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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES  
                              NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
                                              REGION II
REGION II  
                          245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200  
                                    ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257  
                                          October 3, 2012
EA-12-132
October 3, 2012  
Mr. George Hamrick
Site Vice President
EA-12-132  
Carolina Power and Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Mr. George Hamrick  
P. O. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1
Site Vice President  
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165
Carolina Power and Light Company  
SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - FINAL SIGNIFICANCE
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant  
              DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND
P. O. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1  
              ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER (NRC INSPECTION REPORT
New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165  
              05000400/2012010)
Dear Mr. Hamrick:
SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - FINAL SIGNIFICANCE  
This letter provides the final significance determination of the two preliminary White findings and
DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND  
associated apparent violations (AVs) discussed in NRC Inspection Report (IR) No.
ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER (NRC INSPECTION REPORT  
05000400/2012007, dated July 16, 2012. The first preliminary White finding and AV involved
05000400/2012010)
multiple examples in which the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and associated equipment
were not adequately maintained for protracted time periods between approximately August
Dear Mr. Hamrick:  
2009 to November 2011, due to an apparent lack of adequate control over maintenance of
ventilation system equipment. The second preliminary White finding and AV involved the
This letter provides the final significance determination of the two preliminary White findings and  
potential that the Technical Support Center (TSC) could not be maintained during an emergency
associated apparent violations (AVs) discussed in NRC Inspection Report (IR) No.  
response, after your staff reduced the calculated unfiltered air inleakage. In this case, the
05000400/2012007, dated July 16, 2012. The first preliminary White finding and AV involved  
calculation change may have rendered the TSC less than fully functional because the
multiple examples in which the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and associated equipment  
habitability effects on the TSC were not evaluated when the inleakage value was revised. The
were not adequately maintained for protracted time periods between approximately August  
above two findings also represented AVs of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), which
2009 to November 2011, due to an apparent lack of adequate control over maintenance of  
together require that adequate emergency facilities such as the EOF and TSC be maintained.
ventilation system equipment. The second preliminary White finding and AV involved the  
Additionally, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8 (2011 version) specifies that
potential that the Technical Support Center (TSC) could not be maintained during an emergency  
emergency facilities shall include a TSC and an EOF from which effective direction can be given
response, after your staff reduced the calculated unfiltered air inleakage. In this case, the  
and effective control can be exercised during an emergency.
calculation change may have rendered the TSC less than fully functional because the  
This letter also provides the results of a third AV that was assessed using the NRCs traditional
habitability effects on the TSC were not evaluated when the inleakage value was revised. The  
enforcement process. This AV involved the failure to report a major loss of emergency
above two findings also represented AVs of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), which  
assessment capability to the NRC within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
together require that adequate emergency facilities such as the EOF and TSC be maintained.
At your request, a Regulatory/Pre-Decisional Enforcement Conference was held on August 24,
Additionally, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8 (2011 version) specifies that  
2012, to discuss Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L) views on these issues. A meeting
emergency facilities shall include a TSC and an EOF from which effective direction can be given  
summary was issued on August 28, 2012, which includes copies of the slide presentation made
and effective control can be exercised during an emergency.  
by CP&L (ADAMS Accession # ML12242A432 ). During the meeting, your staff described your
assessment of the significance of the findings, the corrective actions planned and taken, and the
This letter also provides the results of a third AV that was assessed using the NRCs traditional  
results of your root cause evaluations of the findings.
enforcement process. This AV involved the failure to report a major loss of emergency  
assessment capability to the NRC within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).  
At your request, a Regulatory/Pre-Decisional Enforcement Conference was held on August 24,  
2012, to discuss Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L) views on these issues. A meeting  
summary was issued on August 28, 2012, which includes copies of the slide presentation made  
by CP&L (ADAMS Accession # ML12242A432 ). During the meeting, your staff described your  
assessment of the significance of the findings, the corrective actions planned and taken, and the  
results of your root cause evaluations of the findings.


G. Hamrick                                   2
G. Hamrick  
For the first finding and related AV involving the EOF, you acknowledged the existence of
2  
performance deficiencies associated with facility oversight and maintenance controls. In
response to the NRCs concerns, your staff conducted additional engineering reviews and
For the first finding and related AV involving the EOF, you acknowledged the existence of  
calculations to determine the functional status of the EOF. Following the regulatory conference,
performance deficiencies associated with facility oversight and maintenance controls. In  
your staff also provided to the NRC additional updated calculations. These functional
response to the NRCs concerns, your staff conducted additional engineering reviews and  
habitability calculations were performed for temperature, humidity, carbon dioxide, and
calculations to determine the functional status of the EOF. Following the regulatory conference,  
radiological conditions. As presented at the conference, you concluded that the performance
your staff also provided to the NRC additional updated calculations. These functional  
deficiency did not cause loss of a planning standard function such that the EOF was functional
habitability calculations were performed for temperature, humidity, carbon dioxide, and  
but degraded. Your review identified three periods in which the EOF could be considered non-
radiological conditions. As presented at the conference, you concluded that the performance  
functional, however, none of these periods exceeded seven days. Based on your review, you
deficiency did not cause loss of a planning standard function such that the EOF was functional  
concluded that the significance of the EOF issue should be considered to be of very low safety
but degraded. Your review identified three periods in which the EOF could be considered non-
significance (Green).
functional, however, none of these periods exceeded seven days. Based on your review, you  
As you presented at the conference, your staffs calculations indicated that portions of the EOF
concluded that the significance of the EOF issue should be considered to be of very low safety  
would reach a maximum of 87 oF because of the degraded ventilation system. While there is no
significance (Green).
specific stated NRC temperature for EOF habitability or for EOF equipment, an elevated
temperature is of particular concern when emergency response organization members are
As you presented at the conference, your staffs calculations indicated that portions of the EOF  
under stress, as in emergency response situations during which they must effectively conduct
would reach a maximum of 87 oF because of the degraded ventilation system. While there is no  
their emergency plan functions. Although you indicated that compensatory measures would
specific stated NRC temperature for EOF habitability or for EOF equipment, an elevated  
likely have been taken if necessary to staff the EOF for an emergency, no procedurally
temperature is of particular concern when emergency response organization members are  
controlled compensatory measures had been established; nor were compensatory measures
under stress, as in emergency response situations during which they must effectively conduct  
planned or taken for the periods of time acknowledged above when you considered the EOF
their emergency plan functions. Although you indicated that compensatory measures would  
non-functional.
likely have been taken if necessary to staff the EOF for an emergency, no procedurally  
Regarding the potential for elevated CO2 concentration levels, the NRC notes that the back-draft
controlled compensatory measures had been established; nor were compensatory measures  
damper in the normal ventilation supply path was found rusted closed on January 25, 2010.
planned or taken for the periods of time acknowledged above when you considered the EOF  
Based on the condition of the damper and the lack of previous testing by your staff, it is
non-functional.  
reasonable to conclude that this condition existed for a period of greater than seven days. With
this configuration, swapping the EOF ventilation system to the emergency mode of operation
Regarding the potential for elevated CO2 concentration levels, the NRC notes that the back-draft  
could not be ensured, in which case you assert in your calculations NAI-1651-001 Rev 0 and
damper in the normal ventilation supply path was found rusted closed on January 25, 2010.
NAI-1680-002, Revision 0, that the CO2 concentration in the facility would build-up to greater
Based on the condition of the damper and the lack of previous testing by your staff, it is  
than 5000 parts per million (PPM) in approximately five to six hours. The NRC notes that the
reasonable to conclude that this condition existed for a period of greater than seven days. With  
Harris facility does not maintain a procedure for sampling CO2 in the EOF, so response staff
this configuration, swapping the EOF ventilation system to the emergency mode of operation  
likely would not be aware of rising concentration levels during facility use. The elevated CO2
could not be ensured, in which case you assert in your calculations NAI-1651-001 Rev 0 and  
concentration, combined with the stress associated with an actual emergency in a facility with
NAI-1680-002, Revision 0, that the CO2 concentration in the facility would build-up to greater  
temperatures at the elevated levels you calculated, would likely have impaired at least one key
than 5000 parts per million (PPM) in approximately five to six hours. The NRC notes that the  
responder in his or her ability to perform an assigned emergency response function.
Harris facility does not maintain a procedure for sampling CO2 in the EOF, so response staff  
Regarding radiological conditions in a postulated accident, the NRC reviewed dose
likely would not be aware of rising concentration levels during facility use. The elevated CO2  
considerations related to the equipment deficiencies, and reached a conclusion similar to that of
concentration, combined with the stress associated with an actual emergency in a facility with  
your staff. Although dose rates in the facility would have been elevated, personnel staffing the
temperatures at the elevated levels you calculated, would likely have impaired at least one key  
facility would not have received a dose in excess of the 5 Rem total effective dose equivalent
responder in his or her ability to perform an assigned emergency response function.  
(TEDE) limit during design basis accident conditions.
Regarding the periods of time in which the EOF was considered to be non-functional, the NRC
Regarding radiological conditions in a postulated accident, the NRC reviewed dose  
used Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B Emergency Preparedness
considerations related to the equipment deficiencies, and reached a conclusion similar to that of  
Significance Determination Process Table 5.8-1 for assessing the significance of issues. For
your staff. Although dose rates in the facility would have been elevated, personnel staffing the  
the circumstances of the Harris EOF, a primary consideration is whether the EOF was not
facility would not have received a dose in excess of the 5 Rem total effective dose equivalent  
functional for a period longer than seven days from the time of discovery, to the extent that any
(TEDE) limit during design basis accident conditions.
Regarding the periods of time in which the EOF was considered to be non-functional, the NRC  
used Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B Emergency Preparedness  
Significance Determination Process Table 5.8-1 for assessing the significance of issues. For  
the circumstances of the Harris EOF, a primary consideration is whether the EOF was not  
functional for a period longer than seven days from the time of discovery, to the extent that any  


G. Hamrick                                     3
G. Hamrick  
key emergency response organization (ERO) member could not perform his/her assigned
3  
emergency plan functions, in the absence of compensatory measures. As indicated in IMC
0609, the time duration is considered from the time of discovery and is not limited to the
key emergency response organization (ERO) member could not perform his/her assigned  
maintence periods you indicated in your presentation. Based on the inspection and information
emergency plan functions, in the absence of compensatory measures. As indicated in IMC  
presented at the conference, the NRC concluded that sufficient opportunity existed for Harris
0609, the time duration is considered from the time of discovery and is not limited to the  
staff to recognize the degraded condition of the EOF. As such, we have concluded that the time
maintence periods you indicated in your presentation. Based on the inspection and information  
periods of EOF non-functional status were as stated in our inspection report.
presented at the conference, the NRC concluded that sufficient opportunity existed for Harris  
After considering the information developed during the inspection and the information provided
staff to recognize the degraded condition of the EOF. As such, we have concluded that the time  
by CP&L during the conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding involving the EOF is
periods of EOF non-functional status were as stated in our inspection report.  
appropriately characterized as White, a finding of low to moderate safety significance. In this
case, the large number of occurrences and durations in which the EOF was non-functional, in
After considering the information developed during the inspection and the information provided  
part due to habitability concerns related to the potential for elevated temperature and CO2
by CP&L during the conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding involving the EOF is  
concentration levels, the failure to assess the impact of out-of-service equipment and
appropriately characterized as White, a finding of low to moderate safety significance. In this  
maintenance, and the lack of procedural guidance and recognition of the need for compensatory
case, the large number of occurrences and durations in which the EOF was non-functional, in  
measures available to the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members to operate the
part due to habitability concerns related to the potential for elevated temperature and CO2  
system, collectively resulted in an NRC conclusion that the EOF was inadequately maintained to
concentration levels, the failure to assess the impact of out-of-service equipment and  
the extent that some key ERO members could not have performed their assigned emergency
maintenance, and the lack of procedural guidance and recognition of the need for compensatory  
plan functions. These occurrences indicate a lack of adequate control over maintenance of
measures available to the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members to operate the  
equipment that would have significantly impacted your staffs ability to respond to a radiological
system, collectively resulted in an NRC conclusion that the EOF was inadequately maintained to  
emergency. Furthermore, your emergency preparedness staff and ERO members were
the extent that some key ERO members could not have performed their assigned emergency  
unaware of these occurrences.
plan functions. These occurrences indicate a lack of adequate control over maintenance of  
The NRC staff determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Corrective Action
equipment that would have significantly impacted your staffs ability to respond to a radiological  
Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area, because CP&L did not
emergency. Furthermore, your emergency preparedness staff and ERO members were  
identify the issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their
unaware of these occurrences.  
safety significance. Specifically, CP&L did not properly classify, prioritize, or evaluate
operability and reportability of the non-functional EOF [P.1(c)].
The NRC staff determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Corrective Action  
The NRC also has determined that the finding involving the failure to maintain a fully functional
Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area, because CP&L did not  
EOF on several occasions is a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), and 10 CFR
identify the issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their  
50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8 (2011 version). The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of
safety significance. Specifically, CP&L did not properly classify, prioritize, or evaluate  
Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in IR
operability and reportability of the non-functional EOF [P.1(c)].  
05000400/2012007. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the Notice is considered
escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.
The NRC also has determined that the finding involving the failure to maintain a fully functional  
You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staffs significance
EOF on several occasions is a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), and 10 CFR  
determination for the White finding or the Notice of Violation associated with this finding. An
50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8 (2011 version). The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of  
appeal of the White finding will be considered to have merit only if it meets the criteria given in
Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in IR  
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2. An appeal must be sent in writing to the
05000400/2012007. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the Notice is considered  
Regional Administrator, Region II, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 245 Peachtree Center
escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.  
Avenue, Suite 1200, Atlanta, GA 30303-1257.
Regarding the second preliminary White finding and AV involving the TSC, the NRC has
You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staffs significance  
concluded that this finding should be characterized as a minor issue. In summary, CP&L
determination for the White finding or the Notice of Violation associated with this finding. An  
agreed that at the time of the inspection, there was a lack of experimental and empirical data to
appeal of the White finding will be considered to have merit only if it meets the criteria given in  
support the in-leakage assumption of 60 CFM used in the alternate source term (AST)
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2. An appeal must be sent in writing to the  
habitability calculations for the TSC. In response to the preliminary inspection finding, on
Regional Administrator, Region II, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 245 Peachtree Center  
July 11, 2012, CP&L conducted a tracer gas test on the TSC envelope in order to quantify
Avenue, Suite 1200, Atlanta, GA 30303-1257.  
Regarding the second preliminary White finding and AV involving the TSC, the NRC has  
concluded that this finding should be characterized as a minor issue. In summary, CP&L  
agreed that at the time of the inspection, there was a lack of experimental and empirical data to  
support the in-leakage assumption of 60 CFM used in the alternate source term (AST)  
habitability calculations for the TSC. In response to the preliminary inspection finding, on  
July 11, 2012, CP&L conducted a tracer gas test on the TSC envelope in order to quantify  


G. Hamrick                                     4
G. Hamrick  
unfiltered air in-leakage. Additionally, the NRC reviewed your test methodology, data, analysis
4  
and results. When the TSC envelope was tested, the resulting data demonstrated that
habitability for the facility would be maintained with the test results indicating a maximum of 48
unfiltered air in-leakage. Additionally, the NRC reviewed your test methodology, data, analysis  
cubic feet per minute (CFM) in-leakage which was less than the 60 CFM in-leakage stated in
and results. When the TSC envelope was tested, the resulting data demonstrated that  
the AST habitability calculations. Based on the above, the NRC concluded that the Harris
habitability for the facility would be maintained with the test results indicating a maximum of 48  
facility adequately maintained its TSC as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), and that this matter
cubic feet per minute (CFM) in-leakage which was less than the 60 CFM in-leakage stated in  
does not represent a violation of regulatory requirements.
the AST habitability calculations. Based on the above, the NRC concluded that the Harris  
The third AV involved the failure to report a major loss of emergency assessment capability to
facility adequately maintained its TSC as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), and that this matter  
the NRC within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Based on the information
does not represent a violation of regulatory requirements.  
developed during the inspection and the information provided at the pre-decisional enforcement
conference, the NRC has concluded that a violation of NRC requirements occurred.
The third AV involved the failure to report a major loss of emergency assessment capability to  
Specifically, the NRC determined that the EOF facility was not functional or adequately
the NRC within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Based on the information  
maintained, and therefore was required to be reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72
developed during the inspection and the information provided at the pre-decisional enforcement  
(b)(3)(xiii). The violation, the significance of which was evaluated using the NRCs traditional
conference, the NRC has concluded that a violation of NRC requirements occurred.
enforcement process, is cited in the enclosed Notice and the circumstances surrounding it are
Specifically, the NRC determined that the EOF facility was not functional or adequately  
described in detail in IR 05000400/2012007. In this case, the NRC concluded that on several
maintained, and therefore was required to be reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72  
occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9, 2011, the licensee failed to report an
(b)(3)(xiii). The violation, the significance of which was evaluated using the NRCs traditional  
occurrence of a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
enforcement process, is cited in the enclosed Notice and the circumstances surrounding it are  
As discussed in the Enforcement Policy, the severity level of a violation involving the failure to
described in detail in IR 05000400/2012007. In this case, the NRC concluded that on several  
make a required report to the NRC will be based upon the significance of and the circumstances
occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9, 2011, the licensee failed to report an  
surrounding the matter that should have been reported. In this case, and as discussed above,
occurrence of a major loss of emergency assessment capability.  
the NRC concluded that the failure to provide the required report is associated with a White
finding for CP&Ls failure to maintain a fully functional EOF. In addition, CP&Ls failure to report
As discussed in the Enforcement Policy, the severity level of a violation involving the failure to  
the condition of the EOF between August 4, 2009, and November 9, 2011, as required by 10
make a required report to the NRC will be based upon the significance of and the circumstances  
CFR 50.72, impeded the NRCs regulatory process. Had CP&L reported the incident as
surrounding the matter that should have been reported. In this case, and as discussed above,  
required, NRC review and follow-up inspection likely would have occurred, which may have
the NRC concluded that the failure to provide the required report is associated with a White  
prompted CP&L to adopt compensatory measures and/or corrective actions, thereby precluding
finding for CP&Ls failure to maintain a fully functional EOF. In addition, CP&Ls failure to report  
further incidents after August 4, 2009. Based on the above, the NRC has concluded that the
the condition of the EOF between August 4, 2009, and November 9, 2011, as required by 10  
violation of 10 CFR 50.72 is appropriately characterized at Severity Level III, in accordance with
CFR 50.72, impeded the NRCs regulatory process. Had CP&L reported the incident as  
the NRC Enforcement Policy.
required, NRC review and follow-up inspection likely would have occurred, which may have  
Because your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last
prompted CP&L to adopt compensatory measures and/or corrective actions, thereby precluding  
two years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action in
further incidents after August 4, 2009. Based on the above, the NRC has concluded that the  
accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement
violation of 10 CFR 50.72 is appropriately characterized at Severity Level III, in accordance with  
Policy. In response to the inspection findings of June 2012, Harris staff promptly initiated a
the NRC Enforcement Policy.  
review of its reportability procedure for Emergency Response Facilities, conducted an extent of
condition review of past instances in which its emergency response facility may not have been
Because your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last  
maintained adequate, and included the reportability aspect as part of an overall Root Cause
two years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action in  
Analysis for its emergency response facilities. Your Root Cause Analysis concluded that the
accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement  
cause of the reportability issues could be attributed, in part, to incorrect guidance in the sites
Policy. In response to the inspection findings of June 2012, Harris staff promptly initiated a  
reportability procedure, which allowed taking credit for alternate emergency facilities rather than
review of its reportability procedure for Emergency Response Facilities, conducted an extent of  
reporting a non-functional emergency facility. Based on this review, you revised the procedure
condition review of past instances in which its emergency response facility may not have been  
for reportability by specifically incorporating the reportability requirements of NUREG 1022
maintained adequate, and included the reportability aspect as part of an overall Root Cause  
related to emergency response facilities, and reported to the NRC additional instances in which
Analysis for its emergency response facilities. Your Root Cause Analysis concluded that the  
you determined that the emergency response facilities were not adequately maintained. The
cause of the reportability issues could be attributed, in part, to incorrect guidance in the sites  
NRC notes, however, that the results of your extent of condition review regarding additional
reportability procedure, which allowed taking credit for alternate emergency facilities rather than  
reportability instances did not fully coincide with all examples identified by the NRC. Based on
reporting a non-functional emergency facility. Based on this review, you revised the procedure  
for reportability by specifically incorporating the reportability requirements of NUREG 1022  
related to emergency response facilities, and reported to the NRC additional instances in which  
you determined that the emergency response facilities were not adequately maintained. The  
NRC notes, however, that the results of your extent of condition review regarding additional  
reportability instances did not fully coincide with all examples identified by the NRC. Based on  


G. Hamrick                                     5
G. Hamrick  
the promptness of corrective actions, the procedural revision and the Root Cause Analysis, the
5  
NRC has concluded that, credit is warranted for the factor of Corrective Action.
Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, and in recognition
the promptness of corrective actions, the procedural revision and the Root Cause Analysis, the  
of the absence of previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized, after
NRC has concluded that, credit is warranted for the factor of Corrective Action.
consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to propose that a civil penalty not be
assessed in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.
Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, and in recognition  
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the
of the absence of previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized, after  
enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you
consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to propose that a civil penalty not be  
believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRC
assessed in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.  
review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is
necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the  
For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report, No.
enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you  
05000400/2012010. Accordingly, AVs 05000400/2012007-01, 05000400/2012007-02, and
believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRC  
05000400/2012007-04 are updated consistent with the regulatory positions described in this
review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is  
letter. Therefore AV 05000400/2012007-01, Failure to Maintain an Adequate EOF to Support
necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.  
Emergency Response is updated as VIO 05000400/2012007-01 with a safety significance of
White and a crosscutting aspect in the area Problem Identification and Resolution, P.1.(c).
For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report, No.  
Apparent violation 05000400/2012007-02, Failure to Notify the NRC of the EOF Loss of
05000400/2012010. Accordingly, AVs 05000400/2012007-01, 05000400/2012007-02, and  
Emergency Assessment Capability, is updated as VIO 05000400/2012007-02, Severity Level III,
05000400/2012007-04 are updated consistent with the regulatory positions described in this  
with no cross-cutting aspect. Apparent violation 05000400/2012007-04, Failure to Maintain an
letter. Therefore AV 05000400/2012007-01, Failure to Maintain an Adequate EOF to Support  
Adequate TSC to Support Emergency Response, is updated as a minor issue and closed.
Emergency Response is updated as VIO 05000400/2012007-01 with a safety significance of  
The NRC determined the performance of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant to be in the
White and a crosscutting aspect in the area Problem Identification and Resolution, P.1.(c).
Regulatory Response Column of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix as of the second
Apparent violation 05000400/2012007-02, Failure to Notify the NRC of the EOF Loss of  
quarter of calendar year 2012. Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct a supplemental inspection
Emergency Assessment Capability, is updated as VIO 05000400/2012007-02, Severity Level III,  
in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95001, Supplemental Inspection for One or Two
with no cross-cutting aspect. Apparent violation 05000400/2012007-04, Failure to Maintain an  
White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area, to provide assurance that the root causes and
Adequate TSC to Support Emergency Response, is updated as a minor issue and closed.  
contributing causes of risk-significant performance issues are understood, that the extent of
cause is identified, and that your corrective action for risk-significant performance issues are
The NRC determined the performance of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant to be in the  
sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and prevent recurrence. The NRC
Regulatory Response Column of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix as of the second  
requests that your staff provide notification of your readiness for the NRC to conduct a
quarter of calendar year 2012. Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct a supplemental inspection  
supplemental inspection to review the actions taken to address the White inspection finding.
in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95001, Supplemental Inspection for One or Two  
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area, to provide assurance that the root causes and  
enclosure, and your response, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
contributing causes of risk-significant performance issues are understood, that the extent of  
NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS), accessible from
cause is identified, and that your corrective action for risk-significant performance issues are  
the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your
sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and prevent recurrence. The NRC  
response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that
requests that your staff provide notification of your readiness for the NRC to conduct a  
it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
supplemental inspection to review the actions taken to address the White inspection finding.  
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its  
enclosure, and your response, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the  
NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS), accessible from  
the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your  
response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that  
it can be made available to the Public without redaction.  


G. Hamrick                               6
G. Hamrick  
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Randy Musser at
6  
(404) 997-4603.
                                          Sincerely,
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Randy Musser at  
                                          /RA/
(404) 997-4603.  
                                          Victor M. McCree
                                          Regional Administrator
Sincerely,  
Docket No.: 50-400
License No.: NPF-63
Enclosure: Notice of Violation
cc w/encl.: (See page 7)
/RA/  
Victor M. McCree  
Regional Administrator  
Docket No.: 50-400  
License No.:   NPF-63  
Enclosure: Notice of Violation
cc w/encl.: (See page 7)  




_________________________                   # SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE # FORM 665 ATTACHED
_________________________  
OFFICE       RII:DRP         RII:DRP         RII:DRP         RII:DRP         RII:DRP         RII:DRP         RII:EICS         HQ:OE
SIGNATURE     By email       By email       By email       JWG1             By email       By email       By email         By email
# SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE # FORM 665 ATTACHED  
NAME         JDodson         JAustin         PLessard       JWorosilo       RMusser         RCroteau       BKlukan         LCasey
OFFICE  
DATE             10/1/2012       10/2/2012       10/1/2012       10/1/2012       10/1/2012       10/1/2012       10/1/2012   09/27/2012
RII:DRP  
E-MAIL         YES     NO     YES     NO    YES     NO    YES     NO     YES     NO    YES     NO   YES      NO      YES
RII:DRP  
COPY?                                                                                                                                    N
RII:DRP  
OFFICE       HQ:NRR         HQ:NSIR         RII:DRS         RII:DRA         RII:RA
RII:DRP  
SIGNATURE     By email       By email       By email       LDW /RA/         VMM /RA/
RII:DRP  
NAME         R Franovich     M Thaggard     HChristensen   LWert           VMcree
RII:DRP  
DATE         09/24/2012     09/24/2012     10/2/2012       10/02/2012       10/03/2012
RII:EICS  
E-MAIL         YES     NO     YES     NO    YES     NO    YES     NO     YES     NO    YES      NO
HQ:OE  
         
SIGNATURE  
G. Hamrick                        7
By email  
cc w/encl:                          David H. Corlett
By email  
Brian Bernard                        Supervisor
By email  
Manager, Nuclear Services and EP    Licensing/Regulatory Programs
JWG1  
Nuclear Protective Services          Progress Energy
By email
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant   Electronic Mail Distribution
By email  
Electronic Mail Distribution
By email  
                                    David T. Conley
By email  
Brian C. McCabe                      Senior Counsel
NAME  
Manager, Nuclear Oversight          Legal Department
JDodson  
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant  Progress Energy
JAustin  
Progress Energy                      Electronic Mail Distribution
PLessard  
Electronic Mail Distribution
JWorosilo  
                                    Donna B. Alexander
RMusser  
George T. Hamrick                    Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
RCroteau  
Vice President                      (interim)
BKlukan  
Carolina Power and Light Company     Progress Energy
LCasey  
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant  Electronic Mail Distribution
DATE  
Electronic Mail Distribution
10/1/2012  
                                    John H. O'Neill, Jr.
10/2/2012  
Lara S. Nichols                      Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
10/1/2012  
Deputy General Counsel              2300 N. Street, NW
10/1/2012  
Duke Energy Corporation              Washington, DC 20037-1128
10/1/2012  
Electronic Mail Distribution
10/1/2012  
                                    Joseph W. Donahue
10/1/2012  
M. Christopher Nolan                Vice President
09/27/2012
Director - Regulatory Affairs        Nuclear Oversight
E-MAIL  
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC          Progress Energy
COPY?
Electronic Mail Distribution        Electronic Mail Distribution
    YES  
Robert J. Duncan II                  W. Lee Cox, III
NO       YES  
Senior Vice President                Section Chief
NO     
Progress Energy                      Radiation Protection Section
  YES  
Electronic Mail Distribution        N.C. Department of Environmental
NO     
                                    Commerce & Natural Resources
  YES  
Sean T. O'Connor                    Electronic Mail Distribution
NO       YES  
Manager, Support Services
NO     
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant  Public Service Commission
  YES  
Electronic Mail Distribution        State of South Carolina
NO    
                                    P.O. Box 11649
YES  
Donald L. Griffith                  Columbia, SC 29211
NO       YES
Training Manager
N
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant  Chairman
OFFICE  
Progress Energy                      North Carolina Utilities Commission
HQ:NRR  
Electronic Mail Distribution        Electronic Mail Distribution
HQ:NSIR  
R. Keith Holbrook                    (cc w/encl continued next page)
RII:DRS
Manager, Support Services
RII:DRA  
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
RII:RA  
Electronic Mail Distribution
SIGNATURE  
By email  
By email  
By email  
LDW /RA/  
VMM /RA/  
NAME  
R Franovich  
M Thaggard  
HChristensen  
LWert  
VMcree  
DATE  
09/24/2012  
09/24/2012  
10/2/2012  
10/02/2012  
10/03/2012  
E-MAIL  
    YES  
NO       YES  
NO     
  YES  
NO     
  YES  
NO       YES  
NO     
   YES
NO      
 


G. Hamrick                           8
G. Hamrick  
cc w/encl continued:
7
Terrence E. Slake
Manager
cc w/encl:  
Nuclear Plant Security
Brian Bernard
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Manager, Nuclear Services and EP
Electronic Mail Distribution
Nuclear Protective Services
Robert P. Gruber
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Executive Director
Electronic Mail Distribution
Public Staff - NCUC
4326 Mail Service Center
Brian C. McCabe
Raleigh, NC 27699-4326
Manager, Nuclear Oversight
Chair
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant  
Board of County Commissioners of Wake
Progress Energy
County
Electronic Mail Distribution
P.O. Box 550
Raleigh, NC 27602
George T. Hamrick
Ernest J. Kapopoulos Jr.
Vice President
Plant General Manager
Carolina Power and Light Company
Carolina Power and Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant  
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution  
Electronic Mail Distribution
Chair
Lara S. Nichols
Board of County Commissioners of
Deputy General Counsel
Chatham County
Duke Energy Corporation
P.O. Box 1809
Electronic Mail Distribution
Pittsboro, NC 27312
M. Christopher Nolan
Director - Regulatory Affairs
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Electronic Mail Distribution
Robert J. Duncan II
Senior Vice President
Progress Energy
Electronic Mail Distribution
Sean T. O'Connor
Manager, Support Services
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Donald L. Griffith
Training Manager  
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Progress Energy
Electronic Mail Distribution
R. Keith Holbrook
Manager, Support Services
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant  
Electronic Mail Distribution  
David H. Corlett
Supervisor
Licensing/Regulatory Programs
Progress Energy
Electronic Mail Distribution
David T. Conley
Senior Counsel
Legal Department
Progress Energy
Electronic Mail Distribution
Donna B. Alexander
Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
(interim)
Progress Energy
Electronic Mail Distribution
John H. O'Neill, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
2300 N. Street, NW
Washington, DC  20037-1128
Joseph W. Donahue
Vice President
Nuclear Oversight
Progress Energy
Electronic Mail Distribution
W. Lee Cox, III
Section Chief
Radiation Protection Section
N.C. Department of Environmental
Commerce & Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution
Public Service Commission
State of South Carolina
P.O. Box 11649
Columbia, SC  29211
Chairman
North Carolina Utilities Commission
Electronic Mail Distribution
(cc w/encl continued next page)


G. Hamrick                               9
G. Hamrick  
Letter to George Hamrick from Victor M. McCree dated October 3, 2012.
8
SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - FINAL SIGNIFICANCE
              DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND
cc w/encl continued:
              ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER (NRC INSPECTION REPORT
Terrence E. Slake
              05000400/2012010)
Manager
Distribution w/encl:
Nuclear Plant Security
C. Evans, RII
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
L. Douglas, RII
Electronic Mail Distribution
OE Mail
RIDSNRRDIRS
Robert P. Gruber
PUBLIC
Executive Director
RidsNrrPMShearonHarris Resource
Public Staff - NCUC
4326 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC  27699-4326
Chair
Board of County Commissioners of Wake
County
P.O. Box 550
Raleigh, NC  27602
Ernest J. Kapopoulos Jr.  
Plant General Manager
Carolina Power and Light Company
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant
Electronic Mail Distribution
Chair
Board of County Commissioners of
Chatham County
P.O. Box 1809
Pittsboro, NC  27312


                                      NOTICE OF VIOLATION
G. Hamrick
Carolina Power and Light Company                                            Docket No. 50-400
9
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant                                          License No. NPF-63
                                                                            EA-12-132
Letter to George Hamrick from Victor M. McCree dated October 3, 2012.  
During an NRC inspection completed on June 20, 2012, two violations of NRC requirements
were identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violations are listed below:
SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - FINAL SIGNIFICANCE
A. 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, that a licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power
DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND
  reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards of 10
ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER (NRC INSPECTION REPORT
  CFR 50.47(b).
05000400/2012010)  
  10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) requires that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support
  the emergency response are provided and maintained.
Distribution w/encl:
  10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8 (2011 version) states, in part, that the emergency
C. Evans, RII
  facilities shall include licensee onsite technical support center and an emergency operations
L. Douglas, RII
  facility from which effective direction can be given and effective control can be exercised
OE Mail 
  during an emergency.
RIDSNRRDIRS
  The Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan, Section 3.1, revision 57, states in part that
PUBLIC
  adequate emergency facilities, communications, and equipment to support emergency
RidsNrrPMShearonHarris Resource
  response are provided and maintained.
  Contrary to the above, on several occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9,
  2011, the licensee failed to maintain adequate emergency facilities and equipment to
  support emergency response. Specifically, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
  normal and emergency ventilation system was in a degraded state and/or removed from
  service, for extended periods of time.
This violation is associated with a White SDP finding.
B. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) states that a licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and
  in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of
  emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications
  capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification
  System, or offsite notification system).
  Contrary to the above, on several occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9,
  2011, the licensee failed to notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a major
  loss of emergency assessment capability. Specifically, the licensee failed to report that the
  EOF normal and emergency ventilation system was in a degraded state, and/or removed
  from service, for extended periods of time when portions of the ventilation system were
  undergoing repairs, testing and maintenance, without compensatory measures.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Enforcement Policy paragraph 6.6).
                                                                                          Enclosure


                                                2
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Carolina Power and Light Company is hereby
Enclosure
required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Regional Administrator, Region 2, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that
is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of
Carolina Power and Light Company 
Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation;
EA-12-132" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if
contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that
have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken, and (4) the
date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous
Docket No. 50-400
docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response.
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 
If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a
Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified,
suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where
good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with
License No. NPF-63
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the
NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not
include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made
available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is
necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your
response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your
response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must
specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in
EA-12-132
detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will
create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by
During an NRC inspection completed on June 20, 2012, two violations of NRC requirements
10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
were identified.  In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violations are listed below: 
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please
provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
A. 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, that a licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working
reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards of 10
days of receipt.
CFR 50.47(b). 
10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) requires that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support
the emergency response are provided and maintained. 
10 CFR  50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8 (2011 version) states, in part, that the emergency
facilities shall include licensee onsite technical support center and an emergency operations
facility from which effective direction can be given and effective control can be exercised
during an emergency. 
The Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan, Section 3.1, revision 57, states in part that
adequate emergency facilities, communications, and equipment to support emergency
response are provided and maintained.
Contrary to the above, on several occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9,
2011, the licensee failed to maintain adequate emergency facilities and equipment to
support emergency response.  Specifically, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
normal and emergency ventilation system was in a degraded state and/or removed from
service, for extended periods of time. 
This violation is associated with a White SDP finding.
B. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) states that a licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and
in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of
emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications
capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification
System, or offsite notification system).
Contrary to the above, on several occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9,
2011, the licensee failed to notify the NRC within eight hours of  the occurrence of a major
loss of emergency assessment capability.  Specifically, the licensee failed to report that the
EOF  normal and emergency ventilation system was in a degraded state, and/or removed
from service, for extended periods of time when portions of the ventilation system were
undergoing repairs, testing and maintenance, without compensatory measures. 
This is a Severity Level III violation (Enforcement Policy paragraph 6.6). 
 
2  
Enclosure
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Carolina Power and Light Company is hereby  
required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the  
Regional Administrator, Region 2, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that  
is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of  
Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation;  
EA-12-132" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if  
contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that  
have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken, and (4) the  
date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous  
docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response.
If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a  
Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified,  
suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where  
good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.  
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with  
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear  
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC  
Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the  
NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not  
include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made  
available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is  
necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your  
response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your  
response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must  
specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in  
detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will  
create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by
10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial  
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please  
provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.  
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working  
days of receipt.
Dated this 3rd day of October 2012
Dated this 3rd day of October 2012
                                                                                            Enclosure
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 22:10, 11 January 2025

Final Significance Determination of White Finding, Notice of Violation and Assessment Follow Up Letter (NRC Inspection Report 05000400-12-010)
ML12277A285
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/03/2012
From: Mccree V
Region 2 Administrator
To: Hamrick G
Carolina Power & Light Co
References
EA-12-132 IR-12-010
Download: ML12277A285 (12)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000400/2012010

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

October 3, 2012

EA-12-132

Mr. George Hamrick

Site Vice President

Carolina Power and Light Company

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

P. O. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1

New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165

SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - FINAL SIGNIFICANCE

DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND

ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER (NRC INSPECTION REPORT

05000400/2012010)

Dear Mr. Hamrick:

This letter provides the final significance determination of the two preliminary White findings and

associated apparent violations (AVs) discussed in NRC Inspection Report (IR) No.

05000400/2012007, dated July 16, 2012. The first preliminary White finding and AV involved

multiple examples in which the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and associated equipment

were not adequately maintained for protracted time periods between approximately August

2009 to November 2011, due to an apparent lack of adequate control over maintenance of

ventilation system equipment. The second preliminary White finding and AV involved the

potential that the Technical Support Center (TSC) could not be maintained during an emergency

response, after your staff reduced the calculated unfiltered air inleakage. In this case, the

calculation change may have rendered the TSC less than fully functional because the

habitability effects on the TSC were not evaluated when the inleakage value was revised. The

above two findings also represented AVs of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), which

together require that adequate emergency facilities such as the EOF and TSC be maintained.

Additionally, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8 (2011 version) specifies that

emergency facilities shall include a TSC and an EOF from which effective direction can be given

and effective control can be exercised during an emergency.

This letter also provides the results of a third AV that was assessed using the NRCs traditional

enforcement process. This AV involved the failure to report a major loss of emergency

assessment capability to the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

At your request, a Regulatory/Pre-Decisional Enforcement Conference was held on August 24,

2012, to discuss Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L) views on these issues. A meeting

summary was issued on August 28, 2012, which includes copies of the slide presentation made

by CP&L (ADAMS Accession # ML12242A432 ). During the meeting, your staff described your

assessment of the significance of the findings, the corrective actions planned and taken, and the

results of your root cause evaluations of the findings.

G. Hamrick

2

For the first finding and related AV involving the EOF, you acknowledged the existence of

performance deficiencies associated with facility oversight and maintenance controls. In

response to the NRCs concerns, your staff conducted additional engineering reviews and

calculations to determine the functional status of the EOF. Following the regulatory conference,

your staff also provided to the NRC additional updated calculations. These functional

habitability calculations were performed for temperature, humidity, carbon dioxide, and

radiological conditions. As presented at the conference, you concluded that the performance

deficiency did not cause loss of a planning standard function such that the EOF was functional

but degraded. Your review identified three periods in which the EOF could be considered non-

functional, however, none of these periods exceeded seven days. Based on your review, you

concluded that the significance of the EOF issue should be considered to be of very low safety

significance (Green).

As you presented at the conference, your staffs calculations indicated that portions of the EOF

would reach a maximum of 87 oF because of the degraded ventilation system. While there is no

specific stated NRC temperature for EOF habitability or for EOF equipment, an elevated

temperature is of particular concern when emergency response organization members are

under stress, as in emergency response situations during which they must effectively conduct

their emergency plan functions. Although you indicated that compensatory measures would

likely have been taken if necessary to staff the EOF for an emergency, no procedurally

controlled compensatory measures had been established; nor were compensatory measures

planned or taken for the periods of time acknowledged above when you considered the EOF

non-functional.

Regarding the potential for elevated CO2 concentration levels, the NRC notes that the back-draft

damper in the normal ventilation supply path was found rusted closed on January 25, 2010.

Based on the condition of the damper and the lack of previous testing by your staff, it is

reasonable to conclude that this condition existed for a period of greater than seven days. With

this configuration, swapping the EOF ventilation system to the emergency mode of operation

could not be ensured, in which case you assert in your calculations NAI-1651-001 Rev 0 and

NAI-1680-002, Revision 0, that the CO2 concentration in the facility would build-up to greater

than 5000 parts per million (PPM) in approximately five to six hours. The NRC notes that the

Harris facility does not maintain a procedure for sampling CO2 in the EOF, so response staff

likely would not be aware of rising concentration levels during facility use. The elevated CO2

concentration, combined with the stress associated with an actual emergency in a facility with

temperatures at the elevated levels you calculated, would likely have impaired at least one key

responder in his or her ability to perform an assigned emergency response function.

Regarding radiological conditions in a postulated accident, the NRC reviewed dose

considerations related to the equipment deficiencies, and reached a conclusion similar to that of

your staff. Although dose rates in the facility would have been elevated, personnel staffing the

facility would not have received a dose in excess of the 5 Rem total effective dose equivalent

(TEDE) limit during design basis accident conditions.

Regarding the periods of time in which the EOF was considered to be non-functional, the NRC

used Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B Emergency Preparedness

Significance Determination Process Table 5.8-1 for assessing the significance of issues. For

the circumstances of the Harris EOF, a primary consideration is whether the EOF was not

functional for a period longer than seven days from the time of discovery, to the extent that any

G. Hamrick

3

key emergency response organization (ERO) member could not perform his/her assigned

emergency plan functions, in the absence of compensatory measures. As indicated in IMC 0609, the time duration is considered from the time of discovery and is not limited to the

maintence periods you indicated in your presentation. Based on the inspection and information

presented at the conference, the NRC concluded that sufficient opportunity existed for Harris

staff to recognize the degraded condition of the EOF. As such, we have concluded that the time

periods of EOF non-functional status were as stated in our inspection report.

After considering the information developed during the inspection and the information provided

by CP&L during the conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding involving the EOF is

appropriately characterized as White, a finding of low to moderate safety significance. In this

case, the large number of occurrences and durations in which the EOF was non-functional, in

part due to habitability concerns related to the potential for elevated temperature and CO2

concentration levels, the failure to assess the impact of out-of-service equipment and

maintenance, and the lack of procedural guidance and recognition of the need for compensatory

measures available to the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members to operate the

system, collectively resulted in an NRC conclusion that the EOF was inadequately maintained to

the extent that some key ERO members could not have performed their assigned emergency

plan functions. These occurrences indicate a lack of adequate control over maintenance of

equipment that would have significantly impacted your staffs ability to respond to a radiological

emergency. Furthermore, your emergency preparedness staff and ERO members were

unaware of these occurrences.

The NRC staff determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Corrective Action

Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution area, because CP&L did not

identify the issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their

safety significance. Specifically, CP&L did not properly classify, prioritize, or evaluate

operability and reportability of the non-functional EOF P.1(c).

The NRC also has determined that the finding involving the failure to maintain a fully functional

EOF on several occasions is a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), and 10 CFR

50, Appendix E,Section IV.E.8 (2011 version). The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of

Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in IR 05000400/2012007. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the Notice is considered

escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.

You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staffs significance

determination for the White finding or the Notice of Violation associated with this finding. An

appeal of the White finding will be considered to have merit only if it meets the criteria given in

NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2. An appeal must be sent in writing to the

Regional Administrator, Region II, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 245 Peachtree Center

Avenue, Suite 1200, Atlanta, GA 30303-1257.

Regarding the second preliminary White finding and AV involving the TSC, the NRC has

concluded that this finding should be characterized as a minor issue. In summary, CP&L

agreed that at the time of the inspection, there was a lack of experimental and empirical data to

support the in-leakage assumption of 60 CFM used in the alternate source term (AST)

habitability calculations for the TSC. In response to the preliminary inspection finding, on

July 11, 2012, CP&L conducted a tracer gas test on the TSC envelope in order to quantify

G. Hamrick

4

unfiltered air in-leakage. Additionally, the NRC reviewed your test methodology, data, analysis

and results. When the TSC envelope was tested, the resulting data demonstrated that

habitability for the facility would be maintained with the test results indicating a maximum of 48

cubic feet per minute (CFM) in-leakage which was less than the 60 CFM in-leakage stated in

the AST habitability calculations. Based on the above, the NRC concluded that the Harris

facility adequately maintained its TSC as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), and that this matter

does not represent a violation of regulatory requirements.

The third AV involved the failure to report a major loss of emergency assessment capability to

the NRC within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Based on the information

developed during the inspection and the information provided at the pre-decisional enforcement

conference, the NRC has concluded that a violation of NRC requirements occurred.

Specifically, the NRC determined that the EOF facility was not functional or adequately

maintained, and therefore was required to be reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72

(b)(3)(xiii). The violation, the significance of which was evaluated using the NRCs traditional

enforcement process, is cited in the enclosed Notice and the circumstances surrounding it are

described in detail in IR 05000400/2012007. In this case, the NRC concluded that on several

occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9, 2011, the licensee failed to report an

occurrence of a major loss of emergency assessment capability.

As discussed in the Enforcement Policy, the severity level of a violation involving the failure to

make a required report to the NRC will be based upon the significance of and the circumstances

surrounding the matter that should have been reported. In this case, and as discussed above,

the NRC concluded that the failure to provide the required report is associated with a White

finding for CP&Ls failure to maintain a fully functional EOF. In addition, CP&Ls failure to report

the condition of the EOF between August 4, 2009, and November 9, 2011, as required by 10

CFR 50.72, impeded the NRCs regulatory process. Had CP&L reported the incident as

required, NRC review and follow-up inspection likely would have occurred, which may have

prompted CP&L to adopt compensatory measures and/or corrective actions, thereby precluding

further incidents after August 4, 2009. Based on the above, the NRC has concluded that the

violation of 10 CFR 50.72 is appropriately characterized at Severity Level III, in accordance with

the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Because your facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last

two years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective Action in

accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section 2.3.4 of the Enforcement

Policy. In response to the inspection findings of June 2012, Harris staff promptly initiated a

review of its reportability procedure for Emergency Response Facilities, conducted an extent of

condition review of past instances in which its emergency response facility may not have been

maintained adequate, and included the reportability aspect as part of an overall Root Cause

Analysis for its emergency response facilities. Your Root Cause Analysis concluded that the

cause of the reportability issues could be attributed, in part, to incorrect guidance in the sites

reportability procedure, which allowed taking credit for alternate emergency facilities rather than

reporting a non-functional emergency facility. Based on this review, you revised the procedure

for reportability by specifically incorporating the reportability requirements of NUREG 1022

related to emergency response facilities, and reported to the NRC additional instances in which

you determined that the emergency response facilities were not adequately maintained. The

NRC notes, however, that the results of your extent of condition review regarding additional

reportability instances did not fully coincide with all examples identified by the NRC. Based on

G. Hamrick

5

the promptness of corrective actions, the procedural revision and the Root Cause Analysis, the

NRC has concluded that, credit is warranted for the factor of Corrective Action.

Therefore, to encourage prompt and comprehensive correction of violations, and in recognition

of the absence of previous escalated enforcement action, I have been authorized, after

consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to propose that a civil penalty not be

assessed in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the

enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you

believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRC

review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is

necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.

For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report, No.

05000400/2012010. Accordingly, AVs05000400/2012007-01, 05000400/2012007-02, and 05000400/2012007-04 are updated consistent with the regulatory positions described in this

letter. Therefore AV 05000400/2012007-01, Failure to Maintain an Adequate EOF to Support

Emergency Response is updated as VIO 05000400/2012007-01 with a safety significance of

White and a crosscutting aspect in the area Problem Identification and Resolution, P.1.(c).

Apparent violation 05000400/2012007-02, Failure to Notify the NRC of the EOF Loss of

Emergency Assessment Capability, is updated as VIO 05000400/2012007-02, Severity Level III,

with no cross-cutting aspect. Apparent violation 05000400/2012007-04, Failure to Maintain an

Adequate TSC to Support Emergency Response, is updated as a minor issue and closed.

The NRC determined the performance of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant to be in the

Regulatory Response Column of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix as of the second

quarter of calendar year 2012. Therefore, the NRC plans to conduct a supplemental inspection

in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95001, Supplemental Inspection for One or Two

White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area, to provide assurance that the root causes and

contributing causes of risk-significant performance issues are understood, that the extent of

cause is identified, and that your corrective action for risk-significant performance issues are

sufficient to address the root and contributing causes and prevent recurrence. The NRC

requests that your staff provide notification of your readiness for the NRC to conduct a

supplemental inspection to review the actions taken to address the White inspection finding.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS), accessible from

the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your

response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that

it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

G. Hamrick

6

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Randy Musser at

(404) 997-4603.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Victor M. McCree

Regional Administrator

Docket No.: 50-400

License No.: NPF-63

Enclosure: Notice of Violation

cc w/encl.: (See page 7)

_________________________

  1. SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE # FORM 665 ATTACHED

OFFICE

RII:DRP

RII:DRP

RII:DRP

RII:DRP

RII:DRP

RII:DRP

RII:EICS

HQ:OE

SIGNATURE

By email

By email

By email

JWG1

By email

By email

By email

By email

NAME

JDodson

JAustin

PLessard

JWorosilo

RMusser

RCroteau

BKlukan

LCasey

DATE

10/1/2012

10/2/2012

10/1/2012

10/1/2012

10/1/2012

10/1/2012

10/1/2012

09/27/2012

E-MAIL

COPY?

YES

NO YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO YES

N

OFFICE

HQ:NRR

HQ:NSIR

RII:DRS

RII:DRA

RII:RA

SIGNATURE

By email

By email

By email

LDW /RA/

VMM /RA/

NAME

R Franovich

M Thaggard

HChristensen

LWert

VMcree

DATE

09/24/2012

09/24/2012

10/2/2012

10/02/2012

10/03/2012

E-MAIL

YES

NO YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO YES

NO

YES

NO

G. Hamrick

7

cc w/encl:

Brian Bernard

Manager, Nuclear Services and EP

Nuclear Protective Services

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Brian C. McCabe

Manager, Nuclear Oversight

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

Progress Energy

Electronic Mail Distribution

George T. Hamrick

Vice President

Carolina Power and Light Company

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Lara S. Nichols

Deputy General Counsel

Duke Energy Corporation

Electronic Mail Distribution

M. Christopher Nolan

Director - Regulatory Affairs

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Electronic Mail Distribution

Robert J. Duncan II

Senior Vice President

Progress Energy

Electronic Mail Distribution

Sean T. O'Connor

Manager, Support Services

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Donald L. Griffith

Training Manager

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

Progress Energy

Electronic Mail Distribution

R. Keith Holbrook

Manager, Support Services

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

David H. Corlett

Supervisor

Licensing/Regulatory Programs

Progress Energy

Electronic Mail Distribution

David T. Conley

Senior Counsel

Legal Department

Progress Energy

Electronic Mail Distribution

Donna B. Alexander

Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs

(interim)

Progress Energy

Electronic Mail Distribution

John H. O'Neill, Jr.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge

2300 N. Street, NW

Washington, DC 20037-1128

Joseph W. Donahue

Vice President

Nuclear Oversight

Progress Energy

Electronic Mail Distribution

W. Lee Cox, III

Section Chief

Radiation Protection Section

N.C. Department of Environmental

Commerce & Natural Resources

Electronic Mail Distribution

Public Service Commission

State of South Carolina

P.O. Box 11649

Columbia, SC 29211

Chairman

North Carolina Utilities Commission

Electronic Mail Distribution

(cc w/encl continued next page)

G. Hamrick

8

cc w/encl continued:

Terrence E. Slake

Manager

Nuclear Plant Security

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Robert P. Gruber

Executive Director

Public Staff - NCUC

4326 Mail Service Center

Raleigh, NC 27699-4326

Chair

Board of County Commissioners of Wake

County

P.O. Box 550

Raleigh, NC 27602

Ernest J. Kapopoulos Jr.

Plant General Manager

Carolina Power and Light Company

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Chair

Board of County Commissioners of

Chatham County

P.O. Box 1809

Pittsboro, NC 27312

G. Hamrick

9

Letter to George Hamrick from Victor M. McCree dated October 3, 2012.

SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - FINAL SIGNIFICANCE

DETERMINATION OF A WHITE FINDING, NOTICE OF VIOLATION, AND

ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER (NRC INSPECTION REPORT

05000400/2012010)

Distribution w/encl:

C. Evans, RII

L. Douglas, RII

OE Mail

RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC

RidsNrrPMShearonHarris Resource

Enclosure

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Carolina Power and Light Company

Docket No. 50-400

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

License No. NPF-63

EA-12-132

During an NRC inspection completed on June 20, 2012, two violations of NRC requirements

were identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violations are listed below:

A. 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, that a licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power

reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards of 10

CFR 50.47(b).

10 CFR 50.47(b)(8) requires that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support

the emergency response are provided and maintained.

10 CFR 50, Appendix E,Section IV.E.8 (2011 version) states, in part, that the emergency

facilities shall include licensee onsite technical support center and an emergency operations

facility from which effective direction can be given and effective control can be exercised

during an emergency.

The Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan, Section 3.1, revision 57, states in part that

adequate emergency facilities, communications, and equipment to support emergency

response are provided and maintained.

Contrary to the above, on several occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9,

2011, the licensee failed to maintain adequate emergency facilities and equipment to

support emergency response. Specifically, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

normal and emergency ventilation system was in a degraded state and/or removed from

service, for extended periods of time.

This violation is associated with a White SDP finding.

B. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) states that a licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and

in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of

emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications

capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification

System, or offsite notification system).

Contrary to the above, on several occasions between August 4, 2009, and November 9,

2011, the licensee failed to notify the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence of a major

loss of emergency assessment capability. Specifically, the licensee failed to report that the

EOF normal and emergency ventilation system was in a degraded state, and/or removed

from service, for extended periods of time when portions of the ventilation system were

undergoing repairs, testing and maintenance, without compensatory measures.

This is a Severity Level III violation (Enforcement Policy paragraph 6.6).

2

Enclosure

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Carolina Power and Light Company is hereby

required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the

Regional Administrator, Region 2, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that

is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of

Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation;

EA-12-132" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if

contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that

have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken, and (4) the

date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous

docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response.

If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a

Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified,

suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where

good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with

the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC

Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the

NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not

include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made

available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is

necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your

response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your

response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must

specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in

detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will

create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by

10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial

information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please

provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working

days of receipt.

Dated this 3rd day of October 2012

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