a d,.aIy sufficient to enable emergesny resses to be transmitted.
 
Hardened, attack-resistant antennas
3 could be designed and ueed to provide a delay time.
 
)
Combinationt of these or other smhiar methods could I-
enhance the viability of transnission.


o e
1. Armor The vehicle should provide protection for the driver(s) and guard(s) against projectile impact. The ex ternal surface of the vehicle (side panels, floor, top, fire wall area, and viewing areas) should be constructed of materials that are resistant to at least the muzzle im pact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. Fuel tanks should be provided with similar protection against projectile im pact. Fuel tanks also should be equipped with a lock type cap and a screen in the tank nozzle to prevent the insertion of an explosive device into the tank.


==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
2. Cab-Cargo Interface The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments should be armored. Additional features to be considered in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface depend on the method selected for the protection of the shipment. At least one of the methods listed below should be used. These methods are similar in that each provides the capability for the crew to use firearms to prevent entry into the cargo compartment without leav ing the vehicle.
1.


d The characteristics listed below are acceptable to the r-
a. An armed guard should be permanently stationed in the cargo compartment. In this case, a continuous wall of armor with a bullet-resistant window would be considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.
Regulatory staff for a road vehicle operated by armed n
guards in order to comply with AEC regulations pcrttain a
ing to SNM shipments. Additional Federal, State, and n
lcal requirements pertaining to safe interstate sad local g
transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments d
and compliance with these requirements is expected.


11 r
I. ARMOR
r The vehicle should provide protection for the a
driver(s) and guard(s) against projectile impact. The external surface of the vehicle (side panels, floot, top, firewall area, and viewing areas) should be comstructed of materials which are resistant to at least the muzzle
*-
impact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. The fuel tank(s)
I
should also be provided with similar protection against
3 projectile impact. The fuel tank(s) should be equipped
5.31-2
5.31-2
- 0
%.


with a lock-type cap and a screen in the tank neulc to pl nt the insertion. of an explosive device into the I2.
b. Access to the cargo compartment from the cab should be available so that a guard can go directly from the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle.


CAB.CARGO INTERFACE
c. Gunports should be available which will permit firing from the cab into the cargo compartment.. Addi tionally, the gunports should permit firing of the weap on at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides of the cargo compartment can be prevefited.
The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments should be armored. Additional features to be considered in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface depend ats the method sclectcd fot the protection of( the shipment. At least one of the methods listed below should be used. These methods are similar in that each provides the capability rot the crew to use fireamis to prevent entry bi!o the cargo compartment without leaving the vehtrde.


a. An armed guard should be pentianenty stationed in the cargo compartment. In this case, a continuous wail of armuot with a buflet.resistant window would be considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.
3. Guards and Drivers All personnel of an armored vehicle should be quali fied to perform all normal operational tasks involved with a shipment. Both guards and drivers should be qualified to perform either function, and interchange of function should be allowed if required for the safety and security of the cargo and crew.


b. Access to the cargo compartnent fr(mn the cab
Compliance with DOT regulation 49 CFR
%hould be available wo that a guard can go directli' front die cab to the cargo cornpaftmcnit without leaving the vehicle.
173.393(jX4), which deals with radiation levels in occu pied vehicles, should be maintained in addition to other applicable State and local requirements. All guards and drivers should be qualified in accordance with NRC
Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training, Equipping, and Quali fying of Guards and Watchmen," or an equivalent pro gram.


c. Gunports should be availabli which will permit firing from the cab into the cargo compartment, Additionally. the gunports should permit firing of the wcapmi at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides of the cargo compartmcnt call be prevented.
4. Door Locks The cargo compartment doors should normally be in a locked mode and should be secured by a locking mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if the cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo com partment is not occupied, the cargo compartment door lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo com partment door lock should require positive action by personnel at the cargo compartment door and in the cab compartment. The cab compartment doors should normally be locked and should require key insertion for operation from the outside.


===3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS===
S. Alarm System The vehicle should be equipped with an audible and/or visual alarm which is activated from within the vehicle and which has the same range of detection as that normally required by emergency vehicles. De activation of the alarm system circuitry should require access to the armored compartments of the vehicle.
All peorsonnel of an armored vehicle should be qualifred to perform all normal operational tasks in- volved with a shipment.


th1b guards and drivers should be qualified to perform either function., and interchange of functiom should be allowed if required for the safety and security of the cargo and crew, Compliance with DOT
6. Securing the Cargo The vehicle should be supplied with fittings in the cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment for such securing devices as are required to provide re straint against substantial movement of or damage to the cargo in normal operation and during emergency stops.
regulation
49 CFR
173.3936X4) which deals with radiation levels in oc- cspied vehicle, should be mfaintdined in addition to other applicable State and local requirements. All guards and drivers should be qualified ini accordance with A[iC
Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training. Equipping. and Qualifying of Guards and Witchmarn," tir an equivalent program.


===4. DOOR LOCKS===
The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR Part
The cargo compartment doors should normally be in a locked mode and should he secured by n locking mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if the cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo corn- parttrnm is not occupied, the cargo compartment door lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo compartment door lock should require positive action by personnel at the cargo compartment door and fi the cab compartment. The cab compartment doors also should normally be locked and should require key insertion for operation from the outside,
177.


===5. ALARM SYSTEM===
7. Gas Protection The vehicle compartments should be equipped with gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the crew to resist an attack by incapacitating gas for a suf ficient time to allow transmittal of a distress message and, if possible, the arrival of aid.
Tile vehicle should be equipped with an audible and/or visual alarm which is activated froni within the vehicle and which has the samte ranW, of detection as that normally required by emergency vehicles. Dcac- tivation of the alarn system circuitry should require acccss to the armored comtnparttmentts of the velhicle.


===6. SECURING THE CARGO===
8. Antenna Protection Either a concealed or a hardened antenna should be provided in order to afford sufficient time for the com munication system to transmit an emergency message.
The vehicle should be ,supplied with fittings in tlrc cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment for such securing devycos as are required to provide restraint against substantial movement of or damage to the cargo in normal operation and during emergency stops. The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR
Part 177.


7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS
9. Immobilization Although there is no requirement for immobili zation of vehicles that use armed guards, this is a desira ble feature. The vehicle could have a provision for im mobilization upon an authorized command originating from within the vehicle. Once commanded, the im mobilization system should resist unauthorized de activation for -as long as feasible. Caution should be taken to ensure that activation devices that cause im mobilization are adequately shielded to prevent them from being energized from spurious electromagnetic signals.
Personnel involved In the handling of radioactive material should be provided with a filmn badge, a pocket dosimeter and for plutonium shipments, a titer- moluminescent neutron dosimeter. These should he monitored after each trip.


===8. GAS PROTECTION===
==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
The vehicle cornpartlnents should be equipped witli gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the crew to resist art attack by incapacitating gas for a sufficient time to allow transmittal of a distrems message and, if possible, the arrival of aid.
The purpose of this section is to provide informa tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for utilizing this regulatory guide.


===9. ANTENNA PROTECTION===
This guide reflects current regulatory practice.
Either a concealed or a hardened anterina should lie provided in order it) afford sufficient timte I"r the comnmunication systeln to1 transmit an cmncgeuncy nies- sage.


1
Therefore, except in those cases in which the applicant or licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Com mission's regulations, this guide will be used by the staff in evaluating the materials and plant protection portion of license applications, licensee security plans, or other documents pertaining to materials and plant protection submitted to the NRC on or after the issuance date of this guide.


===0. IMMOiJIZATION===
5.31-3
Although there Is no requirement for imnojbilization of vehicles which use armed guards, this is a desirable, feature. The vehicle could have a provision for immobi- lization upon art authorized command originating from within the vehicle. Once commanded, the immobi- liiation system should resist unauthorized deactivation Ibr as long as feasible. Caution should be taken to assure that activation devices which cause imnmobiliiation are adequately shielded to prevent them from being erier.


gw.ed from spurious clectromagnetic signals.
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C.


5-31.3}}
20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION}}


{{RG-Nav}}
{{RG-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 02:07, 17 January 2025

Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special Nuclear Material
ML003740081
Person / Time
Issue date: 04/30/1975
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
References
RG-5.31 Rev 1
Download: ML003740081 (4)


U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGULATORY GUIDE

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31 SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR

ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

A. INTRODUCTION

Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," requires that road movements of special nuclear material (SNM) in quanti ties identified in paragraph 73.1(bX2) be protected by one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least two armed guards accompanying the shipment in a sepa rate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to di version by design features that permit immobilization of the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed guards are used with the specially designed vehicle, immobiliza tion is not required. Paragraph 73.30(d) requires that the qualification, of individuals to act as guards used pur suant to paragraph 73.31(c) be documented. This guide describes features acceptable to the NRC staff for a vehi cle operated by armed guards to ship special nuclear material by road and for the qualification of the armed guards.

B. DISCUSSION

There are two approaches that can be taken to satis fy paragraph 73.31(cX2), i.e., specially designed truck or trailer. One method would be the use of a specially de signed secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to resist entry for a substantial period of time by unauthor ized personnel using a wide variety of tools and weap ons. The penetration time would be commensurate with the time needed for law enforcement agencies to re spond to the scene of an emergency. The vehicle would be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of a diversion attempt.

The other method would be through the use of ar mored car service. In this case, resistance to unauthorized entry is provided, in part, by the armed personnel within the vehicle who are in turn protected by the inherent design of the armored vehicle.

Acceptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel used in armored car service are provided in this guide.

This revision reflects comments received from the public and other factors.

1. Armor Armored vehicles are supplied to the industry by a very small number of manufacturers. The specific design of the armor supplied by each company is considered proprietary information. The armor can generally be de scribed with respect to its resistance to projectile pene tration. All manufacturers provide armor that will re sist initial penetration by bullets from readily available small arms. The armor is usually affixed to the vehicle in such a way as to provide protection to the occupants against attack from any external direction.

2. Cab-Cargo Interface The cab-cargo interface can be provided with several options. In most cases, the separating wall between cab and cargo compartment is armored to provide protection in case either compartment is compromised. A window of bullet resistant material that allows the crew in one compartment to have a clear view of the access doos of the other compartment is also provided. Some models have a door that. allows passage from the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle. Other models are equipped with gunports that permit firing from cab to cargo compartment.

3. Guards and Drivers Normally an armored vehicle crew consists of tWo or three individuals divided between the cab and cargo compartments. For long-distance trips the crew.is often USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES

Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commlseeien. U.S. Ntuclaw Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C. N00.

Attention: Docketing *nd methods ccpble to the NC staff of implementing specific prtsService Section.

Commission's regulations. to delineate techniques used by the staff in evalu- T

uides are iuued in the flowing ten broad divisions:

ating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to appli.

cants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, end complilance

1. Power Reactors

& Products with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in

2. Research aedrTetReactors

7. Tran**otatlon the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to

3. Fuels and Materiale Facilitle

8. Ocsupat"oe

"eo the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.

4. Environmental and Siting

9. Antitrust Review Comments and suggestions for improvements in these guides are encouraged

5. Materials and Plant Protection

10. General at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate. to accommnodate com ments and to reflect new information or experience. This guide was revised as a Copies of published guides may be obtained by written request Indicaling the result of substantive comments received from the public and additional staff divisions desired to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comeloeion. WasnIngton. D.C.

review.

2f6.

Attention: Director. Office of Sandaerds Developement.

Revision 1 April 1975

increased to allow rest periods for drivers and guards.

SNM shipments are expected to involve frequent long distance trips of two or more days. In order to maintain the full-protective capacity of the armored service during these trips, it is important that adequate crews for continuous manning of both compartments during normal operation be supplied. Considerable flexibility in achieving this end would be provided if both guards and drivers were qualified and permitted to perform either function (guard or driver).

4. Door Locks All armored vehicles are supplied with compartment locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cases, access to the cargo compartment requires positive action by personnel in both compartments when the cargo compartment is occupied by a guard.

5. Alarm System Many of the armored cars presently in service are equipped with audible alarms or flashing lights similar to those used by police and emergency vehicles. The aware ness of attack that such alarms elicit in the general pub lic can facilitate response to attack or recovery of di verted material.

6. Securing the Cargo Armored cars have no standard provision for tying down cargo. This is understandable in view of the types of cargo normally handled by these carrier

s. For SNM

cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected, some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will be required to provide for cargo integrity and personnel safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expense would be required to equip existing vehicles with tie down fittings.

"17. Gas Protection Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow through (front-to-back) air system for heating and cool ing the vehicle interior. Typically, these systems draw outside air from the front (cab area) of the vehicle and expel exhaust air through vents in the upper areas of the vehicle. A slight positive internal pressure provided by the air system offers some resistance to the introduction of gaseous substances. The air intake is under occupant control and can be closed. S6me vehicles are normally equipped with gas masks. The use of gas masks, filters, and internal air supplies for carriers of SNM would en hance the ability of vehicle crew members to resist gas attacks.

8. Antenna Protection Almost all armored vehicles are equipped with communication systems of some kind. Each vehicle is equipped by the purchaser of the vehicle although the manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access areas for the communication system components. In some instances, the purchaser may provide the corn

  • Lines indicate substantive changes from previous issue.

munication equipment to the manufacturer who will in stall the equipment at the time the vehicle is con structed. Both radio and radiotelephone systems are in use. Each system is dependent on the use of radio signals received and transmitted from a vehicle-mounted antenna that could logically become the first target of an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would pre clude the vehicle occupants from either notifying ex ternal agents of the attack or from seeking aid or as sistance. To provide for sufficient delay during an attack for a vehicle crew to transmit emergency messages, antenna protection is desirable. Such protection could be provided in the form of concealment, multiplicity, or hardening. The actual antenna could be concealed or designed to appear as some other object while con ventionally appearing dummy antennas would be conspicuously located on the vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal switching could offer a delay sufficient to enable emergency messages to be transmitted. Hardened, attack-resistant antennas could be designed and used to provide a delay time. Combinations of these or other similar methods could enhance the viability of trans mission.

C. REGULATORY POSITION

The characterisitcs listed below are acceptable to the NRC staff for a road vehicle operated by armed guards in order to comply with NRC regulations pertain ing to SNM shipments. Additional Federal, State, and local requirements pertaining to safe interstate and local transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments and compliance with these requirements is expected.

1. Armor The vehicle should provide protection for the driver(s) and guard(s) against projectile impact. The ex ternal surface of the vehicle (side panels, floor, top, fire wall area, and viewing areas) should be constructed of materials that are resistant to at least the muzzle im pact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. Fuel tanks should be provided with similar protection against projectile im pact. Fuel tanks also should be equipped with a lock type cap and a screen in the tank nozzle to prevent the insertion of an explosive device into the tank.

2. Cab-Cargo Interface The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments should be armored. Additional features to be considered in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface depend on the method selected for the protection of the shipment. At least one of the methods listed below should be used. These methods are similar in that each provides the capability for the crew to use firearms to prevent entry into the cargo compartment without leav ing the vehicle.

a. An armed guard should be permanently stationed in the cargo compartment. In this case, a continuous wall of armor with a bullet-resistant window would be considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.

5.31-2

b. Access to the cargo compartment from the cab should be available so that a guard can go directly from the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle.

c. Gunports should be available which will permit firing from the cab into the cargo compartment.. Addi tionally, the gunports should permit firing of the weap on at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides of the cargo compartment can be prevefited.

3. Guards and Drivers All personnel of an armored vehicle should be quali fied to perform all normal operational tasks involved with a shipment. Both guards and drivers should be qualified to perform either function, and interchange of function should be allowed if required for the safety and security of the cargo and crew.

Compliance with DOT regulation 49 CFR

173.393(jX4), which deals with radiation levels in occu pied vehicles, should be maintained in addition to other applicable State and local requirements. All guards and drivers should be qualified in accordance with NRC

Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training, Equipping, and Quali fying of Guards and Watchmen," or an equivalent pro gram.

4. Door Locks The cargo compartment doors should normally be in a locked mode and should be secured by a locking mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if the cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo com partment is not occupied, the cargo compartment door lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo com partment door lock should require positive action by personnel at the cargo compartment door and in the cab compartment. The cab compartment doors should normally be locked and should require key insertion for operation from the outside.

S. Alarm System The vehicle should be equipped with an audible and/or visual alarm which is activated from within the vehicle and which has the same range of detection as that normally required by emergency vehicles. De activation of the alarm system circuitry should require access to the armored compartments of the vehicle.

6. Securing the Cargo The vehicle should be supplied with fittings in the cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment for such securing devices as are required to provide re straint against substantial movement of or damage to the cargo in normal operation and during emergency stops.

The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR Part

177.

7. Gas Protection The vehicle compartments should be equipped with gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the crew to resist an attack by incapacitating gas for a suf ficient time to allow transmittal of a distress message and, if possible, the arrival of aid.

8. Antenna Protection Either a concealed or a hardened antenna should be provided in order to afford sufficient time for the com munication system to transmit an emergency message.

9. Immobilization Although there is no requirement for immobili zation of vehicles that use armed guards, this is a desira ble feature. The vehicle could have a provision for im mobilization upon an authorized command originating from within the vehicle. Once commanded, the im mobilization system should resist unauthorized de activation for -as long as feasible. Caution should be taken to ensure that activation devices that cause im mobilization are adequately shielded to prevent them from being energized from spurious electromagnetic signals.

D. IMPLEMENTATION

The purpose of this section is to provide informa tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for utilizing this regulatory guide.

This guide reflects current regulatory practice.

Therefore, except in those cases in which the applicant or licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Com mission's regulations, this guide will be used by the staff in evaluating the materials and plant protection portion of license applications, licensee security plans, or other documents pertaining to materials and plant protection submitted to the NRC on or after the issuance date of this guide.

5.31-3

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR

REGULATORY COMMISSION