ML17309A624

Deficiency Rept Re Failure of Shunt Trip Coil Plunger to Return to Deenergized Position Resulting in Breaker Tripper Bar Being Maintained in Trip Free Position,Preventing DB-75 Air Circuit Breaker from Closing.Failed Assembly Replaced

ML17309A624
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	01/15/1998
From:	Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	Vissing G NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
REF-PT21-98 NUDOCS 9801220365
Download: ML17309A624 (8)

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ROBERT C. MECREDY Vice President Nvcfeor Operotions ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION ~ 89EASTAVENUE ROCHESTER N.Y. Id6d9.0MI AREA CODE716 54'6-2700 January 15, 1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn:

Guy S. Vissing Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

10 CFR Part 21 30 Day Report R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Vissing:

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, Section 21 (d)

(3) (ii), which requires "Written notification to the NRC... on the identificatiohi of a defect or a failure to comply", the attached 10 CFR 21 report is hereby submitted.

Very truly yours, Robert C. Mecred xc:

Mr. Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 14B2)

Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 6

I U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

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10CFR21 30 DAYWRITTEN REPORT Page 2 I. 'AME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE COMMISSION:

NAME:

Robert C. Mecredy

'ice President Nuclear Operations Group ADDRESS:

Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation 89.East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649

'IDENTIFICATIONOF THE FACILITY,THE ACTIVITY,OR THE BASIC COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT:

I The facility is the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.

The basic component is the shunt trip assembly on the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Supply Breaker to Bus 16. This breaker is a Westinghouse DB-75 air circuit breaker and the Ginna equipment identification number is EIN 52/EG1B1, The shunt trip assembly was installed on this breaker in May, 1995, using spare parts purchased in 1977.

IDENTIFICATIONOF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITYOR SUPPLYING THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT:

The shunt trip assembly was supplied by:

Westinghouse Electric Corporation Power Systems Switchgear Division 700 Braddock Avenue East Pittsburgh, PA 15112 NATUREOF THE DEFECT OR FAILURETO COMPLYANDTHE SAFETY HAZARD WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURETO COMPLY:

The shunt trip coil plunger is part of the shunt trip and alarm switch assembly.

The plunger of the shunt trip assembly was binding in the shunt trip coil. When activated, the breaker's shunt trip coil plunger pulls the breaker tripper bar to trip the breaker.

The bound plunger was not returning to its deenergized position.

The breaker tripper bar was being maintained in the trip free position, preventing the DB-75 air circuit breaker from closing.

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Page 3 Testing of the "B" EDG Supply Breaker to Bus 16 was performed in November, 1997, during the 1997 outage.

'During this testing, the breaker failed to close.

The breaker could not be closed electrically or manually, because the shunt trip coil plunger was maintaining the tripper bar in the trip free position. This failure would prevent the "B" EDG from supplying power to the safeguards loads on Bus 16.

This is considered a major degradation since, in conjunction with a single failure on the redundant train, required safety functions could not be performed.

THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OF SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURETO COMPLY WAS OBTAINED:

The information was obtained during testing performed on November 14, 1997.

IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A DEFECT OR FAILS TO COMPLY, THE NUMBERAND LOCATIONOF ALLSUCH COMPONENTS IN USE AT, SUPPLIED FOR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNASTATION:

There are six Westinghouse DB-75 breakers permanently installed at Ginna Station, in safeguards buses 14,and 16.

One of these breakers is manually operated and the shunt trip coil is not used. In addition, there is one spare DB-75 breaker in stock.

With the exception of the 52/EG1B1 breaker, these breakers still have their original shunt trip assemblies installed.

The 52/EG181 breaker is the only DB-75 breaker that has had the shunt trip assembly replaced.

The replacement shunt trip assembly that failed was one of ten purchased in 1977 as spares.

THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONWHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILLBE TAKEN; THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUALOR ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIMETHAT HAS BEEN OR WILLBE TAKENTO COMPLETE THE ACTION:

Corrective action is complete.

The failed shunt trip assembly was replaced with a spare from stock.

The assembly was manually and electrically bench'tested prior to being returned to operable status.

The remaining eight assemblies in stock were inspected.

Two assemblies had coil plungers that did not fully return to the deenergized position during manual manipulation.

These were removed from stock.

1 The other DB-75 breakers were visually inspected.

Acceptable plunger movement is indicated by adequate plunger to tripper bar gap and full retraction of the alarm switch attachment push rod.

No additional binding concerns were found.

Page 4 The Procurement Analysis Form (PAF) for the shunt trip assembly was appended.

Prior to reordering, the PAF now requires the addition of plunger movement verification to the assembly acceptance plan.

Westinghouse was contacted.

There have been no other reported events of this nature'that Westinghouse is aware of. A check of industry operational events did not identify similar breaker failure.

ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY ABOUTTHE FACILITY,ACTIVITY,OR BASIC COMPONENT THATHAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILLBE GIVENTO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:

Receipt inspection could verify acceptable plunger movement.

During DB-75 breaker maintenance, consider verifying that the shunt trip coil plunger moves freely. in the coil by verifying adequate plunger to tripper bar gap and full retraction of the alarm switch attachment push rod.

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J GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER EVENT NUMBER:

33442 LICENSEE:

ROCHESTER GAS R ELECTRIC CORP CITY: ROCHESTER REGION:

1 COUNTY:

STATE:

NY LICENSES:

AGREEMENT: Y DOCKET:

NOTIFICATXON DATE: 12/22/97 NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:10

[ET]

EVENT DATE:

11/14/97 EVENT TIME:

12:00[EST]

LAST UPDATE DATE:

12/22/97 NOTIFICATIONS NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN ST.

MARTEN HQ OPS OFFICER:

DOUG WEAVER EMERGENCY CLASS:

NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION:

CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH JAMES NOGGLE JERRY CARTER RDO NRR EVENT TEXT PART 21 DEFECTIVE SHUNT TRIP COXLS THE LICENSEE D1SCOVERED A WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 BREAKER THAT WAS FAILING TO CLOSE AT THEIR GINNA PLANT.

THE PLUNGER OF THE SHUNT TRIP COIL ASSEMBLY WAS BXNDING, MAINTAININGTHE BREAKER TRIPPER BAR IN THE TRIP FREE POSITION.

THE LICENSEE HAS SEVEN DB-75 BREAKERS ON SITE, ONLY ONE HAD THE PROBLEM DESCRIBED.

THE BREAKER WITH THE FAILED SHUNT TRIP COIL IS THE ONLY ONE TO HAVE HAD THAT PART PREVIOUSLY REPLACED.

THE REPLACEMENT SHUNT TR1P COIL THAT FAILED WAS ONE OF TEN PURCHASED IN 1977 AS SPARES.

THE FAILED SHUNT TRIP COIL WAS REPLACED WITH A SPARE FROM STOCK.

THE REMAINING EIGHT ASSEMBLIES IN STOCK WERE INSPECTED.

TWO ASSEMBLXES HAD COIL PLUNGERS THAT DID NOT FULLY RETURN TO THE DEENERGIZED POSITION DURING MANUAL MANIPULATION.

THESE WERE REMOVED FROM STOCK.

LICENSEE RECOMMENDS RECEIPT INSPECTION TO VERIFY ACCEPTABLE PLUNGER MOVEMENT AND ALSO VERIFYING THAT THE SHUNT TRIP COIL PLUNGER MOVES FREELY IN THE COIL ASSEMBLY DURING BREAKER MAINTENANCE.

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