Regulatory Guide 5.31: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML003740081
| number = ML13350A241
| issue date = 04/30/1975
| issue date = 06/30/1974
| title = Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special Nuclear Material
| title = Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special Nuclear Material
| author name =  
| author name =  
| author affiliation = NRC/RES
| author affiliation = US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation =  
Line 10: Line 10:
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = RG-5.31 Rev 1
| document report number = RG-5.031
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| page count = 4
| page count = 3
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                                                                                                                     Revision 1 April 1975 REGULATORY GUIDE
{{#Wiki_filter:Jime 1974 June 1974 U.S. ATOMIC EMERY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
REGULATORY GUIDE
                                                              REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31 SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR
DIRECTORATE Of REGULATORY STAINDARDS
                                  ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31 SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR
ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL


==A. INTRODUCTION==
==A. INTRODUCTION==
entry is provided, in part, by the armed personnel within the vehicle who are in turn protected by the inherent Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical                              design of the armored vehicle.
Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physcal Protection of Plants and Materials." requires that road movements of
5pecial nucleal material (SNM)
in quantities identified in §73.l(bI(2) be protected by one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least two armed guards accompanirng the shipment in a separate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to diversion by design features that permit irnmtobiiiia- tion of the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed guards are used with the specially designed vehicle, immobilization is not required. Paragraph 7330(d).
requires that the qualification of individuals to act as guards used pursuant to §73.3 I(c) be documented. This guide describes features accvptabl to the Regplatory staff for a vehicle operated by armed guards to ship special nuclear material by road and for the quiific"ation of the armed guards.


Protection of Plants and Materials," requires that road movements of special nuclear material (SNM) in quanti                                      Acceptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel ties identified in paragraph 73.1(bX2) be protected by                               used in armored car service are provided in this guide.
==B. DISCUSSION==
There are two approaches that can be taken to satisfy
§73.31(c)2), i.e., specially designed truck or trailer.
 
One method would be the use of a specially designed secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to resist entry for a substantial period of time by unauthorized personnel using 3. wide variety of tools and weapons. The penetration time would be commensurate with the time needed for law enforcement agencies to respond to the scene of an emergency. The vehicle would be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of a diversion attempt.
 
The othl'r method would be through the use of armored car service. In this case resistance to unauthor- ized entry tis provided, in part, by the armed picsonnel within the vehicle who axe in turn protected by the inhercnt design of the armored vebIiclc.
 
Acc.eptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel used in armored car s;erxe arc provided in this guide.
 
I. ARMOR
Armored vehicles ate supplied to the industry by a very small number of manufactuters. The six-cific design of the armor supplied by each comrpany is coiisidered proprietary information. The armor can generally he desribed With respect to its fesistance to projectile penetration. All inanufacturers provide armor which will resist initial penetration by bullets frum readily available small urns. The armor is usually altxicd to the vehicle in such a "v as to provide prultection to the occupants agains'r attlac from any external direction.
 
2. CAlB-CARGU INTERFACE
The cab-caigo interface can be provided with several options. In mrt cases the xparnting wall bttween cab and cargo compz? tment is armored to provide protection in case either conpartment is -compromised. A window of bullet-resistzs-t material which allows the crew in one compartment to have . clear view of the access doors of the ofther compirtmeni is ao provitied. Some models have a door tLat allows passage from the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the vchicle. Ohiler models are e4quipped with gunports that permit ftirng from cab to cargo compartmett.
 
===3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS===
Normally vi armored vehicle crew consists of two or three individuals divided between the cab and cargo tompnntrtnts. For long-d"tance trips the ciew is often increased to xllow nst periods for drivers and guards.
 
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one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least                            This revision reflects comments received from the public two armed guards accompanying the shipment in a sepa                                and other factors.
to mtwwnIod


rate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to di                              1. Armor version by design features that permit immobilization of                                  Armored vehicles are supplied to the industry by a the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical                              very small number of manufacturers. The specific design penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed guards                              of the armor supplied by each company is considered are used with the specially designed vehicle, immobiliza                            proprietary information. The armor can generally be de tion is not required. Paragraph 73.30(d) requires that the                          scribed with respect to its resistance to projectile pene qualification, of individuals to act as guards used pur                              tration. All manufacturers provide armor that will re suant to paragraph 73.31(c) be documented. This guide                              sist initial penetration by bullets from readily available describes features acceptable to the NRC staff for a vehi                          small arms. The armor is usually affixed to the vehicle in cle operated by armed guards to ship special nuclear                                such a way as to provide protection to the occupants material by road and for the qualification of the armed                            against attack from any external direction.
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guards.
SNIA shipments we expected to involve frequent loaq distance trips of two or mome days. In order to uxintal the full protective capacity of the armored service dune then trips, it Is important that adequate crews fc continuous manning of both compartments dude normal operation be supplied. Considerable flexibility I
achieving this end would be provided if both guards an driven were qualified and permitted to perform eitht function (guard or driver).


2. Cab-Cargo Interface
===4. DOOR LOCKS===
All armored vehicles are supplied with compartmu:
locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cam access to the cargo compuntment requires positive actio by personne, in both compartments when the carg compartment is occupied by a guard.


==B. DISCUSSION==
S. ALARM SYSTEM
The cab-cargo interface can be provided with several options. In most cases, the separating wall between cab There are two approaches that can be taken to satis                        and cargo compartment is armored to provide protection fy paragraph 73.31(cX2), i.e., specially designed truck or                          in case either compartment is compromised. A window trailer. One method would be the use of a specially de                              of bullet resistant material that allows the crew in one signed secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to                            compartment to have a clear view of the access doos of resist entry for a substantial period of time by unauthor                          the other compartment is also provided. Some models ized personnel using a wide variety of tools and weap                              have a door that. allows passage from the cab to the ons. The penetration time would be commensurate with                                cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle. Other the time needed for law enforcement agencies to re                                  models are equipped with gunports that permit firing spond to the scene of an emergency. The vehicle would                               from cab to cargo compartment.
Many '4 the armored cars presently in service ar equipped
;ith audible alarms and/or flashing tighi similar to ti ;so used by police and emergency vehicle!
The awarencs of attack that such alarms elicit in th general public can facilitate response to attack c recovery of diverted material.
 
===6. SECURING OF CARGO===
Armored cars have no standard provision for tyin down cargo. This Is understandable In view of the type of cargo normally handled by these carrier
 
====s. For SNM====
cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will b required to provide for cargo integrity and personne safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expens would be required to equip existing vehicles wit]
tie-down fittings.


be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of a diversion attempt.                                                               3. Guards and Drivers Normally an armored vehicle crew consists of tWo The other method would be through the use of ar                            or three individuals divided between the cab and cargo mored car service. In this case, resistance to unauthorized                        compartments. For long-distance trips the crew.is often USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES                                        Comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commlseeien. U.S. Ntuclaw describe to staff    and make available to the public    Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C.        N00.  Attention: Docketing *nd methods              to issued Guides are Regulatory ccpble        the NC          of implementing specific prtsService              Section.
7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS
Each siipment will be configured at origin to be bi compliance with Department of Transportation (DOT
general packaging and safety requirements (DOT regu lation 49 CFR 173.393). Additionally. in order ti monitor total radiation absorbed by personnel, som type of personnel dosimetry should be considered Types of personnel dosimeters are the filtm badge anw pocket dosimeter for gamma radiation, and the thei moluminescent neutron dosimeter (TLD) for neutroi radiation. The film badge consists of a film packet in plastic holder. The film badge or TLD provide a&
accurate Indication of exposure to radiation over a Ion period of time. Since the film has to be developed ani read on a densitometer, it may take some time to obtaii a radiation reading. The pocket dosimeter, on the othe hand provides a quick estimate of radiation received ove a short period of time, but is not as accurate as the filt badge for gamma radiation.


Commission's regulations. to delineate techniques used by the       staff in evalu- T    uides are iuued in the flowing ten broad divisions:
& GAS PROTECTION
                                                    to provide guidance to appli.
Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow through (front.to-back)
air system for heating ani cooling the vehicle interior. Typically, these system
1- draw outside air from the fioat (cab area) of the vehicle in wd expl exhaut &ir tbroqh vests in the upper wa o4 Z
the vehicle. A alight postive iinterial pmwao provided U
by the air system offten some resistance to the intro-
8 ductlon of gaseous subtaces. The &ss intake it under an occupat control and can be close


ating specific problems or postulated accidents, or cants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, end complilance      1. Power Reactors                      &  Products with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in    2. Research aedrTetReactors            7. Tran**otatlon the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to 3. Fuels and Materiale Facilitle      8. Ocsupat"oe    "eo the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.              4. Environmental and Siting            9. Antitrust Review Comments and suggestions for improvements in these guides are encouraged            5. Materials and Plant Protection    10. General at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate. to accommnodate com ments and to reflect new information or experience. This guide was revised asa      Copies of published guides may be obtained by written request Indicaling the result of substantive comments received from the public and additional staff        divisions desired to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comeloeion.WasnIngton. D.C.
====d. Soew vehic aie d ====
normally equipped with gas masks. The use of ps mas*
er filters, and internal afr supplies for carrit of SNi would enhance the abibity of vehickle crew members to tesist gas attacks.


review.                                                                            2f6. Attention: Director. Office of Sandaerds Developement.
it


increased to allow rest periods for drivers and guards.         munication equipment to the manufacturer who will in SNM shipments are expected to involve frequent long              stall the equipment at the time the vehicle is con distance trips of two or more days. In order to maintain        structed. Both radio and radiotelephone systems are in the full-protective capacity of the armored service during      use. Each system is dependent on the use of radio signals these trips, it is important that adequate crews for            received and transmitted from a vehicle-mounted continuous manning of both compartments during                  antenna that could logically become the first target of normal operation be supplied. Considerable flexibility in        an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would pre achieving this end would be provided if both guards and          clude the vehicle occupants from either notifying ex drivers were qualified and permitted to perform either          ternal agents of the attack or from seeking aid or as function (guard or driver).                                      sistance. To provide for sufficient delay during an attack for a vehicle crew to transmit emergency messages,
===9. ANTENNA PROTECTION===
  4. Door Locks                                                    antenna protection is desirable. Such protection could All armored vehicles are supplied with compartment          be provided in the form of concealment, multiplicity, or locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cases,          hardening. The actual antenna could be concealed or access to the cargo compartment requires positive action        designed to appear as some other object while con by personnel in both compartments when the cargo                ventionally appearing dummy antennas would be compartment is occupied by a guard.                              conspicuously located on the vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal switching could offer a delay sufficient to
Almost all arnored vehicles am equipped with com- n
  5. Alarm System                                                  enable emergency messages to be transmitted. Hardened, Many of the armored cars presently in service are          attack-resistant antennas could be designed and used to equipped with audible alarms or flashing lights similar to      provide a delay time. Combinations of these or other those used by police and emergency vehicles. The aware          similar methods could enhance the viability of trans ness of attack that such alarms elicit in the general pub        mission.
munication systems of same kind Each eicle is o
equipped by the purchase of the vehicle althaqb h the manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access areas for the communication system comnponmt&. In some instnces, the parchamer may proviWe the can- e
munication equipment to the manufacturer who will ts install the equipment at the tim the vehicle is con-
.
structed. Both radio and radjotelephone systems are in e
use. Each tystem is dependent on the use of radio sgnals ir received and transmitted from a vehicle-montied an- tenna which could logically become the first target of an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would pred"e the vehicle occupants from either notifying extetral g
agents of the attack or firnn secking aid or mistanc


lic can facilitate response to attack or recovery of di verted materia
====e. To s ====
provide for sufficient delay during an attack for a vehicle
4 crew to transmit emergency massages, antenna protec-
.
tion is desirable. Such protection could be provided in e
the form of concealment. multiplicity, ot hardeniz


====l.     ====
====g. The I ====
actual antenna could be concealed or designd to appear e
as some other object while conventionaly appearing h
dummy antennas would be conspicuously located on the vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal switching could offer a d,.aIy sufficient to enable emergesny resses to be transmitted.


==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
Hardened, attack-resistant antennas
6. Securing the Cargo                                                The characterisitcs listed below are acceptable to Armored cars have no standard provision for tying          the NRC staff for a road vehicle operated by armed down cargo. This is understandable in view of the types          guards in order to comply with NRC regulations pertain of cargo normally handled by these carriers. For SNM            ing to SNM shipments. Additional Federal, State, and cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected,        local requirements pertaining to safe interstate and local some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will be          transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments required to provide for cargo integrity and personnel            and compliance with these requirements is expected.
3 could be designed and ueed to provide a delay time.


safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expense would be required to equip existing vehicles with tie            1. Armor down fittings.                                                        The vehicle should provide protection for the driver(s) and guard(s) against projectile impac
)
Combinationt of these or other smhiar methods could I-
enhance the viability of transnission.


====t. The ex====
o e
"17. Gas  Protection                                              ternal surface of the vehicle (side panels, floor, top, fire Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow              wall area, and viewing areas) should be constructed of through (front-to-back) air system for heating and cool          materials that are resistant to at least the muzzle im ing the vehicle interior. Typically, these systems draw          pact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. Fuel tanks should outside air from the front (cab area) of the vehicle and        be provided with similar protection against projectile im expel exhaust air through vents in the upper areas of the        pact. Fuel tanks also should be equipped with a lock vehicle. A slight positive internal pressure provided by        type cap and a screen in the tank nozzle to prevent the the air system offers some resistance to the introduction        insertion of an explosive device into the tank.


of gaseous substances. The air intake is under occupant control and can be closed. S6me vehicles are normally            2. Cab-Cargo Interface equipped with gas masks. The use of gas masks, filters,              The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments and internal air supplies for carriers of SNM would en          should be armored. Additional features to be considered hance the ability of vehicle crew members to resist gas          in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface attacks.                                                        depend on the method selected for the protection of the shipment. At least one of the methods listed below
==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
  8. Antenna Protection                                            should be used. These methods are similar in that each Almost all armored vehicles are equipped with              provides the capability for the crew to use firearms to communication systems of some kind. Each vehicle is              prevent entry into the cargo compartment without leav equipped by the purchaser of the vehicle although the            ing the vehicle.
1.


manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access              a. An armed guard should be permanently stationed areas for the communication system components. In                in the cargo compartment. In this case, a continuous some instances, the purchaser may provide the corn              wall of armor with a bullet-resistant window would be
d The characteristics listed below are acceptable to the r-
  *Lines indicate substantive changes from previous issue.        considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.
Regulatory staff for a road vehicle operated by armed n
guards in order to comply with AEC regulations pcrttain a
ing to SNM shipments. Additional Federal, State, and n
lcal requirements pertaining to safe interstate sad local g
transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments d
and compliance with these requirements is expected.


11 r
I. ARMOR
r The vehicle should provide protection for the a
driver(s) and guard(s) against projectile impact. The external surface of the vehicle (side panels, floot, top, firewall area, and viewing areas) should be comstructed of materials which are resistant to at least the muzzle
*-
impact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. The fuel tank(s)
I
should also be provided with similar protection against
3 projectile impact. The fuel tank(s) should be equipped
5.31-2
5.31-2
- 0
%.
with a lock-type cap and a screen in the tank neulc to pl nt the insertion. of an explosive device into the I2.
CAB.CARGO INTERFACE
The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments should be armored. Additional features to be considered in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface depend ats the method sclectcd fot the protection of( the shipment. At least one of the methods listed below should be used. These methods are similar in that each provides the capability rot the crew to use fireamis to prevent entry bi!o the cargo compartment without leaving the vehtrde.


b. Access to the cargo compartment from the cab          6. Securing the Cargo The vehicle should be supplied with fittings in the should be available so that a guard can go directly from        cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the            for such securing devices as are required to provide re vehicle.
a. An armed guard should be pentianenty stationed in the cargo compartment. In this case, a continuous wail of armuot with a buflet.resistant window would be considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.


straint against substantial movement of or damage to the c. Gunports should be available which will permit cargo in normal operation and during emergency stops.
b. Access to the cargo compartnent fr(mn the cab
%hould be available wo that a guard can go directli' front die cab to the cargo cornpaftmcnit without leaving the vehicle.


firing from the cab into the cargo compartment.. Addi The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR Part tionally, the gunports should permit firing of the weap        177.
c. Gunports should be availabli which will permit firing from the cab into the cargo compartment, Additionally. the gunports should permit firing of the wcapmi at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides of the cargo compartmcnt call be prevented.


on at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides of the cargo compartment can be prevefited.                             7. Gas Protection The vehicle compartments should be equipped with
===3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS===
3. Guards and Drivers                                          gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the All personnel of an armored vehicle should be quali      crew to resist an attack by incapacitating gas for a suf fied to perform all normal operational tasks involved          ficient time to allow transmittal of a distress message with a shipment. Both guards and drivers should be              and, if possible, the arrival of aid.
All peorsonnel of an armored vehicle should be qualifred to perform all normal operational tasks in- volved with a shipment.


qualified to perform either function, and interchange of function should be allowed if required for the safety and       8. Antenna Protection security of the cargo and crew.                                      Either a concealed or a hardened antenna should be provided in order to afford sufficient time for the com Compliance with DOT regulation 49 CFR                   munication system to transmit an emergency message.
th1b guards and drivers should be qualified to perform either function., and interchange of functiom should be allowed if required for the safety and security of the cargo and crew, Compliance with DOT  
regulation  
49 CFR
173.3936X4) which deals with radiation levels in oc- cspied vehicle, should be mfaintdined in addition to other applicable State and local requirements. All guards and drivers should be qualified ini accordance with A[iC
Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training. Equipping. and Qualifying of Guards and Witchmarn," tir an equivalent program.


173.393(jX4), which deals with radiation levels in occu pied vehicles, should be maintained in addition to other        9. Immobilization applicable State and local requirements. All guards and               Although there is no requirement for immobili drivers should be qualified in accordance with NRC            zation of vehicles that use armed guards, this is a desira Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training, Equipping, and Quali        ble feature. The vehicle could have a provision for im fying of Guards and Watchmen," or an equivalent pro            mobilization upon an authorized command originating gram.
===4. DOOR LOCKS===
The cargo compartment doors should normally be in a locked mode and should he secured by n locking mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if the cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo corn- parttrnm is not occupied, the cargo compartment door lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo compartment door lock should require positive action by personnel at the cargo compartment door and fi the cab compartment. The cab compartment doors also should normally be locked and should require key insertion for operation from the outside,


from within the vehicle. Once commanded, the im mobilization system should resist unauthorized de
===5. ALARM SYSTEM===
  4. Door Locks                                                  activation for -as long as feasible. Caution should be The cargo compartment doors should normally be            taken to ensure that activation devices that cause im in a locked mode and should be secured by a locking            mobilization are adequately shielded to prevent them mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in            from being energized from spurious electromagnetic both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if            signals.
Tile vehicle should be equipped with an audible and/or visual alarm which is activated froni within the vehicle and which has the samte ranW, of detection as that normally required by emergency vehicles. Dcac- tivation of the alarn system circuitry should require acccss to the armored comtnparttmentts of the velhicle.


the cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo com partment is not occupied, the cargo compartment door                             
===6. SECURING THE CARGO===
The vehicle should be ,supplied with fittings in tlrc cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment for such securing devycos as are required to provide restraint against substantial movement of or damage to the cargo in normal operation and during emergency stops. The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR
Part 177.


==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS
lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be              The purpose of this section is to provide informa further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo com        tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's partment door lock should require positive action by          plans for utilizing this regulatory guide.
Personnel involved In the handling of radioactive material should be provided with a filmn badge, a pocket dosimeter and for plutonium shipments, a titer- moluminescent neutron dosimeter. These should he monitored after each trip.


personnel at the cargo compartment door and in the cab compartment. The cab compartment doors should                        This guide reflects current regulatory practice.
===8. GAS PROTECTION===
The vehicle cornpartlnents should be equipped witli gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the crew to resist art attack by incapacitating gas for a sufficient time to allow transmittal of a distrems message and, if possible, the arrival of aid.


normally be locked and should require key insertion for        Therefore, except in those cases in which the applicant operation from the outside.
===9. ANTENNA PROTECTION===
Either a concealed or a hardened anterina should lie provided in order it) afford sufficient timte I"r the comnmunication systeln to1 transmit an cmncgeuncy nies- sage.


or licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Com S. Alarm System mission's regulations, this guide will be used by the staff The vehicle should be equipped with an audible            in evaluating the materials and plant protection portion and/or visual alarm which is activated from within the          of license applications, licensee security plans, or other vehicle and which has the same range of detection as documents pertaining to materials and plant protection that normally required by emergency vehicles. De submitted to the NRC on or after the issuance date of activation of the alarm system circuitry should require        this guide.
1


access to the armored compartments of the vehicle.
===0. IMMOiJIZATION===
Although there Is no requirement for imnojbilization of vehicles which use armed guards, this is a desirable, feature. The vehicle could have a provision for immobi- lization upon art authorized command originating from within the vehicle. Once commanded, the immobi- liiation system should resist unauthorized deactivation Ibr as long as feasible. Caution should be taken to assure that activation devices which cause imnmobiliiation are adequately shielded to prevent them from being erier.


5.31-3
gw.ed from spurious clectromagnetic signals.


UNITED STATES
5-31.3}}
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
    WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
        OFFICIAL BUSINESS          UNITED STATES NUCLEAR
  PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300    REGULATORY COMMISSION}}


{{RG-Nav}}
{{RG-Nav}}

Revision as of 00:17, 11 January 2025

Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special Nuclear Material
ML13350A241
Person / Time
Issue date: 06/30/1974
From:
US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
To:
References
RG-5.031
Download: ML13350A241 (3)


Jime 1974 June 1974 U.S. ATOMIC EMERY COMMISSION

REGULATORY GUIDE

DIRECTORATE Of REGULATORY STAINDARDS

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31 SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR

ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

A. INTRODUCTION

Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physcal Protection of Plants and Materials." requires that road movements of

5pecial nucleal material (SNM)

in quantities identified in §73.l(bI(2) be protected by one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least two armed guards accompanirng the shipment in a separate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to diversion by design features that permit irnmtobiiiia- tion of the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed guards are used with the specially designed vehicle, immobilization is not required. Paragraph 7330(d).

requires that the qualification of individuals to act as guards used pursuant to §73.3 I(c) be documented. This guide describes features accvptabl to the Regplatory staff for a vehicle operated by armed guards to ship special nuclear material by road and for the quiific"ation of the armed guards.

B. DISCUSSION

There are two approaches that can be taken to satisfy

§73.31(c)2), i.e., specially designed truck or trailer.

One method would be the use of a specially designed secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to resist entry for a substantial period of time by unauthorized personnel using 3. wide variety of tools and weapons. The penetration time would be commensurate with the time needed for law enforcement agencies to respond to the scene of an emergency. The vehicle would be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of a diversion attempt.

The othl'r method would be through the use of armored car service. In this case resistance to unauthor- ized entry tis provided, in part, by the armed picsonnel within the vehicle who axe in turn protected by the inhercnt design of the armored vebIiclc.

Acc.eptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel used in armored car s;erxe arc provided in this guide.

I. ARMOR

Armored vehicles ate supplied to the industry by a very small number of manufactuters. The six-cific design of the armor supplied by each comrpany is coiisidered proprietary information. The armor can generally he desribed With respect to its fesistance to projectile penetration. All inanufacturers provide armor which will resist initial penetration by bullets frum readily available small urns. The armor is usually altxicd to the vehicle in such a "v as to provide prultection to the occupants agains'r attlac from any external direction.

2. CAlB-CARGU INTERFACE

The cab-caigo interface can be provided with several options. In mrt cases the xparnting wall bttween cab and cargo compz? tment is armored to provide protection in case either conpartment is -compromised. A window of bullet-resistzs-t material which allows the crew in one compartment to have . clear view of the access doors of the ofther compirtmeni is ao provitied. Some models have a door tLat allows passage from the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the vchicle. Ohiler models are e4quipped with gunports that permit ftirng from cab to cargo compartmett.

3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS

Normally vi armored vehicle crew consists of two or three individuals divided between the cab and cargo tompnntrtnts. For long-d"tance trips the ciew is often increased to xllow nst periods for drivers and guards.

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SNIA shipments we expected to involve frequent loaq distance trips of two or mome days. In order to uxintal the full protective capacity of the armored service dune then trips, it Is important that adequate crews fc continuous manning of both compartments dude normal operation be supplied. Considerable flexibility I

achieving this end would be provided if both guards an driven were qualified and permitted to perform eitht function (guard or driver).

4. DOOR LOCKS

All armored vehicles are supplied with compartmu:

locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cam access to the cargo compuntment requires positive actio by personne, in both compartments when the carg compartment is occupied by a guard.

S. ALARM SYSTEM

Many '4 the armored cars presently in service ar equipped

ith audible alarms and/or flashing tighi similar to ti ;so used by police and emergency vehicle!

The awarencs of attack that such alarms elicit in th general public can facilitate response to attack c recovery of diverted material.

6. SECURING OF CARGO

Armored cars have no standard provision for tyin down cargo. This Is understandable In view of the type of cargo normally handled by these carrier

s. For SNM

cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will b required to provide for cargo integrity and personne safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expens would be required to equip existing vehicles wit]

tie-down fittings.

7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS

Each siipment will be configured at origin to be bi compliance with Department of Transportation (DOT

general packaging and safety requirements (DOT regu lation 49 CFR 173.393). Additionally. in order ti monitor total radiation absorbed by personnel, som type of personnel dosimetry should be considered Types of personnel dosimeters are the filtm badge anw pocket dosimeter for gamma radiation, and the thei moluminescent neutron dosimeter (TLD) for neutroi radiation. The film badge consists of a film packet in plastic holder. The film badge or TLD provide a&

accurate Indication of exposure to radiation over a Ion period of time. Since the film has to be developed ani read on a densitometer, it may take some time to obtaii a radiation reading. The pocket dosimeter, on the othe hand provides a quick estimate of radiation received ove a short period of time, but is not as accurate as the filt badge for gamma radiation.

& GAS PROTECTION

Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow through (front.to-back)

air system for heating ani cooling the vehicle interior. Typically, these system

1- draw outside air from the fioat (cab area) of the vehicle in wd expl exhaut &ir tbroqh vests in the upper wa o4 Z

the vehicle. A alight postive iinterial pmwao provided U

by the air system offten some resistance to the intro-

8 ductlon of gaseous subtaces. The &ss intake it under an occupat control and can be close

d. Soew vehic aie d

normally equipped with gas masks. The use of ps mas*

er filters, and internal afr supplies for carrit of SNi would enhance the abibity of vehickle crew members to tesist gas attacks.

it

9. ANTENNA PROTECTION

Almost all arnored vehicles am equipped with com- n

munication systems of same kind Each eicle is o

equipped by the purchase of the vehicle althaqb h the manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access areas for the communication system comnponmt&. In some instnces, the parchamer may proviWe the can- e

munication equipment to the manufacturer who will ts install the equipment at the tim the vehicle is con-

.

structed. Both radio and radjotelephone systems are in e

use. Each tystem is dependent on the use of radio sgnals ir received and transmitted from a vehicle-montied an- tenna which could logically become the first target of an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would pred"e the vehicle occupants from either notifying extetral g

agents of the attack or firnn secking aid or mistanc

e. To s

provide for sufficient delay during an attack for a vehicle

4 crew to transmit emergency massages, antenna protec-

.

tion is desirable. Such protection could be provided in e

the form of concealment. multiplicity, ot hardeniz

g. The I

actual antenna could be concealed or designd to appear e

as some other object while conventionaly appearing h

dummy antennas would be conspicuously located on the vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal switching could offer a d,.aIy sufficient to enable emergesny resses to be transmitted.

Hardened, attack-resistant antennas

3 could be designed and ueed to provide a delay time.

)

Combinationt of these or other smhiar methods could I-

enhance the viability of transnission.

o e

C. REGULATORY POSITION

1.

d The characteristics listed below are acceptable to the r-

Regulatory staff for a road vehicle operated by armed n

guards in order to comply with AEC regulations pcrttain a

ing to SNM shipments. Additional Federal, State, and n

lcal requirements pertaining to safe interstate sad local g

transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments d

and compliance with these requirements is expected.

11 r

I. ARMOR

r The vehicle should provide protection for the a

driver(s) and guard(s) against projectile impact. The external surface of the vehicle (side panels, floot, top, firewall area, and viewing areas) should be comstructed of materials which are resistant to at least the muzzle

  • -

impact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. The fuel tank(s)

I

should also be provided with similar protection against

3 projectile impact. The fuel tank(s) should be equipped

5.31-2

- 0

%.

with a lock-type cap and a screen in the tank neulc to pl nt the insertion. of an explosive device into the I2.

CAB.CARGO INTERFACE

The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments should be armored. Additional features to be considered in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface depend ats the method sclectcd fot the protection of( the shipment. At least one of the methods listed below should be used. These methods are similar in that each provides the capability rot the crew to use fireamis to prevent entry bi!o the cargo compartment without leaving the vehtrde.

a. An armed guard should be pentianenty stationed in the cargo compartment. In this case, a continuous wail of armuot with a buflet.resistant window would be considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.

b. Access to the cargo compartnent fr(mn the cab

%hould be available wo that a guard can go directli' front die cab to the cargo cornpaftmcnit without leaving the vehicle.

c. Gunports should be availabli which will permit firing from the cab into the cargo compartment, Additionally. the gunports should permit firing of the wcapmi at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides of the cargo compartmcnt call be prevented.

3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS

All peorsonnel of an armored vehicle should be qualifred to perform all normal operational tasks in- volved with a shipment.

th1b guards and drivers should be qualified to perform either function., and interchange of functiom should be allowed if required for the safety and security of the cargo and crew, Compliance with DOT

regulation

49 CFR

173.3936X4) which deals with radiation levels in oc- cspied vehicle, should be mfaintdined in addition to other applicable State and local requirements. All guards and drivers should be qualified ini accordance with A[iC

Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training. Equipping. and Qualifying of Guards and Witchmarn," tir an equivalent program.

4. DOOR LOCKS

The cargo compartment doors should normally be in a locked mode and should he secured by n locking mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if the cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo corn- parttrnm is not occupied, the cargo compartment door lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo compartment door lock should require positive action by personnel at the cargo compartment door and fi the cab compartment. The cab compartment doors also should normally be locked and should require key insertion for operation from the outside,

5. ALARM SYSTEM

Tile vehicle should be equipped with an audible and/or visual alarm which is activated froni within the vehicle and which has the samte ranW, of detection as that normally required by emergency vehicles. Dcac- tivation of the alarn system circuitry should require acccss to the armored comtnparttmentts of the velhicle.

6. SECURING THE CARGO

The vehicle should be ,supplied with fittings in tlrc cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment for such securing devycos as are required to provide restraint against substantial movement of or damage to the cargo in normal operation and during emergency stops. The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR

Part 177.

7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS

Personnel involved In the handling of radioactive material should be provided with a filmn badge, a pocket dosimeter and for plutonium shipments, a titer- moluminescent neutron dosimeter. These should he monitored after each trip.

8. GAS PROTECTION

The vehicle cornpartlnents should be equipped witli gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the crew to resist art attack by incapacitating gas for a sufficient time to allow transmittal of a distrems message and, if possible, the arrival of aid.

9. ANTENNA PROTECTION

Either a concealed or a hardened anterina should lie provided in order it) afford sufficient timte I"r the comnmunication systeln to1 transmit an cmncgeuncy nies- sage.

1

0. IMMOiJIZATION

Although there Is no requirement for imnojbilization of vehicles which use armed guards, this is a desirable, feature. The vehicle could have a provision for immobi- lization upon art authorized command originating from within the vehicle. Once commanded, the immobi- liiation system should resist unauthorized deactivation Ibr as long as feasible. Caution should be taken to assure that activation devices which cause imnmobiliiation are adequately shielded to prevent them from being erier.

gw.ed from spurious clectromagnetic signals.

5-31.3