ML20127J894

Safety Insp Rept 50-455/85-17 on 850516-0617.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Deficiency Repts, Location of Manual Trip Circuit in Solid State Protection Sys & Action on Previous Insp Findings

ML20127J894
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	06/21/1985
From:	Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
References
50-455-85-17, NUDOCS 8506270171
Download: ML20127J894 (7)

See also: IR 05000455/1985017

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COTIISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-455/85017(DRP)

Docket No. 50-455

License No. CPPR-131

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

Post Office Box 767

Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 2

Inspection At: Byron Station, Byron, IL

Inspection Conducted: May 16-June 17, 1985

Inspectors:

J. M. Hinds, Jr.

K. A. Connaughton

LC), L_

Otec

Approved By:

W. L. Forn

,C

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Reactor Projects Section 1A

Date'

Inspection Summary

Inspection on May 16-June 17, 1985 (Report No. 50-455/85017(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced saftey inspection by the resident

inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; 10 CFR 50.55(e)

reports; location of manual trip circuit in the solid-state protection system;

prevention of equipment problems experienced on Unit 1; flushing procedures;

and housekeeping / care and preservation of safety related equipment.

The inspection consisted of 128 inspector-hours onsite by 2 NRC inspectors

including 11 inspector-hours during off-shifts.

Results: Of the six areas inspected no violations or deviations

were 'lentified, and no issues were identified which might indicate potential

public health and safety concerns.

8506270171 850621

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DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Commonwealth Edison

T. Maiman, Manager of Projects

V. I. Schlosser, Byron Project Manager

R. Tuetken, Byron Startup Superintendent

R. Querio, Byron Station Superintendent

• G. Sorensen, Byron Project Construction Superintendent

• F. Hornbeak, Unit 2 Technical Staff Supervisor

• R. Klingler, Project QC Supervisor

• J. Woldridge, QA Supervisor

J. Binder, Project Electrical Supervisor

D. Pyatt, Project Constructin

D. Kruger, Technical Staff

• J.

Langan, Technical Staff

P. Anthony, Technical Staff

Harfield Electric Company

A. Smith, QA/QC Manager

The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and

contractor personnel during the course of this inspection.

• Denotes those present during the exit interview on June 17, 1985.

2.

Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(92702)

(Closed) Noncompliance Item (455/85006-01(DRP)): Failure to provide

adequate instructions, procedures or drawings for Engineered Safety

Feature (ESP) battery installation. The licensee's response letter dated

May 24, 1985, indicated that subsequent to identification of this item,

documentation concerning the battery cell-to-end stringer gap dimensions

was provided in the field work instructions.

Battery installation was

completed with gaps properly established and verified by quality control

inspection. All Hatfield Electric Company (RECo) field engineering

personnel were advised of the need to keep special work instructions with

work packages.

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The inspector verified accomplishment of the foregoing corrective actions

by review of HECo Rework Requests Nos. 11751, 11752, 11753 and 11754 as

well as direct measurements of ESF batteries 211 and 212 battery

cell-to-end stringer gaps. The inspector was provided a copy of a HECo

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Engineering Directive dated May 17, 1985, which provided appropriate

guidance concerning incorporation of special instructions into field work

instructions. All HECo engineering personnel acknowledged their reviews

of the directive by signature.

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3.

10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports (92716)

(Closed) 50.55e Report (455/83011-EE): Anaconda flexible conduit split.

This item was previously reviewed in NRC Inspection Report No. 454/85013

and remained open pending verification that the onsite electrical

contractor's procedures were satisfactory for implementing design drawing

and engineering specification requirements. The inspector reviewed

Hatfield Electric Company Procedure 20, " Class 1 Exposed Conduit System

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Installation," Revision 14, dated March 15, 1984.

Section 5.1 of this

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procedure, " Material" stated that materials used in Category I systems

shall be as specified in Sargent and Lundy Standard EB-146, Paragraph 5.1

through 5.2.8.

Paragraph 5.2.5 of the subject standard specified the use

of either Service Air Co. SF65 series /SS63 series or American B0A NB

series flexible conduit for installations inside containment.

For equipment supplied by offsite vendors with Anaconda flexible conduit

and located inside containment or another harsh environment, electrical

drawing 6E-0-3000K, note 3D specified that the conduit would be replaced

with those types specified in Sargent and Lundy Standard EB-146.

The

licensee generated the following Hatfield Electric Company Rework

Requests to require replacement of the supplied Anaconda conduit.

Hatfield Rework

ITEM

Request Nos.

Instrument Panel 2PL50J

6366

Instrument Panel 2PL52J

6365

Instrument Panel 2PL53J

5400

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Instrument Panel 2PL54J

5701

Instrument Panel 2PL55J

5702

Instrument Panel 2PL56J

5724

Instrument Panel 2PL57J

5725

Instrument Panel 2PL60JA

6001

Instrument Panel 2PL60JB

6002

Instrument Panel 2PL60JC

6003

Instrument Panel 2PL60JD

6004

Instrument Panel 2PL61JA

6005

Instrument Panel 2PL61JB

6006

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Instrument Panel 2PL61JC

6007

Instrument Panel 2PL61JD

6008

Instrument Panel 2PL66J

6367

Instrument Panel 2PL67J

6368

Instrument Panel 2PL69J

6369

Instrument Panel 2PL70J

5703

Instrument Panel 2PL71J

6009

Instrument Panel 2PL72J

6010

Instrument Panel 2PL74J

5704

Instrument Panel 2PL75J

6370

Instrument Panel 2PL76J

5705

Polar Crane

6033

Manipulator Crane

6032

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Inspection of the Location of the Manual Trip Circuti in Westinghouse

Designed Plants With a Solid State Protection System (SSPS)-TI 2500/14

(25014)

a.

Background

The effects of short-circuit failures of the output transistors in

the UV output circuit of the Westinghouse SSPS were highlighted in

recently issued Information Notice No. 85-18.

A short-circuit

failure of the type described in the notice would prevent the

automatic tripping of the associated reactor trip breaker (RTB) on

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a valid reactor trip demand.

During NRC review of this matter, another potential deficiency

involving the SSPS was discovered. Namely, the use of erroneous

controlled schematic diagrams of the SSPS at an operating facility.

Except for the drawings being used by the I&C technicians, the

controlled schematic diagrams of the SSPS being used at that

facility erroneously depicted the manual trip circuit for the RTBs

as being upstream of two particular output transistors.

If such

were the case, and if one of the output transistors was shorted as

described in Information Notice 85-18, then the manual trip action

associated with the UV portion of the trip circuit would also be

ineffective.

Temporary Instruction TI 2500/14 was therefore issued to require NRC

inspector verification that the SSPS manual trip circuits were

downstream of the undervoltage output transistors and thus the

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manual undervoltage trip functions were not vulnerable to shorting

of the transistors.

b.

Inspection

The inspector reviewed electrical drawings GE-2-4030 EF23,

" Schematic Diagram, Reactor Protection, Part-2, Train A," Revision B,

dated October 13, 1984, and 6E-2-4030 EF73, " Schematic Diagram

Reactor Protection Part-2 Train B," Revision B, dated September 19, 1984.

These drawings correctly specified that the manual undervoltage trip

circuits were downstream of output transistors Q3 and Q4 on the

undervoltage driver cards.

To further verify that the foregoing schematics accurately reflected

the as-installed SSPS equipment the inspector contacted licensee

technical staff personnel and was provided with: an identical

schematic (applicable to both trains) from the Byron Station SSPS

vendor manual; Westinghouse Electric Corporation Instrumentation and

Control Drawings 2379A59 Sheet 6, Revision D and Sheet 9, Revision AC;

Drawing 6E-2-4114F, " External Wiring Diagram, Solid State (RX&ESF)

Protection System Cabinet, Train A (Logic Section) Part 3 (2PA09J)",

Revision C, dated March 5, 1984; Drawing 6E-2-4052AA, " Internal-External

Wiring Diagram MCB Reactor and Chemical Volume Control Section B2,

Part 11 (2PM05J)," Revision B, dated November 19, 1984; Drawing 6E-2-4054U,

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" Internal-External Wiring Diagram MCB Engineered Safety Features

Section A2, Part 6 (2PM06J)," Revision C, dated December 12, 1984;

Drawing 6E-2-4054P, " Internal-External Wiring Diagram MCB Engineered

Safety Features Section A2 Part 2 (2PM06J)," Revision E, dated

August 8,1984 and; Drawing 6E-2-4208B, " Internal-External Wiring

Diagram Reactor Trip Switchgear Cabinet 2 2RD05E," Revision F dated

March 22, 1985.

The above listed wiring diagrams and drawings traced wiring from the

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Undervoltage Output Cards, Pins 29 and 30, through the manual reactor trip and manual safety injection control switches to the

termination points on the reactor trip switchgear cubical which were

connected to the undervoltage trip coil.

Based upon review of the

foregoing " Approved for Use" design and construction drawings the

inspector concluded that the Byron Unit 2 SSPS was configured such

that shorting of ouput transistors Q3 and/or Q4 on the undervoltage

output card would not defeat the manual undervoltage reactor trip

function.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Prevention of Equipment problems Experienced on Byron Unit 1 (92706)

During a management meeting held on May 28, 1965, and documented in NRC

Inspection Report (454/85021(DRP)) certain equipment problems encountered

during the Byron Unit 1 startup testing program were discussed. One such

problem concerned the improper installation of an air-operated non-return

check valve in an extraction steam line which was required to function as

part of the main turbine overspeed protection system.

While prompt corrective action was taken to address this matter for Unit 1

it was not apparent to NRC personnel present at the May 28, 1985,

meeting that actions had been taken or were planned to be taken to assure

a similar problem did not exist on Unit 2.

Moreover, it appeared that

-depending upon the circumstances underwhich Unit 1 equipment problems

were identified, as well as the manner in which they were documented and

corrected, the problems may or may not have been evaluated for applicability

to Unit 2.

Regarding the specific instance involving an improperly installed

non-return check valve, the licensee performed a Unit 2 system walkdown

on May 20-24, 1985. This walkdown verified that the following check

valves were properly installed relative to the direction,of flow:

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2ES002

2ES005

2ES008

2ES011A

2ES011B

2ES011C

2ES015A

2ES015B

2ES015C

2ES017A

2ES017B

2ES017C

2ES062A

2ES062B

The inspector has no further concerns relative to this specific item.

Regarding the programmatic concern that Unit i equipment problems

encountered during Unit 1 startup testing and commercial operation are

properly evaluated for applicability to Unit 2, the licensee agreed to

describe those measures already in place or which will be in place to

address this concern during a future scheduled management meeting.

Pending inspector review and evaluation of information to be provided by

the licensee this matter is considered an open item (455/85017-01(DRP)).

6.

System Flushing Procedure Review (92706)

The inspector reviewed Byron Unit 2 Flush Procedure 2.018.52, " Chemical

and Volume Control System," Revision 0, dated November 8, 1984, against

the requirements of the licensee's quality assurance manual, the Byron

Flushing Manual, and ANSI N45.2.1, " Cleaning of Fluid Systems and

Associated Components During the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power

Plants," dated 1973 as endorsed and supplemented by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.37, " Quality Assurance Requirements for Cleaning of Fluid Systems and

Associated Components of Watercooled Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 0,

dated March 7, 1973.

Specifically, the inspector verified that the subject procedure had

received required reviews and approvals including reviews against

10 CFR 50.59 considerations; specified prerequisites; properly specified

system cleanliness requirements, including influent and effluent water

quality; included marked up piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDis)

to delineate flush paths and sample points and; provided for documented

verifications of installation and removal of temporary system alterations.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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Housekeeping / Care and Preservation of Safety Related Compnents (92706)

The inspectors conducted plant tours of Unit 2 between May 16 and

June 17, 1985. Areas of the Unit 2 plant observed during the tours

included the containment, fuel handling and storage areas, auxiliary

building areas including the Unit 2 portion of the control room, and the

turbine building. Areas were inspected for work in progress, state of

cleanliness, overall housekeeping, state of fire protection equipment and

methods being employed, and the care and preservation of safety-related

components and equipment. The inspectors paid particular attention to

areas identified to the licensee during the previous inspection period as

requiring increased attention to establish and maintain levels of

cleanliness comensurate with the current stage of Unit 2 construction.

The inspectors determined that licensee actions continued to be effective

in the previously identified areas.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action

on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed

during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.

9.

Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1

at the conclusion of the inspection on June 17, 1985. The inspectors

summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The

inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the

inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the

inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such

documents / processes as proprietary.

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