ML18143A065

R. E. Ginna - Special Quality Control Inspection Report 244/69-1, on 04/21/1969, Inspections of Four Safety-Oriented Reactor Systems, Three Mechanical and One Electrical

ML18143A065
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	04/21/1969
From:	O'Reilly J Rochester Gas & Electric Corp
To:	Boyd R US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
References
IR 1969001
Download: ML18143A065 (30)

Text

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~~41IS 04 OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASH INGTON. D.C.

20545 Apr11 21, 1969 (I~a~sa R~

~RK-

~~ame ~

S. Boyd, Assistant Director for Reactor Prospects vision of Reactor Licensing (2)

SPECIAL QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTION OF THE ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (R

E, GINNA REACTOR)

The enclosed report of a special quality control inspection of the R. E.

Ginna reactor facility 1s forwarded for information.

Th1s report supplements our normal inspection reports and relates solely to our special review of four safety-oriented reactor systems.

The results of this inspection reveal problems not unlike those detected at Oyster Creek. and Nine Mile Point and which were reported in our memoranda dated May 6, 1968, and January 22, 1969.

As in the case of Oyster Creek and Nine Mile Point, the problems indicate that the quality control system was ineffective during the ma)or part of the construction period.

A Compliance meeting was held on Apr11 1II, 1969, with senior management per-sonnel of the Rochester Gas and Electric Company, for the purpose of dis-cussing the deficiencies detected.

At this meeting, the licensee was advised that the Division of Compliance has concluded that the attention directed to quality assurance at the R. E. Ginna facility was less than that currently considered necessary for a nuclear facility.

Compliance also stated that ad-ditional inspection efforts w111 be requ'ired by RG&E and Compliance to provide reasonable assurance that the facility.,has been constructed in accordance with the intent of the application.

Upon resolution of the outstanding problems and completion of additional in-spection efforts, Compl1ance will conduct a special inspection of a safety-oriented mechanical system.

We wiU. keep you 1nformed of developments in routine inspection reports.

p(g

. P. O'Reilly f

Reactor Inspection and Enforcement Branch Division of Compliance

Enclosure:

CO Report No. 24II/69-1 cc w/encl:

E. G. Case, DRS S. Levine, DRL (6)

D. J. Skovholt~

DRL D. F. Knuth, DRL (3)

L. Kornblith, Jr.,

CO R. W. Kixkman, CO:I J.,G.

Davis~ CO:IX B. H. Grier~ CO:IXX D. X. Walker~

CO:XV Ro W. Smithp CO:V REG Central File OFFXCIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTION of the ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (R. E. Gunn )

DOCKET NOa 50-244'O REPORT NOe 244/69-1 April 2lp 1969 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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OFFICIAL USE ONLY ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY TABLE OF CONTENTS Page A e

Background

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B.

Obgectives e

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Planning and Organization I

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Ma)or Features

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Systems and Bases for Inspection

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Areas of Inspection

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D.

Utilization of Manpower

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Ei Principal Persons Contacted F.

Inspection Results

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1.

Reactor Coolant System

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1 a.

Description and Function

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Quality Control - Field Installation

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c.

Inspection Findings

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(1)

Reactor Coolant System

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(2)

Incore Instrumentation Penetrations d.

Problems and Status

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Reactor Coolant System Piping (2)

Welder Control.

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(3)

Welding Electrode Control 2.

High Head Safety Infection System 0

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OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY a.

Description and Function....,..

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b.

Quality Control Field Installation Page 8

c.

Inspection Findings d.

.Problems and Status 3.

Related Mechanical Systems a.

Description and Function 10 10 b.

Problems and, Status

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Containment System

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Description and Function

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Containment Liner << Field Installation 10 c.

Problems and Status

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12 Emergency Power

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Description and Function.... ~.....

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Inspection Findings (1)

Diesel Generators

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D.C. Control Power

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Integral Systems

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Relay Room

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Problems and Status

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Quality Assurance - Electrical and Instrumentation 16 a.

Discussion

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Bechtel Corporation Quality Assurance Responsibility 16 (2)

Westinghouse Electric Corporation Quality Assurance Responsibility OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (3)

RGB Quality Assurance Responsibility

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Problems and Status

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Summary of Outstanding Problems 1.

Reactor Coolant System 18 18 2.

High Head Safety In)ection System 19 a.

Piping 19 b.

Welder Control c.

Welding Electrode Control 3.

Related Mechanical Systems 20 4.

Containment System 5

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Emergency Power

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Quality Assurance Electrical and Instrumentation 21 21 22 H.

Conclusions

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22 OFPICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTION ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ROBERT EMMlrT GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNXT NO ~ 1 Docket No. 50-244 - CO Report No. 244/69-1 A.

BACKGROUND Region I (New Jersey) implemented a special quality control inspection at the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG8cE) reactor facility because of growing concerns in the area of quality control, based on several recent experiences, and because findings from earlier quality control inspections at the Oyster Creek facility (CO Report dated May 6, 1968), the SEFOR facility (CO Report dated August 26, 1968),

and the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation facility (CO Report No.

220/68-6) indicated the need for such an effort.

This quality control inspection program was in addition to the Division of Compliance's (CO) normal inspection activities.

The scope of the inspection was less broad than that performed at Oyster Creek, but equivalent in depth.

The program involved inspections of four systems, three mechanical and one electrical.

B.

OMECTXVES The quality control inspection was designed to augment the normal in-spection program with in-depth information, obtained on a sampling

basis, in selected areas important to reactor safety.

This type of in-formation is required to support a "finding" relative to the complete-ness of the facility in accordance with the provisions of the construction permit and the application.

C.

PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION The special quality control task group consisted of the following per-sonnel:

F. Bower, Reactor Xnspector (Construction),

CO:XI (Atlanta).

D. Hunnicutt, Reactor Xnspector, CO:I (New Jersey)

J. Collins, Metallurgical Engineer, CO Headquarters J. Varela, Reactor Xnspector (Construction); CO:II (Atlanta)

The ma)or features of the inspection effort were as follows:

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY a.

The inspection effort was concentrated on four selected

systems, or portions of-systems~

which directly relate to nuclear safety.

b.

The review;was conducted. with prior knowledge that onsite records were not complete.

c.

Design specifications were assumed to be adequate.

d. All noted deficiencies were clearly and promptly identified to the applicant.

Follow-up action on these matters, as required, is being accomplished by the applicant and by Compliance.

2.

S stems and Bases for Ins ection In order to establish bases on which to make inspections, copies of material, fabrication, repair, cleaning, inspection, testing,

shipping, and storage specifications were made available to Com-plicance by RG&E.

However, their availability was limited to onsite use only.

This information was supplemented by field installation specifications and related procedures.

The systems selected for inspection were the following:

a.

Reactor Coolant System, up to the first isolation valve on each connecting system.

b.

Containment

System, except for the personnel and equipment access openings.

c.

High-head Safety Infection System.

d.

Emergency Power System.

3.

Areas of Ins ection r

The areas that were reviewed during the inspection were as follows:

a.

Review of welding procedures to determine that their use resulted in welds that met design specifications.

b.

Review of welder qualification records for conformance with established codes.

c.

Review of records certifying that materials were in con-formance with codes and specifications.

d.

Review of procedures and practices for control of electrodes

-2>>

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY and inserts for conformance with codes and specifications and to determine if storage control conformed to'manu-facturers'ecommendations and ASTM requirements.

e.

Review of records of inspection of material preparation

~ prior to welding, i.e., machining, grinding, fit-up, and cleaning.

Review of radiographic, magnetic particle and dye penetrant testing procedures.

g.

Visual inspections of fit-up~ deposition of weldment~ prepa-

,'ation of welds for nondestructive testing, prior to, during and following welding.

h.

Visual inspection'si of concrete,'oncrete placement and patch-ing of the equipment and, personnel access

batches, and in-stallation of strain gages in the containment vessel dome reinforcing steel.

De UTILXZATIONOF MANPOWER The task group spent 16 man-days performing onsite inspections in con-

)unction with this audit.

E.

PRINCIPAL PERSONS CONTACTED 1.

Rochester Gas and Electric Co oration RG8iE Robert Koprowski, Assistant Chief Engineer John Arthur, Prospect Manager C. J. Mambretti, Acting Prospect Engineer (Mechanical Engineer)

G. O. Acree, Welding Inspector Charles Anderson, Maintenance Engineer W. Backus, Operations A. Underwood, Piping Inspector Richard Heflin, Chief Pipe Inspector Robert Murray~ Quality Assurance Engineer Lee Lang, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. Stull, Construction Manager W. Proulx, Senior Field Engineer John Gilbert, Field Engineer Wayne Mourer, Field Engineer w3&

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE'ONLY 3.

Westi house Electric Co oration E. U. Powell, Manager Ginna Prospect L. Elliot, Assistant Resident Engineer Robert Sawyer,'elding Engineer

<Fremont Gagnon, Material Coordinator 4.

Southwest Research Institute A. L. Lowenberg~

Welding Engineer F.

INSPECTION RESULTS The inspection findings contained in this section of the report were ob-tained by the implementation of the plan outlined in Section C of this report.

They are a summary of the more detailed inspection results which are available, if required, upon request to the Division of Compliance.

The inspection findings were obtained from detailed review of onsite records,'irect inspection of installed equipment, and discussions with cognizant representatives of the various firms involved.

At the conclusion of the inspection, the significant problems identified during the inspection were discussed with representatives of the

RGBaE, Bechtel,- and Westinghouse organizations.

A representative of the South-west Research Institute was also in attendance during this exit inter-view meeting.

These personnel were cooperative and stated that they would review and obtain more information on the alleged deficiencies.

An additional meeting at the corporate level is scheduled to be held in the near future with RGB management to discuss the status of outstanding problems.

The results of this meeting and the status of all outstanding problems will be reported in subsequent'inspection reports.

The significant results obtained from the special quality control inspec-tion of the four selected systems are as follows:

1.

Reactor Coolant S stem a.

Descri tion and Function The Reactor Coolant System consists of two identical heat transfer loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel.

Each loop contains a steam generator, a pump, loop piping, and instrumentation.

The pressurizer is connected to one of the loops.

Auxiliary system piping connections into the, re-actor coolant piping are provided.

The piping in each loop is attached to the reactor vessel at an elevation that is OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY above the top oX the reactor core.'he integr1ty of the pipe sections, recirculation pumps~ branch line 1solation

valves, as weU. as the onsite welding of the components, was -the principal issue in the inspection of the Reactor Coolant Pystem.

b.

ualit Control - F1eld Installation All components and piping for the Primary Coolant System were procured 'by Westirighouse.

Compliance rev1ewed Westing-'ouse specifications, quality control plans, purchase

orders, approved, fabrication procedures, and mill test certification data for the piping and components.

The quality control records of field welding, welding procedures and welder qualifications were examined.

Visual inspection was made of wells.

Radiographs were examined on a sample bas1s.

Installation of the Reactor Coolant System was contracted, to the Bechtel Company.

Westinghouse s1te engineers who were assigned on a full>>time basis at.the site and wQ responsi-bilities for assigned

systems, audited the performance of Bechtel.

Southwest Research Institute acted as consultants for RG&E.in auditing the quality of the Reactor Coolant System.

The Reactor Coolant System field welds were 100 percent radio-graphed.

The radiographs were reviewed 'by Pittsburgh Test1ng Laboratory, Bechtel, Westinghouse, and Southwest Research Znstitute.

c.

Ins ection Findin s (l)

Reactor Coolant S stem Compliance examined radiography records, interpretation sheets and weld repair history for four of the field weld joints in the Reactor Coolant System.

Results of these examinations were satisfactory for each of the weld joints examined.

F1lm exposures (double film techniques) were made with Ir-l92 sources.

Radiographic quality w1th regard to 2-2T penetrameter sensitivity, image quality, and density was excellent.

Weld soundness quality exhibited by the radiography was within the ac-ceptable standards for defects established by Section VIII of the ASME McPV Code.

Each field'eld is labeled with a symbol-number combina>>

tion which is identifiable on the system's isometric OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY drawings and a."Daily Inspection Record-Critical Pipe Joint, " Form WR-4, was used as a control record.

Compliance also visually examined a number of field welds on the Reactor Coolant System piping.

The welds

'ere ground smooth and had the appearance of good work-manship.

The pipe-component transition contours were ground to reduce stress concentrations in these areas.

No objectionable surface defects were found.

Compliance audited the welding electrode system.

The review indicated that the system for inspection, con-ditioning and control of electrode materials at the construction site was ineffective.

In-core Instrumentation Penetrations Thirty-five of the 36 in-core instrumentation penetra-tions do not comply with Westinghouse Drawing No.

684J935.

At the bottom of the reactor vessel head, each of these one-inch schedule 80 stainless steel lines has a notch sensitive zone machined near the nipple instead of the required 0.375 inch machined radius.

The applicant stated that either a blending radius would, be provided or additional weld metal would be used to build up the notch sensitive zone.

Compliance will ob-tain assurance that the observed condition is repaired using an approved technique, and that after repairs, the required wall thickness is maintained.

d.

Problems and Status Reactor Coolant S stem Pi in Records 'were not available that would confirm the final fit-up and, alignment of the Reactor Coolant System.

Dis-cussions with Westinghouse and Bechtel personnel revealed that each weld fit-up received the approval of the West-,

inghouse representative prior to the start of welding.

The weld was dye penetrant tested following the initial root pass.

A complete set of radiographs was taken sub-sequent to completion of each one-half inch of weld deposition.

As fabrication of the loop continued, Westinghouse and Bechtel indicated that special care was taken to prevent introduction of physical stresses to com-pleted sections.

The final pipe spool pieces were machined, after the remainder of the loop fabrication had been com-pleted. OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY Westinghouse initiated a general cleanup program for the exterior surface of the Reactor Coolant System loops.

This cleanup included removal of weld spatter and arc strikes.

The cleanup is in progress and Com-pliance will obtain assurance that all necessary cor-rective actions have been completed.

Radiography records indicate that as many as 12 weld repairs were required on a Reactor Coolant System field weld. It is possible that the welder and welding electrode de<<

ficiencies identified below contributed to th1s problem.

The licensee was asked to provide assurance that im-portant system welds were not and auld not be adversely affected by the above deficiencies.

Compliance will continue to follow this area of concern.

(2)

Welder Control (a)

Veld joint numbers and weld dates were not en-tered against welder identification shown on the WR-4 form.

Weld joint index tabulations show this informat1on.

No primary records were avail-able to support the tabulations.

Lack of these primary records indicates that a firm conclusion cannot be drawn to determine that a qualified welder(s) did, in fact, weld a particular joint.

(b)

The WR-4 form does not show that proper welding heat input controls were made.

Lack of these records leaves adherence to the qualified welding procedures open to question.

C (c)

The WR-4 form does not show that checks to assure use of proper electrode materials were made.

Poor electrode controls and deviations from the quali-fied welding procedure were observed during the inspection.

Lack of information on the WR-4 forms makes it difficult to assess weld joint quality in view of the implications of this situation.

(d)

The WR-4 form exhib1ted negl1gible information and no continuity to alternate records on which firm conclusions could be reached by Compliance.

(3)

Veldi Electrode Control (a)

Available certified test reports from electrode manufacturers were not signed to indicate incoming materials were checked for compliance to the pur-chase order or applicable specifications prior to w7w OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY release to storage.

Two random "grab" samples from newly opened containers of E-7018 and E-6010 electrode's manufactured by Westinghouse were found to contain many unidentified electrodes.

(b)

The inspector was advised that issuance of elec-trodes was under strict control of the welding supervisors.

It was noted that welders had un-restricted access to electrode holding ovens located around several work areas.

(c)

The inspector was advised that holding ovens (dryers) were maintained at 200

- 300 F. as recommended by Bechtel.

Two of three ovens checked were found to be cold.

(d)

Stainless steel electrodes (E-308) and carbon steel electrodes (E-7018, E-6010) were found mixed with unidentified electrodes in 'one of the holding ovens.

(e)

A check of two welders revealed that both possessed unidentified electrodes.

These welders were found to be joining carbon steel piping systems in the reactor auxiliary building.

(f)

A can of electrodes was found to contain water and a second can of electrodes was observed in a loca-tion where the relative humidity was at or near 100 percent.

2.

Hi h-head Safet In ection S stem a.

Descri tion and Function The principal components of the High-head Safety Injection System are three high-head safety injection pumps with as-sociated piping and instrumentation.

The accumulators dis-charge into the cold legs of the reactor coolant piping.

The high-head safety injection pumps deliver borated water into two separate headers; each header subdivides into two injection

lines, and then into the Reactor Coolant System through four connections, one in each hot leg and one in each cold leg.

b.

Qualit Control - Field Installations The components and valves were procured by Westinghouse.

The piping was procured by Bechtel Corporation.

Compliance reviewed OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFXCIAL USE ONLY purchase specifications, quality control plans, purchase

orders, approved fabrication procedures, and mill test certification data f'r the piping, valves and components.

The field fabrica-tion quality control records, weld procedures and'elder qualifications were examined.

A sample of the radiographs was reviewed and welds were visually inspected.

Installation of the High-heal Safety In)ection System was con-tracted to the Bechtel Company.

Westinghouse site engineers, who were assigned on a full-time basis at. the site and with re-sponsibilities for assigned

systems, audited the performance of Bechtel.

Southwest Research Xnstitute acted as consultants for RG&E.

The High-head Safety In)ection System fi'eld welds were 100 per>>

cent radiographed.

The radiographs were reviewed by Pitts>>

burgh Testing Laboratory, Bechtel, Westinghouse, and Southwest Research Xnstitute.

Ins ection Findin s Compliance examined eight weld points, radiography records on techniques, interpretation sheets, and, weld repair histories.

Results of the inspection were satisfactory for each of the weld points examined.

Film exposures (double film techniques) were made with Ir-192 sources.

Radiographic quality with re-gard to 2>>2T penetrameter sensitivity, image quality and'ensity was excellent.

Weld soundness quality exhibited by the radiog-raphy was within the accepta'ble standards for defects established by Section VIIX of the ASME B&PV Code.

Each field weld is labeled with a symbol-number combination which is identifiable on the system's isometric drawings and a

'baily Inspection Record-Critical Pipe Joint~".Form WR-4, was used as a control record.

Compliance also visually examined the field welds of the High-head Safety Infection System piping.

The wells were ground smooth and had the appearance of good, workmanship.

The pipe-component transition contours were also ground to reduce stress concentrations in these areas.

No obgectionable surface defects were found.

Compliance audited the Welding Electrode Control System with Westinghouse and Bechtel.

The review indicated that the system for inspection, conditiphing and control of electrode materials at the construction site was ineffective.

Problems and Status The status of problems involving weld spatter, arc strikes~ control "9"

OFFXCIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY of welders and control of welding electrodes as discussed in Section F.l.d. for the Reactor Coolant System are also applicable to the High-head Safety Infection System.

3.

Related Mechanical S stems a.

Descri tion and Function Selected portions of related mechanical systems were in-cluded in the Reactor Coolant System evaluation.

Valves in the Residual Heat Removal System, methods used to calibrate torque wrenches, deposition of weldment, weld preparation, and fit-up were included in the evaluation.

Compliance in-spected the outward appearance of several field welds and found indications of welding being performed by weaving of the weld beads in excess of general recommendations.

All welds were found to have acceptable fusion and no indication of burnthrough.

Some welds were not properly prepared for nondestructive testing.

Westinghouse and.

RG8cE had initiated a general cleanup program for the exterior surfaces of all stainless steel piping.

The purpose of this cleanup was to remove weld spatter and arc strikes.

Compliance's visual inspection of the external sur<<

faces revealed that considerable effort had been expended to clean up the surfaces.

At the time of our audit several arc strikes had not been removed and others were marked for clean-

'up work.

b.

Problems and Status (1)

Welding adjacent to two'alves, manufactured by the Velan Manufacturing Company, in the Residual Heat Re<<

moval System appeared to be very rough with a wide weld weaving pattern.

Compliance has questioned the quality of the welds on these two valves, particularly with respect to meeting the Code requirements.

(2)

A small percentage of the welding was accomplished by weaving of the weld 'beads in excess of the general recommendation of two and one-half times the electrode diameter.

Compliance has questioned the quality of these welds, in particular, with respect to possible residual stresses deposited by use of the weaving technique.

(3)

Compliance's inspection of the external surfaces of all OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY stainless steel piping and components revealed weld spatter and arc strikes in several locations.

I Compliance will assure that these conditions have been corrected and that the applicability oi this condition has been properly evaluated by Westinghouse and RG&E.

(4)

Calibration of torque wrenches was accomplished, by checking one wrench against another.

Compliance questions the validity of this practice, particularly with respect to relating the torque values for several different sizes of nuts and required torquing values.

The matter is being pursued with the licensee.

Containment S stem a.

Descri tion and Function The reactor containment structure is a reinforced concrete vertical right cylinder with a flat base and a hemispherical dome.

A welded steel liner is attached to the inside face of the concrete shell to assure a high degree of leak tightness.

The cylinder wall is prestressed vertically and reinforced cir-cumferentially with mild steel deformed bars.

The side walls of the containment vessel are anchored to the foundation rock with prestressed rock anchors.

The tendons in the side walls are coupled to the rock by means of post-tensioned rock anchors which assure that the rock acts as an integral part of the containment structure.

b.

Containment Liner - Field Installation 4

The liner was fabricated by Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I)

CB&I coordinated with Bechtel in the inspection effort.

The liner is complete, except for the personnel and equipment access

,openings.

Records show that the basic liner plate conforms to APM A-442, Gr. 60 material modified to AS'.A-300. All pene-tration sleeves through the containment wall consist of material conforming to ASXN A-212, Gr. B modified to A-300 or ASTM A-516 Gr. 60 or Gr. 70.

All liner seams covered with steel test

channels, then concrete, were air tested at 62 to 65 psi and halide leak tested.

CB&I and Bechtel utilized "expanded plans" of the base plate, vertical shell and hemispherical dome to control inspection dur-ing fabrication.

These plans identified each plate panel; weld

)oint and penetration; the nondestructive tests pertaining to OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY the base plate; and the vertical shell and hemispherical

'dome.

Information concerning other quality control docu-mentat'ion was also referenced on the plans.

All records were-satisfactory.

Plans showed that steel T-bar anchored in concrete with Ne1son studs provided backing strips for welding of the base plate.

The steel T-bar backing strip principle was used in welding steel plate and transition knuckle sections.

All intersecting T-bars were welded to provide a continuous backing strip for Joining plates.

The welds in base platesp knuckle plates and associated T-bars were inspected, re-paired and reinspected to a satisfactory condition by mag-netic particle testing methods.

Records show that all other welds were 100 percent liquid penetrant tested and found to be satisfactory.

A sampling examination of welder qualifications revealed that the requirements of ASHE Code,Section IX, were being adhered to by CB&I.

Spot radiographs were made by CB&I in compliance with Sec-tion VIII, ASME EkPV Code.

Compliance determined that the quality of the radiographs and coverage of the weld area weresatisfactory.

c.

Problems and Status (1)

During installation of approximately 42 tendons, the time that the tendon casings were uncovered exceeded the manufacturer's specifications.

The specifications state that 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> is the maximum time a tendon casing i'8 to be left open.

In some cases tendon casings were left open for more. than 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> before NO-OX-ID grease was inserted.

These casings were not protected from moisture.

Rust spots and condensation were ob-served inside the casings.

Compliance will obtain assurance that the observed con-ditions and practices do not have adverse effects on the integrity of the containment vessel tendons.

(2)

Water was observed to be seeping through the concrete walls at elevations 230 feet to 235 feet.

At least 10 steel form>>tie bolt holes had been left open in this-same general area.

The water was collecting and was ob-served to enter one of the tendon casings.

12>>

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY Compliance willpursue with the licensee corrective action to eliminate the water leaks.

(3)

An open can of electrodes was observed in a'ocation where the relative humidity was 100 percent, as evidenced by condensation on piping and walls.

Welders were ob-served removing and using electrodes from this open can to make closure welds over access holes in 20-inch diam-eter tendon casings.

These closure welds are not re-quired for strength.

However, the poor workmanship reflects adversely on the overall quality control program.

Compliance will review the possible consequences of this deficiency.

5.

Emer enc Power a.

Descri tion and Fhnction The emergency power facilities consist of the 480 volt, emergency electrical buses; two emergency diesel<<generator sets located in separate rooms of a Class I structure; two station batteries; and associated equipment.

Each unit, as a backup to the normal standbyAC power supply, is capable of sequentially starting and supplying the power requirement for one complete set'of safeguards equipment.

Each of the station batteries has been sized to carry its expected shutdown loads for a period of eight hours, foU.owing a plant trip and a loss of all AC power.

b.

Ins ection Findin s (1)

Diesel Generators r

The two diesel generators provided for backup were found to be of the size and capacity described in the FSAR.

The units have been installed and connected into the electrical system.

However, no testing has been con-ducted.

Each unit is located in a separate room with associated individual systems and can 'be considered standard.

'In-spec'tion of the hardware and electrical circuitry from the two units revealed that control wiring and. power out-put cables have been installed.

The installation is as required by the FSAR.

Each unit has an individual bus vault which is located directly below the generator.

The output cables from

<<13 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY the batteries run through one diesel generator room.

These output cables are separated from the remainder of the room by sheet metal partitions.

DC Control Power The DC control power supply is provided by two 'battery systems and associated static chargers.

Each battery system has an associated distribution system.

Each of the two systems is entirely separate except for an in-tertie at equipment with redundant functions.

Inspection showed that the cables and equipment are installed in a redundant arrangement to provide the required reliability.

The installation complies with the provisions of the FSAR.

An inspection of DC distribution system drawings and discussions with RG8cE maintenance personnel indicate that all emergency electrical systems are supplied with re>>

dundant 125 volt DC power for control.

The circuitry and systems that supply control power for the 480 volt emergency buses were installed as set-forth in the FSAR.

Inte ral S stems Portions of the 480 volt emergency bus system, 125 volt DC control power system, diesel generator

systems, safety infection system, containment spray system and low steam pressure monitoring system were included in the emergency electrical system evaluation.

The three safe-guards systems were inspected to the extent that these systems interconnect with the diesel generator start con-trol.

Inspection. of electrical systems was primarily oriented toward separation of. redundant circuits and, equipment, evaluation of the site quality assurance effort, and, a review of site quality control documentation and records.

Results of this inspection of the physical installation generally indicated equipment, components and materials had been installed as required.

The failure to establish a separate and responsible quality control organization at the construction site im-paired the documentation effort needed to confirm-that the electrical installation was in accordance with the applicant's stated requirements.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY Rela Room The relay room is located directly below the control room.

The relays are located in enclosed metal clad cabinets with redundant systems equipment 'located in separate cabi-nets.

All cables; serving this equipment are routed through a cable tray system above the relay cabinets which also provides a spreading network for cables entering the con>>

trol room cabinets located above.

c.

Problems and Status (1)

(2)

Inspection shows that the diesel vaults can be flooded, since the sumps are not provided with drains and/or sump pumps.

Discussions with onsite personnel indicated that investigation and corrective action are under way to pro-vide sump pumps for the two vault areas.

Compliance will assure that adequate corrective action is taken.

The FSAR states that the battery rooms associated with the DC control power will be separated by a three-hour fire wall and that each room willbe provided with a ventilation fan.

The door on the, access opening to the battery rooms is a U.L. "B" labeled door rated at one and one-half hours.

I A study to determine the generation rate of hydrogen in the battery rooms and exhausting of hydrogen from the rooms had not been made.

RGB will investigate to determine if a study has been made or was to be made concerning the pos-sible hydrogen problem.

One fan is a blower introducing air into the east battery room while the other fan is an ex-hauster pulling air from the opposite room.

Circulation through the rooms is provided through an opening over a con-necting door at the rear of the rooms.

Compliance willfolio~ up on the battery room ventilation problem.

In addition, Compliance will assure that the battery room separation complies with the FSAR, or informa-tion concerning the existing structure has been documented and found to be acceptable to DRL.

The sensor lines supplying signals to the Safety Infection System from the pressurizer and the sensor lines supplying signals to the auxiliary feedwater pump and the diesel generators from the steam headers appear to be vulnerable to incidents that could sever these lines. OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (4)

In both cases'loss of signals causes the desired. actua-tion of the system; RGSE indicated, however, that effort will be exerted to improve these weaknesses.-

The output cables from two of the three containment high pressure transducers are in the same conduit.

This is a deviation from the separation criteria of redundant circuits set forth in the FSAR.

Compliance will follow up and will assure that remedial action is taken to separate these redundant systems to meet the FSAR criteria requirement and review actions taken by the applicant to assure separation of other safety-oriented equipment.

A fire in the relay room could cause the loss of auto-mat1c control to all systems.

RG&E management stated that they are currently developing a fire protection program.

This program willutilize administrative con-trols and other means in the course of preventing or controlling incidents.

The diff1culties associated with this situat1on require a basic change 1n design ph1losophy and are not asso-ciated with any failure of the licensee to meet the re-quirements as stated in.the FSAR.

6.

Qualit Assurance QA

- Electrical and Instrumentation Quality assurance for the electrical installation is discussed on page 8,2-6.E of the FSAR.

An examination of quality control records and other pertinent data was made to determine and verify the QA program at RG&E.

a.. Discussion Bechtel Co oration QA Res onsibilit The Bechtel Corporation is the prime electric installer for this prospect and has the contractual responsibility for the generation of QA documentation.

Based on our inspection findings, the primary responsibility of the QA o

anization a pears to be cons ruc on e ineeri QA separate,QA organization within the Bechtel field organiza-tion.

The* cable installation sheet referenced in the FSAR was OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY being prepared in accordance with established procedure.

Bechtel has initiated a program for reviewing'ermina-tion of cable conductors.

An inspection program is being conducted using an electronic device~

a portable receiver in combination with a signal imposed on individual cables~

to assure that separation of cable has'een maintained in accordance with the stated criteria.

Bechtel has no formally documented test program.

However, as each ma)or piece oi equipment is tested, the test data are entered on a form.

The circuitry and the components comprising the circuitry for the control and operation of the engineered safeguards are tested but the results of the test are not being re-corded on any form.

Records of these tests consist of an elementary control diagram which is marked with colored pencil as the component or element is tested and found to be carrect.

Test failures and corrective action are not shown on this record.

(2)

(3)

Westin house Co oration QA Re onsibilit Westinghouse is entirely dependent upon the action of the Bechtel Corporation and does not maintain QA records.

Page 8.2-6E of the FSAR indicates the Westinghouse re-sponsibility for plant design and construction.

RG&Z QA Res onsibilit RG&E has approximately

$0 personnel at the construction site assigned to quality control work and training.

Six or seven of these personnel are assigned to the instru-mentation and electrical installation.

The Rb&E program is one of continual review of plans, specifications, and installation to determine that the criteria are met.

The lack of detailed technical information and the limitations imposed by organized construction craft personnel appear to reduce the effectiveness of the RG&E effort.

RG&E accepts systems on a beneficial occupancy basis as each system is completed by the contractor.

When RG&E accepts a system, a review of the entire installation using the copies of the available documentation is made.

The RG&E effort indicates that an effective quality assur-ance program is being maintained.

b.

Problems and Status 17>>

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (1)

The Bechtel'test program is not documented.

The test results are, however, recorded.

The failure to provide a formal test program is con-sidered to be a weakness in the electrical instrument QA program and is considered to reflect adversely on the overall QA program for the plant.

(2)

Bechtel circuitry test results are not recorded other than color markings on the circuit diagrams.

Compliance considers this practice to be deficient in that test failures and corrective actions are not re-corded.

We will continue to pursue upgrading of this system with the licensee.

(3)

Westinghouse has the responsibility, as outlined in the FSAR, to spot-check installation to assure compliance with design.

No records were available to substantiate the effectiveness with which this audit is being carried out.

Compliance considers the absence of records to be a

significant deficiency.

We intend to pursue obtaining some evidence that the Westinghouse responsibility was satisfactorily accomplished.

R OF OUTSTANDING PROKZMS The problems identified by the special quality control task group dur-ing the RG&E quality control inspection and the status of each problem have been discussed in Section F of this report.

As previously stated, additional information is available upon request to the Division of Compliance.

The issues still considered by Compliance to be unresolved, as of this

date, are summarized below:

1.

Reactor Coolant S stem a.

Reactor Coolant S stem Pi i (1)

Removal of weld spatter and arc strikes from stainless steel piping.

(2)

Satisfactory contouring of the in-core instrument pene-trations in the reactor'vessel lower head has not been

-x,8-OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY accomplished.

b.

'Welder Control (2)

Weld joint nuinbers and weld dates were not'entered against welder identification, shown on WR-0 forms.

No primary records were available to support weld joint index tabulations.

(3)

The WR-4 form does not show that proper welding heat input controls were made.

(4)

The WR-4 form does not show that checks to assure the use of proper electrode mater'ials were made.

(5)

The WR-4 form does not exhibit required information for the weld repair history of field welded piping.

(6)

The WR-4 form does not maintain any continuity with alternate records concerning in-process welding and, weld repair.

c.

Weldin Electrode Control (1)

Available certified test reports from electrode manu-facturers were not signed.

(2)

Welders were observed to have unrestricted access to electrode holding ovens located around several work areas.

(3)

Two electrode holding ovens were found to be cold.

(4)

Stainless steel electrodes and carbon steel electrodes were found mixed with unidentified electrodes in a holding oven.

(5) unidentified electrodes.

(6)

A can of electrodes was found to contain water and a second can of electrodes was observed in a location where the relative humidity was at or: near 100 percent.

2.

Hi h Head Safet In ection S stem OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (l)

Removal of weld spatter and arc strikes from stain-less steel piping.

b.

Welder Control (l)

Weld )oint numbers arid weld dates were not'entered against welder identification shown on WR-4 forms.

(2)

No primary records were available to support weld

)oint index tabulations.

(3)

The WR-4 form does not show that proper welding heat input controls were made.

(4)

The WR-4 form does not show that checks to assure use of proper electrode materials were made.

(5)

The WR-4 form does not exh1bit required informat1on for the weld repair history of field welded piping.

(6)

The WR-4 form does not maintain any continuity with alternate records concerning surveillance of in-process

.welding and weld repair.

c.

Weldi Electrode Control (l) Available certified test reports from electrode manu-facturers were not signed.

(2)

Welders were observed to have unrestr1cted access to electrode holding ovens located around several work areas.

(3)

Two electrode holding ovens were found to be cold; (4)

Stainless steel electrodes and carbon steel electrodes were'ound m1xed with unidentified electrodes 1n a holding oven.

~5 g)i1 (5)

Two welders were observed Joining carbon steel'piping while they possessed unidentified electrodes.

(6)

A can of electrodes was found to contain water and a second can of electrodes was observed in a location where the relative humidity was at or near 100 percent.

Related Mechanical 8 stems a.

Welding on two valves in the Residual Heat Removal System does OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY not comply with piping code requirements.

b.'ome welding was accomplished by weaving of the weld beads in excess of general recommendations.

c.

Arc strikes and weld spatter were observed on some stain-less steel piping and components.

d.

The procedure used for calibration of torque wrenches 18 4.

Containment S stem a.

Conden'sation and "rust spots" were on the upper tendon anchors.

b, Moisture was observed on the inside walls of some of the ten-don casings.

c.

Water 'seeping through the concrete wall flowed into one ten-don casing.

r An open can of electrodes was observed in a locat'ion where the relative humidity was 100 percent.

Welders wer'e observed using electrodes from. this open can to make closure welds in the tendon casings.

5.

Emer enc Power a.

The diesel generator vaults can be flooded.

b.

The door on the access opening to the battery rooms is a U.L.

"B" Label door, rated at one and one-half hours.

FSAR stated that battery rooms willbe separated by a three-hour fire wall.

c.

A study to determine the generation of hydrogen in the battery rooms has not been made.

d.

The adequacy of the battery room ventilation is questionable.

e.

Output cables fromthe containment high pressure transducers are in the same conduit.

f.

A fire in the relay room could cause the loss of automatic control to all systems.

g.

Sensor lines associated with the safety infection system appear to be vulnerable to incidents that could sever these OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY lines.

6.

ualit assurance Electrical and Instrumentation a.

Records were not,available to substantiate Westinghouse quality control activities.

b.

Recording of circuitry test results is questionable.

H.

CONCLUSIONS The results of the quality control inspection program indicate to the Division of Compliance that:

1.

The overall attention directed to "quality assurance" at the R. E. Ginna facility was less than that currently considered necessary for a nuclear facility.

2.

Additional efforts by Rochester Gas 8c Electric Company are necessary to resolve outstanding problems and questions.

Based on these findings, additional inspections must be conducted on

systems, important to safety, 'that were not reviewed in depth by Compliance.

22>>

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