ML021210488

IR 05000266/2002-004(DRS), IR 05000301/2002-004(DRS), on 02/11-04/1/2002, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. Exercise Evaluation

ML021210488
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	04/30/2002
From:	Grobe J Division of Reactor Safety III
To:	Warner M Nuclear Management Co
References
EA-02-049 IR-02-004
Download: ML021210488 (18)

See also: IR 05000266/2002004

Text

April 30, 2002

EA-02-049

Mr. M. Warner

Site Vice President

Kewaunee and Point Beach Nuclear Plants

Nuclear Management Company, LLC

6610 Nuclear Road

Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT:

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-266/02-04(DRS); 50-301/02-04(DRS)

PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

Dear Mr. Warner:

On April 1, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection of your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and

2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with Mr. M.

Reddemann and members of your staff at an interim exit meeting on February 15, 2002.

Following the on site inspection, additional information was provided by your staff that was

reviewed in the Region III office. A final exit meeting was conducted on April 1, 2002, with Mr. A.

Cayia and other members of your staff to discuss the NRCs preliminary significance determination

of the inspection results.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel. Specifically, this inspection focused on emergency preparedness, including your

staffs determinations of performance indicators for the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone.

The enclosed report discusses an issue involving your staffs critique of its performance during

the biennial emergency preparedness exercise that was conducted on February 12, 2002. The

NRCs preliminary conclusion is that two exercise performance concerns, which are associated

with emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), were inadequately

critiqued by your staff. The first concern was the critique of the initial protective action

recommendation that your exercise participants communicated to offsite officials. Your

exercise critique concluded that this recommendation was a successful performance indicator

opportunity. However, our inspection identified issues concerning this recommendation that

were not fully evaluated within your critique. The second concern involved your staffs critique

of the exercise participants decision making on the simulated removal from the site of non-

essential personnel, who were not members of the current shift of emergency responders, after

all onsite personnel were accounted for.

M. Warner

-2-

This issue was assessed using the applicable significance determination process as a

potentially safety significant finding that was preliminarily determined to be White, i.e. an issue

with some increased importance to safety which may require additional NRC inspection. A

basic reason for conducting emergency preparedness drills and exercises is to identify

performance and procedure concerns through the critique process so that corrective actions

can be taken before such concerns might occur during an actual emergency and possibly have

an adverse impact on health and safety. Therefore, it is important that your staffs critiques of

emergency preparedness drills and exercises be thorough and self-critical whether or not NRC

staff are also present to observe and assess these activities. Since both items are associated

with an exercise critique, rather than an actual emergency event, no apparent violation is

associated with the preliminary White finding.

Before the NRC makes a final decision on this matter, we are providing you an opportunity to

request a Regulatory Conference where you would be able to provide your perspectives on the

significance of the finding, the bases for your position, and whether you agree with the apparent

violations (if applicable). If you choose to request a Regulatory Conference, we encourage you

to submit your evaluation and any differences with the NRC evaluation at least one week prior

to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a

conference is held, it will be open for public observation. The NRC will also issue a press

release to announce the conference.

Please contact Mr. Kenneth Riemer at (630) 829-9757 within seven days of the date of this

letter to inform the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you by telephone or in

writing regarding a conference within 10 days, we will continue with our significance

determination and enforcement decision, and you will be advised by separate correspondence

of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter

and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public

Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's

document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA by Roy Caniano Acting For/

John A. Grobe, Director

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301

License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 50-266/02-04(DRS);

50-301/02-04(DRS)

See Attached Distribution

M. Warner

-2-

This issue was assessed using the applicable significance determination process as a

potentially safety significant finding that was preliminarily determined to be White, i.e. an issue

with some increased importance to safety which may require additional NRC inspection. A

basic reason for conducting emergency preparedness drills and exercises is to identify

performance and procedure concerns through the critique process so that corrective actions

can be taken before such concerns might occur during an actual emergency and possibly have

an adverse impact on health and safety. Therefore, it is important that your staffs critiques of

emergency preparedness drills and exercises be thorough and self-critical whether or not NRC

staff are also present to observe and assess these activities. Since both items are associated

with an exercise critique, rather than an actual emergency event, no apparent violation is

associated with the preliminary White finding.

Before the NRC makes a final decision on this matter, we are providing you an opportunity to

request a Regulatory Conference where you would be able to provide your perspectives on the

significance of the finding, the bases for your position, and whether you agree with the apparent

violations (if applicable). If you choose to request a Regulatory Conference, we encourage you

to submit your evaluation and any differences with the NRC evaluation at least one week prior

to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a

conference is held, it will be open for public observation. The NRC will also issue a press

release to announce the conference.

Please contact Mr. Kenneth Riemer at (630) 829-9757 within seven days of the date of this

letter to inform the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you by telephone or in

writing regarding a conference within 10 days, we will continue with our significance

determination and enforcement decision, and you will be advised by separate correspondence

of the results of our deliberations on this matter

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter

and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public

Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's

document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA by Roy Caniano Acting For/

John A. Grobe, Director

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301

License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 50-266/02-04(DRS);

50-301/02-04(DRS)

See Attached Distribution

DOCUMENT NAME: G:DRS\\POI02-04DRS.wpd

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy

OFFICE

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DATE

4/30/02

4/30/02

4/30/02

4/30/02

4/30/02

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

M. Warner

-3-

cc w/encl:

R. Grigg, President and Chief

Operating Officer, WEPCo

R. Anderson, Executive Vice President

and Chief Nuclear Officer

T. Webb, Licensing Manager

D. Weaver, Nuclear Asset Manager

T. Taylor, Plant Manager

A. Cayia, Site Director

J. ONeill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman,

Potts & Trowbridge

K. Duveneck, Town Chairman

Town of Two Creeks

D. Graham, Director

Bureau of Field Operations

A. Bie, Chairperson, Wisconsin

Public Service Commission

S. Jenkins, Electric Division

Wisconsin Public Service Commission

State Liaison Officer

W. Curtis, FEMA, Region V

M. Warner

-3-

cc w/encl:

R. Grigg, President and Chief

Operating Officer, WEPCo

R. Anderson, Executive Vice President

and Chief Nuclear Officer

T. Webb, Licensing Manager

D. Weaver, Nuclear Asset Manager

T. Taylor, Plant Manager

A. Cayia, Site Director

J. ONeill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman,

Potts & Trowbridge

K. Duveneck, Town Chairman

Town of Two Creeks

D. Graham, Director

Bureau of Field Operations

A. Bie, Chairperson, Wisconsin

Public Service Commission

S. Jenkins, Electric Division

Wisconsin Public Service Commission

State Liaison Officer

W. Curtis, FEMA, Region V

ADAMS Distribution:

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J. Dixon Herrity, OE

K. Halvey Gibson, NRR

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos:

50-266; 50-301

License Nos:

DPR-24; DPR-27

Report No:

50-266/02-04(DRS); 50-301/02-04(DRS)

Licensee:

Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Facility:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location:

6610 Nuclear Road

Two Rivers, WI 54241

Dates:

February 11 through February 15, 2002; and

April 1, 2002

Inspectors:

T. Ploski, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector

R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Inspector

S. Orth, Senior Radiation Specialist

P. Krohn, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved by:

Kenneth Riemer, Chief

Plant Support Branch

2

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000266-02-04(DRS), 05000301-02-04(DRS), on 02/11-04/1/2002, Nuclear Management

Company, LLC, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. Exercise Evaluation.

The report covers a baseline inspection by two regional emergency preparedness

inspectors, one regional radiation protection inspector, and a senior resident inspector.

The inspection focused on the Reactor Safety, Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone,

during the biennial emergency preparedness exercise, and included a review of

records related to the three emergency preparedness performance indicators for the

period ending December 31, 2001. One preliminary White finding was identified

during the inspection.

The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red)

using IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for

overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its

Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www/nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity

level of the applicable violations.

A.

Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

TBD. Two exercise performance issues, which are associated with emergency preparedness

planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), were inadequately critiqued by licensee staff. The first

issue was associated with the licensees critique of the initial offsite Protective Action

Recommendation (PAR) that its exercise participants communicated to offsite officials. The

NRC identified issues that contradicted the licensees critique conclusion that the initial PAR

was a successful performance indicator opportunity with respect to its content. The second

issue was the licensees critique of its participants decision making process on the simulated

removal from the site of non-essential personnel, who were not members of the current shift of

emergency responders, once all onsite personnel were accounted for.

Using the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, the NRC has made a

preliminary determination that the finding was of low to moderate risk significance (White). In

accordance with NRCs Enforcement Policy, as published in NUREG 1600, it was determined

that there is no apparent violation of NRC requirements since the critique issues were related to

an exercise, rather than to an actual emergency. (Section 1EP1.b)

3

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

The plant operated at approximately 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.

1.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP1

Exercise Evaluation (71114.01)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the February 2002 exercises objectives and scenario to

ensure that the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the licensees

emergency plan and to verify that the exercises simulated problems provided an

acceptable framework to support demonstration of the licensees capability to

implement its plan. The inspectors also reviewed records of a pre-exercise practice

drill, which was conducted in January 2002, to determine whether the associated

accident scenario was sufficiently different from the scenario used in the

February 12, 2002 exercise.

The inspectors evaluated the licensees exercise performance, focusing on the

risk-significant activities of emergency classification, notification, and protective action

decision making, as well as implementation of accident mitigation strategies in the

following emergency response facilities:

Control Room Simulator (CRS)

Technical Support Center (TSC)

Operations Support Center (OSC)

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The inspectors also assessed the licensees recognition of abnormal plant conditions,

transfer of responsibilities between facilities, internal communications, interfaces with

offsite officials, readiness of emergency facilities and related equipment, and overall

implementation of the licensees emergency plan.

The inspectors attended the initial post-exercise critiques in the CRS, OSC, TSC, and

EOF to evaluate the licensees initial self-assessment of its exercise performance. The

inspectors later met with the licensees lead exercise evaluators to assess the licensees

refined critique of its exercise participants performances. The licensees refined

critiques results were then compared with the inspectors independent observations and

assessments.

4

b.

Findings

One preliminary White finding was identified for the licensees inadequate critique of two

exercise performance issues associated with emergency planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Per Supplement VIII of NRCs Enforcement Policy, as published in

Nuclear Regulatory Guide (NUREG) 1600, no associated violation of NRC requirements

was identified since the finding was associated with an exercise rather than an actual

emergency event.

This planning standard encompasses protective actions for the general public and

onsite personnel. As demonstrated by the licensees exercise performance, the

inspectors identified two issues associated with the planning standard that were not

adequately critiqued by the licensee. The first issue was that the licensee failed to

adequately critique exercise participants initial Protective Action Recommendation

(PAR) that was communicated to offsite officials. The second issue was that the

licensee failed to adequately critique exercise participants decision making on the

simulated removal of non-essential onsite personnel, who were not members of the

current shift of emergency responders, from the site after all onsite personnel had been

accounted for.

The NRC Manual Chapter (MC) 0609 divides the sixteen emergency planning standards

of 10 CFR 50.47(b) into two categories, namely risk significant planning standards and

other planning standards. With respect to the two aforementioned issues, MC 0609

states that 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) is risk significant for offsite PARs but not also for onsite

protective actions.

Protective Action Recommendation

The first issue associated with the preliminary White finding was that the licensee did

not adequately critique the initial PAR. Based on a review of the licensees exercise

scenario manual, Section 6 of the licensees emergency plan, Emergency Plan

Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 1.3, relevant guidance in Nuclear Regulatory Guide

NUREG 0654 and Supplement 3 of this NUREG, the Environmental Protection Agencys

protective action guides, and the criteria in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) publication 99-

02, Revision 2, the inspectors determined that the licensees initial PAR was incorrect

and unanticipated per the scenario and should not be considered as a successful

Performance Indicator (PI) opportunity. In contrast, the licensees critique conclusion

was that this initial PAR was a successful Performance Indicator PI opportunity.

In accordance with the exercise scenario, the licensees decision maker correctly

declared a General Emergency at about 10:48 a.m. Licensee staff then formulated an

initial PAR that was communicated to offsite officials within 15 minutes of the General

Emergency declaration. The initial PAR included a correct recommendation to evacuate

the public within a two mile radius of the site. However, the inspectors specific concern

was that this initial PAR also included an unexpected recommendation to evacuate

persons within five sectors (L, M, N, P, and Q) between two and five miles from the site,

rather than evacuation of persons within three or possibly four of these sectors between

two and five miles from the site, which was predicted by the scenario and which would

be consistent with the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspectors

5

based their conclusion that the initial PAR was not a successful PI opportunity on a

number of factors, including:

Licensee participants were presented with plant conditions, which were correctly

recognized by those tasked with developing and approving the initial PAR, that

included a gap release from containment. The scenario also postulated a wind

direction from 90 degrees +/- five degrees, a forecast wind direction shift that

might occur, and a B atmospheric stability class before and after this possible

wind direction shift.

Per Attachment A to EPIP 1.3 and the output from the licensees offsite dose

projection software, which was used by participants during the exercise and

included atmospheric stability class as an input, a wind direction from 90 degrees

+/- five degrees translated into the three downwind sectors (each having a width

of 22.5 degrees) of M, N, and P.

Per Step 3.3 of EPIP 1.3 and Subsection 5.1.2 of Section 6 of the licensees

emergency plan, an offsite PAR would include evacuation of a two mile radius

from the site and typically (per EPIP 1.3) or in many cases (per the

emergency plan) three or four sectors between two and five miles downwind.

However, neither EPIP 1.3 nor the emergency plan specified what circumstances

might warrant a PAR having more than three or four downwind sectors with the

following possible exception. Step 3.4 of EPIP 1.3 stated that a PAR to evacuate

all sectors within a five mile radius of the site should be considered if either the

wind speed was less than three miles per hour or if a lake breeze effect was

identified. In contrast, the scenario postulated a wind speed remaining above

five miles per hour and no lake breeze effect.

As noted by the inspectors and as documented in a few records generated by

licensee participants during the exercise, State officials modified the licensees

initial PAR to include evacuation of only three downwind sectors (M, N, and P)

between two and five miles from the site.

The scenario manual indicated that a wind direction shift from about 90 degrees

to about 115 to 120 degrees would be issued to participants around noontime in

order to support an exercise objective of having licensee, State, and county

staffs demonstrate their capabilities to deal with changing meteorological

conditions warranting two PARs. During the exercise, the licensees exercise

controllers modified the scenarios postulated wind direction shift such that the

revised wind direction was from about 130 degrees. The inspectors interpreted

this controller action to mean that the initial PARs inclusion of five sectors

beyond two miles from the site was not forecast by the scenario and was,

therefore, unexpected by the scenario and the licensees exercise controllers.

The licensees exercise participants quickly recognized the wind direction shift to

be from 130 degrees. They developed a revised PAR that included the three

downwind sectors between two and five miles from the site that were consistent

with Attachment A to EPIP 1.3 and the output from the licensees offsite dose

projection software. The inspectors agreed with the licensees critique that the

6

development of this revised PAR was a successful PI opportunity.

The licensee generated a number of Action Requests-Corrective Action Program

(AR-CAP) documents as a result of its exercise critique. The inspectors noted

that only AR-CAP002169 addressed PARs developed during the exercise.

However, this AR addressed a concern of how to document a PAR change due

to a wind shift. Specifically, this AR-CAPs concern was whether accumulated

sectors should be documented on the form or only the newly affected downwind

sectors. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had not

adequately critiqued its initial PAR.

Removal of Non-Essential Personnel

The second issue associated with the preliminary White finding was that the licensee did

not adequately critique its exercise participants decision making on the simulated

removal of non-essential onsite personnel, who were not members of the current shift of

emergency responders, from the site after all onsite personnel were accounted for.

An actual assembly and accountability of onsite personnel was performed during the

exercise and was successfully completed at about 10:05 a.m., which was after the Site

Area Emergency declaration and prior to the General Emergency declaration. The

subsequent removal of non-essential personnel from the site was simulated in order to

avoid further disrupting the normal work activities of personnel who were not chosen to

be otherwise involved in the exercise.

During the exercise, inspectors noted that the decision to begin the simulated removal of

non-essential personnel from the site was not made until about 12:50 p.m. The decision

occurred over 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after all onsite personnel were accounted for and about two

hours after the licensee issued its initial PAR to offsite officials that included evacuation

of the public. The decision was to release non-essential personnel and to allow them

to leave the site using their own vehicles, although the use of buses to be provided by a

local company was discussed.

The inspectors reviewed the following documents: Sections 5 and 6 and Appendix D of

the licensees emergency plan and EPIP 6.1, which was titled Assembly, Accountability,

Release, and Evacuation of Personnel. The inspectors also reviewed AR-CAP002156

and AR-CAP002170 that were generated as a result of the licensees exercise critique,

as well as log entries made by several participants who were involved in the decision

making process. Based on the inspectors exercise observations, review of the

aforementioned documents, and assessment of the licensees February 14 and 15

critique presentations, inspectors concluded that the licensee had not adequately

critiqued exercise performance regarding participants decision making to simulate

removing non-essential personnel from the site. In contrast, the licensees position was

that its staff had adequately critiqued this decision making and that participants use of

EPIP 6.1 was acceptable.

7

The inspectors conclusion was based on a number of factors, including:

Subsection 5.1.1.d.2 of Section 6 of the emergency plan stated that an assembly

and release or evacuation will be ordered upon the classification of a Site or

General Emergency. This subsection and EPIP 6.1 stated that assembled, non-

essential personnel would either be released from the site when no radiological

conditions were present, or be evacuated from the site when radiological

conditions were present and additional actions, such as radiological monitoring

and relocation, were required.

Subsection 3.2.3 of Section 5 of the emergency plan stated that non-essential

personnel will be released if conditions allow; however, these conditions were

not specified. Step 4.4 of EPIP 6.1 stated that an evacuation of non-essential

personnel to an offsite assembly area shall be considered under certain

projected or measured radiological conditions, or other hazards.

Following the licensees critique presentation on February 14, the inspectors

asked the licensees exercise controllers about the acceptability of the

participants considering the use of buses from a local company to transport non-

essential personnel from the site. The licensee indicated that it believed that an

agreement existed with a local company to provide such a support. In contrast,

the inspectors did not identify evidence of pre-planning, either in the emergency

plan or in EPIP 6.1, to use a local company to provide buses to remove non-

essential personnel from the site during an emergency.

At its February 14 critique presentation, the licensee gave the inspectors copies

of two AR associated with its exercise critique of the implementation of EPIP 6.1.

Eight concerns associated with the assembly and accountability processes in

one onsite building were summarized in AR-CAP002156. Assembly and

Accountability Process was the title of AR-CAP002170, which also listed eight

concerns. Although one of these eight concerns was when to evacuate

assembled personnel, the AR did not also list a concern about when to release

assembled personnel consistent with the emergency plans and EPIP 6.1's

different meanings of the words release and evacuate.

After the licensees February 14 critique presentation, the inspectors asked other

questions about the participants decision making on removing non-essential

personnel from the site, such as whether the decision to begin removing non-

essential personnel was considered to be timely and what road was eventually

chosen to reach the Site Boundary Control Center (SBCC). The inspectors

concluded that the licensee did not have sufficient information available to

respond to these questions.

Significance Determination

Appendix B to NRC Manual Chapter (MC) 0610* includes criteria for determining

whether an issue warrants further analysis and documentation in an inspection report as

a finding. Using these criteria, the inspectors determined that the issues of the

licensees failure to adequately critique: (1) its participants initial PAR and (2) its

participants decision making on the simulated removal of non-essential personnel from

8

the site were issues that had a credible impact on safety. Each issue could also be

viewed as a precursor to a significant event and would, if left uncorrected, under the

same conditions become a more significant safety concern. Both critique issues were

evaluated as such because a basic reason for conducting Emergency Preparedness

drills and exercises is to identify performance and procedure concerns so that corrective

actions on such concerns can be taken before these concerns may occur during an

actual emergency and have an adverse impact on health and safety.

Appendix B to MC 0609 divides the 16 emergency planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) into two categories, specifically risk significant and other planning

standards. With respect to the two aforementioned issues, Subsection 5.10 of Appendix

B states that 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) is risk significant for offsite PARs, but not for onsite

protective actions.

Rather than have a separate finding for each critique issue, it is appropriate to identify

one preliminary finding to encompass both issues and to focus on their common factor,

specifically that both issues were inadequately critiqued by licensee staff. It is then

appropriate to assign a preliminary significance to the evaluation of the licensees

critique that is associated with the more risk significant of the two critique issues (White)

(Unresolved Item No. 50-266/02-04-01 and 50-301/02-04-01).

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees records related to each of the three emergency

preparedness PIs to verify that the licensees program was implemented consistent with

the industry guidelines in Nuclear Energy Institute publication No. 99-02 and related

licensee procedures. Specifically, licensee records related to the performance of the

Alert and Notification System (ANS), key Emergency Response Organization (ERO)

members drill participation, and Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP) were reviewed to

verify the accuracy and completeness of the data submitted to NRC for the period

October 2001 through December 2001.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

a

Exit Meeting

The inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. M. Reddemann and

other members of licensee management and staff at an interim exit meeting on

February 15, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the information presented. No

proprietary information was identified. On April 1, 2002, a final exit meeting was held

with Mr. F. Cayia and other members of licensee management and staff.

9

b.

Other Meeting

On February 15, 2002, an inspector summarized NRCs preliminary inspection results at

a public and media briefing hosted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in

Manitowoc, Wisconsin.

10

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Interim Exit Meeting

Licensee

J. Anderson, Production Planning Manager

L. Armstrong, Engineering Manager

R. Arnold, Chemistry Supervisor

W. Bartelme, EP Coordinator

A. Cayia, Site Director

G. Corell, Chemistry Manager

D. Hettick, Performance Assessment Manager

V. Kaminskas, Maintenance Manager

M. Kelley, EP Coordinator

C. Krause, Regulatory Compliance

K. Pavley, Nuclear Oversight Manager

M. Reddemann, Site Vice President

R. Repshas, Site Services Manager

J. Strarsky, Operations Manager

S. Thomas, Radiation Protection Manager

R. Walsh, Nuclear Oversight

D. Weaver, Assistant Manager

T. Webb, Licensing Manager

W. Yarosz, EP Manager

Final Exit Meeting

Licensee

J. Anderson, Production Planning Manager

L. Armstrong, Engineering Manager

W. Bartelme, EP Coordinator

A. Cayia, Site Director

F. Flenje, Senior Regulatory Compliance Specialist

R. Hopkins, Nuclear Oversight Supervisor

V. Kaminskas, Maintenance Manager

M. Kelley, EP Coordinator

R. Pulec, Assistant Director

R. Repshas, Site Services Manager

D. Schoon, Operations Manager

T. Taylor, Plant Manager

S. Thomas, Radiation Protection Manager

E. Weinkam, Regulatory Services Director

W. Yarosz, EP Manager

NRC

R. Caniano, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region III

T. Ploski, Senior EP Inspector, Region III

K. Riemer, Chief, Plant Support Branch, Region III

11

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-266/02-04-01

URI

Inadequate critique of two exercise performance issues

50-301/02-04-01

(Section 1EP1.b)

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ANS

Alert and Notification System

AR

Action Request

CAP

Corrective Action Program

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CRS

Control Room Simulator

DEP

Drill and Exercise Performance

DRS

Division of Reactor Safety

EOF

Emergency Operations Facility

EP

Emergency Preparedness

EPIP

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure

ERO

Emergency Response Organization

IR

Inspection Report

MC

NRC Manual Chapter

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NUREG

Nuclear Regulatory Guide

OSC

Operations Support Center

PAR

Protective Action Recommendation

PI

Performance Indicator

SBCC

Site Boundary Control Center

TBD

To Be Determined

TSC

Technical Support Center

12

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1EP1

Exercise Evaluation

EPIP 1.1

EPIP 1.2

EPIP 1.3

EPIP 2.1

EPIP 4.1

EPIP 4.2

EPIP 4.3

EPIP 4.7

EPIP 5.1

EPIP 5.2

EPIP 6.1

EPIP 10.1

AR-CAP002117

AR-CAP002127

AR-CAP002156

AR-CAP002166

AR-CAP002167

AR-CAP002168

AR-CAP002169

AR-CAP002170

AR-CAP002171

AR-CAP002172

AR-CAP002173

AR-CAP002174

February 2002 Exercise Scenario Manual

Summary of January 2002 Drill Scenario

Licensees Time Line on Decisions on Simulated

Removal of Non-essential Personnel

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan

Course of Actions

Emergency Classification

Dose Assessment and Protective Action

Recommendations

Notifications

TSC Activation and Evacuation

OSC Activation and Evacuation

EOF Activation and Evacuation

Offsite Radiation Protection Facility Activation and

Evacuation

Personnel Emergency Dose Authorization

Radioiodine Blocking and Thyroid Dose

Accounting

Assembly and Accountability, Release and

Evacuation of Personnel

Emergency Reentry

Joint Public Information Center Does Not Appear

to be Set Up for Concurrent Kewaunee and Point

Beach Plant Emergency Events

Supply Discrepancies in TSC, OSC, and EOF

Assembly/Accountability Problems in North

Service Building

Reassess Emergency Action Level 1.1.5.1

Lab Coats Not Available for Sample Handlers

Milwaukee Call Center Provided Out of Date

Information to Simulated Public Callers

How to Document PAR Change Due to Wind

Direction Shift on State/County Notification Form

Reassess Assembly and Accountability Process

Discrepancy in Dose Assessment Programs

Computer Monitor Display versus a Printout

Develop Briefing Sheets for Directors

Miscellaneous Equipment Issues During Exercise

Qualifications of Craft Personnel for Some Tasks

August 2000

Revision 37

Revision 34

Revision 27

Revision 22

Revision 30

Revision 14

Revision 24

Revision 1

Revision 13

Revision 13

Revision 19

Revision 21

13

AR-CAP002175

AR-CAP002176

AR-CAP002177

AR-CAP002178

AR-CAP002179

AR-CAP002180

AR-CAP002181

AR-CAP002182

AR-CAP002183

AR-CAP002184

AR-CAP002185

AR-CAP002186

AR-CAP002189

AR-CAP002190

AR-CAP002215

Shift Manager Unable to Activate Primary ERO

Notification System

Dose/PAR Coordinator Checklist Concern

CRS Crew Twice Started Equipment Without

Proper Investigation

Problems Hearing Gai-Tronics Announcements

Several Staff Reading Personal Reading

Materials in OSC Briefing Room During Exercise

Participant Access Problem at Joint Public

Information Center

Several Non-Participants Unwilling to Augment

Participants When Requested

Several Simulator Fidelity and Controller

Performance Issues

Several Information Flow Problems in TSC

Two Participants Not Fully Qualified

Environmental Sample Analysis Records Keeping

Accumulated Dose Tracking Concern in OSC

EP Staff Involvement in Operator Training for

DEP Performance Indicator

Two Vehicles Had Insufficient Gas

Instances of OSC Teams Not Demonstrating

Good Contamination Control Practices

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

MO4-11

MO4-12

MO5-12

AR-CAP-002214

Fourth Quarter 2001 Evaluation Forms for Three

PIs

Field Observations of Sirens Full Sound Test

Full Sound Siren Test Records - October through

December 2001

Growl Sound Siren Test Records - October

through December 2001

Drill Nuclear Accident Reporting Form

Drill Nuclear Accident Reporting Forms

Drill Scenario Time Line

Reassess Which EOF Position is State/County

Communicator for PI Reporting Purposes

November 7, 2001

October 4, 2001

December 6, 2001

December 2001