IR 05000259/2004011

IR 05000259-04-011, on 02/13/2004, Tennessee Valley Authority, Browns Ferry Unit 1

ML041340063
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	05/12/2004
From:	Reyes L Region 2 Administrator
To:	Scalice J Tennessee Valley Authority
References
EA-04-063 IR-04-011
Download: ML041340063 (40)

Text

May 12, 2004

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION (BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 RECOVERY - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000259/2004011)

Dear Mr. Scalice:

This refers to the inspection completed on February 13, 2004, involving recovery activities at Tennessee Valley Authoritys (TVA) Browns Ferry 1 (BF1) reactor facility. The results of the inspection, including the identification of an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, were forwarded to you by NRC letter dated April 6, 2004. Based on the results of the inspection, a pre-decisional enforcement conference was held on April 28, 2004, in the NRCs Region II Office in Atlanta, Georgia, with members of your staff to discuss the apparent violation, its significance, root causes, and your corrective actions. A listing of conference attendees, material presented by the NRC, and material presented by TVA are included as Enclosures 2, 3, and 4, respectively.

Based on the information developed during the inspection, and the information presented at the conference, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation involves four examples of a failure to adhere to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. All four examples were associated with the BF1 Long-Term Torus Integrity Program, and involved: failure to evaluate or incorporate numerous deficient welds into Deficiency Fix Requests sketches; failure to perform numerous repairs on the correct welds; omission of numerous welds requiring repair from Work Orders, and failure of Quality Control (QC) to independently verify the correct location of numerous weld repairs. At the conference, TVA acknowledged the errors, discussed its root cause and extent of condition reviews, and corrective actions.

As described in NRC Manual Chapter 2509, Browns Ferry Unit 1 Restart Project Inspection Program, and explained during the conference, BF1 is not considered to fall within the scope of the Commission's current General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, for commercially operating nuclear power plants. As such, traditional enforcement is in effect for the restart of BF1 for violations in those cornerstones which cannot be monitored under the Reactor Oversight Program. The significance of violations will be

TVA

evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2 and other applicable enforcement guidance, including Supplement II of the Enforcement Policy. In this case, the violation identified above involves TVAs Quality Assurance program for construction related to a single work activity (BF1 Long-Term Torus Integrity Program), and involves a failure to conduct adequate audits/reviews and take prompt corrective action on the basis of such audits/reviews. In addition, the errors were associated with multiple examples of deficient construction due to inadequate program implementation. As such, the NRC has concluded that the violation is appropriately characterized at Severity Level III.

In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $60,000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation. Because your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement action within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.C.2 of the Enforcement Policy. TVAs immediate corrective actions included the development and implementation of a plan to systematically verify the scope of torus weld problems. The plan consisted of training personnel on torus orientation and the proper use of sketches, independent review of the welds that were to be repaired to ensure they were identified in work documents, a walk-down of the torus welds that did not require repair to verify acceptability, and a determination of the cause of each example of the violation. Other corrective actions included the verification and revision of torus sketches, the placement of placards inside the torus to aid in orientation, revision of weld data sheets and weld maps, establishment of a single point of contact to control sketches, meetings with QC inspectors to stress the critical importance of independence, additional training for QC inspectors, increased Nuclear Assurance oversight of field activities, the assignment of dedicated resources for focused oversight of QC and other disciplines, and the conduct of a self-assessment of BF1 Nuclear Assurance oversight effectiveness. Based on these and other corrective actions discussed at the conference, the NRC concluded that credit was warranted for the factor of Corrective Action.

Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations and in recognition of the absence of previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized to propose that no civil penalty be assessed in this case. However, similar violations in the future could result in further escalated enforcement action. Issuance of this Notice constitutes escalated enforcement action, that may subject you to increased inspection effort.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), which is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, the response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, classified, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. The

TVA

NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.gov; select What We Do, Enforcement, then Significant Enforcement Actions.

Sincerely,

/RA/ LAR Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-259 License No. DPR-33

Enclosures:

1.

Notice of Violation 2.

List of Attendees 3.

Information Presented by NRC 4.

Information Presented by TVA

REGION II OFFICE, ATLANTA, GEORGIA I.

OPENING REMARKS, INTRODUCTIONS, AND SUMMARY OF ISSUES L. Reyes, Regional Administrator II NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY C. Evans, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff III STATEMENT OF CONCERNS / APPARENT VIOLATION H. Christensen, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety IV LICENSEE PRESENTATION IV.

BREAK / NRC CAUCUS V.

NRC FOLLOWUP QUESTIONS VI.

CLOSING REMARKS L. Reyes, Regional Administrator Enclosure 3

1 Apparent violations discussed at this conference are pre-decisional and are subject to change.

Apparent Violation1 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.

As of February 13, 2004, instructions, procedures, or drawings were not implemented for weld repairs to the ECN P-0093 torus modifications as described below:

1.

TVA procedure NEDP-5, Design Documents Review, Section 3.I.1 requires the preparer of design documents to provide an adequate and accurate solution for the problem, provide a quality product, and ensure that the design documents are complete. Section 3.1.2 requires the Checker (design verifier)

to ensure that the design documents are adequate, complete and accurate.

Deficiency Fix Request Sketches for the Long Term Torus Integrity Program were inadequate, in that approximately 50 examples of deficiencies requiring repairs were not identified on the sketches, because the preparer and design verifier failed to ensure that discrepancies identified during the torus walkdowns were adequately and accurately evaluated, failed to ensure that the discrepancies requiring repair were included in engineering output documents (deficiency fix request sketches), and failed to ensure the sketches were accurate and that required repairs were shown at the correct locations.

2.

The drawings titled Deficiency Fix Requests, Sketches 4 through 38, detailing corrective actions for PER number 03-017339, Unit 1 Torus, Differences Between As-Built and As-Designed Configurations, show locations for repairs to welds.

Welds designated as weld numbers MS-1-WO 03017394016-008 in work order 03-017394-016, weld numbers PCI-1-WO 03017394002-029 and -30 in work order 03-017394-002, and weld numbers MS-1-WO 03017394006-047, -

048, PCI-1-002-004, -005, and -006 in work order 03-017394-006 were repaired (welded) at the incorrect location. However review of the work order documentation, specifically weld maps and data sheets, indicated the welds had

1 Apparent violations discussed at this conference are pre-decisional and are subject to change.

been repaired. The deficient welds at these locations shown on Deficiency Fix Requests, Sketches 31 and 36 were not repaired. Approximately 20 additional welds were identified by the licensee which were repaired in the incorrect location.

3.

TVA procedure VT-6, Visual Examination of Structural Welds Using the Criteria of NCIG-01, requires quality control inspectors to perform an independent inspection of completed work activities important to safety. A requirement of the inspection procedure is independent verification that the work was performed at the correct location.

Quality Control (QC) inspection personnel failed to independently verify that welds designated as weld numbers MS-1-WO 03017394016-008 in work order 03-017394-016, weld numbers PCI-1-WO 03017394002-029 and -30 in work order 03-017394-002, and weld numbers MS-1-WO 03017394006-047, -048, PCI-1-002-004, -005, and -006 in work order 03-017394-006 were repaired at the correct location. However review of the QC inspection documentation in the work orders indicated the welds had been repaired, inspected and accepted by quality control inspectors. The deficient welds at these locations shown on Deficiency Fix Requests, Sketches 31 and 36 were not repaired.

4.

TVA procedure MMDP-1, Maintenance Management System, Paragraph 3.2, requires work orders to be developed to a level of detail appropriate for the circumstances which addresses the aspects of the work, including the scope of the work and work instructions. MMDP-1 requires that the work order specify that work is to be performed in accordance with approved procedures, when approved procedures are available. Paragraph 3.8.1 of TVA procedure MMDP-1 requires independent/technical review of the work order to insure the work order contains detailed work steps to perform the required work prior to approval and implementation of the work order. TVA procedure MMDP-10, Controlling Welding, Brazing, and Soldering Processes, Section 3.3, requires work implementing documents and weld data sheets be prepared and included in the work order for all welding activities.

Work implementing documents and weld data sheets for six welds which required restoration to the sizes shown on Deficiency Fix Request, Sketch Number 30, referenced in PER 03-017394, were omitted from Work Order 030017394-006. The independent/technical review of the work order did not

1 Apparent violations discussed at this conference are pre-decisional and are subject to change.

identify the omission when performing the independent technical quality review.

As followup, the licensee identified approximately 30 additional welds which were shown on the drawings as requiring repair but were not included in the work order instructions. That is, no work instructions or weld data sheets had been prepared for these welds and thus the welds had not been repaired.