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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety         hhcensingBoard_
s,3 f
In the. Matter of                           )-     ..
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION hhcensingBoard_
5 MAY)22 PI:39 Philadelphia Electric Company'             )   Docket Nos. 50-3520L (Limerick Generating Station, OC T /S
Before the Atomic Safety In the. Matter of
                . Units l'and 2)                       ER NCH APPLICANT'S ANSWER TO PROPOSED REVISED CONTENTIONS OF THE GRATERFORD PRISONERS Preliminary Statement On   May   13,     1985,   intervenor     Graterford     Prisoners
)-
            '("intervenor") filed proposed, revised contentions regarding:
5 MAY)22 PI:39 Philadelphia Electric Company'
                          ~
)
Docket Nos. 50-3520L (Limerick Generating Station, OC T
/S
. Units l'and 2)
ER NCH APPLICANT'S ANSWER TO PROPOSED REVISED CONTENTIONS OF THE GRATERFORD PRISONERS Preliminary Statement On May 13,
: 1985, intervenor Graterford Prisoners
~
'("intervenor") filed proposed, revised contentions regarding:
the adequacy of radiological emergency planning to protect inmates at the State Correctional-Institution at Graterford
the adequacy of radiological emergency planning to protect inmates at the State Correctional-Institution at Graterford
("Graterford").1! For the reasons discussed below, Appli-cant opposes those contentions as lacking specificity and bases pursuant to 10 C.F.R.'S2.714(b).
("Graterford").1!
                                                                      ~
For the reasons discussed below, Appli-cant opposes those contentions as lacking specificity and bases pursuant to 10 C.F.R.'S2.714(b).
The procedural history which resulted in the submission of these contentions-has already been amply. set for'th by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board               (" Licensing Board" or
The procedural history which resulted in the submission
~
of these contentions-has already been amply. set for'th by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
(" Licensing Board" or
,m a
,m a
,            1/   See Proposed Revised Contentions of the Graterford Inmates With Regard to the Radiological Emergency Response      Plan      (May  13,  1985)      (" Proposed Revised Conterstions") .
1/
8505230480 850522                                                                  /h s
See Proposed Revised Contentions of the Graterford Inmates With Regard to the Radiological Emergency
PDR    ADOCK 05000352 PDR o
gQ m
g


4
===Response===
          " Board") in its Memorandum and Order which denied the first set of proposed contentions.2/
Plan (May 13, 1985)
Contrary to any expectation that respecification of the contentions would be supported by portions of Plan 2 not previously disclosed to intervenor in Plan 1,-     the revised l       contentions demonstrate     that   the further relief granted i
(" Proposed Revised Conterstions").
intervenor has     resulted only   in a reopening of issues previously resolved to its satisfaction during the dis-cussions and negotiations which took place at two prehearing conferences before the Licensing Board on February 27 and March 22, 1985.O l
8505230480 850522
2/   Philadelphia Electric Company       (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), Docket Nos. 50-352-OL and 50-353-OL (April 12, 1985) (slip op. at 1-4).       That order was reversed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal     Board (" Appeal Board")   in ALAB-806 on the grounds that intervenor should have been granted yet another opportunity to submit respecified contentions based upon review by its ; counsel and consultant of a more plan.
/h PDR ADOCK 05000352 s
fully disclosed version of the SCIG emergency Limerick, supra, ALAB-806, 21 NRC         (May 1, 1985).
Q o
3_/ TEie' Board and parties have used the designation " Plan 1" to refer to the sanitized version of the Graterford emergency plan disclosed to intervenor on December 13, 1984, and " Plan 2" as the almost       fully disclosed version disclosed on March 18, 1985.
PDR g
4/   ~Thuc, the proposed contentions are late without good cause. Nonetheless, the Appeal Board has precluded this Board from making any such determination and has found,   even prior to its review of the revised l             contentions, that good cause exists for their lateness.
m g
l             I_d,. at 12.
 
4.
" Board") in its Memorandum and Order which denied the first set of proposed contentions.2/
Contrary to any expectation that respecification of the contentions would be supported by portions of Plan 2 not previously disclosed to intervenor in Plan 1,-
the revised l
contentions demonstrate that the further relief granted i
intervenor has resulted only in a
reopening of issues previously resolved to its satisfaction during the dis-cussions and negotiations which took place at two prehearing conferences before the Licensing Board on February 27 and March 22, 1985.O l
2/
Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating
: Station, Units 1 and 2),
Docket Nos.
50-352-OL and 50-353-OL (April 12, 1985)
(slip op. at 1-4).
That order was reversed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board
(" Appeal Board")
in ALAB-806 on the grounds that intervenor should have been granted yet another opportunity to submit respecified contentions based upon review by its ; counsel and consultant of a more fully disclosed version of the SCIG emergency plan.
Limerick, supra, ALAB-806, 21 NRC (May 1,
1985).
3_/
TEie' Board and parties have used the designation " Plan 1" to refer to the sanitized version of the Graterford emergency plan disclosed to intervenor on December 13,
: 1984, and
" Plan 2"
as the almost fully disclosed version disclosed on March 18, 1985.
4/
~Thuc, the proposed contentions are late without good cause.
Nonetheless, the Appeal Board has precluded this Board from making any such determination and has
: found, even prior to its review of the revised l
contentions, that good cause exists for their lateness.
l I_d,.
at 12.
l
l


.. e .
.. e..
The Appeal Board has directed this Board to consider "whether ~ [the . refiled contentions] have adequate bases and specificity."bI     Even with regard to these limited criteria, the proposed contentions are seriously Scficient for the reasons   for- which this Board denied virtually the                                               same conter>tions - in its Memorandum and Order of April 12, 1985-discussed below.
The Appeal Board has directed this Board to consider "whether ~ [the. refiled contentions] have adequate bases and specificity."bI Even with regard to these limited criteria, the proposed contentions are seriously Scficient for the reasons for-which this Board denied virtually the same conter>tions - in its Memorandum and Order of April 12, 1985-discussed below.
Argument In determining the level of specificity required for admission of-intervenor's proposed contentions, the recent decision of the Appeal Board in ALAB-804 provides excellent
Argument In determining the level of specificity required for admission of-intervenor's proposed contentions, the recent decision of the Appeal Board in ALAB-804 provides excellent
        , guidance. In that decision, the Appeal Board affirmed this
, guidance.
        . Board's dismissal' of respecified contentions rel'ating to environmental impacts of the system for supplying supple-mental cooling water for the Limerick facility, finding that                                               _
In that decision, the Appeal Board affirmed this
intervenor had not put forth reasonable specific bases for                                                   1
. Board's dismissal' of respecified contentions rel'ating to environmental impacts of the system for supplying supple-mental cooling water for the Limerick facility, finding that 1
                                                                                                                    .l its contentions based on the documents that were available to it.5/   The situation there closely parallels the' circum-stances of the Graterford Prisoners' refiling here.
intervenor had not put forth reasonable specific bases for
In ALAB-785, which also permitted respecification of contentions,   the Appeal Board distinguished                                           that   inter-venor's entitlement to reformulate its contention at an 5/   'Id. at 18.
.l its contentions based on the documents that were available to it.5/
6/   Limerick, supra, ALAB-804,                     21 NRC                                 (April 10, 1985) (slip op at 13).
The situation there closely parallels the' circum-stances of the Graterford Prisoners' refiling here.
In ALAB-785, which also permitted respecification of contentions, the Appeal Board distinguished that inter-venor's entitlement to reformulate its contention at an 5/
'Id.
at 18.
6/
: Limerick, supra, ALAB-804, 21 NRC (April 10, 1985) (slip op at 13).


e advanced stage of the proceeding from that of a petitioner in proposing contentions at the outset.     It emphasized that any allegations'at that point must specifically dispute the adequacy of statements and analyses in the Final Environ-mental Statement for Limerick.E       Subsequently, the Appeal Board affirmed this Board's finding that no such specificity had been pleaded.
.- e advanced stage of the proceeding from that of a petitioner in proposing contentions at the outset.
In like manner,   intervenor here has been given yet another opportunity to sharpen the focus of its contentions
It emphasized that any allegations'at that point must specifically dispute the adequacy of statements and analyses in the Final Environ-mental Statement for Limerick.E Subsequently, the Appeal Board affirmed this Board's finding that no such specificity had been pleaded.
        ' based upon review of Plan 2. Despite a reasonable expecta-tion that its proposed contentions would very precisely delineate alleged deficiencies with specific plan -refer-ences, .the allegations in support of the newly proposed contentions are as diffuse and unsupported as the originally proposed contentions. Each of the particular bases alleged will be examined individually.U A. Manpower mobilization. The thrust of this proposed contention is that commercial phone lines could be "overbur-i L         dened and unavailable"     in the event of   a   radiological I
In like manner, intervenor here has been given yet another opportunity to sharpen the focus of its contentions
7/   Limerick, supra, ALAB-785, 20 NRC 848, 869, 876 (1984).
' based upon review of Plan 2.
l I,
Despite a reasonable expecta-tion that its proposed contentions would very precisely delineate alleged deficiencies with specific plan -refer-ences,.the allegations in support of the newly proposed contentions are as diffuse and unsupported as the originally proposed contentions.
        ~
Each of the particular bases alleged will be examined individually.U A.
8 /. As to the " General Contention" which has been pleaded (Proposed Revised Contentions at 2), intervenor lacks
Manpower mobilization.
[-             standing to assert any interest on behalf of the SCIG staff. Intervenor. uas admitted as "the Graterford         l Prisoners" to represent the collective interests of SCIG inmates who petitioned for       intervention. See Limerick, supra, LBP-82-43A,     15 NRC 1423,     1446-47 (1982).
The thrust of this proposed contention is that commercial phone lines could be "overbur-i L
dened and unavailable" in the event of a
radiological I
7/
Limerick, supra, ALAB-785, 20 NRC 848, 869, 876 (1984).
l 8 /.
As to the " General Contention" which has been pleaded I,
(Proposed Revised Contentions at 2), intervenor lacks
~
[-
standing to assert any interest on behalf of the SCIG staff.
Intervenor. uas admitted as "the Graterford l
Prisoners" to represent the collective interests of SCIG inmates who petitioned for intervention.
See
: Limerick, supra, LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC
: 1423, 1446-47 (1982).
l
l


    ,      emergency such that off-duty Graterford security personnel could'not be promptly reached.E!           The only basis cited for this concern is a statement by a township supervisor in the evidentiary     hearing on     offsite   emergency     planning   for Limerick.     The contention fails to note, much less address, the Licensing Board's specific disposition of the witness's concern     in its Third PID.E!           Moreover,     the contention unjustifiably equates the need for prompt notification of township Emergency Operations Center personnel with noti-fication of off-duty prison guards.
emergency such that off-duty Graterford security personnel could'not be promptly reached.E!
As such,     there is a serious lack of basis in the contention.       It fails to recognize. that adequate prison
The only basis cited for this concern is a statement by a township supervisor in the evidentiary hearing on offsite emergency planning for Limerick.
            -security is on duty       a't all times. Additional security personnel would be needed only if an evacuation were or-dered. It is already a matter of record that such an evacuation would not even commence until about six hours into an. actual emergency.E             Under those circumstances, there will be ample time to contact any necessary personnel by telephone.
The contention fails to note, much less address, the Licensing Board's specific disposition of the witness's concern in its Third PID.E!
9_/   Proposed Revised Contentions at 2.
: Moreover, the contention unjustifiably equates the need for prompt notification of township Emergency Operations Center personnel with noti-fication of off-duty prison guards.
1_0f   Limerick, supra, LBP-85-14, 21 NRC               (May 2,   1985)
As such, there is a serious lack of basis in the contention.
It fails to recognize. that adequate prison
-security is on duty a't all times.
Additional security personnel would be needed only if an evacuation were or-dered.
It is already a matter of record that such an evacuation would not even commence until about six hours into an. actual emergency.E Under those circumstances, there will be ample time to contact any necessary personnel by telephone.
9_/
Proposed Revised Contentions at 2.
1_0f Limerick, supra, LBP-85-14, 21 NRC (May 2, 1985)
(slip op. at 271).
(slip op. at 271).
M/     See the -discussion at pages 13-16, infra.             Although.
M/
intervenor has challenged the accuracy of the time estimate, its allegations do not question whether an evacuation can occur sooner, but rather "whether the plan   ]i.e., evacuation]     can be accomplished in the (Footnote Continued)
See the -discussion at pages 13-16, infra.
Although.
intervenor has challenged the accuracy of the time estimate, its allegations do not question whether an evacuation can occur sooner, but rather "whether the plan
]i.e.,
evacuation]
can be accomplished in the (Footnote Continued)


In any event,'there is no requirement under the Com-mission's regulations or planning guidance for other than commercial telephone communications as a means of notifying.
In any event,'there is no requirement under the Com-mission's regulations or planning guidance for other than commercial telephone communications as a means of notifying.
personnel   such as off-duty prison guards.             Intervenor's reliance upon Criterion F.1.a of NUREG-0654 is unwarranted.
personnel such as off-duty prison guards.
That   provision   provides   guidance     as to   communications between response ~ organizations. As to notifying individual personnel within those organizations, NUREG-0654, Criterion F.1.e simply states that plans shall include " provision for alerting or activating emergency personnel in each response organization."   A network of sequential or " cascade" commer-cial telephone calls meets this standard. E           In sh. ort, the (Footnote Continued) estimated time frame (of six to ten hours] ."             Proposed Revised Contentions at 13.
Intervenor's reliance upon Criterion F.1.a of NUREG-0654 is unwarranted.
          -12/ In Diablo Canyon, the Licensing Board considered the adequacy of a similar network for notifying offsite emergency workers. It. held:
That provision provides guidance as to communications between response ~ organizations.
NUREG-0654 does not prohibit cascade or sequential warning systems for the notification of ~ individual emergency workers. The County emergency plan includes a cascade plan for telephone notification which'will reach into every element of the response organization.
As to notifying individual personnel within those organizations, NUREG-0654, Criterion F.1.e simply states that plans shall include " provision for alerting or activating emergency personnel in each response organization."
The   plan   generally     specifies     that organizations       upon     receiving       a notification will in turn notify key personnel using'prioritized call lists.
A network of sequential or " cascade" commer-cial telephone calls meets this standard. E In sh. ort, the (Footnote Continued) estimated time frame (of six to ten hours]."
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,. Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70, 16 NRC 756, 813-(1982), aff'd, ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819             (1984).           This likewise disposes of intervenor's related contention that "a viable back-up system should be required."
Proposed Revised Contentions at 13.
-12/
In Diablo Canyon, the Licensing Board considered the adequacy of a similar network for notifying offsite emergency workers.
It. held:
NUREG-0654 does not prohibit cascade or sequential warning systems for the notification of ~ individual emergency workers.
The County emergency plan includes a cascade plan for telephone notification which'will reach into every element of the response organization.
The plan generally specifies that organizations upon receiving a
notification will in turn notify key personnel using'prioritized call lists.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,. Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70, 16 NRC 756, 813-(1982),
aff'd, ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819 (1984).
This likewise disposes of intervenor's related contention that "a
viable back-up system should be required."
Proposed Revised Contentions at 3.
Proposed Revised Contentions at 3.
        ~
~


proposed contention lacks any legal basis and also fails to explain any specific reason why it would be necessary to contact off-duty prison guards       immediately in order to prepare for an evacuation which would not 'even commence until at least-six hours after an evacuation was ordered.E I B. Planning input from the prison guards' union.     It is unclear. in this contentions whether- intervenor is at-tempting to represent the legal interests of Graterford officers, their union or both. As the Licensing. Board has
proposed contention lacks any legal basis and also fails to explain any specific reason why it would be necessary to contact off-duty prison guards immediately in order to prepare for an evacuation which would not 'even commence until at least-six hours after an evacuation was ordered.E I B.
    . pointed out, neither any guard nor his union is a party to this proceeding (Tr. 20624-25). Intervenor lacks standing to represent any interest of the guards because standing
Planning input from the prison guards' union.
    -constitutes a personal htake in the outcome of the proceed-ing.E In any event, there is simply no regulatory requirement that support organization personnel or their unions have an opportunity to provide input into the planning process.15/
It is unclear. in this contentions whether-intervenor is at-tempting to represent the legal interests of Graterford officers, their union or both.
    -13/   As the Board has observed, the same telephone system will be used within the Limerick EPZ to notify county and municipal emergency workers (Tr. 20629). FEMA has thoroughly reviewed the offsite plans pursuant to its responsibilities under 44 C.F.R. Part 350 and has found no deficiency in the use of commercial telephone lines to contact county and municipal personnel. Intervenor has alleged nothing which would distinguish the situation   for telephone   notification of off-duty.
As the Licensing. Board has
. pointed out, neither any guard nor his union is a party to this proceeding (Tr. 20624-25).
Intervenor lacks standing to represent any interest of the guards because standing
-constitutes a personal htake in the outcome of the proceed-ing.E In any event, there is simply no regulatory requirement that support organization personnel or their unions have an opportunity to provide input into the planning process.15/
-13/
As the Board has observed, the same telephone system will be used within the Limerick EPZ to notify county and municipal emergency workers (Tr. 20629).
FEMA has thoroughly reviewed the offsite plans pursuant to its responsibilities under 44 C.F.R. Part 350 and has found no deficiency in the use of commercial telephone lines to contact county and municipal personnel.
Intervenor has alleged nothing which would distinguish the situation for telephone notification of off-duty.
Graterford guards.
Graterford guards.
M/     See note 8, supra.
M/
M/     Limerick, supra, " Memorandum and Order"     (April 12, 1985) (slip op. at 13-14).
See note 8, supra.
M/
: Limerick, supra,
" Memorandum and Order" (April 12, 1985) (slip op. at 13-14).


Thus, this proposed contention does not allege any deficien-cy.in-the Graterford plan;-it merely proposes an additional procedural mechanism for soliciting comments.         As such, the contention is wholly _.without basis.       Intervenor's citations to various portions of . NUREG-0654 regarding assignment of responsibilities to " organizations" which support an emer-gency. response       are inapposite. Prison guards are not
Thus, this proposed contention does not allege any deficien-cy.in-the Graterford plan;-it merely proposes an additional procedural mechanism for soliciting comments.
        " organizations" and their union as such has absolutely no role     in   implementing 'an   emergency   response- under the Graterford plan.
As such, the contention is wholly _.without basis.
C.     Training for civilian bus and ambulance drivers.
Intervenor's citations to various portions of. NUREG-0654 regarding assignment of responsibilities to " organizations" which support an emer-gency. response are inapposite.
        ,In essence, intervenor asserts its dissatisfaction with the ,
Prison guards are not
" organizations" and their union as such has absolutely no role in implementing 'an emergency response-under the Graterford plan.
C.
Training for civilian bus and ambulance drivers.
,In essence, intervenor asserts its dissatisfaction with the,
representa' tion by the Commonwealth that dosimetry 'traiEling =
representa' tion by the Commonwealth that dosimetry 'traiEling =
will'.be offered . bus drivers whose employers have agreed to.
will'.be offered. bus drivers whose employers have agreed to.
      ' furnish buses and drivers to evacuate Graterford inmates in-the event of a radiological emergency.           Intervenor-states a preference for : the broader training " offered to the school bus drivers." b         During a discussion of this contention as originally proposed, intervenor's counsel expressly stated that it would be withdrawn -if a commitment were made to provide those drivers with an opportunity. to receive the same' training offered to bus providers which have agreed to         !
' furnish buses and drivers to evacuate Graterford inmates in-the event of a radiological emergency.
assist       in the   evacuation of   school children and other l
Intervenor-states a preference for : the broader training " offered to the school bus drivers." b During a discussion of this contention as originally proposed, intervenor's counsel expressly stated that it would be withdrawn -if a commitment were made to provide those drivers with an opportunity. to receive the same' training offered to bus providers which have agreed to assist in the evacuation of school children and other l_6/
l l
Proposed Revised Contentions at 7.
l_6/   Proposed Revised Contentions at 7.


r
r
  ;Wi a.
;Wi a.
transportation-dependent       individuals -in   the event   of- a
transportation-dependent individuals -in the event of-a radiological emergency at Limerick (Tr. 20687-90).EI
-          radiological emergency at Limerick (Tr. 20687-90).EI
. In. renewing this. contention, intervenor fails-to address the representation of Applicant.on the record.that such' bus driver. training will be provided by Energy-Consul-tants on the same basis as to other bus providers who have.
                . In . renewing   this . contention,   intervenor   fails- to address the representation of Applicant .on the record .that such' bus driver. training will be provided by Energy-Consul-tants on the same basis as to other bus providers who have.
evacuation.EI
          . agreed to- assist in an       evacuation.EI    .This is precisely what intervenor requested.         Moreover, Applicant's represen-tation has not been challenged as deficient in any way.EI 17/
.This is precisely
          ~
. agreed to-assist in an what intervenor requested.
See- also Notice of Appeal from Licensing Board's             '
Moreover, Applicant's represen-tation has not been challenged as deficient in any way.EI 17/
      ~
See-also Notice of Appeal from Licensing Board's
Memorandum and Order on Graterford Priso'ers' n    Proposed' Contentions at 10 (April 18, 1985).
~
~
Memorandum and Order on Graterford Priso'ers' Proposed' n
Contentions at 10 (April 18, 1985).
M/- See Applicant's Answer to Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions of the Graterford Prisoners at 4 n.3 (April 4, 1985).
M/- See Applicant's Answer to Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions of the Graterford Prisoners at 4 n.3 (April 4, 1985).
M/. Intervenor' lumps together " ambulance drivers, rescue squad operators, hospital personnel, police and. fire departments" in the same category'as requiring further-training. See Pro         Revised Contentions. at p. 7.
M/.
Unlike bus drTvers, r     posed however, such personnel are, by the very nature of their responsibilities, given extensive training in responding to emergencies.. Intervenor has failed' to state any basis- for asserting that such personnel have not received. adequate training .to perform responsibilities, if any, related to Graterford in the event of a~ radiological emergency at Limerick.
Intervenor' lumps together " ambulance drivers, rescue squad operators, hospital personnel, police and. fire departments" in the same category'as requiring further-training.
See Pro Revised Contentions. at p.
7.
Unlike bus drTvers, posed r
however, such personnel are, by the very nature of their responsibilities, given extensive training in responding to emergencies..
Intervenor has failed' to state any basis-for asserting that such personnel have not received. adequate training.to perform responsibilities, if any, related to Graterford in the event of a~ radiological emergency at Limerick.
In fact, 'intervenor has not even made a threshold showing that the Graterford plan relies upon any non-Department personnel ~, other than bus drivers, who would. be. expected to report to Graterford in a
In fact, 'intervenor has not even made a threshold showing that the Graterford plan relies upon any non-Department personnel ~, other than bus drivers, who would. be. expected to report to Graterford in a
  .-            radiological . emergency.         Finally,   it   is   again emphasized that civilian emergency personnel will serve the entire populace within the EPZ in the event of an emergency.     Here again, FEMA has not reported any
radiological. emergency.
                ~ deficiency in their training or preparedness, nor has intervenor independently cited a_ny - basis for its implicit assertion to the contrary.
: Finally, it is again emphasized that civilian emergency personnel will serve the entire populace within the EPZ in the event of an emergency.
Here again, FEMA has not reported any
~ deficiency in their training or preparedness, nor has intervenor independently cited a_ny - basis for its implicit assertion to the contrary.


p D. Medical services for contaminated / injured individu-als~. Citing. the decision in San ~ Onofre that planning to provide medical care       for   about   25 contaminated   injured individuals is reasonable,El         intervenor questions whether.
p.
D.
Medical services for contaminated / injured individu-als~.
Citing. the decision in San ~ Onofre that planning to provide medical care for about 25 contaminated injured individuals is reasonable,El intervenor questions whether.
there is adequate " capacity" at Montgomery Hospital to meet the needs of any -contaminated injured Graterford inmates.
there is adequate " capacity" at Montgomery Hospital to meet the needs of any -contaminated injured Graterford inmates.
This-involves an obvious non seguitor because there is no regulatory requirement       in. planning medical     services for
This-involves an obvious non seguitor because there is no regulatory requirement in. planning medical services for
_ contaminated injured victims that each hospital must indi-vidually be able to render service to all 25 or so hypothet-ical patients.
_ contaminated injured victims that each hospital must indi-vidually be able to render service to all 25 or so hypothet-ical patients.
Moreover, intervenor's allegation that Dr. Linnemann's
Moreover, intervenor's allegation that Dr. Linnemann's ad'ress the capacity that exists at affidaviti "does not d
:    affidaviti "does not      ad'ress d      the capacity that exists at Montgomery Hospital for treating such contaminated individu-als"EI     is utterly lacking in specificity.         It is wholly unstated and otherwise unapparent what additional " capacity" intervenor alleges to be missing.SI-
Montgomery Hospital for treating such contaminated individu-als"EI is utterly lacking in specificity.
          -20/   See Southern California Edison Company           (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 532, 535 n.10 (1983).
It is wholly unstated and otherwise unapparent what additional " capacity" intervenor alleges to be missing.SI-
2J/   Proposed Revised Contentions at 9.
-20/
2
See Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 532, 535 n.10 (1983).
_2_2/ If intervenor is referring to physical capacity, it totally misapprehends Dr. Linnemann's affidavit as well as   the   basic   concepts     involved. As   the   Board previously found, planning standards and criteria for providing medical services to contaminated injured individuals "are concerned with radiation exposure principally     because     medical   personnel     treating 1 traumatic injury sustained in a radiological emergency (Footnote Continued) l l
2J/
1
Proposed Revised Contentions at 9.
                                                                              )
_2_2/
If intervenor is referring to physical capacity, it 2
totally misapprehends Dr. Linnemann's affidavit as well as the basic concepts involved.
As the Board previously found, planning standards and criteria for providing medical services to contaminated injured individuals "are concerned with radiation exposure principally because medical personnel treating traumatic injury sustained in a radiological emergency (Footnote Continued)
)


                                                                                                                        ._ 11 _
._ 11 _
w p-                       +
w p -
+
Intervenor's' remaining claims, including its assertion l:
Intervenor's' remaining claims, including its assertion l:
that' a "back-up facility" must be specified, have already L
L that' a "back-up facility" must be specified, have already l;
l; been decided'by this Board in its Second PID.                                                                                                       The ' _ Board explicitly rejected the same-contention as-regards planning for- Limerick onsite workers,                                                                         holding that there                                       are         a
been decided'by this Board in its Second PID.
[             , , -              considerable                                       number                       of   hospitals                       capable                 of     providing l                                 radiation. exposure / contamination treatment.- !                                                                                               As the Board (Footnote Continued) l-                                           :    may well - have to reckon with contamination as an obstacle to                                               adequate treatment of the traumatic injury."                               Limerick, supra,-LBP-84-31, 20 NRC 446, 531 (1984).                               Thus,                   hospitals _ utilize                           their                 routinely
The ' _ Board "explicitly rejected the same-contention as-regards planning for-Limerick onsite workers, holding that there are a
                                              - available facilities                   and                   resources                   to             handle contaminated injured victims.                                                                         In the event larger-numbers must-be treated, a.hos'pital would init'iate its
[
* _ disa's'ter plan for expanding such capabilities, just as it would in the event of any non-radiological emergency                                                                                                                             )
considerable number of hospitals capable of providing l
(Boyer, et al. , ff.-Tr. 9772, at 8-9, 14; Linnemann, l
radiation. exposure / contamination treatment.- !
Tr. 9928; - Appl. Exh. 40).                                                                     Intervenor has ,shown no i
As the Board (Footnote Continued) l-may well - have to reckon with contamination as an obstacle to adequate treatment of the traumatic injury."
basis .for ~ litigating any issue related to physical ~                                                                                                                             i capacity.
Limerick, supra,-LBP-84-31, 20 NRC 446, 531 (1984).
Contrary to-intervenor's assertion that Dr. Linnemann's Affidavit- of April 4,                                                             1985,               does not cover the equipment necessary to . provide such . medical care, he
: Thus, hospitals _ utilize their routinely
                                                  -expressly stated in 13 of his affidavit that "[t]here                                                                                                                               j are specific supplies and equipment set aside for this type of patient" at Montgomery Hospital._'Intervenor's criticism that the affidavit does not contain as much
- available facilities and resources to handle contaminated injured victims.
                                                    " detail" as Dr. Linnemann's testimony fails.to specify any deficiency in planning.
In the event larger-numbers must-be treated, a.hos'pital would init'iate its
M/             Limerick, supra, LBP-84-31, 20 NRC 446, 535 (1984).
* _ disa's'ter plan for expanding such capabilities, just as it would in the event of any non-radiological emergency
)
(Boyer, et al.,
ff.-Tr.
9772, at 8-9, 14; Linnemann, Tr.
9928; - Appl. Exh.
40).
Intervenor has,shown no i
basis.for ~ litigating any issue related to physical ~
i capacity.
Contrary to-intervenor's assertion that Dr. Linnemann's Affidavit-of April 4,
: 1985, does not cover the equipment necessary to. provide such. medical care, he
-expressly stated in 13 of his affidavit that "[t]here j
are specific supplies and equipment set aside for this type of patient" at Montgomery Hospital._'Intervenor's criticism that the affidavit does not contain as much
" detail" as Dr. Linnemann's testimony fails.to specify any deficiency in planning.
M/
Limerick, supra, LBP-84-31, 20 NRC 446, 535 (1984).
The decision in GUARD v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir.
The decision in GUARD v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir.
1985), provides no support for intervenor's position.
1985), provides no support for intervenor's position.
i^
That decision simply held that agreements to provide i^
That decision simply held that agreements to provide medical services, rather than the mere designation of available                                   hospitals,                   are                   required             by the NRC's regulations.                                               Also,     the' Commission has instructed licensing- boards to utilize pre-GUARD standards in their licensing decisions.                                                                 See Statement of Policy on Emergency Planning Standard 10 C.F.R. 550. 47 (b) (12) .
medical services, rather than the mere designation of available hospitals, are required by the NRC's regulations.
(                                                 50 Fed. Reg. 20892 (May 21, 1985).
: Also, the' Commission has instructed licensing-boards to utilize pre-GUARD standards in their licensing decisions.
        -   *-,4-,   .--     . .,   r,-       .-9,     ,--. - - - - , - , , , , , . . , , , _ , , . , , ~ , , . , -    -
See Statement of Policy on Emergency Planning Standard 10 C.F.R.
                                                                                                                            ,,----,,--,~,-~w-,,-,,-           w,,,....--...,.,             .--.~,-,,%-4w,--,,
550. 47 (b) (12).
                                                                                                                                                                                                  .                  --+..,v---er. - -
(
50 Fed. Reg. 20892 (May 21, 1985).
.--.~,-,,%-4w,--,,
--+..,v---er. - -
*-,4-,
r,-
.-9,
,--. - - - -, -,,,,,..,,, _,,.,, ~,,., -
,,----,,--,~,-~w-,,-,,-
w,,,....--...,.,


_ 12 -
_ 12 -
          ' held 'ini dismissing ~ this particular contention initially, findings as to the availability of medical services in the
' held 'ini dismissing ~ this particular contention initially, findings as to the availability of medical services in the
          -Second PID represent.the law of the case b         and therefore require l denial of this contention as lacking in any liti-gable' basis.
-Second PID represent.the law of the case b and therefore require l denial of this contention as lacking in any liti-gable' basis.
E. Evacuation time estimate.     In its proposed con-tention,   intervenor misapprehends   the   requirements   for preparing 'an evacuation time estimates study for the EPZ surrounding..a nuclear. power plant as well as the purpose for which such estimates are prepared.     -It appears that inter-venor is under the impression that some regulatory require-ment will' be . violated if Graterford inmates are not evacu-  -
E.
        ~
Evacuation time estimate.
          .ated within the estimatsd 'six to ten. hour period.-
In its proposed con-
Thus, as the primary basis- for its claim, intervenor-asserts that- th'ere is "no reasonable assurance that the estimated time of evacuation of six to ten u hours can be 24/   Limerick, supra, Memorandum and. Order on Graterford
: tention, intervenor misapprehends the requirements for preparing 'an evacuation time estimates study for the EPZ surrounding..a nuclear. power plant as well as the purpose for which such estimates are prepared.
                ' Prisoners Proposed Contentions (April 12, 1985) (slip op. at 15). See also Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo - Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),
-It appears that inter-venor is under the impression that some regulatory require-ment will' be. violated if Graterford inmates are not evacu-
~
.ated within the estimatsd 'six to ten. hour period.-
Thus, as the primary basis-for its claim, intervenor-asserts that-th'ere is "no reasonable assurance that the estimated time of evacuation of six to ten u hours can be 24/
: Limerick, supra, Memorandum and. Order on Graterford
' Prisoners Proposed Contentions (April 12, 1985)
(slip op. at 15).
See also Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo - Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819, 824 (1984); Diablo Canyon, supra,
ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819, 824 (1984); Diablo Canyon, supra,
                .ALAB-592, .11- NRC 746, 754     (1980 ) ; - Public Service Company of   Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2) , ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 259-60 (1978); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company -(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2) , LBP-83-18, 17 NRC 501, 504-05 (1983); Perry, supra, LBP-82-117, 16 NRC           i 1955, 1956 (1982); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
.ALAB-592,
.11-NRC
: 746, 754 (1980 ) ; - Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 259-60 (1978); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company -(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-18, 17 NRC 501, 504-05 (1983); Perry, supra, LBP-82-117, 16 NRC i
1955, 1956 (1982); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (Wm.
H.
Zimmer Nuclear Power
: Station, Unit 1),
LBP-82-68, 16 NRC 741', 746 n.2 (1982).
LBP-82-68, 16 NRC 741', 746 n.2 (1982).


q .--
q.--
achieved."E         l Contrary to the allegation, there is no time mandated by regulation within which an evacuation must be accomplished, as this Board held in its Third PID.b!
achieved."E l Contrary to the allegation, there is no time mandated by regulation within which an evacuation must be accomplished, as this Board held in its Third PID.b!
Moreover, the matters raised by intervenor as a basis for = alleging that a longer period -will be required simply are not litigable.         There is no way this Board can possibly anticipate,     much     less   determine,   whether prisoners will attempt     a- " hostage siege"       or " riot" as hypothesized by intervenor.E There is also an absence of any showing that prison authorities would not be prepared to handle any potential disturbances regardless of their cause and no asis has been shown to ~ litigate the ad.equacy of security measures    already 'in place to prevent or handle 'any such
Moreover, the matters raised by intervenor as a basis for = alleging that a longer period -will be required simply are not litigable.
            ' disturbances.EI         Moreover, such speculative and conjectural issues defy adjudication.           Even if such issues were heard, it is impossible. to discern any. useful planning information that could be developed.             How much time would intervenor 2_5_/ Revised Proposed Contentions at 11.
There is no way this Board can possibly anticipate, much less determine, whether prisoners will attempt a-
2_6,/ Limerick, supra, LBP-84-14, 21 NRC             . (May 2, 1985)
" hostage siege" or
(slip   op. at   31-32). See also Cincinnati Gas &
" riot" as hypothesized by intervenor.E There is also an absence of any showing that prison authorities would not be prepared to handle any potential disturbances regardless of their cause and no asis has been shown to ~ litigate the ad.equacy of security already 'in place to prevent or handle 'any such measures
c                    Electric Company (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) , ALAB-727, 17 NRC ' 760, .770 (1983)~r Carolina Power and Light Company (Shearon Harris Nuclear - Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) , LBP-84-29B, 20 NRC ' 3 8 9, 419 (1984).
' disturbances.EI Moreover, such speculative and conjectural issues defy adjudication.
E/     Proposed Revised Contentions at 13.                               ;
Even if such issues were heard, it is impossible. to discern any. useful planning information that could be developed.
28/   See Limerick, supra, " Memorandum and Order" (April 12, T9Ts) (slip op. at 14).
How much time would intervenor 2_5_/
Revised Proposed Contentions at 11.
2_6,/
Limerick, supra, LBP-84-14, 21 NRC
. (May 2, 1985)
(slip op.
at 31-32).
See also Cincinnati Gas Electric Company (Wm.
H.
Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, c
Unit 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC ' 760,.770 (1983)~r Carolina Power and Light Company (Shearon Harris Nuclear - Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-29B, 20 NRC ' 3 8 9, 419 (1984).
E/
Proposed Revised Contentions at 13.
28/
See Limerick, supra, " Memorandum and Order" (April 12, T9Ts) (slip op. at 14).


      . allow in the revised . estimate to quell a' riot or success-fully negotiate a hostage's-release?
. allow in the revised. estimate to quell a' riot or success-fully negotiate a hostage's-release?
Another s fundamental deficiency in the ~ contention is intervenor's apparent misunderstanding of the purpose for which'a_ time. estimate for evacuation of the EPZ is prepared.
Another s fundamental deficiency in the ~ contention is intervenor's apparent misunderstanding of the purpose for which'a_ time. estimate for evacuation of the EPZ is prepared.
(As this Board recently held:
(As this Board recently held:
                    -[T]he   purpose Lof an evacuation time estimate. study'is to indicate the range of times required to evacuate the EPZ under a . limited number of commonly occurring events- so as to. permit deci-sion-makers . in an actual emergency to
-[T]he purpose Lof an evacuation time estimate. study'is to indicate the range of times required to evacuate the EPZ under a
                  'make an informed . decision as to the appropriate protective action based upon actual conditions. An evacuation time estimate study does not attempt to                                     '
. limited number of commonly occurring events-so as to. permit deci-sion-makers. in an actual emergency to
predict   exact   conditions     during   an
'make an informed. decision as to the appropriate protective action based upon actual conditions.
                  . evacuation-. Rather,     it- attempts' 'to -
An evacuation time estimate study does not attempt to predict exact conditions during an
. evacuation-
: Rather, it-attempts' 'to -
indicate the sensitivity of_the analysis to a limited number of commonly occur-ring events.2_9_/
indicate the sensitivity of_the analysis to a limited number of commonly occur-ring events.2_9_/
              -.Under- this concept, decision-makers would recommend a protective   action   in a radiological     emergency     for _the
-.Under-this concept, decision-makers would recommend a protective action in a
_ populace within_the EPZ, depending upon the situation.                   Time estimates for evacuation are needed to support those rec-ommendations. Accordingly,   NUREG-0654,   Criterion           J.10.1, states that an organization's plans to implement protective measures for the EPZ shall include:
radiological emergency for _the
Time   estimates   for   evacuation   of various sectors and distances based on a dynamic . analysis     (time-moti'no    study under various conditions) for the plume M/     Limerick, supra, LBP-84-14, 21 NRC               (May 2,         1985)
_ populace within_the EPZ, depending upon the situation.
Time estimates for evacuation are needed to support those rec-ommendations.
Accordingly, NUREG-0654, Criterion J.10.1, states that an organization's plans to implement protective measures for the EPZ shall include:
Time estimates for evacuation of various sectors and distances based on a dynamic. analysis (time-moti'n study o
under various conditions) for the plume M/
Limerick, supra, LBP-84-14, 21 NRC (May 2, 1985)
(slip op. at 32).
(slip op. at 32).


p 4
p 4.
exposure pathway emergency planning zone
exposure pathway emergency planning zone
                            -(See Appendix 4) . . .
-(See Appendix 4)
                                                      .M/.
.M/.
Because the purpose of an evacuation time estimate study is to provide decision-makers with useful information in the event-of an actual emergency to provide dose-savings to the greatest number of people, evacuation estimates are reason-able and   suitable for the purpose     for which they were developed if they permit such reasoned determinations.EI Under'the facts of this case, the Graterford prisoners will not begin to evacuate until all or practically all of the EPZ has     already been evacuated.EI     Accordingly,   inter-venor's alleged concerns regarding whether an evacuation M/     The regulations require the development of a range of protective actions for the plume exposure pathway EPZ to protect emergency workers and the public.           No particular requirements for an evacuation time estimate study are stated.     Rather, the regulations simply require that "[g]uidelines for the choice of protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal     )
Because the purpose of an evacuation time estimate study is to provide decision-makers with useful information in the event-of an actual emergency to provide dose-savings to the greatest number of people, evacuation estimates are reason-able and suitable for the purpose for which they were developed if they permit such reasoned determinations.EI Under'the facts of this case, the Graterford prisoners will not begin to evacuate until all or practically all of the EPZ has already been evacuated.EI Accordingly, inter-venor's alleged concerns regarding whether an evacuation M/
guidance are developed and in place . . . . " 10 C.F.R.
The regulations require the development of a range of protective actions for the plume exposure pathway EPZ to protect emergency workers and the public.
S50.47 (b) (10) .
No particular requirements for an evacuation time estimate study are stated.
                -'-31/ Intervenor relies upon the statement in NUREG-0654 at
: Rather, the regulations simply require that "[g]uidelines for the choice of protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal
                      -page 4-3 that an estimate for evacuating a special facility population "shall usually be done on an institution-by-institution basis."     (Emphasis added.)
)
By its own terms, this qualified statement does not require preparation of separate estimates for each special facility population (e.g., schools, nursing homes, hospitals, prisons, day care centers, etc.)
guidance are developed and in place.
(                       within the EPZ.
10 C.F.R.
32/   See Appl. Exh. E-67, Table 6.1. The maximum estimated evacuation time for the entire EPZ, winter weekday, adverse weather, is six hours, 45 minutes.
S50.47 (b) (10).
-'-31/
Intervenor relies upon the statement in NUREG-0654 at
-page 4-3 that an estimate for evacuating a special facility population "shall usually be done on an institution-by-institution basis."
(Emphasis added.)
By its own terms, this qualified statement does not require preparation of separate estimates for each special facility population (e.g.,
: schools, nursing
: homes, hospitals,
: prisons, day care
: centers, etc.)
(
within the EPZ.
32/
See Appl. Exh. E-67, Table 6.1.
The maximum estimated evacuation time for the entire EPZ, winter weekday, adverse weather, is six hours, 45 minutes.
t
t


                          "can ' bel accomplished''in the estimated time f rame " 3_3_/ .                                                                               are immaterial because,- by the time the-inmates would actually be evacuated,'there will be no competing traffic.                                                                                   A deci-
"can ' bel accomplished''in the estimated time f rame " 3_3_/.
,                        . s' ion to' evacuate or shelter would be made on an entirely a_d_
are immaterial because,- by the time the-inmates would actually be evacuated,'there will be no competing traffic.
                        - hoc basis. E ~
A deci-
F.               Plume' monitoring.                                                     Pointing to NUREG-0654, Criteri-
. s' ion to' evacuate or shelter would be made on an entirely a_d_
                        - on C.1. 3,                       intervenor requests ' identification of the radio-logical laboratories which will provide radiological' moni-i-
- hoc basis. E ~
toring and analyses services during an emergency.                                                                                       As'the Board is aware, the Graterford plan states that a Department                                                                                             ,
F.
f I-                      . of Energy                           (" DOE")                       plume monitoring team will be sent to
Plume' monitoring.
,                        Graterford in the event sheltering is                                                   .                    .
Pointing to NUREG-0654, Criteri-
implemented in. a
- on C.1. 3, intervenor requests ' identification of the radio-logical laboratories which will provide radiological' moni-i -
      . ,                radiologic'al                                   emergency.                                       The     availability       of DOE       plume monitoring teams is a basis for emergency planning at every d
toring and analyses services during an emergency.
nuclear power plant site in the United States.-                                                                                   Nothing.is raised- by intervenor which would cast any ' doubt upon the availability of adequate- laboratory facilities for plume monitoring.                                   Along with other plume monitoring capacity, this is fully covered in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's
As'the Board is aware, the Graterford plan states that a Department fI-
                        - Disaster Operations                                                        Plan                  -
. of Energy
Annex E.N!         Intervenor .has failed                     to             challenge                                   the               adequacy       of   the information 1
(" DOE")
1 3_3/         Proposed Revised Contentions at 13.
plume monitoring team will be sent to Graterford in the event sheltering is implemented in. a radiologic'al emergency.
The availability of DOE plume monitoring teams is a basis for emergency planning at every d
nuclear power plant site in the United States.-
Nothing.is raised-by intervenor which would cast any ' doubt upon the availability of adequate-laboratory facilities for plume monitoring.
Along with other plume monitoring capacity, this is fully covered in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Annex E.N!
Intervenor.has
- Disaster Operations Plan failed to challenge the adequacy of the information 1
1 3_3/
Proposed Revised Contentions at 13.
34/
34/
                        - '          Further, inasmuch as the prison is over eight miles from Limerick, it would take only a short time to
Further, inasmuch as the prison is over eight miles from Limerick, it would take only a short time to transport inmates outside the EPZ.
,                                    transport inmates outside the EPZ.
M/
M/           See Annex E, pp. E-36, E-12-10, E-12-16 and E-12-43.
See Annex E, pp. E-36, E-12-10, E-12-16 and E-12-43.
1 d
d


r contained in Annex E.             The proposed contention therefore i
r contained in Annex E.
          ' lacks basis.
The proposed contention therefore i
G. Adequacy       of   tabletop     exercise.       Intervenor questions the adequacy of the emergency planning exercise at Graterford on March         7,   1985 because it allegedly did not include the ' activities suggested by NUREG-0654, Criterion
' lacks basis.
          .N.3., which states in relevant part:
G.
Pending the development of exercise scenarios         and     exercise     evaluation guidance by NRC and FEMA the scenarios for use in exercises and- drills shall include but         not   be   limited   to,   the following:
Adequacy of tabletop exercise.
        ,                    e.     A n.arrative summary describing                   .
Intervenor questions the adequacy of the emergency planning exercise at Graterford on March 7,
the conduct of the exercises or drills to include such things as simulated casualties, offsite fire department assistance, rescue of personnel,         use     of   protective               ,
1985 because it allegedly did not include the ' activities suggested by NUREG-0654, Criterion
clothing,       deployment     of   radio-               '
.N.3., which states in relevant part:
logical       monitoring       teams,   ~and public         information       activities As is readily apparent, some of the suggested activ-ities are applicable principally if not exclusively to an onsite emergency exercise.           Except for deployment of radio-logical monitoring teams, which would be applicable to the entire plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathway EPZ's, l
Pending the development of exercise scenarios and exercise evaluation guidance by NRC and FEMA the scenarios for use in exercises and-drills shall include but not be limited to, the following:
          .none of . the suggested activities would be applicable to Graterford     at   all.       Hence,     no   basis   exists     for the
e.
A n.arrative summary describing the conduct of the exercises or drills to include such things as simulated casualties, offsite fire department assistance, rescue of personnel, use of protective
: clothing, deployment of radio-logical monitoring
: teams,
~and public information activities As is readily apparent, some of the suggested activ-ities are applicable principally if not exclusively to an onsite emergency exercise.
Except for deployment of radio-logical monitoring teams, which would be applicable to the entire plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathway EPZ's, l
.none of. the suggested activities would be applicable to Graterford at all.
: Hence, no basis exists for the


                                            - 18:-
- 18:-
y
y
          ' contention that they should have been included. E             -More-
' contention that they should have been included. E
  +
-More-over, - as the ' regulations contemplate, FEMA reviewed the
over, - as the ' regulations contemplate, FEMA reviewed the
+
          -exercise       scenario and -found   it satisfactory.     No basis exists-to litigate this contention.
-exercise scenario and -found it satisfactory.
:36/.
No basis exists-to litigate this contention.
Moreover,     as NUREG-0654     clearly   states,   exercise
:36/. Moreover, as NUREG-0654 clearly
: states, exercise
: scenarios are to be developed by the NRC and FEMA.
: scenarios are to be developed by the NRC and FEMA.
FEMA observed and. graded - the exercise, finding that "the_Graterford authorities adequately demonstrated an understanding of the emergency response procedures in the ability to adequately implement. them," thereby eliminating the previous Category A deficiency _ in FEMA's interim findings.       See Memorandum from Richard W. Krimm,- Assistant Associate Director, Office cof Natural and Technological Hazards Programs, F E M A ,. t o Edward L... Jordan, Director,' Division of- Emergency Prepa' redness and Engineering         Response,   Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC (March 27, 1985).
FEMA observed and. graded - the exercise, finding that "the_Graterford authorities adequately demonstrated an understanding of the emergency response procedures in the ability to adequately implement. them,"
37/   Intervenor's allegation that the exercise " failed to consider the various possible scenarios which may exist during     an   emergency   at. LGS"     (Proposed Revised.
thereby eliminating the previous Category A
Contentions at .15) also lacks basis.. An exercise of offsite capabilities need not ' consider every possible onsite~ scenario, but must only " simulate an emergency that results in offsite radiological releases which would     require   response by     offsite   authorities."
deficiency _ in FEMA's interim findings.
NUREG-0654,     Criterion   N.1.a. As   stated . in   the regulations, exercises are required "to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities." . 10 C.F.R. 550.47 (b) (14) . See also- 10 C.F.R. 'Part 50, Appendix E.IV.f.
See Memorandum from Richard W.
Intervenor'       final claim, that the exercise report
Krimm,- Assistant Associate
                " fails to 4ndicate the appropriate staff at SCIG who would in fact' be involved in the decision making process" (Proposed Revised Contentions at 15), also lacks basis.       FEMA's report states 'at page 1:       "The Commissioner, Department of Corrections, coordinated the overall response while the Deputy Warden at Graterford was responsible for - his institution."           In any' event,     the requirement is       that   the response capability     be   tested,   not   that   any   particular individual be identified.
: Director, Office cof Natural and Technological Hazards Programs, F E M A,. t o Edward L... Jordan, Director,' Division of-Emergency Prepa' redness and Engineering
: Response, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC (March 27, 1985).
37/
Intervenor's allegation that the exercise " failed to consider the various possible scenarios which may exist during an emergency at.
LGS" (Proposed Revised.
Contentions at.15) also lacks basis..
An exercise of offsite capabilities need not ' consider every possible onsite~ scenario, but must only " simulate an emergency that results in offsite radiological releases which would require response by offsite authorities."
NUREG-0654, Criterion N.1.a.
As stated. in the regulations, exercises are required "to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities.". 10 C.F.R.
550.47 (b) (14).
See also-10 C.F.R.
'Part 50, Appendix E.IV.f.
Intervenor' final claim, that the exercise report
" fails to 4ndicate the appropriate staff at SCIG who would in fact' be involved in the decision making process" (Proposed Revised Contentions at 15), also lacks basis.
FEMA's report states 'at page 1:
"The Commissioner, Department of Corrections, coordinated the overall response while the Deputy Warden at Graterford was responsible for - his institution."
In any' event, the requirement is that the response capability be
: tested, not that any particular individual be identified.


li"
li"
            ~
~
H. Alleged Spontaneous- Evacuation by Guards or In-
. H.
                                                                                                                              ~
Alleged Spontaneous-Evacuation by Guards or In-mates.
mates.           'The - final . contention raised by'intervenor is that there- is no ~ reasonable assurance that the Graterford plan "will prevent a spontaneous evacuation on either the guards or ~ inmates part - . [ sic] , i.e., panic."3_8,/ .This necessarily involves highly speculative an'd problematical concerns.                                                           As
'The - final. contention raised by'intervenor is that
                'a-regulatory agency, neither the NRC nor a licensing board is     institutionally equipped to resolve .any hypothetical concern regarding the possibility of " panic" at Graterford which would lead to the outbreak of a disturbance.
~
As a practical matter, this Board could not determine' whether the security provisions already i n ,p l a c e.                                             ,
there-is no ~ reasonable assurance that the Graterford plan "will prevent a spontaneous evacuation on either the guards or ~ inmates part -. [ sic],
to deal   ,
i.e., panic."3_8,/.This necessarily involves highly speculative an'd problematical concerns.
        '                                                  ^
As
with- such           disruptions would be     adequate                                           to handle       any postulated " panic" in the event of a radiological emergency at Limerick.           The Board's previous determination on this very point is the law of the case .and requires denial of this contention as wholly lacking in any basis.E/
'a-regulatory agency, neither the NRC nor a licensing board is institutionally equipped to resolve.any hypothetical concern regarding the possibility of " panic" at Graterford which would lead to the outbreak of a disturbance.
Conclusion For the reasons stated more fully above, intervenor has failed to state any litigable issue with specificity and H/           Proposed Revised Contentions at 16.
As a practical matter, this Board could not determine' whether the security provisions already i n,p l a c e.
39/         Limerick, supra, " Memorandum and Order on Graterford
to deal
;                              Prisoners Proposed Contentions" (April 12, 1985) (slip op. at 14).
^
with-such disruptions would be adequate to handle any postulated " panic" in the event of a radiological emergency at Limerick.
The Board's previous determination on this very point is the law of the case.and requires denial of this contention as wholly lacking in any basis.E/
Conclusion For the reasons stated more fully above, intervenor has failed to state any litigable issue with specificity and H/
Proposed Revised Contentions at 16.
39/
Limerick, supra, " Memorandum and Order on Graterford Prisoners Proposed Contentions" (April 12, 1985)
(slip op. at 14).
4 L
4 L


4,
4,
                                        -    .s.
.s.
basis. Its contentions 'should therefore be denie'd and it should be-dismissed from the proceeding.
basis.
Its contentions 'should therefore be denie'd and it should be-dismissed from the proceeding.
Respectfully submitted, CONNER & WETTERHAHN, P.C.
Respectfully submitted, CONNER & WETTERHAHN, P.C.
                                                                      \
\\
                                                ,/> Y         %1tS-1     .
,/> Y
Troy     onner, Jr.     V Robert M. Rader Counsel-for the Applicant May 22, 1985 I}}
%1tS-1 Troy onner, Jr.
V Robert M. Rader Counsel-for the Applicant May 22, 1985 I}}

Latest revision as of 15:34, 12 December 2024

Answer to Graterford Prisoners 850513 Proposed Revised Contentions Re Adequacy of Radiological Emergency Planning to Protect Inmates.Fema Reviewed Exercise Scenario & Found It Satisfactory
ML20127N265
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/22/1985
From: Conner T
CONNER & WETTERHAHN, PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20127N270 List:
References
CON-#285-096, CON-#285-96 OL, NUDOCS 8505230480
Download: ML20127N265 (20)
v • d • e


Text

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s,3 f

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION hhcensingBoard_

Before the Atomic Safety In the. Matter of

)-

5 MAY)22 PI:39 Philadelphia Electric Company'

)

Docket Nos. 50-3520L (Limerick Generating Station, OC T

/S

. Units l'and 2)

ER NCH APPLICANT'S ANSWER TO PROPOSED REVISED CONTENTIONS OF THE GRATERFORD PRISONERS Preliminary Statement On May 13,

1985, intervenor Graterford Prisoners

~

'("intervenor") filed proposed, revised contentions regarding:

the adequacy of radiological emergency planning to protect inmates at the State Correctional-Institution at Graterford

("Graterford").1!

For the reasons discussed below, Appli-cant opposes those contentions as lacking specificity and bases pursuant to 10 C.F.R.'S2.714(b).

The procedural history which resulted in the submission

~

of these contentions-has already been amply. set for'th by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

(" Licensing Board" or

,m a

1/

See Proposed Revised Contentions of the Graterford Inmates With Regard to the Radiological Emergency

Response

Plan (May 13, 1985)

(" Proposed Revised Conterstions").

8505230480 850522

/h PDR ADOCK 05000352 s

Q o

PDR g

m g

4.

" Board") in its Memorandum and Order which denied the first set of proposed contentions.2/

Contrary to any expectation that respecification of the contentions would be supported by portions of Plan 2 not previously disclosed to intervenor in Plan 1,-

the revised l

contentions demonstrate that the further relief granted i

intervenor has resulted only in a

reopening of issues previously resolved to its satisfaction during the dis-cussions and negotiations which took place at two prehearing conferences before the Licensing Board on February 27 and March 22, 1985.O l

2/

Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating

Station, Units 1 and 2),

Docket Nos.

50-352-OL and 50-353-OL (April 12, 1985)

(slip op. at 1-4).

That order was reversed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board

(" Appeal Board")

in ALAB-806 on the grounds that intervenor should have been granted yet another opportunity to submit respecified contentions based upon review by its ; counsel and consultant of a more fully disclosed version of the SCIG emergency plan.

Limerick, supra, ALAB-806, 21 NRC (May 1,

1985).

3_/

TEie' Board and parties have used the designation " Plan 1" to refer to the sanitized version of the Graterford emergency plan disclosed to intervenor on December 13,

1984, and

" Plan 2"

as the almost fully disclosed version disclosed on March 18, 1985.

4/

~Thuc, the proposed contentions are late without good cause.

Nonetheless, the Appeal Board has precluded this Board from making any such determination and has

found, even prior to its review of the revised l

contentions, that good cause exists for their lateness.

l I_d,.

at 12.

l

.. e..

The Appeal Board has directed this Board to consider "whether ~ [the. refiled contentions] have adequate bases and specificity."bI Even with regard to these limited criteria, the proposed contentions are seriously Scficient for the reasons for-which this Board denied virtually the same conter>tions - in its Memorandum and Order of April 12, 1985-discussed below.

Argument In determining the level of specificity required for admission of-intervenor's proposed contentions, the recent decision of the Appeal Board in ALAB-804 provides excellent

, guidance.

In that decision, the Appeal Board affirmed this

. Board's dismissal' of respecified contentions rel'ating to environmental impacts of the system for supplying supple-mental cooling water for the Limerick facility, finding that 1

intervenor had not put forth reasonable specific bases for

.l its contentions based on the documents that were available to it.5/

The situation there closely parallels the' circum-stances of the Graterford Prisoners' refiling here.

In ALAB-785, which also permitted respecification of contentions, the Appeal Board distinguished that inter-venor's entitlement to reformulate its contention at an 5/

'Id.

at 18.

6/

Limerick, supra, ALAB-804, 21 NRC (April 10, 1985) (slip op at 13).

.- e advanced stage of the proceeding from that of a petitioner in proposing contentions at the outset.

It emphasized that any allegations'at that point must specifically dispute the adequacy of statements and analyses in the Final Environ-mental Statement for Limerick.E Subsequently, the Appeal Board affirmed this Board's finding that no such specificity had been pleaded.

In like manner, intervenor here has been given yet another opportunity to sharpen the focus of its contentions

' based upon review of Plan 2.

Despite a reasonable expecta-tion that its proposed contentions would very precisely delineate alleged deficiencies with specific plan -refer-ences,.the allegations in support of the newly proposed contentions are as diffuse and unsupported as the originally proposed contentions.

Each of the particular bases alleged will be examined individually.U A.

Manpower mobilization.

The thrust of this proposed contention is that commercial phone lines could be "overbur-i L

dened and unavailable" in the event of a

radiological I

7/

Limerick, supra, ALAB-785, 20 NRC 848, 869, 876 (1984).

l 8 /.

As to the " General Contention" which has been pleaded I,

(Proposed Revised Contentions at 2), intervenor lacks

~

[-

standing to assert any interest on behalf of the SCIG staff.

Intervenor. uas admitted as "the Graterford l

Prisoners" to represent the collective interests of SCIG inmates who petitioned for intervention.

See

Limerick, supra, LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC
1423, 1446-47 (1982).

l

emergency such that off-duty Graterford security personnel could'not be promptly reached.E!

The only basis cited for this concern is a statement by a township supervisor in the evidentiary hearing on offsite emergency planning for Limerick.

The contention fails to note, much less address, the Licensing Board's specific disposition of the witness's concern in its Third PID.E!

Moreover, the contention unjustifiably equates the need for prompt notification of township Emergency Operations Center personnel with noti-fication of off-duty prison guards.

As such, there is a serious lack of basis in the contention.

It fails to recognize. that adequate prison

-security is on duty a't all times.

Additional security personnel would be needed only if an evacuation were or-dered.

It is already a matter of record that such an evacuation would not even commence until about six hours into an. actual emergency.E Under those circumstances, there will be ample time to contact any necessary personnel by telephone.

9_/

Proposed Revised Contentions at 2.

1_0f Limerick, supra, LBP-85-14, 21 NRC (May 2, 1985)

(slip op. at 271).

M/

See the -discussion at pages 13-16, infra.

Although.

intervenor has challenged the accuracy of the time estimate, its allegations do not question whether an evacuation can occur sooner, but rather "whether the plan

]i.e.,

evacuation]

can be accomplished in the (Footnote Continued)

In any event,'there is no requirement under the Com-mission's regulations or planning guidance for other than commercial telephone communications as a means of notifying.

personnel such as off-duty prison guards.

Intervenor's reliance upon Criterion F.1.a of NUREG-0654 is unwarranted.

That provision provides guidance as to communications between response ~ organizations.

As to notifying individual personnel within those organizations, NUREG-0654, Criterion F.1.e simply states that plans shall include " provision for alerting or activating emergency personnel in each response organization."

A network of sequential or " cascade" commer-cial telephone calls meets this standard. E In sh. ort, the (Footnote Continued) estimated time frame (of six to ten hours]."

Proposed Revised Contentions at 13.

-12/

In Diablo Canyon, the Licensing Board considered the adequacy of a similar network for notifying offsite emergency workers.

It. held:

NUREG-0654 does not prohibit cascade or sequential warning systems for the notification of ~ individual emergency workers.

The County emergency plan includes a cascade plan for telephone notification which'will reach into every element of the response organization.

The plan generally specifies that organizations upon receiving a

notification will in turn notify key personnel using'prioritized call lists.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,. Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70, 16 NRC 756, 813-(1982),

aff'd, ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819 (1984).

This likewise disposes of intervenor's related contention that "a

viable back-up system should be required."

Proposed Revised Contentions at 3.

~

proposed contention lacks any legal basis and also fails to explain any specific reason why it would be necessary to contact off-duty prison guards immediately in order to prepare for an evacuation which would not 'even commence until at least-six hours after an evacuation was ordered.E I B.

Planning input from the prison guards' union.

It is unclear. in this contentions whether-intervenor is at-tempting to represent the legal interests of Graterford officers, their union or both.

As the Licensing. Board has

. pointed out, neither any guard nor his union is a party to this proceeding (Tr. 20624-25).

Intervenor lacks standing to represent any interest of the guards because standing

-constitutes a personal htake in the outcome of the proceed-ing.E In any event, there is simply no regulatory requirement that support organization personnel or their unions have an opportunity to provide input into the planning process.15/

-13/

As the Board has observed, the same telephone system will be used within the Limerick EPZ to notify county and municipal emergency workers (Tr. 20629).

FEMA has thoroughly reviewed the offsite plans pursuant to its responsibilities under 44 C.F.R. Part 350 and has found no deficiency in the use of commercial telephone lines to contact county and municipal personnel.

Intervenor has alleged nothing which would distinguish the situation for telephone notification of off-duty.

Graterford guards.

M/

See note 8, supra.

M/

Limerick, supra,

" Memorandum and Order" (April 12, 1985) (slip op. at 13-14).

Thus, this proposed contention does not allege any deficien-cy.in-the Graterford plan;-it merely proposes an additional procedural mechanism for soliciting comments.

As such, the contention is wholly _.without basis.

Intervenor's citations to various portions of. NUREG-0654 regarding assignment of responsibilities to " organizations" which support an emer-gency. response are inapposite.

Prison guards are not

" organizations" and their union as such has absolutely no role in implementing 'an emergency response-under the Graterford plan.

C.

Training for civilian bus and ambulance drivers.

,In essence, intervenor asserts its dissatisfaction with the,

representa' tion by the Commonwealth that dosimetry 'traiEling =

will'.be offered. bus drivers whose employers have agreed to.

' furnish buses and drivers to evacuate Graterford inmates in-the event of a radiological emergency.

Intervenor-states a preference for : the broader training " offered to the school bus drivers." b During a discussion of this contention as originally proposed, intervenor's counsel expressly stated that it would be withdrawn -if a commitment were made to provide those drivers with an opportunity. to receive the same' training offered to bus providers which have agreed to assist in the evacuation of school children and other l_6/

Proposed Revised Contentions at 7.

r

Wi a.

transportation-dependent individuals -in the event of-a radiological emergency at Limerick (Tr. 20687-90).EI

. In. renewing this. contention, intervenor fails-to address the representation of Applicant.on the record.that such' bus driver. training will be provided by Energy-Consul-tants on the same basis as to other bus providers who have.

evacuation.EI

.This is precisely

. agreed to-assist in an what intervenor requested.

Moreover, Applicant's represen-tation has not been challenged as deficient in any way.EI 17/

See-also Notice of Appeal from Licensing Board's

~

~

Memorandum and Order on Graterford Priso'ers' Proposed' n

Contentions at 10 (April 18, 1985).

M/- See Applicant's Answer to Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions of the Graterford Prisoners at 4 n.3 (April 4, 1985).

M/.

Intervenor' lumps together " ambulance drivers, rescue squad operators, hospital personnel, police and. fire departments" in the same category'as requiring further-training.

See Pro Revised Contentions. at p.

7.

Unlike bus drTvers, posed r

however, such personnel are, by the very nature of their responsibilities, given extensive training in responding to emergencies..

Intervenor has failed' to state any basis-for asserting that such personnel have not received. adequate training.to perform responsibilities, if any, related to Graterford in the event of a~ radiological emergency at Limerick.

In fact, 'intervenor has not even made a threshold showing that the Graterford plan relies upon any non-Department personnel ~, other than bus drivers, who would. be. expected to report to Graterford in a

radiological. emergency.

Finally, it is again emphasized that civilian emergency personnel will serve the entire populace within the EPZ in the event of an emergency.

Here again, FEMA has not reported any

~ deficiency in their training or preparedness, nor has intervenor independently cited a_ny - basis for its implicit assertion to the contrary.

p.

D.

Medical services for contaminated / injured individu-als~.

Citing. the decision in San ~ Onofre that planning to provide medical care for about 25 contaminated injured individuals is reasonable,El intervenor questions whether.

there is adequate " capacity" at Montgomery Hospital to meet the needs of any -contaminated injured Graterford inmates.

This-involves an obvious non seguitor because there is no regulatory requirement in. planning medical services for

_ contaminated injured victims that each hospital must indi-vidually be able to render service to all 25 or so hypothet-ical patients.

Moreover, intervenor's allegation that Dr. Linnemann's ad'ress the capacity that exists at affidaviti "does not d

Montgomery Hospital for treating such contaminated individu-als"EI is utterly lacking in specificity.

It is wholly unstated and otherwise unapparent what additional " capacity" intervenor alleges to be missing.SI-

-20/

See Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 532, 535 n.10 (1983).

2J/

Proposed Revised Contentions at 9.

_2_2/

If intervenor is referring to physical capacity, it 2

totally misapprehends Dr. Linnemann's affidavit as well as the basic concepts involved.

As the Board previously found, planning standards and criteria for providing medical services to contaminated injured individuals "are concerned with radiation exposure principally because medical personnel treating traumatic injury sustained in a radiological emergency (Footnote Continued)

)

._ 11 _

w p -

+

Intervenor's' remaining claims, including its assertion l:

L that' a "back-up facility" must be specified, have already l;

been decided'by this Board in its Second PID.

The ' _ Board "explicitly rejected the same-contention as-regards planning for-Limerick onsite workers, holding that there are a

[

considerable number of hospitals capable of providing l

radiation. exposure / contamination treatment.- !

As the Board (Footnote Continued) l-may well - have to reckon with contamination as an obstacle to adequate treatment of the traumatic injury."

Limerick, supra,-LBP-84-31, 20 NRC 446, 531 (1984).

Thus, hospitals _ utilize their routinely

- available facilities and resources to handle contaminated injured victims.

In the event larger-numbers must-be treated, a.hos'pital would init'iate its

  • _ disa's'ter plan for expanding such capabilities, just as it would in the event of any non-radiological emergency

)

(Boyer, et al.,

ff.-Tr.

9772, at 8-9, 14; Linnemann, Tr.

9928; - Appl. Exh.

40).

Intervenor has,shown no i

basis.for ~ litigating any issue related to physical ~

i capacity.

Contrary to-intervenor's assertion that Dr. Linnemann's Affidavit-of April 4,

1985, does not cover the equipment necessary to. provide such. medical care, he

-expressly stated in 13 of his affidavit that "[t]here j

are specific supplies and equipment set aside for this type of patient" at Montgomery Hospital._'Intervenor's criticism that the affidavit does not contain as much

" detail" as Dr. Linnemann's testimony fails.to specify any deficiency in planning.

M/

Limerick, supra, LBP-84-31, 20 NRC 446, 535 (1984).

The decision in GUARD v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir.

1985), provides no support for intervenor's position.

That decision simply held that agreements to provide i^

medical services, rather than the mere designation of available hospitals, are required by the NRC's regulations.

Also, the' Commission has instructed licensing-boards to utilize pre-GUARD standards in their licensing decisions.

See Statement of Policy on Emergency Planning Standard 10 C.F.R. 550. 47 (b) (12).

(

50 Fed. Reg. 20892 (May 21, 1985).

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  • -,4-,

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_ 12 -

' held 'ini dismissing ~ this particular contention initially, findings as to the availability of medical services in the

-Second PID represent.the law of the case b and therefore require l denial of this contention as lacking in any liti-gable' basis.

E.

Evacuation time estimate.

In its proposed con-

tention, intervenor misapprehends the requirements for preparing 'an evacuation time estimates study for the EPZ surrounding..a nuclear. power plant as well as the purpose for which such estimates are prepared.

-It appears that inter-venor is under the impression that some regulatory require-ment will' be. violated if Graterford inmates are not evacu-

~

.ated within the estimatsd 'six to ten. hour period.-

Thus, as the primary basis-for its claim, intervenor-asserts that-th'ere is "no reasonable assurance that the estimated time of evacuation of six to ten u hours can be 24/

Limerick, supra, Memorandum and. Order on Graterford

' Prisoners Proposed Contentions (April 12, 1985)

(slip op. at 15).

See also Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo - Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),

ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819, 824 (1984); Diablo Canyon, supra,

.ALAB-592,

.11-NRC

746, 754 (1980 ) ; - Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 259-60 (1978); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company -(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-18, 17 NRC 501, 504-05 (1983); Perry, supra, LBP-82-117, 16 NRC i

1955, 1956 (1982); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (Wm.

H.

Zimmer Nuclear Power

Station, Unit 1),

LBP-82-68, 16 NRC 741', 746 n.2 (1982).

q.--

achieved."E l Contrary to the allegation, there is no time mandated by regulation within which an evacuation must be accomplished, as this Board held in its Third PID.b!

Moreover, the matters raised by intervenor as a basis for = alleging that a longer period -will be required simply are not litigable.

There is no way this Board can possibly anticipate, much less determine, whether prisoners will attempt a-

" hostage siege" or

" riot" as hypothesized by intervenor.E There is also an absence of any showing that prison authorities would not be prepared to handle any potential disturbances regardless of their cause and no asis has been shown to ~ litigate the ad.equacy of security already 'in place to prevent or handle 'any such measures

' disturbances.EI Moreover, such speculative and conjectural issues defy adjudication.

Even if such issues were heard, it is impossible. to discern any. useful planning information that could be developed.

How much time would intervenor 2_5_/

Revised Proposed Contentions at 11.

2_6,/

Limerick, supra, LBP-84-14, 21 NRC

. (May 2, 1985)

(slip op.

at 31-32).

See also Cincinnati Gas Electric Company (Wm.

H.

Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, c

Unit 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC ' 760,.770 (1983)~r Carolina Power and Light Company (Shearon Harris Nuclear - Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-29B, 20 NRC ' 3 8 9, 419 (1984).

E/

Proposed Revised Contentions at 13.

28/

See Limerick, supra, " Memorandum and Order" (April 12, T9Ts) (slip op. at 14).

. allow in the revised. estimate to quell a' riot or success-fully negotiate a hostage's-release?

Another s fundamental deficiency in the ~ contention is intervenor's apparent misunderstanding of the purpose for which'a_ time. estimate for evacuation of the EPZ is prepared.

(As this Board recently held:

-[T]he purpose Lof an evacuation time estimate. study'is to indicate the range of times required to evacuate the EPZ under a

. limited number of commonly occurring events-so as to. permit deci-sion-makers. in an actual emergency to

'make an informed. decision as to the appropriate protective action based upon actual conditions.

An evacuation time estimate study does not attempt to predict exact conditions during an

. evacuation-

Rather, it-attempts' 'to -

indicate the sensitivity of_the analysis to a limited number of commonly occur-ring events.2_9_/

-.Under-this concept, decision-makers would recommend a protective action in a

radiological emergency for _the

_ populace within_the EPZ, depending upon the situation.

Time estimates for evacuation are needed to support those rec-ommendations.

Accordingly, NUREG-0654, Criterion J.10.1, states that an organization's plans to implement protective measures for the EPZ shall include:

Time estimates for evacuation of various sectors and distances based on a dynamic. analysis (time-moti'n study o

under various conditions) for the plume M/

Limerick, supra, LBP-84-14, 21 NRC (May 2, 1985)

(slip op. at 32).

p 4.

exposure pathway emergency planning zone

-(See Appendix 4)

.M/.

Because the purpose of an evacuation time estimate study is to provide decision-makers with useful information in the event-of an actual emergency to provide dose-savings to the greatest number of people, evacuation estimates are reason-able and suitable for the purpose for which they were developed if they permit such reasoned determinations.EI Under'the facts of this case, the Graterford prisoners will not begin to evacuate until all or practically all of the EPZ has already been evacuated.EI Accordingly, inter-venor's alleged concerns regarding whether an evacuation M/

The regulations require the development of a range of protective actions for the plume exposure pathway EPZ to protect emergency workers and the public.

No particular requirements for an evacuation time estimate study are stated.

Rather, the regulations simply require that "[g]uidelines for the choice of protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal

)

guidance are developed and in place.

10 C.F.R.

S50.47 (b) (10).

-'-31/

Intervenor relies upon the statement in NUREG-0654 at

-page 4-3 that an estimate for evacuating a special facility population "shall usually be done on an institution-by-institution basis."

(Emphasis added.)

By its own terms, this qualified statement does not require preparation of separate estimates for each special facility population (e.g.,

schools, nursing
homes, hospitals,
prisons, day care
centers, etc.)

(

within the EPZ.

32/

See Appl. Exh. E-67, Table 6.1.

The maximum estimated evacuation time for the entire EPZ, winter weekday, adverse weather, is six hours, 45 minutes.

t

"can ' bel accomplishedin the estimated time f rame " 3_3_/.

are immaterial because,- by the time the-inmates would actually be evacuated,'there will be no competing traffic.

A deci-

. s' ion to' evacuate or shelter would be made on an entirely a_d_

- hoc basis. E ~

F.

Plume' monitoring.

Pointing to NUREG-0654, Criteri-

- on C.1. 3, intervenor requests ' identification of the radio-logical laboratories which will provide radiological' moni-i -

toring and analyses services during an emergency.

As'the Board is aware, the Graterford plan states that a Department fI-

. of Energy

(" DOE")

plume monitoring team will be sent to Graterford in the event sheltering is implemented in. a radiologic'al emergency.

The availability of DOE plume monitoring teams is a basis for emergency planning at every d

nuclear power plant site in the United States.-

Nothing.is raised-by intervenor which would cast any ' doubt upon the availability of adequate-laboratory facilities for plume monitoring.

Along with other plume monitoring capacity, this is fully covered in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Annex E.N!

Intervenor.has

- Disaster Operations Plan failed to challenge the adequacy of the information 1

1 3_3/

Proposed Revised Contentions at 13.

34/

Further, inasmuch as the prison is over eight miles from Limerick, it would take only a short time to transport inmates outside the EPZ.

M/

See Annex E, pp. E-36, E-12-10, E-12-16 and E-12-43.

d

r contained in Annex E.

The proposed contention therefore i

' lacks basis.

G.

Adequacy of tabletop exercise.

Intervenor questions the adequacy of the emergency planning exercise at Graterford on March 7,

1985 because it allegedly did not include the ' activities suggested by NUREG-0654, Criterion

.N.3., which states in relevant part:

Pending the development of exercise scenarios and exercise evaluation guidance by NRC and FEMA the scenarios for use in exercises and-drills shall include but not be limited to, the following:

e.

A n.arrative summary describing the conduct of the exercises or drills to include such things as simulated casualties, offsite fire department assistance, rescue of personnel, use of protective

clothing, deployment of radio-logical monitoring
teams,

~and public information activities As is readily apparent, some of the suggested activ-ities are applicable principally if not exclusively to an onsite emergency exercise.

Except for deployment of radio-logical monitoring teams, which would be applicable to the entire plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathway EPZ's, l

.none of. the suggested activities would be applicable to Graterford at all.

Hence, no basis exists for the

- 18:-

y

' contention that they should have been included. E

-More-over, - as the ' regulations contemplate, FEMA reviewed the

+

-exercise scenario and -found it satisfactory.

No basis exists-to litigate this contention.

36/. Moreover, as NUREG-0654 clearly
states, exercise
scenarios are to be developed by the NRC and FEMA.

FEMA observed and. graded - the exercise, finding that "the_Graterford authorities adequately demonstrated an understanding of the emergency response procedures in the ability to adequately implement. them,"

thereby eliminating the previous Category A

deficiency _ in FEMA's interim findings.

See Memorandum from Richard W.

Krimm,- Assistant Associate

Director, Office cof Natural and Technological Hazards Programs, F E M A,. t o Edward L... Jordan, Director,' Division of-Emergency Prepa' redness and Engineering
Response, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC (March 27, 1985).

37/

Intervenor's allegation that the exercise " failed to consider the various possible scenarios which may exist during an emergency at.

LGS" (Proposed Revised.

Contentions at.15) also lacks basis..

An exercise of offsite capabilities need not ' consider every possible onsite~ scenario, but must only " simulate an emergency that results in offsite radiological releases which would require response by offsite authorities."

NUREG-0654, Criterion N.1.a.

As stated. in the regulations, exercises are required "to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities.". 10 C.F.R. 550.47 (b) (14).

See also-10 C.F.R.

'Part 50, Appendix E.IV.f.

Intervenor' final claim, that the exercise report

" fails to 4ndicate the appropriate staff at SCIG who would in fact' be involved in the decision making process" (Proposed Revised Contentions at 15), also lacks basis.

FEMA's report states 'at page 1:

"The Commissioner, Department of Corrections, coordinated the overall response while the Deputy Warden at Graterford was responsible for - his institution."

In any' event, the requirement is that the response capability be

tested, not that any particular individual be identified.

li"

~

. H.

Alleged Spontaneous-Evacuation by Guards or In-mates.

'The - final. contention raised by'intervenor is that

~

there-is no ~ reasonable assurance that the Graterford plan "will prevent a spontaneous evacuation on either the guards or ~ inmates part -. [ sic],

i.e., panic."3_8,/.This necessarily involves highly speculative an'd problematical concerns.

As

'a-regulatory agency, neither the NRC nor a licensing board is institutionally equipped to resolve.any hypothetical concern regarding the possibility of " panic" at Graterford which would lead to the outbreak of a disturbance.

As a practical matter, this Board could not determine' whether the security provisions already i n,p l a c e.

to deal

^

with-such disruptions would be adequate to handle any postulated " panic" in the event of a radiological emergency at Limerick.

The Board's previous determination on this very point is the law of the case.and requires denial of this contention as wholly lacking in any basis.E/

Conclusion For the reasons stated more fully above, intervenor has failed to state any litigable issue with specificity and H/

Proposed Revised Contentions at 16.

39/

Limerick, supra, " Memorandum and Order on Graterford Prisoners Proposed Contentions" (April 12, 1985)

(slip op. at 14).

4 L

4,

.s.

basis.

Its contentions 'should therefore be denie'd and it should be-dismissed from the proceeding.

Respectfully submitted, CONNER & WETTERHAHN, P.C.

\\

,/> Y

%1tS-1 Troy onner, Jr.

V Robert M. Rader Counsel-for the Applicant May 22, 1985 I

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