ML20077D258

Proposed Tech Specs 3.8.2.2 & 3.8.2.4 Re Containment Integrity in Modes 5 & 6

ML20077D258
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	05/20/1991
From:	BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20077D255	List: ML20077D252 ML20077D258
References
NUDOCS 9105290228
Download: ML20077D258 (18)

Text

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ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AND BASES PAGES 1

1 3/4 8-5 3/4 8-7 3/4 8-11 3/4 9-4 B3/4 6-1 B3/4 9-1 1

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l 910529022e 910520,,

PDR ADOCl.', 0500031 e p

PDR

LlHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the a.

onsite Class 1E distribution system, and b.

One diesel generator with:

1.

A day fuel tank containing a minimum volume of 375 gallons of fuel.

2.

A fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 18,250 gallons of fuel, and 3.

A fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources 1

OPERABLE; :::r-d l : ;:r n ':.: '

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a.

Immediately*

suspend all operationn involving CORE h

ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of d

irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads over L

irradiated fuel, and

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?

Establish containment penetration closure as identified

(

f u$.

in Specification 3.9.4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, sa9E

_J I m m esa+ e\\ y k>k. h nitiate corrective actions to restore L

i the minimum A.C.

electrical power sources to OPERABLE j

y j

{

status awd _

m SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of each of the Surveillance Requirements of 4.8.1.1.1 and 4.8.1.1.2 except for requirement 4.8.1.1.2a.5.

• Performance of Action a.

shall not preclude coopletion of actions to establish a safe conservative position.

=_

CALVERT CLIF 5-t:N!T 1 3/4 8-5

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS i C. O!STRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPEMTION 3.8.2.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical busses shall be OPEMBLE and energized from sources of power other than a diesel gene-rator but aligned to an OPEMBLE diesel generator:

1

- 4150 volt Emergency Bus 1

- 480 volt Emergency Bus 2

- 120 volt A.C. Vital Busses APPLICABILITY: MODES S and 6 ACTION:

With less than the above ecmplement of A.C. busses OPERABLE and energized!

"-"-' :: J.::L !"T::":T" i"

~ t;.n.

_ = = - - -

=

Immediately*

suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity

changes, movement of l

J irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads over irradiated d

f fuel, until the minimum required A.C. busses are restored to i

OPERABLE and energized status, and

}

Establish containment penetration closure as identified in Specification 3.9.4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. ani.

[

Im medide\\y k.

(gnitiate corrective actions to restore the

/

minimum A.C.

electrical busses to OPERABLE and energized status,omd

^

^

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.2 The specified A.C. busses shall be determined OPERABLE and energized from A.C. sources other than the diesel generators at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability.

~ - -, - - -

n

• Performance of Action a.

shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative position.

iL_

_j CAI.VE'RTCLIFFS-UNIT 1 3/4 3-,

l

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1

+

IELECTR* CAL DOWER SYSTEMS 0.C. O!STR:3UTION - SFUTDOWN LIMITING CON 0! TION FOR OPERAT!CN 3.3.2.4 As a minimum, the follcwing C.C. electrical equipment and busses shall :e energizid and OPEMBLE:

I l

2 - 125-vol: 0.C. busses, and o!!

2 - 125-vol: tattery banks, ene of ani:n.r.sy be :ne Reserve Ba::ery, and one ass:ciated enar:;er per bank supplying tne above O.C. busses.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES S and 6.

ACTION:

Witn less than-the above ecmolement of 0.C. e;uiement and busses OPEMSLE

= ; i ;' T *T'"~'P

.U;;.

*~ "r"!xm.

w a.

Immediately*

suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of

{

irradiated

fuel, and movement of heavy loads over i

irradiated fuel until the minimum required D.C.

I equipment and busses are restored to OPERABLE status, and Y.

Establish containment penetration closure as identified l

l

( (

in Specification 3.9.4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, :azd If r%mmeMo,4ch I k. 9[Ditiate corrective actionsi-it'_i-J to restore the minimum D.C.

equipment and busses to OPERABLE status, and w

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.4.1 The above required 125-vel: 0.C. busses shall be determined OPEMBLE and eneri;i:ed at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignmen and indicated power availability.

4.8.2.4.2 The above re::uired 125-volt battery banks and chargers shall be demcnstrated OPEM3LE per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.3.2.

/-

• Performance of Action a.

shall not preclude completion l

of actions to establish a safe conservative position.

n_

=

__ m __

CALVERT CL *FF5 - UN 7I 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. lla

REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS

' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The contaim.ent penetrations shall be in the following statusr The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of a.

four bolts,

b.

A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed,' and Each penetration providing direct access frun the containment c.

atzsphert to the outside atmsphere shall be either:

1.

Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or 2.

Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic. contain-ment purge valve.

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REPLACE WITH INSERT ON FOLI4 WING PAGE.

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Verifying the penetrations are in their closed / isolated condition, or a.

b.

Testing the containment purge valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.4.1.2.

• The emergency escape hatch temporary closure device is an acceptable replace-ment for_ that airlo_ck door.

(ek _REPI1CE WITH INSERT ON FOLLOUING PAGE.

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CALIERT CLI# 5 - UNIT 1 3/4 9-4 knendment No.108 1

1 INSERT FOR LCO 3.9.4 ACTION i

t'ONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS r

APPLICABILITY:

During CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity i

changes, movement of irradiated fuel within the containtent, movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel withi.n the e

containment

building, and electrical power distribution l

system degradation as required by Specif:.cationg3.8.2.2 and 3.8.2.4.

@.S. L 2.)

ACTION:

a.

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately**

suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIO!'S, positive' reactivity

changes, movement of irradiated fuel within the containment and movement of heavy loads ovat irradiated

-fuel within the containment building.

b.

The provis),ons of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.4 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be either in its closed / isolated condition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge valve within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ' ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel in the containment, movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel within the containment building, _ or electrical power distribution system degradation by:

1

• Performanc e of Action a.

shall not preclude completion l.

of actions to establish a safe conservative position.

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4 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RA$ES 3/4.6,1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY j

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Fq In Modes 1,

2, 3,

and 4,

primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY j ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the I containment atmosphere vill be restricted to those leakage

( paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident

}

l analyses.. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage (I rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during accident i f conditions.

In Modes 5

and 6,

the probability and consequences of these events are reduced because of the j

l Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and temperature u

. (, limitations of these modes, by preventing operations which (

) could lead to a

need for containment isolation, and by i

( =providing containment isolation through penetration closure. J 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKA&E The limitations on contairunent leakage ratas ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the As an added con-accident analyses at the peak accident pressure, P,r.

servatism, the measured overall integrated leaka e ata is further during performance of t fof p(as applicableossible degradation of the contai the periodic tests f.o accoun.75 L limited to < 0.75 L or < 0 ment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates are consistant with the requirements of Appendix 'J" of 10 CFR 50.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCXS.

The 11.dtations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT IhTEER.ITT and containment leak rata. Surveillance tasting of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal dange during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 8 3/4 6-1

3/4.9 REFUELING CPERAT!CNS h

BASES 3/4.9.1 BCRON CONCENTRATION 4

The limitations on minimum boron cencentration (2300 ppm) ensure thaf.:

1) the reactor will remain suberitical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volur.es having direct access to the reactor vessel.

The limitathn on X,ff of no greater t.*an 0.95 which includes a c:nservative allewance frr uncertainties, is sufficient to prevent react:r criticality curing refueling operations.

3/4.9.E INSTRUMENTATION TheOPhRABILITYofthesourcerangeneutrenf1pxmonitorsensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor suberiticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products.

This decay time is cenststent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

REPIACE WITH INSERT ON FOLI4 WING PAGE.

3/4.9.a CONTAINMENT PENETR.ATIONS f ',.

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3/4.9.5 CCMMUNICK" IONS 5

The requirement for communications capability ensures tha: refueling station personnel can be premptly informed cf significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditien during CORE ALTERATIONS.

l l

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 S 3/- 9 1 Amendment No. A8 1

OfJ.l: 7 L:- :

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INSERT FOR BASES 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION?

During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated. fusi -

within containment, a

release of fission product radioactivity to the environment must be prevented.

During Modes 1,

2, 3,

and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY as described in LCO 3.6.1.

In other situations, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not present, therefore, less stringent requirements are needed to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere.

The containment structure serves to contain fission product radioactivity which may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA), such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.

Additionally, this structure providne radiation shielding from the fission products which may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

l

i l

ATTACHMENT 2 UNIT 2 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AND BASES PAGES 3/4 8-5 3/4 8-7 3/4 8-11 3/4 9-4 B3/4 6-1 B3/4 9-1 l

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

+

SHUTDOWN

• L1HITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.B.1. 2 As a minimum, the fo11cding A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

One cir:vit between the offsite transmission network and the a.

onsite Class 1E distribution system, and b.

One diesel generator with:

1.

A day fuel tank containing a minimum volume of 375 gallons of fuel, A fuel storage system containing}a minimum volum 2.

18,250 gallons cf fuel, and 3.

A fuel transf er pump.

APPLICASILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

9 With less than the abcvt minimum re uired A.C. electrical power sources e-7 :-:- < : : <-:-

ro....v opggA3t ;, m. -m-

_ : - 4. 4. ;, :eg;_,- p _ - -

7

r ti: : ;

1

C'~'*!'.!

^

fa.

Immediately*

suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement

• of

}

l irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads over t

{/

irradiated fuel, and l

i t

k15.

Establish containment penetration closure as identified I

in Specification 3.9.4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />,.and-r g-Imm e&in+ely j

?

h

& nitiate corrective actions to restore d

4 the minimu.m A. C.

electrical power sources to OPERABLE stat SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I.8.1.2 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERASLE by the cerformance of each of the Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.1.1.1 and 4.5.1.-l.2 except for requirement 4.5.1.1.2a.5.

y l

• Performance of Action a.

shall not preclude completion J

l(==of actions to establish a safe conservative position.

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_ =

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l 3/4 B 5 CALVERT Cliff 5-t/ NIT 2

~

1:

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS A.C. DISTRIBUTION - SHUTCOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical busses shall be OPEMBLE and energized frem sources of power other than a diesel gene-rator but aligned to an OPEMBLE diesel generator:

1

- 4160 volt Emergency Bus 1

- 480 volt Emergency Bus 2 - 120 volt A.C. Vital Busses APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6 ACTION:

With less than the above complement of A.C. busses OPEMBLE and energized;

t:M ':' ::'i'.:. i.,7 ::T:: P i0:..O M c:.

-~v, x

(

Immediately*

suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity

changes, movement of t

irradiated fuel and movement of heavy loads over irradiated j

fuel, until the minimum required A.C.

OPERABLE and energized status, and bussesarerestoredto(j 6

I ik.

Establish containment penetration closure as i

identifiedi)n

(

Specific.ation 3.9.4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />,2nd m m e 6ioM ely

)

itiate - corrective actions 9 ' tin

.: h::3 to restore the i 4

minimum A.C.

electrical busses to OPERABLE and I

statusiand energize)d

-g SURVEII. LANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.2 The specified A.C. busses shall be determined OPEMBLE and i

energized from A.C. sources other than the diesel generators at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability.

n P

• Performance of Action a.

shall not preclude completion of l

p actions to establish a safe conservative position.

s __

x

_(

CALVERT CLIFFS-UNIT 2 3/4 B-7

~__-

gl

! ELECTRICAL PotiER SYSTEMS 0.C. O!57913U7:0N SFU7DCWN LIMIT!NG CONO: TION FOR OPERATION l

}.

3.8.2.4 As a minimum, the following 0.C. electrical equipment and busses snall be energized and OPERABLE:

' - 125-volt 3.~.

susses, and 2 - 125-voli battery banks, one cf wnica may be the Reserve Battery, and one associated charger per bank supplying the above D.C. busses.

3PPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With less than the above comelement of 0.C. ecuiement and busses OPERABLEj Y Y.,, + ~. ~ ~ '

2'.~. l. ~ % ~. L l. 7

~

,- _ -- =

a.

Immediately*

suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated

fuel, and movement of heavy loads over

)

irradiated fuel until the minimum required D.C.

I I

equipment and busses are restored to OPERABLE status, I

and i.

Establish containment penetration closure as identified I

in Specification 3.9.4 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, and f

( mme k he\\y

[>

W.

• nitiate corrective actions N to restore the minimum D.C.

equipment and busses to OPERABLE i

status.

j SURVEILLANCE REOUIRENENT5 4.8.2.4.1 The above required 125-volt 0.C. busses shall be determined CTERABLE and energized at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability.

4.8.2.4.2-The above recuired 125-volt battery banks and chargers shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.3.2.

_ _ = _

_ ww 1

• Performance of Action a.

shall not preclude completion f

of actions to establish a safe conservative position.

L f_

f CALVERT CLIFF 3 - UNIT 2 3/4 8-11 knendment No. 97 I

m-,,

w

-w

t

RETUELING OPERATIONS l

CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The contairnent penetrations shall be in the following statusi a.

The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts, b.

A minicu:n of one door in each airlock is closed *, and c.

Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atwsphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1.

Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or 2.

Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic contaiteent purge valve.

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A a a, tete 99tyy.

Pt,. J _ emme he venne.=a**

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• f>

REPLACE WITH INSERT ON FOLI4 WING PAGE.

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Verifying the penetrations are in their closed / isolated condition, or a.

b.

Testing the contairnent purge valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.4.1.2.

The emergency escape hatch ter:perary closure device is an acceptable replacement for that airlock door.

~

(4 4 REPLACE WITH INSERT ON FOLLOWING PAGE.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 9-4 Amendment No. 91

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INSERT FOR LCO 3.9.4 ACTION CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS i

hPPLICABILITY:

During CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel within the containment, movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel within the containment

building, and electrical power distribution l

system degradation as required by Specif:, cation,s 3.8.2.2 and g

3.8.2.4.

1 b

i ACTION:

a.

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately**

suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity

changes, movement of irradiated fuel within the containment and movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel within the containment building.

b.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

.....-----..---===========-m,--====---

4.9.4 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be either in its closed / isolated condition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge valve within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel in the containment, movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel within the containment building, or electrical power distribution system degradation by:

• • Performance of Action a.

shall not preclude completion of actior.s to establish a safe conservative position.

1 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY j

.,,$ CM.S."C ""7." 2.' = J '.- ^4 b I 122

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In Modes 1,

2, 3,

and 4,

primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

$[

ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses.

This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limiution, will limit the site boundary radiation

([j doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.

In Modes 5

and 6,

the probability and l

consequences of these events are reduced because of the

}

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and temperature I

/

limitations of these modes, by preventing operations which I

could lead to a need for containment isolation, and by h

(( providing containment isolation through penetration closure. j 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAIMMENT LEAXAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the,value assumed in the

~

As an added con-accident analyses at the peak accident pressure. P,r.

servatism, the measured overall integrated leaka e ate is further during performance of the periodE tests to account fof' p(as applicable limited to < 0.75 L. or < 0.75 L ossible degradation of the contain-ment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates are consistant with the requirements of Appendix "J" of 10 CFR 50.

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3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LCCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air i

locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance tasting of the air lock seals I

provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals Mtween air lock L

leakage tests.

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a 3/2.9.1 50RCN CCNCENTRATION The limitations on minimum bcron cencentration (2300 ppe) ensure that:

1) the reacter will remain suberitical during CORE ALTERATIOUS, and 2) a uniform boren c ncentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volumes having direct access to the reactor vessel.

Tne limitation on X, p of no greater than 0.95 which includes a conservative all:wance for unchr ainties, is sufficient to prevent reactor criticality during refueling eperations.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERAB!t.!TY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity c:ndition of the core.

3/2.9.3 DECAY TIME

. The minimum requirement for reacter suberiticality prior to movement of irradia ed fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fissien preducts.

This decay time is cons.istent with the assur.ptions used in tne accident analyses.

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e e m e...e 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS.

The requirement for cermunications capability ensures that refueling station persennel can be prc=ptly infer:.ed of significant changes in the facility status er core reactivity conditien during CORE ALTERAT!ONS.

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i INSERT FOR BASES 3/4.9.4 CONTAINNENT PENETRATIONS 4

During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within containment, a

release of fission product radioactivity to the environment must be prevented.

During Nodes 1,. 2,

3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY as described in LCO 3. 6.1.

In other situations, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not. present, therefore, less stringent requirements are needed to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere.

The containment structure serves to contain fission product radioactivity which may be released from the reactor core following a Design Basis Accident (DBA), such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.

Additionally, this structure provides radiation shielding from-the fission products which may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

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