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| {{#Wiki_filter:, ' | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
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| !! -1 UNITED STATES l NUCLEAR REGULATORY l COMMISSION I
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| ; 48 %, .
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| ++***
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| ST. LUCIE l SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF i
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| LICENSEE PERFORMANCE ,
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| l . (SALP)
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| JANUARY 2,1994 - JANUARY 6,1996 l SALP BOARD MEETING - JANUARY
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| ! 18,1996 h
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| 31 5 970306 PDR 9,y .B INDER_96-485 ,
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| ; es ST LUCIE BOARD BRIEFING PACEAGE 1
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| IMDEZ i l
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| : 1. SALP BOARD MEETING CONFIRMATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF J OUTLINES MEMORANDUM i a
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| - 2. SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP) i INPUT REQUEST MEMORANDUM
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| : 3. INPUT FEEDER INFORMATION
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| ! 4. INPUT FEEDER FORMS SUPPORTING DATA
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| : 5. MASTER INSPECTION PLAN :
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| ! 6. LISTING OF INSPECTION BOURS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA i
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| : 7. PREVIOUS'SALP REPORT, SALP STRENGTES, AND NT.TmGES I 8. LISTING OF INSPECTIONS .
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| . 9. LISTING OF VIOLATIONS, ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, AND CALs
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| ''N 10. LISTING OF LERS AND LER ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 4 4
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| / LICENSEE
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| # 11. MAJOR INSPECTIONS, NRC REVIEW ACTIVITIES, CONFERENCES, AND LICENSEE ACTIVITIES
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| ! 12. REACTOR TRIPS, TS-REQUIRED SEUTDONNS
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| : 13. SALP OUTLINI REQUEST MENORANDUM i
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| : 14. PLANT OPERATIONS OUTLINE
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| : 15. ENGINEERING OUTLINE 1 l
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| : 16. MAINTENANCE OUTLINE
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| : 17. PLANT SUPPORT OUTLINE
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| : 18. POWER HISTORY CURVES
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| : 19. SITE INTEGRATION MATRIZ '
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| F N-
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| g* 880 0 UNITED STATES
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| ' 4* 9'o,* NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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| # REGION 11 E 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., sulTE 2000 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 303234100 l
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| '+4 , ,,,,.!
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| January 11, 1995
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| , MEMORANDUM TO: Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects Johns P. Jaudon, Deputy Director Division of' Reactor Safety David B. Matthews, Director Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l- FROM: Kerry D. Landis, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3
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| ; I i
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| Division of Reactor Projects
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| ==SUBJECT:==
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| ST. LUCIE SALP BOARD MEETING CONFIRMATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF OUTLINES h
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| The St. Lucie SALP Board will meet January 18, 1996, at 8:00 a.m. in the DRP conference room. The designated Board members should ensure that appropriate
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| ' members of their staff will be present to support this meeting. SALP Board ;
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| 4 members will be responsible to present their assigned SALP functional area.
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| C7 Preparation of overheads are required for the presentation.
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| The SALP Board meeting will be conducted in accordance with Management Directive 8.6 and Regional Office Instruction 516. The St. Lucie SALP Board briefing ;
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| package is enclosed (i.e., outlines, updated input feeder forms, updated !
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| inspection report referenced pages, and power history curves).
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| If you have any questions, please contact Edwin Lea at (404) 331- 3641.
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| Attachments:
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| - SALP Board Briefing Package
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| - Outlines
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| - Updated Feeder Forms j
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| - Updated Inspection Reports References 4
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| - Power History Curves l l
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| l . 1 v' .
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| E. Merschoff, et. al' 2
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| 1
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| : 6) '1 W'-
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| 'cc w/ attachments:'
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| S.- Ebneter, ORA-L. Reyes, ORA 4
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| N. Miller,: SRI, St. Lucie l J. Norris, NRR l
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| l UNITED STATES ,
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| . /pm *8cg% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION !
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| j 3 $ MEGION IL
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| > U j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2I00 ATLANTA. GEORGIA 203Bo198
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| . MEMORANDUM TO: Ellis W. Merschoff, Director ,
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| Division of Reactor Projects l Johns P. Jaudon, Deputy Director Division of Reactor Safety David B. Matthews, Director Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulatio FROM: Kerry D. Landis, Chief -
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| Reactor Projects Branch 3 [ <
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| ! Division of Reactor Projec s
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| ==SUBJECT:==
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| SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP) INPUT REQUEST Enclosure 1 is the Input Feeder Information on the licensee's performance at the St. Lucie facility during SALP period 24, from January 2, 1994, to January 6, 1996. You are requested ro provide confirmation that all pertinent information 4
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| h on the licensee's performance has been accurately captured in Enclosure 1.P which.is Enclosure 2. The blank feeder forms are also available on the computer LAN "I" drive as I:\BLKFDRFM.LSR (for laser printers) and I:\BLKFDRFM. DOT (for ,
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| dot matrix printers). One input feeder form per SALP functional area is '
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| provided. Each division is requested to have their technical staff complete their review /QA of the Input Feeder Form for each SALP functional area. The forms should be completed by your respective division and all inputs forwarded to me by December 22, 1995.
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| General guidance for completing the forms is given on the bottom of each blank form. For each example that you list on the input feeder forms, include the reference inspection report number and paragraph number. Also, please provide copies of pertinent pages of the inspection reports that you reference on the feeder forms. Please mark the inspection report number and paragraph number clearly on the upper right corner of each inspection report page. This will allow easy reference to the source report during review of the feeder form and development of the outline. The completed input feeder forms should be transmitted electronically (via e-mail to KDL and EXL2). Hard copies of the IR pages should be transmitted by internal mail or FAX.
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| The enclosed supplemental information package will be generated and distributed only once. Updated supplemental and new information that would effect the assessment of a licensee SALP period performance will be forwarded to the Board members for inclusion to their briefing books prior to the Board meeting date.
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| Y
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| 2 m The SALP Board meeting for St. Lucie is scheduled for January 24, 1995. The assessment period and phase that should be assessed are described below:
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| Site Name Salo Period Beoinnino Date - End Date St. Lucie SALP Cycle 24 January 2, 1994 - January 6, 1996 4
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| The assigned responsibility by functional areas for the subject SALP assessment is as follows:
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| Plant Operations - Ellis W. Merschoff Engineering -
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| David B. Matthews Maintenance -
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| Johns P. Jaudon Plant Support -
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| Johns P. Jaudon For purposes of manpower recording, the following inspection report number should be used when recording time spent on SALP assessment preparations:
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| Report Number: 50-335/95-99; 50-389/95-99 Inputs are due by December 22, which is approximately 15 days prior to the end of the SALP period. This will mean that the computer printouts and other SALP information which DRP will provide your staff may not contain data on l inspection reports that have not been issued by the end of the SALP period.
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| Your staff should ensure that their inputs cover all inspection reports inclusive to the SALP period completed. Listed below are reports which are m planned for this SALP period, but have not been issued to date:
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| Report Number Lead Insoector Insoection Dates Insoection Area 95-21 R. Prevatte 10/29 - 12/2/95 All Areas Inputs should be written in accordance with the ROI 0516 "SALP." Also enclosed is a copy of the Master Inspection Plan (MIP) detailing which inspection modules are in each functional area. Your staff will be provided with a copy of this memorandum, as well as listings of the inspections performed, license event reports (LERS), and violations identified for the appraised period. The report numbers associated with the particular noncompliance should be verified to ensure that all of the violations are included for discussions at the Board meeting.
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| If violations, LERs, or inspection activities belong in a functional area different from that indicated on the enclosures, the ORP Branch Chief or Project Engineer should be notified to ensure appropriate coordination.
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| Your staff will also be provided with a copy of the previous SALP report and previous SALP strengths and challenges. Challenges identified in the previous SALP report should be reflected in the input feeder forms, to be used as supporting information for the outline which will be presented at the Board meeting. The challenges will be discussed during the Board meeting to determine if any improvements have been achieved during the SALP period.
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| In the course of your input and assessment, it is essential that you provide j sufficient information for the SALP Board to obtain an accurate perspective of the inspection activity in the area. The SALP Board does not wish to render a rating in an area in which the licensee did not conduct activities or in which {
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| 4
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| 3 4
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| , - y- the region performed insufficient inspection activity to evaluate the area. j
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| ;/ I would like to emphasize the importance of providing complete, accurate, and I
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| , timely-inputs to the SALP process. Our desire is to produce a professional ,
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| report which will be beneficial, now and in the' future, to both the NRC and l the licensee.
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| ~
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| If there are any questions concerning the SALP process or preparation of your
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| . input, I would be glad to discuss them with you.
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| ==Enclosures:==
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| : 1. Input Feeder Information
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| : 2. Input feeder QA Form
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| : 3. Master -Inspection Plan
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| ; . 4. Listing of Inspection Hours "
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| by Functional Area
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| : 5. Previous SALP Report, SALP Strengths and Challenges
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| : 6. Listing of Inspections
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| : 7. Listing of Violations, Enforcement Actions, and CALs
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| : 8. Listing of LERS and LER Root Cause Analysis
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| , 9. Major Inspections, NRC Review
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| , . Activities, Licensee Conferences, and Licensee Activities 1
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| \s_ / 10. Reactor Trips, TS-Required Shutdowns cc w/encls:
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| DRS BC EB DRS BC OLB DRS BC MB
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| . DRS BC PSB DRS BC SIB E. Lea, DRP
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| , , R. Prevatte, St. Lucie J. Norris, NRR 4
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| %=,
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| ENCLOSURE 1 - 51 LUC h ,4P INPUT FEEDER INFORMAil04 s Page No.. 1
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| .11/15/95 Si LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS ,
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| ' S'AP DATE RPi # UNIT ISSUE EX AMPLE S ASSESSMENI INSPECTOR AREA NO.
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| ** SALP AREA ENG ENG 01/20/95 94-025 1 CONFIGURAfl04 MANAGEMENT NAON REllEt VALVES ENGINEERING ANALYSl5 IMOROUGN AND APPROPRIATE DEPTM - LER 335 94 006 PREVAlfE ENG 07/01/95 95-012. 1 CONFIGURAllON MANAGEMENT EVAL FOR NI CN D TEMP MOD SAilSFACTORY PREVAllt ENG 07/29/95 95-014 2 CONFIGURA110N MANA.EMENT 28 EDG FO IFER MANUAL ISOLAll04 EVAL SUBJECT OF IIA PREVATTE ENG / / 95-018 0 DESIGN BASIS INFO AND DET AIL 5 0F DESIGN ON tNlii 1 SFP COOLING UNCLEAR DESCRIPil0NS PREVATTE RETRIEVAL EEG 03/24/95 95-005 0 DESIGN BAS 15 INFORMAil0N AND D90 PROGRAM PROVIDED USEFUL INFORMATION. GOCD MANAGEMENT SUPPORT EVIDENT THONAS RETRIEVAL EEG 03/25/94 94-006 2 DESIGN CONTRDL PC/M PLACING CNPP'S 04 7ERO SECOND LOAD INADECUATE REvlEW - NCY 94-06-02 MACDONALD BLOCK INTRODUCED C00040N MODE FAILURE MECW ENG 06/27/94 94 013 0 DESIGN CONTROL VTM CONTROL CONTROL WEAKNESSES IDENilFIED. FRG APPROVAL OF VTM*5 NOT 11 MELT, ELROD REVISION CONTROL RESULIED IN MORE TNAN 1 TRANSMITIAL WITH SAME REV NO ENG 06/27/94 94-013 0 DESIGN CONTROL CONTROL OF DRAWING UPDATES STRONG CONTROL, TIMELY ISSUANCE EtROD ENG 08/31/94 94-018 1 DESIGN CONTROL LACK OF DRAWINGS FOR REFUELING TOOLS ELROD ENG 12/14/94 94-024 0 DESIGN CONTROL VFNDOR TECHNICAL MANUALS TECHNICAL MANUAL CHANGES NOT REVIEWED AND APPROVED PRIOR TO USE - PREVAffE SLiv 94-24-02 ENG 02/17/95 95-002 0 DESIGN CONTROL CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCNOR BOLTS IN COMPLIANCE Wlin NRC REQUIREMENTS LENANAN ENG 03/24/95 95-005 0 DESIGN CONTROL 11 JLLs PEVIEWED NO DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED IN J/LLs THOMAS ENG 03/24/95 95-005 0 PESIGN CONTROL DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGES ADEQUATE /SUFFICIENTLY DOCUMENTED IMOMAS ENG 03/24/95 95-005 0 DESIGN CONTROL PROCEDURES ADEQUATE GUIDELINES THOMAS ENG 03/24/95 95-005 0 DESIGN CONTROL TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS WEAKNESS IN GUIDANCE FOR NOW CONTROL ROOM DRAWINGS UOULD REFLECT IN0 MAS MODS ENG 10/12/95 95-018 2 DESIGN CONTROL INADEQUATE DESIGN /INADEeuATE TESTS EDG GOVERNOR SWIFT TO ISOCIIRONOUS MODE ON CSAS AND CIAS WNILE PREVAtlE PARALLELED TO OSP Stiv 95-18-06 ENG 03/25/94 94-006 0 DESIGN INSTALLAil0N STAfl04 SLCGIUT MODS IMPLEMENTATION SAftSFACTORT MACDONALD PULL-TO-LOCK MODIFICAil0NS
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| * ICW/CCW CONTROL SCIIEME/INSTALLATICII ADEGUATE MACDONALD.
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| ENG 03/25/94 94-006 0 DESIGN INSTALLAil0N ENCLOSURE 1
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| .. ~ ~ - - . .~ . n. x- - a
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| - + s Page No. ._ 2 41/15/95 51 tuCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS .
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| $*.LP DATE RPi
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| * UNIT' ISSUE EXAMPLES ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AREA NO.
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| ENG 05/20/94 94-011 .2 DESIGN INSTALLATION POST ACCIDENT EXCORE NEUTRON FLUX NO DISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED ELROD MONITORING SYSTEM INSTAttAil0N ENG 05/20/94 94-011 2 DESIGN INSTALLATION 0-2 P2R SAFETY VALVE DISCNARGE PIPING NO DISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED ELROD MOD ENG 05/20/94 94-011 2 DESIGN INSTALLATION SG A & 8 WR LEVEL XMTR REPLACEMENT NO DISCREPANCIES IDENilFIED ELROD ENG 05/20/94 94 011 2 G2 SIGN INSTALLAll04. GL 89-10 SPRING PACK REPLACEMENT / limit NO DISCWEPANCIES IDENTIFIED ELROD SWITCN ADJUSTMENTS E2G 08/19/94 94-016 2 DEslGN INSTALLATION MINOR ENGINEERING PACKAGE FOR N2 SUPPLY WELL WRIllEN AND COMPLETE CARRION TO RAB ENG 12/14/94 94-024 1 DESIGN INSTAttATION FIVE PtANT RF0 M005 AUDITED ADEQUATELY PERFORMED PREVAffE ENG 12/14/94 94-024 1 DESIGN INSTALLAil0N PCM 182-193 (PTC SWliCHES), SG LEVEL MODIFICA110NS WEtt DESIGNED, INSTALLED AND TESTED PREVATIE TRANSMITTER UPGRADES, CAVITY SEAL RING ENG 03/24/95 95-005 0 DESIGN INSIAttAll0N 15 PC/Ms REVIEWED GOOD QUAtt1Y IN DESIGN WORK, TECNNICALLY ADEcuAIE, 50.59s .
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| INOMAS SATISFACTORY, 1 INSTALLAil0N RELATED DISCREPANCY IDENilFIED - Stiv 95-05-01 ENG 04/01/S5 95-007 0 DESIGN INSTALLAil0N MODIFICATION OF KLF RELAYS SAilSFACTORY PREVA11E EKG 06/03/95 95-010 0 CESIGN INSTALLAllON ATWS RULE IMPLEMENTA110N ATWS MOD *FICATION REVIEW SATISFACTORY PREVATIE EKG 10/20/94 94-020 1 ENGINEERlhG SUPPORI TECHNICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM WALKDOWNS TO USEFUL FOR LIMlilNG CONTAMINAll0N PREvATTE IDENilFY PACKING AND UNION LEAKS TNG 12/14/94 94-024 1 FNGINEERING SUPPORT S/G TUBE PLUG REPAIRS ENGINEERING SUPPORT WAS TIMELY AND EFFECilVE PREVAliE E;'G ' 10/18/94 94-020 0 ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO USE AND KNOWLEDGE OF PRA PLANT PERSONNEL Noi TRAINED IN IPE - IPE NOT USED IN PLANNING AND PREVAITE MAINTENANCE SCHEDUllWG OF WORK ENG 12/14/94 94-024 1 ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO REPAIR TO RW1 EFFECTIVE PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IIPILY ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING AND PREVAliE MAINTENANCE IMPLEMENTING ALT!RNATIVE REPAIR 10 TANK SOTTOM ENG 03/24/95 95-005 0 ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO PRA SUPPORT TO ONLINE MAINTENANCE ADEGUATE THOMAS MAINTENANCE ENG 03/24/95 95-005 0 ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO SUPPORT TO MAINTENANCE SUPPORT TIMELY THOMAS MAINTENANCE ENG 03/24/95 95 005 0 ENGINEERtWG SUPPORT TO EVALUAtl0NS SUPPORTING PM BASl5 PROGRAM ADEeUATE INOMAS MAINTENANCE AND ONLINE MAINTENANCE
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| Page No.
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| 11/15/95 51 LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS .
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| EALP OATE RPT R UNIT ISSUE , EXAMPtES ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AREA No.
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| i
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| 'ENG 03/24/95 95-005 0 ENGINEERING SUPPORY 10 INVOLVEMENT IN BACKLOG REDUCTION CONSIDERED A STRENGIR THOMAS MAINTEMANCE- EFFORTS ENG 10/16/95 95-015 1 - ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO DG WORK SUPPORT OF MAINTENANCE AND R001 CAUSE EVALUATION 11 MELT A@ NELPFUL PREVATTE MAINTENANCE EEG 10/26/95 95-020 0 ENGlkEERING SUPPORT TO REVIEW /M001FICAll04 0F PLANT RELIEF COMPREHENSIVE AND SOUND CORRECTIVE ACil0NS PREVAffE MAINTENANCE VALVE SETPOINTS ENG T1/25/94 94-022 1 ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO DESIGN PROBLEM ON NACH PIPING SYSTEM ENGINEERING PROVIDED TIMELT SMORT AND LONG TERM RESOLU180N - STRONG PREWATTE OPERAi10NS MANAGEMENT INVOLVDENT IN DEVELOPING lNTERIM AND LONG TERM FIN ECG 03/24/95 95-005 0 ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO ENGINEERING TEAM INSPECil04 CONCLUSION SUPPORT itMELY TO OPERAll0NS AND MAINTENANCE TMOMAS OPERATIONS ,
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| ENG ' 03/31/95 95-004 2 ENGINEERING SUPPORI 10 RCGVS REALIGNMENT HIGN QUALITT DOCUMENT (50.59) WITM L111LE LEAD TIME PREVAfit OPERAll0NS EEG 03/24/95 95-005 -0 PROCUREMENT AcilvlTIES EO MOTOR REWINO ACTIVITIES ACCEPTABLE PROCESS, SOME DEFICIENCIES NOTED IMOMAS ENG 03/1//94 94-005 0 SA0V 50.59 AUD11 0F 6 EVALUA110NS EVALUATIONS WELL WRITTEN ElROD EEG 06/2//94 94-013 0 SAoV 50.59 AUD11$ NO DISCREPANCIES ELROD EKG 03/24/95 95-005 0 SAQV INDEPENDENT TECMulCAL REVIEWS ISEG FUNCTIONS SUCCESSFULLY TRANSFERRED 10 QA TNOMAS
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| . .i ECG 03,24/95 95-005 0 SAov SELF ASSESSMENT AtilvillES CONSIDERED A STRENGIM TMOMAS [
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| ENG 03/24/95 95 005 0 SAov NCR/SIAR GUIDANCE FOR OPERA 81Lili GUIDANCE DIO NOT ADDRESS EVALUAilNG PAsi OPERA 81L11Y TMOMAS ASSESSMENTS ENG 03/24/95 95-005 0 SAov 2 ROOT CAUSE EVALUAll0NS REVIEWED THOROUGH AND IN-DEPIN EVALUA110NS IMOMAS ENG 03/24/95 95-005 0 SAov ICI FLANGE 8 WIRING DISCREPANCIES F AILURE 10 DOCLMENT NONCONFORMANCE - NCV 95 05-04 TMcMAS ENG 05/20/94 94-011 2 SUPPORT FOR TESTING AND MSSV BINDING DURING TEsilNG ENG EVAL WEAK IN THAT II DID NOT THOROUGMLY EVALUATE ROOT CAUSE OF ELROD SURVEILLANCE BINDING ENG 11/25/94 94-022 0 SurPORT OF TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW INTEGRATED EXCELLENT SUPPORT PREVAffE SURVEILLANCE SAFEGUARDS TEST
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| : m. .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ ._..______m__._______- ___ ______.______._____.__,____.___m_m _ . ___ ,.>. . -. _. .-r,-- - , - - --c-+- _ , , . v. . . - , . - . , , . , . e,
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| Page No. 4 11/15/95 ST LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS ,
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| SALP DATE PPT # UNIT ISSUE EXAMPLES ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AREA NO.
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| ** SALP AREA MS MS 03/25/94 94-N E O CORRECTIVE Atil04 NF A RELAY PERIODit VISUAL INSPECil0NS GOOD CORRECTIVE Atil0N/ REDUCED RELAY FAILURES MACDONALD MS 04/08/94 94-008 2 CORRECTIVE ACTION FAILURE TO WRl1E NCR FOR DAMAGED PIPE FAILURE VIOLATED PLANT PROCEDURES - Stiv 94-08-02 CROWLEY SUPPORT MS 04/le/9 94 008 2 CORREClive ACriON EVAtUAiiDN OF SRv/PORv DiSCNARGE eiPiNG EVAt PERFORMED WiiN00T DOCu,.NiED iNSituCriONS - 5 SNU ERS CROWtEr WATERNAMMER EVENT SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND INOP - Stiv 94-08-01 MS 05/20/94 94-012 2 CORREtilVE ACTION U2 FAILURE TO LCAD SNED SWING ICW/CCW F AILURE TO T AKE ADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR PREVIOUS NRC ELROD PUMPS VIOLAll0N - SLIV 94-12 01 MS 06/13/94 94-011 0 CORRECTIVE ACil0N 3 INSTANCES OF STALLED MOV'S DURING FAILURE TO DOCUMENT POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO VALVES AND ACTUATORS - Stiv GIRARD SURVEILLANCE TESTING 94-11-01 MS 06/2//94 94-013 0 CORRECTIVE ACTION TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE CONDITION WEAKNESS IN OPEN ITEM SYSTEM - INADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF COMPLETED ELROD REVIEW ACTIONS ES 09/0//95 95-016 1 CORRECilVE ACil04 PORW INOPERABill1T ROOT CAUSE METHODICAL AND 11MLT PREVAffE DETERMINAil04 MS 10/26/95 95-020 1 CORRECTIVE Atil0N LIF1/F AILURE TO RESEAT OF SDC DISCHARGE F AILURE 10 INCLUDE ENGINEERING IN ADDRESSING PRIOR RELIEF VALVE PREVAlif' THERMAL RELIEF VALVE LIFTS CONTRIBUTED TO EVENT. FAILURE TO TAKE PROMP1 CORRECTIVE ACil0N - SL 95-20-01 MS / / 95-J18 1 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVES LEAKING MISAllGNED TAILPIPES EXTENDED OUTAGE PREVATTE MS / / 95-018 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE ICI WIRING IMPROPER L ABELING RESutiED IN REVERSING WIRING DURING W RE ASSEMRLY PREVAffE PREVIOUS RF0 - WCW 95-18-05 MS 02/18/94 94-001 1 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE 2A, 2C CHARGING PUMP REPAIRS WELL-CONTROLLED WORK ELROD MS 03/25/94 94-006 0 CORRECilVE MAINTENANCE 52 ELECTRICAL MAIN 1ENANCE PWO PACKAGES ADEQUATE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGS MACDONALD REVIEWED MS 04/28/94 94-C09 2 CORRECilVE MAINTENANCE 2A CS PLMP GASKET REPLACEMENT SATISFACTORT ELR(e MS 04/28/94 94-009 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE AFW MOV REPLACEMENT Sail $ FACTORY ELROD MS 04/28/94 94-009 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE 2A CCW HK TURE PLUGGING / INSPECTION PERFORMED SAftSFACTORILY ELROD MS 04/28/94 94-009 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE 2A LPSI PUMP MOTOR TERMINATION WORK SATISFACTORT ELROD MS 04/28/94 94 010 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE PRES $URIZER N0ZZLE REPLACEDENTS AtilVITIES WELL-CONTROLLED AND PERFORMED. VIO FOR INADE00 ATE WELD CROWLEY j PREP - Stiv 94-10-01 I SATISFACTORT WOREMANSNIP AND PMi ELROD MS 05/20/94 94-011 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE REPLACEMENT OF MISSING WERE IN 25-2AB l CONTROL POWER
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| Page No. T 11/15/95 ST LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS SALP DATE RPi 8 UNIT ISSUE ERAMPLES - ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AREA ND.
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| MS 07/01/95 95t12 1 DIAGNOSTIC MAINTENANCE 1A EDG SPEED CONTROL PROBLEMS 1/R EFFORT METHODICAL. WELL CONTROLLED PREVATTE
| |
| ' MS 10/18/94 94-020 0 ENGINEERING SUPPORT TO USE AND KNOWLEDGE OF PRA FLANT PERSONNEL. NOT TRAINED IN IPE - IPE NOT USED IN PLANNING AND PREVATTE MAINTENANCE SCHEDULING OF WORK MS 10/16/95 95-015 1 EQUIPMENT CONDlil0N EDG FAILURE LOOSE LASN ADJUSTMENT NUT RESUtiS IN DAMAGE TO 18 EDG PREVAffE MS 12/14/94 94-024 1 IEC EOUIPMENT ROSEMOUNT MODEL 1153 TRANSMITTER 50.72 REPORis MADE - LER ISSUED PREVATTE FAILURES MS 04/08/94 94 008 0 IN-SERvlCE INSPECTION AND ISI PROGRAM CONSIDERED A STRENGTN CROWLEY TESilNG a
| |
| MS . 04/08/94 94-008 0 IN-SERVICE INSPEtil0N AND EROSION / CORROSION PROGRAM PROACilVE PROGRAM CROWL E Y TESTING CS 04/08/94 96-008 0 IN-SERVICE INSPECTION AND $NUBBER SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM COMPLIES WITN TECN SPECS CROWLEY TESTING MS 08/31/94 94-018 1 INSERvlCE INSPECTION AND ECT Acilvl1IES PERFORMED IN A COMPETENT MANNER ELROD TESTING QS 12/14/94 94-405. 1 INSERVICE INSPECil0N AND U1 Ri - ECT - FLOW ACCELERATED PROGRAM EFFECTIVE AND MEETS ACCEPTABLE PRACTICES AND ST ANDARDS NARRIS TESilNG CORROSION PROGRAMS MS 12/14/94 94-405 1 INSERVICE INSPECil0N AND WELDING WELDING PROCEDURES AND WELDER QUALIFICAll0N CONFORMS Tu ACCEPTED NARRIS -
| |
| TESTING PRACilCFS MS 12/14/94 94-405 1 INSERVICE INSPECTION AND NDE (VAN) EXAMINATIONS FOUND No DEFECTS AND CLOSELT MATCNEO INE LICENSEE NARRIS TESTING RESULTS MS 12/I4/94 94-405 1 INSERVICE INSPECTION AND WDE (VAN) ISI AND NDE PROGRAM WELL PLANNED, IMOROUGNLY CONTROLLED, WELL MARRIS TESilNG EXECUTED AND MEETS ASME CODE MS 12/14/94 94-405 1 INSERVICE INSPECTION AND PROCEDURE (NDE) thaDE00 ATE PROCEDURE FOR UT EXAMINATION OF CAST STAINLESS STEEL MARRIS TESTING MS 12/14/94 94 405 1 INSERVICE INSPECil0N AND NDE (VAN) CERTIFICAll0N AND DOCUMENTAil0N OF NDE TECHNICIANS WELL EXINTROLLED NARRIS TESilWG MS - 10/16/95 95-015 0 INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION PERSONNEL QUALIFICAil0N WEAK PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE ON REculdED SUPERVISORT OVERSIGNT FOR PREVATTE UN00AltflED WORRERS MS / / 95-018 2 OUTAGE ACTIVITIES RPV DISASSEMBLY AND DEFUELING PERFORMED WELL WITN ONLY MINOR EQUIPMENT PtogLERS PREVATTE MS 03/17/94 94-005 2 CUTAGE AcilVlilES REACTOR VESSEL NEAD LIFT GOOD INTERDEPARTMENTAL C00RDINAfl0E ELROD
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| M . - z. .. . . - - - a . - -
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| / \
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| \. r I \~+ }
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| * Page No. 8- ,.
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| 11/95/95 Si LtTIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS
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| * SALP DATE RPT F Unli ISSUE EXAMPLE S ASSESS 8ENT INSPECTOR AREO NO.
| |
| MS 12/14/94 94-024 1 OUTAGE ACilvlTIES M00lFICAil045 FIVE PLANT RF0 MODS ADEQUATELY PERFORMED PREVATTE MS 04/08/94 94-005 0 PNYSICAL CONOlilON OF PLANT NOUSEKEEPING AND MATERIAL CON 0lil0N IN CONSIDERED STRENGins CROE E T U-2 R8, RAa, STM TRESILE, INTAKE STRUCTURES AND U-1 AND 2 CCW STRUCTURES MS 04/28/94 94 009 0 PHYSICAL CONDITION OF PLANT 6 AREA WALKDOWNS SAilSFACTORT ELROD MS 10/20/94 94-020 1 PNYSICAL CONDlil0N OF PLANT SYSTEM WAtkDOWN 23 MINOR EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED PREVATTE MS 01/20/95 94-025 1 PHYSICAL CONDITION OF PLANT PLANT RESTART WALKDOWN AFTER RF0 11 MINOR DEFICIENCIES IDENilFIED - LEAKS - MIS $1NG INSULAtl0N = PREVATTE ,
| |
| HOSES ROUTED TO FLOOR DRAINS MS 02/17/95 95-002 0 PHYSICAL CON 0lTION 0/ PtANT tuli 1/2 CCW ARE AS NUMEROUS AREAS OF CORROSION IDENilFIED LENANAN
| |
| .. MS 03/31/95 95-004 0 DNYSICAL CONDlilom 0F PLANI UNIT 1/2 CCW AREAS NUMsER OF ARE AS WITH LOCALIZED CORROSION PREVAf+f MS 03/31/95 95-004 2 F'MYSICAL CONDITION OF PLANI UNIT 2 FUEL POOL AREA - LOOSE SNOE WE AK HOJSEKEEPING PREVAITE COVERS NEAR EDGE. CLEAR PLA$ilC IN AREA.
| |
| MS 07/29/95 95-014 2 PNYSICAL CON 0lilON OF PLANI UNIT 2 AT-POWER CONTAINMENT INSPECil04 THOROUGM, SATISFACTORY PREVATIE MS .10/16/95 95-015 1 PHYSICAL CONDITION OF PLANT 40 DEFICIENCIES IDENilFIED LINE FUNC110N GROUPS NOT IDENilFYING AND CORRECilNG DEFICIENCIES PREVAlfE MS 10/16/95 95-015 1 PLANT RESTARI EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS / PERSONNEL NUMEROUS EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS AND PERSONNEL ERRORS RESULTED IN PREVAITE PERFORMANCE EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE MS 05/20/94 94-011 2 POST MAINTENANCE TEsilNG PMI 0F MV-08-13 EXCELLENT TEST CONTROL ELROD MS 08/31/94 94-018 2 POST MAINTENANCE TEsilNG PHY PROCEDURE ADEQUATE TO VERIFY PCM IMPLEMENTAll0N ELROD MS 09/07/95 95-016 1 POST MAINTENANCE TESilNG UNIT 1 PORV IMOPERABill1Y FAILURE TO PERFORM ADEQUAIE PMT, SURVEILLANCE TESTING AND POST TRIP PREVAllE REVIEW - Still 95-16-1/CP i MS 06/13/94 94-011 1 PREDICilVE MAINTENANCE MOV IRENDING NO PROCEDURE DOCUMENTING WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE, PERIODicifY, WHO GIRAR0 RECOMMENDED ACil0NS, ETC MS 03/24/95 95-005 0 PREDICilVE MAINTENANCE VISRAil0N TRENDllni, THERMOGRAPNY CONSIDERED A STRENGIN THOMAS TRENDING AND OIL SAMPLE ANAliSIS i
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| MS / / 95-018 1 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE DG GOVERNOR CONTROLS POOR PAST MAINTENANCE PRACTICES ON EDG CONTROLS RESULTS IN NEED FOR PREVATTE y EXTENSIVE WORK - OPERATIONS NOT FORCl#C RtGN STANDARDS MS 03/25/94 94-006 2 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE PROTECTIVE RELAY REFUR5tSFt2Ni WELL CONTROLLED SY PROCEDURES, ADEQUATE OC NOLD PolNTS UilLIZED MACDONALD MS 04/28/94 94 009 2 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE 2A MPSI PP MOTOR CMANGEOUT SATISFACTORT ELROD t
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| i L
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| 'Page No. 9 11/15/95 SI LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS SALP DATE RPT # UNil ISSUE. EXAMPLES ASSESSMENT AREA NO. INSPECTOR
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| . MS . 04/28/94 94 009 2 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE 28 EDG INSPECil0N TRAINING FOR ELECTRICAL PERSONNEL GOOD - ELROD MS 04/28/94 94-009 2 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE 2A LPSI PUMP OVERMAUL PROCEDURAL WEAANESS IDEHilFIED IN REASSEMBLV - OTNERWISE EtatE SAilSFACTORT MS 06/13/94 94-011 0 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE GL 89-10 PROGRAM GENERALLY SATISFACTORT PROGRAM stRARO -
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| IOS 06/27/94 94-013 i PREVENilvF MAINTENANCE 1R CCW ex CLEANING MYDROLASER FOUND AT 100 WIGN A PRESSURE DUE 10 VIBRAll0N, POOR ELROD DESIGN US 07/29/94 94-014 2 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE WRGM INOP WHEN WORKERS FAILED TO FAILURE TO INCLUDE INDEPENDENT WERIFICATION IN PROC - NCV 94-14 02 ELROD RECDNNECT SAMPLING LINE AFTER CAL MS 08/23/94 94-015 0 PREVENilVE MAIN 1ENANCE 3 PWO'S ACTIVlilES WELL PERFORMED PREVAlfE MS 10/18/94 94 020 0 PREVENTIVE MAlWTENANCE MAlh1EhANCE CONDUCTED IN SAFE AND EFFICIENT MANNER --ACCURACY AND PREVATIE RANGES OF TEST EQUIPMENT NOT SPECIFIED IN PRCCEDURE MS 11/25/94 94 022 0 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE NEW PROCEDUdt DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING TIME IN LCO'S PREVATTE FOR CRITICAL MAINTENANCE MS 11/25/94 94-022 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PERFORMANCE OF CRAFISMEN AND EXCELLENT PREVA11E TECNNICIANS MS 12/14/94 94-024 0 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE 6 PWO'S ACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE PREVATTE MS 04/01/95 95-007 1 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE WEEKLY BATTERY INSPECTIONS PERFORMED SAtlSFAC10RILY PREVATTE MS 04/01/95 95-007 2 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE CMARGING PUMP ACCIDEA ATOR PM WEAK PROCEDURE. WORK PERFORMED WELL PREVATIE MS Ot/29/95 95-009 2 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE OF MV21-2 NO DEFICIENCIES IDENilFIED PREVAffE M5 06/03/95 95-010 2 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE B TRAIN ECCS CMM PROCEDURE STEPS NOT SIGNED OFF AS WORK PERFORMED PREVAlit MS 06/03/95 95 010 2 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE 8 TRAIN ECCS CMM ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE TRAINING WEAKNESS IDEmilFIED PREVAffE MS 06/03/95 95-010 2 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE 8 TRAIN ECCS CMI INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION WEAKNESS PREVAliE MS 07/01/95 95-012 1 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE 1A CCW NK CLEANING /INSPECil04 SAilSFACTORY PREVAllE MS '07/29/95 95-014 2 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE 2C AFP OIL CNANGE POOR PREPLANNING, SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE' PREVAliE MS 07/29/95 95 014 1 PREVEmilVE MAINTENANCE 18 AFP COUPLING PM (CNE) PERFORMED VERY WELL/ EMPEDli10USLY PREVAlif MS 10/16/95 95-015 1 PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE COMPLIANCE MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL NOT SIGNING PROCEDURE AS WORK STEPS ARE PREVAfit ACCINLISMED - (REPEAT OF liEM IN IR 95-10) t I
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| l -_ _ - _ __ -__ _ __ __ , - _ . . - , _-_ - - . _ . _ , _ - , .
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| - , '. ,.. . .~ ; cnd M ~ a L. . L ., n. - a :1J4 .
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| ;Dage No. 10 '
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| 11/15/95 Si LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS -
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| SALD DATE RPT s UNii ISSUE EX AMPL E S ASSESSMENT -INSPECTOR AREA NO.
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| MS 04/01/95 95-007 1 SAQV MONEL DI AFMRAGMS IN ROSEMQJNi PROACilVE CamlTMENT TO 9001 CAUSE DETERMINAtl0N PREVAlif -
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| TRANSMiffERS MS 10/16/95 95-015 1 SAQV NONCONFORMING CONDITION FAILURE TO DOCUMENT DEFICIENCi Wlin $1AR - Stiv 95-15 05 PREVATTE MS / /" 95 018 2- SURVElLLANCE TESTING MISSED SURVEILLANCE WEAK OPERATOR KNOWLEDGE OF 15 REQUIREMENT RESULIED IN MIS $1NG TEST PREVAllE ACTIVITIES ON RCS BORON SAMPLING WHILE $NUTDOWN - NCY 95-18-07 MS / / 95-018 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTING INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS TEST DETAILED PROCEDURE - IDENTIFIED DESIGN PROBLEM PREV AT TE ACTIVITIES MS / / 95-018 i SURVEILLANCE TESilNG MISSED SURVEILLANCE INATTENil0N TO DETAIL IN MANDLING RECORDS RESulTED IN MIS $1NG TWO PREVAliE ACilVITIES CONSECUTIVE TEST OR CEA P0sITION DEVIATION - NCV 95-18-06 ~
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| MS 02/18/94 94-001 1 SURVEILLANCE TESTING 1A3 LOAD SHED DURING TESilNG DUE TO CORRECT IDENilFICA1104 0F ROOT CAUSE ELROD ACTIVlilES RELAT FAILURE MS 02/18/94 94-001. 1 SURVEILL ANCE TESilNG 1A EDG MONTHLY TEST OPERATOR PERFORMANCE GOOD, MAINT/ENG'S SUPPORT TIMELY 'ELROD ACilVITIES MS 03/17/94 94 005 2 SURVEILLANCE TEstlNG AFW TURBINE OVERSPEM TESTS SAilSFAC10RY ELROD ACTIVli1ES MS 03/17/94 94 005 2 SURVEILLANCE TES11NG AFW TURBINE MECM AND ELECT 0/5 TRIP Sail $ FACTORY ELROD ACTIVlilES TESTS MS 03/17/94 94-005 2 SURVEILLANCE TESilNG MAIN $fEAM SAFETT VALVE SETPolNT GOOD CON'ROL AND C00RDINAllON ELROD-ACTIVlilES TESTING CS 03/IT/94 94-005 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTING AFW PERIODIC SAilSFACTORT ELROD AcilvtilES MS f5/17/94 94-005 2 SURVEILLANCE 1ESTING INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS TESilWG PROFES$10NAL CONDUCT, GOOD BRIEFING, GOOD COMUNICATIONS, ELROD ACTIVITIES WELL-CONTROLLED CS L3/17/94 94-005 1 SURVEILLANCE TESilNG CEA PERIG)lt EXERCISE OPERATORS CAUil005, PROCEDURE WEAKNESS IDENilFIED ELROD ACTIVillES MS - 03/25/94 94-006 1 SURVEILLANCE TES11NG 18 EDG FAILURE FAILURE TO MAKE TS REQUIRED REPORT - NCV 94-06-01 ftACDONALD ACTIVITIES MS 04/28/94 94-009 1 SURVEILLANCE TESTING 15 EDG PERIODIC RUM OPERATOR ERROR IDENilFIED III EMPANS10N TANK LEVEL CNECK, PROCEDURAL ' ELROD ACTIVITIES lEAKNESS IDENTIFIED IN 00RRECTIIIS NIGIt WATER LEVEL CoselTION
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| . MS 04/28/94 94-009 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTitIG 28 EDG PERIODIC RUIt SATISFACTORY ELROD ACTIVITIES
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| Page No. 11
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| ~11/15/95 Si LUCIE SALP lNPUT FEEDERS -
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| SALP PAYE- #PT # UNil ISSUE ERAMPLES ASSE SSMENT INSPECTOR AREA- No,
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| . M5 - 05/20/94 94-011 2 SURVERLLANCE TESTING RCD WORTH TESilNG PERFORNANCE EXCELLENT ELROD ACTIVlilES MS 06/13/94 94 011 1 SURVEltLANCE TEstlNG DESIGN-8A$ls D/P IEST FOR VALVE DID NOT ACCL!RAIELT DETERMlWE D/P Al VALVE AND DID NOT ASSURE GIRARD AtilvtilES 1-V 3660 REPRESENTAllVE FLOW MS 06/27/94 94-013 1 SURVEILLANCE TESTING TA EDO PERIODIC RUN PROCEDURAL WEAKNESS CORRECILY DISPOSITIONED BT SNPO ELROD ActivillES MS. 06/27/94 94-013 2 SURVEILLANCE TEsilNG DELTA T POWER CHANNEL CAtlBRAil0N SAllSFACTORT ELROD ACTIVlilES MS 06/27/94 94-013 2 SURVEILL ANCE TESilNG CEA PERIODIC IEST PERFORMED PROFESSIONALLY, GOOD C04RMICAt t0NS, GOOD RE SUPPORI ELROD ACTIVlilES CS - 06/27/94 94-013 2 SURVEILLANCE TEsitNG CEDMCS PERIODIC EXERCISE GOOD COMMUNICATIONS AMONG PARilCIPANIS, TECHNICIAN alN0utEDGEA8tE ELROD ACilvlilES MS 06/27/94 94 013 1 SURVEILL ANCE TESilNG CEA PERIODIC TEST GOOD COMMUNICATIONS ELROD ACTIVlilES MS 06/27/94 94-013 2 SURVEILLANCE YESilNG HPSI VALVE STROKE TEsis SAilSFACTORT ELROD ACilvillES MS 07/29/94 94-014 0 SURVEILL ANCE 1EsilkG NUC DELTA 1 CAL /AFW PERIODIC TESTS NO DEFICIENCIES ELROD ACTIV!1lES OBSERVED HS 08/23/94 94 015 0 SURVEILLANCE TESilNG 2 TESTS OBSERVED PERFORMED WELL PREVAliE ACTIvlilES MS 08/31/94 94-018 0 SURVEILLANCE TEsijNG 4 SURVEILLANCE TEST - EDG, CS, HPSI PERFDRMED WELL WlIN GOOD COMptMICAll0N ELROD ACTIVITIES VLV, CEAS MS 10/20/94 94-020 1 SURVEILLANCE TESTING AFW PERIODIC EQUIPMENT Call 8 RATED, C000 TEST - LCD MET - GOOD ATTENil0N TO DETAll' PREVATTE ACTIVITIES MS 10/20/94 94-020 1 SURVEILLANCE TESilNG TEST PROCEDURE FOR FLOW TRANSMITTER TEST EQUIPMENT NOT ACdURATELT SPECIFIED IN PROCEDURE - PROCEDURE DID PREVAllE ACilvlTIES CALIBRATION NOT GIVE TOLERANCE MS 10/20/94 94-020 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTING ESF RELAT TESTS ALL GOOD - SODE SWITCHES LASELLED WIIN MARtlNG PEN - PREJOB BRIEF, PREVATTE ACTIVITIES JUMPER LIFTED LEAD USE, REPEAT BACE COMMUNICAfl0NS, MANAGEMENT SUPERVISORT OVERSIGHT MS 10/20/94 94-020 1 SURVEILLANCE TESilNG AFU TEST PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE ON SCENE, TEST PERFORMANCE AND CapetMICATIONS PREVATTE ACTIVITIES WITHIN AND WITN CONTROL ROOM t
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| MS 10/20/94 94-020 1 SURVEILLANCE TESTING FLUID SYSTEMS LEAK TEST EARLY IDENilFICAil04 FOR SYSTEM LEAKS PREVAlif ACTIVITIES
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| Date No. 12 11/15/95 Si LUCIE SALP INPU1 FEEDEh5 SQLP DA!E RPT R UNIT ISSUE EXAMPL ES ASSESSMENT AREA NO. INSPECTOR MS 11/25/94 94 022.O SURVEILLANCE TESTING Six SURVEILLANCE TESTS
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| ' ACilvl11ES SAilSFACTORY - GOOD PREJOB RRIEFING - GOOD PROCEDURAL USE - GOOD 'PREVAlit.
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| REPEAT BACK COMMUNICAil0N - SUPERVISORY OVERSIGNT MS 12/14/94 94-024 1 SURVEILLANCE TESilNG TWO EQUIPMENT OPERA 8ttlif TESTS TEST SATISFACTORY - 1, A AS A RESULT OF CDee.INICATION EQUIPMENT ACTIVlilES PREVATTE INADEQUACY AND LEAKING TEST EQUIPMENT CS 01/20/95 94 025 1 SURVEILLANCE 1ESilNG AT POWER DETERMINAil0N OF MIC AND POWER TEST WELL EXECUTED, GOOD COMMUNICATION AND C00RDINAll0N WITN OPS -PREVAfff ACTIVlilES COEFFICIENT MS 03/31/95 95 004 1 SURVERLLANCE TESTING TURBlNE TRIP TESTING GOOD COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION. PREVATIE ACTIVITIES MS 03/31/95 95-004 1 SURVEILLANCE TESilNG 1 A EDG PERIODIC IEST ACilVlilES GOOD COORDINATION BETWEEN RCO AND AMPS Ai SYNCNRoulZATION PREVATTE M3 04/01/95 95-007. 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTING AFP QUARTERLY TEST SAilSFAct0RT ACilVlilES PREVAffE-MS 04/01/95 95 007 2 SURVEltt ANCE TESTING ESF RELAY TEST SATISFAC10Ri ACTIVlilES FREVAlfE MS 04/C1/95 95 007 2 SURVEllLANCE TESTING 2B EDG MONTNLY TEST SATISFACTORT ACfivlTIES PREVA11E CS 04/29/95 95-009 2 SURVElLLANCE TESTING CONTAINMENT AIRLott TESTING NOT IMPRESSIVE StopE/CEPTM OF CORRECTIVE AC110NS - NCV 95-09-01 ACTIVITIES PREVA11E CONOL4TED WITNIN TS PERl(DICITY MS 06/03/95 95 010 2 SURVEILLANCE TESilNG V3659 DELTA P TESI SAT 75 FACTORY AcilVITIES PREVA11E MS 06/03/95 95-010 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTING 2A LPSI PUMP SECil0N RI RUN SAilSFACTORT ACilvillES PREVA11E M3 06/03/95 95 010 1 SURVEILLANCE TESTING FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR INCREASED TECH STAFF OVERSIGNT - NCV 95-10-01 PREVA11E ACTIVITIES EDG TEST FREQUENCY MS 07/01/95 95-012 1 SURVEILLANCE TESTING 18 EDG TS SURVEILLANCE sails 7AC10RY ACTIVITIES PREVA11E MS 07/29/95 95-014 2 SURVEILLANCE TEsilNG 28 EDG PERIODIC TEST PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY ACTIVlilES PREVAlit MS 07/29/95 95-014 1 SURVEILLANCE TESTING 15 AFP SECil0N XI TEST PERFORMED SAilSFACTORILY ACilvlTIES PREVATTE MS 07/29/95 95-014 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTING EDG DAT TANK LEVEL TEST WEAK PROCEDURE, INADEeuATE PRETEST CNECES ACilvtilES PREVATTE mu_.*i ---a_a._ m.__.au..._m__--___.-._____L<.__L_z..-+i_____-_L..- _ . _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - , _ _ _ _ - _ ___________-___-+m _ _e
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| Cage No.
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| 13 11/15/95 Si LUCIE SALP ikFiff FEEDERS ^
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| SAtP Ofit RPI # UNIT ISSUE ERAMPLES ASSESSMENT ASEA WO. INSPEC10R MS 07/29/95 95 014 1 SuevEILLANCE TESTIwG TURBINE TRIP TEST OPERATOR ERROR CAUSES UNIT Trip ACTIVITIES PREVAliE MS 10/16/95 95-015 1 SURVEtttANCE TESilNG ROUTINE EDG TEST SAilSFACTORT AtilV! TIES PREVAITE
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| Page No. 14 '
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| 11/15/95
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| $1 LUClf SALP INPUT FEEDERS -
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| SALP DATE RPi 8 Lali ISSOE EXAMPLES ASSESSMENT -
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| AREA INSPECTOR NO.
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| ** SALP AREA OPS OPS 12/14/94 94-024 1 CONTROL ROOM PROFES$10NAllSM RF0 AND STARTUP CONTROL ROOM OVERCROWED DURING PREP FOR REsiART - PAPERWORK CLOSURE PREVAliE DID CONTROL FOR CRITICAL EVENTS - ROD PULL, ETC.
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| OPS 10/20/94 94 019 0 INIIIAL AN REQUALIFICAll0N PERMITTED LICINSED SRO 10 SE ASSIGNED URI ? MOORMAN TRAINING OF OPERATORS R0 DUTIES AND MAINTAIN RO QUALIFICA110NS Ci$$ 10/20/94 94-019 0 INIllAL AND REQUALIFICATION LICENSEE POLICY ALLOWS OPS SUPERv!SOR IFl? MOORMAN TRAINING OF OPERATORS SRO LICENSE TO REMAIN ACilVE BY VIRTUE OF His POSITION OPS 10/20/94 94-019 0 INITIAL AND REQUAtlFICATION NPS EXNIBITED TECHNICALLY INADEQUATE WEAFNESS MOORMAN TRAINING OF OPERATORS PERFORMANCE AND DISREGARD FOR MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE ON PROPER USE OF-EOP OPS 10/20/94 94 019 0 INITIAL AND REQUALIFICAil0N REQUALIFICAil0N PROGRAM ADEQUATE 10 ENSURE SAFE PLANT OPERATION - EkSURES inA1 IN0lVIDUALS MOORMAN 1 RAINING OF OPERA 10R$ SATISFY INE CONDil10NS OF THEIR LICENSE CPS 10/20/94 94-019 0 INITIAL AND REQUALIFICAil04 MEDICAL CONDIll0NS TRACKING VERY Ll11LE PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE TO ENSURE LICENSE MEDICAL CONDill0NS MOORMAN TRAINING OF OPERATORS ARE TRACKED CPS 10/20/94 94-019 0 INITIAL AND REQUALIFICAll0N CHANGE IN MEDICAL CONDITION OF A FAILED TO NOTIFY NRC - V107 MOORMAN TRAINING OF OPERATORS LICENSED OPERATOR CPS 10/20/94 94-019 0 INiilAL AND REQUALIFICAil0N TRAINING DEPARTMENT GENERALLY EFFECTIVE IN ADMINISTRATING EXAM AND EVALUATIN' OPERATOR MOORMAN TRAINING OF OPERATORS PERFORMANCE OPS 11/07/94 94-300 0 INITIAL AND REQUALIFICATION WEAK GUIDANCE FOR REENERGIZATION OF PROCEDURAL WEAKNESS BALDWIN TRAINING OF OPERATORS ELECTRICAL BUSES AND ONE PROCEDURAL STEP CONTAINED TWO ACTION STATEMENTS OPS 11/07/94 94-300 0 INIIIAL AND REQUALIFICAil0N WRITTEN EXAM WEAKNESSES IN OPERATOR KNOWLEDGE BALDulN TRAINING OF OPERATORS CS 11/07/94 94-300 0 INiilAL AND REQUALIFICAil04 SIMULATOR EXAMS WEAKNESS IN CREW C0pW4UNICAil0N BALDWIN TRAINING OF OPERATORS OPS 11/17/94 94-300 0 INiilAL AND REQUALIFICATION PROCEDURES DO NOT PRovicE GUIDANCE TO PROCEDURAL WEAKNESS BALDWIN l TRAINING OF OPERATORS REMOVE RCP FRapt SERVICE WHEN RCS FALLS sELOW $00 DEGREES F i
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| OPS 08/23/94 94-015 1 MANIPULAilNG REACIOR AND RESIN REPLACEMENT (NIGil RAD) GOOD INTERFACE AND CopetsNICAil0N - GOOD PERFORMANCE, OPS AND NP l
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| , AUEILIARY CONTROLS PREVATTE l
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| OPS / / 95-018 1 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT DID NOT DOCUMENT LOGKEEPING LOGKEEPfleG WEAKNESS PREVATTE CONDlil0NS DEFICIENCIES
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| .Page No. 15 11/15/95 ST LUCIE SALP lNPut FEEDERS. -
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| '5 ALP DATE RPi # UNii ISSUE EXAMPLES ASSESSMENT AREA INSPECTOR NO.
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| OPS / / 95-018 0 MON!iORING AND LOGGING PLANT DID NOT ENTER BYPASS SWITCM IN PROCEDURE vl0LATION - VIO LEVEL IV PREVATTE CONDITIONS DEVI All0N LOG - DID NOT LOG Oui KEYS OPS 10/18/94 94-020 1 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT NLO ROUNDS GOOD PRACitCES SY NLO'S DURING ROUNDS - KNOWLEDGEASLE, CONSCIEmil005 PREVAlit CON 0lil0NS AND MOTIVATED OPS 11/25/94 94 022 1 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT CR LOG ENTRIES NOT MADE IN POOR LOGKEEPING PRACTICES / PROCEDURES VIOLAll0N - Stiv 94-22-02 PREVATTE CON 0lil0NS CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER AND NOT PRECEDED BY
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| " LATE ENTRY" OPS 03/31/95 95-004 1 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT 00ENCH TANK IN LEAKAGE DUE TO CODE AC110NS METHODICAL, TECHNICALLY SOUND, FOCUSED ON PLANT / WORKER PREVAliE CONDITIONS SAFETY VALVE LEAK SAFElf OPS 03/31/95 95 004 2 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT SLIGHT INCREASE IN RM CAVITY IN LINKAGE GOOD ATTENTION 10 CONTROL 80ARD INDICAi!ONS, APPROPRI ATE EMPMASIS ON PREVAliE CONDITIONS PROMPTED CONTAINMENT ENTRY / INSPECTION SAFETY OPS 04/01/95 95-007 1 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT LOSS OF SNUID0uh COOLING WE AK OPERATOR RESPONSE TO ANNUNCI ATORS, OPERATOR ERROR ROOT CAUSE. PREVATTE CONDl110NS flMELY, OBJECTIVE CORRECTIVE Atil0NS.
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| OPS 07/01/95 95-012 1 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT 005 LOGKEEPING FOR CCW LOADS WEAK PREVATTE CONDI110NS OPS 07/01/95 95-012 1 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANI 1B BAITERY CELL JUMPER INSTALLATION WEAK LOG KEEPING RE BATTERY CONDlil0NS PREVA11E CONDlil0NS OPS 07/07/95 95-014 2 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANI ICW OPERAPILITY WifM ELEVATED SEA WATER GOOD NPS INVOLVEMENT - CLEAR INSTRUC110NS TO OPERATORS PREVATTE CONDITIOks TEMP C73 10/16/95 95-015 1 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT 2 EXAMPLES OF POOR LOCKEEPING POOR LOGKEEPING - NCV 95-15-08 PREVATTE CON 0lil0NS OPS 10/16/95 95-015 1 MouliORING AND LOGGING PLANT FAILED TO ENTER VALVE POSill0N IN PROCEDURE VIOLATION - VIO LEVEL IV PREVATTE CON 0lil0NS DEVIAtt04 LOG OPS / / 95 018 1 PLANT SHUIDOWN OPERATOR PERFORMANCE SHUTDOWN DELATED BY LARGE NUMBER OF PROCEDURE CHANGES Bui PROCEEDED PREVATTE SLOWLY AND METHODICALLY WITNOUT INCIDENT OPS / / 95-018 1 PLANT STARTUP OUTAGE RESTART STARTUP SLOW, CAUTIOUS, AND IETHODICAL . PREVATTE OPS 02/18/94 94-001 1 PLANT STARTUP CRiflCALIIT ACHIEVED WITNOUT VALID ECC INSUFFICIENT PLANNING, PROCEDURAL WEAKNESS IDENTIFIED ELROD WORKSHEET OPS 02/18/94 94-001 1 PLANT STARTUP UNIT 1 FAILUBE TO ACHIEVE CRITICALITY CURVES NAD SEEN CONSERVATIVE FROM SDM PERSPECTIVE. RESOLUTION ELROD DUE TO INADEQUATE CORE PNYSICS CURVES THOROUGN AND TECINitCALLY SOUND OPS 05/20/94 94 011 2 PLANT STARTUP POWER INCREASE FROM 26X 10 31% DUE TO WEAK ATTENil0N TO DETAIL SY OPERATORS ELROD POSITIVE MTC l=
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| _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ ~ . . .-
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| Page No. 16- %-
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| 91/15/95 51 LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS -
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| SQLP DATE RPI # UNIT ISSUE E1AMPLES CAEA ASSE SSMENT NO. INSPECTOR OS 05/20/94 94-012. 2 PLANT STARTUP U-2 POSI-RF0 STARTUP COMMUNICATIONS, C&C, STRONG DURING FILL AND VENT AND STARTUP ELROD OS 06/27/94 94-013 2 PLANT STARTUP U 2 SIARIUP TRANSPO$llIONAL PROCEDURE ERROR IDENTIFIED. OthERWISE SAilSF ACIORY - ELRG OPS 07/29/94 94 014 1 PLANT STARTUP U T S/U NEW RE 1/M PLOIS GOOD INiil ATIVE. WELL CONTROLLED EVOLJil04. ELRG)
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| CONSERVATIVE DECISION TO WAli UNTIL 1A MAIN XFRNR REPAIR $ WERE COMPLETE BEFORE SYNCNING TO GRID OS 12/14/94 94 024 1 PLANT STARTUP REFUELING 001 AGE GOG) PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE, EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL, COG) PRE VAT TE COMpaJNICATION, GOOD PREJOB BRIEFINGS, AND APPROPRIATE SUPERvtSORY OVER$1GMT RESULIED IN WELL EXECUTED PLANT RESTART OPS 03/31/95 95-004 2 PLANT STARTuP STARTUP FOLLOWING UNIT TRIP DUE TO . GOOD COMMUNICATION AND TEAMWORK PREVATTE FAILED SGL1 OPS 04/01/95 95 007 1 PLANT SIARIUP UNil 1 STARTUP PROFES$10NAL/WELL CONTROLLED PREVA11E OPS 07/11/95 95 014 1 PLANT STARTUP UNIT 1 51AR10P PERFORMED th A PROFES$10NAt MANNER PSEVATTE OPS 10/16/95 95 015 2 PLANT STARTUP PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE RESTART FROM NURRICANE WITNCUT SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS PREVAlfE 05 10/16/95 95 015 0 PtANT STARIUP, SHUTDOWN AND OFERATOR PERFORMANCE POWER OPS NUMEROUS OPERATOR ERRORS INDICATED DEttlNING PERFORMANCE PREVAITE OS 04/28/94 94 009 1 POWER OFERAll0N EDG FUEL Olt IRANSFERS BETWEEN UNils RESuliED IN NON-CONSERVATIVE ENTRY INTO 15 AS E L ROD .
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| US 08/23/94 94-015 2 POWER OPERATION ST AR TUP /SNUTDOW4/ POWER MANEUVERS WELL CONTROLLEn AND PROFESSIONAL PREVAllE 05 10/20/94 94 020 1 POWER OPERAi10N NIGNT ORDERS DID hof ACCURATELY CONVET NEGAllVE REPORI FINOS AND NEEDED AC110410 PR OPERATOR $
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| OPS 01/20/95 94-025 1 POWER OPERA 110N MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT CON 0lil0N OPERATOR FAILED 10 IDENilFY INCORRECT INDICAil0N PREVATIE ON DURING CONTROL BOARD WALKDOWN 2 WKS -
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| OP3 11/25/94 94-022 1 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT CONTROL WASTE GAS RELEASE WlIN METEOROLOGICAL OPERATOR ERROR TOWER INSTRUMENTAll0N OUT OF SERVICE PREVATTE OPS 08/31/94 94-018 1 REFUELING FUEL RECEIPT PROCEDURES '
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| PROVIDED CENTRALI2ED CONTROL OF REQUIRED PREPARAll0NS AND PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE OPS 12/14/94 94-024 2 REFUELING STAFFING FOR REFUELING SINGLE LICENSED OPERAT0k MED ON REFUELING BRIDGE - ECORRECIED) PREVAffE OPS 06/23/94 94-015 2 RESPONSE TO OFF-NORMAL INOPERABLE TCB CONDITIONS FAILURE 10 COMPLY WITN TS REQUIRED SNUTDOWN - VfD 94-15-01 PREVATTE
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| , OPS 02/18/94 94-001 1 RESPONSE TO IRANSIENTS AND UNti 1 MANUAL TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF MFW OPERATORS ALEti, ADEIRIATE POST-TRIP REVIEW OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS PUMP ELROD l
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| ? l f 1 T f T i T T
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| " T N D D I D i i 1 T f T l T D D D T
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| - C O O ( Q O Q Q Q A A A A O O O O A E R R R R v R V V V V V V R R R V P L L L L E t V V L L L
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| Dage No.. 18 11/15/95
| |
| ' $1 LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS -
| |
| SALP DATE RPT # UNIT ISSUE E
| |
| * AMPL E S ASSE SSMENT INSPECTOR AREA No.
| |
| OS 11/25/94 94-022 0 SA0V QA/QC AUDITS DETAILED, TIMELi, AND EFFECTIVE.- CORRECTIVE ACTION IIMELT PREVATTE OS 11/25/94 94 022 O SAOV SELF ASSESSMENT AUDITS NP, OPS. EM, PM, EFFECTIVE PREVATIE I&C, WELDlWG - CAP OP3 11/25/94 94-022 0 SAQV ON-LINE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE AND FRG AGGRESSIVE IN RESPONDING TO NEED PREWATTE-CONTROLS >
| |
| OPS. 12/14/94 94-024 1 SAQV INFO N0flCES MINIMUM TEMP FOR ACTION ON INIS ISSUE WAS PROACTIVE AND APPROPRIATE PREVATTE CRITICALITY OPS 12/14/94 94-024 0 SAov PROCEDURE REVIEWS FAILURE 10 PERFORM 15 REQUIRED PROCEDURE REVIEWS NCY 94-24-01 PREVATTE OP3 12/14/94 94 024 1 SA0V FRG MEETINGS R001 CAUSE ANAliSIS of 18 EDG FAILURE DETAltED AND TNOROUGMLY PREVATTE REVIEWED BY SAFETY CopNtITTEE OS 12/14/94 94-024 0 SAQV QA AUDITS - ONE AUDIT ALA)ti ACTIVITIES THOROUGN AND WELL DOCUMENTED PREVAttE OP3 01/20/95 94 025 0 SA0V FRG MEE11NGS SATISFACTORY PREWATIE DS 02/17/95 95 002 0 SAOV SPEAKOUT PROGRAM ACTIONS ADEQUATE, RESOLVED IN A itMEli MANNER L(NANAN
| |
| -OS 03/31/95 95-004 0 SAQV CNRS MEETING ACTIVE PARTICIPATION, IMPRESSIVE DEPIN of QUESTIONING, VALUE ADDED PREVATIE 05 03/31/95 95 004 0 SAov SPEAKOUT PROGRAM POST CUTAGE REVIEW APPE ARS Ef fECTIVE IN PROMOTING GOOD WORK ENVIRONMENT PREVATTE OPS 03/31/95 95-004 1 SA0V 1A LPSI RELIEF VALVE LIFT LICENSEE AGGRESSIVELY PURSUED ROOT CAUSE/ VERIFIED flN0lNGS IN FlELD PREVATTE OPS 04/01/95 95-007 0 SAcv FRG MEETING SATISFACTORY PREVATTE OPS 04/01/95 95-007 2 SA0V ALL MANDS POST TRIP REVIEW MEETING INNOVATIVE APPROACM TO PROBLEM SOLVING PREVATTE OPS 04/29/95 95-009 0 SAQV QA AUDIT OF VARIOUS OPERATIONAL DETAILED PREWAliE ACTIVITIES OPS 06/03/95 95-010 0 SAcV 2 FRG MEETINGS ATTENDED ACTIVE PARTICIPATION WOTED PREVATTE OPS 06/03/95 95-010 0 SAov CNRS MEETING ATTENDED DETAILED QUESTIONS NOTED PREVATTE --
| |
| OPS 06/03/95 95-010 0 SAeV CNRS MEETING AlfENDED DETAILED QUESil0NS NOTED PREVATTE OPS 07/01/95 95-012 0 SAov 2 AUDITS REVIEWED DETAILEG, IMOROUGH PREV 4TTE OPS 07/21/95 95 014 1 SAeV ALL-NANDS POST iRIP REVIEW POST MIP REVIEW MEETING FOUND USEFUL PREV 4 TIE OPS 07/29/95 95-014 0 SAov 2 OA AUDITS REVIEWED DETAP.ED - MULTIDISCIPLINARY PREVATTE
| |
| | |
| . - 4 _e - 4 ,,h - - .m -
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| l
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| ; .r :, ,
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| }.
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| } ,.
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| v Page Nof 19.
| |
| -11/15/95 ST LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS --
| |
| SALP DATE RPT R Unit' ISSUE. E XAMPLES ASSESSMENT . INSPECTOR AREA' NO.
| |
| ~ OPS 10/16/95 95-015 1. SAov CONTAIMMENT SPRATDOWN QA ASSESSMENT DEialLED ASSESSMENT WifN GOOD RECTNSEENDAllONS PREVA11E
| |
| ' OPS / / 95-018 2 SNuiDOWN OPERA 110NS RPV DISASSEMRLY A4R) DEFUELING . PERFORMED ELL WiiN ONLT MINOR EQUIPMENT PRORLEMS PREVATTE OPS 03/17/94 94-005 2 SNUTDOWN OPERA 110NS U2 REDUCED INVENTORT GOOD OPERATOR KNOWLEDGE ELROD-CX 0*/2d/94 94-009 2 SMUTDOWN OPERATIONS U-2 REDUCED INVEN10RT OPERAi!ONS ERCEttENT OPERATOR KNOWLEDGE OF EVOLUTION ELROD OPS 04/28/94 94-009 2 SNUTDOWN OPERATIONS U-2 REFUELING AND CORE SNUFFLE - PROCEDURAL ERROR /0PERATOR ERROR (NCV) E! ROD INCORRECT GRAPPLING OF FUEL ASST
| |
| 'C3 04/28/94 94-009 2 SNUTDOWN OPERAll0NS CORE LOAD VERITICAil04 ADEQUATE 'ELROD OP3- 08/31/94 94-018 0 SNUTDOWN OPERA 1 IONS NEW FUEL MOVENENT PERFORMED VERY WELL ELRCD OPS 08/31/94 94-018 1 SNUIDOWN OPERAil0NS REFUELING STAFF ENPERIENCED AND COMPETENT SUEL MANDLED WITN GRE AT CARE AND .ELROD ACCURATELY Postil0NED f
| |
| US 11/25/94 94-022 1 SNU1DOWN OPERAIIONS REDUCED RCS INVENTORT OPERAll,0NS OPERATORS ATTEmilVE - GOOD MANAGEMENT OVER$1GMT PREVATIE OS 11/25/94 94-C22 1 SMUTDOWN OPERATIONS PROCEDURES, SUPERVISORT AND MANAGEMENT A STRENGIN PREvA11E.
| |
| CONTROLS sN REDUCED RCS INVENTORY i
| |
| OPS 11/25/94 9C-022 1 SNUIDOWN OPERAll0NS PL ANT ENTERED OUTAGE 5 DAYS EARtv AS SilLL COMPLETED OUT AGE IN LESS TNEN SCHEDULED fitt PREVAllt RESULT OF RX TRIP j OPS 12/14/94 94-024 1 SNUTDOWN OPERAil0NS RCS REDUCED INVENIORT MIDLOOP OPERATION MANAGED WELL WITWOUT INCIDENT PREVATIE OP3 12/14/94 94-024 1 SNUTDOWN OPERAil0NS UNIT 1 RFC OUTAGE ACCOMPLISNED WELL W11HIN SCHEDULE WlINOUT SIGNIFICANT- PREVA11E PERSONNEL OR EeUIPMENT PROBLENS.. STRONG MANAGEMENT - GOOD SUPERVISORT SUPPORT AND TEAMWORK OPS 12/14/94 94-024 1 $NUTDOWN OPERATIONS REFUELING ACTIVITIES CREWS ADEGUATELT STAFFED AND WELL QUALIFIED - FREQUENT MANAGEMENT PREVAliE PRESENCE j OPS 03/31/95 95-004 1 SNUIDOWN OPERAi!ONS UNii 1 COOLDOWN (RATE, SYSTEM COOLDOWN REQUIREMNTS ~
| |
| SAilSFIED _PREvalTE AllGNMENTS)
| |
| OPS 10/16/95 95-015 1 SMuiDOWN OPERATIONS FAILED TO BLOCK MSIS FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES - Stiv 95-15-01' ' PREVATTE OPS 10/16/95 95-015 1 SNuiDOWN OPERATIONS RCS MIDLOOP OPERA 110N Ev0Luil0N CONTROLLED WELL PREVATTE ,
| |
| OPS -10/16/95 95-015 1 SNUIDOWN OPERAll0NS RCP SEAL FAILURE IMJE TO RESTAGING At TO FAILED TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE - Stiv 95-15-02 PREVATTE NIGN TEW OPS 10/16/95 95-015 1 SNUTDOWN OPERATIONS RCP SEAL FAILURE DUE TO FAILURE TO FAILED TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE - Stiv 95-15-03 PREVATTE
| |
| :s INITIATE SEAL INJECTICII
| |
| . _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ . -~. - - . , . . . . . _ _ . . - . - _ _ . .,.
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| | |
| . . .a o _- -iic _, i.._ , , --m i - .)
| |
| ,- ,- - g Dage No. 20
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| ~
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| ;, (Im' .-
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| . j-11/15/95.
| |
| St LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS
| |
| $SALP'DATE RPI
| |
| * UNIT ISSUE ERAMPLES ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AREA No.
| |
| - OPS- 10/16/95 95-015 1 SNUTDOWN OPERAll0NS NUMEROUS EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS AND EQUIPMENT / PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE F908tEMS PREVATTE PERSONNEL ERRORS RESULTED IN EXTENDED PLANT GUTAGE OPS 10/16/95 95 015 1 SNU100WN OPERATIONS FAILED 10 FOLLOW PROCEDURES RESULTED IN FAILURE 10 FOLLOW PROCEDURES - Stly 95-15-04 PREWA11E-STARTED LPSI PUMP FOR SDC WITN SUCil0N VALVE SNUT OPS 10/16/95 95-015 0 SYSTEM ALIGNMENT 2 SYSTEM WALKDOWNS CORRECTLY ALIGNED MINOR EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES PREWAITE OPS // 95-018 0 SYS1EM tlNEUPS 4 SYSTEM WALKDOWNS SYSTEMS ALIGNED CURRECTLY - MINOR HOUSEKEEPING DEFICIENCIES CWE PREVATTE PROCEDURAL WEAKNESS DS ~ / / 95 018 2 SYSTEM tlWEUPS FAILURE 10 USE CLE ARANCE DURING PROCEDURE VIOLATION - VIO LEVEL IV .PREVAftE CONDENSER WATER 80R CLEANING RESULT IN PERSONNEL INJURY DS / / 95-018 1 ' SYSTEM LINEUPS OPERATOR USED INCORRECT PROCEDURL FOR OPERATOR ERROR PREVATTE neu. wiu IDENilFIED, DID NOT 8ACK OUT OF PROCEDURE CORRECTLY OS 02/18/94 94 001'1 SYSTEM LINEUPS 1 CLEARANCE AUDITED NO DEFICIENCIES NOTED EtROD OPS 02/18/94 94-001 0- SYSTEM tlNEOPS $ SYSTEMS AUDliED No DEFICIENCIES IDENYlFIED ELROD OPS 03/17/94 94-005 2- SYSTEM LINEUPS MISPOSITIONED PZR AUX SPRAY VALVE TMOROUGN INVEstlGATION AND CORRECilVE ACTION (NCV) ELROD OPS 03/17/94 94-005 1 SYSTEM LINEUPS 1 CLEARANCE AUDITED WO DEFICIENCIES ELROD' OPS 03/17/94 94-005 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS - 2 SYSTEMS AUDITED No DEFICIENCIES IDENilFIED ELROD
| |
| - OP3 04'28/94 94 009 2 SYSTEM LINEUPS 6 CLEARANCES AUDiiED NO DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED ELROD t OPS 04/28/94 94-009 2 SYSTEM LINEUPS SPILL DUE TO INADEQUATE VENilNG WHEN CLEARANCE FOR EVOLUTION WAS DEFICIENT ELROD PLACING FREEZE SEAL OPS 05/20/94 94 012 2 SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 CLEARANCES AUDITED SAilSFACTORY ELROD OPS 05/20/94 94-012 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 SYSTEMS AUDITED SATISTACTORY ELROD OPS 06/27/94 94-013 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS & CLEARANCES AUDITED NO DISCREPANCIES ELROD OPS 06/27/94 94-013 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 4 SYSTEMS AUDliED No DISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED ELROD OPS 07/29/94 94-014 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 3 CLEARANCES AUDITED SATISFACTORY ELROD OPS 07/29/94 94-014 0 SYSTER LINEUPS 4 SYSTEMS AUDITED NO DISCREPANCIES ELROD
| |
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| m ___.wa , . - . -_. _ .i. ' __ _ -,
| |
| . -w .. _
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| t' ,.c
| |
| .h j -
| |
| Dage No. 21 11/15/95 51 LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS ,
| |
| SALP DaiE RPi 8 UNii ISSUE Elt AMPL ES ASSESSME NT -INSPECTOR CAEO NO.
| |
| OS Of/29/94 94 014 2 SYSTEM LINEUPS F Al'.LME TO TC OP PROC FOR FCV-07-18 PERSONNEL ERROR ELROD BEING LEFT OPEN 05 08/23/94 94-015 2 SYSTEM LINEUPS ENTRY INTO 3.0.3 CLEARANCE RESULIED lu SIMULTANEOUS IMOPERASILliY OF 2A LPSI AND 25 PREVAlfE CHARGl#G PUMP 05 08/23/94 94-015 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS ESF SYSTEM WALKDOWNS SYSTEMS CORRECTLY ALIGNED AND IN SATISFACIORY MATERIAL CONDIll0N' PREVATTE OP5 08/23/94 94 015 2 SYSTEM LINEUPS ENTRY 15 AS FOR CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE 1EMPERATURE INSTRUMENTS INADVERTENTLY TAKEN 005 PREVATTE C95 10/18/94 94 020 1' SYSTEM LINEUPS OWA CONTROL ROOM VENilLAll0N DECOMMIS$10NED SYSTEM LINEUP NOT IN PREVATIE PROCEDURE BUT WALVE NEEDED TO BE CLOSED OPS 11/25/94 94-022 i SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 CLE ARANCES INSPECTED ALL 1AGS AND BREAKERS CORRECT PREVATTE OPS 11/25/94 94 022 1 SYSTEM LINEUPS ELECTRICAL DISTRIBuil0N STSIEM PLACED CORRECTIVE AC110N VIOLATION - Stiv 94-22-01 PREVAliE IN UNTESTED ALIGNMENT ISWlhG COMPONE NI5)
| |
| OPS 12/14/94 94 024 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS SYSTEM WALKDOWNS SOC A/B AND CS A/B AND CONTROL ROOM AIR CON 0lfl0NING SYSTEMS AllGNED PREVA11E CORRECTLY 05 01/20/95 94 025 1 SYSTEM LINEUPS CLEARANCES REVIEWED (2) NO PROGLEMS IDENTIrlED PREVAllE 05 01/20/95 94 025 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS SYSTEM WALKDOWNS 4 SYSTEMS CORRECTLY ALIGNED - MINOR NOUSEKEEPING DEFICIENCY PREVAITE OPS 03/31/95 95 004 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 5 JYSTEMS AUD11ED MINOR DEFICIENClES PREVATTE OPS 03/31/95 95 004 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 CLEARANCES AUDITED NO DEFICIENCIES PREVATTE OPS 04/01/95 95 007 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 SYSTEMS AUDITED NO DEFICIENCIES IDENilFIED PREVA11E OPS 04/01/95 95-007 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 CLEARANCES AUDITED NO DEFICIEtJCIES IDENilFIED PREVATTE -
| |
| IDS 04/29/95 95 009 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 3 CLEARANCES AtelTED No DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED PREVATTE OPS 04/29/95 95-009 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 6 SYSTEMS AUDliED ALIGNED CORRECTLT, BUT NUMEROUS MINOR DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED PREVATTE OPS 06/03/95 95-010 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS HVAC WALKDOWNS NVAC SYSTEMS FOUNO IN CORRECT LINEUPS, POOR CONDITION, MINOR PREVAlit PROCEDURE DEFICIENCIES OPS 06/03/95 95-010 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 6 CLEARANCES AUDliED MINOR DEFICIENCIES (ADMIN) NOTED PREVAliE OPS 07/01/95 95-012 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 3 SYSTEMS AUDITED ONLY MINOR DEFICIENCIES NOTED PREVATTE OPS 07/01/95 95-012 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 CLEARANCES AUDITED NO DEFICIENCIES PREVATTE
| |
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| Page No. 23 11/15/95 51 LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS .
| |
| StLP DATE Apt # UNil ISSUE EXAMPLES ASSE SSMENT INSPECTOR AREA NO.
| |
| ** SALP AREA PS PS- 03/04/94 94-004 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE - N011 FICA 110N METNODS TIMELY NoitTICATIONS/0NE FAILURE TO COCUMENT N011FICAlt04 IDENilflED WRIGNT PS 03/04/94 94+004 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE - EMERGENCY Ef fECilVE EVALUAll0N OF CONDlil0NS/DECLARAll0NS TIMELY WRIGNT CL ASSIFICAil0N SYSTEM PS 03/04/94 94-006 1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAt ERERCISE - OBJECTIVES / SCENARIOS SCENARIO / CONTROLLERS ADEQUATE WRIGNT PS 03/04/94 94-004 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 1994 FULL PARilCIPA110N ENERCISE GOOD PERFORMANCE WalGNT PS 03/04/94 94-004 9 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXE2CISE - EMERGENCY FACILillES SIMUL ATOR TSC, OSC, EOF, EMERG NEWS CENTER MANNED PROPERLY, GOOD WRIGHT AND EQUIPMENT COMMUNICATIONS -
| |
| PS 03/04/94 94 004 0 EMERGEhC1 PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE - RESPONSIBILITIES ADEQUATELY DESCRIBED / ADEQUATE PERSONNEL AVAILABtf WRIGNT RESPONSIBIll1Y/ STAFFING PS 03/04/94 94-004 0 . EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE PROTEC11VE RESPONSES *CONTAIMMENT FAILURE
| |
| * NOT CLEARLY DEFINED, LICENSEE F AILED 10 ID WRIGNT SOURCE CF RELEASE PS 03/04/94 94-004 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNES$ ANNUAL EXERCISE - ACCIDEhi ASSESSMENT STAFF EFFECilVE IN EVALUAllNG RAD CONDIll0NS WRIGNT PS 03/04/94 94-004 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AkNUAL EXERCISE - EMERGENCY ADEQUACY, OPERABILITY, AND EFFEC 11VE COMMUNICAll0NS EQUIPMENT WRIGNT COMMUNICAil0NS DEMONSTRATED PS 03/14/94 94 004 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE - CRITICUE ADEOUATE WRIGNT PS 03/14/94 94-004 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL EXERCISE - RADIA110N EkPOSURE SAilSTACTORY WRIGNT CONTROL PS 06/27/94 94 013 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACCIDENT PREPARATIONS IkADEQUATE - CR LICENSEE *S OPEN IIEM SYSTEM FAILED TO TRACK ISSUE TO CLOSURE (DEV) ELROD WATER SUPPt!ES AND SANITAil0N KIIS PS 02/17/95 95-003 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TRAINING PERSONNEL PROPERLY TRAINED KREN PS 02/17/95 95-003 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EMERGENCY FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, GENERALLY Sail $ FACTORY, MINOR DEFICIENCIES IN SUPPLY STORAGE KREM INSTRUMENTAll0N, AND SUPPLIES PS 02/17/95 95-003 0 EMERGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS REVIEWS / AUDITS DETAILED AND THOROUGN KREN PS 02/17/95 95-003 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EFFECilVENESS OF LICENSEE CONTROLS STAR SYSTEM EFFECTIVE FOR ENSURlWG CORRECilVE ACil0NS KREM PS 02/17/95 95-003 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ORGANIZAil0N MANAGEMENT CONTROL VERY WELL MANAGED AND IMPLEMENTED KREN PS 02/17/95 95-003 0 EMLAGENCY PREPAREDNESS EPIPs APPROPRIATE AND ACCEPTASLE KREN PS 06/03/95 95-010 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ANNUAL ENERCISE STRONG PERFORMANCE PREVATTE R
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| o l _ _ _
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| Dage No. I 24
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| '11/15/95 Si LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS SALP DATE RPi R - UNIT : ISSUE EIAMPLES ASSES $nENT INSPECTOR --
| |
| AREA No.
| |
| PS -10/16/95 95-015 0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS . PLANT SNUIDowN FOR NURRICANE ERIN PREPARAil0N AND STAFFING PLANNING, AND SMUTDOWN WAS EXCELLENT PREVATTE PS 02/18/94 94-001 0 FIRE PROTECYlom MONTNLY OBSERVAil0NS SAilSTACTORT EtROD.
| |
| PS 03/11/94 94-005. O' flRE PROTECilON MONINLY OBSERVAil0NS SAllSFAC10RY ELROD PS' 04/25/94 94 009 2 FIRE PROTECil0N MONTHLY 06SERVAll0NS SATISFACTORY ELROD PS -05/20/94 94-011 0 FIRE PROTECTION MONTHtY OSSERVAi!ONS ' NO DISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED ELROD --
| |
| PS : 06/2T/94 94-013 0 FIRE PROTECil0N MouiNIY OBSERVATIONS SAilSFAC10RY ELROD PS 07/29/94 94 014 0 FIRE PROTECil0N MONTHtY OBSERVAfl0NS/1 NEAT DETECTOR SA11STACTORY ELROD' SURVEILLANCE OBSERVED-PS ' -01/20/95 94 025 0 FIRE PROTECTION flRE DRitt SITE FIRE BRIGADE AND OFFS 11E AS$1 STANCE RESPONSE WAS 11MELY WiiN PREVAffE EXCELLENT COOPERAil0N PS 03/31/95 95 004 0 FIRE PROTEtilON MONTHLY ESSERVATIONS SATISFACTORY PREVAf f E PS 04/01/95 95 007 0 FIRE PROTECil0N MONINLY OBSERVAll0NS' SAilSfAC10RY PREVAliE PS 04/01/95 95 007 1 FIRE PROTECTION UNIT 1 PRESSURIZER CUBICLE FIRE APPROPRI ATELY EVALUATED AND ADDRESSED 'PREVATTE PS 04/29/95 95 009 0 f!RE PROTECTION MONINtv 06SERVAll0NS SAftSFACTORY PREVAffE PS 06/03/95 95-010 0 FIRE PROTECil04 MONTHLY OBSERVA110NS SAilSTAC10RY PREVATTE PS 07/01/95 95-012 0 FIRE PROTECTION flRE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT XfRM DELUGE PIPING BADLY CORRODED / REPLACED PREVATTE CS 07/01/95 95-012 O flRE PROTECil0N SURVE ILL ANCES Sail $ FACTORY PREV 4ffE PS 07/01/95 95-012 0 FIRE PROTECil0N PROCEDURE AUDil MINOR DEFICIENCIES PREVAITE PS 07/01/95 95-012 0 FIRE PROTECTION FIRE 8RIGADE DRILL Sail $ FACTORY, LACKED REAllSM, TECNul0UES WEAK PREVAlfE PS 07/01/95 95-012 0 FIRE PROTECil0N FIRE BRIGADE DEFICIENCIES NOTED IN PHYSICAL QUALIFICAll0NS PREVATTE PS - 07/01/95 95-012 0 FIRE PROTECTION FIRE PROTEtil0N EQUIP 9ENT - SATISFACTORY PREVATTE EMilNOUISMERS PS 08/23/94 94-015 0 FIRE PR0iECil0N, PNYSICAL MONTMLY OBSERVATION PERFORMED IN MIGHLT PROFESSIONAL MANNER PREVATTE PROTECTION PS / /. 95-018 0 FIRE PRefECfl0N, PNYSICAL MONINLY OBSERVATIONS NO DEFICIENCIES IDENilFIED PREVATTE PROTECil0N, RADIOLOGICAL PROTECil0N
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| |
| Pege No. 26 11/15/95 ST LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS
| |
| .SALP DATE .RPi 8 UNil ISSUE EXAMPLES ASSE ssMENT INSPECioR
| |
| - AREA NO.
| |
| PS- 12/13/94 94-023' 0 lufERNAL ENPOSURE CONTROL - MONITORING EQUIPMENT PROGRAM FOR MONITORING, ASSESSING AND CONTROLLING EXPOSURE CONDUCTED RANKIN.
| |
| I AW REGULATORY AND PROCEDLRAL REQUIREMENTS - No ERPOSURE IN EXCESS PT 20 Limits
| |
| ' PS 11/25/94 94 022 1 OUTAGE SUPPORT AREA'S PREPARATION AND RESPONSE. TIMELY AND FOCUSED PREVA11E .
| |
| TO EARLY ENTRY IN RTO PS 02/18/94 94 001 0 PNYSICAL PRO 1ECil0N MONTHLY 085ERVAll0NS SAll5FAC10RY ELROD-PS 03/17/94 94-005 0 PNYSICAL PROTECTION MONTHLY OBSERVAil0NS SAilSFACIORY ELROD PS 05/20/94 94-011 0 PMYSICAL PROTEC110N MONTNLY OBSERVATIONS SAll5FAC10RY ELROD PS 07/29/94 94-014 0- PMYSICAL PROTECil0N MONTNLY OBSERVATIONS SATISFACTORY ELROD P3 03/31/95 95 008 0 . PHYSICAL PR01EC110N PERSONNEL PROFESSIONAL /WEtt VERSED ON THElk DuilES 10814 PS 03/31/95 95 008 0 PHYSICAL PRolEC110N TE511NG, MAINTENANCE, AND COMPENSATORY APPROPRIATE 108Iu f MEASURES PS 03/31[9595-008 0 PNYSICAL PROTECil0N ALARM STATIONS AND COMMUNICAil0NS AS REQUIRED TOBIN PS' 03/31/95 95-008 0 PNYSICAL PRO 1Etil0N FIREARMS RANGE E RCE Pil0NAL TOSIN PS 03/31/95 95 004 0 PHYSICAL PROTECilDN MONINLY 085ERVAll0NS SAilSFAC10RY ' PREVAtlt-PS 03/31/95 95-005 0 PNYSICAL PROTECil0N TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION A PROGRAM 51RENGIN TOBlu PS 04/01/95 95-007 0 PNYSICAL PROTECil0N MONTHLY OBSERVATIONS 5Al!5FACTORT PREVATTE PS 04/29/95 95-009 0 PNYSICAL PROTECil0N MONTHLY OBSERVATIONS Sail 5 FACTORY PREVATTE PS 04/29/95 95-009 0 PHYSICAL PROTECTION - AUDlis QA AUDli 0F SECURITY PLAN /CONilNGENCY DETAILED AND INOROUGH PREVATTE AND CORRFCilVE ACTIONS PLAN / TRAINING AND QUALS PS 04/28/94 94-009 0 PNYSICAL SECURITY MONTMLY OBSERVATIONS 110 DEFICIENCIES IDENilFIED ELROD PS 06/27/94 94-013 0 PRYSnCAL SECURiiY MONINLY OSSERVATIONS Sail $ FACTORY ELROD PS 10/18/94 94-020 0 PLANT SUPPORT PLANT SUPPORT FUNCil0NS CONTINUE 10 BE EFFECTIVE PREVATTE 7
| |
| PS 02/18/94 94-001 0 RAD CONTROLS MONTMLY 085ERVAil0NS Sail $ FACTORY ELROD l
| |
| I PS 03/24/94 94-006 0 RAD CONTROLS SAov - AUDli AND APMtAISAL PROGRAM ADEGUATE IN IDENTIFYlWG POTENTIAL IS5UES FOR825 PS 03/24/94 94-007 0 RA0 CONTROLS NP TECINIICIANS ENOWLEDGEA8LE, UELL-TRAINED FORSES
| |
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| Page No.. 27 '
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| 111/15/95 St LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS SALP DATE RPI # UNIT I$5UE E N AMPLE S ASSESSMENT- INSPECTOR.
| |
| AREO No.
| |
| ' P3 03/24/94 94-006 0 RAD CONTROLS OVERALL PROGRAM ADEQUATE IN PROTECil#G HEALIN AND SAFEif OF PLANT EMPLOYEES FORSES
| |
| ~ PS 03/24/94 94 006 0 RAD CONTROLS ALARA IN!!! AllVES - RESPIRATOR PROGRAM STRENGIN FongES REDUCTION PS 03/24/94 94-006 0 RAD CONTROLS CONTAMINAll0N CONTROL /NOUSEKEEPING ADEQUATE FORSES PS 03/24/94 94-006 0 RAD CONTROLS INTERNAL / EXTERNAL EEPOSURE PROGRAMS EFFECTIVE 'FORSES PS 04/28/94 94-009 2 RAD CONTROLS ExfERNAL EXPOSURE CONTROL - PARAFFIN PERSONNEL ERROR IN SNIELDING PLACEMENT ELROD SNIELDING PLACED AROUND LETDOWN RAD MONITOR VICE BORONOMETER P3 06/27/94 94 013 0 RAD CONTROLS MONINLY OBSERVATIONS SATISFACTORY ELROD PS : 08/19/94 94-016 0 RAD CONTROLS PLANI WATER CNEMISTRY EFFECllVELY IMPLEMENTED CARRION PS 08/19/94 94 016 0 RAD CONTROLS ANNUAL ENVIRONMENT AL REPORT WELL WRillEN AND COMPLIES WITN REGutAi!ONS CARRION PS 08/31/94 94-018 0 RAD CONTROLS ALARA LOCKED NIGN RAD AREA KEV CONTROL ACCOMPtTSMED I AU PROCEDURES EtROD PS 10/20/94 94 020 1 RAD CONidOLS EDUIPMENT CAllBRA110N MAINTENANCE TECHNICI ANS E*NIBITED GOOD RC PRACitCES - ALSO GOOD NP PREVA11E SUPPORT OF 1ASK PS 11/25/94 94-024 1 RAD CONTROLS ALARA INNOVATIVE USE OF CAMERAS TO MONITOR SG NO22LE DAM INSTALLAil0N PREVATIE:
| |
| PS 12/13/94 94-023 1 RAD CONTROLS ALARA LICENSEE AGGRESSIVELY EVALUATING AND USING TECHNOLOGICAL RANKIN IMPROVEMENTS IN REMOTE MONITORING EQUIPMENT, D0$lMETRY, VISUAL MONITORING A80 Cmet EQUIPMENT TO CONTROL EXPOSURE PS 12/*3/94 94 023 0 RAD CONTROLS ALARA GOOD PREJOB 8RIEFINGS - APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT RANKIN PS 12/13/94 94-023 1 RAD CONTROLS ALARA PERMANENT REACTOR CAVITY SEAL ElWG INSTALLATION - ANitCIPATED DOSE. RANKl#
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| SAVINGS 7-10R/RF0 PS 12/13/94 94-023 0 RAD CONTROLS CONTROL OF RAD 10AcilVE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT CAllBRATED - NO CONCERNS IDEmilflED RANKIN CONTAMINAil0N - SURVEYS - MONITORING PS 12/13/94 94-023 1 RAD CONTROLS OUTAGE SUPPORT ADEQUATE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR PLANNING Ale IWLE8ENTING EFFECTIVE RANKIN RADIATION CONTROLS MEASURE DURING RF0 PS 03/31/95 95-004 0 RAD CONTROLS MONTNLY OBSERVATIONS SATISFACTORY PREVAffE PS 04/01/95 95-007 0 Rao CONTROLS MONTNLY OsSERVAtl0NS SATISFACTORY PREVaiTE -
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| PS 04/07/95 95-006 0 RAD CONTROLS PRIMARY WATER CMEMISTRY PROGRAM EFFECilVELY IMPLEMENTED CARRION
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| , , , , - . _ _ . _ ~ - - . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ .
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| Page No.' 28 11/15/95 Si LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS SALP DATE RPT # UNIT ISSUE EXAMPLES ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AREA NO.
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| PS 04/07/95 95-006 0 kAD CONTROLS CHEMISTRY DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION SAi!$ FACTORY CARRION PS 04/07/95 95-006' 0 RAD CONTROLS AUDli PROCESS CAPA8LE OF IDENTIFYING PROGRAMMATIC WAKNESSES AND GENERATING CARRION CORRECilVE Atil0NS PS 04/07/95 95-006 0 RAD CONTROLS HP ORGANIZAil0N SAflSFACTORY CARRION PS 04/07/95 95-0 % 2 RAD CONTROLS LEAKING SPENT FUEL POOL 10m EXCMANGER IICENSEE 100K PROACTIVE POSITION FOR RESOLUTION OF ISSUE t;ARRION DS 04/07/95 95-006 0 RAD CONTROLS ANNUAL EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT MET 15, DOSES 10 PUBLIC MINIMAL CARRION PS 04/07/95 95-006 0 RAD CONTROLS PROCES$1NG AND SHIPPING PERFORMED IN A COMPETENT AW PROFES$10NAL MANNER. DOCUMENTAll0N CARRION -
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| TMOROUGN AND IN COMPT!ANCE PS 04/07/95 95 006 0 RAD CONTROLS ISOTOPE MirRATION DUE TO Rtli LEAK ADEQUATELY MONI10 RED CARRION PS 04/29/95 95-009 0 RAD CONTROLS QA AUDIT OF G CM/ PROCESS CONTROLS / RAD THOROUGN, WELL WRl1 TEN ' PREVAITE EFFLUENTS PS 04/29/95 95-009 0 RAD CONTROLS MONTNLY C8SERVAll0NS SATISFACIORY PREVAlif PS 06/02/95 95-011 0 RAD CONTROLS NEW PART 20 AUDli$ COMPREHENSIVE AND DETAILED PARKER PS 06/02/95 95-011 0 RAD CONTROLS NEW PART 20 TRAINING CONFREMENSIVE/ THOROUGH PARKER PS 06/02/95 95-011 0 RAD CONTROLS NEW PART 20 DPW POLICIES SAilSFAC10RY PARKER.
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| PS 06/02/95 95-011 0 RAD CONTROLS NEW PART 20 CONTROL OF HRA/VHRA SATISFACTORY PARKE R PS 06 02/95 95 011 0 RAD CONTROLS NEW PART 20 TEDE ALARA POLICY 1Ai!SFACTORY PAREER PS 06,03/95 95-010 0 RAD CONTROLS MONTHLY n8SERVA110NS SAflSTAC10RY PREVATTE PS 07 01/95 95-012 0 RAD CONTROLS 3 PIECC & RAD MATERIAL NOI PREWATTE TAGGED / IMPROPERLY STORED PS 10/16/95 95-015 1 RACIAtl0N WORK CONTROL OUTAGE SUPPORT SUPPORT DURING OUTAGE' GOOD PREVAITE PS 08/19/94 94-016 0 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENT CONTROL - SAMPLING RADICACTIVE GASES PER$0NieEL WERE ENOWLEDGEASLE AND COMPETENT CARRION PS 08/19/94 94-016 0 RADICACTIVE EFFLUENT CONTROL COLLECil0N AND PREPARATION Of LESS THAN OPittlAL CARRION RADIOACTIVE GASES FOR ANALYSIS MANDLING TECHNIQUES PS 08/19/94 94-016 0 Racl0 ACTIVE EFFLUENT CONTROL PROGRAM IN PLACE TO MONITOR EFFLUENT. EFFECilWE AND MAS CAUSED MINIDRst IMPACT TO ENVIRONMENT AND VIRTUALLY CARRION DETECT RADIATION No DOSE TO GENERAL PUBLIC
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| Page No. ' 29 11/15/95 51 LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS SAID DATE RPi # UNIT ISSUE EKAMPLES ASSESSMEmi INSPECTOR AREA NO.
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| PS 08/19/94 94-016 0 RADICACilvE EFFLUENTS SEMI AWeiUAL RADI0 ACTIVE RELEASE REPORT MET REQUIREMENTS CARRION
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| .PS 08/19/94 94 016 0 RADIDACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT DISPOSAL OF CONTAMINATED SEWAGE SLUDGE PROCEED IN A PRUDENT MANNER CARRION PS 08/19/94 94-016 0 RADIDAC1tvE WAsit MANAGEMENT RADWASTE PROCES$ LNG AND $ NIPPING CONDUCTED IN A COMPETENT, PROFES$10NAL MANNER - IMOROUGN. CARRION -
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| DOCUMEWTAiION PS 05/23/94 94-015 1 RAD 10ACilvE WASTE MANAGEMENT RESIN REPL ACEMENT (MIGN RAD) GOOD INTERFACE AND COMMUNICAil0N - GOOD PERFORMANCE, OPS AND NP PREVATTE PS 12/13/94 94-023 1 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL (ERTERNAL RM NEAD LIFT GOOD RP PRACTICES, ALARA MEASURE, WORK CONTROL, USE OF REMOTE RANKIN ERPOSURE) MON!f 0 RING DEVICES TO REDUCE ERPOSURE PS 12/13/94 94-023 0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS DOSIMETRT IMPROVED ACCURACY OF CALIRRAfl0N PROCESS OF ALARMlWG DOSIMETRY RANCIN PS 12/13/94 94-023 0 RADIOLOGICAt CONTROLS EriERNAL EXPOSURE POSilNG POSilNG OF AREAS GENERALLY ADEGUATE RANKIN PS 12/14/94 94-024 1 Racl0 LOGICAL CONTROLS RADisil04 WORE CONTROL NP SUPPORT OF OUTAGE EFFEtilvE IN REDUCING EXPOSURE PREVATTE PS 68/19/94 94-016 1 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT CONTROL MONITORING MIGRATION OF RWT TRITIUM ADEOUATE CARRION RELEASE FROM RWT PS 11/25/94 94-022 1 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT CONTROL WASTE GAS RELEASE WiiN METEOROLOGICAL OPERATOR ERROR PREvalfE TOWER INSTRUPENTATION GJT OF SERvlCE PS 12/13/94 94-023 1 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT CONTROL RWT REPAIRS EXPEDITIOUSti 3DENilFIED LEAK - MONITORED MIGRAilow 0F CONTAMINANTS RArtl4 AND EXERCISED GDc2 CONTAMINA1104 AND EXPOSURE CONTROL DURING REPAIRS.
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| PS 08/19/94 94-016 0 RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING UNITS WELL MAINTAINED, CAllRRATED AND G0cm WantlNG ORDER CARRION MONITORING PS 07/29/95 95-014 0 ROUilNE 08SERVATIONS FP, SECL;ltlif, WP Sail $ FACTORY PREWATTE P3 11/25/94 94-022 0 $40v NUCLEAR SPEAK 0UT PROGRAM EFFECilvE AND SEEKS 10 tDENTIFY AND RESOLVE EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PREVATTE PS 12/13/94 94 023 0 SAav RADI ATION PROTECil0W AlslTS DID NOT ADDRESS ALL CMANGES TO PART 20 - Ateli CHECK LIST COGI - RANEIN AUDITOR CUALIFIED - CORRECTIVE ACTION TO Alsli Fl WINGS APPROPRIATE PS 01/20/95 94-025 0 SAcv OA/0C AUDIT THOROUGN AW WELL DOEUMENTED PREVATTE PS- 06/03/95 95-010 0 SAov 1 OA AUDli REVIEWED DETAILED, WELL WRITTEN PREVATTE PS 10/18/94 94-020 0 SECURITY PROCEDURE AND PROCESS FOR IMPROVED SARTOR ACCOUNTABILifY DURING SITE EVACUATION
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| ENCLOSURE 2 l
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| 4 INPUT FEEDER FORMS - PLANT OPERATIONS j
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| J %d Pope No. 4 01/11/96 ST LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS UPDATE SALP DATE RPT # UNIT ISSUE EXAMPLES ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AREA NO.
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| ** SALP AREA OPS OPS 12/01/95 95-021 2 CORRECTIVE ACTION FAILURE TO COIFLETE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WEAKNESS IN CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PREVATTE Capet!TTED TO AFTER JULY CCW WALKDOWN OPS 12/01/95 95-021 1 CORRECTIVE ACTION ALARMS INITIATED DUE TO VOLTAGE DIP FAILURE TO DOCUMENT AN OWA THAT CONTRINUTED TO A TRIP 4 DATS K FORE PREVATTE . . .
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| WHEN STARTING FIRE PupFS - NOT ON OWA LIST OPS 12/01/95 95-021 2 CORRECTIVE ACTION CCW SAfrLE VALVE SHOWED DUAL INDICATION FAILURE TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY DEFICIENCIES PREVATTE WITHOUT INITIATING WO TO TROUBLESN00T OPS 12/01/95 95-021 1 CORRECTIVE ACTION N2 TO CST ISOLATED FOR PS WOINC FOR 9 FAILURE TO INITIATE WO FOR IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCY PREVATTE DAYS WITHOUT WO DEING EENERATED GPS 01/05/96 95-022 0 CORRECTIVE ACTION SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF INADEEUATE TC LICENSEE PREPARED
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| * CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN WHICN APPEARED SOUND, EUT '
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| PREVATTE CONTROL MAD NOT BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED - NCV 95-22-01 OPS 08/30/95 95-016 0 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT PORY POST-REFURSISMMENT OPERABILITY OPS DECLARED PORV85 OPERABLE WITHOUT ADEGUATE TESTING PREVATTE CONDITIONS OPS 12/01/95 95-021 2 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT- FAILURE TO MAINTAIN CURRENT PENETRATION NCV - GA IDENTIFIED. FAILURE PREVATTE
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| -CONDITIONS LOG OPS 12/01/95 95-021 2 MONITORING A m LOGGING PLANT VALVE AND SWITCH DEVIATION LOG Almit 2 DEFICIENCIES NOTED. POOR ATTENTION TO DETAll BY OPERATORS PREVATTE CONDITIONS OPS 01/05/96 95-022 2 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT ESTAS CABINET DOOR FOU W OPEN PERSONNEL ERROR / POOR LOGKEEPING IDENTIFIED PREVATTE CONDITIONS OPS 01/05/96 95-022 2 PLANT STARTUP POST RF0 U-2 STARTUP GOOD BRIEF, RE EFFECTIVELY ANALY2ED DATA AND PROVIDED FEEDSACK TO PREVATTE OPERATORS. FRG-APPROVED PNSICS DATA AW PROCEDURE CONTAINED DEFICIENCIES l?
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| l OPS- 02/03/95 95-001 1 POWER OPERATION IDENTIFICATION AIS DISPetITION OF NOT . OPERATORS FAILED TO IDENTIFY COM ITION, EVEN AFTER RPS PRE-TRIPS PREVATTE LEG STRATIFICATION WRE RECEIVED. WAK CINGENICATION SETWEN CPERATORS AND OTNER SITE
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| - ORGAlllZATIONS NOTED OPS 12/01/95 95-021 2 REFUELING U-2 CORE WERIFICATION COIBRNI! CATIONS GOOD, C00NDINAtl0N EXCELLENT, INDEPEleENT WERIF GotB PREVATTE OPS 12/01/95 95-021. 1 RESPONSE TO TRANSIENTS AND U-1 MANUAL TRIP DN FAILuitE OF TNE 18 EXCELLENT OPERATOR RESPONSE PREVATTE OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS MFRV OPS 12/01/95 95-021 1 RESPONSE TO TRANSIENTS AND RAPID DOWNPOWER AIID CORRECTIVE ACTICIIS OPERATOR RESPONSE TIMELY Als EFFECTIVE PREVATTE OFF-IIOltMAL CONDITIONS FOLLOWING FAILURE OF 1A MAIN TRANSFORE R FANS
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| ^
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| OPS 01/12/95 95-001 0 SA0V FRG MEETING MIGN STAleAltDS S d BT P91. SOIE MEMBERS GOIIIG TNIt0UEN IeTICIIS OF PREVATTE REVIEW ~
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| V Pese No. 5 01/11/96 ST LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS UPDATE SALP DATE RPT # UNIT ISSUE EXAIFLES ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AREA NO.
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| OPS 02/03/95 95-001 0 SA0V QA ALCIT 0$L-OPS-94-28 OF SUFFICIENT DETAIL TO DETECT PROBLEMS. SAME OVERALL CONCLUSIONS PREVATTE AS RESIDENT STAFF.
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| OPS 12/01/95 95-021 0 SA0V QA AUDIT REVIEW FINDINGS CLOSELY PARALLELED NRC'S. DETAILED, TMOROUGN.
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| PREVATTE OPS 01/05/96 95-022 d SA0V FRG MTG MEETING MAfrERED BY LACK OF OPS /ENG ATTEleAalCE. 'RECENT e4 PDEVATTE ASSESSIENT ALSO POINTED OUT ATTEteA81CE ISSUES.
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| OPS 01/05/96 95-022 0 SA0V QA ASSESSMENT OF FRG ASSESSMENT INCLUDED TEAM MEIGER FROM ANO AND VISIT TO SURRY.
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| PREVATTE INSIGHTFUL AIS SELF-CRITICAL.
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| OPS 01/05/96 95-022 0 SA0V CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ASSESSIENT TMOROUGH JN SCOPE. EFFECTIVE AT IDENTIFYING AND SUPPORTING PREVATTE WEA101 ESSES. USED MC 40500 CPS 12/01/95 95-021 2 SMUTD0tal GPERATIONS SDC PROCEDURE INCLUDED PROCEDURAL WEAlfMESS PREVATTE NATURAL-CIRC-RELATED SURV DLEING RED INV OPS. NAT'L CIRC NOT POSSIBLE IN THIS CASE DUE TO SREACMED RCS PRESS SOUNDARY OPS 12/01/95 95-021 2 SMUTDOWN OPERATIONS . REDUCED INVENTORY OEPRATIONS FOR RX GOOD OPERATOR KNOWLEDGE Ale PREPARATIONS PREVATTE O-RING AND 2A2 RCP OPS 12/01/95 95-021 2 SMUTDOWN OPERATIONS SDC PROCEDURE CONTAINED DISCREPANT POUR PROCEDURE REVIEW PREVATTE
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| , VALUES FOR REGUIRED RX CAVITY WATER l' LEVEL - PROCEDURE MAD BEEN APPROVED FOLLOWING EINIAlICED ATTW TO DETAIL l
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| l.
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| OPS 01/05/96 95-022 2 SMUTDOWN OPERATIONS REDUCED INVENTORY TO StPPORT 0-RIIIG Als PREPAftATIONS EXCELLENT. DETAILED, TNONOUGH BRIEFING PREVATTE RCP SEAL WOItK l.
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| l- OPS 02/03/95 95-001 2 SYSTEM LINEUPS UIIIT 2 EDGS AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS SAT WITH MIIIOR DEFICIENCIES PREVATTE l'
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| OPS 02/03/95 95-001 2- SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 CLEMUWCES ALSITED SATISFACTORY MIEVATTE -
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| OPS 12/01/95 95-021 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS V09120 CLOSED, VICE LOCKED CLOSED PER FAILURE TO ESTABLISM ADEeuATE CLEMtANCE - SLIV V10 95-21-01 PREVATTE CLEARANCE OPS 12/01/95 95-021 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS ' 2 SYSTEMS WALKED DOWN PROCEDURAL AND DRAWING DEFICIENCIES NOTED.
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| PREVATTE OPS 12/01/95 95-021 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS CLEARANCE DEFICIENCIES INVOLVING IV SAFETY REVIEW CRITERIA INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED - SLIV VIO 95-21-02 PREVATTE OPS 12/01/95 95-021 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS WORK CONTROL CENTER CLEARANCE IIDEX NOT UPDATED PER PROCEDURE - LACK OF STRICT ATTN TO DETAIL PREVATTE AtelTED
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| - OPS -01/05/96 95-022 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS U-1,2 AFW WALKDOWNS DRAWING / PROCEDURE DEFICIENCIES'ID'D PREVATTE m
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| Page No. 14 11/15/95 Si LUCIE SALP INPUI FEEDERS SALP CATE RPi 8 UNii ISSUE ERAMPLES ASSE SSMENT INSPECTOR AREA No.
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| ** SALP AREA OPS OPS 12/14/94 94 024 i CONTROL ROOM PROFESSIONALISM RF0 AND STARTUP CONTROL ROOM OVERCROWED DURING PREP FOR RESTART - PAPERWURE CLOSURE PREVA11E DID CONTROL FOR CRITICAL EVENTS - RCD PULL ETC.
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| OPS 10/20/94 94-019 0 INiilAL AN REOUAllFICATION PERttliiED LICENSED SRO TO DE AS$1GNED URI ? N00R9eN '
| |
| 1 RAINING OF OPERATORS RO DuilES AND MAINTAIN R0 QUALIFICA110NS OPS 10/20/94 94 019 0' INIllAL AND REQUALIFICATION LICENSEE POLICY ALLOWS OPS SUPERVISOR IFl? MOORMAN TRAINING OF OPERATORS SRO LICENSE 10 REMAIN ACTIVE ET vitiUE OF NIS PostTION OPS 10/20/96 94 019 0 INiilAL AND REQUALIFICATION NPS EXHIBITED TECNulCALLY INADEQUATE WE AKNE SS MOORMAN TRAINING OF OPERATORS PERFORMANCE A2 DISREGARD FOR MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE ON PROPER USE OF EOP C?S 10/20/94 94 019 0 INiilAL AND REQUALIFICATION REQUALIFICAll0N PROGRAM ADEQUATE 10 ENSURE SAFE PLANT OPERATION - ENSURES INAT INDIVIDUALS MOORMAN TRAINING OF OPERATORS SAilSFY ThE CONDIll0NS OF TNEIR LICENSE CPS 10/20/94 94 019 0 INillAL ANO REQUALIFICATION MEDICAL CONDITIONS 1 RACKING VERT Lli1LE PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE TO ENSURE LICENSE MEDICAL CON 0lil0NS MOORMAN TRAINING OF OPERATORS ARE TRACKED OPS 10/20/94 94-019 0 INITIAL AND REQUALIFICAIlON CHANGE IN MEDICAL CONDjil0N OF A FAILED 10 N0ilFY NRC - VIO? MOORMAN TRAINING OF OPERATORS LICENSED OPERATOR OPS 10/20/94 94 019 0 INiilAL AND REQUAttflCAll04 IRAINING DEPARifENT GENERALLY tFFECTIVE IN ADMINISTRAllNG EXAM AND EVALUATING OPERATOR MOORMAN 1 RAINING OF OPERA 10RS PERFORMANCE OPS 11,07/94 94-300 0 INITIAL AND REQUALiflCAll0N WEAK GUICANCE FOR REEMERGilATION OF PROCEDURAL WEAKNESS BALDWIN TRAINING OF OPERATORS ELECTRICAL RUSES AND ONE PROCEDURAL STEP CONTAINED TWO Acil0N STATEMENTS OPS 11,97/94 94-300 0 INITIAL AND REQUALIFICAll0N WRITTEN EXAM WEAKNESSES IN OPERATOR KNOWLEDGE SALDWIN TRAINING CF OPERATORS OPS 11/07/94 94-300 0 INIIIAL AND RECUALIFICATION SIDRJtATOR EXAMS WEAKNESS IN CREW C0pWRJNICAil0N BALOWIF TRAINING OF OPERATOR $
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| OPS 11/17/94 94-300 0 INiilAL AND REQUALIFICAil0N PROCEDURES DO NOT PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO PROCEDURAL WEAKNESS BALDWIN TRAINING OF OPERATORS REMOVE RCP FIIGI SERVICE WIEN RCS FALLS BELOW 500 DEGREES F OPS 08/23/94 94-015 1 MANIPULAll#G REACTOR AND RESIN REPLACEIENT (NIGil RAD) GolB INTERFACE Ale CWORINICAilell - 003 PERFORMANCE. OPS AND NP PREVATTE AURILIART CONTROLS OPS / / 95-018 i MONIf0 RING AND LOGGING PLANT DID NOT DOCUMENT LOOKEEPlieG LOGItEEPING WEAKNESS PREVAfit Copelfl0NS DEFICIEllCIES
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| 11/15/ft5 Si LUCIE SALP INPui FEEDERS SAIP DA.C RPi R UNIT ISSt;E ERAMrtES ASSESSMENT AREA NO. INSPECTM OPS / / 95-018 0 MON!iORING AND LOGGING PLAmi DID NOT ENTER STPASS SWITCN IN PROMDURE V10LAil04 - VIO LEVEL IV PREvntiE -
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| CONDITIONS DEVI All0N LOG DID NOT LOG OU1 KETS OPS 10/18/94 94-029 1 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT NLO ROUNDS GOOD PRACTICES SY NLO's DURING ROUmS - KNOWLEDGEASLE, CONSCIEN110US PREVAITE CONDlil0NS AND Muil GTED OPS 11/25/94 94-022 i MONB10 RING AND LOGGING PLANT CR LOG ENTRIES NOT MADE IN CONDITIONS POOP LOGKEEPiteG PRACilCES/ PROCEDURES VIOLAll04 - SLIV 9e 22-02 'PREVATTE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER AND NOT PRECEDED BT
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| " LATE ENTRT" OPS 03/31/95 95 004 1 MONITORING Ae LOGGlWG PLANI QUENCN TANK IN-LEAKAGE DUE 10 CODE Atil0NS MElletmiCAL, TECINIICALLY SOUm, FOCUSED ON PLANT / WORKER PREVAllE CONDl110NS SATE 1T VALVE LEAK SAFETY OPS 03/31/95 95 004 2 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT SLIGNT 1NCRE ASE IN RM CAVilf lu LINKAGE GOOD AliENTION 19 CONTROL SOARD INDICAil0NS, APPROPRI ATE EMPNASIS ON PREVATTE CONDITIONS PROMPTED CONTAIINENT ENTRT/ INSPECTION SAFETT .
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| OPS 04/01/95 95 007 1 Moul10 RING AND LOGGING PLANT LOS$ Of SHUIDOWN COOLING WE AK OPERATOR RESPONSE 10 manwl ATORS, OPERATOR ERROR ROOT CAUSE _ PREVATTE COND1110NS TIMLT, OBJECTIVE CORRECliVE Attl0NS.
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| OPS 07/01/95 95 012 1 M04110 RING AND LOGGING PLANT 00$ LOGEEEPING FOR CCW LOADS WEAK '
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| PREVATTE CON 0lil0NS OPS' 07/01/95 95-012 1 MONITORING AND LOGGING PLANT 1B BATTERT CELL JUNPER INSTALLATION WEAK LOG KEEPING RE BATTERY CONDill0NS PREWATTE CON 0lil0NS ,
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| OPS 07/07/95 95-014 2 MONB10 RING AND LOGGING PLANT ICW OPERASILlif W11N ELEVATED SEA WATER GOOD NPS INVOLVEMENT - CLEAR INSTRUCil0NS 10 CPERATORS I
| |
| PREVAllt '-
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| CONDlil0NS TEMP t OPS 10/16/95 95 015 1 MON 110 RING AND LOGGING PLANT 2 EXAMPLES OF POOR LOGEEEPING POOR LOGKEEPIIIG - NCY 95-15-08 PREVAlif' CON 0lil0NS t OPS 10/16/95 95-015 1 MONITORING AND LOGGIIIG PLANT FAILED TO ENTER VALVE Postil0N IN PROCEDURE VIOLATION - VIO LEVEL IV PREWAliE CONDlil0NS DEVIAil0N LOG OPS / / 95-015 1 PLANT SNUTD0hEI OPERATOR PERFORM 480CE
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| $NUTDOWN DELATED BT LARGE IRNGER OF PROCEDURE CHANGES SUT PROCEEDED PREVATTE SLOWLY AND IEilitBICALLY WIfflinst INCIDENT OPS / / 95-018 1 PLANT STARTUP OUTAGE RESTART STARTUP SLOW, CAUTIOUS, AIS BETNESICAL PREValfE OPS 02/10/96 94-001 1 PLANT STARTUP CRITICALITT ACNIEVED WifuGUT VALID ECC INSUFFICIENT PLAINIllb, PROCEDURAL WEARNESS IDENTIFIED ELROD WORK $NEET OPS 02/18/94 94-001 1 PLANT STARTUP UIIIT 1 FAILLmE 10 ACNIEVE CalitCALITY CimVES NAD DEEli CMRtETIVE Feel WH PERSPECilVE. RESOLUTION ELROD DLE TO INADEmmTE CIME PWYSICS CIRVES ' THOROUGE Ase TECINTCALLY SIR W OPS 05/20/94 96 011 2 PLANT STAtfUP POWER INCREASE FRen 262 10 31% DUE 10 WEAK ATTENil0N TO DETAIL BY OPERATORS ELROD PostTIVE Mic i
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| n V)
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| . Dage No. 16 o a 11/15/95
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| $1 LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS SALD DATE RPI 8 UNIT ISSUE ERAMPLES AREA ASSES $9ENT Wo. INSPECTOR' OPS 05/20/94 94 012 2 PLANT STARTUP U-2 POSI RTO STARIUP COMMUNICAll0NS C&C, STRONG DURING FILL AND WENT AND STARIUP ELROD OS 06/27/94 94 013 2 PLANT STARTUP u 2 STARTUP TRANSPOSI180NAL PROCEDURE ERROR IDCNTIFIED. OTHERWISE SAllSFACTORT EtROD OS 07/29/94 94 014 1 PLANT STARTUP U 1 S/U NEW RE 1/M Ptois GOOD INiil AllVE. WELL CONTROLLED EVOLUll0N. Et POD .
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| CONSERVAllVE DECISION TO WAIT UNTIL 14 MAIN IFRMR REPAIRS WRE
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| * COMPLETE BEFORE SimCNING TO GRID OPS 12/14/94 94 024 1 PLANT STARTUP REFUEtlNG OU1 AGE GOOD PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE. EFFECilVE CareeAND AND CONTROL, GOOD PREVATTE COMMUNICAil0N, GOOD PREJOB BRIEFINGS. AND APPROPalATE SUPERVISOR 1 DVERSIGNT BESULTED IN WELL E*.EtuiED PLANT RESTART OPS 03/31/95 95 004 2 PLANT STARTUP STARTUP FOLLOWING UNIT TRIP DUE TO C000 COMMUNICA180N AND TEAfRdDRK PREVAITE IAILED SGLT OP3 04/01/95 95 007 1 PLANT STARIUP UNII 1 STARTUP PROFESSIONAL /WLL CONTROLLED PREVA11E OPS 0//11/95 95 014 1 PLANT STARIUP UNIT 1 STARTUP PERFORMED IN A PROFESSIONAL MANNER PREVATTE OPS 10/16/95 95 015 2 PLANT STARTUP PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE RESTARI FROM HURRICANE WiiNout SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS PREVAllE OPS 10/16/95 95-015 0 PLANT STARTUP, SMUIDOWN ANO OPERA 10R PERFORMANCE POWER OPS NUMEROUS OPERATOR ERRORS INDICATED DECt1NTNG PERFORMANCE PREVATTE OS 04/28/94 94-009 1 POWER OPERAll0N EDG FUEL OIL TRANSFERS BETWEEN UNils RESULIED IN NON CONSERVATIVE ENTRY INTO is AS ELROD OPS 08/23/94 94-015 2 POWER OPERATION ST ARTUP/SHU100WN/ POWER MANEUVERS WELL CONTR0ttED AND PROFES$10NAL PREVAITE OPS 10/20/94 94 020 1 POWER OPERA 110N NIGNI ORDERS DID NOT ACCURA 1ELY CONVEY NEGAllVE REPORT FINOS AND NEEDED ACil0N 10 PREV OPE RATORS
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| ~
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| OPS 01/20/95 94 025 1 POWER OPERAll0N MONiiORlWG AND LOGGlWG PLANT CON 0lil04 OPERATOR FAltED 10 IDEWilFY INCORRECT INDICATION ON LPSI PR PREVATTE DURING CONTROL ROARD WALKDOWN 2 W S OPS 11/25/94 94 022 1 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT CONTROL WASTE GAS RELEASE WITN METEOROLOGICAL OPERATOR ERROR PREVATTE TOWER INSTRUMENTATION OUT OF SERVICE OPS 08/31/94 94-018 1 REFUELING FUEL RECEIPT PROCEDURES PROVIDED CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF REQUIRED PREPARAll0NS AND PREVENilVE ELROD MAINTENANCE OPS 12/14/94 94-024 2 REFUELING STAFFING FOR REFUELING SINGLE LICENSED GPERATOR USED ON REFUELING BRIDGE - (CORRECTED) PREV &TTE i OPS 08/23/94 94-015 2 RESPONSE TO OFF-NORMAL INOPERABLE TC4 CINRilfl0NS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH TS REeutRED SNUTDOWN - VIO 94-15-01 PREVAffE OPS 02/18/94 94-001 1 RESPONSE TO TRANSIENTS AND UNIT 1 MANUAL TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF MFW OPERATORS ALERT. ADEeuRTE P051 TRIP REVIEW ELROD OFF NORMAL CONDITIONS PUMP
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| Dage No. 17 11/15/95 ST LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS SALP DATE RPI R UNil ISSUE E R AMPLES ASSE SSMENT INSPECTOR AREA NO.
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| OPS' 05/20/94 94 012 1 RESPONSE 10 TRANSIENTS AND U-1 TRIP DUE TO OPENING OF ERCITER PROPER OPERATOR RESPONSE, NLRtAN ERROR R001 CAUSE ELRG) 0FF-NORMAL CONDITIONS OUTPUT BKR OPS 05/20/94 94-011 1 RESPONSE TO TRANSIENIS AND U T TRIP DUE 10 laADEQUATELT PLANNED INAvEQUATE PRIOR REVIEW ELROD l OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS ELECTRICAL LINEUP OPS 05/20/94 94-011 2 RESPONSE TO TRANSIENi$ AND UNil 2 TRIP DURING POSI-RF0 POWER EXCELLENT OPERATOR RESPUNSE. ROOT CAUSE (PRE-tKISilNG edlRING ELRG)
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| OFF-NORMAL CONDlil0NS ASCENSION PROBLEM) EFFORT WELL-FOUWED OPS 07/29/94 94-014 1 RESPONSE TO IRANSIENTS AND U-l IRIP DUE TO DEBRIS BLOWN ACROSS OPERATOR RESPONSE COG) ELROD l OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS MAIN TRANSFORER DUTPUT BREAKER l
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| ! OS 08/23/94 94-015 2 RESPONSE TO TRANSIENTS AND INOPERABLE 108 FAILURE TO COMPti Wlin TS REQUIRED SMUTDOWN - VIO 94-15-01 PREvAlif l- 0FF-NORMAL COW lil0NS OPS 08/23/94 94-015 2 RESPONSE 10 IRANSIENTS AND APPARENT RCP OIL LEAK OPERATORS RESPONDED WELL 10 RCP Oil LEAK, CONSERVAllVE DOWNPOWER ELROD
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| ! 0FF-NORMAL CONDjil0NS OS 11/25/94 94-022 1 RESPONSE 10 TRANSIENTS AND NEATER DRAIN PUMP 1 RIP AS RX TRIP DUE OPERATORS RESPONDED WELL - ACTUALLY INADEcuATE MAINTENANCE OF PREVA11E OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS TO LIGMilNG $1RIRE POTENilAL TRANSFORMER IN SWITCNTARD OPS 03/31/95 95 004 1 RESPONSE 101RALSIENTS AND 1A LPSI SUCil0N RELIEF VALVE LIFT PROMP1 COMMUNICAllON PREVATTE OFF-NORMAL CONOliIONS OPS 03/31/95 95-004 2 RESPONSE TO TRANSIENTS A @ UNil 2 TRIP DUE 10 F AILED SGli CREW PERFORMANCE /C0f04UNICAil0NS GOOD PREVAllE OFF-NORMAL CONDI110NS OPS 04/29/95 95-009 2 BESPONSE TO IRANSIENTS AND DEN POWER SUPPLY REPLACEMENT OFF-LINE REPAlt DEMONSTRATED ColiSERVAilvE APPROACH 10 SAFETT PREVAllE OFF NORMAL CONDlil0NS OPS 07/01/95 95-012 1 RESPONSE 10 TRANSIENTS AND 18 BATTERT CELL JUMPER INSTALLAil0N CAUil0US, PROPER REVIEW / EXECUTION PREV 41TE off-NORMAL CONDITIONS OPS 07/29/95 95-014 1 RESPONSE 10 TRANSIENTS AND UNIT 1 NIGN PRESSURE 1 RIP OPERATOR RESPONSE EXCELLENT PREVATTE OFF-NORMAL COWITIONS OPS / / 95-018 0 SAFETT REVIEWS FRG MEEllNG ADOPTED SUBCopelliiEE CHAIRMAN POSill0N DELEGATED TO SERVICES 8 TANAGER PREVATTE OPS / / 95-018 0 SAov QA/QC AUDliS (2) AUDliS/INSPECil0NS DETAILED Am TNOROUGN, RESULTS WELL DOCUENTED PREVATTE OPS 03/1T/94 94-005 0 SAQV 3 QA AUDlis REVIEWED CROSS SECil0N OF AcilVITIES COVERED. NO DEFICIENCIES IDEmilflED. ELROD OPS 04/28/94 94 009 2 SAov 6 REFUELING-RELATED AUDITS REVIEE D SATISTACf0RY ELROD OPS 05/20/94 94-011 1 SAov NEW FUEL QuRLITY ASSURANCE PROGRAfl ACil0NS INOROUGN lli SCOPE Am ENECUil0Il ELROD OPS 10/20/94 94-020 0 SA0V FRG MEETlWG PROFESSIONAL WITH STAWARDS SUT SET BY POM PREVAffE I
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| -11/15/95 St LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS I SALP OATE RPi 8 UNii ISSUE ERAMPLES ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AREA NO, OPS -11/25/94 94-022 0 SAeV QA/cc AUDl15 DETABLED, I!NELY, AND EFFECilVE - CORRECTIVE ACil0M itMELY .PREVAllE OPS 11/25/94 94 022 0 SA0V SEL? ASSESSMENT AUDifS MP, OPS, EM, PM, E FFECTIVE PREVATIE ISC, WELDING - CAP OPS .11/25/94 94-022 0 SACV ON LINE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE AND FRG AGGRES$lVE IN RESPONDING TO NEED PREVAllE CONTROLS CPS 12/14/94 94-024 1 SA0V tuf0 h0TICES - MINIMUM TEMP FOR Atil0N ON THl3 SSSUE WAS PROACTIVE AND APPROPRIATE. PREVAf f E CRif1CALITY OPS 12/14/94 94 024 0 SACV PROCEDURE REVIEWS FAILURE TO PERFORM TS REGUIRED PROCEDURE REvl!WS NCV 94-24-01' PREVAtit OPS 12/14/94 94 024 1 Scov FRG MEETINGS ROOT CAUSE ANALists OF 18 EDG FAILURE DETAILED AND INOROUGMLT PREVAliE REVIEWED RT SAFETY CopNeliTEE OPS 12/14/94 94 024 0 4AQV QA AUDIIS - ONE AUDIT Auoli AcilVITIES INOROUGN AND W LL DOCUMENTED PREVAlif OPS 01/20/95 94-025 0 SAQV FRG MEETINGS SATISFACTORT PREVAITE CPS G2/1//95 95-002 0 SA0V SPEAKOUT PROGRAM ACil0NS ADEQUATE, RESOLVED IN A TIMELT MANNER LENAMAN OPS 03/31/95 95-004 0 SAov CNRR MEETING ACilVE PARitCIPAi!ON, IMPRESSIVE DEP1H Of QUESil0NING, VALUE ADDED PREVATIE C75 03/31/95 95-004 0 uov SPE AKOUT PROGRAM POST GUTAGE REVIEW APPEARS EFFECTIVE IN PROMollNG GOOD WORK ENVIRONMENT PREVAllE OPS 03/31/95 95-004 1 SA0V 1A LPSI RELIEF VALVE Llfi LICENSEE AGGRESSIVELY PURSUED ROOT CAUSE/VERiflED flNDINGS IN fif tD PREVAllE OPS 04/01/95 95-00/ 0 SAQV FRG MEEllNG SAilSFAC10RY PREV 411E OPS 04/01/95 95 007 2 SAQV ALL MANDS POST TRIP REVIEW MEEilNG INNOVAilVE APPRO4CM TO PROBLEM SOLVING PREVATTE OPS 04/29/95 95-009 0 SAov QA Ateli or VARIOUS OPERAll0NAL DETAILEU PREVAffE AtilVlilES OPS 06/03/95 95 010 0 SA0V 2 FRG MEETINGS ATTENDED ACTIVE PARTICIPAllON NOTED ~ PREVATTE OPS 06/03/95 95 010 0 SAov CNRs MEETING ATTENDE0 DETAILED QUESil0NS NOTED PREVAfiE OPS 06/03/95 95-010 0 SAeV CNRS MEEilNG AliENDED DETAILED QUESil0NS NOTED PREVAffE OPS 07/01/95 95-012 0 SAov 2 AUDITS REVIEUED DETAILED, TNDROUGN PREVAffE -
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| t OPS 07/21/95 95 014 1 Snev ALL-NANDS POST-Tele llEVIEW POST TRIP ItEVIEW MEETINS FQlRS UREful- PREVAliE OPS 07/29/95 95-014 0 SAov 2 04 AUDITS REVIEWED DETAILED - MULTIDISCIPLINARY PREVATIE
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| e1 PA S S S S S S g/ LE S S S S S S S S S S S S S a1 AR P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P1 ' SA O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O G O
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| ( *J Page No. 21 11/15/95 Si LUCIE SALP INPUI FEEDERS SCtP DATE RPI R UN!! ISSUE E X AMPLE S ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AREA NO.
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| OPS . 0//29/94 94 014 2 SYSTEM LINEUPS F AILURE TO IC OP PROC FOR f CV-07-18 PERSONNEL ERROR ELROD BEING LEFT OPEN OPS 08/23/94 94 015 2 SYSTEM tlNEUPS ENTRY INTO 3.0.3 CLE ARANCE RESULIED IN SifRJLTAMEOUS INOPERASillIY OF 2A LPSI Ak0 28 PREVAliE CMARGING PUMP CPS 08/23/94 94 015 0 SYSTEM tlNEUPS ESF SYSTEM UALKDOWNS SYSTEMS CORRECILY AtlGIIED AND IN SATISf ACTORY MATERIAL C0 eel 1 ION PREVATTE OPS 08/23/94 94 015 2 SYSTEM LINEUPS ENTRY IS AS TOR CONT AIMMENT TEMPERAlURE TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENTS INADVERIENTLY TAREN 005 PREVATTE CPS 10/18/94 94 020 i SYSTEM LINEUPS OWA CONTROL ROOM VENTILA110N DEC(WeslSSICNED SYSTEM LINEUP NOT IN PREVAlft PROCEDUPE BUT VALVE NEEDED TO SE CLOSED c?S 11/25/94 94-022 1 SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 CLEARANCES INSPECTED ALL TAGS AND BREAKERS CORRECT PREVATTE OP! .11/25/94 94 022 1 SYSTEM LINEUPS ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM PLACED CORRECilVE Atil0N VIOL All0N - SLIV 94-22 01 PREVA11E IN UNTESTED ALIGNMENT (SUING COMPONENT 5)
| |
| OPS 12/14/94 94-024 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS SYSTEM WALKDOWNS SDC A/S AND CS A/8 AND CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS ALIGNED PREVAlit CORRECTLY CPS 01/20/95 94-025 1 SYSTEM LINEUPS CLEARANCES REVIEWED (2) NO PROBLENS IMNTIFIED PREVAITE CPS 01/20/95 94 025 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS SYSTEM WAtth0WNS & SYSTEMS LORRECILY ALIGNED - MINOR NOUSEEEEPIEG DEflCIENCY PREVAlit CPS 03/31/95 95 004 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 5 SYSTEMS AUDi1ED MINOR DEllCIENCIES PREVATIE OPS 03/31/95 95-004 D SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 CLEARANCES AUDliED NO DEflCIENCIES PREVAllE OPS 04/01/95 95-007 0 SYSTFM LINEUPS 2 SYSTEMS AUDITED No DEflCIENCIES IDEMilf!ED PREVAITE OPS 04/01/95 95-007 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 CLEARANCES AUDllED NO DEflCIENCIES IDENilflED PREVAffE OPS 04/29/95 95-009 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 3 CLEARANCES AUOllED No DEflCIENCIES IDENTIflED PREVATTE OPS 04/29/95 95-009 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 6 SYSTEMS AUDliED ALIGNED CORRECILY, BUT NUMEROUS MlWOR DEflCIENCIES IDENilflED PREVAfiE OPS 06/03/95 95-010 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS HVAC UALEDOWNS NVAC SYSTEMS foUND IN CORRECT LINEUPS, POOR CONDlIION, MINOR PREVAlit-PROCEDURE DEFICIENCIES OPS 06/03/95 95 010 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 6 CLEARAIICES AUDliED MIIIOR DEflCIENCIES (ADMIN) IIOTED PREVATTE OPS 07/01/95 95-012 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 3 SYSTEMS AUDifED ONLY MINOR PEflCIENCIES NOTED PREVATTE i
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| OPS 07/01/95 95-012 0 SYSTEM LINEUPS 2 CLEARANCES AUDITED No DEflCIE11CIES PREVATTE
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| e l R 'E E E E t E E O l l
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| ' R P R C D U L LE O LE 1 E 5 A S EV EV 1 C T R E VO F VO W O 5 N U I E O E S R L E D C L N LN P E M E N I N I . U S
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| S C E E 0 E S E F N.
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| A O S R SE i 8E V U OI S P I AT N AT L Q NT S A F RL E RL A E UU R R E EU T EU V D J L E C D PS T PS A /O D N OE A 0E L N E V -
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| . I O NR N L RE E
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| E M N I I INP A I
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| O u N P N D N M E I I
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| R DD P P E L D M T
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| O R O 0 N R l N N 1 W D F O F O AO iW W 5 R T R O O E E A E F LD D D T P R P 0Y 1 I
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| E E D D R R R 1R 5A U E U N U N O E O S K A T G T ) D MSP L A A 2 E G
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| S A S R N R ( C TT E N E W E C E I E S
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| O R SN I L P A P P S A
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| N C M O E P SM YE L E
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| M M C N U A E R D G D N G R T A N N N A N YI l FA F
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| E E S E A I A R Y L A i IT R L N EO RN S C A L A E 2 W I W L E V VC U 4 3 O F O C S
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| S S S S S 5 S P P P P P P P N U U U U U U U W E E E E E E E O N N N N N N N D E I I I I l I I T U L L L L t L L U S n S M M M M M M M S I E E E E E E E T T T T T T T i S S S S S S S l Y Y Y Y Y Y Y m S S S S S S S t T
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| y ,- - ,..m.: -- +m u a a + m e, a a en .-
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| 4 ENCLOSURE 2 .
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| .?
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| t i C INPUT FEEDER FORMS - MAINTENANCE i
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| i l
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| i
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| -t t
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| m December 15,1995 i
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| l x..M MEMORANDUM TO: K. D. Landis, Chief <
| |
| ; Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects l
| |
| 1 THRU: II. O. Christenson, Chief '
| |
| 3 Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety I'
| |
| a e FROM: G. A. Hallstrom j
| |
| | |
| ==SUBJECT:==
| |
| DRS-M&S INPUT FEEDERS FOR 1995 ST LUCIE SALP 1he subje 2 DRS-M&S input feeder forms for the 1995 ST LUCIE SALP are enclosed.
| |
| . 3
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| -l tg.! ,
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| ==Enclosures:==
| |
| Maintenance / Surveillance Feeder Form cc w/encis:
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| L. Mellen E. Lea s
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| b f
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| l e
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| - - - - , s e
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| L ,,
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| .Page No. 2 01/11/ %
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| ST LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS UPDATE SALP DATE RPT # . UNIT ISSUE EXARLES ASSESSENT INSPECTOR AREA No.
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| ' ** SALP AREA MS MS 12/31/94 95-001 1 CORRECTIVE ACTION FAILURE TO SAMPLE SIT SIMILAR TO EVENT IN IR 93-023. INATTENTION TO DETAIL BY OPERATORS -
| |
| PREVATTE v10 95-01-01 MS C2/03/95 95-001 1 CORRECTIVE MAINTEMANCE CALIBRATION OF CONT PARTIQJLATE MONITOR TECHNICIANS KNOWLEDGEARLE, CAL IAW PROCEDURE PREVATTE . . ..
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| MS 02/03/95 95-001 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE 2C AFP INSPECTION / REPAIR WELL-COORDINATED TRAIN OUTAGE. ONE DRAWING DEFICIENCY INVOLVING AN PREVATTE IMACQJRATE INFO-ONLY DRAWING IN WORK PACKAGE WHICM CWPLICATED REASSY MS 02/03/95 95-001 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE CALIBRATION OF PZR LEVEL CHANNELS THOROUGH PRE-JOB BRIEF, ISC W LL-PREPARED, EXECUTION PROFESSIONAL PREVATTE MS 12/01/95 95-021 0 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE REVIEW OF FREEZE SEAL PRACTICES IN AGREEMENT WITN MC 9900 PREVATTE MS 12/01/95 95-021 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE
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| * WIDE RANGE SG LEVEL UPGRADE FOR POST WELL MANAGED MODIFICATION PREVATTE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS MS 12/31/95 95-021 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE REPLACEE NT OF 3 PZR WATER SPACE AND 9 MANAGED VERY EFFECTIVELY PREVATTE RCS LOOP NOZZLES MS 01/05/96 95-022 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE RX VESSEL NEAD 0-RING LEAK PROPER DISPOSITION. PRE-JOB BRIEF FOR NONING POOR.
| |
| PREVATTE MS 01/05/96 95-022 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE T/R OF FCV-25-14 SAT MAINTENANCE, BUT POOR PRACTICE OF SITilWG ON S-R DUCTWORK PREVATTE MS 01/05/96 95-022 2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE 2A2 RCF SEAL PACKAGE REPLACEMENT ROOT CAUSE/ CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DETAILED, THOROUGM.
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| PREVATTE -
| |
| MS 02/03/95 95-001 2 otAGNOSTIC MAINTENANCE TROUBLESN00 TING OF INSTA51LITIES IN FAILURE OF IV PROCESS RESULTED IN VALVE CYCLING SNUT DUE TO ROLLED PREVATTE LETDOWN CONTROL VALVES LEADS - VIO 95-01-02 MS 12/01/95 95-021 2 DIAGNOSTIC MAINTENANCE tJ-2 SG EDDY CURRENT TESTING CONSERVATIVELY CONDUCTED, PROPERLY euhLIFIED EXAMINERS, WELL-WRITTEN PREVATTE 4r---- --s_____-___- _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . .. .____- _ __ _-___.____ _ a_____- _ __-_ _. . _ _.2
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| _. . . _ . . _ .._ _. . . m ,
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| _ .. . . _ _ . . , . ~.,
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| f .T I
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| ,l PROC MS 01/05/96 95-022 2 OUTAGE ACTIVITIES U-2 POST-RF0 CONTAINENT CLOSEGUT NLMBER OF DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED INDICATED A DECLINE OWER PREVATTE PREVIOUSLY MONITORED CLOSE0UTS. POSSitLE 19RMNING TRES IN EFFECTIVENESS OF CLEANUP MS 01/05/96 95-022 2 OUTAGE ACTIVITIES ICI FLANGE WORK DEFICIENCIES ADDRESSED APPROPRIATELY, KNOWLEDGEASLE WORGRS. POOR PREVATTE FE CONTROLS DISPLAYED BY SC INSPECTOR MS 01/05/96 95-022 2 OUTAGE ACTIVITIES U-2 RF0 SCOPE ACTIV11tES SNOWED 115% INCREASE OWER TNOSE PLANNED. INDICATIVE OF PREVATTE ise?T ADDRESSING EXISTING DEFICIENCIES TO IMPROWE PUWIT PERFORMNCE MS 02/03/95 95-001 1 PREDICTIVE MINTENANCE 1A CEA MG PHASE CONNECTION FAILURE PREDICTIVE MINT PROGRAM A STRENGTN. COMPETENT AS MOTIVATED STAFF ::
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| PREVATTE , .
| |
| IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO MG FAILURE MS 02/03/95 95-001 2 PREVENTIVE MINTENANCE PMS ON UNIT 2 FWIV NO DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED PREVATTE 4
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| e 5
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| i .
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| - a ,
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| Page No. 3 01/11/96 ST LUCIE SALP INPUT FEEDERS UPOATE SALP DATE RPT S UNIT ISSUE EXAMPLES ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AREA NO.
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| MS 12/01/95 95-021 2 PREVENT!VE MAINTENANCE 18 MONTN PMS AND RELAY SOCKET ACCEPTA88% WORit all SOCKETS, GOOD OVERALL PERFORMMCE PREVATTE DEFICIENCIES MS 01/05/96 95-022 0 SA0V QA ALCIT OF SITE GC IDEITIFIED AREAS FOR IlW90VEIENT. GOW WORKING DOCLDIENT PREVATTE M' 01/05/ % 95-022 i SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES INTEGRATEDSAFEGUARDSTEETING DETAILEDBRIEF,EXCELLENTPROCEDURALCONTROL,$NPSEFFECTIVEIN PREVATTE MtulMJZING TIME THAT SDC WAS UNAVAILABLE, OPERATORS COULD NOT -
| |
| EXPLAIO RAD MONITORING SYSTEM BEHAVIOR FOLLOWING LOOP MS 02/03/95 95-001 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTING MSIV/MFIV PERIODIC TEST CONDUCTED IN PROFESSIONAL MAIINER. IMPRESSIVE NPS SLPERVISION PREVATTE MS 02/03/95 95-001 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTING 2A EDG PER!aDIC TEST SURV SAT. MINOR DEFICIENCIES NOTED IN EDG PNYSICAL CONDITION PREVATTE MS 02/03/95 95-001 1 SURVEILLANCE TESTlWG
| |
| * 1A EDG PERIODIC TEST GOOD C00RDINAtl0N SETWEEN RCO AND AIIPS. PERFOR9ED SATISFACTORILY ,
| |
| PREVATTE MS 02/03/95 95 001 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTING 2C AFP SURV TEST PERFORMED WELL PREVATTE MS 12/01/95 95-021 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTING INTEGRATED SAFElR.AARDS TESTING THOROUGH 94tEF, WELL CONTROLLED, GOOD C019EJNICATIONS PREVATTE MS 12/01/95 95 021 2 SURVEILLANCE TESTING MISSED RCS BORON SAMPLE FAILURE OF OPS / CHEM TO RECOGNIZE SAMPLE FREG SNIFT AT MODE CMANGE.
| |
| PREVATTE SECOND SAMPLING FAILURE SINCE OCTOBER - VIO 95-21-03 MS 12/01/95 95-021 1 SURVEILLANCE TESTING VACUUM RELIEF TESTING SAT PREVATTE MS 12/01/95 95-021 1 SURVEILLANCE TESTING 1B EDG PERIODIC OPERATORS 1010WLEDGEASLE, PROCEDURE ADNERANCE GOOD, COORD GOOD.
| |
| PREVATTE MS 12/15/95 95-017 0 USE OF CGD MATERIAL FAILURE TO ENTER REGUIRED TEST FRES FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE - EXAMPLE OF VIO 95-17-01 MOORE DATA INTO SHELF LIFE PROGRAM MS 12/15/95 95-017 0 USE OF CCD MATERIAL UNGUALIFIED DIODES INSTALLED IN RCGV ColelERCIAL GRADE DEDICATION TESTING IIOT PERFORMED. FAILURE TO MOORE SYSTEM FOLLOW PROCEDURE. ONE EXAMPLE OF VIO 95-17-01
| |
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| .,s g - -s - ..-Q:q, 81 5 : 1U 15/95'95 017 .0 USE OF ce set?faIAL FAILURE TO PLACE DistMPANT PUIES FAILM 70 FOLLthi Pumam . ENdWDLE OF VIO M-17 91
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| -IMME ~.
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| ON-NOLD FOR EWS'S RESE UTIENI .
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| MAINTENANCE /RJRVRHLANCE (MS) :
| |
| ST LUCIE CYCLE 11 ,
| |
| 1/2/94 - 1/6/96.
| |
| . - . . . - - _ - - . - . - - - - ~. ._ _. - _ - .
| |
| 12/15/95 DRS Input Dhommmer, rwebs> rv m>., careen, menemmes teamr e .
| |
| R 412 werMed 36 =% M&S arddlims. IR M12 Mar. 27 - IR M12, SAR S. EW !
| |
| famed that: (1) Good post work esseing for a ymhe4mck -adisiema"" Apr. 23, of the imeshe cachag water and commpament coeEng water pump camaret igpg switches revealed a =====g wire in the Unit 2 lead shed circuit (14.d).
| |
| (2) he asesmeen was evnesma is insyrevues -
| |
| between OPS and IAC per--.a (15.e) and at brish for m*
| |
| evoimmems (15). 0) Unit 2 emeage usedRestisms were- '" - , (1s I i
| |
| 5.f. 5.g. 5.h, a 5.i).14) De raysir of Unit 1 skuedown cashms het lug i surdum indumes esive V.3480 was einnely and wet dame (15.c).
| |
| Besseur, VIO 3HM124t was EduseMed ese en immenemmes .j earvandse andma Sur a pseeless simissium Sur W survuBmmee
| |
| , esseing af to C insuke e muser ymmy (14A.
| |
| t IR M13 veriAnd commmmed good ,- " e of - + and Apr. 24 - IR 9413, SAR S. Eared servain==,e acemenes (14). He Ecemmee's eh med cesvecerve May 28 actisms to em isome of"_,1 ,
| |
| pressurecentrolwhBeca emmy CCW 1994 j heat anang=r e6es was thorough (14.a.2). Good c=--==nemas were ==ned during boek amies' CEA emercise servain==re esses (1s 4.b.4 ,
| |
| j & 4.b.51.
| |
| .j IR 9414 aime == mad that M&S acervimms ahearved that period were May 29 - IR M14, S&R S. Eared ;i performed was. Good trembhsheseng mem.a.aary was meted in the M y2,1994 repair of the 25 Emergency Dienst Gemermeer dined starams air cessyressor masser (14.a.2).
| |
| 't IR 9415 she mend that M&S actmmes etmerved that paried won well Juip 3 -30 IR M15, S&R S. Erred j 1994 t IR 9418 reported that - eheerved during the paried was Jugy 31 3R 94 33, S&R S. Ebred em in a cosapeemet im Good name wt was ==a d in the Aug.27, Ecemose's reopease to the fmBure of the 2B EDG eueput bremher en 19p4 clase. Survemmace teseing was m L.
| |
| * wee, wilk good casemmumiesmem and steemenen es dutmR. .L i
| |
| Page 2 of le
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| SALP INPUOTFDER FORM ,
| |
| MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE (MS) -
| |
| . :. _ - = _= = :==. .. .. .. _. . -. .
| |
| .. . . := _
| |
| ST LUCIE CYCLE 11 1/2/94 - IM/96 :
| |
| g--=..:_=------------::__=------== :- . :_ : .:- = :. _ . : _ _ _ - z - . _.. . u - z=-_:.--=_--. .;- :.- >
| |
| 12/15/95 DRS Input
| |
| .___.--:~----- -------_=_:._====-.= -mmM ISSUE DATE REFERENCE NetC CONTACT ASSESSMENT s+ T=he Amtew W4 IR 9541 repened that MAS activieles comemmed to be condmeted we5 Jan.1 IR 9541, SAR R. Prevatte r during the persed. Predicts,e M=mes==mre involvement in the Feb. 4,1995 edenenession of Unit 1 CEA MG wiring prehesene was comedered a strengek. Museeur, a vedemma won *m invahug a Smaure to portmens em M % wurMemana duming CTCS mantmenemmne (TIO 50 3EDf954143,Fmihme en 9hamw PW 2
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| -TAM.TS,14.a.leM IR 9547 reported that surveimmaces were performed s.wisfacterty. near. 5 - IR 9547, SAR R. Pre,seee me=ever,a womhmen was *m in W W provedad Apr.1, sursiepoemrummesera pre.usm hassiaty. Abe,a tem 1993 iJ -- 1 centrol was "W by thelicensee, movetemme she faihare to remme,e a temmperary switch froma en electrical carrut, and resulted im NCV 335/954742,' Failure to hem Coungeranom Centrol of Unit 1 ECCS Area Yh E3ectrical Cisumt," 14.a.t.
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| IR 9549 repened that Maimes===ce performance during the short AprE 2 - 29 IR 9549, S&R R. Pre,asse eutage was emcesset. De piammed cruecal work activisies were 1995 accameplimbed ahead of scheemie med per-mand an orderiy reenre to power. Ne esAcsemeses were idameSed during the observatism of
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| + activames. moeuver, a luna murh h to a .
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| =&=aams evem@t rumsdeed in am MCV WICY SMW954548,1 4.hJ. His was te Erst sW s Amedad omrveEmmte met s P en m ixtem 1991.
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| j; SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION f-n f MAINTENANCE .
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| If $ . EXCERPT 3 IR 9441 1
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| ! ' -&! ~
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| Report Nos.:' fa-335/94-01 and 50-389/94-01 ;
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| e fic===a. Florida Power & Light Co !
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| ?J 9250 West Plagler Street - l
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| ; Miami, FL 33102 ]
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| 1 Docket Nos.: 50 335 and 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16 ;
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| . . Facility Name: St. I.mcie 1 and 2
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| \
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| Inspection Conducted-Inspectors: .
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| S. A. Elrod, Senior Resulent Inspector Date Signed j
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| l4
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| ' M. S. Miller, Resident Inspector Date Signed 4
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| -j Approved by:
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| 4' K. D. Iandis, Chief Date Signed Reactor Pmjects Section 2B
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| = . Division of Reactor Projects ,
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| : i. !
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| -l Secpe: ' Ibis routine sesident inspoution was conducted onsite in the areas ,
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| s of plant operations review, =alatan=aca observations, surveillance observations, safety system !
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| Inspection, and review of nonroutine events.
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| . i, . e
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| ,' Backshift inspection was performed on January 2, 5, 9, and 15.
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| I
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| .I Results:
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| i ,
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| Plant operations area (paragraph 3): ]
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| Operators were alert in tripping unit 1 in response to a loss of the 1B main feed pump (paragraph 3.b.2). b l core physics curves in use resulted in a failure to achieve criticality during restart. Upon the failure to achieve l
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| . criticality, operators took the appropriate immediate action returmng the reactor plant to Mode 3 (para 3.b.4). !
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| J Maiana== ara and Surveillance area (paragraphs 4 and 5):
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| Surveillances continued to be performed in a professional manner. Operations, Maintenance and Technical Staff personnel response to IA emergency diesel generator speed oscillations was timely and appropriate. Observed mainannara activities were performed well.
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| Engineering area:
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| 4 Reactor Engineering support to Operations during the Unit I restart efforts was good. h self-a-maar
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| ; - performed in the wake of the failure to achieve criticality was thorough and technically sound (paragaphs 3.b.4).
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| 4 d Page 1 of 6
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| EXCERPTS IR 9441 4
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| Engineering support in response to the inadvertent load shed event and emergency diesel generator speed oscillations was good (paragraph 3.b.5).
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| .I Plant Support area:
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| 1 13censee activities in the areas of Health Physics, Security, and housekeeping continue to be carried out in a ,
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| professional manner. l In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.........
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| l
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| : 2. Plant Status and Activities i
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| 2.a. Unit 1 Unit I began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 9, the unit was manually .
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| , tripped in response to a loss of the IB MFWP (see paragraph 3.b.2). Safety systems respaadarl normally, ;
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| however difficulties were encountered with both 1A and IB MFWP operation. As a result, RCS temperature
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| }. .
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| was mainaminarl with the use of the 1 A and IB AFWPs.
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| On January 10, a reactor startup was c ~ +i, however criticality was not achieved upon reaching an ARO condition (see paragraph 3.b.3). N unit was returned to Mode 3 and the licensee discovered that the core physics curves in use for the startup were inadequate to correctly predict criticality for the existing time in core life.' 'Ibe ermt was conservative. [
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| At 4:25 p.m. on January 10, a reactor startup was commanced einploying improved core physica data, and
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| ^
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| criticality was achieved at 6:16 p. m. (see paragraph 3.b.4). 'Ibe balance of the startup occurred mor .mily, and j . the unit was tied to the Brid at 10:00 p.m. ,
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| 2.b. Unit 2 Unit 2 began the inspection penod at 10015 and operated without major load changes for the entirety of the inspection period.
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| : c. NRC Activity....... !
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| J 3. Review of Plant Operations (71707) 3.a. Plant Tours.....
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| ' 3.b. Plant Operations Review
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| : 1) b inspectors penodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.......Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed.
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| During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following tagout (clearance). ,
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| l
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| * 2-94-01-009 2A Charging Pump Isolation for Maintenance ]
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| 1
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| : 2) Unit 1 Manual Trip At 7:40 p.m. on January 9, unit 1 operai ,rs manually tripped the reactor when the IB 1 Main Feed Pump tripped, leaving the unit with inadequate feedwater flow. Safety-related equipment operated I
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| ; properly. 'the resident inspectors responded to the trip and confirmed satisfactory unit operation, h licensee noted that the SOER recorded a MFP low flow trip, but was unable to determme that a low flow l N' Page 2 of 6 ,
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| EXCERPTS IR 9441 t- / condition had been present. 'Ibe low flow trip circuit involved the use of a flow switch and a time delay relay l (10 seconds) to cause a pump trip. As no obvious cause for a low flow condition could be identified (e.g., no h pump trip), the licensee suspected that an IAC problem may have been the cause of the MPP trip.
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| 'the licensee inspected and tested the flow switch and relay in question, but could not determine that they were the cause.of the MPP trip. As a precautionary measure, the licensee replaced the subject ea-pa==*= and performed an ' autopsy" on the removed s---;- ---* No failure mechanism was identified. b licensee also ,
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| performed continuity and ground checks of the IB MPP circuit breaker and its control circuitry and monitored low flow trip circuitry during IB MFP runs prior to unit restart. 'Ibese efforts did not reveal possible causes ,
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| for the pump trip.
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| The inspectore concluded that operators were alert in respondmg to the MFP loss. Additionally, the inspectors ,
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| concluded that the llamanaa performed an adequate post-trip review.
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| : 3) Unit 1 F :Im to Mi-ve Crisiaaliev On January 10, operators tu =8 a reactor startup of Unit 1. l 4
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| Apphenble y.-:-- in effect at the time were:
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| I
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| -* OP 10030122, revision 50, " Reactor Startup"
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| * Op 1-0030126, revision 13, "Esaimarad Critical Conditions and Inverse Count Rate Ratio'- ,
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| 1 h ECC wodsheet prepared for the startup determinad the required boron concentration for a critical CEA position of 60 laches on regulating group 7. OP 10030126 specifies a 500 pcm reactivity tolerance for criticality, and the CEA position selected ensured that an ARO condition would be experienced prior to exceeding 500 pcm above the estimated critical CEA position. 'Ibe reactor failed to achieve criticality at the N ==ti==aad critical CEA position and, upon reaching ARO conditions, the reactor :=aminad suberitical. Upon the i failure to achieve criticality, operators took the appropriate imma&aaa action and returned the reactor plant to
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| ';. D Mode 3.
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| b licensee concluded that the failure to achieve criticality was the result of performing the ECC worksheet f
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| i with core physica curves which were soon to be revised due to core burnup. h curves in effect for the startup were calculated based upon 200 EPPH core burnup. 'Ibe core burnup at the time of the ECC was 4601 EPPH.
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| 'Ibe Reactor Engineering Supervisor stated that it had been the practice of reactor engineering to issue physics i
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| curves at intervals of 200,5000,9000 and 11467 EFPH. 'Ihis periodicity was considered conservative from the
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| . standpoint of shutdown margin calculations, as core reactivity would be conservatively bounded by the curves.
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| I ~ Reactor Engineering subsequently submitted 5000 EPPH curves to the FRG for review. Following FRG review, the curves were issued to the control room.
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| Reactor Engineering performed a self-a==amamaar in light of the failure to achieve criticality. b self
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| -t concluded that core physics curves should be issued on a more frequent basis. In the short term, a
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| !- 2500 EPPH periodicity was specified. A longer term approach, involving establishing curves with periodicities based upon reactivity effects with burnup, was also described. 'Ibe self ===a== ment also addressed the issue of timeliness in the issuing of curves. 'the self a-=aar & si that a family of physics curves (vice a 4 '
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| 4 single burnup set) should, in the future, be submitted to the FRG for review to ensure timely di== amination.
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| 'the inspector concluded that Reactor Engineenng's approach to resolving this issue was thorough and technically sound.
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| : 41 Unit 1 Rastart 'the inspector observed pcrtions of the Unit 1 reactor criticality achieved at 6:16 p.m. on
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| - January 10. 'Ibe ECC worksheet completed for this restart was based upon the 5000 EFPH core physics curves
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| .n discuaned above. Criticality was achieved, without incident, within the 500 pcm reacMy solerance required by Page 3 of 6 i I
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| i F
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| f EXCERPTS 1R 9441 j '
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| i the ECC worirsh==t. 1he inspector noted that appropnate operator and management attention was directed toward the evolution and that a 1/M plot was being -- '-" and refeeenced, as required by procedure.
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| i As criticality was achieved, the inspector noted an operator completing an ECC workabeet for an 6:00 p.m.
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| criticahty and that this ECC worksheet was employed in obtaining and recording criticality physics data. AAer the startup, the inspector reviewed OP 10030126 and noted that step 4.14 stated that an ECC worksheet should l
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| ' be considered valid for a period not to exceed one-half hour before or one-half hour aAer the time entered on l :
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| the wortral==# for the planned criticality. The inspector verified that ECC worksheets had been prepared for l' l criticalitise at 4:30 p.m. (covering criticality from 4:00 to 5:00 p.m.),5:30 p.m. (covering criticality from 5:00 '
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| to 6:00 p.m.), and 6:00 p.m. (covering criticality from 5:30 to 6:30 p.m.), although the 6:00 p.m. data was not l
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| i - -- ' ^ ' before the criticality at 6:16 p.m.. The inspector concluded that a valid ECC woriral=at did not exist ?
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| 2- for the 6:16 p.m. criticality......
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| b inspector concluded that the failure to prepare an ECC woriral=ae for the time of criticality represented
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| ; insufficient planning on the part of the operators performing the approach to criticality. Additionally, the
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| : Inspector found that the lack of procedural guidance relatmg to such a situation indicated a waalrna== in OP l-0030126.1he inspectors will continue to follow the lie ===a's actions on this issue.
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| : 5) T avartant -a e-a of 1 A3 4160 Volijias On January 13, operators performed a surveillance test on the ;
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| lli 1 1A3 4160 V safety bus which resulted in an inadvertent load shed of the bus and a starting and loading of the i l
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| I!- 1 A EDO. The surveillance in question was performed in ,is./ c.a with AP l 0010125A, Rev 32, l
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| ' Surveillance Data Sheets," Data Sheet 33, 'Punctional Test of Degraded Grid Voltage.' '
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| I i
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| j Por the bus in question, load shed and EDG start was initiated for conditions of low voltage by closing two 3 m series-wired contacts; one associated with the 2X-1 relay and one associated with the 2X-2 relay.1hese relays were energiand by contacts from two relays sensing low bus voltage. For the surveillance test in question, an j j m c.)
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| : i. e\ / operator was to select a low voltage relay for testing by placing a switch in a position u-. ,.e.c.f.ing to the nelay 1 to be tested.1he operator was then to push a test button and observe a blue lamp to light and then extinguish.
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| f
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| ' This action would indicate that the relay had performed satisfactorily. When the ope,rator performed these
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| ' l
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| - actions for undervoltage relay 2X-1, the blue lamp did not light and the operator assumed that the relay had failed its surveillance test........b licensee determined that the cause for the load shed events was a sticking l_
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| j contact from the 2X 2 relay.1his contact had remained closed following a previous relay actuation and, when combined with the jumpering of the series-wired contact from relay 2X 1, satisfied the two-out of-two logic
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| . requirement for load shed and EDG start. Additionally, the licensee discovered that relay 2X-1 had not failed its surveillance test; rather, the test circuit which should have energized the blue lamp was affected by the
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| . sticking which had taken place in the 2X-2 relay.
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| I Following the second load shed, the 2X-2 relay reset and functioned normally.1he licensee attempted to
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| - recreate the sticking in the 2X-2 relay but could not. Engineers from the licensee's Electrical Maintananca 2- group explained that the procedure governing the performance of this test was to be revised to include direction to employ the test circuit so as to ascertain that no relays were stuck before, during, or aAer the test.
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| i b inspectors e===laarl the licensee's conclusions with regard to the events described and concluded that the
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| [ licensee had correctly identified the camponent responsible for causing the inadvertent load shed. The inspectors will follow Ik -- ; ,,---:=' procedural changes.
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| 4 c. Technical Specification C- :-f== j i
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| :1 Ucensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified. This included the review of selected surveillance test ;
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| results..... The inspectors ' verified that related plant procedures in use were adequate, complete, and included !
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| I' M Page 4 of 6 0
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| ,v-- , ,,v--- -
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| . - -~ -. - . . . _ - - . - -. _. . . - -- - . .. .-.- .
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| l.
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| o ,
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| 4
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| '. EXCERPTS IR 94-01 the most recent revisions.
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| [4 qvf
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| ~
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| : d. Physical Protection
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| , %e inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being impien=nted....
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| In conclusion, operators were slert in responding to the loss of MPP IB. During restart, the' core physics curves in use resulted in a failure to achieve criticality. Upon the failure to achieve criticality, operators took the ,,g ;. i===Almaa action and returned the reactor plant to Mode 3. Reactor lingineering support to Operations during the subsequent utartups was good and corrective actions resulting from self amma=== ant were ,
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| thorough. During the successful Unit I restart, the ECC period of validity was exceeded due to inadequate prior planning.
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| , 4. Surveillance Observations (61726)
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| Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements .... De following surveillance tests were observed:
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| : 1) OP 1-22000$0A "1A Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General Operating Instructions" l t
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| * s b inspector ebeerved the , % - - e of this surveillance test, which included a semi anuud verification that the EDO, when started from the control room, achieved rated speed within 10 seconds %e. inspector noted that, while the EDO did reach rated speed within the required time, speed fluctuated about the 60 Hz (900 rpm) j q value for approximataly 1 minute before settling out at the appropriate speed.
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| ) y y- Operators felt that the oscillations were atypical of EDG performanca and chose not to the load the EDO while v
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| the oscilladons were in progress. b operators co==micated their concerns to Maintananca and Technical Staff engineers and discussed the issue with the Operations Supervisor, and during consultations noted that OP l-2200050A locludes a precaution that such oscillations may occur aRer a fast start. He lic==ae stated that the noted behavior has been witnessed in past starts and that the cause may be due to cold governor oil temperature.
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| Once loaded, the EDO performed satisfactorily.
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| i ne inspector found the operators' performance to be good during the surveillance, with appropnate concern directed toward the noted EDG performanca. Additionally, Maintenance and Technical Staff engineering support to the operators was timely.
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| : 2) OP 24)700050 "Auxihary Feedwater Periodic Test' He inspector observed a surveillance test of the 2C steam driven AFP. During the test, V(yrES testing was performed on MOV 08-13 per MP-0940080, Rev 0, ' VOTES Differential Pressure Testing on Motor Operated Valves'. De VCrrES testing was part of an ongoing trending effort of the performance of MOV-08-13. De valve has experienced high stroking forces in the past (see IR 93-18), and the licensee initiated the trendmg as a
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| . - part of their response to the issue.
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| De surveillance and VCyrES tests were performed satisfactorily, with VOTES testing indicating slight increases in pullout and differential pressure forces over previous values. %ese forces, however, ra==laad well within
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| ), MOV operational limits. %e inspector found the testag to be controlled appropriately and noted that procedures were available locally and referred to frequently.
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| j .r m
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| .1 M Page 5 of 6
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| - - - --- - . . -. -- - - . - . - - - . ~ - ..
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| ; , EXCERFIS IR 9441 In conclusion, surveillances continued to be performed in a professional mannar. Operations, Maiasanaam and Technical Staff personnel response to 1A EDO speed oscillations was timely and appropriate. j t l
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| : 5. Maine ====em Observation (62703)
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| Station main amanace activities involving selected safety-related systens and components were observed / reviewed ]
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| ; to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements..... Work requests were reviewed to 1 detennine the status of outstandingjobs and to ensure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
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| Portions of the maintan= ace activities were observed for the following: PWO 8253/62 2A Charging Pump Repair i On January 3, the 2A charging pump was declared out of service aAer operators noted a decrease in pump r fo. - s and a metallic banging sound. b pump was dia==a=hled and main e ===ca , . " discovered a broken discharge valve for one cylinder.
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| h inspector observed portions of the repair effort and found conditions to be well-controlled. Work was proceeding in accordance with the PWO and an approved procedum for pump disassembly /r==a-hly.
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| Radiological controls were applied appropriately and a well defined parts layout area was employed.
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| l Malasanance personnel identified an additional valve which showed signs of cracking and the licensee elected to replace all cylinder suction and discharge valves.......
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| .l
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| . On January 17, the 2C charging pump was removed from service aAer operators noted a decrease in pusip y.J. -- = Mainaanance personnel disassembled the pump and found valve damage similar to that found in the 2A pump. The pump's valves and valve seats were replaced. On January 21, the 2C pump was removed )
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| - imma service when water was noted to be leaking from the pump head ama. Maintenance per=a==al i d'=====h1-t the pump and discovered that the block had cracked. b 2C charging pump was repaired and
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| : j. m%j. -
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| c returned to servlee on January 24. i 1he inspector discussed the charging pump failures with the licensee's cognizant maintenance engineer, who stated that the noted failures were due to fatigue. The maintanance engineer explainad that the two pumps had been subjected to similar wear cycles (approximately 21,600 hours for the 2A pump and approximately 19,900 hours for the 2C pump) and that the failure mechanisaw present in the pumps had been experienced in the past.
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| In conclusion, maintenance activities continued to be performed well.
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| : 6. Fire Protection Review (64704) During the course of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely examinart i facets of the Fire Protection Program..... Normally the inspectors would review transient fire loads, fla==ahle materials storage, housekeeping, control of hazardous chemicals, ignition source / fire risk reduction efforts, Are protection training, fire pmtection system surveillance program, fire barriers, fire brigade qualifications, and QA reviews of the program.
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| : 7. Onnite Followup of Events (Units 1 and 2)(93702) b trip of Unit 1, discussed in (3) above, was reviewed..... Potential generic impact and trend detection were also considered. Conclusions regardag this event are discussed in (3). ,
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| 1
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| : 8. Exit Interview The inspection eqc and findings were summarized on February 16,1994, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.....
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| Page 6 of 6 I l
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| i EXCERPTS IR 9445 3
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| f .m j
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| : k. , .
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| Report Nos.: 50-335/9445 and 50-389/9445 a .
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| .j I 3a=====: Flonda Power & Light Co' 9250 West Flagler Street
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| . Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 IJcense Nos.: DPR47 and NPF-16 I
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| 4 i. ; Facility Naans: ' St. Imcie 1 and 2
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| "-- ,
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| * Conducted. January 30 - February 26,1994
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| . Inspectors.
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| j S. A. Elrod, Sensor Resident Inspector Date Signed M. S. Miller, Resident Inspector Date Signed
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| . T. P. Johaana, Senior Pa=idant Inspector Date Signed l R. P. Schin, Project Engineer Date Signed
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| ;3 m Approved by:
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| K. D. I mades, Chief Date Signed 1T p -)
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| i- V Reactor Projects Section 2B ,
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| 'A Division of Reactor Projects
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| Scope: 'Ihis routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant operations review, maintanance observations, surveillance observations, safety system inspection, review of special reports, review of nouwtine events, and followup of previous inspection j- findings.
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| Backshift inspection was performed on February 13,16,18,19, and 22.
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| A.
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| 4 q Results:
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| Plant Operations area: Operations this period continued to be conducted in a safe and professional mannar.
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| b unit 2 reactor shutdown was planned and performed well, with good support from Reactor Engineenng and the Nuclear Fuels group (paragraph 3.b.1). b licensee's actions in response to the mispositioning of a pressuriner auxiliary spray isolation valve were timely in determination of root cause and corrective actions (paragraph 3.b.2). One Non-Cited Violation was identified: NCY 50-389/94-05-01, Mispositioned Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Isolation Valve, paragraph 3.b.2 Maint==aara and Surveillance area: Good coordination between malataaaaca, operations and health physics per=aaaal was noted. 'Ihe Unit 2 reactor veneet head lift pracaadad without incident (paragraph 5),
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| EXCERPTS IR 9445 7
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| (/ Engineering area: Engineering support to operations was noted in the Unit 2 shutdown. b creation of Nue'wr Fuels guidelines for the shutdown indicated noteworthy involvement (paragraph 3.b.1).
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| l Plant Support area: Health physics support to, and control of, outage activities was strong. A potentially
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| ; nonconservative reduction in the level of security applied to an area was noted (paragraph 3.d).
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| $ In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.......
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| : 2. Plant Status and Activities 1( )
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| 2.a. IhdL1 Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and operated at full power throughout the l
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| : j. inspection period. N unit ended the inspection period in day 45 of power operation since startup on January 10.
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| 2.b. ]J.ak2 Unit 2 began the inspection period at 98 percent power, coasting down to the cycle 8 refueling
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| ; outage. On February 13, a unit shutdown was commanced and the unit was taken off-line at 0006 February 14 (see paragraph 3.b.1).
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| t 1 During preparations for taking the pressurizer to solid water conditions and pressuruer cooldown, the licensee discovered a mispositioned valve which had rendered auxiliary spray inoperable since March,1993 (see
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| , paragraph 3.b.2). After unisolating the subject valve, the cooldown progressed without incident. On February 19, the unit was placed in reduced inventory to support outage work (see paragraph 3.b.3).
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| i ! 2.c. NRC Activity......presentationof the St. Imcie SALP report on February 17. A meeting summary for the j .
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| SAIE 7. * ** = was issued on Februasy 22,1994. Following the SAIE pr-tation on February 17, NRC
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| ===aga===' met with local officiale. Matters docussed included the importance of esmergency r. , . ' in 4 the new SAIE format and federal prioritization of evacuation routes for road funding. Meeting =**=laa= are
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| . listed in the Attachment to this inspection report.
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| ; 3. Review of Plant Operations (71707)
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| ; 3.a. Plant Touis........During routine tours, the inspectors observed an unsecured compressed gas cylinder by 1 the entrance into the Unit 1 RAB. Operators were notified, and they promptly restrained the cylinder from falling. This unsecured cylinder presented no hazard to safety equipment, but was a potential personnel hazard.
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| l, It was in the same location as an unsecured cylinder observed by the inspectors in December,1993 (IR 50-1 335,389-93-24 paragraph 3.a).
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| 'l 3.b. Plant Operations Review.....Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed.
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| l During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following tagout:
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| e 2-9442-183 ICW Pump 2A '
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| The inspectors reviewed quality assurance activities and findings concerning control room operations .....
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| The following activities were reviewed: Quality Assurance Audits ' QSleOPS-93 38 34, 33.
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| h inspector found that the audits detailed in these reports to be representative of a cross section of operational activities. Areas audited included survaillmace activities, Administrative controls of valves, locks and switches, chamletry activities, operating shift activities, jumper / lifted leads control, cleanliness, fire brigade performance, new fuel receipt and records control. No major findings involving operations activities were identified.
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| ' EXCERIrTS IR 9445
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| : i. - / (1) ReAaeling shutdown - Unit 2 N inspectoc observed portions of the unit shutdown which en -- +i on February 13......
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| li As a result of an ASI-related reactor trip experienced during the last refueling outage shutdown (see IR 92 07), .
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| the 13<===== developed a plan for reactivity ====gamant for the current shutdown. b plan involved the use of J
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| l all CEAs, inserted from their upper electrical limits (typically 136') to their TS<lefined fully withdrawn values i of 129*, to aid in the control of ASI and to maintain the worth of regulating groups during the shutdown.
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| 'Ihe inspector noted that the Nuclear Fuels group had prepared simuistions for the shutdown and had synelw=i=1 i their result into guidaliaan for operators. h guidehnes were promaalgated by Night Order. 'Ibe inspector -
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| found the shutdown to be well controlled and executed. Good comamaications between operators and support a, permanaal was noted. 'Ibe inspector considered the approach to reactivity management for the shutdown and the
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| : l. Nuclear Fuels guideline development as an innovative solution to the ASI difficulties experienced in the past.
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| Nuclear Fuels'. lavolvement in the shutdown indicated good coordination across organirationallines. i
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| !j. (2) Mispositioned Auxiliary Spray Isolation Valve - Unit 2 t i
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| On February 17, operators attempting to take the pressurizer solid through the use of auxiliary pressurimr spray found that RCS pressure did not respond as expected to manual operation of the auxiliary spray valves. Upon
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| ' investigation, the operators discovered that the pressurizer auxiliary spray manual isolation valve, V2483, was l locked closed. 'Ihey opened the valve and restored auxiliary spray. V2483 is Incaead inside the pressunser cubicle in enataia=aat It provides isolation between the pressurizer and the two parallel muniliary spray valves 1 which are operated from the control room. Operating procedures required V2483 to be locked open during Unit l
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| .m 2 operation. During the time it had been improperly locked closed, Unit 2 had operated at power with the a
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| [.y munillary spray inoperative.......
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| n h lica==a candac*ad an investigation of the circumstances and found that the valve had been locked closed on March 13,1993, as part of a clearance supporting pressurizer instrumant nozzle ==taeanaaca On March 27, 1993, the valve was eleased from the clearance and was initialed to have been locked open. Additionally, the l licensee's valve lineup following maintenance indicated that the valve had been verified locked open, as had a )
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| quarterly surveillance last performed in March,1993 (no additional surveillance verifications were performed on ;
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| the valve, as it was located in a high radiation *igh temperature location during plant operations). b licensee j j* thus conservatively concluded that the valve had been mispositioned since March 27,1993. I 1
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| l Unit 2 UFSAR, section 5.4.7.5, states that the reactor may be taken from normal operation to cold shutdown
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| ' conditions using only safety-grade equipment, and that redundancy exists such that the cooldown may proceed assuming a single failure. 'Ihis section also includes options for the depressunzation of the primary plant for conditions of no offsite power and the loss of one emergency power train. "Ihese safety-related options include:
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| o Charging pumps and auxiliary spray powered from the operable emergency power train
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| * Depressurization by alternately charging (to raise pressurizer level) and cooldown with atmospheric dump valves (to lower pressurizer level)
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| * Use of the PORVs in conjunction with charging flow to reduce primary pressure.
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| 'Ibe mispositioning of V2483 rendered the first of these options inoperative from the time it was mispositioned.
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| h inspector reviewed 2-EOP-15, ' Functional Recovery,' and found that the aaraad option was a=hadied in section 5.5, 'RCS Pressure Control," in " Success Path 4: Steam Generator Heat Removal.' In this procedure, ata==ing the steam generators was employed as a manas to reduce RCS pressure, assummg natural circulation flow conditions were observed. Step 2 of this success path required that pressunzer level be maintained i
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| v EXCERPTS IR 94-05
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| 1 / between 10 and 70 percent during this evolution. Although the chargmg pumps were not specified as the means
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| , of maintaining level, their use was later directed in subsequent steps to counteract lowered pressurizer level during RCP restart and to eliminate vessel head voiding...... i
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| 'Ibe third option ramminart a viable alternative while V2483 was mispositioned, as the PORVs were safety grade and were powered from separate emergency power sources. Further, this method of 4-*t- was
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| : explicitly described in 2-EOP-15, section 5.5, " Success Path 5: PORVs'......
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| 4 f h licensee promptly submitted a voluntary LER (LER 389/94-01) as a result of this event. In addition, the .
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| 4 4 lie == counseled and disciplined the non-lican=arl operators involved with the valve mispositioning, deteramed "
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| by probabilistic risk analysis that there was no significant risk lacrease with the loss of auxiliary spray, '
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| l determinadthat Unit I could not be similarly affected since it has no similar valve, performed a walkdown of
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| , accessible Unit i valves per the quarterly surveillance for valve position verification, and will complete a
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| ; walkdown of Unit 2 valves before restart.
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| h inspector concluded that the ability to perform a cooldown from normal operating conditions using ;
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| l' redundant, safety grade equipment was not lost due to the mispositioning of V2483. Further, the inspector ;
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| found that the licensee's investigation was thorough and initial corrective actions were adequate. h '
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| mispositioning of V2483 was a violation of NRC requirements and licensee procedures. ' Ibis violation will not be subject to enforcamaar action hacanaa the licasee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Poli' c y. 'this is a closed Non-Cited Violation, )
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| 4 NCV 50 389/94-05 01, Mispositioned Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Isolation Valve.
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| 3 (3) Reduced Inventory Operations - Unit 2
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| ) Unit 2 entered a reduced RCS inventory condition to support the Unit 2 refueling outage on February 19,1994.
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| h following items were observed on February 18/19 in preparation for this evolution...... Additionally,
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| . operators verified that the reactor had been suberitical for a minimum of 120 hours and that two containm=r
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| ! fan coolers were in operation, as required by procedure. 'lhe inspector found operator knowledge of the
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| ; upcoming evolution to be good.
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| In conclusion, operations this period continued to be conducted in a safe and professional manner. 'Ihe Unit 2
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| ; reactor shutdown was planned and performed well, with good support from Reactor Engineering and the
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| , Nuclear Puels group. 'Ihe licensee's actions in response to the mispositioning of a pressurizer auxiliary spray
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| - isolation valve were timely in determination of root cause and corrective actions. b submittal of a voluntary LER was a noteworthy initiative.
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| 4 3.e. Technical Specification Compliance Licensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified.....
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| 3.d. Physical Protection 4
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| h inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being 8
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| _,- _i....While touring the RCA on February 16, the inspectors noted that a normally locked door to an equipment area was open without a guard posted. 'Ibe equipment in the subject area was required to be operable per TS, and was the only TS-operable train for the function it performed. b licensee had relaxed access controls to the area in question, as well as other normally locked areas, as a function of the refueling outage. 'Ibe inspector reviewed the licensee's safeguards plans and applicable implementing procedures and
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| . . found that the licensee's actions were performed in accordance with these documents.
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| EXCERPTS IR 94-05 '
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| . 0.,V As the licensee's acela== in this issue conformed to their approved ' y- t plan, the inspector concluded that a gcp
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| * deficiency did not exist. However, the inspector referred the details of the occurrence to NRC regional permanaal for consideration as a generic concern. ,
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| ' 4. Surveillance Observations (61726)
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| Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements......
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| Portions of the following surveillance tests were observed:
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| . t 4.a. OP 2-0400050, Periodic Test of the Engmeered Safety Features
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| ;a b Periodic Test of the Engineered Safety Features was p.'w d the week of February 14. Specifically, the i
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| inspectors observed the performance of:
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| * Section 8.2, 'Ime of Offsite Power / Safeguards Actuation with DGs in Standby Condition
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| * Section 8.5, ' Diesel Generator 453 KW Load Rejection Test
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| . Section 8.9, ' Synchronize both dos to the Grid' j'
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| * Section 8.10, "E i :y Boration, Gravity-Feed Valve Test' N inspectors found the observed tests to be characterized by professional conduct on the part of operators and
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| -j- data takers. Pre-test briefings were appropnate to the scope of the tests, and included input from both the ANPS conducting the test and plant snanagement. Due to the broad scope of the tests, extensive coordsaaden j was required between operators, data takers, and support pemonnel. Centrol of coordmation functions was well n=inantaad in the control :oom, with good.~--wions between operators and test engineens Control:com access and noise levels were also well controlled.
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| [ 3
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| ; With respect to the SIAS/CSAS/CIS/ LOOP integrated ESF test (section 8.2), plant equipment performed as designed, with the following exceptions: 1 1
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| * 'Ibe 2BB Battery Charger did not load onto the emergency bus during the integrated SIAS/CSAS/CIS/IDOP portion cf the test. During a subsequent LOOP test, the component loaded onto the bus as designed. 'Ibe
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| - lica==aa is continuing to investigate the failure and the inspectors will follow the licensee's actions.
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| '[ * 'Ibe 2B Charging Pump loaded onto the emergency bus immediately, as opposed to loading with components
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| ;! on the 5 =arnad load block as per the design. b licensee has hypothesized that the cause may be that the SIAS signal caused the pump to sequence onto the bus before the LOOP and that a malfunctioning relay msy have prevented load shed, thus resulting in immediate pump restart upon reenergization of the emergency
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| !' . buses, b inspectors will follow the licensee's actions to determine root cause for this occurrence.
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| MFIV HCV-09-1 A was not included in the test, as the valve failed to reopen following the A MSIS actuation test. The licensee was troubleshooting the failure at the end of the inspection period, and the valve is to be i retested prior to resumption of operations. The inspectors will follow the licensee's actions.
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| , l 4.b. OP l 0110050, Control Element Assembly Periodic Exercise ,
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| i This test was performed satisfactorily on February 24. However, the inspector noted a procedural human factors wa=Laaan involving unclear procedural steps and notes in the retum-to-normal portion of the procedure.
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| Operators showed appropnate caution in intespreting the procedure, and the licensee was preparing a procedure
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| ;- revision at the close of the inspection period.
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| !^ i EXCERPTS IR 9445
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| : f. 4.c. OP 24700028, Auxiliary Feedwater Thrbine Machanical and Electrical Overspeed Trip Tests 4.d. OP 24700050, Auxiliary Feedwater Periodic Test
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| ; 4.e. OMP M-0705, Main Steam Safety Valve Maintananca and Setpressure Testing j h inspectors noted very good licensee control and coordination of OP 2 0700028, OP 2-0700050, and GMP M 0705. During the latter, the licanmaa tested the setpressure of all 16 of the Unit 2 main steam safety valves. l N as-found ,
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| z; for eight of *he 16 valves did not meet the test acceptance criteria (each liRed at too high a pressure). Aher retesting and adjuarmant, the as-left c;-- - were all within the specified ranges.
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| The inspectors will review the licensee's NCR and safety analysis of these test results. l l
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| l In conclusion, licensee performance of surveillances this period showed good planning and w./J don. b success of the lategrated ESP testing wu noteworthy in both technical and w d-andw:ontrol areas. One
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| _procedural waaknam was identified (involving CEA exercising), and the licensee promptly took steps to improve
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| :; }g the subject procedure.
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| 4 ~5. Maintan= ara Observation (62703) j a
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| ); Station maintar.ance activities involving selected safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed j 1' to ascertain that they were conducted in w.J cs with requirements.....'Ibe inspector observed the following ,
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| overhaul activity during the ongoing Unit 2 outage: Reactor Vessel Head Lift... 'Ibe inspector was present for the lift of the unit 2 reactor vessel head to support refueling. Good coordination between maintanance, l operations, and health physics personnel was noted. b lift proceeded without incident.
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| .) 6. Fire Protection Review (64704) i(; c' j ', During the course of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely examined facets of the Fire Protection Program..... l
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| : 7. Review of 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations (37001)
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| b NRC Senior Project Manager for St. lacie 1 & 2 performed an audit of several (6) of PCMs reported by I j the beensee to the NRC by {{letter dated|date=December 13, 1993|text=letter dated December 13,1993}}......h audit found the PCMs files complete sad
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| _j comprehannive, b Safety Evaluations were well written and followed " Guidance for Performing 10 CPR 50.59 Safety Evaluations.' 'Ihe audit found no violations or deviations.
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| i E' t. Exit Interview l
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| . b laspection scope and findings were summarized on February 25,1994, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.....NCV 389/94-05-01 closed Mispositioned Pressurizer Auxiliary 4
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| h 4- .- EXCERPTS IR 94-06 .
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| , ;- .( i/ l Docket Nos. 50 335, 50-389 - l Ucense Nos.' DPR47, NPF-16 h' .
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| Florida Power and Usht Company ATIN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg President . Nuclear if ,
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| P.O. Box 14000 -
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| Juno Beach, FL 334084420 '
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| Gaasta-ma:
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| ==SUBJECT:==
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| NRC INSPECI1ON REPORT NO. 50-335/9446 AND 50-389/94-06
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| ' his refers to the inspection cwW by G. MacDonald and R. Moore of this office on February 28 - March
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| * 4,1994. De inspection included a review of activities authorized for your St. Ixcie facility. At the conclusion
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| - of the inspection, the findags were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed
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| i- report.
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| ;; Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection -i=#ad of selective examiamelons of gw.am and representative records, laterviews with personnel, and observation of -
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| activitise in progress.
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| h seclosed Inspection Report Irlantifies activities that violated NRC require, nts that will not be subject toi
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| ' enforcement action because the licensse's efforts in identifying and/or correcting the violations met the criteria 9 , specified in Section VII.B. of the Enforcement Policy..............
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| 'ij- Mp]; % e Sincerely, 4 4 orisinal alsned by,
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| *^ 1. 3. Blake/for
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| ; 1 Caudie A. Julian, j ,; Chief,Engmeering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety I
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| : Enclosurei NRC Inspection Report ,
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| !i Report Nos.: 50-335/9446 and 50-389/9446 Ucensee. Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 Ucense Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16 i
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| 'i Facility Name: St. Imcie 1 and 2 i -1 , :+=_ Conducted: February 28 - March 4,1994
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| ... Inspectors: G. MacDonald, Reactor Inspector Date Si;ned: 3/18/94
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| i EXCERFI'S IR 94-06
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| / R. Moore, Reactor Inspector Date Signed: 3/24/94 :
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| Approved by: M. Shymiock, Chief Date Signed: 3/24/94
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| ; Plant Systems Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| Scope: .
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| 'Ihis routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of Electrical Maintenance and Station Blackout Implamaatarina.. Additionally,E.-s,, y Diesel Generator sequencer relay inspections, modifications, and the Unit 2 protective relay refurbishment activities were reviewed.
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| :i Results:
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| 4 Electrical cowoctive maintenance items reviewed adequately implemented regulatory requirements for safety related elee ical equipment with the exception of the items described in non-cited violations (NCV) 50-335/94- i 0641 an/ ' '/ 50-389/944642. ]
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| Noncited violation 50-335/944641 was identified for failure to make a required report in accordance with the .j plant technical specifications. 'Ibe IB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) failure of April 24,1992 was not reported to the NRC. (12.2) Nons:ited violation 50-389/944642 was identified for the licensee's failure to m implement adequate design controls in Plant Change Modification (PC/M) 87-292. PC/M 87-292 changed the i
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| j . charging pumps and boric acid make-up pumps EDG sequencer load block assignment. (T 2.3) 7 J a w
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| . 'Ihe licaamaa implemented the staff recommandatiana identified in the Station Blackout (SBO) Supplemental i Safety Evaluation (SSE). SBO procedures and training were implemented, b unit cross-tie modification testing demonstrated that Unit 2 EDGs could provide power to Unit 1. <
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| 'Ibe licensee's periodic inspections of the safety related General Electric HFA relays have improved the HFA i I
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| i relay reliability as evidenced by the reduced number of HPA relay failures in the Idest Unit 2 Integrated
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| ' .; safeguards test. Further, the licensee was in the process of replacing these problem relays. PC/M 183-293 replaced six Unit 2 HPA relays with pull-to-lock switches which will anhance the operators ability to accomplish j the unit cross-tie evolution within the required 10 minute period.
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| h Unit 2 protective relay refurbishment activities were adequately controlled. b relay refurbinhawats
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| ' implemented corrective action for a previously identified hardware deficiency.....
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| 2.0 Electrical Mainiananca (IP 62705) 1 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance activity on safety related electrical systems. A sample of maintenance docu=matation between 1991 and 1994 was selected from the 480 VAC,120 VAC, and EDG systems. Aspects of maintenance activity reviewed included pics. t of parts and equipment, equipment failuse cause analysis, and post maintenance testing. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed EDG failure reporting over this time period and implementation of Plant Change Modification (PC/M) 87-292. ' Ibis PC/M transferred the Unit 2 charging pumps and boric acid make-up (BAMU) pumps from the 5 minute EDG sequencer load block to the zero load block.
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| . EXCERPTS 1R 94 06
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| .2.1 De following (52) mainemaa== work orders (WOs) were reviewed..... l Task descriptions provided adequate guidance for work activity with references for specine procedures and ;
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| speciRed mquired post maintenance testing. Measuring and test equipment was appropriately docu=a hi for ,
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| ia traceability and veriAcation of calibration. De work orders included doennwaration which verified that j~ api-* parts and equipesnt were procured at the appropriate material quality levels. The inspectors
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| ! *aarkdad that the above west orders C1 ^:', daa==ented electrical vaal=4a=== activities. As
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| .; ,- diar ===ad in the following ja g a *; " failure analysis was adequately n==nplished.
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| De Inspectors noted several occurrences of 480 VAC molded case circuit breaker (MCCB) failures which were attributed to a broken handle --hanism, e.g. WO 92045270 and WG 93006036. De licensee initiated a root l cause investigation of this General Electric (GE) MCCB failure mechanism in 1991 thmugh a failure analysis j' contractor and corresponded with the vendor, GE. Report No. FPI-91 169. Root Cause Investigation of GE MCCB Pallure, concluded the cause was a manufacturing defect. b vendor disagreed with this conclusion ,
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| and indicated the failure was attributable to breaker aging and a high number of manual operations. Although
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| ; the licensee had not resolved the issue, the investigation activity dennonstrated appropriate involvement in f equipmerit failure cause analysis. ,
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| ; 2.2 EDO Failure Reporting
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| ! De inspectors reviewed the Station EDO operating logs for the 1991 - 1994 period to determine if EDO failures had been identified in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.108, Periodic Testing of themel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants, revision 1, and reported to
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| - the NRC as required by the licensee's Technical Specifications (TS). During the inspection entrance meetag on ,
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| Febmary 28,1994, the lioaaaaa informed the inspectors that they had reviewed EDO docu==ntation the j m
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| ,-j j j previous week and identified an EDG failure which had not been reported to the NRC as required by TS l l v 4.8.1.1.3, Reports. De failure occurred April 24,1992, and was identified as a valid failure on the 1B EDO. l He licensee issued a special report dated March 1,1994, to Comply with the TS reporting requirement. l
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| ( 1 l .
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| N inspectors aview of the EDO loss did not identify another unreported EDO failure. b failures which, l had occurred were categorized in accordance with RG 1.108. All EDG failures, including the non-reported j failure of April 24,1992, were accounted for in EDG reliability deternunations for SBO and surveillance j
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| ! intesvals. b li 's failure to report the April 24,1992, failure was a violation of regulatory requirements l l[ as implemented by TS 4.8.1.1.3, Reports b inspectors reviewed the licensee's identification and correction !
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| ii of this violation to determine if the NRC Enforcement Policy criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section )
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| f 1 VII B for non-cited violations had been met. De violation was identified by the licensee. It was not a
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| -l' violation which could have been prevented by corrective actions for a previous finding in the past two years.
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| b corrective action was accomplished within a reasonable length of time, and the violation was not willful. I
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| 'l %is item is thified as non-cited viahtiaa NCV 50-335/94-06-01 Failure to Report EDO Failure as Reauired by Technical Specifications.
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| 2.3 Plant Change / Modification (PC/M) 87-292 h inspectors reviewed the licensee's Unit 2 modification which transferred the charging pumps and BAMU
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| ' frosa the 5 minute sequencer load block to the mro load block. PC/M 87-292, Place the CVCS Charging l Pumps and BAMU on the EDG Zero Imad block, revision 0, was installed during the Unit 2 outage of April,
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| ; 1992. During operator simulator training on July 23,1992, the licensee discovered that this modification
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| ; introduced an unanalyzed charging pump common mode failure. Unit 2 was in mode I at 100 percent power. j De failure occurred during a loss of offsite power (LOOP) in conjunction with a safety injection actuation
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| ; l
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| .N/ Page 3 of 7 I
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| II -
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| EXCERPTS IR 94-06 1
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| . [,N- l
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| !:j e signal (SIAS). Both chargmg pumps tripped due to a pump stop signal from the charging pump recirculation val i which occurred 180 =aranda aRer the SIAS pump start as the valve cycled to the full open position. ' Ibis l
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| l recirculation valve trip signal was a feature unique to Unit 2.
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| l
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| 'the licensee initiated In-House Event Report (IER; 92 044 on July 23,1992, and Problem Report (PR) JB 4 008 on August 3,1992 to address this issue. A Substantial Safety Hazard Determianhon (SSHD) analysis was also initiated on July 31,1992 via REA SLN-92135, to evaluate the impact of the delayed charging flow on the Unit 2 accident analysis, b IER and PR determined that the problem was not reportable or safety signincant l==ca-= the charging pump flow could be restored annually from the control room in eight . 3=naa= = which was
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| ;j within the ten minute period allowed in the small break !mf-coolant accident (SBIACA) analysis.' 'Ibe l1 SBIDCA was the only accident analysis which included charging pump input. The SSl4D coccluded that the peak cladding temperature would ra==la substantially below the limits specified in 10 CFR 50.46.
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| 4 The PR concluded that the cause of the problem was design error in that the control widag diagrams were not r' ; ' ', reviewed for this anodification. The PR specified the following (6) corrective actions ....
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| *Ihe inspectors verined that the above corrective actions had been implamantart. 'Ibe chargas pump and BAMU ll were sturned to the 5 minute load block via PC/M 87-292, supptamane 1, on August 4 and 5,1992.
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| E,,'- t 2 to PC/M 87-292 dated December 17,1992. was developed but not installed. ' Ibis PC/M l { '.
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| )i supplement will transfer the pumps and BAMU to the zero load block and resolve the recirculation valve timing jf problem Post ==ineaamara testing for this change included the requirement for simulator testing of the circuit.
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| i Quality Instruction, QI 3.1-3, Engineering Packages, revision 8, implemented the program requirement for
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| ===lasar testing of complex logic circuit changes before plant installation of the change. b TAP report included PR JB-92 008. With the exception of the Implementation of the PC/M suppiamaar 2 load block i change, the above corrective actions were completed.
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| t,
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| * l w 'this design error was a violation of 10 CPR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The lle===*'s
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| ,; V seemsures for design verification and post modification testing failed to identify the design error and an
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| '- f on Unit 2. The laspectors concluded that the licsasee's
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| '- . . ,,, M design change was * .
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| 4
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| ; efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the Critada specified in section VH.B of the Enfere===a Pelley for a non cited violation. This lien is identified as NCY 56-389/944642 Inadequate
| |
| -'--CL.t P---r =' =a+
| |
| p - . : C - ' i on Unit 2 "--
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| 3.0 Station Blackout Implementation (92701) k' 1 4
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| 1- 'Ihe inspectors reviewed the status of the licensee's implementation of station blackout requirements. b areas reviewed included the licensee's activities on the NRC staff recommendations in the SBO SSE, and the SBO l I
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| 1 unit cross-tie modincation. l i
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| 3.1 SBO SSE Recommendations ,
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| 4 By {{letter dated|date=May 18, 1992|text=letter dated May 18,1992}}, the NRC issued Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSE) St. Lucie, Units 1 And 2, Response To Station Blackout Rule. b SBO SSE contained 7 NRC reco-rnandations as follows:
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| : 1. C--
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| ,'- - Unit i Ventilation Studies, 2. Confirm Unit 1 RCS Inventory For SBO, 3. Complete SBO Procedures For Unit Cross-tie, 4. Confirm Unit 1 EDG Target Reliability Program Meets RO 1.155,
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| : 5. Maintain Unit 2 EDO Target Reliability at ;t .975, 6. Complete SBO EDO Load Analysis, 7. Update
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| . PSAR To laclude SBO Description.
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| 3.1.1 Ventilation Studies a
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| s
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| ! -i l
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| EXCERFTS IR 9446
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| ;D ;
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| i ;" ' N 11eaa=== propewed calculations to - -;'"- the Unit 1 ventilation studies. %* Npectors reviewed the following (4) ..lculations ...no calculated temperatums were s; 120' F for all areas analyzed and thus met the Wei- for those rooms identified as condition I rooms per section 2.7 of NUMARC 87 00, revision !
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| : 1. M worot case area was the inverter rooms with a maximum ambient : _ , m; e of115.1* P. De heensee l
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| i
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| 'j modined the controle of HVS-5A/B, RAB Electrical Equipment Room Supply Fans Tmin A/B, in PC/M 147-
| |
| < 193 to automatically load as SBO loads. His will result in reducing the temperatures in the RAB electrical f equipment and inverter rooms since the original analysis assumed no ventilation for 30 minutes.
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| i De contalasaaat analysis results indicated a maximum ambient temperature of 165' F which was bounded by the licensee's LOCA analysis. The licensee had addressed SSE neonunendation number 1 above ngarding l
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| ,i j
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| l} Unit 1 venellation studies, 3.1.2 RCS Inventory
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| \
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| %e licensee completed calculation PSlelPJP-92 042, revision 0, regarding SBO RCS Inventory Analysis. %e results indicatal that the RCS inventory would maintain the core covered during the four hour cooling duration.
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| The liea=== bad addressed SSE raca===ada*ian Nanber 2 above regarding Unit 1 RCS Inventory.
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| 3.1.3 SBO Procedune De licensee prepared procedures for response to SBO. De following (4) procedures were reviewed....De i p. = -
| |
| contamed guidance for ^;-- '; SBO and instructions for SBO mitigation and restoration.
| |
| Specific instructions were included for accomplishing the unit cross-tie evolution to utilize the Unit 2 EDGs as AAC sources for a Unit I SBO. Guidance for use of Unit I EDGs as AAC sources for a Unit 2 SBO was also provided.' %e procedures raatalaad detailed EDO loading instructions including a listing of allowable EDG j KW load values to support starting of LOOP and SBO loads. ne licensee had completed training for operations personnel on the SBO procedures. De inspectors reviewed the licensed operator requalification program lesson
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| {
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| plan 0802229, Station Blackout Modification Study Guide. De guide included trainmg on SBO diagnosis, SBO mitigation, SBO unit cross-tie, and SBO restoration. De inspectors reviewed trainmg records and verified that simulator training had been conducted for operations personnel on accomplishing SBO unit cross-tie evolutions.
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| & training provided was 4 hours of classroom' instruction and 1 hour of simulator exercises. The licensee had addressed SSE recanunendation nonber 3 regarding SBO proceduns.
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| ; 3.1.4 EDO Reliability Program De inspectors reviewed the licensee's EDG reliability program to determine if the requirements of RG 1.155, I position C.I.2 were implemented. Administrative Procedure (AP) No. 0010022. E.r-.;.r.:y Diesel Generator Reliability Program, revision 0, established the program at St. Lucie. The purpose of the procedure was to track l
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| EDO rehability and provide plant management with information to ensure EDG reliability was maintained at or l
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| above SBO target reliability levels. %e procedure designated a target reliability of 0.975 with trigger values of 3,4, and 5 failures for 20,50, and 100 starts aspectively. His was consistent with the St. Lucie plant category and coping duration values. He licensee's TS surveillance test program for EDG testing meets the RG 1.155 criteria for an EDO surveillance test program. Procedure AP-0010022 designated the responsibility
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| : for monitoring EDG reliability to the EDO system engineer. De procedure additionally required periodic i reporting to managemen' of EDG reliability levels.
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| ; 3.1.5 EDC Target Reliability
| |
| ; i N inspectors reviewed the licaaaaa's reliability monitoring information and verified that existing reliability levels were measured against the target values and management was appropriately informed. Interoffice Page 5 of 7 V ;
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| __m________ i___'__._ -__- . * - - - -
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| r I
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| , ,s EXCERPTS 1R 94-06
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| ; ./
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| }
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| v ---- =sh daded June 10,1993, and December 31,1993 comamaicated EDG reliability to management. W June 10,1993 memorandum identified to the site vice president that Unit 2 EDGs met the 0.975 criteria however, Unit 1 EDGs exceeded a single trigger condition bar== of nye failures in the last 100 starts. b memorandum also included a description and results of all actions taken, as required for exceeding a single trigger value. b December 31,1993, memorandum to the Technical Support Supervisor reported that the ;
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| . EDG reliability was 0.975 and 0.99 for Units 1 and 2 respectively. l The inspectors concluded that the lhasse had developed and implanented an EOG reliability program consistent with the rete uir=====8= of RG 1.155. N He==sse had addressed SSE recommendations amnbers t 4 and 5 regarding Unit 1 EDG r=HaMHty program and Unit 2 EDG target r=HaMuty.
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| \
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| 3.1.6 EDG Imad Analysis b licensee completed steady state and transient EDO loading analyses for the EDGs. De inspectors reviewed the following (3) calculations.....De unit 1 SBO, Unit 2 NBO EDG calculation indicated an EDG loading of 4
| |
| * 3451 kw peak and 3121 kw steady state which was i the EDG Continuous rating of 3685 kw. Unit 1 SBO, Unit 2 NBO EDG transient response calculation results indicated that SBO transients would not exceed the vendor load profile. De Unit 2 SBO, Unit 1 NBO calculation indicated an EDG loading of 3302 kw steady state which was & the EDG caatismaus rating of 3500 kw. The licensee had addressed SSE me===naanimelan muniber 6 regardag EDG loeding analysis.
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| 3.1.7 PSAR Update De licensee had performed the Unit 1 PSAR update for SBO. b Unit 2 PSAR update for SBO will be included in the next periodic PSAR update. The licensee addressed SSE recommendation number 7 a<
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| %)
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| g regardag FSAR update.
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| 3.2 SBO Unit Cross-tie Modifications Ilcensee PC/M 023-190 for Unit 1 and PC/M 290-289 for Unit 2 implemented the cross-tie between units 1 and
| |
| : 2. De modification utilized existing safety related 4 kV breakers in buses I AB and 2AB to cross-tie the units.
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| b modification allowed either EDO from either unit to power either safety related bus in the opposite unit.
| |
| He modifications were performed as safety related modifications. b cross-tie modification met the requirements of RG 1.155. New material utilized for the modification was procured as safety related equipment.
| |
| A spare breaker in bus 2AB and the IC HPCI breaker in bus I AB were utilized for the cross-tie breakers. De modification installed new cable between buses I AB and 2AB and modified the breaker cubicles to serve as feeder breakers with changes to the protection and controls.
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| h inspectors reviewed the modification and verified that the new equipment had been lastalled. New meters, key-lock switches, and annunciators had been installed in each control room for breaker operation and control.
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| De inspectors reviewed breaker controls and verified that the breakers could only be operated from the contsol room. local operation was only possible with the breakers racked to the test position.
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| Review of the modification indicated that cable pull deficiencies occurred b inspector verified tha: :he deficiencies were resolved prior to post modification testing, b modification initially used an existing unsuitable relay within the breaker control circuit. His deficiency and another wiring deficiency were discovered during post modification testing. Change request notices CRN 028-190-3712 and 290-289-3713 for units 1 and 2 respectively were written to replace the relays. h post modification testing was satisfactorily completed. b testing demonstrated that the Unit 2 EDGs could energize the I AB bus via the cross-tie
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| : w. Page 6 of 7
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| EXCERIFTS IR 9446
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| ?.
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| I modification.
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| : 4. EDO Sequencing HFA Relays and PCM 183-203 (IP 62705) t - Failures of safety related GB HPA latching relays have occurred at St. Lucie. %e inspectors reviewed this issue to deternune the adequacy of licensee corrective actions. b failures were discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-335,389/93 14. The licensee has implemented periodic visual latch engagement inspections of the safety related GE HFA relays. Twenty-three relays have been inspected and 3 relays required adjustment. Test results after implementation of the latch engagement inspections have shown fewer HPA relay failures. Due to the poor reliability of the HPA relays, the licensee prepared P-C/M 183-293 to replace the GE HPA latching relays with pull-to-lock switches with slip contccts.
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| De PC/M replaced the GB HPA relays for the ICW and CCW pumps in Unit 2. De inspectors reviewed the modification package and determined that the new control scheme was adequate. b modification was in progress and the inspectors observed the installation of switches in the control room. b switches were
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| , instatied in accordance with modification requirements. Installation was adequate, however loose washers were not cleaned up after installation.
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| 1
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| ' %e post modification testing specified in the PCM was reviewed. b testing checked all control circuit interlocks and functions. %e outage schedule did not allow the inspectors to witness the testing durir.g this inspection. % resident inspectors will observe the post modification testing. h inspectors concluded that the
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| : licensee corrective action regarding safety selated GB HPA relays in Unit 2 was adequate.
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| : 5. Unit 2 Protective Relay Refurbishment (IP 62705)
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| J',--) .
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| b licensee identified a hardware deficiency regardmg protective relay internal wiring, b Unit I relays were refurbished during the Unit 1 1993 refueling outage. His issue was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-s 335,389/93-14.
| |
| b inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 protective relay refurbishment activities to determine the adequacy of licensee corrective action. All Unit 2 safety related protective relays were scheduled to be rewired or replaced during this Unit 2 refueling outage. He licensee was responsible for managing the work under their QA program with relay vendor technicians performing the relay refurbishment activities onsite.....b inspectors
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| ' i reviewed the procedures and determined that the refurbishment activities were adequately controlled by the l procedures. He inspectors witnessed refurbishment of several relays and verified that the refurbishment was conducted in accordance with the procedures and the vendor relay drawings. Adequate QC hold points were utilized and the inspectors concluded that the refurbishment activities were well controlled.
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| : 6. Exit Meeting b inspection scope and results were summarized on March 4,1994 with those individuals indicated in )
| |
| paragraph 1............
| |
| Non-Cited Violation NCV 50-335/944641. Failure to Report EDG Failure as Required by Technical Specifications Non-Cited Violation NCV 50-389/94-0642. Inadequate Design Controls on Unit 2 Sequencer Charging Pump i leading Block i
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| Page 7 of 7
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| -f.
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| EXCERPI3 IR 9448 ;
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| 5
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| / )
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| Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 l
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| i Ucense Nos. DPR47, NPF-16 4 Florida Power and Ught Company ATIN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg President - Nuclear ,
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| i F. O. Box 14000 ji . Juno Beach, FL 33408 4420 i Ganel-:
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| | |
| ==SUBJECT:==
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| NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPEC110N REPORT NOS. 50-335/9448 AND 50-389/9448)
| |
| [11 mis refers to the inspection conducted by B. Crowley and J. I =ahan of this office on March 7-11,1994. b .
| |
| inspection included a review of activities au:horiand for your St. Incie facility. At the conclusion of the
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| . Inspection, the findings were discussed with those nw=nhers of your staff identified in the ancta==I report.
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| Areas avarainad during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the laapardan. ~=al=*ai of selective evarniaanlons of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation 4 of activities in psogrees.
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| g m)
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| 's
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| ; Based on the results of this inspection, certain of your activities appeared to be in violation of NRC mi , as specified in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). Violation A is of concern tw;cause failure to evaluate non-conforming conditions e- -- _'- - the effectiveness of your corrective action program.
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| Violation B is of concern haca- failure to identify five inoperable snubbers on the pressuriser power operated y relief valve and safety relief valve discharge piping aAer the November 24,1992, watesha- event
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| ~
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| 3- -' " the structural integrity of this piping. Failure of this piping could have prevented the valves from performing their intended safety functions. h Nuclear Regulatory Commission specifically addressed the impostance of this piping under TMI Action - NUREO 0737 item II.D.1........ ,
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| Sincerely, 1[ Charles A. Casto, Acting Chief Engineenng Branch
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| [ Division'of Reactor Safety ;
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| I
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| ==Enclosures:==
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| =
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| : 1. Notice of Violation i
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| : 2. NRC Inspection Report ENCLOSURE 1 NOI1CE OP VIOLA'110N Florida Power & Ught Docket No.: 50-389 '
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| ; St. Lucie : Ucense No.:. NPF-16 ;
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| M' Page 1 of 12 l
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| i i' f g ' EXCERPTS IR 9446 o ( i i i
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| * d During an NRC inspection ea=Ae*=8 on March 711,1994, a violadon of NRC require =an*= was identified. In
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| - accordance with the ' General haa=aat of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CPR Part
| |
| ; 2, Appendix C, the violations are listed below:
| |
| i A. 10 CPR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as impl-east by Florida Power and Ught (FP&L) Topical Quality Report 1-76A, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions or
| |
| ; procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances, and shall be accomplished in wh with these instructions or procedures. FP&L M : :aeive Site Procedure ASP-8, Corrective Action, Revision 6, ,
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| .: requires that discrepancies that require an engineering evaluation be docu= age =1, evaluated and dispneitioned
| |
| ( using a Nonconfonnance Report (NCR). 'Ibe Note under Paragraph 7.2 of FP&L Admialstrative Site
| |
| ;i Procedure ASP 4, Revision 4, states that a Change Review Notice shall not be utilized in lieu of a NCR to correct deviations from design docummats.
| |
| Contrary to the above, on March 10,1994, NRC identified that a Nonconformance report had not been initiated
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| , to document a damaged pipe and pipe support end piece at pipe support number RC-4300-138. 'Ibo damaged 1
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| pipe and pipe support was repaired using a Change Review Notice which was initiated on March 5,1994 and ;
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| ;* approved on March 7,1994. 'Ibe repair work was completed prior to March 10,1994.
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| ; 'Ihis is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
| |
| h B. 10 CPR 50, Appendix B, Critenson V, as '<-- ^ ' by FP&L Topical Quality Report 176A, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by doc ==anearl instructions or procedures of a type appropnate to the cirana=*maeas, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions or procedmes.
| |
| i Contrary to the above, on March 11,1994, NRC identified that the inspection of the Safety Relief Valve (SRV) i , y and Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) discharge piping and associated pipe supports followmg the i November 24,1992, waterhammar eveat, and the engineering evaluation of the effects of the waterha-4 event on the structural lategrity of the piping, were accomplinhart without the use of documaatal lastructions or procedures. F 77tly, functional testing of snubbers completed on March 10,1994, identified that five
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| : j. '
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| snubbers on the SRV and PORV discharge piping had been inoperable since the November 24,1992, l waterhammer event.
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| t
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| :1 '!his is a Severity level IV violation (Supplement I)......
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| ! Report Nos.t 50-335/9448 and 50489/94-08
| |
| ;- Ucensee: Florida Power and ught Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 Ucense Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16 a
| |
| Facility Name: St. Imcie 1 and 2 Inapae*iaa Conducted: March 7 - 11,1994 Inspectors.
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| 1 - B. R. Crowley
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| )
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| v' Page 2 of 12 Y
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| ' EXCERPTS IR 9408 1' - Date Signed -
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| - J. J. T anahan 1 Date Signed
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| . Approved by:
| |
| . J. J. Blake, Chief.
| |
| l Date Signed I- Materials and Processes Section n-g-- -;.;g Branch Division of Reactor Safety
| |
| ?
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| Scope:
| |
| 'Ihis roudne, announced laspection was conducted on site in the areas ofInservice Inspection (ISI), !
| |
| ;. Erosion / Corrosion (E/C) Technical Specification (TS) Snubber Surveillance Program, modiRestions to ;
| |
| pressurizer relief valve discharge piping, review of the pressurizer relief tank over-pressurization event, material
| |
| . condition and housekeeping, and corrective actions for previous inspection findings.
| |
| , ' Results:
| |
| In the areas inspected, two violations (VIOs), one regarding failure to issue a nonconformance report to I(j ic
| |
| * disposition #= , = lavolving a damaged pipe and pipe support - paragraph 6, and the other regarding N taad=T==*= '-- 7-4 and evaluation of effects of a waterh===ar event on Safety Relief Valve (SRV) and
| |
| : 1. Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) discharge piping - paragraph 7, were identified. No deviations were 3
| |
| Identified.
| |
| An unresolved item was identified regarding clarification of the safety classification of the PORV and SRV discharge piping, paragraph 7.
| |
| s 1' Relative to the ISI and E/C activities, good performance was observed. The ISI program is considered to be a
| |
| [ strength. Quality ISI inspections were being performed in a professional mannar by qualified personnel in accordance with approved procedures. b licensee has a pro-active FlC program in place that should ensure j,
| |
| .I. that thinned piping is identified before failure. During this outage, the Number 4 Extraction ham piping was replaced with Chromium Molybdenum (Cr-Mo) material. b E/C program does not include small bore (2' and less in diameter) piping, but a plant study has shown that small bore piping has not been a problem However, further evaluation of the need for a small bore program is planned. b anubber surveillance program complies with Technical Specification requirements.
| |
| Strengths were identified in material condition and housekeeping.......
| |
| : 2. Inservice :- , * - Unit 2 (73753)
| |
| 'Ibe inspectore reviewed doca =aa*= and records, and observed activities, as indicated below, to determine whether Ist was being conducted in accordance with applicable y w.d.uw, ap.!.: y requirements, and Ikensee commitments. The applicable code for Unit 2 ISI is the American Society of Mechanical Engineere
| |
| , Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV) Code, Section XI,1989 Edition, b beginning date for V Page 3 of 12
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| , , .. , , _ ,.y..- - --. .-
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| EXCERFTS IR 94-08
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| ,-~.
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| ) commercial serviae was August 8,1983. %e current outage is the first outage of the first period of the Second
| |
| . Ten Year ISI interval, which began August 8,1993, and ends August 8,2003. & Second Tm Year Interval ISI Pmgram was forwarded to the NRC by FP&L letter I 93-191 dated August 4,1993. A Safety Evaluation Report (SER) has not been issued.
| |
| ISI is performed by the Corporate Code Programs Section under the direction of the Site ISI Coordinator.
| |
| Contract examination personnel perform examinations to licensee procedures and inspection program under the supervision and direction of the Code Programs Section.
| |
| 2.a. ISI Proaram Review %e inspectors reviewed the (10)151 program procedures.....
| |
| 2.b. Review of Procedures De inspectors reviewed the following (7) NDE procedures to determine whether 3
| |
| thece procedures were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments....
| |
| 2.c. Observation of Work and Work Activities b inspectors observed work activities, reviewed NDE 1 personnel qualification records, and reviewed certification records of NDE equipment / materials, as detailed below. . .. .
| |
| (1) Liquid Penetrant 8===ta=> ton (Fr): W inspectors observed the in-process FT examinnaion of weld SI-213-4 FW 1 in Zone 062-02 062......
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| (2) Magnetic Particle (MT) U===ta=*:on: b inspectors observed the in-process MT examinations of welds MS-1-FW2 and MS-1-1-SW-1-IE in Zone 065/02465-A......
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| n (3) Ultrasonic (UT) Examination: %e inspectors observed the (3) in-process UT examinations as indicated j c j beiow. . . . .. ,
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| V \
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| (4) Visual (VT) Examination: %e inspectors observed the (6) in-process VT examinations as indicated below...
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| (5) Eddy Current (ET) Examination: At the time of the inspection, the ET inspection of steam generator (SG) tubes had been completed. De inspectors randomly selected a number of tubes, listed below (9), and reviewed the ET data, including: MIZ-18 acquired data, the primary and secondary render analysis and results, resolution analysis, and calibration data (Cal SG10CCA1A0006)......
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| In addition the inspectors reviewed the overall inspection plan and the inspection results for the current outage.
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| W following summarizes the plan and results: (1) Each SG contains 8411 tubes. Prior to the current inspection,264 tubes in SG A and 194 tubes'in SG B had been plugged. (2) h initial IS inspection aample included approximately 20% of the tubes in each SG as follows....
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| In addition to the IS Bobbin Coil sample above, the original planned sample included augmented Mechanized Rotating Pancake Coil (MRPC) inspections of 25% of the hot leg tube sheet expansion transitions and 3% of the ,
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| cold leg expanelon transitions. MRPC was also used as a diagnostic examination to clarify or confirm selected (
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| Bobbin Coil indications.
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| Based on inspection results, the Bobbin Coil inspection sample was expanded to 100% of the in-service tubes in both SGs. h MRPC inspection of the hot leg tube sheet expansion transitions was also expanded to 100% of the tubes in service. He following summarizes the inspection results:
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| 1 SGA SGB l l
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| d Page 4 of 12 )
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| I l
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| - . - - ._. - - - - . - . . . - _ ~ .. - - - -
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| EXCERPTS IR 9408 p) Total Inde=*ia== 227 .167 (20% to 39% Degradstion)
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| Total t=dA 5- 1 (k 40% Degradation) .
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| .i Total'Ibbes Plugged 0 1
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| . Preventive (>35%) 1 ]
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| 2 40% Degradation 5 1 Circumferential lad. 0 2 N 2 circumferenhal ladicantana in SG B were at the hot leg tube sheet expansion transition. 'Ibe nukrity (217 in SG A and 153 in SG B) of the 2 20% indications were wear indeaeiana at the U-band diagonal i 8uPPorts.
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| (6) Personnel Q' ualification/ Certification: N inspector reviewed personnel qualification doc ====tation as
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| _[ Indicanad below for ====ia=s who perfonasd the a===ina*ia== detailed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) above...... .
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| I (7) Equipment Certification Records: Equipment / material certification records, as listed belcw, for i equipamat/ materials used in the lampartiaan detailed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) abwe were I. reviewed to ensure - , "- e with ,,"-- -M: requirements ....
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| RESULTS
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| , s In abs areas i==paeaad, no violations or deviations were identified. l jg
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| . Good , 0 was observed in abo area of ISI.- N===ia=*ia== were being aaaduasad in a consciuitions
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| *' manner by qualified personnel in accordance with approved proceduses and required Codes. All inspe:tions observed were perfonned in a quality >=anaar. . level III personnel were involved with the i==pae*ia= process.
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| Nest and anie@* records were being generated and ==l=*=iaad. Results of Er of SG tubes indicated that the '
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| j nudority of degraded tubes are degraded by wear and the increase in the number of degraded tubes is relatively
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| ' amall.
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| i
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| : 3. . Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) Program - Units 1 and 2 (49001) q
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| ; See NRC Inspection Reports 50-335,389/91-24,50-335,389/9249 and 50-335,389/93-10 for documentation of I
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| !- previous lampareiaa= in this area....'Ihe cuneet inspection evaluated various aspects of the program to determine if a defined program was in place and if it appeared the scope of the program was adequate to identify degraded piping. 'the following is a summary of the inspection activities and results:
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| . 3.a. Program Sta*us Based on discussions with licensea personnel, review of the documents listed in paragraph
| |
| ; b. below, and observation of the inspections listed in paragraph c. below, the following actions have been completed by the licensee: (1)'Ihree full time wirvi.;. cegmeers have been assigned to develop and ,
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| impament the E/C programs at St. Iancie and 'harkey Point. (2) A d=*=ilad program and ' ,' --: )
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| have been issued. (3) C-:- , . " selections for * , e'== were based on (a) EPRI CHECMA*IE Model, (b) plant exponence, (c) industry expenence, and (d) engineering judgement. j l
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| N following systems were included in the program: Main Steam, t'andan=*a (Froma the No,. 2 -l l 11 Heater to the Feedwater Pumps), . Feedwater (From Feedwater Pumps to Steam Generators),
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| Steam Generator Blowdown (Seismic), Forward Iumped Hester Drams (No. 5 HP Heater to No.
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| L Page 5 of 12 4 .
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| l
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| f 1
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| EXCERPTS IR 9448 ;
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| m
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| ") 4 LP Hester to Drain Cooler to Hester Drain Pump talet), Hester Drain Pump Dianharge to caadaa==*a System Tie-in, Pahansad Hester Drains (to Shell Side No. 5 HP Hester), Moisture Separator Hester Drains (to Shell Side No. 4 If Hester), C# ; Hester Drains ( No. 3 LP 6 Hester to No. 2 IE Hester to No.111 Hester), Nos. 4 and 5 Extraction Steam Nos.1,2, ;
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| and 3 Extraction Steam, and Turbine Cm=dar Piping l 1
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| (4) . EPRI CHECMATE Models and CHEC-NDE are being used. Pass 1 CHECMATE analysis was completed !
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| before 1992 and used in sample selection for the 1992 and 1993 Unit 1 outages and for the current and 1992 Unit 2 outages. (5) VECIRA Technologies has been hired to
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| * t
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| '--Hy verify the Heat R=I- and f J P&lDs for the CHECMATE Models, b Unit 2 verification has been completed and the Unit 1 is scheduled to be - ' ' psior to issue of the next outage plan.
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| 3.b. Review of Pmcedures: b inspectors reviewed the following (9) documents which defined the E/C
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| - . . . . l 3.c. Observaticas and Reviews: In addition to review of the above program, procedures, and plans, the f ;
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| inspectors observed in-process activities and reviewed other aspects of the E/C program as detailed below:
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| l (1) The a==iaatian plan for the current outage included 156 inspection locations. Sixty of the 156 locations
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| .i were h===line inspections for new piping installed. In addition, visual inspections of selected locations of the ,
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| 'Ibebine Cmes-Under piping was included. At the time of the inspection, essentially all of the 96 (existing pipe) planaad inspection lar=*iana had been completod. b results required sample expansion for six locations. ;
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| Inspection of the sample expansion locations wt:s stillin process.
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| (2)1n-process grid layout was observed for componsats 20ES3-X-1-27 and 20ES3-E-8-28. In addition, UT I
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| ehic1==== measurement was observed for - -;-- 20ES3 X-1-27.
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| ; [c.
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| V (3)I , 4= records and data analysis were reviewed for components 1-2B1-P-16-32,13B62P2,24C37-T 1-8M and SMS24-E-1-3.
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| (4) N inspectors examined licensee's past practice and future plans for material replacements for E/C degraded piping, i.e., practices for replacing 'like for like' or upgrading to better materials, b general practice is to replace carbon steel with Cr-Mo material. During the current outage the #4 Extraction Steam J piping (230 feet of 24' diameter piping), shown to be thinning during previous inspections, was replaced with Cr-Mo material. The inspectors observed the new piping installation.
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| (5) The followlag two areas for program improv====8 were noted: (1) The programa currently does not include anall bort (:s 2" diameter) piping. When questioned by the inspectors, the licensee provided a
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| , recently completed study, "Small Bore High Energy Pip'mg Study' dated February 14,1994, that looked at
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| ==all bore leaks occurring since 1990. ' Ibis study found that through-wallleaks in small bore piping had been x very few and were predominately caused by faulty steam traps. The problems with steam traps are being addressed. Even though the problems with through-wall leaks in amall bore piping have been minimal, the study reco==aada that a pilot program for E/C inspections of small bore pip'mg be initiated. Responsible
| |
| . licensee personnel stated that this r=~ don will be implemented. (2) Line Convection Factors have not heen antered and the Plass 2 analysis campbead with the mammured data for the CHECMATE Model.
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| Discussions with licensee personnel indicated that they were waiting to obtain measured data for two outages using the CHECMATE Model before updating the Model with measured data and Une Correction Factors. 'Ibe purpose for waiting was to obtain more accurate weer data based on two successive measurements. 'Ihis outage
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| : will complete the second set of measurements. 'Iberefore, plans are to update the model before the next outage.
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| 4
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| . )- Page 6 of 12 i
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| : m. . EXCERPTS IR 9408 ,
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| t . ';
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| I! h.j RESULTS In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identined.
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| t The liosasse has a pre eceive E/C programs. The detailed prograna, dadlemaad personant and resources, 'i j-the use of the EPRI CHECMATE Models, and the wholesale pipe . j-- - ^ (230 feet of 24" dE=*=- ;
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| N Extractisu Stensa Flplag during the current outage) with better grade ansterials illustrate this pro- i active approach. .l 5 *
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| ; ' 4. I'_
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| , ; and Material canditian - Units 1 and 2 (62700) .
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| I L:
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| ' a walkdown ia partia= la the Unit 2 reactor cantaia===* building, the Unit 2 auxiliary !
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| 'Ibe inspectors r '
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| building, abe Unit 2 sesem tressel, the Units 1 and 2 intake structures, and the Units I and 2 {- coohng
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| !' structures and ==aminad housekeeping, material condition, and protective contings- i t
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| i Masseial cometion and housekeeping was sueellent in the areas walked down. A few tainor defleiancias ;
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| * were identified in the condition of protective contings 'Ihsee were as follows- I t
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| i; (1)1he exterior concrete contings were deteriorated on two concrete coated steel pipes which extend across the front of the intake structures above the sea level walkways. (2) Some minor i!
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| li' corrosion was noted on some nuts and bolts on the base of the Unit 2 =tamm tressel. (3) Pield I a pplied contings were peeling and flaking on Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning ducts ork i in the Unit 2 reactor ca=amia-a building. j
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| !- m, The inspectors also identified a piece of deteriorated unistrut supporting an electrical pull box in the Unit 2
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| ! intake enclosure. Although the unistat was deteriorated by severe corrosion, it was still capable of perfonning
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| ; its ihnction.
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| j:
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| Material aa=dista= and i __ ' . ' , was rated as a strength.
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| In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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| l.
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| )[. 5. Snubber Surveillance Program - Unit 2 (70370) ii; .
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| 'Ibe inspectors reviewed procedures and quality records related to the snubber surveillance program, observed
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| , snubber visual inspection and functional testing activities, and inspected safety-related snubbers installed on l- selected Unit 2 piping systems. Acceptance criteria utilised by the inspectors appear in Technical Specification ,
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| l 3/4 7.9.
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| 1- .
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| 5.a. Review of Snubber Surveillance Procedures j
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| 'Ihe inspectors reviewed the following procedures (5) which control anubber surveillance and inspection i: activities......'lhe licensee's visual inspection program includes two types of examinations for vaachanical l snubbers. b first is the VT 3 exam, which is visual inspection of the anubber to determine the general
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| =achamieml and stmetural condition of the meubber, and inch.les " - - . ,t of snubber extension and pin to -
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| pin di====la== h second visual i==pacelaa is the VT 4 exam which includes a limited operabdity test to
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| ;t- ; verify the snubber is free to move over its full reage of travel. . The VT 4 exam is an optional test the lie ===a
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| ] perfonas on all =ach==ical snubbers size PSA 10 and maaller, which are not scheduled for ihnetional testing. ;
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| jj Snubbers m'fich appear to have restrictions to motion are then subjected to functional testing to determine if they
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| , . f3 Page 7 of 12 4
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| J s 1 '. A a
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| hn- -< ,, +m- -,- r- -- ,
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| i i
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| i m- EXCERPTS IR 94-08
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| _ are operable. Inoperable snubbers are replaced. ,
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| e rresting Activities
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| ~
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| 5.b. Observation of Snubber F ,
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| t 1- . The inspectors obearved visual inapartiaa of snubber number 2-212. Visual ' -;=m* =; which was i de__ ' by i Sienun's contract inspectors.....b visual inspection was performed in i.,-.1 s with prae =Awal seguirements. The inspectors witnessed installation of new control valves in steam generator snubber number 005....in accordance with manufacturer's recoma-darians per procedure SSP-1227 005. b valves are renewed fross the large bore Liseen steam generator snubbers for functional testing to da-aaateete snubber ;
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| operability..... AAer the valves are tested, they are re-installed in other steam generator snubbers. h he===aa ;
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| j was testing 100 percent of the control valves on all sintaan steam generator snubbers. 'these snubbers had been {
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| installed dunng the last refueling outage to replace the older model snubbers installed during original {
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| construction.
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| N inspectors ====laad steam generator snubber numbers 004,006, and 007 and verified that the anubbers ,
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| [ were properly =88achadt o steam generator 2A and the supporting structure.1he inspectors also performed a
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| - walkdown inspection in the Unit 2 e=sain===a buikkas and verified that snubbers taan=11=d on various piping systems were secure........ No deficiencies were observed by the inspectors
| |
| ! 'Ihe inspectors witnessed functional testing of the following snubbers. Size PSA % - serial numbers 38003, 38026, and 38532; Size PSA 1 - serial number 19223; and Size PSA 3 - serial number 25895. 'Ibe PSA 3, which was from snubber lacariaa 2-169, failed the functional test. This had been previously identified as a visuallamparenaa (VT-4) failure. b results of the functional tests performed on the remaining snubbers met the -- , - = criteria. j 1he inspectors witnessed A====hly and inapartina of three snubbers which failed functional testing.1hese j were snubbers from support numbers 2-169,2466, and 2185.1he tear down inspection showed the following degraded conditions: -A bent / broken shaA in snubber 2-185. This was later attributed to a water ha==ar and is further discussed in paragraph 7 below. -Corrosion and excess dried grease in snubber 2-066. This was
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| . attributed to the location (envinnamaat) where the snubber was installed. -laternal damage in snubber 2169. l 1his was also later attributed to the November 24,1992, water hammer event. i.
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| 5.c. Review of Quality Records ;
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| b inspectors reviewed quality records documenting visual inspection and functional testing of safety-related snubbers. Review of the functional test remrds showed that Snubber Tag numbers 2466,2-241,2-242,2-315,
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| '4 2-316, and 2-334 did not meet the licensee's functional test acceptance requirements. These snubbers were ;
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| tested por the TS functional testing program. Bar== of these functional test failures, the licanaam expanded the :
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| functional test sample to test five additional groups in accordance with 13 4.7.9.d.
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| W licensee also performed functional testing on snubbers which for freedom of motion per the VT-4 exam
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| ;- indicated impaired operability, h following snubbers did not meet the licensee functional test ane-*~
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| requirements: Tag numbers 2-67, 2-70, 2-73, 2 102, 2-144, 2-156, 2-169, 2-177, 2-178, 2-185, and 2-322.
| |
| The functional test failures were docummated on nonconformance reports and transmitted to the licensee's design l engineering organization for evaluation.
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| Revww of the snubber test data showed the following trends - Snubber numbers 2466,2-067,2 070,2473, and 2-102 had been installed on safety injection piping near the reactor coolant piping. 'Ibese snubbers had l
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| - 1 Page 8 of 12 i
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| '! EXCERPTS IR 9448 V'7 been 12,E ^:f to high temperature and humidity conditions. - Pour snubbers, amnber 2-144,2156,2-169 and 2-185 had been installed on ihe pressurizer safety relief or PORV discharge piping, and had been subjected to a
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| : water hanumer on Nove har 24,1992, as discussed in paragraph 7, below.
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| 3- In the areas inspected, no violations or deviahans were identiRed. .
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| : 6. Review of Modifications to Pressurimr Safety Relief Valve Discharge Piping - Unit 2 (37701)
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| De inspectors e===iaad Plant Change / Modification (PC/K) 004-293, which was being !-;' - ' ' by the licenses to cornet leakass of the three Code Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) on the pressuriast. %is modiAcetion
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| : 2. was classined as a quality related modincation sines it affected piping which was =I==ically analyasd and supported ModiScation P C/M 004-293 involved replacing three supports on the tailpipes, replacing the Tee on the pressuriser quench tank, and sosse piping anodificehone to relieve stresses on the SRVs being induced by i
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| thermal movements of the pressurimer relative to the tailpipes. De inspectors reviewed the modi 5 cation package to e===ma the work in progmes he insulation had been removed from the piping and one of the new supports had been lamaallad, while one other new support, a constant support, was partially 9 f -f. Portions of the piping had also been cut to F
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| i relieve any residual stresses and to permit adju=*===ia to acco==adata predicted piping snovaments. He inspectors a===laad the two supports. Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspectors are the reference drawings listed below. Supports e===iaad were as folicws: (1) Partially completed Support Mark No. RC-4300 6128, Drawing No. BCS 004-293.3013, Sheets 1 and 2 of 2. (2) Support Mark No. RC-4300 6124, Drawing No.
| |
| BCS 004-293.3014, Sheets 1 and 2 of 2.
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| - - no inspectors also == amin =d quality records related to la paa*6 of Support No. RC-4300 6124. Dese
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| ,. included weld travelers and weld visualinspection records. The inspectors coachsdod that the support had
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| .] ' ' .11me inspectors also eenchaded that the heen instnued in neeerdance with the design a:,
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| * partions of Support Mark No. RC43064128 lastnDed to date west in secoh with daign During the walkdown and further review of the PC/M docummatation, the inspectors noted that the pipe support j and piece and a spool piece at support number RC-4300-138 (snubber tag No. 2-170) on line number 6*-RC-827 ~j j, were found to be damaged on March 5,1994, when the pipe insulation and pipe were removed for the L modincation work. %e inspectors questioned licensee engineen regarding the cause of the damaged pipe, ,
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| ' which was deformed, and pipe support end piece, which had a cracked weld. Dese discussions disclosed that !
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| the damage occurred during the November 24,1992, pressurizer relief tank overpressurization event. %e 4,
| |
| inspectors questioned the licensee engineers regarding whether a anacanfor===ca document had been prepared to document the damaged pipe and pipe support end piece. De inspectors 4;: 4 that no nonconformance i docu===ts had been propend as of the time of the discussions (10:00 AM on March 10,1994). I le=====
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| 4 engineers stated that a Change Request Notice (CRN), number 004-293-4356, had been issued on March 7, 1994 to remove the pipe end piece and re-install it on a new piece of pipe. De work was completed under the CRN. ,
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| 4 l FP&L Admini*stive Site procedure ASP-8, Corrective Action, Revision 6 requires that discrepancies that :
| |
| l require an engineering evaluation be docu==asad, evaluated and dispositioned using a Nonconformance Report (NCR). De note under paragraph 7.2 of PP&L Administrative Site Procedure ASP 4, Omnge Request Notice Contral Revision 4, states that a CRN shall not be utilized in lieu of a NCR to correct deviations froen PC/M I
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| i design documents. %e damaged pipe and cracked welded metach==ar on the pipe support and piece constituted a deviation from the PC/M design documents.
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| Page 9 of 12 4
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| 9 .
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| l-EXCERFfS IR 94-08 n
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| I ' V) The failure of licensee engineers to issue a NCR to docianent the discrepancy (damaged pipe and cracked weidad attacia on the pipe support end piece), and use of a CRN to repair the discrepancy, was identified to the licensee as Violation of le CfR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V for failure to follow proceduns. This was identified as Violation Itan 289/94 08 01, Failure to Follow Cornctive Action Procedures, which is applicable to Unit 2 only.
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| Discrepant Field Condition report No. 4180 and NCR 004-293-3025M were issued by the licensee in the anernoon of March 10,1994, to properly document and disposition the damaged pipe and pipe support end piece.
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| In the areas inspected, one violation and no deviations were identified.
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| i
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| : 7. Review of Ucensee Engineering Actions in Response to Presst.rizer Relief Tank Overpnesurization Event -
| |
| l Unit 2 (37700)
| |
| On November 24,1992, while Unit 2 was operating at 100 percent power, the pressurizer relief (Quench) tank was overfilled. When the tank was overfilled, water backed up into the tank inlet piping (the SRV and PORV discharge piping) until the cold water came in contact with the SRV's, resulting in lihing of one of the SRVs on the pressurizer. b lifting of the SRV resulted in a 45 poi decrease in reactor coolant pressuro and rupturing of the relief tank rupture disk. b Unit was shut down aRer this occurred. During the subsequent plant l outage, walkdown inspections were performed by licensee engineers to examine supports on the SRV and Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) discharge piping.....h walkdown inspection consisted of a visual examination of 19 anubbers and 2 spring cans on the SRV discharge piping on November 25 for cold setting and on December 1 for hot setting. h snubber extensions and spring can settings were measured, and the piping was
| |
| 'q checked for presen:e of insulation and irterferences Insulation was r.ot removed to inspect welded attachmants
| |
| ; f to the piping or the condition of the piping, and no freedom of motion tests wem performed on the snubbers.
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| .D f Additional walkdown inspections were performed on the PORV tail piping. The results of these inspections were documented in undated handwritten note which summarizes telephone conversations on November 28, 1992, and November 30,1992.....h November 28,1992, telephone conversation summarizes damage found on three rigid struts on support numbers RC 4300-60, -210, and -590. %e paddles were found to be bent on these supports. h November 30,1992, telephone conversation stated that site engineering expanded the inspection to six additional supports. Inspection results showed no visual damage to the six supports.
| |
| f Discussions with licensee engineers disclosed that insulation was not rernoved to examine the PORY l
| |
| piping, snubbers were not subjected to freedom of motion tats, and that visualinspections were not j conducted on all PORY supports. b licensee concluded that a water hammer occurred when the SRV
| |
| " lined, resulting in damage to the three struts.......
| |
| During the current outage, the licensee discovered additional damage to supports on the PORV and SRV discharge piping. This included the damaged piping and pipe support end piece for support number RC-4300-138 (snubber tag number 2-170) on the SRV discharge piping, discussed in paragraph 6.0, above, and four snubbers, tag numbers 2-144,2-156,2-169, and 2-185, discussed in paragraph 5, which were found to have impaired operability on the PORV discharge piping. he reasons for these problems were attributed to the water hammer which occurred during the November 24,1992, event.
| |
| Subsequent to the inspection, on March 16,1994, in a telephone conservation with licensee engmeenng personnel, the inspectors discussed the licensee's actions to evaluate the extent of damage which occuned during the November 24,1992, ennt. hee discussions disclosed the following information: (1) Ucensee engineers stated that it was not necessary to write a NCR to cover the dan' aged struts since the root cause of the problem Page 10 of 12
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| i j
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| l I
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| EXCERPTS IR 94 08
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| ^
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| m was 5nown, and the hardware problem had been corrected using PWOs.1his was in accordance with FP&L )
| |
| Procedure QI 15-PR/PSlel.- (2)In 1992, when evaluating the water hammar damage, licensee engineers 1 aa a==aad the magnitude of the water ha==ar forces acting on the damaged struts were approxi==aaly 1000 )
| |
| 3 pounds in the lateral direction. Based on information obtained during the current outage, lic- engineers J increased their ==si=ana of the water 1 a==ar forces to range from 6000 to 8000 pounds. (3) Ileaaaaa sagineere !
| |
| ~j I stated that, based on their judgement, the SRV and PORY discharge piping was operable from 1992 - 1994, even with the five inoperable / damaged supports.1his conclusion is based on engmeering judgment only, since ,
| |
| 1 a stress analysis was not performed on the piping with five inoperable / damaged supports. (4) Ucensee j i
| |
| ],, engineers stated that piping was non-safety related, although seismically designed and that failure of the piping j) would not affect the reactor coolant pressure boundary. (5) Ucensee engineers stated that inspection of the !
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| !j piping and pipe supports following the waterka-- event was performed without the use of documented
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| {4 lastructions or procedures.
| |
| In November 19e0, NRC issued NUREG4737, Clarification of'IMI Action Plan Requirements. Item II.D.1 of J
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| }
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| i,, NUREG 0737 required licensees to perform eight actions to reconfirm the integrity of PWR reactor coolant j overpressure protection systems (i.e., PWR safety, relief and block valves) and thereby assure that General j
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| .l Design Criteria 14,15, and 30 of Appendix A to 10 CPR 50 are met. Action 8 under II.D.1 states: Qualify 1 jj 1 the plant specific safety and relief valve piping and supports by w-y.d.g to test data and/or performing l appropriate analysis. In December,1988, NRC issued a Tachaical Evaluation Report, (TER) titled TMI Action ]
| |
| - NUREG 0737 (II.D.1) Relief and Safety Valve Testing St. Imcie, Unit 2, Docket No. 50-389. Paragraph 5.2 l of the TER stated that item 8 which requires qualification of the piping and supports on the pressuriser SRV !
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| )
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| and PORV diacharge piping was not met.1he licensee was requested to submit additionalinformation to NRC to damaa=* ste that the piping was designed with sufficient margin such that design conditions would not be
| |
| : amaadad during relief / safety valve events. In PP&L letter, number le90-135, to the NRC dated August 30, 1990, the hosasse stated that they had --m'- ' the analytical wodt required to resolve NRC cancarns stated in yg g paragraph 5.2 of the TER.
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| ! V 1he inspectors reviewed drawing numbers RC-AB-1 Revision II, and RC-AB-2, Revision 10. No safety
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| ' classification was indicated for the SRV 6' dia-adar discharge piping and 10' diamanar coeunos header on drawing RC-AB-1.1he PORV discharge piping was shown as non-eafety related on drawing number RC-AB-2.
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| b inspector also reviewed P&ID drawing numbers 2998-G478, sheets 108 and 109.1hese drawings
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| ' indicated the PORV and SRV discharge piping was classified as Quality Class D, i.e. non-eafety related outboard of the relief valves.1hese same drowings are PSAR figures 5.1-4 and 5.1-4a. 'Ibe drawings appeared to be in conflict with PSAR Section 5.4.11, which covers the pressurizer safety relief system and
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| )j quench tank design. PSAR Section 5.4.11.1 states that the pressure relief discharge system is designated
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| ;- Quality Group C, per Regulatory Guide 1.26, ' Quality Group Classification and standards for Water , Steam ,
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| *' and Radioactive-Weste-Containing t'-- , ---ts of Nuclear Power plants". February,1992, Revision 3. N l importance of Quality Group C, which is a safety related designation, is discussed in PSAR Section 3.2.2.
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| 3 Section 5.4.11 of the PSAR also states that the pressure relief discharge system is designated non-seismic. .
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| ; However, Section 5.4.11.3 of the PSAR states that the piping system from the pressurizer to the quench tank j
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| ; has been seismically analyrod.1he licensee's seismic anubber list includes all snubbers on the PORY and SRV tail piping. The seismic anubber list is classified as Nuclear Safety-Related.
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| < Based on review of the PSAR, the Nuclear Safety-ndated as3==le snubber list, and the llemma='s naposses to TMI Action Itan (NUREG 9737) II.D.1, the inspectors concluded that the licensre's actions to fouowup ;
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| on the November 24,1994, waterina===e event fell within the purview of their Quality Assurance j i FNgram. The licensee's naponse to this event was inadequate and ramited in failure to identify the
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| ' - . . " snubbers and damaged pipe. The engineering evaluation of the erects of the waterh===se on .
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| I s.,, / Page 11 of 12
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| )
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| , 1
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| EXCERPTS 1R 9408 m
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| I the SRV and "ORY dl=ehange piping was also inadequate. Dime ==la== with he===== engineers As.caaaad that the l==parelaa activities performed to inspect the SRV and FORY dimehasse piping following the waterhanneer event, and the . -* i.g evaluation of the event, were perforised without the use of daa==e= tad instrue*la== or procedures. Performing activities affecting quality without the use of daa===8ad instructions or -- ' of a type : . ., M to the circumstances is contrary to the of le CFR Se, Appendix B, Criterion V. This was identified to the lleensee as violation lien 389/944842 Inadequate Inspection and Evaluation of Effects of Waterhanumer event on SRV and FORY Discharge Piping. l i
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| 'Ibe licensee's inadequate response to this event was due la part to their failure to recognize the severity of the Nova =hae 24,1992, event. b inoperable anubbers compromised the structural integrity of the SRV and PORV dimeharge piping. Failure of this piping could have prevented the SRV's and PORVs from performing their safety function. An unasolved item 335,389/94 0843, Quality level of PORY and SRV Discharge Piping, was also identified to the licensee regarding clarification of the safety classification of the PORV and SRV discharge piping.
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| In the areas inspected, one violation and no deviations were identified.
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| : 8. I.Jeansee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701,92702) 8.a. (Closed) Violation 335,389/9124-01, Failure to Follow Procedure for Properly Identifying Radiographic Film and Documaatation of Associated Records....
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| 8.b. (Closed) VIO 389/9348-01, Failure to Provide Adequate Measures to Control Welding......
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| i
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| : 9. ExitInterview: b inspection scope and assults were su==ariand on March 11,1994, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1..... Additional telephone discussions were held with licensee per=rmaal on March 16, 1994, relative to Violations 389/94 0841 and 389/944842. At the time of the Exit Interview, Violation 389/0842 was identified to the licensee as an Unresolved Item (URI). During the March 16 telephone discussion, the inspectors informed the licensee that, after further investigation, the URI was considered to be a Violation. 'Ihe violations were also discussed with the Site Vice-President during a telephone call on April 8, 1994.
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| (Closed) Violation 335,389/91-2441, Failure to Follow Procedure for Properly Identifying Radiographic Film and Documentation of Associated Records I
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| (Closed) VIO 389/93-0841, Failure to Provide Maquate Measures to Control Welding (Open) VIO 389/944841, Failure to Follow Corrective Action Procedures - Paragraph 6 (Open) VIO 389/9448-02, Inadequate Inspection and Evaluation of Effects of Waterhammer Event on SRV and
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| - PORY Discharge Piping - paragraph 7 (Open) Unresolved item 335, 389/94-0843, Quality level of PORV and SRV Discharge Piping -para 2
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| / Page 12 of 12 v
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| 'i y EXCERFTS IR 94-09
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| .? i
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| .) - . .. l April 28,1994 Docket Nos? 50-335, 50-389 1 Ucense Nos. DPR-67 NPF-16 .
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| Plorida Power & Ught Company ATTN: . J, H. Goldberg )
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| President - Nuclear Division F. O. Box 14000
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| ' Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420 Gentlansa:
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| ==SUBJECT:==
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| (NRC INSPECI1ON REPORT NOS. 50-335/94 09 AND 50-389/94-09) i
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| . 1' .
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| . This refers to the inspection conducted by S. A. Elrod of this office on February 27 - March 26,1994. 'Ibe
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| * inspection included a review of activities authorized for your St. Lucie facility. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findaags were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report.
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| )I .. Areas avamiaad during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the laWa= consisted ,
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| of selective ====iaatiana of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation ,
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| of activities in psogress.
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| A 1he enclosed Inspection Report identifies activities that violated NRC requirements that will not be subject to l j enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and/or correcting the violation most the criteria
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| .i - ( specified in Sectica VII.B. of the NRC Enfor==aar Policy......
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| Sincerely,
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| .i Original signed by David M. Vercelli <
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| l
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| ' David M. Verrelli, Chief ;
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| Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects l s
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| . Report Nos.: 50-335/94m and 50-389/94-09 i
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| Ucensee: Florida Power & Light Co )
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| ! 9250 West Flagler Street 1 Miami, FL 33102 {
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| J Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 Ucense Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF 16 I I
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| Facility Name: St. Lucie 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: February 27 - March 26,1994 t Inspectors:
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| S. A. Elrod, Senior Resident inspector Date Signed
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| . d Page 1 of 13
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| ; l EXCERPTS IR 9449 1- %
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| T. Johnson, Senior Resident inspector Date Signed j
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| . M. S. Miller, Resident Inspector Date Signed M. A. Scott, Resident Inspector . Date Signed 1
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| L. Trocine, Resident inspector Date Signed R. Schin, Project Engmeer Date Signed -;
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| { Approved by:
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| * K. D. Landis, Chief - Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 2B r
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| Division of Reactor Projects
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| j .
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| Scope:
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| 'this routine roeident inspection was coulucted onsite in the areas of plant operations review, Unit 2 refueling observations, surveillance observations, maintenance observations, outage activities, and fire protection review.
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| Har*mhift inspection was performed on February 28 and March 1,2,3,13,15,16,17,19, and 20.
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| 1, . \ y ,
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| 2 Plant Operations area: Operators g'esi.i,4 Unit 2 reduced inventory operations well. Unit 1 operations canrinuant to be good. One non-conservative licensee entry into a rachnical specification limiting condition for operation action statement was identified, involving emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank level. Failure to
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| ~ follow refueling procedures resulted in a failed attempt to grapple a fuel assembly due to bridge mispositioning. j (1s 3 & 4)
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| Maintenance and Surveillance area: Mainaanance activities, both normal and outage related, were generally conducted well. Several procedumt weaknesses were identified and were addressed by the licensee.
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| - Surveillances were performed satisfactorily; However, operator and procedural waaknaamas wem identified during an EDO surveillance run. (1s 5,6, & 7)
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| Plant Support area: Health Physics coverage of outage-related maintenance was strong, as was health physics personnel response to a spill of potentially contaminated water. (1s 3 & 6)
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| One non cited violation (NCV) and two unreec,1ved items (URIs) were identified:
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| NCY 50-389/944941,lacorrect Grappling of a Fuel Ansamhly,14.a.
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| URI 50-389/94 0942, Adequacy of a Singla Operator on the Refueling Bridge During Core Alterations,14.a.
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| URI 50-389/94-09-03, Adequacy of Review and Approval of Refueling Core Alterations,14.a.
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| 6 5 EXCERPTS IR 9449 a m. ,
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| :] .
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| , {j . 2. Plant Status and Activities !
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| L 2.a.- llaiti : Unit I began and ended the inspection period at 100 percent power. At the end of the inspection, the unit was in day 75 of power operation since startup on January 10, 1994.
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| 2.b. llaiL2 : Unit 2 began the in= pac *ia= period shut down in operational mode 6 with the reactor ;
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| disassembled and being refueled. At the end of the inspection, refueling had been completed and the unit was in cold shutdown, Mode 5, completing other overhaul work.
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| 2.c. NRC Activity: An inspection of electrical malatananca and station blackout impla=antaten. was canthienad from February 28 to March 4 by G. MacDonald and R. Moore of NRC Region II. 'Ibe inspection results were !
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| {
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| reponed in IR 335,389/94-06. ,
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| . An inspection of the radiation protection program was conducted from February 28 to March 4 by D. Forbes of :
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| 3 NRC Region II. h inspection results were reponed in IR 335,389/9447.
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| j' An inspection of inservice inspection, erosion /enrrosion, snubber surveillance, and modifications to the pressuriser pressure relief valve discharge piping were conducuni from March 7 to 11 by B. Crowley and J.
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| T anahan of NRC Region II. N inspection results were reported in IR 335,389/94-08.
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| l I
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| j An inspection of Unit 2 pressurizer steam space instrument norzle weld repairs was conducted from March 21 ,
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| to March 24 by J. Coley and B. Crowley of NRC Region II. 'Ihe inspection results were reported in IR
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| { 335,389/94-10. ;
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| : 3. Review of Plant Operations (71707)
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| 'j hM' v
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| . 3.a. Plant Tours
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| .h inspectors periodically conducted plant tours......h inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of I . ESP, ECCS, and support systems.......
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| ;I
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| : (1) Misplaced Neutron Shielding. While touring the RCA, the inspector noted that the CVCS letdown radiation i 1
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| monitor was partially =capan1=*ad in paraffin shielding. b monit t is located adjacent to the CVCS ;
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| borenometer, which employs a neutron source to measure soluble baron concentration in the letdown process :
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| j fluid. As paraffin is considered a neutron shield, the inspector questioned the licensee as to its placement over the radiation monitor, which contains no neutron source. After investigating, the licensee found that the
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| }4 Intandad location of the paraffin was, in fact, around the boronometer and that the paraffin had been moved.
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| h licensee also stated that the area was surveyed for neutron dose prior to restoring the paraffin shielding and that neutron dose was within the bounds posted at the boronometer. ,
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| 1 (2) Wa~ Snill Caused By Deficient Clearance : While touring the Unit 2 RAB, the inspector witnessed the lican=a's initial cleanup of a spillin the ECCS room on March 8. When maintenance personnel loosened the packing on HCV-3635 (the MOV for IESI B header to loop 2BI), water gushed out a drain line and overcame the temporary catch container and hose. Abcut 40 gallons of water spilled onto the floor. A HP supervisor and i a cleanup person responded promptly and limited the spread of the water. This included cutting a hole in a j
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| main 8an=ca work area plastic sheet that was covering a floor drain. h HP cleanup was good - there were no i r = - ' contaminations and the area was cleaned up and deccet-un= tad within about an hour.
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| ~ N inspector reviewed clearance order 2-94-03-063 for the work on HCV-3635. It included a freeze seal, two ,
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| , . open drain valves, an open vent valve, and other mechanical and electrical isolations. However, drawings t
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| I, d - Page 3 of 13 4
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| EXCERF1S 1R 94-09 m
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| . showed that the vent valve was on the opposite side of HCV 3635 from the drain valves and the frenas seal.
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| 'Ihe position of HCV-3635, a normally closed valve, was not specified on the clearance. As a resu!t, the sectice of pipe between HCV 3635 and the freeze seal was not properly vented and was not completely drained prior to starting work. When the maintaaaace personnel loosened the packing, they created a vent path that allowed more water to drain from the pipe, resulting in the spill.
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| The inspector concluded that the spill was caused by a ddicient clearance. However, the safety eaaaat- wese minimal. The HP cleanup of the spill was very timely and effective.
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| 3.b. Plant Operations Review
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| 'Ihe inapsetors penodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrummat traces, and records of q '_, ^ malfunctions..... Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures. Control room annunciator status was verified. Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed. During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following tagouts (clearances)......
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| (1) Reduced RCS Inventory at St Lucie Unit 2.
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| Unit 2 entered a reduced RCS inventory condition on March 16-17 to support the Unit 2 refueling outage. 'Ibe following items were observed on March 15-17 in preparation for this evolution:
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| (1) Containmaat Closure Capability.....(2) RCS Temperature Indication......(3) RCS I.evel Indication.......
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| . (4) RCS level " ".aeions .......(5) RCS Inventory Volume Addition Capability.......(6) RCS Nozzle
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| .~, Dams.....(7) Vital Electrical Bus Availability.......Two EDGs were operable (8) Pressurizer Vent Path......
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| ,, ) (9) Operators verifled that the reactor had been suberitical for a minimum of 120 hours and that two
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| )
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| V aandaia===d fan coolers were in operation, as required by procedure, ,
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| 1 b inspector found operator knowledge of the upcoming evolution to be excellent.
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| 3.c. Technical Specification Compliance IJcensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified. ' Ibis included the review of selected surveillance test l resulta. . . .. ..
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| (1) Non. conservative Entry into TS LCO Action Statement: During a review of operator logs, the inspector l noted that the 1A EDO had been declared inoperable for eight hours (5 a.m. to 1 p.m.) on March 7,1994, due to a low fuel oil tank level. At the time, Unit I had been operating in Mode 1. Unit 1 TS 3.8.1.1 required restoring the EDG to operable within 72 hours or shutting down the unit.
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| b inspector inquired into the necessity and safety benefit of placing the 1 A EDG in a TS LCO action
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| ,. ==tamant and the licensee's review process that led to and approved this action. Unit 1 TS 3.0.1 Basis states:
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| 'It is not intended that the shutdown action requirements be used as an operational convenience which permits (routine) voluntary removal of a system or component from service in lieu of other alternatives that would not result in redundant systems or components being inoperable.' logs and operator datan=ata indicated that the licensee had pumped fuel oil from the 1 A EDG tank (to below the TS-required level) into the 2A EDO tank to bring the 2A tank within the TS-required range ao that the 2A EDO could be declared operable following
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| =mataamaca and testing. At the time, Unit 2 had been shut down in a refueling outage. After the 2A EDG had been restored to operable, the licensee had pumped fuel oil from the 2B EDG tank to the 1 A EDG tank,
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| )
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| d < Page 4 of 13 1
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| .-~ - - - - - .- - ~ - - - . . . -- - . -. - - - - - - . .
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| 4 ,
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| s l
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| b p EXCERPTS IR 94 09 Q restonag the 1A EDG to operable and placing the 2B EDG out of service with a low fuel oil tank level. Iater in the week, the licensee r:ceived a truckload of oil into the 2B EDG tank......
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| l
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| $ 'Ihe inspector reviewed EDG fuel oil tank levels recorded on the morning of March 7, TS requiramanh, '
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| 13 operating procedure requirements, alarm setpoints, and overflow levels (in gallons):
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| 7 2
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| la IB 1.A 2B TOTAL March 7 tank levels 18,383 18,846 37,338 43,494 118,061
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| ]
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| TS mininum required 16,450 16,450 40,000 40,000 112,900 ,
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| !' OP stated TS min. 17,058 17,058 40,729 40,729 115,574 B Alarm seapoint17,058 17,058 40,729 40,729 115,574 Overflow level 20,000 20,000 43,995 43,995 127,990 l b inspector concluded that, on the morning of March 7, there was enough oil on site in the four EDG fuel oil i, tanks to have all four tanks above the TS-required minimum and above the alarm setpoint. Since the licensee recorded tank levels in feet and inches, the number of gallons available on site may not have been clearly ,
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| evident to operations management. (h above gallon numbers for each tank were converted from feet and )
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| ,' inches by the inspector.) The iWu found no clear n-ity or net safety benefit in pumping the 1A EDG fuel oil tank level down below its TS-required minimum. In this case, placing the 1 A EDG in a TS LCO action
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| ! =sau-aae was a non-conservative action by the licensee. J Also, the inspector found that the licensee tracked and reviewed overall unavailability of certain safety systems, i j but did not track or review overall time in LCO action =eme-ta for any safety systems. Unavailability and j inoperability are substantially different. For example, in this case the 1A EDO was considered to be inoperable j ,m for eight hours but was also considered to be available during the same time.
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| r d <
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| ]. 3.d. Phvalcal Protection : b inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being implemented........ ]
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| In conclusion, operations for this lampeeriaa pesiod were corh satisfactorily. Operator knowledge l and control of Unit 2 reduced inventory operations were considered to be excellent. One lie ==ame j voluntary entrance into a TS LCO action statement, involving EDG fuel oil tank level, was considered to 3, be non conservative.
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| ?
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| 3
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| : 4. Unit 2 Refueling Observations (60710)........
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| {
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| p 4.a. Unit 2 Refueling and Core Shuffle b licensee commenced Unit 2 refueling and core shuffle activities on February 28,1994.....During fuel movement, the licensee controlled the move sequence by using a Recommended Move Ust. %is list was part of the core reload PC/M 001294 for Unit 2 Cycle 8. Puel movement operations were controlled by procedures OP 2-1630024, Refueling Machine Operations, and Test Procedure 3200090, Refueling Operations. %e test procedure referenced the Recommended Move Ust and described the steps - y to deviate from this list.
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| 1
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| . . On February 28,1994, at 11:43 a.m. refueling operations were stopped during an attempt to grapple assembly l H08 in core location 011. De hoist overload energized several times during the upward hoist action attempts.
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| : De licensee discovered a typographical error in the Recommended Move Ust at step 27. De core coordinate for the bridge was listed as 787.71 and abould have been 783.71. Consequently, the bridge was misahgned by
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| ! approximmealy 4 inches. b licensee surmised that the grapple engaged the assembly off center and upward movement was arrested due to actuation of the hoist overload. De refueling SRO directed reactor engineering I 3
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| J Page 5 of 13 s
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| 1 i
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| 2 EXCERFTS IR 94-09
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| .: A
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| :) / / ' to check for addielanat errors in the R=-- -4' Move ust. Dree more errors were found and corrected.
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| In followup to this error, the inspector reviewed operating procedure No. 21630024, ' Refueling Machine Operation".~ In oeder to assure the operation has the correct core location, a comparison check of rough jj n=hantent alpha-nunwie grid coordaansag was directed. Dam, a more exact wei^ ^ was to be made using the digital bridge and trolley indicators. De operator, during move number 27 for assembly H08 in core i' location Gil, did not ensure that the two coordinates checked were in agreement prior to attempting to grapple the fuel assembly. Consequently, the typographical error in the Recommended Fuel Movement Ust caused the l i operator to grapple the assembly in an incorrect position.
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| if De licensee stated that the operator in question was recently qualified and his experience may have been a i
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| ;' J causal factor. Step 8.2.ll.B.3.b of procedure 2-1630024 requires the operator to ensure that the awhanical j . Indicator for the core coordinates agree with the bridge and trolley digital rendouts. TS 6.8.1.s and b, and Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, Appendix A, items 2k and 21 require procedures for 4
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| 5
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| . refueling and core alteration to be written, implanaantad, and raaintainad. Due to the milaar safety significance ,
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| of this esvor and the licensee's preempt cornwetive acelan, this violation will not be subject to enforcement l i.
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| action 8-anne the Ilrensse's efforts in idsedifying and/or correcting the violation meet the criter:a specified in heelan VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Phlicy. The failure to adequately follow procedure 2- l I
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| 163882d in coadn=celan with the error in the Receaunended Move List are identified as NCV 56-389/94-jj
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| , . l 99 41, Incervect Grappling of a het Anusably.
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| ........On March 1, from approximately 11:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m., the inspectors observed refueling operations ll- from the containsaant including the refueling bridge and from the area of the spent fuel pool. During this time, an additional error in step 61 of the Recommended Move List was noted by the licensee in that the fuel movement sheets incorrectly indicated that no CEA was in the fuel ammanably, b licensee -simba this error.
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| 4 I, -
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| During this time, the inspector noted that only one limaand operator was on the bridge c.L ' ; refueling operations. TS 6.2.2.d requires that all core alterations be observed by a licensed operator and supervised by
| |
| ! an SRO with no concurrent responsibilities. His SRO may be in the control room, the refueling bridge, or the
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| ' spent fuel pool area. b inspector questioned the validity of having only one person on the refueling bridge, and whether this meets the intent of a licensed operator " observing core alterations". De licanaaa's position was that a single operator met this requirement. However, considering the error noted above, a second person ji checking or observing could have prevented this. Pending further NRC review, this issue is identified as l5 URI 56 389/94 4942, Adequacy of a Single Operator on the Refueling Bridge during Core Alterations.
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| i b inspectors noted that the Recommended Move Ust and changes were not specifically reviewed by the FRG
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| '3 nor approved by the Plant Manager, but instead were approved by the reactor engineering supervisor. Each
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| - movement is also a core alteration. TS 6.8.1 requires procedures for refueling operations and core alterations.
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| TS 6.8.2 requires those procedures to be FRG reviewed and plant manager approved. Pending fudber NRC re lew, this issue is identitled as URI 56 389/94 09-43, Adequacy of Review and Appewal of Refueling Core Alterations.
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| 1 i
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| b inspectore discussed these concerns with licensee management and on March 2, at about 10:30 am, the ,
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| l licensee suspcmded refueling operations. b licensee initiated the following corrective actions.....
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| - N inspectors verified corrective actions and cheerved portions of the continuing refueling operations.
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| De inspectors also reviewed QA activities associated with the Unit 2 refueling.......
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| I ' , - '--t QC verification of the Anal core configuration and QA review of core physica testing were planaad.
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| QA/QC did not identify any deviations, violations, or problem areas. De inspectors observed that QA/QC i
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| 4
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| i / Page 6 of 13 4
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| ._ . _ _ - . . _ . _ __ __ .. _ ~ _._ __ _ _
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| I EXCERFTS IR 94-09 1
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| * s?
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| ; 1 . we'e not present during the February 28,1994, error nor during the times the inspectors were present in the refueling areas and facilities.
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| i 4.b. CEA Shuffle
| |
| ). Following correction of the refueling process, the inspector monitored portions of the CEA shume on March
| |
| : 10. AAer completing the fuel assembly shume per the approved F-~~aa~t 8 Move List, the licensee moved CEAs to their new required positions.... toward the end of the CEA shume, operators found that two CEAs had been mis-located, b reactor engmeer then made changes to the core los.Tucedure to locate and move CEAs to correct the condition.......
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| . 4.c. Core load Verification 7
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| Immediately aAer the CEA shume, the inspector observed the Unit 2 core load verification. ' Ibis evolation was
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| .: canniucted from the refueling crane, using an underwater camara suspended by a pole from the crane handrail l and two video displays on the crane deck. Licensee personnel involved in the evolution included an SRO in 4
| |
| charge, an RO crane operator, a reactor engineer, and a quality control inspector...... inspector noted that, while '
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| the numbers on the CEAs and new fuel assemblies were clearly legible, many of the numbers on the partially
| |
| : l' used fuel assemblies were obscured by corrosion and small flakes of loose metallic oxidation (the engineer stated that this was from the CEA shume) and were very difficult to read........ inspector concluded that the licanmaa's core load verification was adequate but was hampered by fuel assembly numbers being obscured by l
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| corrosion and small flakes ofloooo metallic oxidation.
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| In conclusion, while evolutions were generally conducted satisfactorily, the inspectors found several
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| : j. U , s}
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| aspects of the Unit 2 refueling operation to be of cancara. These concerns were relayed to the licensee, 1
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| 'O and plant management adequately addressed the issues. Failure to property prepare and fouow refueung )
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| procedures eesulted in a failed attempt to grapple a fuel assembly due to bridge mispositioning. @=*la== l
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| ; related to TS-required levels of stafflag on the nfueling bridge resulted in a URI.
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| i j 5. Surveillance Observations (61726)
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| 'j Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements.....The following surveillance
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| ! tests were observed:
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| I 5.a. OP l 2200050B, "lB Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General Operating Instructions' b inspector witnessed the performance of IB EDG surveillance test performed March 16. The test was l performed satisfactorily; however, the inspector noted wealene==ea associated with operator performance and procedural adequacy.
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| In prepanng to perform the surveillance test, step 4 of the subject procedure requires that the water level in both ;
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| EDGE' radiator expansion tanks be checked. b inspector noted, immediately prior to the performance of this j step, that the water level in the IB1 expansion tank was out-of-sight high in the tank's level sight glass (the j 2 procedure required that the level be visible between two points marked on the sight glass). b inspector !
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| witaaaaani the SNPO performing this evaluation to observe the sight glass and initial the ' SAT" block of the j procedure, indicating that the level was satisfactory b inspector questioned the SNPO as to the ==, a*=N1ity l
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| of the level, after which the SNPO rechecked the level and acknowledged that it was too high. 'Ihe apparent cause for the high level was an increase in weather-related ambient temperature which resulted in higher EDO
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| !- LO and coolant temperaturce and resultant coolant expansion.
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| j Page 7 of 13
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| ;' EXCERPI'S IR 9&O9 i
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| 'j %e inspector uoted that the procedure included instructions for correctag a low wvel condition, but did not address correcting high level conditions. He'SNPO contacted the ANPS, as directed in the procedure, and the ANPS issued instructions for valve manipulations to reduce the level. His involved opening a drain valve to direct water from the expansion tank to a local drain collection point.
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| During the drainmg evolution, the system' engineer present reported seeing air bubbles rising through the sight .
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| glass and the SNPO operating the drain valvc reported hearms air flow noises in the vicinity of the collection l point. De system engineer concluded that the tank was not vented and the ANPS was contacted for further directions. b ANPS directed that the drainmg be stopped and that a vent valve be opened, aAer which a l prompt drop of approximately 1.5' was observed in tank level. De balance of the draining and survedlance i testing occurred without incident.
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| %e inspector concluded that the SNPO's failure to identify the high level in the radiator expansion tank '
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| constituted poor attention to detail. He inspector further found that the governing procedure was week, in that it provided no pih to operators attempting to drain the tank. b procedural weakasse resulted in i; operators draining the tank for approximately 4 minutes without a vent path.
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| 5.b. OP 2-2200050B, '2B "-- ,,4 Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General Operatag Instructions' i 1
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| * Generally, surveillances were performed well; however, one case of inattention to detail and one procedural i waalraa== were identified, j
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| : 6. Mainea==aca Observations (62703) l Station malataaaaca activities involving =alactad safety-related systems and companants were observed / reviewed i
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| (3.c to ascertain that they were eWad in m.h with requirmamata .... Portions of the following maintmanaca l j N' l activities were observed:
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| 6.a. CWO 8143, Support of 2A CCW Heat Exchanger Work (NPWO 3573 Clean and Inspect 2A CCW Heat Eschanger)
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| De majority of the work on the heat exchanger was done under the above NPWO and procedure MMP 14.01, Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Cleaning and Repair. During this outage,73 newly identified leeking tubes were plugged, resulting in a total of 97 plugged tubes. His was approximately 8.5 percent of the ,
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| total euch=ager tubes. Engineering indicated that the plugging limit was 10 percent, with some slight available
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| . margin above that. Engineering was to revisit the plugging margin and consider replacing all tubes in this heat
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| +
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| exchanger during the next outage, b inspector reviewed the tube plugging map against the actual tubes plugged and esaminad the plug I installation work. He work effort was found to be satisfactory. During the post-maintenance test, the tube ends at the tube sheets were exposed for observation and the HX CCW side pressurized at 150 peig for 10 )
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| minutes without signs of leakage b inspector reviewed the test data sheet and found it to be satisfactorily completed.
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| 6.b. NPWO 4865Ai2 Remove, Repair, Re-Install 2A LPSI Pump Procedure 2-M404, Rev 5, Disassembly / Reassembly of I.aw Pressure Safety Injection Pump, was the controlling instruction during the work. His work included removal and inspection of the pump, replacement of the inachanical seal, and re-installation of the pump. He inspector observed the conduct of rigging during re-installation of the pump, the retorquing of the casing stude and bolts, and the troubleshootmg of the V- Page 8 of 13 i
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| -, e e
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| ~
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| EXCERPTS IR 94-09 ii- ,/ mechnaical seal.
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| i:
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| During the rigging of the pump internals and motor assembly p..,, .;my to its installation, the licensee had to make three separate lins to cient travel path obstructions from the repair location [laydown ares] to the installed lower half of the pump casing. All of the liAs were within the ECCS space. b lower casing half had been lea in the piping system. Due to limited description of the required rigging in the procedure, the ==hanice had to make several adjustments in the rigging line lengths. To do these adjustments, the pump and motor had to be lined three separate times to complete the translation. All adjustments were completed prior to movement of
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| ; the pump and motor over the suction piping to the inservice 2B LPSI pump which was in the direct path of
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| ; travel. & lin was in conformance to procedure AP 0010438, Control of Heavy inada [i.e., the subject i' procedure had been reviewed and appneved by the FRG prior to the liA]. But neither pioc.L discussed or cautioned the penannel performing the liA to the fact that the load path crossed the 2B LPSI pump suction piping. b licensee was considering anhancements to the pump overhaul procedure.
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| i, . b rigging did generally conform to the sketches in the base procedure and did conform to another applicable !
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| ;; procedure. 'Ibe rigging was properly sized and had appropriate inspection code markings of AP 0010443, St.
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| Imcie Site Rigging Controls and Rigging Considerations. The text of pioc J e discussed using one 5 toa hoist )
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| : j. to lin and lower the pump motor into the lower casing. b procedural sketch depicted two liR points. The j licensee used two 6 ton hoists to provide motive force, which was more conservative than the nunin== l requirement [the pump and motor assembly weighed 9400 pounds]. b procedural loose description of the 4
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| rigging attachment points and translational points was being reviewed by the licensee for upgrade.
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| a.
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| During the torquing of the pump casing nuts and studs, the licensee discovered that the mechanical seal housing l
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| outer cap had been mis-installed. b cap would not align properly with the seal piping b cap was ISO
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| . - degrees from its appropriate orientation such that the seal piping could not be attached. b licensee was to
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| - change the pracadure to allow an inplace rotation of the sent cap while the pump was installed in the casing. In
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| ; rO'] this == lata = mace conAguration [no water and the pump out of service on a clearance), no pump operation was possible.
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| . h above seal cap mis-installation occurred due to a procedural weakness. The piecedure discussed match marking of the seal and piping, which was performed during disassembly.' However, the procedure did not refer back to the match markmg or caution the maintenance personnel on the orientation neccesities during the re-assembly process, b licensee was considering procedural M====ts in light of this problem.
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| ' 6.c. NPWO 7250 NRC Generic letter 89-10 Valve Work r 'this NPWO adjusted, repaired, and tested a number of critical plant valves that were addressed under the
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| ;. subject letter, b licensee has been progressing through work on these valves. During this outage, the
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| ; licensee had scheduled 14 valves to be worked. 'Ibe inspectors reviewed overall licensee plans and discussed the work scope.
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| j
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| 'Ihe inspector observed the setup and testing of SDC heat exchanger cross-tie valve 3456. 'Ihis Westinghouse
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| ; valve did not close on a torque switch as did most valves in this group, but instead closed and opened on limit i switches.
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| During initial testing of this valve. the motor to the valves's actuator failed. b motor had developed an electrical giound and opened the supply breaker to the actuator. This testing did detect the failure and provide a psth for the replacement of the valve's motor. The licensee had to plan a work package for the motor replacement prior to work proceeding.
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| Page 9 of 13
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| M EXCERITS IR 94-09
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| * I 1
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| w f' 6.d. NPWO 2512/62 2A Containment Spray Pump Gasket Replacement l
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| l This NPWO provided for the liAing of the pump, replacement of the casing gasket, and re-installation of the subject pump. 'Ihe casing gasket had a small leak that had weeped during the last unit operstag cycle.
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| l h inspector observed the first post-maintenance pump run aAer system fill and vent. Health Physics personnel were on hand to assist in the case of emergent problems. An SRO and two non-licensed operators were on hand to observe the leak integrity of the pump [a functional test point in the pump's return to service]
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| and to vent the seal package once the pump began to generate pressure h pump and motor operated without any problems and the initial data (temperatures and vibration] collected by electrical r -- " with the inspector j present Indicatad that the motor was satisfactory.
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| 6.e. NPWO 7305/66 Motor for 2A LPSI pump
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| ' Ibis NPWO provided administrative control of the electrical de-termination, housing removal /re-installation, and re-termination of the 2A LPSI pump motor for the above indicated work [NPWO 4865).
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| .4
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| - N inspector observed portions of the satisfactory re-termination of the 4160 Volt electrical leads to the motor.
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| MP 0930066, Rev 6, 4.16 KV, 6.9 KV, and 15 KV Termination Connections and Insulation, was the applicable j principal procedure for the work. Health Physics coverage was timely and more than adequate.
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| 6.f. NPWO 7303/66 2A HPSI Motor Work b 2A HPSI motor was replaced with a spare motor. Additionally, as an operationalimprovement, the spare - 1 motor feet and pump motor mounting points on the pump skid were amad flat. ' Ibis was done to reduce l
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| ,j vibration levels on the motor that were identified during the previous two refuehag outages to be slightly below l j ,
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| (_s the ad==3=i=a ative limits established by the licensee. 'Ibe previous vibrational anomalies were identified as being due to motor to skid flaina== problems creating was is termed a 'soA foot" or slightly sprung motor foot !
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| [artachinant point].
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| I
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| 'Ibe inspector observed, in part, the motor being mounted to the skid and its interim alignment to the pump, and the first [and natisfactory] uncoupled motor run. b applicable procedure for the motor work was MP 2-0950165, Rev 4, Overhaul of High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Motors HPSI PP - 2A and 2B. b motor
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| - vibrationallevels and motor operation were also satisfactory and met the m+F =e criteria. Health Physics support of the test was good.
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| Maintenance activities were generally well performed. Health Physics coverage for maintenance activities was considesed good. Several procedural weaknesses were identified relating to LPSI pump repair.
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| : 7. Outage Activities (62703)
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| 'Ihc following items were licensee commitments to the NRC or established critical goals for this outage that i were observed by the site NRC inspectors.
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| 7.a. AFW MOV Replacement (MV 08-12 and 0813)
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| 'Ihese steam supply valves to the steam driven AFW pump had previously been noted to have waalraa== in operation. Previously, the actuators and valves were identified as being undersized and the wrong type of valve and therefore marginal for their in-use application. Operational problems had occurred in 1993 and an increased testing and maintenance fiequency had been pursued. W licansee was replacing these valves under v Page 10 of 13 4
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| - - - . ~ - - --- - - - - . - -
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| 4 M
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| 1 m EXCERMS IR 9449
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| ~
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| 1 Q] PCM 17'3-293, %e licensee upgraded the strength of the valves and sim of the actuators. De inspector observed the satisfactory cut out of the old MV 08-13 valve and the end prepping of the piping for the Indallanian of the new 08-13 valve. De valve had been pre-welded with stub pipes to facilitate indaltation into the existing overhead system piping which maant that two additional weld joints were added.
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| h inspector examined the installed new 08-12 valve. %e valve to piping welds and general installation looked more than adequate. Some supports were to later be installed. During the installation, the motor on the j actuator was bumped such that the motor casing had paint removed and was scratched. A motor end bell bolt 4
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| was also bent. %e inspector reported this to the electrical d , t.r t and outage director for evaluation. N installation had yet to be accepted by the plant for operation.
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| ; 7.b. S/G Nonle Dam Replacement I
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| ne previously used nonle dams had posed problems during years of use. b old style had leakage problems and installation had been not ALARA effective. A new design had been selected for use this outage.
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| ~
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| 7.c. MOV Generic Latter 89-10 Work (see maintenance section above)
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| ; 7.d. Replace Rosemount Transmitters i
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| ne licenses letter le93-61, dated March 5,1993, gave the licensee response to NRC Bulletin 9041, .i Supplement 1. %e licensee was replacing a number of pressure transmitters (Ms) in respcase to this bulletin.
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| De inspector observed satisfactory 'as-installed
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| * state of the following(3) Es...
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| l - Dese new Panamaunt Ms had been recently installed on or around the RCS pressurimr cubicle. These Ms had been aalac*ad on a random sampling basis. %bing, electrical cabling, and mounting fadaame were
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| >g . ,t , , inspected for maisfactory instauntion.
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| b licensee had installed at least five other Ms, had issued work orders to replace all other Ms, and were on i schedule to complete all subject Ms by the end of the outage.
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| 7.e. NPWO 8301/66,2B Diesel Generator Inspection l
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| %e inspector observed portions of the 2B EDG mechanical and electrical inspections that were accomplished per NPWO 8301/66 and procedure MP 2-2200063,2B Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Maintenance.
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| . During these observations, the inspector noted a sharply bent cable inside an EDG control panel. De high side !
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| l
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| :c-- -* to a 25 KVA grounding transformer had a short length of bare copper cable that was bent sharply at about a ninety-degree angle. He inspector asked the electricians to check the cable for degradation, and they found that several of the small conductors were broken.
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| He electricians repaired the cable by cutting off the damaged end and installing insulation around the bare section of cable to support it and keep it from bending sharply. Engineers reviewed the condition and found that the degraded cable, with several small conductors broken, would have readily carried its design current. -]
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| In Unit 2 LER 92-006 of E-p= '- r 1992, the licensee attributed the cause of a fire in the 2C enadan==te pump j
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| ;' motor electrical lead to a sharp bend in the cable, exceeding the minimum allowable bad radius. %e )
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| ', licensee's corrective action for that event was focused on lasulated electrical leads to pump motors. %e 1 inspector reviewed records of the licensee's training conducted in C+7 '121992 following that eyesit. De lesson plan was good, including a review of the event and copies of industry standards on minimum cable bend radius. Sixty-two electrical maintenance personnel signed the attendance roster for the trauung. !
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| l EXCERPTS IR 9449 The inspector concluded that the degraded cable did not affect operability of the EDG and that the corrective acticns from Unit 2 LER 92406 should not have prevented the condition.
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| 7.f. Weld Cracks on Pressurizer lastrumaatation Nozzles b
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| During outage work, the licensee found evidence that the 'C' pressurizer level steam space instrument nozzle had been leaking during the operating cycle, h evidence consisted of boron deposits on the exterior of the pressurizer. bre are four pressurizer steam space level instrument nozzles. They are fabricated from inconel 690 and are joined to the pressure boundary by 'J' welds on the interior of the pressurizer.
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| The licensee conducted visual and dye penetrant inspections of the welds in question. Results revealed unacceptable linear indications in three of the four welds. % licensee d.t . / d the most probable cause for the indications to be Pnmary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) in conjunction with fabrication 1
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| techniques employed in ranking the weld. Additionally, the licensee performed eddy current testing oc the nozzles in question and determinari them to be satisfactory.
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| 3 he licanaaa's corretive actions involve a partial nozzle replacement process. The process involves cutting a given nozzle at a point between the 'J' weld (on the inner preaurizer wall) and the outer pressurizer wall and removing the nozzle. A weld pad will then be created on the outer pressurizer well using a tempered bead weld pass procedure and the pad will be prepared for a "J" weld. b nozzle will then be ran=arted and a "J' weld will attach the nozzle to the pad.- This method has the effect of extending the pressure boundary from the pressurizer inner diameter to the pressurizer outer Ammater, ,
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| h liemamaa plans to affect the corrective action under their Plant Change / Modification process. h licensee is currently performing a stress analysis for the method to be employed. Because the planaari corrective actions )
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| will result in retuming to operation with unacceptable liamme indications present in the three of the original four j t
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| \ 'J' welds, the licensee will submit a fracture mechanics safety analysis for NRC review sad approval. j 1his activity is being inspected in detail by NRC Region II welding and materials inspectors and will be !
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| reported in IR 335,389/94-10.
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| In conclusion, nudor outage activities which were monitored by NRC inspectors were generally pesformed well. IJe===a* ssponse to anessent work (e.g. pressuriser nozzles) was thorough.
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| : 8. Fire Protection Review (64704)
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| : i During the course of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely examined facets of the Fire Protection
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| ! Program.....
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| : 9. Exit Interview 3
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| h inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 25,1990, with those persons 68W in paragraph 1, above..... Dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
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| I h licensee took issue with NCV 389/944941. In this instance, an operator mispositioned the refueling machlaa and failed to grapple a fuel assembly due to incorrect coordinates in the Recommended Move List.
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| The licensee stated that, while a cross check of machine coordmates following the move may have prevented the 4 failed attempt to grapple, such a cross check was not procedurally required.
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| The licensee also took iwue with URI 389/9449-02. In this case, the inspector questioned whether a single O Page 12 of 13 l
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| _ )
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| 1 m EXCERPTS IR 9449 x licaaaarl operator, performing core alterations on the' refueling bridge, met the intent of the TS requirement for a licensed operator to "obsarve" core alterations. h licensee's position was that a licensed operator performing core alterations constituted the TS-required observer, b licensee indicated that they y ' NRC correspondence, generated during the original Unit 2 licensing process, which supported their interpretation.
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| b licanaam also took issue with URI 389/94-0943. In this case, the inspector found that the Reco=W Move Ust (for fuel shuffle) was not reviewed by the FRG and was not approved by the plant manager. b licensee stated that the Recom A~3 Move Ust's preparation, use, and modification were directed by an FRG-reviewed procedure and that an FRG review should not be required for the list.
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| (open) NCV 389/94-09-01; Incorrect Grappling of a Fuel Assembly, j 4.a.
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| ; (open) URI 389/94-0942; Adequacy of a Single Operator on the Refueling Bridge During Core Alterations,1 4.a.
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| (open) URI 389/940943; Adequacy of Review and Approval of Refueling Core Alterations, j 4.a.
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| a
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| ('
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| l l
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| e C.}
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| i l /
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| Page 13 of 13 :
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| 5 f'4 .
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| EXCERFfS IR 94-10 l ,
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| ,q
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| .f .h
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| * Docket Nos. 50-335,50-389 ~
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| f le==== Nos. DPR47, NPP-16 q Florida Power and Ught Cornpeny . -
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| ATTN: Mr.1 H. Goldberg - ;
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| President - Nuclear l
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| : P. O. Box 14000 ,
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| ' Juno Beach, FL 33408 4 420 I Gaati===a:
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| i
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| > SUBIECT: N(TI1CE OF VIOLATION I
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| f* (NRC INSPECIlON REPORT NOS. 50-335/94-10 AND 50-389/94-10) '
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| 'i .
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| i This refers to the '- ;--F'= ca=l= *=d by B. Crowley of this office on i March 21-24, March 28-31, and April 4-8,1994. b inspection included a review of activities authoriasd for -
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| ! your St. Imcie facility. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those ===ad==e of your staffidentined in the enclosed report.
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| { Areas ====l==i during the '- ;--F= are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspecten ===i=*=d
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| ~
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| i , of selective ====la=*i- of procedures and ..,,. - dve records, interviews with personnel, and obearvation of activities in progress. :
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| i n===d on the results of this inspection, certain of your activities appeared to be in violation of NRC
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| ; gc . ._ ' . as specified in the enciceed Notice of Violation (Notice).......
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| Sincerely, Charles A. Casto, Acting Chief Engineering Branch
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| 'I- Division of Reactor Safety
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| ==Enclosures:==
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| -3 1. Notice of Violation
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| @ 2. NRC Inspection Report ENCLOSUREI NO11CE OF VIOLA'IlON t Florida Power & Ught Co. Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 St. Imcie Nuclear Plant License Nos. DPR47 and NPF-16 During an NRCanspection conducted on March 2124,1994, March 28-31,1994 and April 5-8,1994, a violation of NRC requi:ements was identified. In accordance with the ' General ha- of Pohey and t Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CPR Part 2, Appendix C, the violation is listed below:
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| < 10 CPR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by
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| + - . Page l of 7
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| .y
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| 9 9
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| EXCERPTS IR 94-10 t
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| 'j lastructions, procedures or drawings .......and shall be' accomplished in m.h with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
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| 10 CPR 50, Appendix B, Criteeion X, requires, in part, that a program for inspection of activities affecting .
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| ; quality shall be ... executed... to verify conformance with the docununted instructions, procedures, and drawings for accomplishing the activity.
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| For repair of the pressurizer vapor space nozzles, paragraphs 13 and 14 of Welding Services, Inc. Work Procedure 3403304, Revision 2, Weld Performance, Post Weld Heat Treatment and Nozzle Installation, St Imcie Unit 2, Nozzles B and C, and referenced Florida Power and Ught Company Plant Change / Modification
| |
| ' 038-294 requires that: (1) the J weld preparation (PREP) for attaching the nozzles to the pressuriser be ground '
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| to an angle of 45* +0*/-5*, and (2) the J-weld PREP be dimensionally inspected and signed off by Quality Control.
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| Contrary to the above, on April 7,1994, activities affecting quality were not accomplished in m.b with prescribed i ,c-:-- and the program for inspection of activities affecting quality was not executed to verify -
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| conformance with docununted procedures in that, the J-weld PREP bevel angles were ground to 50 - 52 degrees for nozzle 'C' and 38 - 45 degrees for nozzle "B'. 'Ibe PREPS were dimensionally inspected and accepted by Quality Control.
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| 'Ihis is a Severity I.evel IV violation (Supplement I).......
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| Report Nos.: 50-335/94-10 and 50-389/94Il 0
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| ..m Ucaa==a: Florida Power and Ught Company y
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| I, L) 9250 West Plagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 Ucesse Nos.: DPR-67 and NPP-16 Pacility Name: Saint Imcie Plant Units 1 and 2 i
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| l Inspection Conducted: March 21-24,1994, Man:h 28-31,1994 and
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| * April 5-8,1994
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| ! Inspectors:
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| B. R. Crowley Date Signed J. L. Coley Date Signed Approved by:
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| J. J. Blake, Chief Date Signed Materials and Piw Section Engmeering Branch Division of Reactor Safety
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| . )
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| - %./ Page 2 of 7
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| t EXCERFTS IR 94-10 1 d dUMMARY
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| ' Scope:
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| {
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| ' Ibis routine, --- =z-:=' inspection was conducted on site in the area of pressurimer steam space nozzle repairs.
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| 1 Results:
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| In the areas inspected, one violation (VIO), failure to meet weld-prep dimensional tolerances on pressurizer instrument nozzle welds - i ,.l. 2.d.(3), was identified. No deviations were identified.-
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| In general repair activities were well controlled and accomplished in accordance with requirements-~~~
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| *t ,
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| k 2. Repair of Steam Generator Pressurizer Steam Space Instrument Nozzles - Unit 2 (73753) (55050)
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| ;1
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| !i N laspectors reviewed documents and records, and observed activities, as ladwa*=d below, to determine whether repair of the one-inch diameter, pressurizer vapor space, instrument nozzles was being conducted in l'
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| =~'-~ with applicable procedures, regulatory requirements, and licenses commitments. The applicable
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| -1 Code for Unit 2 is the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Repair and RgM i
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| . Vessel (ASME B&PV) Code, Section XI,1989 Edition. In w.d c4 with ASME Section XI, the repa r was ;
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| being accomplished in =s " m with the original construction code of record, ASME B&PV Code, Section III, subsection NB,1971 Edition with Addaada through Summer 1972.
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| Code Case N-432, Repair Welding Using Automatic or Machine Gas Tungsten - Arc Welding (GTAW)
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| Temperbead Technique, Section XI, Division 1, was used for the repair. In addition, Code Case 2142, F-
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| ,' Number Grouping for NI-Cr-Fe, Classification UNS N06052 Filler Metal, Section XI, was used for the GTAW
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| !(' welding material.
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| t ll .
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| 2.a. Background I 'Ibers has been a history of industry problems with Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) in amall diameter, Inconel Alloy 600, pressurizer nozzles (See NRC Inspection Report 50-335,389/9348). 'Ibe four Unit 2 pressuriser vapor space instrument nozzles, located in the upper head, were replaced during the 1987 End-of-Cycle (EOC) 3 outage. N replacements were Inconel Alloy 600 material. On March 2,1993, dusing bestup for restart, all four of the nozzles were found to be leaking hacausa of PWSCC and were sop j .
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| with Inconel Alloy 690, which has improved resistance to PWSCC. ' W design remained the same and the
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| ' welding was accomplished with Inconel 182 Shielded Metal ARC (SMAW) welding material.
| |
| During the current refueling outage, visual inspection of the four nozzles revealed evidence of leakage at noz
| |
| 'C'. No leakage was evident at the other three nozzles. Uquid Penetrant (PT) inspection was performed on all four nozzle ends and associated J-welds on the internal of the pressurizer. Randomly oriented rejectable linear
| |
| ' indications were identified in the J-welds of nozzles "A", 'B", and 'C'. M largest indication was 7/8" long and was in the 'C' nozzle weld. Code acceptable rounded indications were identified in nozzle welds 'A',
| |
| "B', and 'D". Surface grinding of the indication area of nozzle 'B' failed to remove any of the indications.
| |
| S* 7 t Eddy Current and Fr indications of the nozzle bores revealed insignificant indications that were attributed to -klatag of the nozzle bores during the manufacturing process.
| |
| 1
| |
| 'Ibe licensee's root cause analysis concluded that the most probable failure mechanism for the 'C' nozzle wold and the rejectable Pr indications in nozzle welds " A', 'B', and 'C' was fabrication defects (alag and lack of
| |
| - fusion)in comt.. nation with PWSCC. 'Ibe most probable root causes of the failure were:
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| Page 3 of 7
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| ---.----...N-
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| i l
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| l r
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| , g EXCERPTS IR 94-10 3
| |
| j - Use of Inconal 182 weld material (SMAW), v.hich is susceptible to PWSCC High residual stesses due to multiple nonle rework / replacement Poor human factor conditions for the SMAW welding To address the above problems, the bcensee re<lesigned the nouie to shell connections as follows: (1) b four existing Int =al 690 nonles were parted below the outside surface of the pressurtaer wall and the inside J-welds were left intact. (2) Inconel pad weld-buildups were made on the outside surface of the pressunzer around the nonle openings. h weld pads were made with the GTAW process using Code Case 2142, UNS N06052 Filler Metal developed for welding inconel 690 base matenals. The pads were 3/4" thick and the laitial six layers were welded using a temper bend technique in accorrlanca with Code Case N-432. 'Ibe parted existing Iacnaal 690 nomies were re-inserted in the pressurizer shell and J-groove welds were used to attach the nonles to the welded pads. 'Ihe J-groove welds were made using the manual GTAW process, b new design should improve the resistance to PWSCC and improve the weld quality by: (1) moving the weld fmm inside to outside the pressurimer, thus lowering the t , .;m at the weld during plant operations by 30' j' F and decreasing the susceptibility to PWSCC, (2) welding with GTAW welding material in lieu of the PWSCC susceptible SMAW material, and (3) improving the human factors conditions for welding by moving the weld to the outside of the pressurimr.
| |
| 2.b. Engineering h inspectors reviewed the following documents (5) for the new design....
| |
| 'Ibe desip was implernented under 10 CFR 50.59. & Structural Analysis and the Fracture Mechanics Analysis were not reviewed in detail by the inspectors, but were reviewed to ensure that appropriate design
| |
| , tar ==.naa had been generated for the new welds. 'Ibe design of the welds was derived from the ASMB j , ,
| |
| ) tar *ia= III Code of Record noted above and the Structural Analysis using the new design was performed by
| |
| ~
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| N4=dia= Engineering, the pressuriser manufacturer.
| |
| 2.c. Implementation
| |
| 'Ibe inspectors laterviewed licensee and contractor personnel, reviewed procedures and records, and observed in-process work activities described below to determine whether the nonle repair activities were being acomplished in accordance with procedures and regulatory requirements. W work was performed by Welding Services Inc. (WSI) using their QA program under the direction of Plorida Power & Ilght Company
| |
| - (FP kL). NDE of the welds (Pads and J-welds, with exception of Ultrasonic (UT) testing of the Pad build-ups, t- ws, performed by WSI. UT inspection of the Pad build-ups was performed by FP&L.
| |
| 9 (1) Pmamms and Pmcedures Review :....h above (23) documents were reviewed for general content, approval requirements, and to determine if the work was adequately controlled. In addition, the PQRs, WPSe, and NDE procedures were reviewed to determine compliance with Code (ASME Sections III, V, and IX) requirements as well as the Code Cases noted above.
| |
| (2) Observation ofIn-orocess Weldinn: h inspectors observed the following in-Process Welds (6)....
| |
| (3) Walder Performance: Welder qualification records, including continuity records, were reviewed for the following welders (10), who performed the shove welds.....'Ibe inspectors also observed completed side bend samples taken from qualification test ===a=& lies for welders GBIA735, TMM-1766, and JMK-8858.
| |
| (4) WMa- Material : Welding material cmtification and receiving inspection records for the following
| |
| - v' Page 4 of 7
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| I i
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| 4 EXCERPTS IR 94-10 q ,
| |
| , .j i
| |
| xy welding ' materials (3 lots) used in the welds observed above were reviewed......
| |
| 1 5 (5) Weidag Equipment : The inspector verified, by review of records, that the following automated welding ,
| |
| equipment used for the above welds had been calibrated......
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| 8
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| ; (6) Obmarvation of NDE : The inspectors observed the following NDE of the Weld Pad build-ups......UT '
| |
| l inspection records for noules 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'D' Pad-buildups and surrounding base material were
| |
| ; reviewed.
| |
| i
| |
| - NDE and Mechanical Inspector qualification records for the following NDE e===nane (6) were reviewed.......
| |
| '1 2.d.' Problems Identified During Welding of the Pad Build-ups During Pad Build-up welding, the four problems discussed below were identified:
| |
| 1 }. (1) Welding started with Pad 'C'. h first layer required 15 weld passes to complete. While weldag
| |
| ~.additional layers on Pad 'C', weldag started on Pad 'A*. When 21 passes were completed on Pad 'A' and f4 the let layer was still not complete, WSI r==ti-i that something was different about the weldag of Pads 'C'
| |
| ]1 and 'A'. N job was stopped to determine why Pad 'A' was requiring more beads to the layer than Pad 'C'.
| |
| After trouble shooting, WSI determinart that the output amperage from the machine being used for Pad 'C' was
| |
| ! 240 Amps in lieu of the procedure required 140 Amps. Although the control console was set at the required j
| |
| .140 Amps and calibration records indicated that the console had been calibrated to indicate the correct l amperage, the actual inachina output was 240 Amps. WSI NCR 0041 was issued and all work was stopped to 4 deterame the cause of the incorrect amperage. All parameters were found to be correct for Pad 'A".
| |
| , ff' For equipment being used for Pad 'C', Trouble shooting revealed that the contacts on the 100 digit rotary i j- (, /.) switch on the console used to set tne emperage was dirty and, although set on 100 Amps, was actually requiring
| |
| . L.
| |
| i the power supply to output 200 Amps. Corrective actions included:
| |
| (1) b contacts on all of the rotary switches (for all parameters) on all of the machinas were cleaned and
| |
| ! calibration assured.
| |
| ii (2) Welding parameters were independently m (' dependent of console settings) verified by WSI QC for all l, remaining layers for all Pads.
| |
| i i
| |
| (3) At the time the problem was identified, Pad 'C' na~l~1 only I or 2 layers to completed. Since the welding up to that point had been accomplished outside qualified procedure parameters, the weld either had to be j j) removed and re-welded, or a procedure qualification performed with the welding pararneters used. h licensee l decidad to have WS1 attempt to qualify the iwn. rs used. N qualineatina was ====ful. !
| |
| I The laspectors reviewed all of the cornetive actions listed above, including the new PQR and test neults for the actual i , - ' . used on the "C" nossie Pad. The licensee and WSI response to the problem was considered to be good. ,
| |
| ; l (2) h final UT inspection revealed lack of fusion (LOF) type defects in all of the Pads. All of the defects l 1 were lac =* art within the upper 0.3" of weld material or well out of the temper bend area (1st 6 layers) of the I build-ups. In all cases, the defects were in tne 90' downhill quadrant of the weld indicating slightly high wire l l i feed or low heat input for that portion of the weld. b weld deposition rate had been increased after the sixth j - layer, but within procedure requirements. All defects were satisfactorily removed and repaned using the
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| . 3 1
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| M Page 5 of 7 l d
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| - - -. .- .-- . . ~ . - _ - . _ _ . - - --- ..-- . - - _-- - -- - - ---
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| 0 4
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| 4 i
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| * EXCERMS IR 94-10
| |
| ; p f'' - manual GTAW process.
| |
| The lampactors miewed the repair , M and oburved in-psecess grinding and M t==p=*lan of cavities for Pads "A", "B", and "D". In addition, final UT l==pw*laa of "C" Pad and re M lampar*laa Pads "B" and "C" was observed. Corrective actions were considered ;, wi M.
| |
| (3) b applicable engmeering specification (PC/M 038-294) for weld preparation (prep) of the J-welds in the !
| |
| -l1 Pad Build-ups, specified a J-prep bevel of 45* +0%5*. Paragraphs 13 and 14 of WSI Wort Procedure 3403304 l
| |
| I impl-8-l his trequirement for the props on nonles 'B' and 'C". 'Ibene paragraphs required that the props were to be hand ground to the PC/M requirements and dia===ionalinspected and signed off by QC.
| |
| ! On April 7,1994, the inspectors observed the WSI QC inspector inspecting the final J-weld prep on the 'D' '
| |
| Pad. Based on comparison with the template used for grinding the prep, it appeared that the J-bevel angle was 1 larger than the template. He stated that he would have the QA Manager look at the prep and determine the
| |
| , correct acceptance criteria. AAer determining that the template had been machined to 45*, the inspector
| |
| : requested the WSI Project Manager to re-measure the props on noale Pads 'B' and 'C', which had been 4
| |
| accepted (disama=ional and M) by QC on the previous night shiR. After counparison with the imeplate, the i Project Manager agreed that the angle for "C" nossie Weld-prey appeared to be outside of drawing l .;; . Further measurements by QA/QC found the angle on Pad "C" to be 50 52 degrees and the jj- angle on Pad "B" to be 3M5 degress. WSI NCR 642 and Corrective Request (CAR) 003 were immed to i dae==aa=4 the condition and corrective actions. 'Ibe corrective actions included:
| |
| I (1) Interview of the QC inspector who performed the inspections and accepted the Weld-preps - b interview i revealed that he had mis-interpreted the drawing and thought the angle was 45* +5'/-0* in lieu of 45* +0'/-5*.
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| i
| |
| - (Note: "this does not explain why an angle of 38 - 45 degrees was accepted for Pad "B")
| |
| !j p
| |
| : 1' (2) Re-training all inspection and production personnel to ensure clear understanding of procedural requirements
| |
| , associated with dinaa==ional tolerances (3) Engineering issued a Change Request Notice (CAN) to allow a larger tolerance on the J-prep bevel angle as
| |
| ' 1 larger tolerances are allowed by the ASME Code.
| |
| [; The laspectors concluded that Engineering specification of the overty tight tolerances on the dl====lons j for the J-bevel weld prep should be considered a contributing cause for the above problem, since the j weld-prep was to be hand ground and the etia- of hand grinding to the tight tolerances were not good.
| |
| l' The inspectors informed the lle==== that failure to sneet procedure and drawing dime ==laaal
| |
| ._,' " for the J-bevel weld preps on nossles "B" and "C" and acceptance of the preps by QC !
| |
| ; appeared to be in violation of NRC requinsnents and would be identified as Violation 389/941M1, l Failure to Meet Weld-prep Dimensional Tolerances on Pnesuriner Instrument Nousie Welds. )
| |
| 4 I (4) While inspecting the nonles "B' and 'C' weld preps, the inspectors noted a 1/2" long discontinuity at the lasersection of the bottom of the J-groove and the bore of the hole for the 'C' nonle Pad. It was questionable 4 whether the area would pass M inspection and whether it would be acceptable for welding at fitup. As noted l
| |
| . above, the weld prep had been accepted by QC earlier on the night shin. 'Ihe WSI QA manager agreed to re - )
| |
| i M inspect the area in question to determine if the area could be properly M inspected. b area did pass the
| |
| ; M inspection. Also, the WSI Work procedure contained a later work step for signoff of fitup when the nonles iJ are installed. b WSI Project Manager and the QA manager stated that, the discontinuity would preclude obtaining an acceptable fitup and would be rejected and repaired at the time of the fitup inspection. However, 1 ,
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| Page 6 of 7 l 9
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| ~
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| e - , - ,
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| l
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| ,~,, EXCERPTS IR 94-10 i
| |
| f the Project Manager decided to repair the discontinuity prior to fitup.
| |
| 2.e. Inspection History For Other Pressurizer Nozzles Welded With Inconel 182 (SMAW) Welding Malenal
| |
| %e inspectors reviewed the inspection status / history for all Unit 2 pressurizer nozzle welds. b following summarizes the results of this review:
| |
| In addition to the four vapor space nozzles repaired this outage there are three liquid space small diameter nozzle welds and 30 heater sleeve to lower head welds. As augmented inspections, all of these small diameter nozzles are inspected each outage for leakage.
| |
| In addition, there are six larger diameter (>3') nozzles. Prior to this inspection, the following inspections had been performed for these welds......UTinspections have not revealed any problems with any of the large diameter pressurizer nozzle welds.
| |
| ! RESULTS In the areas inspected, one violation as noted in paragraph d.(3) was identified. No deviations were identified.
| |
| In gr.ml, the repair activities were found to be weH controHed and perfonned in accordance with I rapJrasents. Good performance was observed. Relative to the violation, the inspectors concluded that Ergineering was a {+M +-; cause due to overly tight tolerances assigned to the disnensions for the J-bevel weld prep, which was to be hand ground.
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| 9
| |
| : 3. ExitInterview h inspection scope and results were summarized on March 24 and March 31, and April 8,1994, with those persons indicated in paragmph 1......
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| . (Open) VIO 389/94-10-01, Failure to Meet Weld-prep Dimensional Tolerances on Pressurizer Instrument Nozzle Welds.
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| 1 i
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| O Page 7 of 7 4
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| e
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| .-g EXCERPTS 1R 94-11 l f.
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| Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 .
| |
| Ucense Nos. DPR 67, NPF-16 Florida Power and Light Company ATTN:, Mr. J. H. Goldberg President - Nuclear P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408 4420 Gentlemen:
| |
| . SURTECT: NOTICE OF VIOLA 110N I (NRC INSPECI1ON REPORT NOS. 50-335/94-11 AND 50-389/94-11) I
| |
| + 'lhis refers to the inspection conducted by E. Otrant of this office on May 2 - 6,1994. 'Ihe inspection included a review of activities authorized for your St. I.mcie facility. At the
| |
| ; conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staffidentified in the report.
| |
| This inspection evaluated your implen-wien of commitments to Generic Ietter (GL) 89-10, ' Safety-Related
| |
| * Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance." h inspection consisted of interviews with personnel and
| |
| - selective emananation of reconis, procedures, and hardware. Based on the evaluation completed, we conclude j u V
| |
| ,j that you an in the process of E--f - -
| |
| ; a genesully satisfactory program in respcase to GL 89-10.
| |
| However, as described in the enclosed report, apparent wh were identified which rosy require
| |
| )'
| |
| correction. Additionally, some aspects of your program remain to be fully implernantad within your comunitment schedule. "Iherefore, further inspection of your implementation of GL 89-10 commitments is anticipated.
| |
| - Based on the results of this inspection, certain of your activities appeared to be in violation of NRC requirements, as specified in the ceclosed Notice of Violation (Notice).......
| |
| 1-
| |
| ' Sincerely, R. V. Crienjak, Chief
| |
| - Engineering Branch i i
| |
| Division of Reactor Safety
| |
| 'i Enclosures
| |
| - - 1. Notice of Violation
| |
| ; 2. NRC Inspection Report ENCLOSURE 1 l 3-
| |
| / NOPI1CE OF VIOLATION ,
| |
| i i
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| }
| |
| 1 Florida Power & Ught Co. Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389
| |
| ;. , St. Lucie Nuclear Plant License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16
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| . 3 i
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| O Page l'of 13 4
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| l
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| . EXCERPTS IR 94-11
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| :}
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| %)
| |
| [ During an NRC laspection conducted on May 2 - 6,1994, a v8dation of NRC require =anas was identified. In 1 i accordance with the " General Senaa-aat of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforea-t Actions," 10 CPR 2 l
| |
| ], Appendix C, the violation is listed below:
| |
| 10 CPR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires measures which assure that conditions adverse to quality are
| |
| , , promptly identified and corrected. For significant conditions, the identification, cause, and corrective action taken are required to be documaatart and reported to appropriate levels of management. l I Contrary to the above, on May 3,1994, in three ina- the licensee's measures had not been effective in
| |
| ; assuring that: (1) conditions adverse to quality would be promptly identified and corrected; and (2) the ,
| |
| , identification and correction of significant conditions adverse to quality were documented and reported to manage ===r 'Ihe significant conditions adverse to quality involved stall failures of redundant Unit 2 motor-l
| |
| ~
| |
| operated valves (MOVs) 2-MV-08-12 and -13, which operate to supply steam to the Unit 2 'Iiarbine Driven 9, Analtiary Peedwater Pump. Valve 2-MV412 stalled when actuated to open on November 11,1991, and 2- I i
| |
| MV 08-13 similarly stalled on September 15,1992, and July 20,1993. 'Ibe licensee did not identify that the '
| |
| stall thrust and torque forces had exceeded the associated actuator and valve maximum limits. Corrective actions doc =nanead did not provide an adequate basis for returning the actuator and valve to operation.
| |
| 4 t 1
| |
| ' Ibis is a Severity Imvel IV violation (Supplement I).......
| |
| Report Nos.: 50-335/94-11 and 50-389/94-11 4'.
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| -% Ucensee: Florida Power and Ught Company
| |
| ! 11 ., 9250 West Plagler Street 1 Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 Ucenae Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name: St. Lucie 1 and 2 4 4 Inspection Conducted: May 2 - 6,1994 i
| |
| 4 I Imd Mr; l B. Girard Date Signed Other Inspector: M. Miller OtherI%------ ^ M. Holbrook, Consultant (EG&G Idaho, Incorporated)
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| ]
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| Approved by:
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| C. Casto, Chief Date Signed Test Programs Section Engineering Branch
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| , 3 Page 2 of 13 l
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| 5 i
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| EXCERIFI'S IR 94-11 ;
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| l
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| ' Division of Reactor Safety t
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| Scope:
| |
| 'Ihis special, announced inspection esaminad the implementation of the licensee's motor-operated valve (MOV) program to meet commit =aata in response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve '
| |
| + Testing and Surveillance.' 'Ihe inspectors utilimad the guidance provided in Temporary Instruction i - ('IT) 2515/109 (Part 2), ' Inspection Requir==anen for Generic Latter 89-10, Safety Related Motor-Operated '
| |
| ' Valve Testing and Surveillance." As dal=== tad in Part 2 of TI 2515/109, this inspection was the initial review of the licensee's L f-- "on of its GL 89-10 program.
| |
| h inspectors conducted interviews with licensee personnel and selectively e===laad records, procedures, and
| |
| , =====d the fica ==aa's hardware to evaluate the licanaaa's implammatation of the GL 89-10 program. 'Ibey also i i actions in response to a related open item and other concerns identified in previous NRC inspectices.
| |
| Results:
| |
| The inspectors concluded that the licensee was in the process of implementing a generally satisfactory GL 89-10 MOV program. However, a violation and two inspector followup items (IFis) were identified, .y - Sg !
| |
| waalr===== in the program impla==atation. b violation and IFIs are su==arized below and described in detailin the indicated report sections:
| |
| m j p (Open) VIO 56335,389/941141,'" , ' Corrective Action for MOVs Which Staned During Surveilloness. (Section 2.5.b): In three lassaae== where MOVs stalled during survaillmace tests, the IIcaa- '
| |
| failed to document possible damage to and corrective action for the valves and actuators. 'Ibers were no recorded calculations of the thrust and torque caused by stall to determine iflimits prescribed for the actuator by the valve manufacturers were exceeded. NRC inspectors' calculations found the thrust praducad by stall was about 230 percent of the actuator thrust rating and 160 percent of its torque rating, b thrust was 125 pcreent
| |
| ~
| |
| of valve limit. (Note: b licensee did document and address possible damage and corrective actions for motors and overload relays.)
| |
| I (Open) IFI 56335,389/94-1142, Inadequate Recognition of MOV Test Pressure and Flow. (Section 2.3):
| |
| b ll:ensee's design-baals differential pressure test for valve 1-V-3660 did not accurately determine differential pressure at the valve and did not assure representative design-basis flow. )
| |
| (Open) IFI 50-335,389/94-1143, lack of Instructions or Guidance for Trending and PerlotBc Evaluation of MOV Failures. (Section 2.5.a): Wre was no procedure or instruction specifying who was responsible to perform and evaluate trend reports, when the reports were to performed, who would initiate i--:- " ons and corrective actions, how frequently the reports were to be issued, etc.
| |
| % licensee's program implementation was scheduled to be completed 60 days following start-up from Cycle 13 refueling outage (scheduled fall 1994) for Unit 1 and Cycle 9 refueling outage (scheduled fall 1995) for Unit
| |
| : 2. Approximately 2/3 of the gate and globe valves had been set and tested but a methodology had not been
| |
| ; estabi Aad for verifying the capabilities of butterfly valves. 'Ibese and other important aspects of the program ,
| |
| that had not been fully developed and/or implemented will require evaluation la a subsequent NRC inspection.
| |
| i I U '
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| Page 3 of 13 4
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| i 4
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| ;<\
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| O
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| ; --s EXCERPTS IR 9411 4~l '
| |
| ji The Ivpectors speelfically identined the following issues for father laspection, t gether with ^*
| |
| the violatism
| |
| = of post and feBowup itanas described c .L ', : (1) Completion of the development and ig'---
| |
| ] '
| |
| ^'= of criteria for detenmining >
| |
| 4
| |
| ==i- test requirements. (Section 2.4), (2) Estabhah===* and * ,
| |
| . the capabdities of butterfly valves. (Section 2.6), (3) Revision of calculations for Direct Current (DC) powered '
| |
| j MOVs (pullout efficiency to be used in place of run efficiency). (Section 2.2), (4) Justificatian for the adequacy of the estbod used to extrapolate MOV test results to dessa-basis conditions. (Section 2.3), (5) j, Justification for the MOV stem friction coefficient =====ad in thrust / torque calentatiaan. (Section 2.2), (6) i Completion of abe development and implementation of criteria for periodic verification. (Section 2.4), (7) .
| |
| p C-4 ^6= of the remaining setting and testing of valves. (Section 2.6), (8) Revision of program and test 5' r= t - to require that tivust margins be adequate to account for appropriate uncertainties (such as tonlue 1 switch ropestability). (Section 2.3), & (9) Results of internal inspection of valve 1-V-3660. (Section 2.3) t j - Previously identified IFI 50-335,389/92-25 01 was closed by the inspectors based on the review, described in ,
| |
| i' Section 2.10.a,' which identified the above violation. Additionally, concerns identified in the previous NRC ia=p=e'iaa (50-335,389/91-18) of the lir===aa's GL 89-10 program, were either found adequately resolved or !
| |
| jd 1 will be addressed in the GL 89-10 closeout ia pae*ia= for St.12acie perfonned by Region IL
| |
| ! ne inspectors observed that the quality of diagnostic dua used by the licensee was pasticularly good and j ),
| |
| aaaaida ed this a strength......
| |
| l 2.0 GENERIC IEITER (GL) 89-10 " SAFETY-RELATED MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE [MOV) 'IESTING j j AND SURVElllANCE" (2515/109) j .....NRC inspections of licensee actions imple==ating conunst==ata to GL 89-10 and its supptamaata have been j aa=daesad based on guidance providad in Temporary Instruction (11) 2515/109, **- ; - -P= P - , * - for -
| |
| j'* Generic Iatter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance.' 'I12515/109 is divided ,
| |
| 4 Into Part 1, " Program Review," and Put 2, ' Verification of Program Ig' ^*=
| |
| * I l' -
| |
| (
| |
| ; he current inspection is the initial 112515/109 Part 2 program implementation inspection. De 112515/109 l Part 1 program review for St. Iancie was candne*ad bre ahae 9 through 13,1991, and was docu==ntad in
| |
| ; NRC Inspection Report 50-335,389/91-18, dated November 18, 1991.
| |
| L i 4
| |
| De principal focus of this inspection was to evaluate in depth the implementation of GL 89-10 for a sample of
| |
| ' MOVs (10) selected from the licensee's program. De MOV sample was chosen from a list of valves that had !
| |
| received differential pressure (DP) testing. De majority of the valves selected were gate valves with high i
| |
| i, design-basis DP (DBDP) operating requirements. De MOVs in the sample were as follows......His inspectica f1 also evaluated actions which the licensee had taken to correct a related violation and wanh==e=== identified in ,
| |
| ; previous inspections, as described in Section 2.10 of this report.
| |
| 3 '
| |
| l Based en this, the inspecton concluded that the lle====a was * ;'----
| |
| ; an -- , ? MOV progrese
| |
| ^
| |
| la response to GL 89-10. However, scene wanh===== were identined. Additional NRC l==paattaa is planned to cosaplete the evaluation of some areas and to address specific findings identifled below.
| |
| 2.1 Design-Basis Reviews : For the above sample of 10 MOVs, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Genenc >
| |
| ; 14tter 89-10 Design-Basis Differential Pressure (DBDP) Calculations, applicable operational r --
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| * _, system i flow drawings, pump curves, and the design-basis documents........%e licensee had been notified of the effects of elevated temperature ca anator torque thrmagh a Potential 10 CPR Part 21 Notice deced May 13,1993, and
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| . Tach =leat Update 93 03 (March 1993) issued by Limitorque Corporation. De licensee issued Conective Action Request 070593 dated September 15,1993, to initiate corrective action for the MOV motors.
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| ;. i i- s'f Page 4 of 13 i
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| EXCERPTS IR 94-11
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| % "i i g Evaluation JPN-SEMP-93 031 was initiated to address the effects of elevated - , m.L . on the MOVs and recommand corrective action. 'Ibe inspectors verified that the licensee impim ead appropriate ;
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| corrective action by revising the calculations for reduced motor torque of the affected MOVs.
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| The inspectors *==eladad the tiemnas= bad adequately implana=8ad the desigMasis h*Eaas of i GL 8910 for design-basis reviews. ,
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| 2.2 MOV Sizing and Switch Settina : W inspectors reviewed the licensee's documaatation for determination (
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| of design-basis thrust / torque requimes for 5 of their selected sample of 10 valves: 1-HCV-3617,1-V-3660, 2-V-3654,2-V-3664, and 2-MV.03-13........
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| M inspectors noted that the licensee had calculated stem friction coefficients using static test data for the purpose of justifying their ====ad 0.20 stem friction coefficient. 'Ibe inspectors discussed with licensee
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| . personnel the importance of measuring stem friction coefficient under test conditions that are iy. ^:ve of I4 design-basis conditions. Ucensee personnel stated this would be considered in developing the,iustification for their ====d stems friction coefficient. Region II will review the licaama's justification during a future
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| {
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| !i inspection.
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| 'Ibe licensee's actuator manufacturer, Limitorque, is understood to have recently recammandad that pullout efficiency be used in place of run efficiency for deter =iame== of actuator capability in the closing directbn for
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| :l
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| ! DC powered MOVs. I Acaaaaa per=rmaal stated that an informal review of the impact of this information had .
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| !* been completed and that no concerns were idantified. 'Ihey ladirasad that use of pullout efficiency for the closing direction for DC MOVs will be incorporated by revising the formal calml-+W Region II will review .
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| the result of using pullout efficiencies during a future inspection. I l
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| /
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| ~ 2.3 Danign-Basis capability : For their selected sample of 10 valves, the inspectors manunad the static test
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| [ ruuhe, dynamic tut packman, and post-het review packages. 'Ibe dynamic test data we evaluated by the
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| :1 licensee using an industry standard equation, the valves' orifice diamatars, and the dynamic test conditions. 'Ibe ;
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| j, evaluation indicated closing gate valve factors up to 1.10 and load sensitive behavior as high as 6 percent. Stem l
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| ;= friction coefficients for the esmpled valves were as high as 0.21 under static test conditions (see Appendix). !
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| ; Based on this data, it ed not appear that the licensee's 0.50 valve factor assumption for gate valves was always bounding. However, for those valves with high valve factors, the thrust margins applied to settings had been sidfleient to assure satisfactory perfor====aa b capabilities of sister valves had been
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| : stamanstrated by testing under dynamic conditions.
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| l To determine the operability of an MOV, the licensee linearly extrapolated the thrust necessary to overcome j differential pressure to design-basis conditions. Ucaamaa personnel stated that a justification for use of linaar extrapolations was under development. Region II will verify the adequacy of the justification in a subsequent GL 89-10 inspection.
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| 1 i- % licensee's Calculation PSt<BFJM-93 029, 'NRC Generic I. meter 89-10 Motor Operated Valve Diagnostic Test Results Evaluation," issued nar==har 9,1993, documented the method used to extrapolate dynamic test results to design-basis conditions, where aar==aary. 'Ihis method stipulated that the closing extrapolated load is j oompared to the thrust measured at control switch trip (CST) to ensure that the torque switch is set adequately
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| ,, for design-basis conditions. However, the laspectors found that the dociament ed not speelfy any
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| =ina- level of margin that would be ==*==a y to account for uncertainties (e.g., torque switch
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| ^ " " ^
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| ! .; i or degradation in valve /ae*== tar perfor=nanea from one test to the ment). Ucensee per=r==al stated they would review the guidance on this issue provided in Supplement 6 of GL 89-10, and that their program and diffenstial pressure test procedures would be revised to require that thrust snargins be adequate to l l
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| Page 5 of 13 1
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| l EXCERPTS IR 94-11 ;
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| 3-S.
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| 1 V )' account for appropriate uncertainties (such as torque switch repentability). Region II will review the licensee's resolution of this issue during a future inspection. l
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| )
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| )
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| l The licensee's dynamic test evaluation for valve 1-V 3660 deter-mad that this 3 inch Velan flex-wedge gate ,
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| valve (Iow Pressure /High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Recirculation to Refueling Water Tank) had a valve ;
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| factor of 1.10. N laspectors' review of the diagnostic force trace taken during the dynamic test indicated that ;
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| i flow isolation was marked just prior to the point where the valve appeared to reach hard seat contact.
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| However, they noted that the force trace had the charactedstic of a globe valve; there was no closing I force plateau just following flow isolation. Such a plateau is expected hae=== of the uniformity of force j when tbs disc is sliding on the gate valve's seating surface without any change in DP. The seating portion of :
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| the static force trace showed the same shape as the dynamic test, which caused the inspectors to question the l licensee's choice of flow isolation and determinatian of valve factor. After review of the static and dynamic traces, licensee personnel agreed that flow isolation was incorrectly marked, leading to an incorrect deterniinasian of valve factor...... b inspectors' review of the traces for a sister valve, lacasad in series with ,
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| j 1 V 3660 and tested under the same dynamic conditions, showed normal gate valve flow isolation characteristics I i . and a valve factor of 0.51....Ii- personnel indicatad that, har==a of the unusual trace,1-V-3660 was l l
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| scheduled for inspection of the valve internals at the next outage of adequate dunstion. h licensee's ;
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| 4 investigation of 1 V-3660 will be examinad in a subsequent GL 89-10 inspection.
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| 4 The inspectors review of the dynamic test lineup and test results for 1-V-3660 raised two issues: j i
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| ; (1) 1 V-3660 was located in a recirculation line which had a restricting orifice, check valve, and manual valve i_ between the pumps and the MOV. h licensee used a pump discharge pressure gage to determine the l upstream pressure for the dynamic test. Because of the pressure drop caused by the components located
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| + between the pump and 1-V 3660, the true pressure at the valve was not mammired during testing. Additionally, lj'4 no aman ==mant for the difference was noted in the test results, such that a satisfactory comparison to design-basis
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| . conditions might be made.
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| i l (2) Two pumps would be in opemtion during the identified design-basis conditions for 1-V-3660. However, the i
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| dynamic test was conducted with only one pump running, providing approximately one-half the volumetric flow rate that would be present during the design-basis event. As the effects of flow on valve performance are not
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| . readily quantified, test conditions should simulate design-basis flow as near practical to facilitate assessment.
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| ,j licensee personnel indicated they would consider the above when evaluating the results of previous dynamic 1 tests and when developing future dynamic test lineups The lica=ama's failure to account for test pressure j, drops and to assure design-basis flow was considered a weakness. It is identified as Inspector Fouowup Itan 56 335,389/94-1142, Inadequate Reengnition of MOV Test Pressure and flow. Region II will review i
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| i the Ibensee's related efforts during a future inspection.
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| ~
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| Based on the data esaminad, the inspectors concluded that the licanmaa's testing program for the GL 89-10 program MOVs provides the assurance that the tested MOVs will perform their intended safety function.
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| a f.
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| J
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| , 2.4 Per ~a:, verifie=*iaa of MOV C==hility: ......IJcensee personnel informed the inspectors that development of a program for periodic verification of the design-basis capability of GL 89-10 MOVs had not been completed. Electrical Mainian-e, Motor Operated Valve Program Manual, Section F, indicated that
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| ; periodic diagnostic testing would be performed on all MOVs included in the scope of the GL 89-10 program on
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| , a 5 year schedule and that the schedule would be developed following full implementation of initial hamaline testins. The inspectors were informed that static diagnostic testing would be used for the vesifications and
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| : Page 6 of 13
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| , EXCERPTS IR 94-11 4
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| d responded that this was not yet an adequately justifled esehad. Region II will assess the adequacy of the lienisse's periodic vedfiention of '- '; '" capability during a future ' - ;+==
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| ) 'Ihe inspectors found that, in i--dc.c.ce with procedure MP 0950050, ' Post Maintenance Testing of Unitorque i
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| 2 Motor Operated Valves," the testing criteria for specific maintan=ca activities were to be determined by the
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| ] MOV Coordinatar, b inspectors questioned whether this provided adequate control. IIce=ase personnel
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| {
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| stated the procedure would be upgraded to include testing criteria for the vadous snalpaamaan* activities. >
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| ; Region II will verify the '- ;'- *= ':= and adequacy of the post mala 8anance testing during a future inspection.
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| 2.5 MOV F 11=es. Corrective Aa*iaa and Tr d:aa- Recommandad action 'h' of the generic letter requests that hea==== analyas and justify each MOV failure and corrective action...... operability.
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| 1 - a. Tr= ''= and Periad:a h=='Han of Failures and DMF'= aa: b inspeClors =ma aad the following i 1 examples of the licensee's trending and periodic examination of MOV degradation and fdlure data:
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| 4
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| - Motor Operated Valve Trending Program Report for valve 2-MV-09-10 (' Ibis report : ^ ' 4 descriptive !
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| Information, manufacturers data, dates of testing and preventi"e maintan=ce, and trend data on parameters such j
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| : as stroke time, megger results, stem factor, peak thrust, and thrust at control switch trip. h report containad i diagnostic results from 1994; and stroke time, current, and megger data from 1992 and 1994.)
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| t
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| ~
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| ; Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System Companaar Failure Analysis Report Component Failure Comparison
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| ; (Unit 2), dated July 2,1993. ('Ihis report compared the St. Lucie and industry failure rate and provided brief a descriptions of the valve failures, causes, and corrective actions for the period from October 1,1991 through j m March 31,1993.)
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| !j 4 ,
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| uV 3) Malataaaaca Fiseia e No. 0940069, Rev.11, Preventive Maina ==ca of Non-Envirnanumtally Qualified Unitorque Motor Operated Valve Actuators. ('this was provided by licensee personnel as an example to show
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| ; that trendable data was being collected through preventive maintenance procedures. T! e inspectors found that it j required inspections and recordmg of vari.ous data that could be used to identify degradation and could be
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| ; trended Examples of the inspections included stem thread condition, run current, and functiorhy of position
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| {
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| indication lights. b inspectors verified similar data was recorded for environmaatally qualified MOV j actuators through Fivaa e 0940072, Rev. 8.)
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| The inspectors review of the above indicated that trending and emanninstion of MOV failures and l .
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| degradation had been initiated, except that there were no administrative controls governing the process. ,
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| 1
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| ! There was an procedure or lastruction specifying who was responsible to perforat and evaluate trend j reports, whas the reports were to perfonned, who would initiate reconunendations and corrective actions,
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| ,i etc. This was considered a weakness. Lirwamme personnel indicated that this finding would he evaluated and n; ' k action would be taken. The matter was identified as Inspector Followup Itan 56-335,
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| ! 389/94-1143, Lack of Instructions or Guidance for Trending and PerWie Evaluation of MOV Failures.
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| : b. Doc-wlaa Analysis. and Corrective Aetiaa= for MOV
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| ==Dear Aa*1m and Failures:==
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| h inspectors
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| - reviewed and ==a==ad the adequacy of the licensee's documaatation, analysis, and corrective actions for MOV degradation and failures through a review of selected licensee maintenance Work Orders (WOs) and N-formance Reports (NCRs). b WOs (9) were cha-a from the printout of summary information in the licensee's datahaaa for 1993 - 94 maina-aaca. 'Ibe NCRs, covering significant failures (5), were chosen from a listing of all NCRs for a like period. Two earlier (1991 and 1992) WOs were added to the review hac=ae of
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| . their apparent relation to failures in the initial WO and NCR selection.
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| % /- Page 7 of 13 e
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| A EXCERPTS 1R 94-11
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| . .;j h WOs reviewed by the inspectors included the following..... !
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| h NCRs reviewed by tne inspectors included the following.......
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| 4
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| : In asesseing the above WOs and NCRs, inspectors found that the licensee's documaatation, analysis, and I corrective actions for MOV degradation and failures was satisfactory except in addressing the machanical I
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| overloads experienced by valves 2-MV-0812 and -13. These are identical MOVs and perform ranh= dant safety
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| , functions, h documanted analyses of the stall of valve 2-MV-08-12 on November 11,1991, and stalls of
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| : valve 2-MV.08-13 on Seremner 16,1992, and July 20,1993, did not determine the torque and thrust j experienced by the actuators and valves (single wedge gate type) for comparison to limits specified by the
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| 'i manufacturers.
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| : d. ...... thrusts and torques during the above stalls were approvima#aly 18,600 lbs and 143 A-lbs, respectively. %
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| calculated thrust was about 125 percent of the valve mszinum thrust limit described in the lie ==a's July 26, 1993, engineering evaluation JPN-PSle93438, Rev. O. This deficiency was not identified or evaluated in
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| }
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| '*; the acceptability of the valves following any of the stall events. P - ;- "ly, the ha== bas .
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| c! ==*=hilahad a valve thrust limit of 44,000 lbs, indicating the valve would not have been damaged in the stall events. 'Ibe calculated stall thrust and torque were 230 and 160 percent of the actuator (Umitorque SMB40) retmas, respectively. As in the case of valve thrust the actuator stall overthrust and overtorque were not
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| 'l documented or evaluated in assessing valve operability.
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| i . In February 1992, Unitorque Technical Update 92 01 was issued to notify lic-- and others of e- --
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| 'M== resulting from review of an industry study to establish increased actuator ratings 'Ihe Update ,
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| i reco==aadad that the utility: contact Unitorque for an operability ammaan=aat if actuator thrust =caadad 140 l . percent of the rating, quantify any overthrust by conservative calculations or measurements, and ensure housing l m cover and base fasteners were torquod to specified minimum levels. 'Ibe Update also indicated that a one-time 4; ' overthrust of up to 250 percent of the acet.ator rating was accapenhia hhaarp=nely, in April 1992, Unitorque j[ issued u=i=*==e= Update 92-1. ' Ibis Update stated that if the 250 percent one-time thrust rating was
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| ;- exceeded, or if the overload occurred more than once, an inspection of the actuator for damage is
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| ; recommandad. 17or opening overthrust, it recom=aadad inspection of the drive sleeve and lower drive sleeve
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| : bearings 'Ibe Main ====ca e Update also stated that a one-time torque overload of up to 200 percent of the i actuator rating was acceptable but that, if this limit was exceeded or overtorque occuned more than once, the
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| . gearing and particularly the worm should be inspected for cracks.
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| !4 Valve 2-MV 08-13 had experienced stall twice, as stated above, and may have experienced conditions appranchinir stall at other times. 'Ibe licensee did not document the calculations or inspectione reco==aadad by i
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| the manufacturer to assure the valves would perform their design safety functions. Instead, the licensee relied
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| ;i on diagnostic testing performed following the stall failures.
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| )
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| l- Ucensee personnel agreed that their documented evaluation was insufficient but considered the corrective actions '
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| ; . they performed adequate. 'Ibeir reasons were as follows: (1) At the time of the 1991 stall event they had no written guidance from Umitorque regarding evaluation of stall. (2) h one-time allowed actuator thrust and l
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| ; torque specified by Unitorque were not exceeded. (3) Electrical Maintenance performed a visual inspection of the actuator during motor replacement following the 1992 event. (4) Diagnostic monitoring performed monthly i following the 1993 stall did not indicate any damage to the actuator internals. In addition, visual a====atian of the actuator did not ladicate camage. % use of diagnostics was considered equivalent to vendor m = mad ='la== (5) 'Ihe valve manufacturer indicated its thrust limit was 44,000 lbs, which was not avaaadad.
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| h inspectors' assessments of the reasons given tojustify the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions was as follows: (1) An appropriate engmeenng evaluation would have included a documanted and verified Page 8 of 13
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| a
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| ] ,S. EXCERFIS IR 94-11 <
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| $ <% / a=I=l=81a= of stall fotees which could be compared with the actuator reting. c' "i.g that the stall thrust calculated during this NRC inspection was over twice the acts ator reting, it would have been appropriate to seek guidance from the manufacturer or replace the actuator. (2) b one-time actuator allowed torque and thrust is specified for overloads IEL19 the stated limits. It is only for one (one-time) overload up-to the allowable limits l
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| . not multiple overloads. 'Ibe licensee experienced two overloads near the limits and at least three additional lower overloads detected during diagnostic testing. Others, up to stall overload levels, may have occurred !
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| undetected. (3) Discussions with licensee , - " indicated that this visual e= amination was not the inspection of components that Umitorque recommends. No documented inspection results were provided to the inspectors in support of an adequate visual examination. (4) While the beanaan's diagnostics did increase
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| , assurance that the valve would perform its safety function, it would not be expected to detect incipient failures as assuredly as the vhual inspect ca recommaaded by Umitonlue. Based on discussions with licensee personnel, the hcensee performed a visual inspection but not the inspection of co-paaa=*= that Unitorque reco===ada. No doc ====*=d inspection results were psevided to the laspectors la support of an adequate visual a===laatiaa. (5) h original thrust limit provided by the valve manufacturer was 9910 lbs. As .
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| . reported in the licensee's 1993 angineenng evaluation (JPN-PSL 93 038) performed following the second stall of 2-MV-08-13, informal information from the vendor indicated the limit could be increased to about 15,000 ;
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| j !
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| lbs. 'This was below the stall thrust calculated during this inspection, which is of 18,600 lbs. 'Ihe licensee was
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| > not aware that the limit could be further increased to 44,000 lbs until later.
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| Based on the above, the laspectors consider the flesama*'s me*la== la response lo the valve stall failurus unsatisfactory. The ilmana*'s failure to daanmane calculation and evaluation of the stall overland conditions, to identify the valve and actuator overload, and to perforse the evaluations or * , "--
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| r====aadad by the acenatar manufactune are considered to reprunent inadequate corrective meelam This landequate corrective action is identified as Violation 58 335,389/941141, Ina "- c ' Corrective m Action for MOVs Which Stalled During Sury,Ine ,
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| Although the inspectors determinad the licensee's valve stall evaluations were deficient, positive aspects were also noted. 'Ibe application of diagnostics following the failures, particularly the periodic diagnostic monitoring of valve performance instituted after the July 1993 stall, provided increased assurance of valve operability. h licensee replaced MOVs 2-MV-08-12 and -13 at the first refuelag outage following the 1993 stall with valves and actuators having improved capabilities. However, it appeared to the inspectors that other actions should have been taken earlier - either improved justifications for the continued operability or valve replacement.
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| j*
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| 9 The adequacy of the licensee's daa==entation, analysis, and corrective actions for MOV degradation and i falhares was satisfactory with the exception of actions of inima following stall failures.
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| 2.6 Schedule :......'Ibe inspectors reviewed the documented status of testing and determined that the licensee had tested approximately 2/3 of the globe and gate valves in the program for each unit. In a--4 cc with the current commitment, one refueling outage remams for each unit. Ucensee personnel stated that some of the ,
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| remaining valves would be tested during operation.
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| Ucenses ,., -- :d had not determiaad what method that would be used to verify the capabdities of butterfly valves but indicated that they expect to meet the schedule commitment. Appropnate testing of butterfly valves is an industry issue and not unique to St. Lucie.
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| L j . 'Ihe inspectors questioned whether the licensee had determined the more important valves to be tested and completed testing of them first, as requested in the March 16,1992, NRC letter that aancwledged the l licensee's schedule change. '! hey were provided copies of related letters (dated January 29 and February 10, 1992) from the licensee's engmeering group to the plant, which prioritized the valves for testing. 'Ibe
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| <- inspectors reviewed the prioritization against the licensee's list of valves tested and found ti.v.t in some casea the
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| -Q' Page 9 of 13 4
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| !, 1 1- . EXCERFIS IR 94-11 l
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| , i l Nj higher priority valves had not been tested. %ese were discussed with licensee personnel. Explanations as to way the valves had not tested included: deletions from the program, questions as to whether valves were testable at or near design-basis conditions, diagnostic sensor problems, mainunance problena, and on-going questions regardag inclusion of certain valves in the program.
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| Based on the test data reviewed by the inspectors la this inspection and on their eac==Ia== with liemsee l personnsi, the l==pactans belleee the licensee can meet the specified completion achaasia The llamma's essapletion of the setting and verification of the capabilities of all valves in the GL 89-10 program
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| - (including butterfly valves) will be confirmed in a subsequent inspection.
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| L 2.7 Pressure Iacking and %srmal Bmdma ........%e inspectors reviewed the licaaama's engineering report that addressed pnesure lockmg and thermal bindmg Engmeering Evaluation JPN-PSleSEMP-93436, 'St.
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| 3 Imcie Units 1 & 2 Engmeering Evaluation of Pressure locking and Thermal Binding of Motor Operated Gate Valves,' Rev. O, was performed by the licasee to identify safety-related motor operated valves that might be susceptible to pressure locking and/or thermal binding. An initial screeniog of the 80 MOVs in Unit 1 and the 103 MOVs in Unit 2 was conducted to determine if the MOVs met screening criteria for susceptibility to pressure locking or thermal binding. He screening criteria for pressure locking susceptibility was: (1) flexible-wedge or double disc wedge gate design, (2) used for irw-y. ;ble fluids, and (3) lacking a design feature for pmvention. De screening criteria for susceptibility to thermal binding was (1) flexible-wedge, solid-wedge, or split-wedge gate design; and (2) MOV closed under high temperature conditions. In Unit 1,14 MOVs met the I
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| initial screenmg criteria for pressure locking and 19 met the initial screening criteria for thermal bindag. In
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| . Unit 2,12 MOVs met pressure locking and 15 met thermal binding initial screening criteria. A further evaluation deterininart that nine MOVs (four in Unit 1 and five in Unit 2) were susceptible to pressure locking.
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| Two MOVs in Unit I were determined to be susceptible to thermal binding. De tranninittal letter for the above ,
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| - evalamainn, JPN-PSI.P-94-0132, dated February 28,1994, identified the MOVs found to be susceptible to l L pressure lock *mg and thermal binding as follows: Pressure Iocking: Valves I&2-V-3480,1&2-V-34st,1&2- l l
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| V-3651,1&2-V-3652, and 2-V-3545 Dermal binding: Valves 1-V-1403 and 1 V-1405 l At this point the inspectors and licensee did not have operability concems with these ve'.ves. De licensee has adequately considered valve operability. However, the letter indicated that a detailed valve specific engineenng analysis would be performed for the above valves to determine any requimd action. )
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| i %e NRC plans to issue additional i-e== hions to licensees regarding pressure locking and thermal bindmg j
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| ,j in the future. Subsequently, the NRC will ===*== licensee actions in this area. 1 i
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| 2.8 Motor Brakes: St. Imcie did not have motor brakes on their MOVs.
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| l j . 2.9 Ouality Assumnce Pronram Implementatiggli %e inspectors reviewed the licasee's implementation of the
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| : quality assurance (QA) function for the GL 89-10 Program MOVs. Hey found that audits and reviews had been performed by the Nuclear Engineering Department, independent Safety Evaluation Group (ISEG), Site QA, and Corporate QA. De inspectors reviewed the following examples: (1) Nuclear Engmeering Department self-a==amarnaar letter JPN-ST-92-150, ' Design Review /Punctional Review MOV - Testing," dated June 12, 1992. (2) ISEO Report ISEG-PSleV-048, ' Evaluate Motor Operated Valve Differential Pressure Testing at St.
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| Imcie,' dated June 22,1993. (3) Corporate QA audit, QAS-JPN-93-3, ' Nuclear Engineenag-PSL Design Control,' dated October 29,1993. (4) Site QA contractors audits QSI< OPS-92-872 for the MOVATS (MOV)
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| Psogram and QSlePS-92-872 for Ralwd & Wilcox MOV Testing.
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| l Based on their review of the above, the inspectors concluded the licensee has implemented an effective QA program to address GL 89-10 MOVs.
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| d Page 10 of 13
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| ; m EXCERPTS IR 94-11 j
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| i / 2.10 Pollown of Previous ta=~eei- Piadiaa ..........
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| j a. Inspector Followup Item (Closed) IFI $0-335,389/92-25-01, Review of Operability of Unit 2 MOV MV-j
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| ' ' ' 08-13 During the Period of July 20 to October 19,1993. j J ' Ibis itsen , ^'H the operability of valve 2-MV.08-13 during the period of July 20 to October 19, 1993.
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| ; 'Ibe failures experienced by & valve and the licensee's corrective actions were er==inad in detail by the -
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| ; inspectors, as described in Section 2.5.b of & report. During the period in question the licensee performed a
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| ; numhar of surveillance tests on the subject valve and in each instance the valve opmed when actuated to j!. perform its intandad safety function. Based on the testing results and evaluations discussed in & report, the 1 inspectors consider the valve to have been operable during that period and & itesa is elooed.
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| It sleemid be noted that the reisted review described in Section 2.5.b, identified that the licensee's corrective action for stall failures of this valve was deficient, la that the July 24, and previous related failures were t=ad t=*=ay analysed. More complete analysis siight have led to a licemese a=el==8a= that jl f the MOV's ,apahanes= west significantly degraded and required I===adiata repleenma=# or father
| |
| [ j- ^~- ^' for ea=*8==ad operation. Note that valve 2-MV.08-13 and its reduadant sister valve were replaced by the licensee during a February 1994 outage.
| |
| 1
| |
| : b. C=- = ; ' ' Wied by f=---Maa 50-335. 389/91-18 for which a Written F-= was Raauested f;
| |
| i j (1) Schedule 'Ihe canen=n was that the licaaaaa might not meet its generic letter =chadula ca==itment.....
| |
| l In a response letter to the NRC dated Febmary 14,1992, the licanana proposed its revised schedule. As
| |
| ; discussed in Section 2.6 above, the inspectors examined the licasee's related actions and believes that the j3 x current comunitment can be met. ;
| |
| l
| |
| ,j. p) ' Ta-aad 'Ibe concern was that design-basis testag was being omitted on MOVs J
| |
| ;i C (2) Velv to be D==i-=?
| |
| that wwe pmetical to test......In the response letter referenced above, the NRC was informed that the licensee j
| |
| would test all valves practical. 'Ibe tiranaaa's testing of all valves practical will be ===a==ad when Region II inspects the licensee's completion of OL 89-10 implementation.
| |
| : c. Cc--:- r Ida=*ified by i~aartiaa 50-335. 389/91-18 for Which No Written F-aa was Reauested (1) Setnoint Window b concern was that the licensee had no procedure or progr===atic guidance for
| |
| ; transforming design calculation results into valve seapoint windows. In the current inspection the NRC Inspectors determined that adequate setpoint windows had been established for the valves sampled. l lI (2) Use of 0.5 Valve Fao*ar to A -em for Uncertainties Seh as Rate of I a.aia- b concern was that the licensee had not adequately accounted for uncertainties such as load sensitive behavior in its thrust setting f-
| |
| '% % inspectors' review, described in Section 2.2 above, found that load sensitive behavior and
| |
| ; ~other factors onginally of concem are being addressed. l l ' (3) Justi" "- Ded=M-= hs Cc *^--~ to Test All Valves Prae *leable b caacars was that the licanaaa was evaluating deviations from the generic letter i---- --M = to design-basis DP test all valves practicable for valves with hish margins of capabilities to design-basis requirements. 'Ibe inspectors raca==idaned & lasue and do not find the deviations of eaacara, if adequately justified. . Such justifications will be subject to evaluation in a subsequent inspection. h original concern is resolved.
| |
| (4) Uns of ****Ie D%ie Ta *iaa to Da-
| |
| * ase Caatiaaad MOV C=a=hilitian b concern was that the
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| . )
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| k/. Page 11 of 13 4
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| + e . - , . -
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| --.c , - . . , . s-.e-- -. .-.. w
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| 1 5
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| 1 r
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| ~ EXCERPTS IR 94-11 i
| |
| d licaaw planned to use static diagnostic testing for periodic verification of MOV capabilities. The ability of
| |
| - static diagnostic testing to demonstrate continued capabilities has not been justified. In the current inspection the
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| '
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| * NRC ' ; "-w were informed that the licensee had not completed the determinatina of the maahad and criteria 2 to be used for penodic verification. This issue will be inspected during program closecut.
| |
| 4 i (5) Staan Prictina Coefficient and Slam Laabrication Frequency ' Ibis concern involved the licensee's use of a low sessa friction coefficient and a stem lubrication frequency greater than reco==aadad by the raanufacturer.
| |
| j A valve stem friction coefficient of 0.15 was utilized in calculating torque switch settings for St. Iacie GL 89-10 valves located outside com niamant. b valve actuator manufacturer indicates this stem friction coemcient is i e
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| .{ '
| |
| to be applied where good stem lubncation is assured and, in practice, the manufacturer normally uses a more conservative 0.20 stem friction coemcient for its own calculations. Also, the eenasar manufacturer I l
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| d reco==aadad an 18 month preventive malanapaana frequency for valve stem lubrication, whereas the beenses f
| |
| permitted a 36 month frequency on its non-equipment environmental qualification (EQ) valves.
| |
| In the current inspection the NRC inspectors verified that the licensee was now using 0.20 stem friction
| |
| ' coefficient. b liaaname stated that the valve stem lubrication frequency of 36 months applied only to non EQ j l OL 89-10 MOVs located inside the buildings b licensee further stated that the 36 month valve stam i
| |
| i lubrication frequency will be adjusted as aa-t-d to ensure the stems are properly lubricated. N inspectors
| |
| , {
| |
| . concluded the licensee has adequately addressed the valve stem friction coefficient of 0.20 and stem lubrication. )
| |
| !. ' Ibis concern is resolved. 'the licensee's verification that its 0.20 stem friction coefficient assumption and the ;
| |
| j 36 month lubrication frequency is adequate will be subject to NRC verification in a ---?- ;_ _ nt inspection.
| |
| ; (6) Tarque Seated Butterfly Valves 'Ihe concern was that some butterfly valves were being seated using torque 4 switch control, whereas the actuator manufacturer reco==wadad limit switch seating. In the current inspection 1 - the NRC inspectors verified that the licanaan had implamanead a change to limit switch seating for all butterfly j w valves. 'lha change was identified PCM 284-292 and y- % was verified by the inspectors review of l3 Work Order examples 93027861,93028660,93028658,93028659, and 93028655. ' Ibis concern is resolved.
| |
| I (7) t=ha= of m,.aat.ei- M.es.ad and Use of Prototvoe Ta=*ia- 'Ibe licensee's program documnat ladie ead that test results obtained at less than design-bas 3 DP would be extrapolated to design-basis DP and
| |
| . that prototype testing would be used in some cases. "Ihe concem was that no criteria were provided for use of either. In the current inspection the NRC inspectors found that the licensee used simple linear extrapolation and l
| |
| that there was no apparent use of prototype testing. Licensee personnel indicated that justification for the l!
| |
| l adequacy of linear extrapolation was under development (see Section 2.3). Any licensee use of prototype test i! results will be subject to NRC evaluation in establishing the licensee's completion of GL 89-10 implementation.
| |
| I .
| |
| ;J (8) GMh for Docu=a=*iaa and Tra A6a MOV Failures and Dear A-*iaa 'Ihe concern was that the i licensee had not provided adequate guidance for performing the trending of MOV failures and degradation i-------- ' ' by GL 89-10. As discussed in Section 2.5.a above, the current inspection a 4 there is still concern regarding the adequacy of the guidance provided, particularly with regard to administrative i
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| controls.
| |
| , I 2.11 Walkdown h inspectors conducted a walkdown of MOVs to observe the installed yoke thrust sensors and the condition of the valve seems. 'Ihey observed that the MOVs located inside buildings were in good condition. 'Ibe valve stern lubricetion was satisfactory and the sensors were installed correctly MOVs located outside, where they were exposed to rain and salt air, were inspected after removing the valve stem covers. On a previous inspection, an NRC inspector had observed that rain water had leaked into similarly located MOVs and '
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| e3 i .V Page 12 of 13
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| ,. s EXCERPTS IR 94-11 l
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| , Q' corrosion had resulted. b licanmaa had special ' hats' mada to cover the valves and initially installed them on two MOVs to determine if they provided protection from the environment. 'Ibe inspectors found that the two .
| |
| MOVs with ' hats' were in good condition with adequate stem lubrication and no corrosion. The other MOVs located outside were observed to have adequate stem lubrication but some minor corrosion. b sensors were antisfactorily areachad to the yokes of all the MOVs inspected. The licensee stated ' hats' would be la=#allad for all outside GL 89-10 MOVs by the end of 1994. b inspectors can=dared this to be appropnate corrective action.
| |
| i b inspectors concluded that the MOVs located inside the buildings were well maintained. However, the i MOVs located outside were subject to corrosion from the rain water and the salt air envirnamant and some form .
| |
| l of protection appeared appropriate.
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| i
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| : 3. EXITINTERVIEW
| |
| % inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 6,1994, with those persons indbasad in Section 1.
| |
| The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. Three wa=Ima===
| |
| were described. b inspectors stated that one of the waalraamas would be discussed with NRC management as a possible violation and that the other two would be identified as followup items. Lica==a peroommel indhead the reasons they did not consider the one item a violation. Their reasons are described in Section 2.5.b, above.
| |
| L,ydv.ssy information is not containad in this report. 'Ihe violation and followup items identified by the inspectors are listed in the summary at the beginmng of this report.
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| a p 1
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| I f~i i
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| 7)
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| !' 1
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| . Page 13 of 13
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| .p@W= *k 4 q+3 . .
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| * 1 4
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| a
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| ,m EXCERPTS IR 94-12
| |
| , ,{ g 1 May 20,1994 i
| |
| ij Docket Nos. 50 335,50-389 Ucense Nos. DPR47, NPF-16
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| . <- Florida Power & Usht Company
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| ! : ATIN: J. H. Goldberg
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| ~
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| 1 President - Nuclear Division
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| , . P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408 4 420 i
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| - ' Gentimman-
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| ~l
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| | |
| ==SUBJECT:==
| |
| NOTICE OF VIOLNI10N (NRC INSPECI10N REPORT NOS. 50-335/94-12 AND 50-389/94-12)
| |
| ' Ibis refers to the inspection conducted by S. A. Elrod of this office on March 27 - April 23,1994. 'Ibc j- inspection included a review of activities authorized for your St. bacie facility. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed repod.
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| Areas ewamined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted ,
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| of selective eva=3 nations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation ]
| |
| of activities in prossess. 1 i! @" - .
| |
| Based on the results of this inspection, censin of your activities appeared to be in violation of NRC 1 i .-;' , as specified in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice)....
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| Sincerely, !
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| Original signed by David M. Verrelli David M. Verrelli, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2
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| ]{ '-
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| Division of Reactor Projects
| |
| | |
| ==Enclosures:==
| |
| | |
| ii 1. Notice of Violation
| |
| : 2. NRC Inspection Report l- NOUCE OF VIOLADON 1
| |
| Florida Power & Ught Company .
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| Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 St. Imcie 1 and 2 Uconse Nos. DPR47 and NPF 16
| |
| -y During an NRC inspection conducted on March 27 through April 231994, a violation of NRC requiramanta
| |
| ; was identified. In --n " = with the ' General %=*-t of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,' 10 CPR Part 2, Appandir C, the violation is listed below:
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| , y.% 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,' Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, as implemented by approved FPL Topical Quality ;
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| Page 1 of 16
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| *~' *
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| ._ . . _ . _ . . _ . . _ . _ ~. ._ _ _ _ _ .
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| l b
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| , ~ . EXCERPTS IR 94-12 l
| |
| w/ Assurance Report, TQR 16.0 revision 8, " Corrective Action,' requires that measures be w=htiM to assure that conditions adverse to quality, including deficiencies and deviations, be promptly identified and corrected.
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| Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to take adequate corrective actions for Violation 335,389/92-05-04 for
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| : i. failure to adequately surveillance test the ability of the 'C' Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pump to energize following a loss of offaite power (LOOP). 'lhe licensee's corrective action, completed on March 3,1992, included a revision to procedure OP 2-0400050, Periodic Integrated Test of the Engmeered Safety Features.
| |
| Test procedures OP 1-0400050 and OP 24400050 remained inadequate, in that, they did not verify proper C train ICW and Componset Cooling Water (CCW) pump (swing pump) load shed and sequencing functions when
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| , powered from their alternate power supply busses. i I
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| i , .
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| On April 3,1994, during post-modification testing, the 2C ICW and CCW pumps failed to load shed from the l B-train safety bus following a LOOP, Subsequent licensee analysis concluded that the 2B EDO was capable of .i
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| { performing its design function, j i
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| - Ihis is a Severity I.svel IV violation (Supplement I)........
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| j l
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| Report Nos.: 50-335/94-12 and 50-389/94-12 )
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| I Ucensee: Florida Power & Ught Co
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| ' I 9250 West Plagler Street Miami, FL 33102 ;
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| )
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| Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 Ucense Nos.: DPR-67 and NPP-16 !
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| .. ?% l Facility Name: St. Imcie 1 and 2 l
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| j Inspection Conducted: March 27 - April 23,1994
| |
| . Inspectors _K. D. I.andis ,_5/19/94 S. A. Elrod, Senior Resident inspector Date Signed
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| ;i Accompanying Inspectors:
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| i
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| '! M. S. Miller, Resident Inspector, St Imcie Site R. Prevette, Senior Resident Inspector, Brunswick Site
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| ? S. G. 'llagen, Resident Inspector, Surry Site G. T. Hopper, Operator Ucense Examiner i
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| Approved by: ,,D. M. Verrelli _ 5/20/94
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| [
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| , . K. D. Landis, Chief Date Signed
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| . Reactor Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects 'l
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| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| | |
| Scope:
| |
| . 'this routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant operations review, survedlance !
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| d observaticas, maintenance observations, fire protection observations, review of nonroutine events, and followup of regional requests. Backshift inspection was performed on March 29 and April 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 16, and 17.
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| I N Page 2 of 16 1
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| 1
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| EXCERFTS IR 9412
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| ! ~/ - Results:
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| Plant Operations area: (1) Co-s==ications, co===ad, and control were noted to be strong during the Unit 2 fill and vent and the Unit 2 startup (1s 3.b.6 & 3.b.10). (2) Operaton responded well to three reactor trips i
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| and a failure of the steam bypass control system, but showed a wa=kaa= in attention to detail when Unit 2 power rose from 26 to 31 percent due to positive moderator - ,
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| ami3 coefficient (13.b.1,3.b.4, 3.b.10, &
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| 3.b.ll). (3) h decision to repair Unit I shutdown cooling isolation valve V-3480 body to bonnet leakage and to delay the unit power =ema= ion to complete the repair was ma=arvative (13.b.2). (4) One reactor trip was attributed to personnel error, one to a procedural inadequacy, and one to a pre-existing hardware problem (1s F 3.b.1,3.b.4, & 3.b.11).
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| 1 . .
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| i Mainianance and Surveillance area: (1) One violation involved inadequate corrective action for a previous violation for inadequate surveillance testing of the C intake cooling water pump (T 4.d). (2) Management ,
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| =ta==rian was evident in improving comrnunications between operations and instrumentation perscenet (15.e). .
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| ' =**mation was evident at briefs for major evolutions (15). (4) Unit 2 outage modifications !
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| (3) " n -
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| were reviewed and found satisfactory (je 5.f,5.g,5.h, & 5.1). (6) Good post work testing for a pull-to-lock modification of the intake cooling water and component cooling water pump control switches revealed a missing
| |
| '' wire in the Unit 2 load shed circuit (14.d). (7)'Ibe repair of Unit I shutdown cooling hot leg suction inciation valve V 3480 was timely and well done (15.c). l
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| ' Ensincering area: (1) 'lhe engineering response to non-conformance report 2-155 was considered r. wa=kaa==
| |
| because the cause of the three main steam safety valves to stick or bind during their initial set pressere test was not thoroughly evaluated (15.j). (2) Engineering support for the Unit I shutdown cooling hot les suction i
| |
| isolation valve V-3480 mpair was excellent (15.c). (3) b pressurimer spray bypass valve evalunhan was poorly worded (13.b.8).
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| ]
| |
| i' LV V Plant Support area: (1) Health Physics support of the Unit 1 shutdown cooling hot leg suction taal=*iaa valve V-3480 repair was excellent (15.c).
| |
| In the areas !v d eone violation was identified, as follows:
| |
| 335,389/94-124)l, Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for a Previous Vio!stion for Inadequate
| |
| ! Surveillance Testing of the C Intake Cooling Water Pump. (14.d).........
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| . 1 l
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| : 2. Plant Status and Activities i i: I 2.a. IJ. nil _1: Unit I began the inspection period at 100 percent power. Unit power was reduced to 68 percent )
| |
| on March 27 for madanner tube cleaning. b unit tripped from loss of load whm the generator excitor circuit !
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| j . breaker was inadvertently opened locally at 6:13 p.m. on March 28 (see paragraph 3.b.1). During the st 7t startup on April 2, a startup transformer breaker failed to open as required (see 13.B.3). On April 3, while daaaargizing the I A2 4.16 KV bus to remove the failed circuit breaker, the unit tripped from 18 percent power (see 13.b.4) Unit I was restarted on April 4 and placed on line at 1:56 a.m. h unit operated
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| . normally the rest of the period, endmg the period in day 19 of power operation since startup on April 4.
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| 2.b. ll.aill : Unit 2 began the inspection period shut down in operstag mode 5 and restonng the reactor to service. . During an inspection of pressuruar instrn= ant lines, the licensee found boric acid stains below a
| |
| - nozzle n -ek+, indicating a through-wallId Pollowing repair of the nozzles, the RCS was filhi and I
| |
| vented on April 10 and 11. h unit entered operating mode 4 at 2:11 p.m. on April 13, and enterna operating mode 3 at 7:21 p.m. on April 14. While in mode 3, the licensee discovered and repaired a cracked socket weld l 4 i Page 3 of 16 I
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| . q EXCERPTS IR 94-12
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| <A :
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| 4 V' joint where an instrunwat line was attached to a safety injection header. Following this repair, the unit entered
| |
| , mode 2 at 2:45 a.m. on April 20 and attained criticality short:y thereafter at 3:28 a.m._ 'Ibe licensee completed low power physics testing on April 21 and continued the return-to-power process. Unit 2 tripped from 30 percent power at 1:18 p.m. on April 23 during adjusemant of the RPS. 'Ibe unit ended the inspection period in l Operating mode 3.
| |
| 2.c. NRC Activity
| |
| . On March 28 - April 8, B. R. Crowley, Welding and NDE inspector from NRC Region II, was on site to i inspect the licensee's repairs to the Unit 2 pressurizer steam space instrument nozzles. His activitiss were docu=aneani in IR 335,389/9410.
| |
| 1
| |
| }3! On April 4-8, R. L Prevette, Senior Resident Inspector at the Brunswick Site, was on site for familiarization
| |
| :' and orientation. His activities included tours, interviews with licensee managers, and inspection of operating i activities. l 4
| |
| i On April 11 15, S. O. 'I1ngen, Re=ulant Inspector at the Surry Site, was on site for familiarization and i orientation. His activities included tours, interviews with licensee managers, and inspection of opunting activities.
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| , l
| |
| [ On April 18-28, O. T. Hopper, Operator LJcense Examiner from NRC Region II, was on site for :
| |
| familiarization and orientation. His activities included tours, interviews with licensee managers, and inspection l of opassting activities.
| |
| \
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| t ,
| |
| p 3. Review of Plant Operataans (71707)
| |
| 'i A" l 3.a. Plant Tours i
| |
| *Ibe inspectors periodically conducted plant tours.............On March 31, the inspector toured Unit 2 cnneminmaar 'Ibe following items were identified and referred to the licensee for correction:
| |
| l
| |
| * B ham Oenerator: (1) Insulation cotter pin not installed near cold leg manway, and (2) LPM chanaal 7 l leads not secured (loosely coiled).
| |
| j e 2A2 RCP: Ground cables on braided conduit leading to motor not electrically term natart.
| |
| * 2A2 RCP seal package elevation: (1) Unqualified white tie wraps secured various braided conduits, (2) Braided conduit at foot level leading to motor damaged, (3) Against wall between RCP and wall, rigging I hung down the wall from the pipe support, and (4) Top level of motor - snubber 2 018 nameplate was hanging I
| |
| loosely by 1 pin. (5) V36212A SIT F/D: braided conduit to solenoid d==-arl (6) Valve for LT 9013B: tag secured with white tie wrap.
| |
| i e V-3618: (1) Braided conduit to solenoid damaged, and (2) Quick connect endcap taped to l==nlation.
| |
| - On April 12 the inspector toured the Unit 2 containment b unit was scheduled to heat up on April 13. 'Ihe following items were identified and referred to the licaaaaa: (1) Metal insulation covers on the top of the
| |
| ' . pnesurimer were missing fasteners. Additional fasteners were added to secure the metal lamdation on top of the pressuriner. (2) h cover over the junction box for power panels 226,227 and 228 was not tightly secured. ;
| |
| b junction box cover screws were tightened. (3)'there was a small amount of boric acid on RCPs 2A1 and 4 2A2 seal flanges. ' No active leakage was observed & small amount of boric acid on the RCP seal flanges was evaluated as acceptable. (4) bre was boric acid on the insulation in the area of chargmg system vent valve V 2805. No active leakage was observed. N boric acii in the area of V 2805 was cleaned off and the
| |
| (_ , area was scheduled to be inspected for leakage during the RCS leak test, i
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| d Page 4 of 16
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| ]
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| j
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| - - _ - . -- - - - . . - . =- . . . - . --.-- . _ .
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| }}
| |
| g EXCERPTS IR 94-12 2i Wh Inspectors also asked several general questions pertmiaing to the condition of equipment in the -tainw that
| |
| . were antisfactorily astressed by the licensee. 'Ibe inspectors wncluded that the above items were minor in nature and did not affect equipment operability and that the containment was clean and in good general condition.
| |
| 1l 3.b. Plant Operations Review 4
| |
| : .....Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed......
| |
| (1) Unit 1 Ranctor Trip due to Personnel Error On March 28, St. Imcie Unit 1 automatically tripped from 68 j {,
| |
| ; percent power at 6:13 p.m. 'lhe unit had been at reduced power to facilitate cleaning madaaaar waterboxes.
| |
| I Due to the reduced initial power level, safety components such as the safety injection system, auxiliary i;' feedwater systeso, or safety valves were not called upon. Operators responded properly. 'Ibe unit was placed
| |
| < in Operating Mode 3 pending restart.
| |
| i *
| |
| 'Ibe trip occurred when a maintenance supervisor manipulated (opened) the ga .;oi excitor circuit breaker for the operating Unit 1 vice the shut down Unit 2, which he was cleared to work on. 'Ibese circuit breakers are sach taca*=d in a house, in turn lacatad on its respective turbine building monnama. Going to the wrong one is
| |
| :; not a simple act. 'Ihe utility is studying the human factors aspects of this event.
| |
| 4i '
| |
| While touring the control scom following the unit trip, the inspector noted several strip chart recorders which were not in agreement with the time of day. 'Ibe worst case inaccuracy was as much as two hours. 'Ibe inspector brought the condition to the attention of the Operations Supervisor.
| |
| (2) 1A +"4 awn CooIInn Hot im Sareiaa Valve Body-to.na-* I,ak. During inspection tours in Unit 1 ij ( caatalamaae followns the Unit 1 trip of March 28, the beensee noted body-to-bonnet leakage frosa valve V-3480, the l A abutdown cooling hot leg suction isolation valve. V-3480 is not isolable from the RCS. 'Ibe ;
| |
| i, l! licensee initially quantified the leakage as approximately 3 cupe per minute. i
| |
| . b apair of this leak involved retorque of the bolts.... application of an external circumferential clamp; and leak sealant injection into the area between the clamp and the valve to stop the leak. ' Ibis is further discussed in l paragraph 5. 'Ihe repair delayed power ascusion following the Unit I restart on April 1.
| |
| !j (3) Unit 1 Startun On April 1, Unit I restarted per OP l 0030122, Rev 51, Reactor Startup, h inspector observed the startup from the control room. The startup was uneventful and the unit was kept at low power pending repair of the body-to-bonnet lenk on shutdown cooling isolation valve V-3480.
| |
| 1
| |
| , . On April 2, following sealing of the body to bonnet leak on V-3480, Unit I was performing a turbme startup.
| |
| 1 When operators attempted to shift the "A* train electrical supply from its startup transformer to its auxiliary transformer, the startup transformer supply breaker to the I A2 4.16 kV bus failed to open when the auxiliary transformer supply breaker closed. Operator attempts to open the startup transformer breaker from the control room failed. 'Ibe inspector was observing operator performance when this occurred. Operators immediately raaa-ai=d the situation and dispatched the NWE and the electrical supervisor to the scene to investigate. Both
| |
| ]>
| |
| local electrical and manual circuit breaker control also failed and a smell of smoke came from the bnaker cubicle. W licensee concluded that it would be necessary to deenergize the IA2 bus prior to troubleshooting the failed breaker.
| |
| (4) Unit 1 Reactor Trio due to ta-Aaaa-*alv Planned Electric Plant Lineun St. Imcie Unit I automatically tripped from 18 percent power at 12:36 a.m. on April 3. Emergency equipment was not called upon due to the Page 5 of 16 I
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| a i .
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| - EXCERPTS IR 94-12
| |
| ; .s low power lev.t. Operators placed the plant in operational mode 3. At the time m the trip, operators had l reduced power to a low level and were deenergizing and isolating the nonsafety-related 1A2 4160 V electrical
| |
| . bus to allow safe removal of a mechanically failed circuit breaker. Following a nonnal post-trip response, the subject breaker was nylaced and the unit was restaded.
| |
| The failed circuit breaker was the feeder to nonsafety-related bus I A2 from the 1A startup transformer. Bus j 1 A2 was, in turn, the normal power source for safety-related bus 1 A3. b F A3 emergency power source was
| |
| ! the l A EDG. Special conditions for isolating the I A2 bus had been considere:I and were incorporated in
| |
| ) temporary change 1-94-036 to OP 10030125, Rev 29, Turbine Shutdown-full Load to Zero Imad. b 1 A 1 EDO was started and paralleled with offsite power on the I A3 bus. When the 1A2-1A3 circuit breaker was i opened, the EDG shifted to independant freq_ ;y control as designed and, as a result, operated one of the two 3
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| e paralleled CEA drive MG sets at a speed slightly different from the other MG. b CEA drive MG see? cf vut of phase and developed large circulating currents which tripped reactor trip circuit breakers - shutting dm 6
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| ; reactor.
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| (5) Unit 1 Restart Unit I restart - - =' late on April 3 and the reactor was critical at 12:25 a.m. on April
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| ]E
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| : 4. The unit entered mode 1 at 1:07 a.m. and was placed on line at 1:56 a.m.
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| ,. (6) Unit 2 RCS Fill and Vent On April 10, the inspector observed operators performing portions of OP 2-1 0120020, Rev $0, Pilling and Venting the RCS..../Ihe venting process vents the reactor head and the I pressurizer dome via the reactor coolant gas vent system to a common drain line to the reactor sump. b
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| ; inspector had reservlors concerning the adequacy of venting since the flow path was not open to direct observation - flow being determined by a sump flow recorder that would record flow from anywhere. System performance during the fill and vent process demonstrated that the procedural process p worked.......C~-alcations between RCOs and supervisors and between the control room and containnumt were excellent. hugh the operators on shift were sufficiently experienced to properly fill and vent the RCS,
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| ;j 46' the procedure had several data sections that were confusing to operators. b inspectors di=cu==ad this with operations management - the ficanmaa plans to conduct a hurnan factors evaluation of the procedure.
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| (7) Unit 2 Crartrad Weld in D-ter Cad Pme Bo d="v On Saturday, April 16, while in mode 3
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| - during the Unit 2 heatup following the refueling, the licensee discovered a cracked weld in a 3/4-inch socket attaching an instrument line flow restricting orifice forging to the side of the 12-inch diameter 2B1 safety
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| : injection header. ' Ibis header was the collecting pipe for the SIT discharge, HPSI discharge, and IESI
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| .. discharge. It, in turn, discharged to the 2B1 RCS cold leg through one check valve. 'Ibe header was part of
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| : the reactor coolant pressure bounaary. b licensee reduced RCS pressure to below 1750 pela where only three SITS were required per TS 3.5.1, isolated the ha=dar using the check valve as an isolation valve, and replaced j' the weld. "Ihis was a Class I repair per ASME Code Section XI. During the repair, the licensee performed 1
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| dye penetrant inspection of the prepared surfaces prior to rewelding, b orifice had a linear indication about l~ 5/8 inch from the end and about 180 degrees around the orifice. b coupling had a 3/8 inch linear indication on the inner edge of the socket. b licensee removed 1 inch from the end of the orifice and later found that the indication had no appreciable depth. & indication in the socket was removed easily. b components 4 i were sewelded, dye penetrant tested, and leak tested.
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| During these activities, the inspector reviewed licensee conformance to the applicable TS. TS 3.4.6.2 required that there be no pressure boundary leakage and required that, with any pressure boundary leakage, the unit be in at least hot standby in 6 hours and cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. " Pressure boundary leakage" was defined in the TS as leakage (except steam generator tube leakage) through a non-isolable fault in a RCS rr==paaane body, pipe wall, or vessel wall. Since the leak was definitely in the ASME Code Class 1 Reactor Coolant Pressum Boundary, the inspector reviewed why the licensee was not cooling down to cold shutdown, Page 6 of 16 ,
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| i l i j ,
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| EXCERITS IR 94-12 i Q sende J. De licensee interpreted the ' isolable' requirement to be met by the one che k valve between the ,
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| : Iqjection header and the main RCS loop, and therefore that the TS was met. Since check valves are not
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| ; normally credited as ' isolation devices
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| * but more as ' flow directors', the inspectors consulted NRC
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| ; -ga==* concerning the relationship between check valves and ' isolable'. %e NRC staff concluded that the repair conditions were satisfactory from a public safety viewpoint based on the check valve actually holding
| |
| ; (isolating RCS pressure from the Si header) and the reactor having been shut down for many days and about i .
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| one third of the fuel replaced with new fuel which had no decay heat yet.
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| i (8) Unit 2 Pr--ime Sorav flam Bvness Valve Failure Pressunzer spray line bypass amadle valves V1453 and l V1454 pass a naa*i=== small flow around the normally-shut spray valves to keep the sprey lines and pressuriser surge line warm relative to the pressurizer temperature. His prevents thermal shock of the spray :
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| i i piping and nozzle during plant tr===laa8=. During the recent outage, these valves were replaced with a different i
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| ! , brand valve per PC/M 178-293M. De V1454 disc tip broke off and wedged into the valve body seat. AAer ,
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| l,* attempts to remove the backen tip through the valve bonnet were unsuccessful, the valve was reassembled as-is 1 and then was closed.
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| . Since V1453 damnaarrated satisfactory performance and V1454 was closed, the licensee analyzed the effects of operating the plant with only one pressuriser spray line 'sypass valve in service.
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| 4
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| - A 10 CPR 50.59 evaluation determined that operation with V1454 closed was acceptable to withstand po ematial system transients and seismic events and to prevent valve internais from entering the RCS.
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| f
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| - NCR 178-293-3037M, CRN 178-293-4511, documented the expected worse case differential temperature i' (delta-T) between the spray line and the pressurimer temperature detector elements. De inspector calculated from information in the CRN that, when Tc was 533 degrees F, the delta-T between spray line ^ , A .. ,
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| l[ g detector 11A-1103 and the pressurizar had been about 180 degrees F and that the other spray line delta-T was j
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| ;' about 130 degrees F. Both delta-Te were within the 200 degrees F TS r; " cyclic limit listed in TS table 5.7-1. U ; ^ to reactor startup, with Tc about 548 degrees F, the spray line-to-pressuriser delta-T with the bypass valve shut was actually found te be about 112 degrees F, well within specifications. I
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| {I nough the inspector calculated from information in the CRN that the delta-T between 11A-1103 and the pressurizer had been about 180 degrees F, the engineering analysis in the NCR contained a poorly worded j calculatios describing the delta-T to be 80 degrees F. %e calculation appeared to be inadequate. Dough the licensee declined to correct the calculation text, the calculation was later explained to address a delta-T other l' than the spray line-to-pressurizer delta-T. De calculation proved to be correct as explained.
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| ;.$ The inspedor concluded that operating with one spray line bypass valve shut was adequate.
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| (9) Unit 2 HPSI System Valve lankage %e inspector noted that the morning report of April 19 containad emergent work requests for four valves resulting from HPSI system testing. De work requests were based on 4
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| ~ excessive seat leakage identified when the HPSI pump was started and pressure downstream of the closed valves instantly ladwanad 750 peig. At the time, the RCS pressure was about 2250 peig. Two of the valves were series isolation valves V3551 and V3523 which isolate the 2B HPSI pump discharge from the hot leg injection path. Osck valves V3527 and V3526 are RCS pressure isolation valves in line between these two valves and
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| . the RCS. Per TS 3.4.6.2 (Operationallmakage), allowable leakage was 1 spm. Paraan leakage tests per Data Sheet 25 found that the leakage for these check valves was O spm and 0.2 spm, respectively. De other two
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| : lealdag valves were V3571 and V3572. ne.e class A valves control HPSI feed to the SITS.......
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| (10) Umt 2 Reactor Start-up Observations On April 19, %e licensee started up Unit 2 for the first time
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| . A following the Unit 2 refueling outage. De applicable procedure was TP 2-3200088.....%roughout the startup i i O Page 7 of 16 E j I
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| 1 l
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| 4
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| +-ir.n.--*
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| yg--
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| 9 y w y-,y y , , , , __y
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| ,,_ _________, _ . . ~ , ~ _ ~ _ _ _ , _ _
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| -_ - - - - - .-. .=- .. . . - - - - - - = - .. . . - - - . . - - .
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| L EXCERPTS IR 94-12 1
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| 4- </ evolution, muungement attention was thorough. All crews performing infrequent evolutions such as initial criticality following refueling were briefed by the Operations Supervisor. A control room management
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| ..r.-
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| dve was present for management oversight. A dedicated RCO was assigned for reactivity
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| +
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| manipulations along with a Reactivity Control SRO. Access to the control room was restricted to essential personnel only. Command and control of observed evolutions was good.
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| Following the management briefing of the startup crew, CEA withdrawal co= ==+i at 1:15 p.m. 'Ibe licensee ==paadad the startup upon discovery that TP 2-3200088 required a temporary change. Step 12.23 required the operators to attempt to insert and then attempt to withdraw Shutdown Group B in Manual Group mode with the CMISH-1 test button d.y.r i Shutdown Group B was still fully inserted at this point. Since testing to ensure the CEAs will not insert is inconclusive if they are already fully inserted, the beensee ,
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| temporarily changed the ins - f 1. to withdraw Group B to 2.0 +/- 1 inches prior to this test. 'Ihis procedure i was ! , ' " in October,1991, and was also used for a post-refueling startup in June of 1992 under an earlier revision. 'Ibe inspectors plan to follow up on previous procedure compliance.
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| Following ====gamane briefing of the oncoming crew, CEA withdrawal raca==-t but was interrupted
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| ' following the withdrawal of Group B when a blown fuse in the CEA Group Deviation Alarm light circuit resulted in a Group Deviation Warning Alarm Restarting the DDPS computer cleared the Group Deviation Warning Alarm. The blown fuse was caused by a shorted lead in the system.
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| CEA withdrawal recommancad at 8:40 p.m., but was interrupted about 11:57 p.m. when CEA 65 dropped
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| '! twice before being successfully retrieved and realigned on April 20 at 12:30 a.m. Dilution to criticality com-macad on April 20 at 2:00 a.m., Mode 2 was entered shortly thereafter at 2:45, and the reactor was declased critical at 3:28.
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| l
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| . (wp Following completion of physics testing, power escalation commancad at 4:15 a.m. April 21, and was stopped st 12:05 p.m. upon reaching the 25 percent power test plateau.
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| l During one tour of the control room following the power increase, the inspector made several observations:
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| - Reactor power increased from 26 percent to 31 percent due to the effects of a positive moderator :.=r e coefficient. Reactor power was restored to the ordered 26 percent by the operators. ' Ibis is further discussed
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| , la paragraph 4.c.
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| - Both Safety Injection Tanks on the A loops had pressures below the alarm set points but were within technical
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| .l
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| , specification requirements.
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| 1 - Ilaane power range meter MD was observed to be reading about 8 percat higher than the other chanaals.
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| I 'Ibe operators stated that instrument shop personnel were preparing to calibrate the instmnwmen.
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| (11) Unit 2 n-*~ Trin Durinn Post-O *- Power W :- St. Imcie Unit 2 tripped from 30 percet power at 1:28 p.m. on April 23, during post-outage power ascension. At the time, instrumentation technicians j were checking the calibration of the RPS channel "B" power instrunwnt. *lhe inspector observed the operating 1 staffimmediately perform the stands.rd post trip actions of 2-EOP41, Rev 10, Standard Post Trip Actions, to confirm proper plant response and to verify that safety function acceptance criteria were satisfied. Having connrmed the safety functions and that this was an uncomplicated trip, the operatore then entered 2-EOP-02, !
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| Rev 6, Reactor Trip Recovery, and established stable Mode 3 operation.
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| j Following the trip, the steam bypass system [cnadanmar dump] opened unexpectedly and rapidly lowered RCS 4 ;. . from 530 to 523 degrees F. 'Ibe inspector observed control room operators respond rapidly to stop the transient. 'Ihe resulting pressurizer level drop deenergized the pressurizer heaters and RCS pressure s dropped from 2150 psig post-trip to 2070 psig. Pressurizer level and pressure recovered aAer operators stopped Page 8 of 16 t, -.
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| . . -. . . . . . .- - . . - .- . . ~ .-. -. . . .-
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| t 4
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| i'
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| ' EXCERPTS IR 94-12
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| , 4
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| ): W I
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| ihe tr*.
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| I - Following these events, the licensee began troubleshooting the RPS and steam bypass system sad evaluatmg other work items that might be appropriate for a short-notice outage. Troubleshooting of the RPS determinarl s
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| that a certain reactor trip bypass switch was not effective and has led to the need to dia==annhie factory-wired cabinet internals. b NRC inspection penod concluded that night at midnight. At the conclusion, the unit was 1.
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| stable in mode 3 and the licensee predicted that the unit would remain shut down for an additional 48 hours
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| !. while RPS wiring and the steam bypass system performance were resolved.
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| l The inspectors concluded that operator naponse to events was excellent and initial root cause followup was well founded. The inspectors will report on the followup and Unit 2 notart in IR 335,309/M-13.
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| I 3.c. Technical Specification Compliance i Licensee compliance with selected TS ILOs was verified.......
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| i 1
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| 3.d. Physical Protection l- h inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being ;
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| i implemented... 1 I
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| i
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| , ' In - ary: (1) Conan==le=* lana, ea-mand, and control were noted to be strong during the Unit 2 fill and vent and the Unit 2 startup. (2) Operators rssponded well to three reactor trips and a failure of the 1 steam bypass control systan, but showed a weakness in attention to detail when Unit 2 power rose frees i 4
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| 26 to 31 pervent due to positive MTC. (3) The d=c8=laa to repair Unit 1 shutdown coollag isolation valve l
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| 'j pg V 3d80 body to bonnet leakage and to delay the unit power ame===lon to complete the repair was conservative. (4) one rector trip was attributed to pew erar, one to a procedural 'ta, and one to a i;;; - --"-; hardware probleni.
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| 1 4.
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| Surveillance Observations (61726)
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| I t
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| Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements.... Portions of the following
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| , } surveillasce tests were observed:
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| \
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| 4.a. Post Modifica*iaa Testina of MV 08-13. Steam Sunolv to AFW Pumo 2C. The inspector witcaamari the
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| {
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| ! + retest of MV 0813, Steam Supply from 2A SG to AFW Pump 2C per OP 24400050, Rev 15 TC 2-94-222, i Periodic lategrated test of the I!agineered Safety Features W inspector also witaa==d he t perforrnaaca of OP 2-0410026, Rev 8, Differential Pressure Testing of MV 08-13. W new valve and increased size operator
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| [Limitorque 00 vice 000) operated smoothly. In both cases test control was excellent and the systan a functioned as designed.
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| 4.b. Rod Worth Ta-*:a= On April 21, the inspectors observed the RCO conducting rod worth measurements per Prooperational Test Procedure 3200091, Rev 3, Appendix E, Rod Worth Measurements by Rod Swap.
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| Elements observed included procedure use, supervision, operator attention, and distractions. Operators, in direct coordmation with the reactor engineer, were swapping positions of several CEA banks and taking reactivity measurements while malataining about 0.02 percent power. Some of the temporary instrumentation 4 was behind the RCO so that he and the reactor engineer had to work in concert to =wa== fully perform the test while minimizing reactivity excursions. b RCO and reactor engineer did not have distractions, did work well j
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| together while following the procedure, and limited reactivity excursions to small increments of about 30 PCM s
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| Page 9 of 16 1
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| 4
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| _ - ~ _ _ _ - . . . . . _ - . _ . _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ - __ _ _
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| N
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| * i a
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| j i
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| l- , EXCERPTS IR 94-12
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| {f, Q' reactivity - thus avoiding significant power changes. Traffic into the control room had been minimi=d dunag ,
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| the test. The laspectors concluded that the licensee's perfonnance during the test was escadient.
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| , i 5 ~4.c. Prooperadonal Startup Physics Testar b inspector reviewed the results of the preoperadonal startup j- physics testing and noted that the MTC, critical boron concentration, and control alamant assembly rod worths were well within the acceptance criteria. % testing indicated that the MTC was positive (3.56 pcm/ degree F)
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| ; requiring special care to de exercised by the ope 3 tors in reactor powerfrave control. Managesment briefed J :;1 J' personned on the precautions of -r ^ _"' ; reactor power under these condtions. The value of the MTC was within the limits insposed by TS 3.I.1.4.
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| ]i 4.d. Unit 2 Failure to Imd Shed Swag Pmuns On April 3, the licanmaa was performing PC/M 183-293 jj islasts involving verification that the ICW and CCW pumps would perform as designed on loss of and -
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| restoration of AC power to the punpe' buses. As part of the test, the 2AB bus carrying the C (swag)ICW and
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| : CCW pumps was aligned to B-train safety bus 2B3 and the swing pumps were operated in lieu of their B jji j --
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| t, which had been placed in " pull-to-lock.' When the 2B3/2AB busses were than doenerstand, the 28 EDO loaded onto the bus, as designed. However, the licensee noted that the 2AB bus did not properly load I
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| l 1
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| j ), shed. 'Ibe 2C CCW and ICW pump supply breakers remainad closed and the pumps started immadiataly when
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| ! the EDG breaker closed. By design, in this case, the 2C CC'V and ICW pump supply breakers should open
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| )i j initially and then reclose in six and nine seconds, respectively, aAer the EDO breaker closure.
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| Operationally, the C pumps were designed to perform the functions of their A or B train counterparts, including ,
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| ! respondag to ESP actuation signals, load shed signals, and starting in the same EDO load blocks. 'Ihe 2AB i bus has been normally aligned to the A-train safety bus. l l '
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| 1 The licensee investigated the constion and found that a wire, required to properly load shed the 2AB bus when it was aligned to the 253 (TArain safety) bus, was adesing fkeen the 253-to-2AB feeder breaker i
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| 6' cubicle. The wire circuit in question was shown on control wiring degrams and electrical =^==nes= and L only affected the lood shed characteristics of the 2AB bus when powered front the B train safety bus. The
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| ? lle==ame ca=eindad that the wire had not been l==*=llad since unit constnaction and instaued a wire the sanne day. The test was then concluded anelsfactoruy.
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| I b inspectors concluded that, whenever the 2AB bus was aligned to the B-train safety bus, the failure would
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| ; effectively move the swing pumps' starting delay from their dealga load blocks to the 0-second load block and j would also use the EDG output breaker as the motor starter. These pumps being large loads prompted the ]
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| i ' inspectors to evaluate the potential for EDO overload during a DBA. b inspectors discussed the matter with site engineering personnel, who subsequently concluded that the 2B EDO remained capable of assuming B-train F electrical loads assuming an ESFAS signal with a concurrent loss of offsite power and adding the C ICW and l CCW pumps to the 0-second load block. !
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| ,4
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| ! While the noted condition represented a challenge to 2B EDO operability, this vulnerability only existed for
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| : periods when the C pumps were aligned to the B-train safety bus. % inspector reviewed operating logs for
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| ;1 1993 and found that the C ICW pump was aligned to the B train several times while Unit 2 was operating at t power, with the longest occurrence being from July 8 to August 12,1993.
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| Previous NRC Deficiency Item 335,389/91-20103, documented in IR 91-201 on November 15, 1991, focused
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| , . primarily on inadequate Unit 1 procedures, but stated:
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| 'In Unit 2, the C (ICW) pump was only tested while aligned to Train A such that the Train B
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| ; power logic and circuit interlock features and the SIAS comact were not tested. In summary, the j t.
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| \ /. Page 10 of 16 4
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| - - - . . - . - - - - - . . - - . . - - . - - - - -. ~ . . - . . _ . - . . - . -
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| 4 l
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| i" },
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| m EXCERPTS IR 94-12 1 l
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| $ .j C pump was not tested and could not be proven operable on ... Train B in Unit 2.*
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| Deficiency 91201-04 was Aarther reviewed on site by the NRC staff and was upgraded to violation 335,389/92- ,
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| i 05 04, which was issued on April 22,1992. The violation focused on failure to adequately verify the ability of ;
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| : j. the C ICW pump to energize following a simulated loss of offeite power as required by TS surveillance iI requiseensats 4.8.1.1.2.e.4. 'Ihe licensee's response to violation 92-05 04 stated:
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| N 'C' pump portions of ECCS testing procedures for both units were revised to adequately test the loss of
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| ' offsite power functions. 'Ihis included an upgrade of 'C' Intake Cooling Water pump and Component Cooling j; Water pump testing methods.' ... ' Full compliance was achieved on March 3,1992." l 1
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| i The inspectors reviewed OP 2 0400050 Rev 15, " Periodic Integrated Test of the Engineered Safety Features,'
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| ; sad found that the loss of offsite power testing did not include the load shed charactenstics of the 2AB bus when powered from the B-train safety bus. Rather, the 2AB bus and swing pumps ween aligned to the A-train j safety bus for the test. b inspector reviewed various revisions of this procedure and noted that no testing,
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| ;; with regent to the swing pumps, had been conducted from the time of original y,4. issue [circa 1984] until
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| ; Rev 12, issued on March 26,1992. Rev 12 included a IDOP test of the 2C ICW and CCW pumps when i I powered from the A-train bus. b procedure, with Rev 15, was most recently used on March 16, 1994, !
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| during the ongoing Unit 2 outage h procedure still did not perform IDOP testing of the swing pumps when !
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| l powered from the B bus, f On Unit 1, the swing pumps have been normally aligned to the B-train safety bus. b heensee performed i visual inspections and verified that a similar deficiency did not exist on Unit 1. h inspector reviewed OP 1- 1 j 0400050, Rev 32, ' Periodic Integrated Test of the Engineered Safety Features," and found that the same failure j 1, ^ to adequately test load shed capability existed; however, the failure involved not testing the IC swing ICW and j I
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| j[ if CCW pumps when powered from the Unit 1 A-train safety bus.
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| l 1
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| 1-1he current events demonstrated that the beensee had taken inadequate corrective action for the above findmss f j The inadequate preoperational and surveillance testing, with regard to the 2AB bus /B-train safety bus combination, prevented identification of the 2AB bus inability to load shed properly.1his inadequate corrective j action resulted in the 2B EDO not being demonstrated operable for the periods in which the C ICW pump was
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| < aligned to the B-train safety bus - specifically, the period from July 8 until August 12, 1993. l 1; .
| |
| Violation 335,389/92 05-04 (Failure to Adequately Test the C ICW Pump) is closed. This current failure to j
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| ;j_-
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| meet NRC requirements is identified as violat'en 335,389/94-12-01,1anduluste Corrective Action for a Previous Violation for Inadequate Surveillance Testing of the C ICW Pump.
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| )
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| 1 In Sannsnary: (1) The perfonnance of rod worth and auxiliary feedwater testing were e=celle=# (2)
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| Manasanent a**-=#4a= was noted ea e emins physics testing and post modification testins. 0) One 4
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| viala8&a= lavolved inadequate corrective action for a previous violation for inadequate surveillanes testing of the C ICW pump.
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| 1
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| : 5. Main ==acae Observation (62703)
| |
| Stataan mainamanaea activities involving selected safety-related systems and components were observed / reviewed
| |
| .....h inspector observed the following overhaul activity during the ongoing Unit 2 outage.
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| 5.a. NPWO 7694. E - W"--in the 125V DC raas ol Power for 2B-2AB 4.16 VAC circuit. This condition had existed for a long time, probably the life of the unit. Its effects are discussed in Paragraph 4.d.
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| The inspector witnessed replacement activities including workmanship and confirming the termir.milon points per .
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| .- s 3
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| ! d Page 11 of 16 i
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| i ~.
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| I j .
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| m EXCERFTS IR 94-12
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| ? Q CWDs 2998-B-327, sheets 950 and 951, and the NPWO. De inspector also reviewed the completed work package. Subsequent retest showed the system to then functica properly.
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| ; 5.b.' NPWO 8004. Incore lastrunmitation Resistance.....
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| i .
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| ; 5.c. NPWO 0225. Unit i V-3480 Body to Bonnet Laak Repair During laspection tours in Unit I cantainmane following the Unit I trip of March 28, the licensee noted body-to-bonnet leakage from valve V-3480, the 1 A shutdown cooling hot leg suction valve. h licensee quantified the leakage as approximately 3 cups per :
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| ;. =lansa. His was less than the TS limit of 10 GPM for total identified RCS leakage. ;
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| }- l h lia====a's Arst attempt at corrective action involved torquing the body-to-bonnet studs in an attaanpt to l
| |
| , < e=haaaa gasket sealing. The increased torque resulted in a reduction in leakage to approvia=*=Jy I cup per i minute. He tinaaaaa then chose to implement a leak repair under the provisions of 10 CPR 50.59. De repair i involved the anear-tation of the body-to-bonnet area of the valve to eliminate the hatsaca of the leakage. A I; clamp, which sealed the gap between the body and bonnet flanges of the valve, was designed and inmaallal as a jl resolution to NCR l-839. De space enclosed by the clamp was then Alled with leak repair -- -
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| %e inspector reviewed the licensee's safety evaluation for the repair effort and found it to be appropriate. b inspector witnessed portions of the clamp lastallation process, which was performed at very low power. De
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| : licensee delayed power ==caa= ion until the repair was completed. b inspector noted that appropriate HP
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| ; coverage was ex*andad to the evoiution. Additionally, engmeering support from both ==ine===aca and site engineering was prueent during the work.
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| i In conclusion, the licensee's decision to make this repair and to delay the power ==canaion to accomplish the j repair reflected a conservative approach to operations.
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| M% 5.d. NPWO 3502. Maintenance of Reactor Containment Equipment Hatch. De inspector observed the setting
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| ; of the Unit 2 enneal====t equipment hatch per MMP48 01, Rev 3 Equipment Maintenance Hatch - Opening ;
| |
| : i. and Closing. Activities observed included cleaning the hatch mating surfacer cad seals, lubricating with the specined lubricant, installation of cotter pins in the eye bolts, torque sequence, and closure 14- D - De l hatch was drawn closed using ratchet wrenches then torqued ~ h mechanics dropped the torque wrench.
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| When the hatch did not fit metal-to-metal, torque wrench calibration was suspected but was found to be j! unaffected by the wrench being dropped. %e licensee found that, when the air test fitting was opened to leak
| |
| : j. test the hatch, air escaped and the hatch finished shutting metal-to-metal. He inspector was impressed by the ;
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| i, tightness of the dual gasket seal. He licensee planned to change the procedure to require the leak test connection be open prior to shutting the hatch and to specify a better bucket or lanyard to secure the torque ;
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| wrench. During this evolution, various minor material discrepancies in the area were noted by the inspector i and identined to the licensee for correction. i 5.e Maintenance Activities During Startup During CEA group movements, operators noted four CEAs which 4
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| appeared to saove a. higher speed than the rest of the associated group. Actually, the rest of the group was operating slowly. Troubleshooting revealed that these CEDMs' leads had been incorrectly installed in CEDMCS cabinets, during maintenance which required all of the leads to be lifted and meggered. He licaamaa corrected the condition by reinstalling the leads per the drawing. ,
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| 1 De color coding for the above CEDMa' leads was different than for the other 87 CEDMs. Since the lead lengths do not support changes to match the norm and color coding shown on drawings for these leads presently
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| , supports the existing color code, the Ilcensee decided to not physically move the leads, and subsequendy tagged thema to emphasize their differences to future maintenance persons
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| ;. E d Page 12 of 16 1
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| ..- . .. - - . - . - - _ . _ . .- - . _ -.~_. - - . . .-- - . . =
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| ;j, 3
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| EXCERPTS 1R 94-12 l* .m P
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| d' 'w)j CFA 65 breaker was found to be defective. De CEA was placed on the mainenamaca bus and the breaker was ,
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| replaced.
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| R.
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| CEA position reed switch adjustments were attempted hara- the CEA bottom lights and LEL lights on several CEAs were actuating at the same CEA position. During physics testing, reactor power was reduced to
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| !{ approximately 5X10d to allow maintenance personnel to enter the reactor vessel head area to adjust the reed switches.' he adjustments were performed while affected CEAs were on the bottom during the tests. De l
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| realignments failed to correct the problem for all of the affected CEAs. Ilcensee management deferred the repairs until physics testing per TP 2-3200088 was completed. Following the completion of reactor physics testing, con ========a of power aaraladaa, and the reactor trip, reed switch alignments were successfully l'l performed using a template for greater accuracy.
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| s After the reactor physics tests were -CM CEA 76 was observed to travel at a speed different from the rest of group 5. Trouble shooting revealed the CEA was receiving 1/2 of the normal CEA drive pulses while the rest of the group received 1/8 of the normal pulses during operation in the manual group mode. An optical isolator card was replaced in the control circuitry and proper operation was restored.
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| Conununications between maintenance personnel (l&C) and the operations staff was confumag at various times during the period of observation. b inspector witnessed reports being made to the control room operations perma ==al regardag CEDM repairs that conAicted with previously reported information. Different p ----
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| brought different reports to the control room. At times I&C was not exactly sure what indications were being observed by operators and operators were not exactly sure what I&C had done to fix a problem or if it had been repaired at all. S' ; t eventually r-aal=d this problem and took positive corrective measures. A special planning meeting was held to assess the data and ori.L.e the repairs
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| . i 5.f. Unit 2 Post W ' ^ s% Neutron Flux M u--km 1 --- During the Unit 2 refuehag outage, the I WC v post accident excore neutron flux monitoring system was replaced in accordance with PC/M 054-293, Excore Neutron Flux Monitoring System Replacement, Rev 0 h system was replaced hac== repla== ant parts were dif5 cult to obtain. De inspectors reviewed the completed PCM, walked down the new cables, junction boxes, and cabinets in the containawat, cable penetration rooms, and switch gear rooms. De inspectors also walkad down the display indicators on the hot shutdown and control room panels. %e inspectors reviewed ],
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| procedure 212450065, Excore Neutron Flux Monitoring System Calibration, Rev.10 and verified that the
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| : portion of the procedure required to be accomplished when the unit was shut down was completed. %e system calibration was required to be completed while the unit was at power. No discrepancies were identified.
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| J 5.g. Unit 2 Pr--izar Safety Valve Diacharme Pininn Modifie=Haa_ During the Unit 2 refueling outage, 4 discharge piping to the quench tank was modified in acc / a with PC/M 004-293 Pressurimer Safety Valve Relief Valve Discharge Piping Modification, Rev.1. De purpoee of this PC/M was to reduce the endload on each safety valve discharge flange to reduce the potential for seat leakage. %e inspectors reviewed the completed PC/M and walked down the modified piping on top of the pressurizer in the containment. No discrepancies were identified. .
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| 5.h. Unit 2 SG A and B Wide Pa==a Imvel Tr heae Raalarammt During the Unit 2 refueling outage, the i SG A and B wide range level transmitters were replaced in .x ,it i.s with PC/M 138-293, Wide Range SG
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| ' level LT-9012 and 9022 EQ Upgrade for RG 1.97, Rev. O. %e purpose of this PC/M was to replace the tran=altters with EQ transmitters, conduit seals, and splices. %e inspectors reviewed the completed PC/M and walked down the replaced detectors that were located in the contalarnant- De inspectors also reviewed procedure 2-1400064L, Installed Plant Instrumentation Calibration (level), Rev. 25, which was used to calibrate the transmitters following replacement. No discrepancies were identified.
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| %./ Page 13 of 16
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| * i l A EXCI'RPTS IR 9412 f,
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| 5.1. Review of GL 89-10 In letter L 92420, dated February 14,1992, the licenew committed to the NRC that f! ;j _
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| OL 8910 testag requirements for Unit 2 would be completed within 60 days following the 1995 spring j refheling outage. During the present Unit 2 refueling outage, the spres packs were replaced on eight MOV j actuators and the torque switches adjusted on thirty actuators in accordance with PC/M 121-293, NRC Generic
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| ]
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| I. meter 89-10 Motor Operated Valve 'Ihrust Values and Actuator Modifications, Rev 1. b inspectors reviewed PC/M-293 and verified that the spring packs and torque switches were replaced / adjusted. N PC/M also provided lastructions for replacement of spring packs on three valves and torque switch adjust = ant on seven valves which are scheduled to be completed while the unit is operating. During the present refueling outage,14 Unit 2 MOVs were differential pressure tested. No discrepancies were identified.
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| 4!
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| ! 5.J. Unit 2 MSSV Set Pressure Testina On February 14 and 15, the Unit 2 MSSVs were set pressure tested in accordance with pi+M1i, M 0705, Main Steam Safety Valve Maiaranance and Set Pressure Testing. Rev 21.
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| N inspectors reviewed the results of the set pressure testing anaeminarl in procedure M-0705. Eight of the sixteen MSSV as-found set pressures exceeded TS Table 4.7-0 acceptable liA seedng specifications. N 4 MSSVs were retested or adjusted and retested as necessary to obtain acceptable set pressures. NCR 2-551 was
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| ;j submitted to document these discrepancies. N inspectors reviewed the engmeering -* of NCR 2-551 jj which concluded that plant safety limits for FSAR analyzed accidents would not have been exceeded at the as-
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| , found MSSV set pressures During this inservice testing, three MSSVs appeared to stick or bind during the initial set pressure test. The as-found set pressure for valve V-8211 was 1062 psig which exceeded the valve's stamped set pressure of 1025 i peig by 3.6 percent. b set pressure obtained on the macanni and third tests were approxi==taly 1038 pais. No 4 adj=*-8= were made to the valve between these tests. 'Ihe valve was subsequently adjusted and =tisfactorily tested. h as-found set pressure for valve V-8216 was 1051 peig which exceeded the valve's stamped set pressure of 1025 peig by 2.5 percent. On the second and third tests the set pressure was 1027 peig. No j Ng adjustments were made to the valve. 'Ibe as-found set pressure for valve V-8207 was 1047 psig which
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| %.- exceeded the valve's stamped set pressure of 985 peig by 6.3 percent. On the second and third tests the set pressure was 981 peig. No adj-*===*= were made to the valve.
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| 'Ibe engineenns response to NCR 2-155 was considered a weakness because the cause of the these MSSVs sticking or binding during their initial set pressure test was not thoroughly evaluated, b evaluation briefly stated that set point drin was the probable rcot cause for the eight MSSVs to exceed TS Table 4.7-0 acceptable lin setting specifications. 'Ibe evaluation did not differentiate between set preesure driR and bindmg as a probable root cause and therefore did not address the cause of the binding.
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| in summary: (1) Management attention was evident in correcting communications between operations and .
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| instrumentation personnel. (2) Management attention was evident at briefs for major evolutions.
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| (3) Unit 2 outage modifications were reviewed and found satisfactory. (4) Engmeering support for the Unit 1 V-3480 valve repair was excellent, however the resolution to NCR 2-155 [ main steam safety valve setpoints]
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| was a waalmeaa and the pressurizer spray bypass valve evaluation was poorly worded. (5) Good post work
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| - testing for a pull-to-lock modification of the ICW and CCW pump control switches revealed a missing wire in the Unit 2 load shed circuit. (6) b licensee's decision to repair Unit 1 shutdown cooling hot leg suction isolation valve V-3480 and to delay the unit power ascension to accomplish the repair reflected a conservative approach to operations. The work was timely and well done. ]
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| : 6. Fire Protection Review (64704)
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| Dunng the course of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely e===inart facets of the Fire Protection Program.......
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| ' 7. Onsite Followup of Written Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 and 2) (92700)
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| Page 14 of 16 6- n , - -v.
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| ,-- _. - . - . ~- .- - . - . -- -.- ..- - - .-
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| 8 1-EXCERPTS IR 94-12
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| : r ij - 4 g}
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| 12Rs were reviewed for po anelal s generic impact, to detect trends, mod to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events that the licensee reported immediately were reviewed as they occurred to
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| : deteradne if the TS were satisfied. LERs were reviewed in m.d a with the current NRC Enforcement
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| { Policy.
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| j * (Open - Unit 2) IIR 50-389/93-07, Manual Reactor Trip AAer the Simultaneous Dropping of Control Element h===hlies due to Equipment Failure.
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| 'Ihis event and the corrective actions to restart the unit were discussed in IR 335,289/93-15.- As long term ji corrective action, electrical penetration D-1 was scheduled to be inspected during the paseet Unit 2 RFO and I the addition of a ground detection circuit for the control element drive markanism control system would be evaluated. b electncal penetration was removed during the RFO and sent to the vendor in order to determine the root cause of the electrical grounds. 'Ibe vedor evaluation was expected to be completed by June,1994.
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| - REA 93-088 was submitted to engineering to evaluate installation of a ground detection circuit.
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| j 8. Response to Regional Requests (71707) 8.a. Overtime Survey b inspectors reviewal the liceasee's use of overtime for 1993 and the first quarter of i 1994. During this period, the licensee had three major outages. (1) A Unit 2 short notice outage from January
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| ~'i; 13,1993 to April 1,1993 involving a cracked reactor coolant pump shaft and then the discovery of cracked instrument noules in the Unit 2 pressurizer steam space. (2) A Unit 1 refueling outage from March 29,1993 j . to June 16,1993. (3) A Unit 2 refueling outage from February 15,1994 to date.
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| Overtime limits for safety-related activities for St. Lucie units are contained in TS 6.2.2.f. 'Ibese are reiterated in Nuclear Division Policy NP-306, Rev 1, ' Overtime," and St Imcie Plant Policy PSle202, Rev 2, j ' Overtime.' 'Ibese are promulgated for use on site by procedure AP 0010119, Rev 12, ' Overtime Ilmitations
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| , V for Plant Personnel.'
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| i .
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| ! 'Ibe 'IS also require that : (1)'Ihe plant have the objective that operating personnel work a normal 8-hour day, 40-hour week, during operations. (2) Deviations from L r,,. y guidehnes (TS limits) be authonzed by the plant manager or his deputy or higher levels of management. (3) Procedural controls shall include monthly
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| - review of individual overtime by the plant manager or designee to assure that excessive hours have not been assigned. Routine deviation fror. temporary guidelines is not authorized.
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| I _ Routine overtime management at St. Lucie had been changed from a plant administrative procedure function to a financial management function. Procedural control and central approval by managanent la the classic
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| ! sense did not esist. Site policy PSte242 established policies of minimizing overtime and of depertment head management of overtisme. Department heads have delegated pre-work decisions to lower level supervisors. 'Ihe high level management (Plant Manager) occurred at a monthly (weekly during outages) i financial review of overtime use - where previous lower level decisions viere reviewed. Overtime during normal operations has been around 10 percent of that during outages and seemed to be based on specific rrT During outages, overtime has been high, but rarely eseeeded the procedural limits. Of 241,000 hours of overtime used at St. Lucie in 1993 (average of about 300 hours per person per year), there were 9 i==8a- of eneseding gulMl= limits which were authorized deviations.
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| 8.b. New Puel Ouality Aasurance In response to regional concerns involving the quality of Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) fuel, the inspector met with members of the licensee's reactor engineering and nuclear fuel
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| , orgsalzations. 'Ibe licensee uses SPC fuel in Unit 1 only. 'Ibe licensee stated that, in response to a '13 violation involving fuel weight in 1990, a team from FPL reviewed the SPC design control process. 'Ihe team's
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| \ _./ Page 15 of 16
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| 1 4
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| EXCERPTS IR 94-12 f
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| r . , ,
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| e findings r== lead, in part, in: -
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| : 7) -
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| (1) De initiation of bi-monthly FPL Fusis/QA oversight asetangs to review fuel-related QA issues and to i address future probleens. b licensee stated that the meetangs involved Nuclear Fuel and QA managers and j~
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| included reviews of vendor performanes, audit trends and industry events involving nuclear fuel.
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| (2) De development of a reload oversight plan. . ine plan was generated from the bimaathly meetings described - j above and was used to help direct QA resources j - (3) Vendor survei!!ance efforts tied to vendor performance. b heensee stated that FPL nonnally performs 1 to 5 surveillances of fuel fabricators. He number of surveillances performed, and the areas to be inspected, ;
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| i were amid to be determined as a result of the bi-monthly meetings and the reload oversight plans dascussed previously.
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| f h inspector reviewed the reload oversight plan for Unit 2, cycle 8, and found the plan to he counprehensive in its consideration of vendor activities. He plan addresses activities , L_ ' by ABB/CE l awl is arranged to ~==idar changes in vendor activities f om the previous fuel cycle, changes in design from the !
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| previous cycle and presents schedules and areas of laterest for planned surveillances and audits. Specific l i
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| concerns delineated in the document included......
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| The inspector miewed the results of two audits: Bepat No. 08.N.EXONR.92.1, perfonned at SPC in f October,1992, and aspat No. 08.N.CENPM.93.1, performed at ABB/CE in June,1993. In both cases,
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| ' the andes appeared to be of -.. v' '.. breadth. Audit findings were generated in areas incluess
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| -_ .. . . j ,% , , , , ,
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| J / Notable in FPL's approach to nuclear fust quality was its requirement that vendore adopt self -*- ,
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| 3 M'-t' in dealing with issues of quality.....De inspector noted, in reviewing audit findags involving computer code validation and verification process fallene at ABB/CE, that FPL auditors recora==viad not only that a proper validation and verification process be pursued, but that the vendor perform a self-* to
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| : deterndne the cause of the noted failures. l la conchmion, the inspector found that the lla=== bas taken actions which appear to be thorough in
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| ; . scope and enecurinn to ensure the quauty of their fuel.
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| l
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| : 9. Exit Interview: b inspection scope and findings were su==arized on April 29,1994, with those persons 4 indicated by an
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| * in paragraph I above, b violation was re-characterized as inadequate corrective action for a
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| .! previous violation on May 4,1994 with those persons indicated by a # in paragraph I above.....h licensee i -
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| considered that the loss of offsite power testing violation should be considered a procedure waalraa== rather than '
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| , a failure to take adequase corrective action. %e procedure for loss of offsite power testing was acknowledged l to have a waalream. He NRC carefully considered the licensee's position and determined that the root cause of
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| ; the procedural wenkaess was a failure to take adequate corrective action.
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| t; *
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| (open) VIO 335,389/94-1241 I- ' 4- Corrective Action for a Previous Violation for Inadequate
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| ]l Surveillance Testing of the C ICW Pump, j 4.d.
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| l (closed) VIO 335,389/92-0544, Failure to Adequately Test the C ICW Pump,14.d.
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| !i l1 1 m Page 16 of 16
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| o 1 1 l
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| 3 EXCERPTS IR 94-13 g
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| *1' p cb .
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| .g/
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| ~
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| June 27,1994 ;
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| * Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 ]
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| Uoense Nos. DPR47, NPF-16 1 4
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| i Florida Power and Ught Company ]
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| E ! ATTN: .Mr. J. H. Goldberg ;
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| President - Nuclear Division ;
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| 4 P. O. Box 14000
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| .I- Juno Beach, FL 33408 4420 .
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| 3 '
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| i G==*t= = u ,
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| ==SUBJECT:==
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| NOTICE OF DEVIA'IlON
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| -(NRC INSPEC110N REPORT NOS. 50-335/9413 AND 50-389/94-13)
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| , 'this refers to the laspection conducted by S. A. Elrod of this office on April 24 - May 28,1994. De l inspection included a review of activities authoriand for your St. Imcie facility. At the conclusion of the
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| - inspection, the findings were discussed with those ma-hare of your staff identified in the enclosed report.
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| Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted 5- of selected ====lamilaas of pen-inves and representative records, interviews with per=anaal, aad observations i t of activities in' progress.
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| s The inspection did not reveal violations of NRC .:, * - However, certain activities having manor safety O
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| significauce appeared to deviate from commitments to the NRC. He deviations and elements to be included in
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| -Q ' your response ano described in the enclosed Ntee of Deviation (Notice).
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| t Your ate = tion is also invited to an unresolved item identified in the inspection report. His matter will be ,
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| I pursued during future inspection....
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| Sincerely,
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| !(
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| David M. Verrelli !
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| { 1
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| !. David M. Verrelli, Chief 4
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| Reector Pmjects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
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| ]
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| Enclosures
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| : 1. Notim of Deviation '
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| j~ 2. NRC Inspection Report NOTICE OF DEVIATION
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| - Florida Power & Ught Company Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 St. Imcie 1 and 2 Ucense Nos. DPR47 and NPF-16 i
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| , . 1 During an NRC inspection conducted on April 24 through May 28,1994, deviations of written commitmmes in
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| ' the Unit 1 Final Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) were identified. In accordance with the ' General Statamaat of 3
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| -}. Page 1 of 9 l
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| 4 EXCERFTS 1R 94-13 l <_ ..),Policy and h-:= - E. for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CPR Part 2, Appendix C, the devishons are listed Section 6.4.1.1 of the Unit 1 PSAR stated that a number of items would be maintained in each of the Unit 1 I and Unit 2 control rooms to support control room habitability. Among these items were:
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| * Potable water in excess of 100 gallons ,
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| * A sanitation kit containing, in part: ;
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| * 1 pair of polyethylene gloves ;
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| 3
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| * 35 cups and lids j
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| * 1 instruction sheet i
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| .]
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| * 2 fiberboard boxes ;
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| t 4
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| Contrary to the above, on inspections conducted May 9,1994, the Unit I control room was found to contain only 55 gallons of water and both control rooms were without polyethylene gloves, cup lids, instruction sheets !
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| j and fiberboard boxes. In an inspection conducted May 15,1994, the Unit I control room was found to contain ,
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| only 80 gallons of water and the previously noted sanitary kit deficiencies were not cv.A;ed..... ;
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| Raport Nos.: 50-335/94-13 and 50-389/94-13 i 1 Ucanaaa- Florida Power & Ught Co i
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| ; 9250 West Plagler Street [
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| Miami, FL 33102 '
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| )
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| , ,. Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50389 Hr===a Nos.: DPR 67 and NPP-16 l Facility Name: St. Imcie 1 and 2 f
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| Inspection Conducted. April 23 - May 28,1994 Report Nos.: 50-335/94-13 and 50-389/94-13 Ucanmaa. Florida Power & Ught Co 9250 West Plagler Street
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| : i. Miami, FL 33102 j' .
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| Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 Ucense Nos.: DPR-67 and NPP-16 Inspetors: R. Schin for 6/27/94 S. A. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed
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| _R. Schin for _ 6/27/94 l M. S. Miller, Resident Inspector Date Signed i
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| _R. Schin for _ 6/27/94 i G. Hopper, Operator Ucense F ==h Date Signed Accompanying Personnel J. A. Norris, Senior Project Manager I .
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| .,s Page 2 of 9
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| -s
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| [
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| EXCERPTS IR 94-13 m ,
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| 4 i \
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| : ~, ,/ ' Approved by: __K. D. Imdis __6/27/94 ;
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| K. D. Landis, Chief Date Signed Ranctor Projects Section 2B i Division of Reactor Projects ,
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| I Scope:
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| 4 f ' Ibis routine resident inspection was conducted onsite in the areas of plant tours, plant operations review,
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| ==ia*====<w observations, surveillance observations, review of design controls, audit of Plant Changss/ Modifications, and followup of previous inspection findings. R=ctr=liiA inspection was performed on !
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| April 24,26,27, May 5,6,9 and 15.
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| . Results:
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| Plant operations area: 'Ibe inspectors found plant operations to be conducted in a safe and profa-t-t mannar (13). 'IVo ia=8- of deficient operations procedures were identified and corrected appropriately by control room operators (1s 3.b.2 & 3.b.3).
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| Maintenance and Surveillance area: The inspectors found that malnemaance and surveillance activities caatiaina to be performed well (14). The licensee's evaluation and corrective actions to an issue of hydrolaser pressure control while cleaning CCW beat exchanger tubes was thorough (14.a.2). Good communications were noted during both units' CEA exercise survaillance tests (1s 4.b.4 & 4.b.5).
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| Engissariat.AGRI. Aspects of the licensee's drawing control process and PC/M and Safety Evaluation process were reviewed and found to be satisfactory (15.b). A review of the licensee's Vendor Technical Manual !
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| control process found waakna-as and indicated that additionalit.spection was required to assess the program's j adequacy (15.a). ,
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| Plant Support area: b inspectors found that plant support activites continued to be performed satisfactorily (1 6).
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| l Within the areas ta==act~t, the following deviation (DEV) and unresolved item (URI) were identified:
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| jI DEV 335,389/94-13-02-Inadequate h ;y Supplies in Control Rooms (17.a.3)
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| URI 335,389/94-13 Vendor Technical Manual Control Weaknesses (15.a).....
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| 1 2. Plant Status and Activities 2.a. llaill Unit I began the inspection period at 100 percent power. 'Ihe unit operated normally the rest of the period, ending the period in day 54 of power operation since startup on April 4.
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| " 2.b. llalL2 Unit 2 began the inspection period shut down in operating mode 3 following a reactor trip from j 30 percent power the previous day. Unit 2 was started up on April 26 and returned to power operation on April !
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| : 28. M unit operated normally the rest of the period, ending the period in day 29 of power operation since j startup on April 26.
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| i l
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| V Page 3 of 9 4
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| . _ __ ~ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ___ - _ _ _ . _ _ ____ __
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| EXCERFI'S IR 94-13 -)
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| ,,!- Q
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| ?
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| t,.;/ 2.c. NRC Activity ,
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| )
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| . On April 18-28, G. T. Hopper, Operator I.Jcense m==inar from NRC Region D, was on site for familiarization and orientation. His activities included tours, interviews with licensee managers, and inspectma of operatmg activities. His activities are documented in this report.
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| On May 2 6, Reactor Inspecton E. H. Girard and M. N. Miller, both fiom NRC Region II, and NRC Contractor M. R. Holbrook, were onsite to inspect implementation of the licensee's GL 89-10 motor-operated f
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| valve program. 'Ibeit activities were documanted in IR 335,389/94-11.
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| 1 ,
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| 4
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| : On May 9-13, L A. Norris, NRR Senior Project Manager for St. Lucie, was onsite. His activities included j meetings with licensee i " and an audit of recently implemented PC/Ms and their ===arimaad Safety
| |
| ; Evaluations.
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| 1 j 3. Plant Operations (71707) 3.a. Plant Tours
| |
| 'Ibe inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify tiset manitoring equipment was recordmg as required, j'
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| equipment was properly tagged, operations penannel were aware of plant conditions, and plant Ec - ' .' ; ,
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| $ efforts were adequate. During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping '
| |
| 4 vibrations, pipe hanger and mai==ic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution sad danger tags, c-- - " positions, n ;--- y of Are fighting equipment, and instnunset calibration dates.
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| {
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| Some tours were conducted on hacarshifts. b frequency of plant tours and control room visits by site l q management was noted. j
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| }
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| : }
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| E./ N inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESP, ECCS, and support systems. Valve, breaker, l l)
| |
| ; and switch lineups as well as equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
| |
| N following accessible-ares ESP system and area walkdowns were made to verify that system lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory: 1
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| - a Unit 1 CCW, i, e HPSI Train 2A,
| |
| * Unit 2 C51', and
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| 'i e Unit 1 Diesel Puel Oil Storage Tankafl'ransfer System.
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| ~
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| 3.b. Plant Operations Review : h inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions......Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed.
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| (1) During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following (4) tagouts....
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| (2) Followun of a Unit 2 Ranctor Startuo Discusand in IR 335/389-94-12 In IR 94-12, Paragraph 3.b.(10), the 4 inspector noted that a "It was required dunng the performance of Prooperational Test P.ae 2-3200088, Rev 3 ' Unit 2 Initial Criticality Pollowing Refueling.' b error in step 12.23, which affected only shaedown
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| , group B, involved attempting to verify that rod motion was inhibited in the inward direction while CEAs wea still fully inserted Operators prepared a TC requiring that shutdown group B CEAs be withdrawn to 2 +/-1 lachan prior to performing the step.
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| N inspector reviewed a previously completed copy of the procedure, completed following the 1992 refueling I
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| Page 4 of 9
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| 1' EXCERFI'S IR 94-13 l
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| 1-b^
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| C outage, and noted that the subject step had been signed as having been -ec-fully completed. The la parw discussed the issue with Operations Depastment managers ......it was explained that.....
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| 'Ihe inspector ibund the es,'--* satisfactory.
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| The inspector concluded that -. ,,, '. functional tests had actually occurred during both the 1992 and 1994 uses of the procedure. ,
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| I (3) Unit 2 Reactor Startuo on Anril 26. The inspector wiw the Unit 2 reactor startup on April 26. b ]
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| i governing procedure was OP 241030122, Rev 36, Reactor Startup. During the course of the startup, a TC was i required to step 8.5.2, which was lasanawl to verify the regulatmg group interlock by attempting to withdraw regulating group 1 with the shutdown groups at their IEL.1he procedure dimeted that operators verify that, :
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| , when withdrawal was da===adad: (1) No regulatmg group 1 motion occurred, (2) Annunciator Kil, CEA l
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| : l. Motion Inhibit, -inted, and (3) Annunciator K26, CEA Withdrawal Prohibit, annunciated.
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| 4 The procedure was in error as the K26 annunciator would annunciate only if CEA withdrawal were inhibited by the a=i*= of two RPS pro-trips. No pre-trips were expected, and none were actuated, during c- " _.
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| I execution. Consequently, the procedurn could not be performed as written and a TC was generated to replace the reference to the K26 annunciator with a reference to the 'CEA Regulating Group Withdrawal Prohibit' !
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| annunciator....
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| b inspector verified that procedure Rev 36 had not been employed in a reactor stastup since its issuance. b inspector reviewed procedure Rev 35 and found that the - c-; ==e criteria delineatad above were embodied in a note following step 8.5.2, which directed that a withdrawal of regulatmg group 1 be attempted. However, Rev 35 correctly stated that the "CEA Regulating Group Withdrawn! Prohibit' annunciator should be lit, vice j
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| - the K26 *CEA Withdrawal Prohibit" annunciator cited in Rev 36. i 1
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| 1he apparent cause for the need to TC the subject procedure was a transpositional error during procedure )
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| j t-revision. In expanding the note -*=iaad in Rev 35 into the procedural steps =*=iaad in Rev 36, an error resulted in an incorrect annunciator refenece.
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| 3.c. Technical Specification Compliance : Ucensee compliance with selected TS ILOs was verified. This ,
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| included the review of selected surveillance test results...... i In conclusion, the inspectors found plant operations to be conA-ead in a safe and professional usanner. ,
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| Two instances of deficient operations procedures were identified and corncted 1,, ,,, -l.tdy by control reorn operators.
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| : 4. Maintenance and Surveillance (62703,61726) 4.a. Maintenance Observations Station maintenance activities involving selected safety-related systems and )
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| t components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with j requirements.....Pcations of the following maintenance activities were observed:
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| e (1) NPWO 66/7716 - Troubleshoot Annunciator O-41......
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| ' (2) NPWO 0039/61 - Clean and 1-+ IB CCW HX NPWO 0039/61 implemented Preventive M=ian-aca item 14-34 of the same title. The uti%y had feed that a mid<ycle cleaning of the salt water side of the HX maintained ample heat exchange a:.argin. At the trae of this inspection, the HX had been opened and initially cleaned. b tubes were being cleaned by runnias a high-pressure hose through each tube while spraying water thtough a special nozzle at 7,500 - 10,000 peig. Plastic sheeting on the deck of the CCW platform led the drain
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| ' ,m b Page 5 of 9 A
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| EXCERFTS IR 94-13
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| .n 3 .
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| water off to the stound. N =achaale= operating the hose wore protective face atuads and appeared to be f .r.Jorming a thorough cleaning.......the time of the inspector's observation on April 27, the pump discha pressure was 12,500 peig. b supervisor adjusted pressure back to 8,500 peig and ladie=*=d that he had very recently assured pressure was about 8,500 peig, within allowed limits.1he inspector initially concluded that, since pressure was not self .-- " ^5 it had changed due to changed operational ;--- _., but subsequent testang showed that the pressme setting valve was moving due to vibration. l Since the spray pressure had excevied the NPWO limit, the inspector requested the licensee to determine if the HX tubes had been damaged.1he licensee subsequently conducted a trial by pressure cleaning one spot each in i esveral pieces of spare or scrap HX tubing at 12,500 pois for several minutes, eben ==celaniar each tube for
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| * ^'
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| * AAer Sve minutes, the water spray I .
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| ^ marked the tube surface but there was no wall
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| . thinning evident. AAer ten minutes, the spray dug signi5 cant pits in the tube wall.1ho inspector concluded that exceeding the NPWO pressee had not been detrimental because spray impingement was for only a few
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| =canda due to the speed at which the spray head pulls itself along......The liesasee _ ' , i
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| , d==a==8 sted ==n== operation of the sanne machl= using upgraded control consponents and gages.
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| l (3) FWO 64/2924 - CEDMCS 1%nodie Exarcise h inspector observed portions of this PWO, which involved IAC support to Operadoes in the performaana of OP 241100$0, conducted May 19.1his support involved obtaining strip chart recorder taces of CEDMCS output to individual CEA oails while the CEAs were being exercised. Approuimanaly one-third of the CEAs being exercised were recorded for analysis. Traces
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| / were to be analysed both for proper voltage output and proper sequencing.
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| . r'a===ications were established with the' control room and communications between the eachaienaa and the RCO performing CEA manipuladons was good, h recorder being used was verined to be within its calibration interval. While no formal procedure was employed to d' rect the technician in the perfornunce of the monitoring, the technician explained that the evolution he was performing was addressed as a normal function of 4 _
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| ' his training.1he inspector found, in d-aming the evolution, that the technician was very knowledgeable about both the activities he was performing and CEDMCS in general.
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| 4.b. Shrveillance Obansvations Vanous plant operations were verified to comply with selected 13 requirma==s= ....1he following surveillance tests were observed:
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| $ (1) OP 24010125. Revision 38. HPSI Valve Stmke Tests lhe inspector wie===ad from the control room and
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| ' at the motor control center the stest of HPSI Flow control valves HCV-3616, 3626, and 3646 following preventive mainemaan~ and cleaning of the circuit breaker cubicles. b retest required a temporary liA of clearance 2-9445 063, which established the isolations for the wod being retested h three breaker cubicles inspected were all clean and well kept, b OPEN and CLOSE contactors worked smoothly during the test and clamp on ammanar readmss were nominalin all cases. W valve stroites were then timed from the control room. Again, stroke times were nominal.
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| (2) OP 2-1400160. Rev 12. F - ' Catih =*iaa - Delta T s,c.we.:- Cativ. 'Ihe laspector witnessed I & C 1 technicians perform portions of a Omaaal A poet maine -anca test per the subject OP. There were two technicians perfornung the test and the procedure was in hand.
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| (3) OP 1-2200050A. Rev 12. l A Emergency Dianal Generator 1%riodic Test and General Opamting Instructions j 1he inspector witnessed portions of the 1A EDG surveillance performed May 5.1he test was performed
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| =*i=f=e*a ily, however the governing yM ., required a change prior to completion.
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| In response to a Unit 2 EDG FO spill resulting from the FO supply isolation valve failing to close on high day
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| ' 4/ Page 6 of 9
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| - - - .-. ~ - - . . . .- -. . - -- . . - - - -- ._. . .
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| i EXCERPI'S IR 94-13 4 .
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| s "j tank leve4, the subject pids was revised to require a test to verify the operability of SE-59-1A, the Unit 1 PO supply isolation valve. However, the procedure included no description as to how this test was to be conducted. b SNPO conducting the surveillance test identified the need for additional instructions and the test was halted until a TC was generated.
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| t b inspector concluded that, while the procedure revision was weak in addressing an operability test of SE r I A, the SNPO acted correctly to effect corrective actions.
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| (4) OP 2-0110050. Rev 15. Ca=* ol F1--* A--k!v Peri ~Iic Test De inspector observed portions of the surveillance test, conducted May 19. His test, in part, satisfied 73 LCO 3.1.3.1. De inspector noted that the surveillance was performed in a professional snannae, with good ea====icanians between the RCO perforsang CEA manipulations and the ANPS. Additionally, the inspector noted the pramanca of an engineer from Reactor Engineering, assigned to provide support to the surveillance test. De test was completed satisfactorily.
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| l I
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| . (5) OP 1-011nnen. Rev 28. Cn=t ol Aa-* A-=k!v Peri ~iic Test De inspector observed portions of this j test, conducted May 26. b test was performed satisfactorily. Good communications were noted between the RCO performing the test and the ANPS when, during regulating group 2 testing, it appeared that CEAs 19 and
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| ^
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| 20 were moving simultaneously, b condition was discua. sed, the responsible I&C engincar was consulted, and
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| . the condition was shown to be the result of a CEA ADS malfunction. b malfunction was corrected and the test was concluded.
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| I 1
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| la camelusian, the inspectors found that minineraant* and surveillance activities cantiam to be pesformed well. The licensee's evaluation and carrective acelan= to the issue of hydrolaser passaw esatrol while cleaning CCW heat enchanger tubes was thorough. Good ea==aunications were noted during both units' CEA esercise surveillance tests.
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| : 5. Engineering'(37550) l 5.a. Review of Demian Controls : b inspector conducted a review of engineering doen=aat control practices !
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| as shey related to PC/Ms, vendor drawings, and vendor e achnical manuals........b inspector's findags were as ;
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| follows:
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| j
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| * b licensee's control of drawing updates, required as a function of plant modifications, appeared strong.
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| , h timeliness of drawing revisions appeared to be generally within the timeframes specified by JPN-QI 6.3, revision 7, ' Drawing Control.' h backlog of drawings (plant and vendor) which evea~l~1 the required timeframes was relatively small (56 as of May 20) and the licensee described proca==a= in place to remove the i backlog.
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| * h licensee's control of VTM updates appeared week. Various personnel described difficulties encountered with VTM re/isions. Areas of concern to the inspector included the following:
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| * FRG Approval of VTMs - Because the licensee employed VTMs as procedures for maintenance activities, FRG approval of VTM was required. However, VTM revisions originated and were approved in the Juno Beach engineering offices. he, the FRG was tasked with approving (for the site) a previously approved (in engineerag) document.....
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| * Engineering Control of VTM Revision ... multiple VTM revisions have been issued under the name revision number. Hat is, for a given VTM, the site has received multiple transmittals, identified by the same revision number, which contain substantively different information. An N/ Page 7 of 9
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| m EXCERPTS IR 94-13
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| ;l^ '
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| 1 . example of such a condition was revision 6 to VTM 8770-6703. The record of revisions,
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| ~
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| .' transmitted to the site, stated that the revision was made per DCR-SLM-93-124. Following FRG approval of this revision, the site received a different tranarnitial of revision 6, with a record of l revisions stating that the revision was mada per PCM 138-191. Revision 7 to this same VTM was !
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| then received, with its record of revision sheet indicating that the later of the two revisions 6 was the basis for the VTM.
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| The inspector concluded, based upon the information above, that the lie ==ame's program for controlling VTMs appeared weak and that continued inspection was required to conclude whether or not regulatory 1 .;
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| " were being violated. As the curant inspection period concluded during this '- ; "'=. the issue is identified as URI 94-13-01, VTM Control Weaknesses. j l1 5.b. Audit of PC/Ms (TAC M72359, M72360)
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| , During the routine quarterly site visit, the NRR Project Manager for St. Lucie performed an audit of several - i 4l plant changes accomplished pureuant to 10 CPR 50.59,1he PC/Ms audited (5)........The audit did not 4
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| uncover any violations or deviations. The PC/Ms reviewed were complete, well organised and easily retrievable....... ,
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| l
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| . In conclusion, aspects of the licensee's drawing control process and PC/M and Safety Evaluatica precus I were reviewed and found to be satisfactory. A review of the lie ===a*'s Vendor Technical Manuel control i process feumi weak =amana and indicated that additional * ; "' = was required to assess the programa's l adaquary, i f 6. Plant Support (71750) ij iA jj C
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| ~
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| 6.a. Fire Protection : During the course of their normal tours, the inupectors routinely ---u facets of the Fire Protection Program .... !
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| I' 6.b. Physical Pmtection : % inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being implemented....
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| 6.c. Radiolonical Protection Program : Radiation protection control activities were observed...... ..
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| The inspectors concluded that plant support activites continue to be performed satisfactorily.
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| ! 7. Followup (Units 1 and 2) (92902,92904) i 7.a. Inspector Followup Items (1) (Closed - Units 1 and 2)IF1-92-2042,'IEV Condition Review.....
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| 4 1 l (2) (Closed - Units 1 and 2) IFI 92-18-01 Emergency Plan Classification inconsistent......
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| l 3) (Open - Units I sad 2)IFI 92-18-02 Evaluate Adequacy of Accident Preparations Per FSAR Section 6.4 This open item resulted when the inspector reviewed the licensee's emergency supplies following hurricane Andrew, h inspector found that water supplies were less than that stated in the PSAR. Further, the is.r W
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| ~
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| found that control room supplies, listed in the PSAR, were not in the control room. The inspector also noted 1
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| J i EXCERP'IS IR 94-13
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| {} - that the PSAR did not address supplies for the TSC staff (the TSC was part of the control room complex).
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| ; In revisiting this issue, the inspector reviewed the licensee's internal response to the subject IFI. In the response to NOI-92 091, the licensee stated that Operations would bring both control rooms into compliance with the PSARs and that waste disposal capability would be made part of an Operations surveillance.
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| 1 The inspector toured both units' control rooms on May 9.....The inspector found that food supplies were ample to meet the PSAR commitments of meeting the needs of 10 persons for a weelt. However, the inspector found ' .
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| j that the Unit I control roorn contained only 55 gallons of water, rather than the 100 gallons committed to in the FSAR. Additionally, both units' control rooms failed to meet PSAR commitments with regant to Office of
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| '!* Civil Defense sanitation kits in that both units' kits failed to include polyethylene gloves, cup lids, instruction sheets, and Abescard boxes, b inspector toured the Unit I control room on May 15 and found that water inventory was 80 gallons and that the previously identified inventory deficiencies of the sanitation kits had not
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| ,l been corrected. The noted failures to meet 75AR conunitments are identified as a deviathn. This is ,
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| identified as DEV 941342, Inadequate Emergency Supplies in Control Rooms. ;
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| ; },
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| i
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| .......With regard to the support of personnel in the TSC, the licensee stahl that the portion of the PSAR i referenced by the inspector in IFI 921842 addressed post-1JOCA control room habitability. b licanmaa stated ,
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| i that provisions for TSC personnel with regard to hurricanes were provided for in ADM 0005753, " Severe l Weather Preparations.' The licensee reasoned that, since preparation time was available in the case of severe j weather, no standing provisions were ==a==ary for TSC personnel. The licensee's disposition of the item failed j
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| < to address the needs of TSC personnel following a LOCA, when no preparation time would be available.1he inspector brought the issue to the a**antion of the Protection Services Supervisor, who, aAer reviewing the
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| ; matter, stated that the licensee was considering the logistics of providing food and water for TSC personnel.
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| Q The inspector f.nned the liesasee's dE=pa=letaa of the issue of the adequacy of TSC staff suppest to be J-
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| :(
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| weak. The lle===='s response failed to address the overriding question put forth by the inspector. In s doing so, the liesasse failed to consider the most limiting canditions in addressing TSC support provisions.
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| l> Mar === of the lle===='s failure to satisfactedly address the issues dinimaal above, this lean remains open to track the lic==ma*'s treatment of supplies for TSC personnel. Issues related to control room stores will be followed under the licensee's response to the deviation cited above. j 1
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| 7.b. Followup of Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations (Units 1 and 2)(92702)
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| (1) (Closed - Unita 1 and 2) VIO-92-05-05 Failure to Test Certain Valves Quarterly.....
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| l
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| [l 8. Exit Interview I
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| . The inspection scope and findings were summarned on May 27,1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.....
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| i (open) URI 335,389/94-13-01, VTM Control Weaknesses,15.a (open) DEV 335,389/94-13 02, Inadequate Emergency Supplies in Control Rooms,17.a.3 (closed) IFI 335,389/92-2H2, TCV Condition Review,17.a.1 (closed) IFI 335,389/92-1841 Emergency Plan Classification inconsistent,17.a.2
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| .. (open) IFI 335,389/92-18-02, Evaluate Adequacy of Accident Preparations Per FSAR Section 6.4,17.a.3 (cloend) VIO 335,389/92-05 05, Failure to Test Certain Valves Quarterly,17.b
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| 'g Page 9 of 9 ;
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| 1
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| . y EXCERPTS IR 9414
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| . A 1
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| M>1
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| ' L. .,
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| I h/ ,
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| July 29,1994 -
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| 3 Docket Nos. 50-335,50-389 .
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| I1==== Nos.' DPR 67, NPF-16 Florida Power and Light Company - i
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| : . ATTN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg f Premioset - Nuclear Division
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| :[ . P. O. Box 14000
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| ~
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| Juno Beach, FL' 33408-0420 i 1
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| i P Gentleenen:
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| t SURIECT: NRC INSPfiCI10N REPORT NOS. 50 335/94-14 AND 50-389/94-14 1 !
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| I'- 'this refers to the inspection conducted by S. A. Elrod of this ofGce on May 29 - July 2,1994. 'Ibe inspection included a review of activities authorized for your St. Imcie facility. At the conclusion of the inspection, the ,
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| . Andings were discussed with those members of your staff identined in the enclosed report. :
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| i Areas ====iad during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the laag= calan ca==iM of selective ====ia=*ia== of procedures and .,. "ve records, interviews with r n', and observation
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| {
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| of activities in progress.
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| R y f~ , 7;,3 Within the scope of the inspection, violadens or deviations wees not identified; however, your attention is -
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| invited to an unresolved item identified in the laag=esina report...... Sincerely, 1
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| Signed by George Belisle for J
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| David M. Verrelli, Chief l Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
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| ==Enclosures:==
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| NRC Inspection Report
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| !. Report Nos.: 50-335/94-14 and 50-389/94-14 D--- Florida Power & Ught Company 9250 West Plagler Street 1 1 Miami, FL 33102 i
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| '- \
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| l l' Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 Ucense Nos.: DPR-67 and NPP-16
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| : 4. .
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| 1
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| . Facility Name: St. Imcie 1 and 2 l l
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| . Taapace== Conducted:
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| s
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| ,; H;. T E .. _R. Schin for 7/27/94 7
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| Page 1 of 7
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| 4 l
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| I EXCERPTS IR 94-14 J J, i %,,/ S. A. Eirod, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed I
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| , R. Schin for 7/27/94 M. S. Miller, Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved by: _G. A. Belisle for 7/29/94 K. D. Imdis, Chief - Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects l .
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| Scope:
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| ; This routine raaidant inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plert operations review, malataaaaca j observations, survaillanca observations, engineering, plant support, and followup of previous inspection items.
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| j paelrahiR inspection was performed on June 8,17, and 26.
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| 4 Results:
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| l
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| : j. Plant operations area: Operations during the period continued to be performed well. Operator response to the Unit I trip was considered good (13.d). 'Ibe licensee's identification and treatment of the issue of Unit 2 Wide Range Gas Monitor inoperability was thorough and resulted in a Non-Cited Violation (13.e). .
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| 1 m- Maintenance and Surveillance aren: Maintananca and Surveillaana activities observed this penod wese l l,' ? f -- ' well. Good ;. ''- ' -#=: : ' '= ' y was noted in the repair of the 28 "=; 7 Diesel Generator dianal starting air compressor motor (14.a.2).
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| Engmaaring area: b inspector conciated that the licensee has been effective in identifying and r.al. ;
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| . recent issues of Vendor Technical Manual revision control.' Pacility Review Group subconunittee reviews, and the resolution of commaats generated in those reviews, have resulted in a lack of timely issuance of some 1 l Vendor Technical Manuals to the field (15.a).
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| i ' Within the areas inspected, the following Non-Cited Violation (NCV) and Unresolved Item (URI) were identified:
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| s; ji URI 335,389/94-1441 - Use of N/A by Operators in Procedural Steps,13.b.
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| NCV 335,389/94-1442 - Inoperable WRGM Due to Maintanance Error,13.e..... l 1
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| , 2. Plant Status and Activities
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| :{ 2.a. Mak.1 Unit I began the inspection period at 100% power. On June 6, the unit experienced a main i~ generator lockout, followed by turbine and reactor trips, when winds from a severe thunderstorm blew a section
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| !; of flashing off an adjacent building and across two output terminals of main transformer IA (sea paragraph
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| ,- 3.d). Repairs to the transformer were affected and the reactor was taken critical on June 8 and was placed on-line on June 11.' b unit was in day 22 of power operation at the end of the inspection period.
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| 2.b. Unk.2 Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100% power and ramalaad at power throughout; ending the inspection period in day 67 of power operation since startup in April. On June 28, the licensee discovered disconnected sample lines to the WRGM which resulted in WRGM inoperability which had lasted, most
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| i' EXCERPTS IR 94-14 1 #
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| 1 Q probably, since April 6 (see 13.e).
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| 3.c. NRC Activity David M. Verrelli, Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 2 and Kerry D. I=ad=, Chief of Reactor Projects Section 2B, NRC Region II, visited the site on June 24....
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| : 3. Review of Plant Operations (71707) 3.a. Plant Tours .......
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| 3.b. Plant Operations Review h inspectors periodicauy reviewed shiA logs and operations records,
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| ' including data abeets, instr ===ar traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.......
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| (1) During a control room observation conducted June 26, the intpector reviewed the licensee's actions relating l to Unit 2 cansaia==ar Spray Flow Control Valve PCV-07-1B. N valve was declared inoperable and left in its open position following indications of stem binding. In a Night Order dated June 9, Operations Department j~ ~
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| management stated that a TC should be generated to OP 2 0010125, ' Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks, and Calibrations," to remove the weekly requira==ar to cycle PCV47-1A and B. 'Ibe weekly cycling of these valves was not required by 'I3 and was considered a contributor to the conditions noted in PCV 07-1B.
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| h inspector qwianad whether or not a TC had been generated per the subject Night Order. Operators stated ,
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| ; :_tly, that they believed a TC had been generated; however, no record of a 'It could be produced. ''-
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| operators prepared a 'It at that time. When asked how, in the sh=aare of a TC, the issue of not performing the ,
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| procedurally-required surveillance had been headled, operators stated that the steps had been marked as 'N/A."
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| with the - for not performing the step armotated ......
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| ; -{p".-
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| . The insporter found that a eenflict asisted between the reguleunents d=M-=*ad in ADM 0014120 and the guidanes tranendeted to operators via Night Order. As the ewrent inspeedon period ended prior to the i resolution of this issue, the issue will be tracked as URI 335,309/94-14 01, Use of N/A by Operators in Procedural steps.
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| Dunns this inspectiou period, the inspectors reviewed the following (3) tagouts (clearances).....'lhe posting of required notices to workers was reviewed and found satisfactory.
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| i
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| ; 3.c. Technical Specification Comphance Licensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified...... j i.;I 3.d. Unit 1 Reactor Trio On June 6, Unit 1 experienced a trip during a severe thunderstorm when the main transformer locked out the generator, causing a reactor trip. 'the lockout occurred due to a phase differential on I. main generator transformer I A. 'Ihis occured as a result of an approximate 8' length of aluminum flashing from an adjacent building which was blown across two phases of the 1A main transformer output lamdatars and
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| ! connectors. 'Ihe inspector responded to the control room and found that the unit post-trip response was normal.
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| h lican- a conducted laspections and tests of the 1 A and IB main transformers and the main generator, and !
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| performed repairs to the 1 A main transformer.
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| l h inspectors were present as the reactor was taken critical on June 8. b inspectors noted the presence of Reactor Engmeering per=nanal during the startup, as well as the use of a new 1/M methodology. Previous 3 startups had employed 1/M graphs which plotted inverse multiplication ratios as a function of CEA position.
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| ' Ibis practice resulted in misleading plots in a previous startup due to nonlinearities in reactivity addition as a ;
| |
| fhection of CEA position. Reactor Engineering r==pandad to this with the issuance of 1/M sheets which
| |
| . lineariand reactivity on the base axis of the sheets, resulting in a more linear 1/M plot. 'Ihis change in
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| . ==ahadalogy resulted in non-generic 1/M sheets; that is, as the base axis of a given sheet reflected CEA l- f% / Page 3 of 7 i
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| t
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| 4
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| ? m EXCERI'rS IR 94-14 E ;d -
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| h] W J
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| < reactivity (as opposed to position only), the sheets heanna unit and EFPH specific. Reactor Ef--i.g recogniand this fact and pt-aad to issue new 1/M sheets with each set of core physics curves issued to the Ii control rooms.
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| 2 ?
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| I no inspectors found the startup to be well controlled. Criticality was achieved on June 8 and the licensee had prepared procedures to bring the unit on-line with only the IB transformer; however, the lic-aae chose to wait j until the 1 A transformer repairs were completed. Cited as factors in the decision were the fact that the 1 A transformer repairs were scheduled to be completed within 2 to 3 days and the unusual electric plant lineup that l.
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| would have resulted. %e inspectors found the licensee's rationale for the decision to be conservative.
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| ?
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| a 8 faaa-able On June 23, the hcensee discovered a condition which 3,e. Wide *~ Gas Mae F
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| ' rendered the Unit 2 Reactor Auvihary Buildag (unit vent stack) wide range gas monitor, RS-26-90, inoperable.
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| During malas- to calibrate the detector, I&C personnel found that the 2 instnuaaar lines (sample tubing) l( , which supply the instrumnat's low and high range detectors were di=-- 1 ' st the instenaant skid. His resulted in an inability of the WRGM to perform its intmadad function of measurms vent stack gas activity. De jf WROM was required to be operable by TS ILO 3.3.3.1, which specified that both the low and high range ji monitors be operable. For cases of inoperabdity, TS required, in part, that the monitors be returned to an j' operable status within 72 hours or that a propinanad alternate method of sampling be initiated. De licensee promptly restored the monitor to an operable status by m=~ ting the sample lines on June 28.
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| lI De licaamaa stated that the disconnection of the sample lines was normally performed in the course of calibesting the air flow lastrummata on the WRGM. De licensee revtwed the ramintananca history of the skid and found the last calibration to have been performed April 6. De licensee interviewed the I&C specialists
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| ]
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| ; involved in that . calibration, who stated that they believed the sample lines were reconnected properly following the calibration. In an attempt to establish the period of inoperabhlity more accurately, the heaamaa companed
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| ]
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| the output of two PLO monitors, which sampled the unit vent stack at approximately that same point, with that lli 'k A of the WROM. He licensee found that routine plant evolutions, such as venting and sampling the VCT, g
| |
| resulted in similar outputs when all detectors were sampling properly. Employing this ==ehad, the licensee was
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| ,' able to bound the onset of WRGM inoperability between February 13 and April 29.
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| k De licaamaa determiriad that one contributing factor to this incident was a lack of iadepaadaat verification of the reconnection of sampling lines for the WRGM. De maintaaaace effort of April 6 was conducted in insd a with 1&C procedure 2-1400189, Rev. O, ' Calibration of the Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring Sample Flow Meters,'
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| which did not require indapandant veritication following the reconnection of the sample lines. %e inspector reviewed QI 5-PR/PStel Rev. 55, " Preparation, Revision, Review / Approval of Procedures,' and found that
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| ;. indar-dant verification was required for cases in which a *... Tech. Spec, system or component will be or has
| |
| - been altered..." I&C engmeers stated that, following the incident, a revision was prepared to the subject i 1-j procedure to require independent verification following reconnection of the sampling lines. Additionally,I&C
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| : engmeets stated that similar I&C procedures were being reviewed to identify similar needs for iadapaadaar verification. %e licensee also stated that consideration was being given to performing effluent monitor cAmaael checks as a function of future planned releases, j %e impact of the noted conditions on unit operations was minimal. De WRGM was installed for wide range, post-accident monitoring over an approximate 12 dacade response span. During normal unit operations, effluents were monitored by both the WRGM and two PIO monitors which sampled the unit stack. De j iampe*ae reviewed EPIP 3100033E, Rev 20, "Off-Site Dose Calculations," and found that, under emergency conditions, release rates were based upon a primary rnethod of grab samples with a first alternate maahad of offluent monitors. In the event that grab samples were not employed, the WRGM would have been ~~==ad for data. While the inoperable WRGM would not have indicated properly at that time, the licensee stated that attention would have been drawn to the inoperabilty by the fact that the PIGS would have been indicating true i Page 4 of 7 t '
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| 1 i
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| 4 EXCERPTS IR 94-14
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| - vent activity. h inspector agreed with this ===aaament.
| |
| While reviewing the EPIP, the inspector noted that worksheet B2, provided for recording data from Unit 2 effluent monitors in the event grab samples were not employed, contained a typographical error which entitled the sheet as ' Release Rate Worksheet Bl' and " Unit 1 Effluent Monitors.' The inspector notified the Chemistry Supervisor of the error, who stated that it would be corrected.
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| j h inspector concluded that this event represented a violation of TS LCO 3.3.3.1, Table 3.3.6, item 2.c.ii, which requires an operable plant vent high range monitor in modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, or the initiation of a preplanned alternate method of monitoring the noted parameter. Although the inoperability of the WROM also affected the low range detection capability of the instrument, the TS-required monitoring of this parameter was accomplished through the use of the PIGS, which monitor the parameter over the range specified in TS Table 3.3.6, item 2.c.i. Due to the minor safety significance of this violation, the fact that the licensee identified the violation, and the licensee's prompt corrective actions, this violation will not be subject to mforcement action because the licasee's efforts la identifying and/or correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Policy, h failure to satisfy TS ILO 3.3.3.1 is idatified as NCV 50-389/94-14-02, Inoperable WRGM Due to Maint== rwa Error.
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| In conclusion, operations during the period continued to be performed well. Operator response to the Unit 1 trip was considered good. b licensee's identification and treatmmt of the issue of Unit 2 WRGM l i
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| i inoperability was thorough and resulted in an NCV.
| |
| : 4. Maintenance and Surveillance (62703,61726) 4.a. Maintenance Observations Station maintenance activities involving selected safety-related systems and c mv.'.a .cre ob:erve:!/ reviewed t > r.scertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirementa.....
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| ' w pw , weer*. p.,uoa.s o/ ii.e co stn'iction of scaffolding, lastalled to support lighti,ng fixture septura and heat detector testing in the 2B EDO room....The inspector noted that applicable procedural requiremmis, including vertical and horizontal member spacing, diagonal member use and the placement of a 'Do Not Use' l tag during construction, were antisfied. Additionally, the crew performing the work was noted to employ good l industrial safety practices. l l
| |
| (2) PWO 62/0380 - 2B EDG Diesel-Powered Startine Air Comoressor This PWO was initiated when operators f::r.d thz.t the starting handerank for the backup starting air compressor engine could not be turned while
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| : t'.2r : .anthly ir.*.v:i'Ir. co test. 'C.; P'NO directed that a troubleshooting effoit ta un:!crtaken t , . t.
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| Cu :r:.:f. %:.
| |
| 1,. ravic.v'ag tb et:.',:, .dage, S ' :spe:r Jeund ths.t the journeyman's notes fror.i te previous shift we;e
| |
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| / (I) [O bb'M.QIj,j e,Q0'e:Iirito ,$;fMt,UC,'t.d,r/hely,pf, (i[ f .Y hid ,fi ,iuJct ir. IMihid.ing he ,
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| | |
| i'
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| .'the inspector witn wed port na of the rcutting of the nrine end the installation a d sensiont g cf V-belts,
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| |
| '. emapae's sanosht3 o turn was due to pesating portotiout un die anguie. *bich boost I abe *W flywhee to
| |
| - the casing. When tae peant as ruauwed, the engme turned as designed. % lice w is reviewing the issue of i cetrol of paint ag. 'Ibe ine.mtor plans to follow the licensee's actions.
| |
| T%e 214 91 pnuined opi,rs!Ic. during thle peei ! kevuee the traeue starting air ressure in the air tankt W3A .
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| s,i h t , , . .. . t. . < n ,..', : .dn.-
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| g, EXCERPTS 1R 9541 1
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| 'I~
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| February 23,1995 Docket Nos. 50 335, 50-389 Usenes Nos. DPR47, NPP Florida Power & Ilght Company
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| -i ATIN: . J. H. Ooldbers .
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| President - Nuclear Division P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408 0420
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| | |
| ==SUBJECT:==
| |
| NCrI1CE OF VIOIA110N
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| . ^ (NRC INSPECI10N REPORT NOS. 50335/9541 AND 50-389/95 01)
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| (laallasama=
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| i
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| .!" : 11ds refers to the laspection eaaA-dad by R. L. Prevatte of this office ce January 1 - February 4,1995. 'Ibe la par +I= included a review of activities authoriand for your St. Imcie facility. At the conclusion of the ,
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| ^'
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| ' - , =. the Andings were diar ===d with thoes awahars of your staff identified in the aarlaaad report.
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| ; Areas manniaad during the i==g=*iaa are inlaatiSed in the report. - Within these areas, the lampactian consisted
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| ' of seisative -a d=*taa= of, -r " and. 4ve records, laterviews with perecenal, and observation of activities is progress. The purpose of the inspection was to detenmine whether activities authoriand by the i licenses were conducted safely and la accordance with NRC . ; ' . Based on the results of this I
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| , -] ' - , - ^' certain of your activities appeared to be la violation of NRC requiremaats, as specified in the !
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| -{'..,j %
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| ==ala=ad Nation of Violation (Notico).......
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| Sincerely, Orig signed by David M. Verrelli David M. Verrelli, Chief
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| ; Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projecte
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| ;. Raela===us.
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| .' } 1. Notice of Violation
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| ,.; 2. NRC faapartiaa Report i i N(yI1CE OF VIOLA'110N
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| ! . Florida Power & Ilght Company Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 St. Imcie 1 and 2 Ucense Nos. DPR47 and NPP-16 During as NRC la= pac *iaa conducted on January 1 - February 4,1995, violations of NRC requisasaanta were
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| . identified. In accordemos with the "Oseeral **=*a===at of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforr===at Actions,"
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| , 10 CPR Past 2, Appendix C, the vial =*ia== are listed below:
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| A. Te&mical Specification surveillance .gi--- " 4.5.1.1.b required, in part,' that safety ieW tanks be d==aaa=* ated operable within six hours of each solution volume incrosse of greater than or equal to one percent of tank volumme by verifying the boron concentration of the safety igjection tank solution.
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| Page 1 of 13 a-r , , - . . _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _
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| 1 4
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| l l
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| EXCERPTS IR 9541 l
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| , .n.
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| 4 d Contrary to the above, on naca.nha,31,1994, a volume addition in excess of one percent was made to the IA2 l, safety iqjection tank without verifying the boron caarantration of the neultant solution within six hours. A satisfactory sample result was obtained appro=1,nasaly nine hours later.
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| ; ' Ibis is a Severity Imel IV violation ("g'--- t I).
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| l I
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| B. Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.s required that written procedures be established, implan=aatant, and 4 inalataland covering the activities reco an=adant in Appendir A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Appendix A, paragraph 1.d includes administrative g= '-- for procedure adherence. Appendix A, ii paragraph 9 includes ge- ' : -
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| for performing main ananca.
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| o 3
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| Procedum QI 5-PR/PSlel, Revision 60, ' Preparation, Revision, Review / Approval of Procedures," Section 5.13.2 stated that all g= ' m shall be strictly adhead to. Ietter of Instruction 2-Ihl-T-89, Revision 0,
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| ; ' Diagnostic Testing of Ietdown level Control System,' required that the positive and negative leads to E/P j 2110Q be i+= 1+f and ladapaadanely verified prior to placing valve LCV-2110Q in service for diagnostic testing.
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| i Contrary to the above, on February 1,1995, r.= ' - IDI-T-89 was not properly '- ;* ' in that the i positive and negative leads to F/P 2110Q wen not properly maartad or fadstand nely Verified due to the leads being reversed, resulting in velve IIV-2110Q not opening when it was placed in service. ' Ibis failure resulted in a loss of letdown flow and required that charging be seemed until the ranh= dant level control valve could be placed in service.
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| l
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| 'Ihis is a Severity level IV violation (9g'- I). . . . .
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| I i Report Nos.: 50-335/9541 and 50-389/95-01 4
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| (/
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| fina=aaa Florida Power & IJght Co 9250 West Plagler Street
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| < Miand, FL 33102 Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 I le==== Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16
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| : . Pacility Name: St. Imcie 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: January 1 - February 4,1995 Inspectors: _R. Schin for _2/22/95 3
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| R. L. Pmvatte, Senior Resident Date Signed 1
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| Inspector R. Schin for 2/22/95
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| : 54. S. Miller, Resident Inspector DE Signed
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| _R. Schin for _2/22/95 W. K. Poortner, Resident Inspector Date Signed l 1
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| Approved by: K. D.Imad= 2/22/95
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| , K. D. Iandia, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 2B !
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| Page 2 of 13 i
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| +
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| i :
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| j .
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| , _ . EXCERFIS IR 9541 d Division of Reactor Projects i
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| j
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| l j i
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| ; , , Scope:
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| 1 This routine resident i==racei= was eaaduciad onsite in the areas of plant operations review, mai=*a==em l observations, surveillance observations, plant support, and other areas. Inspections were perfonned during
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| , normal and backshiA hours and on weekends and holidays.
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| 1!
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| l Rasults:
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| Plant operations anna: Operations was acceptable during tbe inspection period. One violation,lavolving a
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| ; failure to perform a TS survaillanan on SIT baron aa=ca=* stion was identified. Weak --ieania= between j operators and other plant . was noted wirk respect to Unit I bot leg stratification. System and area j walkdowns by the NRC identiSed only minor defleiametaa.
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| I Maintenance and Surveillance area. u l.*ana na/Survaallanca activities ca=*ianad to be ea=Ane*=d well during !
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| l . the period. One violation, involving a failure to perform an adequate * ' , '- verification during CVCS
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| !- ==i=*===aa, was identified. N balance of -i=*aaa=ea activities were randue*=d well. Predictive j wat=*===aa involvement in tbs identification of Unit 1 CEA MO wiring problems was considered a strength.
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| i' Plant Support aren: Plant supped activities were ea=Ane*=d well this period. HP suppon to ea=*=i====*
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| ; entries for i==g-e*ia= and -i=*==e= was consWered good. .
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| ] Within the areas inspected, abs following viala*ia== wese idmanified:
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| j VIO 335/954141, Psilure to Ptuform TS-Required Sampling of the 1A1 SIT,13.e.
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| VIO 389/954142, Failure to Follow Procedure 2-IDI-T-89,14.a.4.
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| 4
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| *~
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| : 2. Plant Status and Activities l 4
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| l
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| : l. 2.a. llak.1 Unit 1 operated at c=a=*i=11y 100 percent power throughout the inspection period. ;
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| 2.b. llak2 Unit 2 operated at aa==*ially 100 percent power throughout the inspection period. At the close of j the i==pacelaa period, the lic===aa was addressing the erratic operation of CVCS letdown control valves and had i stopped other major main eaaaace activities in deference to this issue.
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| [
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| * 2.c. NRC Activity K. D. Landis, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B, NRC Region II, visited the site on February 2 and 3. His activities included a site tour, diaeu-laaa with heensee - n-- ' and an overview of 2
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| residant office activities and issues. S. S. Sanda, Senior Operations Officer, NRC Office for the Analysis and Evaluation of Operating Data, began a six month rotational assignment on January 17. His duties included site 8==iliariation and =g===*=*i- of the resident staff. L. Trocine, Resident laspector, Turkey Point 3 and 4,
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| .' visited the site on January 24 and 35. Her activities included site f==ilineintion for emergency response. W.
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| l K. Poortner, Resident Inspector, naa===, visited the site fresa January 31 through February 3. His activities
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| ; involved augmenting the resident inspection effod.
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| Page 3 of 13 i
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| i 4
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| a-i 4
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| m EXCERPTS IR 95-01 i
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| j . i 3. Plant Operations i .
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| t 3.a. Plant Tous (7170n De inspectors periodacally conducted plant tours to verify that mamisa6s J equipasant was reconhas as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel wese aware of plant
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| [ cauata==, and plant k "- ;'a afrorts was adequate.....De inspeerr perfonned a walkdown of DG 2A and 2a to vwify that the DGs and support systans wae conectly aligned for mandby operation as provided by i
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| ]
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| OP 2-2200020, Rev 23, ' Emergency Diesel Generator Standby llneup." he support systems included DGPO and air start and cooling systems in addition to all DG skid mounted systems /_ _ All valves and j electrical breakers / switches were found in correct positions. b below list of nainor system and/or procedure i di..c'= (14) was provided to the Unit 2 ANPS for w.ii.i. des. He inspector verified that the danciencies
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| ; were conected prior to the end of the reporting period or PWOs were submitted to incorporate eben into the i work schedule.....
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| l 3.b. Plant Operations Review (7170n b inspectors periodically reviewed abiA logs and operations records, including data sheeta, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions....Except as noted below, no
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| ; defleiancian were observed.
| |
| (1) Unit 1 Hot Im Temperature Stratification In December,1994, the inspector noemd, during a Unit I
| |
| ^
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| l control roosa tour, that the hot les temperature laaca*ia== dispisyed on ^ . _ _.. recenler FP-118C showed a
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| '_ difference between individual hot leg * ,. ._. N hot legs varied by several degrees. Am --laa*iaa of
| |
| ,! the reconter trace indicated that hot leg temperatures had tracked together well and then had abruptly deviated
| |
| ; from one another approximanaly one half hour prior to the observation. One hot leg's temperature increased
| |
| '. while abs other decreased. De inspector becusht the condition to the attention of a control roose operator, who stated that the condition had occuned sporadically, and then abated, since startup from the recent refueling
| |
| : l. ,
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| 4 De inspector infonned the operator that the behavior appeared indicative of a hot leg flow anomaly, Idantified in other PWRa, which involved the radial ra*atiaa of hat les flow regimes. h behavior had been found, at other 8=eilitia=, to be the result of a stratified vertical - , - _ profile combined with a spurious radial rotation of the flow regime, which resulted in wanner (or cooler) water being moved relative to the position of l
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| i
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| . bot les RTDs. Unit 1 hot les RTDs were positioned at 45* on either side of vertical, such that when the flow reguno swirled, cooler water was moved up toward one RTD and hotter water was moved down toward the !
| |
| other RTD. !
| |
| l l) N inspector brought the condition to the attantion of the Operations Manager. During the discussion, the inspector pointed out that NRC personnel with knowledge in the area had stated that some CE units had experienced TM/IP pre-trips as a result of the ,+ -- = due to the higher ^ ,
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| - = sensed by the hot i les R' ids. As the RPS employed the higher of NI or AT power, changes in hot leg ^r-;m._.._ resulted in
| |
| : changes in AT power which was then sensed by the RPS. Hus, an increase in the sensed hot leg temperature resulted in an increase in calculated AT power and the potential for challenges to the TM\If pre-trip and trip atpoints.
| |
| Several days aberenAer, the inspector again noted the condition and, as the Operations Manager was in the control roosa at the time, directed his attention to the subject recorder, h Operations Manager directed that
| |
| ; an STA obtain data from the ERDADe computer on the parameters to verify that safety-related R' ids were
| |
| : sensing the same variations in " , A (the recorder displayed the output of non-eafety-related R' ids
| |
| .. employed in the Reactor Regulating System).' On January 6, the inspector noted the condition again and, in
| |
| . . discussions with control room operators, found that the condition had resulted in a series of'IM/IP pretrips on
| |
| ' The==har 24,1994. At this time, at the direction of the Operations Manager, the licaaaaa's Operations Department began a sy=*a== tic evaluation of the phenomaaaa Page 4 of 13 J
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| ' 4 1
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| 4 I
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| : i. . 1 l \
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| i
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| ,3 EXCERPIS IR 9541 !
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| 1 x ../ 1he liosasse's evaluation resulted in the determianelaa that the -ta= behavior was, indeed, due to a J
| |
| ; swirling of thermally stratified coolant, eaami=amas with observations made dunng the startup of Arkaases i Nuclear One, at Mi!!Wome, and at St. Lucie Unit 1 during cycle 5. A safety evaluation was papered which
| |
| ! t=dieas=8 that the ;'---- = did not represent a threat to unit safety, as only abo TM/IP trip was affected and j the TM/IP trip was not credited in the accident analysis. N VHPI', which miied upon NI laputs, was alied 1 upon for providing the necessary trips la response to power ==calmeia== 'lis inspector found the hosesse's
| |
| ! safety evaluation to be satisfactory. Additionally, Operations prepared a Night Order on Jasmary 11 describing ;
| |
| j the ;'- -- - = to operators. l h inspector found that, while the licensee's actions ultimately resuhad la the conclusion that the ;' ----- =
| |
| did not myreeset a threat to safety, operators waso slow to mapand to the amassalaus behavior. h lampactor j discussed the issue with a annaber of operators who stated that they had observed the behavior over an j i '
| |
| approximate one month period. The inspector reviewed strip chart recorder data dating to abe Unit 1 post-refueling startup and found that the ascannly was identifiable la approximanaly 35 i==*- over as approximate
| |
| )
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| }
| |
| j one month penod. Several operatore stated that they ===i,=.e the behavior was a result of problems in
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| ^*
| |
| 4l i :.-- - . although both safety-related and non-eafety-related channels ladicated that -t== babavior was occurring.
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| ^
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| 4
| |
| . Following the occurrence of TM/IP pretrips, operators initiated a PWO to IAC to affect repairs to l i instru===tatian, however d6==la== with the IAC system supervisor Indica 8=4 that he believed the '- = l j' to be placed to real process changes, not an instm===a=*1a= failure. h IAC systeen supervisor produced j l s, '- =, dated neaaha, 14, 1994, la which IAC infonned the beensee's Nuclear Punis group of i
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| !- variations in hat leg temperatures which were be!ieved, by IAC, to be due to hot leg stratification.1he - !
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| l w. , -- ' m went on to reforesco CB Infabulletin 8945, which described hot leg stratification and flow l j: m swirling in other CE units.
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| : 4 N h inspector -ladad that the resolution to this issue was impeded by a number of -irania== failures
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| ; between operators, Operations annagement, IAC, and JPN Nucisar Puels. Additionally, operators abowed ,
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| reluctance to believe ladie=*ia== of the -l== behavior when there was no cause to doubt them.
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| 1 ,
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| ij 3.c. Plant Housakseping 01707) Storage of material and - ;--- ", and clamalina== candielana of various
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| ; amas throughout the facility were observed ....No violations or deviations were identified.
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| { .
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| 3.d. Clearances (71707) During this i==raceia= period, the inapacea s aviewed the following tagouts
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| : 1. (clearmaces): b inspector walked down clearances 2-94-12-117 on the 2B prunary makeup pump and 2-94 l 119 on 2A hold up drain pump. All required tags were in place and all breakers and valves ==marintad with
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| ! these clearnaces were in the coneet position.
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| 3.e. Technical Specification Compliance 01707) IJeansee complia. ace with selected TS LCOs was verified, s
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| 1 bis included the review of selected surveillance test results......
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| ) On nacand=e 31,1994, the licensee identified a failure of Unit 1 penumel to satisfy 13 surv=11aara
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| 'j requisements.1he occunence involved a failure to sample a SIT for boroa eaa~=e ation within the TS-
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| ===d=*=d time fraans following the addition of water to the SIT. Specifically, at 2:07 p.m., operators begna
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| ; adding water to the 1A2 SIT. TS 4.5.1.1.b required, in part, th t wi hin t six hours of such as addition, a sample for adequais baron concentration be ahe=iaad. N control roosa log indacated that, at 4:19 p.sa., a
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| " ^ -1 7 sample mault was obtained front ebemistry for the 1A1 SIT. At 11:15 p.m., the oncoming ANPS noted the SIT ' t-
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| * I- , g in the log, and a sample of the 1A2 SIT was obtained. At 11:35 p.m.,
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| the 1A2 SIT was shown to contain a antisfactory cancanseation of borce.
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| Page 5 of 13 4
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| EXCERPTS IR 9541 !
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| 7 II l NP
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| l ' De appenne root cause for the event was confusion between control room operators and the chemist concerning j j whidi SIT required sampling. h inspector soviewed the control room chronological log and found that the
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| : j. antry made at 2:07 p.sa. stated ' Started IB HPSI pp to fill 3A.,4A4, [ sic] 1A2 SIT." An entry made at 4:19 i p.m. stated 'IAI SIT sample 2229 ppna." De inspector found abat the failure to recognias the diffenace
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| ;' between the SIT added to and the SIT ==plad ' poor attention to detail on the part of control room !
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| OPeratore. I 1' ;
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| 4 I
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| While the subject occurrence was, in and of itself, of low safety significance, the inspector found that the event j was similar to an event discussed in paragraph 7.e ofIR 93-23. b IR closed LER 50-389/93 001, which 4 , desenbod a failure of the licenses to sample the 2A1 SIT following the addition of water to 2Al,2A2, and 2B2
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| .1 SITS on January 8,1993. In this event, the failure to satisfy the TS survallance requirements was attributed to
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| ! an error on the part of a chemist, who sampled only the 2A2 and 281 SITS. However, an addmaW causal j factor was idendfied on the part of control room operators, who hiled to identify that the chemist only reported l sample resuha on two of the three SITS to which water had beer added. As in the current case, the faites was
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| ; identified by an a=caming ANPS during control soon log reviews.....
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| j! TS 4.0.3 stated, is part, that the time limits of TS action =* a====* are applicable frasa the tiano sbat a fadure
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| :' to perform a required surveillance is identified. TS 4.0.3 further stated that the action requisessants may be j delayed for up to 24 hours to permit the completaca of the survaillance Since the licensee ea planad the
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| ; surveillance la 20 minutes aAar the failure to perform the surveillance was identified, they were not required to j initiate the TS 3.5.1 SIT action requimments However, the failu*e to perform the required surveillanea within j 7.25 hours (the 6 hour TS T ^ plus a 25 percent allowance under TS 4.0.2) of adding water to the IA2 SET on n- h= 31 did represent a failure to satisfy TS 4.5.1.1.b and is a violation (VIO 335/95 0101,
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| * Pallure to Perform '!5 Raquired Sampling of the 1A2 SIT). His violatica is being cited because the event was l ^ simular to an event that occurred ca January 8,1993, which was identified as a non-cited violation.
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| ;i 3.f. EfEsctivanans of Licanane Contmia in Identifyinn. Ranniving. and Preventina Problems (40500)
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| ;. (1) %s inspector attended the January 12 PRG saasting and verified that a quorum was present. N meeting
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| . agends covered twelve procedure /nachaical manual changes. Several of the items did not contain all needed information and were returned for additional infor== tina. De inspector was impressed with the edannive
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| : q===*ianiar en several items by the plant general manager. It appears that the PGM uses this snesting to l establish and , y= standards and e==aa*-ha ...that several members appear to go through the motions l
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| ; of reviewing agenda items, but the PGM always has the majority of questions and enforces abs standards. l l *
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| (2) OA Amht Review %e inspector reviewed QA audit report QSI< OPS-94-28 conducted in December 1994.
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| :s his audit evaluated quality activities in the areas of plant = alan- and surveillance activities, TS l ===admaata, plant modifications performed during the recently = - / - ' Unit 1 outage, F=f i g support j services and plant security. No significant deficiencies were identified in the audit. De audit consisted of
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| ; documentation and record reviews and observation of field activities, h audit reports appeared to be of i l sufficient detail to dascover potential problems, h inspector noted that several of the same items audited had
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| ;j also been recently reviewed by the resident staff with the same overall conclusions.
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| i, (3) lacorporation ofISEG into OA During the inspection penod, the lacensee received ===ad==at 69 to Unit
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| ! 2 *tSe, removing the requirammar for an ISEG. As a result, the licensee has d=handad the ISBG as an
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| !, organiantion and transferred its responsibilities to the site QA % '==^* =. b previous ISEG chairena has base assigned as a Technical Assistant to the QA Manager, from which position he will perform '' , l
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| ; Tachalcal Reviews. %e hcensee revised Site Quality Manual 18.0, " Nuclear Assurance Review Activities,'
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| and created Quality Instruction SLQDQI-18.4, 'Indaranda=* Tachaicat Reviews," to describe the - in l which the ISEG function would be performed. N inspectors will follow the 11R effort as it develops, i .l l, Page 6 of 13 4
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| i EXCERPTS IR 95-01
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| .j In - ' " 4 ''- showed mixed pasfonnance during the lamparola= period. One vleintion,
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| < involving a failure to perfona a TS surveillance on SIT boros conce=*estion was identined. Wank
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| --le=*la= betwest operators and other plant organisations was noted with respect to Unit 1 bot leg stratincation. Systema and area walkdowns resulted la only minar ddle8==ria=.
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| : 4. Main an-c, a and Surveillance l 4.a. Maintenance Obaarvations (62703) Station ==ian===e= activities involving selected safety-related systems and components were observed and remewed to ascertain that they were --- ' 7+1 in accordance with
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| . ;-'' . .. portions of the following ==i=*==a= activities were observed: I
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| !='=''= valves. 'thsee PMs included (1) FWO 62/2207 - T_.m - ' ^ - - = an the Unit 2 ?-- '.a ,
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| l 4 fabrication of parts, leak testing of Attings,,, ' '; a dump test, and adding hydraube Amid as needed to the
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| . hydraulic actuators for the four feedwater laal=*i- valves. 'this work was done la comii-e*i- with the perfonnance of the quarterly valve tests in paragraph 4.6.4. 'Ibe inspector observed portions of the above work and noted that the NPS required that , ----- ' - . 2M418, Rev 41, 'Mackaale=1 Maintenance am Safety Related Equipment" be revised to do the required PM task aAer congiletion of the surveillanca test and restoring the MSIV and FWIV to Adi operabdity. No denei=ei= were identified during the above tasks. ,
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| {
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| , (2) PWO 64/3921 - (" -'= of 7.- -- 'n=r Imval t' --- ' Ilc 1110Y. b inspector observed the 1 calibration of level tr====1**ar LT-1110Y, ,, f.,. ' January 24. h calibrataan was requested when operators j noted an approximate 5 percent deviation between X and Y ek==ala ,
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| 1 Ihe subject transmitter wm located in aa-*aia==e, necesitating an entry and -'i== HP support. 'Ibe m inspeceo, assaded a pr job brienns -A-*-I by HP prior to the -eala===# entry. N brie 6ag was '
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| thonagh, covering the areas of stay time, general radiological-'*im hast staas, and - '_ = to be considered la the event of a disabling iqiury.
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| The inspector noted that the I&C personnel perfonning the calibration entered ana*alamaar with an adequate aan=*iaa of iools and .guipment, made frequent use of appropriate calibration ,,c-&_ and supported one another well in what was a high noise and high - - ; -. envir=====* Overall, the IAC personnel i, '- - '; the calibration were well-prepared and executed the calibration prof ===ianally.
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| (3) 2C AFP Maintenance 'Ibe inspector witnessed malaca=I portions of the planning and awa*ian of maintensace on the 2C AFP and ==aciaami MOVs. The evolution was controlled under AP 0010460, Rev 1,
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| ' Critical Maia* =,. u-- y - a 'Ibe licensee's maintananca, planning and operations orgmair=tiaaa 4 i.a* --', " ' la the planning of what was to be co-line maine ==maca Individual work tasks included an inspection of the stesa of MV-08-03 (turbine trip / throttle valve) for the niatance of dampling to accept a set screw which ensured integrity of the valve-stem-hectuator eaaametion. b laarac*i- for the set screw was the result of a 10 CPR 21 notification from the vendor. Additionally, the licensee planaal to perform preventive maintaaaaca on the operators of MV 08 03, MV 08-12 and MV 08-13.
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| . The licensee's planning included a detailed =ck 8=la and the designation of shift darectors to coordinate activities. In accordance with the licensee's CMM procedure, the outage was to last less than one half of the allowable outage time for the AFP.~ PRA data was prepared to quantify the increase in risk assened by the voluntary entry into the AFP LCO AS.
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| While the lica==a's planning efforts were judged to be excellent, the mehaAila was accelerated on January 12, when entrance into the AS was necessitated by the development of a through-wall steam leak in an elbow in line 1-3/4-MS-106. h affected line was a 3/4 inch at== line which provided steam bypass around MV 08-12 for l
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| EXCERPI3 IR 9541 L vj wanning the 2C AFP. 'Ihe licensee isolated the leak and declared the 2C AFP OOS. STAR 2-950079 was initiated to dcrument the condition and the resolution included the rept-r of tae affected elbow.
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| . h inspector observed portions of the ==i- activities associated with the 2C AFP outage and found '
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| thaan generally well contreued. 'Ibe licensee's inspection of the seema of MV4843 ladicated abat a set screw dimple was not machinad in the seem of the valve. 'Ibe licensee's planning had considered this possibility and the dimple was =achiand la acconlance with the vendor's i=----- ""'=e -
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| Two dif5culties were experienced in the reassembling of the trip hakage to MV-0843. h Arut involved the discovery that the emergency trip spring holder had been 3==ealtad backwards. Waa , -- .-_9 worked !
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| with the vendor to obtain accurate drawings and to install the holder properly. Following reassembly of the trip linkage, operatore found that they could not operate the AFP due to a failure of a trip hakage limit switch roller j~ to be properly aligned to its actuating plate. 'Ibe inspector reviewed the work package which had governed the disassembly /ra==a-kly of the linkage and found that a drawing was included la the package which improperly
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| .., ' the or=anatie= of the limit switch with respect to its actustag plate. The inspector 7 "-r' the saistence of the drawing. 'Ihe licensee stated that the drawing was not to be worked to, as evidenced by a 'For '
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| Info Only" stamp. While the licensee could not explain why the drawing was in the package, absy were able to identify a working drawing in the same package which showed the limit switch in its proper oriananeina. 'Ibo beensee laitiated a STAR 2-950081 to address the occunence. ,
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| h inspector found that the 2C AFP vaniaema==ca outage was well-coordinated and involved E--- - ''ve actions to ensure continued system reliability.
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| (4) CVCS laidown Valye Maintenance Activitias On January 23, Unit 2 operators wese forced to isolate i charging and letdown when a pressuriser level control valve in the CVCS letdown line, . --; - 't to a change
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| % l la contreuer bias setting, opened excessively, h excessive opening resulted la an increens la downstream
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| '' pressure which lined a downstruena relief valvo. & lined relief valve resulted is an ongoing loss of inventory.
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| 'Ibe event was terminated whom abe letdown line was taalassi and pressure reduced sufReiendy to allow tbs relief valve to resset. N event recurred on January 24.
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| 1 Operations faitiated a STAR u dar===at the condition and to affect corrective actions In the course of reviewing the condition, the following was determined e The condition was initiated when operators shiAed from single to two charging pump operation. Such a shiA aara=itated an adjusemant to the bias of controller HIC 1110, which controlled the position of one or both j (operator selected) pressurizer level control valves IIV 2110P and 2110Q.
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| ? e Operators found that, while adjusting the bias, the selected valve minad unresponsive to a point, following
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| , which the selected valve's response overshot the required position.
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| * 'Ibe valve position overeboot resulted in an increase in pressure downstream of the valve frosa a nominal 450 peig to approxi==taly 600 peig, the relief valve seapoint.
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| !. e h relief valve design incorporated a 25 percent blowdown, man =ng that the valve would not resent until
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| !I pressure was reduced to below approximataly 450 peig, a pressure which was never achieved prior to letdown i=al=*ian due to tbs action of the letdown pressure control valve to ensiatain pressure at approximately 450 peig.
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| h inspector =**andad a a==har of multidisciplinary insetings on the subject. Operations personnel stated that the observed behavior of the pressurimer level control valves had occurred, albeit to a le==ar degree, throughout the unit's life. Operations managentat expressed a clear arracentiaa that the problem would be addansM such that it would not recur. Additionally, operstaans delayed a scheduled Unit 2 CCW mid<ycle heat exchanger l, cleaning until the letdown issue was resolved. Cooperation and support was noted from M3 ataamaa=, 1 F=f ' g, Tech Staff, and Health Physics. A preliminary troubla=hanting plan was developed which included of U l
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| : p. EXCERPTS IR 95 01
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| %/ isolating one of the level control valves and , L ' static testing to answe smooth valve operados.
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| Additional plans'were made to perform dynanne valve testing.
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| 'llis licensee elected to pwsue dynamic valve testing at a lower letdown presswe 'such that, if valve position overshoot occurred, the peak pressee experienced at the relief valve would not be sufficient to cause et liA. A safety evaluados was prepared by engineering which ===ida ed the potential effects of a 360 peig letdown pressure seapoint. N laspector miswed the subject safety evaluation and found it to be generally thorough.
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| N safety evalueuon indwanad that, under meady state openedon, the letdown presswe control seapoint could be reduced to 360 peig with no ill effects. However, the safety evaluation also found that, should a unit transient result la maxismun letdown now (as might be the case for a load rejectica) that some flashing may ocent. 'I1se inspectors noted that the Unit I letdown pressure setpoint was normally set for 360 peig. N licenses was reviewing the Unit I seapoint for adepacy as of the and of the '7' period
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| & 11===== initiated a Tarhaical Staff 1Ater ofInstruction to conduct dynamic testing of the Unit 2 CVCS
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| , letdown subsystem to determine the cause of the unstable operation. 'Ibe testing was = f ' ' by IAI-T- -
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| , 89, ' Diagnostic Testing of Iatdown Imvel Control Systent." h procedwo ia=#alled reconiers on the HIC- j 1110 Output Controller, Output Ilmiter, Output lag Circuit, and Imidows Flow. 'Ihe procedme also lastallad a valve position traenducer on the actuator of the level control valves to record valve operation under dynamic conditions. 'Ihe initial testing was ==Aw*ad on safety-rulated valve LCV-2110P and consisted of 1) starting and stopping a second charging penp,2) alternating malaceim of letdown preeswe control valves, and 3) using
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| ; bias control to very flow ea-distaa= to gather valve response data. ^ ' ; to the initial testing of valve IIV-2110P the hennana initiated a temporary change to the IDI to obtain data with valve 2110P isolated and the controller in the 'BOUI' positica to obtain data on the valve response under static conditions.
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| ^ Following the testing of valve IIV-2110P the license attempted to perform dynamic testing on safety-related
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| -j valve IIV 2110Q. When valve IIV-2110Q was placed la service the valve did not respond and reannined closed resulting la a loss of letdown flow. N operatore la the control room seemed charging flow due to insufficient letdown and then menanyaad to raamtahliah letdown through valve IIV-2110Q - r-- " "j. 'Ihe --
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| licenses than swahli=kad leklown using valve IIV-2110P. S'- ;--- ' investigation by the licensee decennined that the positive and negative leads to the valve had been swapped by the IAC *=ch= lei- during the calibration of the valve position recorder and this condition prevented the valve from opening to control letdown flow.
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| 2-IDI T-89, Diagnostic Testing of Latdown Imvel Control System, Step 4.2.24 stated ' Remove the l Tr=a ===*iaa, reconnect the positive and negative leads to E/P 2110Q and ====et up the valve position reconter for the test' and required that the step be Tadapaadanely Verified for adequacy. During the , L--- = of this ll step in the procedure the I&C technicians reversed the positive and negative leads to valve IIV-2110Q and this resulted in the valve not opening when the valve was placed in service and a subsequent loss of letdown flow.
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| j h failure to properly r====are the positive and negative leads to valve IIV-2110Q is identified as a
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| ] Violation (VIO 389/954102, Failure to follow procedure 2-LOI-T-89). ' Ibis violation is cited haran- it 1 included not only a failure to follow the procedure but also a failure of the Ind pandant verification process 1
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| 1 j ,
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| 'Ibe licensee properly relanded the positive and negative leads to valve LCV-2110Q, placed the valve in service and- , '" testing of valve IIV-2110Q. Initial indications from the data collected on valve IIV-2110P 1
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| indie=*adthe valve was sticking during operation resulting in presswo perturbations and na=*=hla operation. As l of the and of tbs inag=ettaa period the lie ==== was reviewing the data collected with the valve vendor and i generating an action plan to improve systesa i L -- =_
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| ! 4.b. Surveillance Observations (61726) Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS j
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| G l- .... "Ihe following surveillance tests were observed:
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| U N g EXCERlrlliIR 9541 ii. ,
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| _/ (1) OP l-- ~--=MA. Rev 18. *lA =-- - v C' - ' C - .-. ^- .- " -!- '*-- Test and ''-- -d C-- =
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| . Instmetaans' De inspector witnessed portions of the preparation and e=aentian of this survedlance test, ,,. 's ' on January i! 4. His perfonnance involved a fast start, initiated froni the control soons, and a fast loading; satisfying the
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| !' requiseensets of TS 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 5.
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| i SNPOe performing psetest evolutions were observed and found to have a procedure available and to be knowledgeable of the EDO and of the test being perfonned. Control room operators were also found to have a ij. procedme in band and had obtained a calibrated stopwatch for i '' ; EDO start time. Good coordination ,
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| was noted between the RCO performing tbs test and the ANPS, who verified in a ^; Sj ^ , fasision that the j
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| l' RCO was aware of the actions which would be required. Additionally, the ANPS stopped ESF surveillance l
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| :- testing, which was being perfonned in the control room at the time, to minimi= activities and to focus the attention of operatore to the test.
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| De EDG '--- ' =*iar=e*a ily, with a 9.89 maraad start time. N RCO performing tbs test ----- " "y
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| )
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| : i. ,-- "*' the EDG with the grid and loaded the EDO to approri==aaly 3500 KW within 60 esconds, as 1 requhed by TS. He inspector verified that the KW mater (strip chart recorder) used for the test was within its l calibration interval. l
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| l' (2) OP 2 mn50A. Rev 14. *2A =- - v D'-- ' C-- a:sr Periadie Test and n==--=1 th===*iaa j- Instructions' ;
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| i i De inspector observed the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator amehty suivastlanca test, aaanhaetad in accordance l
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| !. m with abe s. ubject procedure. N laspector reviewed the test procedme and verified that all prerequisites for this lj. d
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| . . test wese met. In January and July this surveillance performs a fast start of tbs DG dman abe contml sensa and
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| ; abe elapsed start times is recorded. He inspector observed abs start fem the contml roosa and verifled that abe
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| : DG started in 8.16 =aanda, h DG was than loaded to approximately 3500 KW and was run at this load for j i approxhnetely 1.5 hours. N inaparear observed the engine starting and found that the control operator
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| ; completed this task in accordance with procedural requirements. He inspector then wout to the DG building and did a detailed walkdown inapartiaa of the running DG.
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| l' t!' De following deficiancian were identified by the inspector or the NPO and system engmeer who were
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| , ,~a..ai.. the test.
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| ' e he fuel rack on 2A2 engine was oscillating slightly.
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| H * %e 2A2 governor bodine motor was loose on its base plate.
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| j nis hem was subsequently reworked on January 13 under PWO 0431/66. l j e Air / oil ^ .; e indicatar point 2 not readmg correctly.
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| 1
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| * One broken and one missing indicator light cover for fuel oil transfer pump switch on DG gauge board.
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| [ e Imbe oil pressure indicator P159407A nading below reco==aadad value 5 h inspector verified that PWOs were submitted to correct the above deficiencies. b inspector noted that oil was added to the governors of both engines while at idle speed as required by the procedure. His oil was j verified to be the correct type. De operator perfonning the DG run and the system engineer appeared to be knowledgeable on the engine and the suivaill==ca pmcedwe. b test was completed without significant problem. l 1
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| . (3) h inspector observed selected portions of the calibration of Unit I naata==ans partaculate process s s V Page 10 of 13
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| , EXCEIUTS IR 95 01 i
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| V .~ monitor perfonned on January 10 and 11. The detector installed on January 10 was defective and had to be replaced. ' Ibis calibration was a d'- ' effort involving rhaistry and IAC. h calibrataan is performed by Chemistry under 'hal=*=y Procedure 1-C-67, Rev 13. If high voltage adju=8-*= are needed then I&C
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| ===1 *a= is respaired to performa the task. The inspector found abat the e achaiciana performing & test were i knowledgeable and followed g= ' - ! requireements.
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| I (4) OP_2411100ELBar.20._'MaitStaanWeedwater Isplation Valves Ariodic.Tast' This is a quarterly 4
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| surveillance test that partially closes each MSIV and FWIV to verify their operation. Since e is a high risk l item, a projob briefing is required prior to e"-- & test.
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| 4 1bs lamparear attended the projob brienng that was en=A=8md in accordance with AP 4010020, '''a=ube* of
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| . Infrequendy Perfonned Test and Evolutions," by the ANPS. N inspector found the brienng to be adequately dadmilad for the test. h inspector aban - = -;- '" personnel froma the test group, IAC, krachaaleal j unias , and Operadons, into the Aeld and observed the tests. N inspector noted abat the NPS provided oversite la the Aeld to ensure the test was conducted in a timely and safe ==anar. The test on MSIVs A and B ll-wese =* labia ily
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| ,, L-k- ' and tbsy were returned to service. The tests on all MFIVe were amalakaarily
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| ' but it was noted that hydraulic pressure on HCV-09-2A inil to approvimanaly 3000 peig during dump i test ca e valve. This was because the HCV accuamlators were improperly discharging during the dump test.
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| ! h licenses detenmined that this did not affect e- , --- ' operability. However, PWO 64/3962 was lesusd to j troubleshoot and repair & malfunction.
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| i Overall & test was accomplished la a professional ma==ar. b inspector was impressed with the supervision
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| ; and directica provided by the NPS. When a problem was encountered he t==Manaly 4 he t aakale=1 s
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| j asseance ceded, veriArd equipment operability, and ensured the plant stayed in a safe condition. His detailed
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| * r reraite of the te.d;
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| * katified procedural improvements that were needed.
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| (5) OP 2-0700Q50. Rev 36. " Auxiliary Fandwater Periodic Test' The inspector observed the L = of t & test en abe 2C APP, ra=A-aad January 13. b test followed significant work activities on the pump's trip /tluottle valve and other ==arianad MOVs and was performed as post--anaa- testing to establish pump
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| ; l operability. b inspector noemi that the pump started without incident and opmated steadily, Additionally, the inspector noted Ibs operator monitoring the test locally to have a current copy of the governing procedure in hand. Test equipment was veriRed to be properly calibrated. Upon completion of the test, the inspector
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| , verined that the pump's performance was in accordance with the applicable ASME Sectica XI _ - ;"- -
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| 'Ibe (==pareae found the test to be performed well.
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| (6) AP 2-0010125. Rev 52. ' Schedule of Periodic Testa Checks and Calibrations' 'the inspector accompanied
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| , a SNPO on a Unit 2 contalamane anomalies inspection, conducted per check sheet 4 of the subject g= ';.
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| i The tour included a walkdown of radiologically meca=ible portions of cantain===e h inspector noted good HP support and control of the tour.
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| l N laspection was successful in identifying boric acid deposits on two valves. No visible leakage was identified. Additionally, what appeared to be an approximately one drop /second packing leak was identined on
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| ; a root valve la a B SG level instrumaat reference leg. Due to the elevations involved, positive identincation of the valve could not be established. Following the laspection, Unit 2 control room personnel initiated PWOs to inspect the identified boroa deposits during the next anomalies inspection. The ANPS stated that drawings were
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| : being reviewed to help identify the valve mored to be leaking.
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| '; 1he laspector found the SNPO to conduct a thorough inspection of accessible areas. The practice of periodic contaiamani inspections continues to provide early identification of potential problems.
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| l jA EXCERPTS IR 9541 i w 7 4.c. Predictlye Mainlanance (62703) As part of the predictive ==i=e===== program the licenses routinely monitors vibration on selected rotating equipment. On Dar==hae 22, the motor vibration alarm actuated and
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| , locked la on IA CEAMG. 'the predictive malana==ca group reviewed their data and found that a atop change ,
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| had occurred la the 120 Hz vibration :- , since routine data had been collected on the previous day. A review of data by the predictive faminea==ce group determined that:
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| o 'Ibe 120 ha vibration co-panaar had increased over a 24 hour period from 0.05 in/sec-pk to 0.37 in/see-pk, measured at the motor horimanal probe locations e The overall vibration levels had increased over the same time interval from 0.20 in/sec-pk to 0.48 in/sec-pk measured at the motor horizontal probe locadca.
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| i e An increase in the 120 hz vibration _- ; -- ' was seen throughout the == china in the horisontal duection, but did not increase as much at the senerator and Aywheel bearmas.
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| e Real-time diagnaedes Indir=8ad that the 120 bz vibration signal was a narrow-band fairly steady z -- , -^
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| e 'Ibo above data indicated a potential electrical -ly la the power supply systaan or motor. Electrical
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| =ala*- was requested to collect voltage / amperage data anu say other data that might assist in evaluating the electrical condition of the == china.
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| e Electrical =al=*===ea found A and B phases to be carrying 158 amperes and phase C to be carrying 0 amperes. Post ==la*==aca data found that each phans should nonnally be about 120 amperus. Further investigadon found the C phase line eaaaae*I= to the breaker was discolored, cracked, and melted off. Repaire
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| ', were camplanad under W/O 94031847 and the component was returned to service.
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| * AAer the repair, vibration readig returned to previous normal values.
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| 'Ibe above ladica*= the ability of the licenese's predictive malaiansaca program to detect, evaluate, and repair plant problems before a failure. ' Ibis is only one of several past examples that da-aa*ede the success of the licaaaaaa predictive malarannara program. 'Ibe inspector has found that this program uses state of the art equipment and is staffed with very -:---1-;:^- and motivated personnel who provide a very valuable and beneficial service to the plant. 'this program is can=*utared a strength.
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| In - " *--- Malainammem/ Surveillance activities naael==d to be conducted well during the period. One viala81aa, involving a failure to perfona an adequate '- ' y " ^ vesification during CVCS - * - =.
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| was identined. The balance of =at=8===** activities west eaaawead well. Predetive Malaeaaaan*
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| Involvensent in the identification of Unit 1 CEA MG wiring problems was considered a strength.
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| Survaanaaran war, ,a=Anead weig.
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| : 5. Plant Support (71750) 4 5.a. Fire Protection During the course of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely ava=iand facets of the Fire Protection Program.....No deficiencies were identified.
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| 5.b. Phvalcal Pmtection During this inspection, the inspector toured the protected area and noted that the prAnster fence was intact and not - _m - - ' - ' by erosion or disrepair. 'the fence fabric was secured and
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| . barbed wire was angled as sequired by the licensee's Physical Security Plan (PSP). Isoladoa zones were
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| ==ianalaad on both sides of the barrier and were free of objects which could shield or conceal an individual.
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| - 'the inspector observed that peraa==al and packages entering the protected anon were searched either by special Page 12 of 13
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| l 4-EXCERPTS IR 9541
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| ) pmpose detecton or by a physical pa:down for finerna, explosives, and contreband. m processing and i
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| i escorting of visitors was observed. Vehicles were searched, escorted, and secured as described in the PSP.
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| IJghting of the perimm r.ad of the protected area met the 0.2 foot-candle criteria. In h, soleded j fumetions and ;'; of the secemity progress were inspeded and found to esempty with the PSP 1
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| raquirements. .
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| i 5.c. Radiolonical Protection Pinaram Radiation protectios control activities were obseived to verify that these l activities were la conformanca with the facility policies and y,i-:-: ' ._, and in compliance with regulatory I requiremanas.....No violations or deviatices were identibd.
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| l
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| . 6. Exitlaterview i
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| h la=pae*iaa scope and findings worr, summamed on February 3,1995, with those perenes ladicanal in 4 paragraph 1 above.....
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| (open) VIO 50-335/954101, Failure to Perform TS-Required Sampling of the 1 A1 SIT,13.e.
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| ; +, .
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| (open) VIO 50-389/954142, Pailure to Follow Procedure 2-lhl T-89,14.a.(4).
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| 2 b' Page 13 of 13
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| -i , ExCEnrrs rR 9542
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| ;. e.
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| b Y.J.l March 17,1995
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| -* Florida Power and Ught Company ATTN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg Pasident - Nuclear Division P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408 4 420 i .
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| ==SUBJECT:==
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| NRC INSPECIlON REPORT NOS. 50-335/95-02 AND 50-389/9542 ]
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| 4 Gendessen: l
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| 'llais refers to the ' , -:'= ca= Aire =1 by J. J. Imaahan of this effea on February 13-17, 1995. Theinapacel- l laciudad a review of activities authonzad for your St. Imcie facil':f. At the conclusica of the inspection, the j I
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| { findings were discussed with aboos ===hans of your staff identined in the report.
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| Ames amamined during the lamp =celan are identified in the report. Within these areas, the i==p=ceia= ca==IM of selective ===ia=*ia== ofi ,i+- ' - and . <ve records, interviews with persminal, and observadca of activities in progress.
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| .1 Within the scope of the inspection, vial =*ia== or deviations were not Llanaified..... )
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| i Sincuely, n.
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| 4 I Original signed by Charles A. Casto
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| {.
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| Charles A. Casto, Chief
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| , Engineerug Branch Division of Reactor Safety Nek=* Nos. 50-335, 50-389
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| -i
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| * Ucense Nos. DPR47, NPF-16 N=cla=i e: NRC Inspection Report Report Nos.: 50-335/9542 and 50-389/9542 Ucensee. Florida Power and Ught Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 Ucense Nos.: DPR47 and NPP-16 4 Pacility Name: St. Imcie Plant Units 1 and 2 Inspection t'a=AM Pobruary 13 17, 1995 j.
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| -I: ; r E. . Original signed by J. J, Imahan March 17.1995 D' Page 1 of 5 c- ,
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| __ , _ _ . _ _ . - _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ~ _ - _ _._
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| ., EXCERITS IR 95 02
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| . j' J. J. Imaakaa, Reactor Inspector Date Signed ,
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| Approved by: Original misnad by L Blake March 17.1995
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| , J. Blake , Qiief Date Signed Materials and Processes Section Division of Reactor Safety
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| [
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| Scope: !
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| ' Ibis routine, special announced la=partiaa was conducted in the areas of repairs to the 2B2 r _ - " Cooling l
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| Water Heat 8 'r, review of concrete ==p===laa anchor ia eallaetan , -:-- ' _, the licensee's Nuclear Safety 9p==lra=8 program and lia==aa action on previous inspection findags.
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| Results:
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| . In the areas ia=paread, violations or deviations were not Idantified.....
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| 2.0 Repaire to Unit 2 2B Compoemit Cooling Water Heat N=ek---ar - (62700) ,
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| 'Ibe Unit 2 28 _- cooling water (CCW) beat exchanger was retubed during the Fall 1990, refueling j
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| outags. AAer the work was completed, a hydrostatic test was perfonned on the heat exchanger. 'Ibo test i identified a defect la the weld between the outer shall and the tube shast es the west and of the heat exchanger. l 1his problems was w ce nonocaformance report (NCR) number 2 428. 'Ibe weld repair was l
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| __,' ^ ' and another hydrostatic test was performed. 'Ibe retest showed the repaired weld was acceptable, l
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| however, the weld between the outer shall and abs tube sheet on the east and of the best exchanger failed the retest. NCR 2-434 was i===ad to document and disposition the repair of the weld on the east and of the heat '
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| exchanger. N NRC Resident Inspectors reviewed portions of the weld defect evaluation, witnessed portions of the weld repair, and reviewed cloescut of the -formaare reports, as docu=anea in NRC Inspection h Report =n=have 50-335,389/90-28 and 90-30.
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| ! h weld defects, which occurred in original vendor welds, resulted in delaying return of the 2B CCW best
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| . . exchanger to service during startup following the end of the Fall 1990 refueling outage. 'Ibo licensee requested a Tensporary Waiver of Compliance to allow -= ion to Mode 2 without the 'B' train of the CCW system in y~ service. 'Ibe request is dae====8ad in FP&L letter L-90-413, dated November 23,1990. N request was verbelly granted by NRC on November 23,1990, and a confirming NRC letter was issued on November 26, 1990.
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| ~
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| During the current inspection, the inspector reviewed records relating to repair, inspection and evaluation of the
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| , repaire to the bi-maallic welds betweer. the outer shell (casban-steel) shell and tube sheet (alu=i=== - bronae).
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| 'Ibe following darn-en (10) were reviewed.....
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| The inspector concluded that the licensee's actions to evaluate and repair the defective welds in the 2B )
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| CCW heat eschengers cosipued with good ladustry practices and NRC r f , with the esception of tim fact that a wdder who had not been qualified to the welding specif' melan, WPS-21, perfonned the 1
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| _- EXCERPTS IR 95-02 s; r Initial weld repair. This problem was detected naalar the Ita====a's quality eentro!.'quauty assuranee 2
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| (: programs and carrective action was inspisPMafad I~ . In their November 23,1990, request for Temporary Waiver of Compliance, the tiem== comunimed to perform l NDE of the Adi circumferece of the shell/ tube sheet welds on the 2B CCW best exchanger durmg the next 1-refueling outage in Spnng,1992. 'Ibe inspector reviewed the results of the NDE inspections su==arized in report: ' Flaw Evaluation of Y- , ~ Indemeia== in 2B C- , - 'Cochag
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| ^'
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| . Apteck " ."-- -L g Senrices i
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| [ Water Heat 5 *7 Glith Welds at St. Incie Unit 2,* dated May 1992. Ultrasonic testing was the NDE assabod used. N UT examiaatiaa resulted in identi5 cation of 43 weld indwaria== in the welds, 21 in the east l
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| I
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| ::;
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| * weld and 22 la the west well. b licensee evaluated the 3=de=*ia== using the ==*hada for flew aaaar ==aa e i criteria specined in IWB-YA0 of ASME Section XI. All reported weld ladeasta== sationed the intent of the i Code. 'Ibs laspector concluded that the lia====a's evalunhan of weld inde=siana comphed with NRC l t
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| j ', 'the inspector also performed a walkdown inspection and asamined the Unit I and 2 CCW heat exchangers (IA, l 18,2A, and 28). N inspector veri 5ed that aba heat exchangers were not detenorated or leaking; however, during the walkdown in the Unit 1 CCW pit and the Unit 2 CCW building, the inspector identined the following issues:
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| 8 - Portions of a hori===eal support on the CCW supply line to the 1B CCW heat exchanger was severely
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| !' corroded. Approuimasaly % to % of the metal on the bottom flanges of the two horianetal support ===hars 1; have been corroded away.
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| i /
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| - Several ==haddad plates in the Unit 1 pit were covered with water. 'Ibe concern involving these plates is that the Nelson sands which anchor the plates to the concrete may corrode. b Nelson studs can not be
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| ; % visually laaracead since they are covered by concrete, and the cormion damage would not be evident; however, the corrosion would affect the structural insegnty of the plates.
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| ;;* g ,
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| - Ibe CCW supply piping to the 2A CCW beat exchanger was corroded in some areas. 'Ibe corrosion had f
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| rv . ' into pitting in a few areas.
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| T
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| - Pipe support hardware on several supports in the Unit I pit exhibited signs of corrosion damage.
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| l 1 - 'Ibe protective coatings (paint) on structural steel, pipe supports, embaida' plates, and piping is deteriorated in some areas in the Unit I CCW pit and Unit 2 CCW buddag.
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| i
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| {, With the exception of the above, item the inspector concluded that the overall condition of the CCW piping, i beat exchanger, pumps, structural steel and other hardware was good.
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| Within the ares inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. j
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| : 3. Dntled -In Si- " = Anchors in Concrete - Units 1 and 2 (37550)
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| : l
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| 'Ibe inspector reviewed the licensee's program for design, inatallation, and lampacelan of various types of j concrete expansion == chars used in safety-related la=#a11=*== at St. Imcie. Areape=aca criteria medimad by the l inspector include the liansee's response to NRC IE nuitamin 79-02, Pipe Support Base Design Using Concrete Frp===Ina Anchor Bolts, for Unit 1, dated July 2,1979, and July 5,1979, and Units 2 PSAR %ceiaa 3.9.B.
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| ,. h licensee's response to IEB 79 02 was ammanand during inspection dacumanead in NRC Inspection Report numhars 50 33509-22,50-389n9-16,50-335/87 26,50-389/87 25,50-335,389/88-28, and 50-335,389/9102.
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| 1; e s EXCERPTS IR 9542 l lj i !
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| ;' V In addstion the coecsete arp===i= anchor program for Unit 2 was reviewed during licensing of Unit 2 by the l
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| ] NRC Ofhoe of Nucient Reactor Regulation. Concrete expansion anchor I==*=II eion for Unit 2 was inspected j during various NRC ia p=e*-a prior to start-up of Unit 2. An investigados of concrete expansion anchor
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| : j. Install =*i- practices for Unit I was ==Aae*=d by NRC in 1977.1hs results of this investigatica which resulted 4
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| in identificatice of improper concrete expansion anchor practices,' and three violations (designated Items of i' Noncompliance la 1977) are documentad in NRC Investigation Report number 50-335n7-10. l l
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| 'Ihe inspector reviewed FP&L Specification CN 2.24, Dnlied-In Expansion Type Anchors in Concrete, ;
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| Revision 8. ' Ibis specification which covers wedge type arpanaton == chars, sleeve type anchors, and undercut
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| - for anchor matenals, design criteria, insta11malan, and quahty control. N l ij anchors, includes ;_ ;^--
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| ii !
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| inspector also reviewed calculanca number PSI <BFJC-90 0009, Revision 0, c'.ic=1=ei= for Specification CN-i 2.24.1his cate=latian was used to determine the ultimate tension and shear capacities for anchors, anchor
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| ==hadd===a, edge distance, and anchor spacing .-; * , h criteria in Specification CN-2.24 is based
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| - as the resulin/ conclusion from this calculation. 'Ihe ultimate anchor capacities are based on the results of on-
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| ,, site testing ==Anenad by the lica==aa. ,
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| j1 1ho inspector reviewed two plant change / modification (PC/M) packages which involved installatlan of concrete 1' anchore:
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| l.
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| l} .
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| * PC/M 026191, Modification of Unit 1 Pressurizer Relief Valve Discharge Pipe Supports, affected 33
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| '! supports on the piping b support modifications were required to address increased piping loads e le=1=*ad to
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| ; address item II.D.1 ef NURBO 0737. N support modiftearia== involved resetting or replacing spring hangers, replacing a mubber, removing a support, and replacing a loose anchor in the baseplate of a support. The l support with the loose anchar was support number RC 005-36, which is a anubber. N loose anchor was
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| ; A id==tified during the original walkdown i==pareina for IEB 7942.1hs loose anchor was noted on the support 9 drawing, drawing number RC 005-36, Sheet 1 of 2. During the origmalIEB 7942 walkdown inspections, pipe
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| !l j; supports which had loose or incorrectly installed anchors were evaluated. If the support would qualify and
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| . could meet the enfety heter requhed by IEB 7942, the anchor was not replaced, but a note was placed ce the support drawing stating the machar deficiency and referencing the IEB 7942 Report. If the support could not l be qualified with the defective anchor, the defective anchor was replaced.
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| , h inspector reviewed calculation number PSleIFJC-91-012, Revision 1. b caleM~ was prepared to
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| ! evaluate pipe support RC-005-36 for the increased loads from tlas pressuriser discharge piping required by i l NURBO 0737, h calculation showed that the support ma=hars were adequate for the lacreased piping loads, i
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| ; but that the loose anchor required s ;'- ^ h heanmaa selected a M inch diamaamr maxi-bolt for
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| ;;, i;' ' of the loooo anchor.1he new anchor group was chacirad for increase in load due to prying ji (bassplate flexibility) acdca. 'Ibe lica==a='s response to IEB 7942 stated that prying action had not been i evaluated for each baseplate. 'Ihe licensee analyzed 45 supports under IEB 79 02 and determinad that the prying effect was negligible. h check for prying for the redesigned baseplate for support number RC 005-36
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| ; also showed no prying action. h inspector reviewed drawing number JPN426-191417 which specified last.11ation of the M inch diamatar anchar in place of the loose anchar. h inspector also reviewed the QC 3; l==padi= report which dae====aad installation and setting of the new anchor la ae 8-~ with CN 2.24.
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| The laspector concluded that the support redesign and new anchor lastallation casuplied with NRC
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| * PCM 030-191, ICW Strainer Support Repair, involved repI=camans of existing supports which had been damaged by corrosion.1his modification involved i ;' ---- of the aviaring strainer supports with new stainless steel ===ha a. M bcensee ==taread =salata== steel maxi-bolt anchore for this modificaela=- The
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| , inspector reviewed drawing numbers JPN-030191-001 and 002 which show the modification decads. The
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| : i. inspector also reviewed calculatica number PSI BFJC-91-004, Revision 1, Qualificataan of Stanniens Steel G Page 4 of 5
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| - EXCERPTS IR 95-02 i
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| </ Drilloo Maxi-Bolt Concrete Frp=== ion Anchore. ' Ibis cale t-*i'i= specifies the instauntion r 7" and the )
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| setting torque for the new anchors.
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| i Specification CN.2.24 does not include the r 7' _ for the =*=iala== eteel maxi-bolts. % anchors for this l 4
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| pc/m package involved installation of clip angles to reinforce some exist concrete walls to support the ICW )
| |
| stainer loads for the modified supports. Prying action was not considered since it was not applicable to this ;
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| lastallation. N inspector ====iaad QC iaar e*iaa reports and verified that the new anchose were iaan=11ad la ;
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| accordance with the criteria specified in the calculation.
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| h inspector a===ladad that the 11==aa's program for .=e.n.eaa= s of esacrute anchors esmiplies with l
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| 1 NRC._.* . Discussions with licensee engineers escioned that very few concrete anchors have been lastalled on site over the last few years.
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| Within the areas inspartad, no violations or deviations were identified.
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| I 4.0 Nuclear Safety Spenlunt Program - 37550 N inspector reviewed the log of concerns identified by various individuals to tbs Nuclear Safety Speakout ,
| |
| Staff and selected for soview those involving i ; g/ design concerns. 'Ibe following files (12-closed. 4-
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| 'j open) were reviewed....h inapacear determined that the licensee's actions to iavestigataca the concerns were i
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| adequate, and that the concerns were investigated and resolved in a tismaly meaner. 'the Nuclear Safety Spenkout Staff performs investigations of the identified issues. When necessary the concern is provided to the appropriate . - '=4= for their input la its resolution. ConfidentinIly is ===ia*aiaad regarding the identify of the individual expressing the canemen.
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| ~
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| yU ) The laspector reviewed the liesasee's evaluation of the elesed concerns listed above, and )
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| 4
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| . " "n if any, to russive the concerns. The liesmese's reviews were thorough and t=*b=le=Hy adequate to resolve the indvidual concerns.
| |
| In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not id==tified.
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| 5.0 I tranama Action on Previous Inspectica Findmss (92701 and 92702) l 5.1 (Closed) Violation Item 389/94-08-01, Failure to Follow Corrective Actaos Procedurse..... .
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| I l ;' 5.2 ((%=d) Violation Item 389/94-0842, Inadequate Inspection and Evaluation of Effects of Waterima===ar i Event on SRV and PORY Discharge Piping...... )
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| 1 5.3 (Closed) Unresolved item 389/94 08-03, Quality I2 vel of PORV and SRV Discharge Piping..... l
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| : 6. Exit Interview i
| |
| N ia paesiaa scope and results were minvaarized on February 17,1995, with those persons indica 8ad in paragraph 1....
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| 4 EXCERPTS IR 9544 l
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| ,N l
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| .l l Docket Nos. 50 335, 50-389 Ucemme Nos. DPR 67, NPP-16.
| |
| 1 Plorida Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. J. H. &!?_ :;g President - Nuclear Division P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33406 4 420 t
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| SURIECT: NRC INSPECI10N REPORT NOS. 50-335/9544 AND 50-389/9544 i os.
| |
| His nders to the lampac*iaa ca=Ance=d by R. L Prevette of this office on February 5 through March 4,1995.
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| -l
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| -; He inspection included a review of activities muskariand for your St. I.mcie facility. At the conclueica of the l
| |
| -j inspeedom, the findings were d1===ad with those members of your staffidentified in the encloemd report. i
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| . Areas ====iaad during the inspectica are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of seleedve ====i==*iaaa of y. --- ' u and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observatica j of activities in progress. He purpose of the ia reelaa was to detennine whether activities authoriand by the license were Mie*=d safely and in accordance with NRC . , '
| |
| Within the scope of the inspection, vioistions or deviaticas were not identified.......
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| ) .m.rw) .
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| m ,,
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| David M Verrelli, Gief 1 Reactor Projects Branch 2 i
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| Division of Reactor Projects r cia...e.
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| NRC faapar*iaa Report cc w/soci: See page 2
| |
| . Report Nos.: 50-335/9544 and 50-389/9544 I 1r====a: Florida Power & Ught Co l l 9250 West Plagler Street l Miami, FL 33102
| |
| ,, Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 Ucense Nos.: DPR47 and NPP-16 l
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| Pacility Name: St. Imie 1 and 2
| |
| ; j i==pae*ia= ('aaaaetad: PA%mry 5 through March 4,1995
| |
| .i 16 R. L Provane, Senior Ramdent Date Signed Inspector D Page 1 of 16
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| - . . - , .,<r.. . . . . - - . . - . ,. - - , ,.,--r
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| t i a EXCERPTS IR 9544 i
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| j A---- -
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| _, _A.ii *-- ; "-w; M. S. Miller, Resident Inspector
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| . R. P. Schin, Reactor Engmeer I.
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| Wert, Senior Resident Inspector
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| . 4 Approved by: ,
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| K. D. Imadia, Chief Date Signed n==cea, Projects Mac*ian 2B 1 Division of Reactor Projects
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| Scope:
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| 1
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| ; . his routine resident '; M-v was conducted on site in the areas of plant operations review, =aiatan=ca observations, surveillance observations, engineering support, plant support, review of nonroutine events, .
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| lt followup of previous inapaa*iaa Andings, and other areas ' , d= were perforased during normal and j backshiA hours and on weekends and holidays.
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| [ a suh .
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| )L Plant Operations area: System walkdowns by inspectors identined several deficiancima in the Unit I control room v==sita*== system. Several k '- ;*; issues were raised, involving intake structures, aa pa===*=
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| cooling water structures, and the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. He licensee's program for ana*=ia===* coatings was
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| , reviewed with regard to the Unit I ca=8miamane and found natiafactory. Operator identification and reaction to apparent safety iqiection header leakass in Unit 2 was considend good, as was operator :==pa=== to a Unit 2 trip. He licensee's approach to neolving issues relating to quench tank in-leskage and a ahuadawn cooling relief valve liA was ocasidered ==athadie=1 and eachaically sound. Unit 1 experienced a 14 minute loss of
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| : i. shutdown cooling. At tbs close of the i==pae*ia= period, a root cause had not been clearly mat =hliabad.
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| t i Maintenance and Surveillance area: De ficaa-a's activities relating to the r;i_ " of a degraded vokage relay in the Unit 1 'A' IE 4160V system displayed appropriate planning,8 ' -- ^ 'aa and caution, despite a resulting load shed resulting from said mainiaaaaca. Activities associated with an apparently air-bound Low
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| ;- Pressure Safety Iqjection pump were found to exhibit good tenar:s.>rk and were methodical and conservative.
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| Observed surveillances were conducted well.
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| : 1. ;
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| ; Engineering area: A safety evaluation, performed to support corrective actions for a leaking Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Gas Vent Systesa solemond valve was reviewed and found to be technically sound and of high quality.
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| Plant Supoort area: De licanaaa's activities relating to a failure of retention alamania in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool ion exchanger, which ralan=ad resin to the spent fuel pool, were reviewed and found to be timely and detailed. De Nuclear Safety Spenkout program was reviewed and found to be effective. Corporate Nuclear 4 Review Board activities were witnessed and found to add value to the licensee's activities.
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| ; In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.....
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| : 2. Plant Status and Activities .
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| ; 2.a.12a11.1 Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and was shut down on February 27 for a seven dav short notice outage for the reptaramane ofleaking pressurizer code safety valves. At the close of the lampar*iaa period, the unit was in cold shutdown.
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| EXCERPTS 1R 95 04 d 2.b. IlBiL2 Unit 2 began the lampar*i- period at 100 percent power. On February 21, the plant experienced an automatic trip due to low steam generator water level. After repairs to a SG level transmi**me and the perfonnance of other ra.n-trip related items, the Unit was restarted on February 24 and achieved 100 percent power ca February 25.
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| 2.c. NRC Activity During the inspection period, R. Schin, Project Engmeer, NRC Regica II, visited the site from February 6 through 10. His activities included augmenting the resident inspectica effort and his findags .
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| are included in & report.
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| 1 Durmg & period, an iampaettaa of the licensee's engineering program was ea=Awad from February 13 l through 17 by J. Imaahmo of Region II, Division of Reactor Safety. De ' ,
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| '=
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| - results were reported in IR 335,389/95 02.
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| During & period, an inspection of the li===='s emergency , ., & program was caaAwe frasa
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| : j. February 13 through 17 by J. Kreh of Region II, Division of Reactor Safety and Safeguards. b inspection i results were :wported in IR 335,389/95-03. l D. Matthews, NRR Project Director with responsibility for St. Imcie, visited the site on February 16. His activities included site tour, d.-alana with licen -me-ne, and an overview of resident ofnoe i- activities and issues. He was s=-y^' by R. Croteau, the NRR Project Manager for Drkey Point and the backup Project Manager for St. Imcle.
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| J. Norris, NRR Senior Project Manager responsible for St. Imcio, visited the site February 16 and 17. His activities included a site tour, discussions with licensee :_ - 1 r , and a review of activities eaaane*=d under N 10 CPR 50.59. De results of his reviews are included la & report.
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| During the inspection period, L. ht, NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Browns Ferry, vished tbs also fecen i i
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| February 27 through March 3. His activities included augmenting the resident lampae+i- effort and his findings are included in n report. I
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| : 3. Plant Operations j 3.a. Plant Tours (71707) De inspectors permdically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring equipment was reconhas as required, equipinant was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plee housekeeping efforts were M 7 ...De following accesable-ares ESP system and area j -
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| walkdowns were me to verify that system heeups were in accordance with licensee requirements for
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| ; operabdity and equipment material conditions were patisfactory: (1) Unit 1 Control Roosa Vaardatiaa System (2) Unit 1 Consainmant, (3) Unit 2 LPSI System & (4) Unit 1 and 2 Main Steam Trestles
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| : 1) Unit 1 Caa**ol Room Vaati1=* ion Sv*= b inspectors reviewed documents related to the Unit 1 control
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| ; room ventilados system, including the TS, FSAR, drawings, and procedures.....
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| N inspectors identified one waalraama in the lica=='s method of apparent ah=adan===# of safety equipment,
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| . the Unit I chlorine detectors. N licensee had Anna =*1==d perforening cahbration and ==iata===aa on the chlorine detectore in 1991, however the chlorine detectors were lea energland and an active part of the control roosa v==*itani- control system. N licenses had removed all chlorine from the site years ago and had resnoved the chlorine detectors from the 'lli. However, the PSARs for both units had not been changed - they still referred to cidorine onsite, chlorine detectors and alarms, i.ie *: for operatore to dos SCBAs within i two =tawam on a chlorine release, etc. b plant design had not been revised..... Procedures utill referred to chlorine as ifit were onsite and to chlorine monitore as if they were operable.....By Annaatianing mala *=ma=,
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| lI' A EXCERPTS IR 95 04 Nj the licemmes is essence improperly aheadanad the chlorine detectors in place, without *=-- ^ =- them from
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| . an active safety system and without revising the PSAR.
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| N ' ; ^ - . assessed the safety signincence of the condition of the chlorine detectors to be very low. N
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| : detectors could cause unwanted actuations of the control rooms vaatitarian syssem into emergency (recirculation) ,
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| ;. mode, but would not prevent a proper ac*n= tion of the system. Aside from the lack of maintananaa, the i
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| ; chlorine detectors were installed la abs plant as described in the PSAR and drawings......AAer the inspector's questions on this issue, the licensee initiated a STAR and made preliminasy plans for a permanent jumper of the
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| ! chlorine dasartars and for removal of the chlorine detectors from the PSAR.
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| ? l }t 'The inspectors also noted some denciencies related to the Unit I control room ventilaelan system, and klaatined them to the fica ===a for their review:
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| a) Procedure Deficiencies: (1) ONOP l 0030101, Rev 58, 'Platt Annunciator Su==ary," was doncient in l
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| ;. window A 34, Control Room Air Intake Chlorine High, in the list of Auto Actmas. Kitchen exhaust dampers
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| :I were not listed. Control Roosa freak air intake imataelaa dampers were stated to begin to close in 36 seconds,
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| , but they were actually required to Adly close in less than 35 =aranda ' Charcoal Alter traia dampers open' was I
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| , stated, but this =tana===# did not match labels on the control and indicaelasi penal and an operator was not sure j what it annant. la sumamery, the list of auto actions did not match the auto actions that were supposed to occur j or the labels on the control and indication panel. A mitigating factor was that the panel was clearly marked j with yellow and black striped circles around items that were to auto actuate on a CIAS.
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| , (2) ONOP l 0030101, Rev 58, ' Plant .6--4=e~ Summary," was dancient in window A-34, Control Room Air Intake Chlorme High, in the list of " Operator Actions - Valid Alarm" in that it failed to include directica as stated la the PSAR for operators to den SCBAs within two minutes of a valid chlorine alarm.
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| 2I b) Drawing Diffarances frasa the Plant: (1) DWG 8770 O-879, Rev 26, showed damper D-17 as " Manual, locked open w/ind. lights." However, there was no locking device on the damper. (2) DWG 8770 G-879, Rev 26, showed 'stop, start sw. w/ind lights on local PB station' for HVA-3A, -3B, and -3C. However, local PB i stations had no ladinasar lights. (3) DWG 8770LG-879, Rev 26, showed PS 25-16B and PS 25-16A to be la
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| j the same vaatilation flowpath as HVE-13A and HVE-13B, respectively. However, the name tags in the plant jj were reversed.
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| c) Plant Minor Deficiencies with sw PWO. (1) HVA-3B access panel had one (of six) access panel la8chaa l missing (broken off). (2) 'Ibe outside wall penetration for chill water piping to the HVAC units had visible air leakage paths around it. (3) PDIS-25-9 had calibration stickers dated 6/24/75 that had not been removed.
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| : 2) Unit 1 Containment Coatings Dunng a tour of the Unit I containnwat, the inspectors noted that the condition of the contag on various concrete surfaces inside the aaannia===t appeared poor. Nro were areas t where large blisters of paint had apparently fallen offin the past h edges of these areas ma==ad to be 3- susceptible to peebag or being Iranchad off the surface. The inspector questicoed how the licensee had evaluated the coating to ensure that no aantala===* sump problems could occur in the event of an accident.
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| , ....... h licensse's engineer responsible for coatings met with the inspector and described the overall ses,W and Assure plans of the Unit I caanalamaa' coatings, o
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| . Each reAneling outage, the condition of the coatings was inspected and corrective actions were taken in selected
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| ; areas. Any loose paint was removed. In some cases, adhaniaa testing was performed to esses that the 2
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| mining coating would stay la place. At the conclusion of the outage, the completed coating repair or restoration areas were inspected again. 'Ibe inspectors viewed videotape of costing inspecticas with the engineer......
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| 1 g EXCERFTS IR 95 04 j s 'the inspector soviewed =aceia= 6.2.2.2 of the PSAR which described design mensmes to easme that debris
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| . wouM not prevent spray pump suction following an accident....the suction of each recirculation line had l
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| screening with 1/4 inch openings and that the sump gradng had openings of 1/2 inch. Figme 6.2-40 of the i PSAR depicted details of the ca=*al===at samp suction strainers, b inspector gaa=*ia-ad the licenses
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| !! regardag how asuch screen blockage was permitted such that the rainimum BCCS NPSH was available and how l l this was correlated to the quantity of unqualified coating that was acceptable. Sarema 6.3.4.2.1 of the PSAR l
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| ~=*=i-ad a cala=lasia= which assened 100 percent blockage of the horimoaal senp scream and 80 percent I l
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| i blockage of the vertical semp screes. l
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| .j ......la response to the ; "'=, the licasses reviewed the Unit 1 contings issuse. 'Ibe inspectore were i1 provided a packman which contained a breakdown of the unquallfled contings in Unit 1 and d=*====d j ~= aid-ations which would reduce the amount of unqualified conhags which could affect the strainers. A j . significant portion of the unqualified conting (all but about 160 square feet) was covered by mstalJacksted j insulados and was very this. As such, it was ====d not to be a pa*=tial contributor to semp blockage.
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| Other areas of the conting were in taca*iana such that no contribution to sanp blockage was considered credible.
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| l .. Adda*iaaat inctors such as conting flake aims were also d=ci==ad 1
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| l Imeerpersdag this leforesados with earBer diaa==la== regardas the engineering ju4emanat emaployed
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| ; innoiving the sentimes is -an===-e, the inspector cand ded that the consideadoes were Wia l* The informados provided supported the coachnion that only a small fracdom of the total amount of the i
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| 1 da*===aad unquaufled coatings could affect the strainers.
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| 1 The licensee initiated STAR 950236 to address the issue. The STAR 'c7 ^ ' s Mode 4 hold. The
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| :=~====adad improvements included formalinatian of the acreening and acceptability of the unqualified 7 condags. One exasuple would be a clear definition of the sphere of influence withis which unqualified coatings j.
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| ( would be considered to affect the semp gratings.
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| The inspector esadeded that although the presset status of large portions of the Unit 1 ca=*=I====4 coating was not optimal, no opernbuity concers adsted and the licensee was syntanaescany isoproving the easting esamtions as tiene perunitted. The addl*la=aljustificados provided, which addressed the unquallfled coadnes, ad-r=*aly supported operabluty of Unit 1. Development of more fonnaliasd screening and acceptability criteria for the unqualified coatings willimprove the review of unqualified control and easme that the contings do not becoans an operability issue.
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| No violatices or deviations were identified.
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| 3.b. Plant Operadans Review (71707) The inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operadoes records, including data sheets, instrumant traces, and records of equipment malfunctions....Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed.
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| : 1) Annannt SI Hender Imkage On February 7, during HPSI survei11=ca testing, Unit 2 operators idatified a
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| }- alight increase in reactor cavity in-leakage which w. ='M in time, to the operation of the 2A HPSI pump.
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| "Ihe system lineup at the time was such that the indicated increase la leakage appeared to be ladicanive of a leek la the 2A1 HPE header la cantalammar b increase in leakage was approximanaly .1 spat As a result of the apparent leakage, the licensee planaad and nac=*ad a eaatalanw=* entry to walk down the accessible portions of the SI header. h lamparew= occurred within hours of the identificatian. 'Ibe lampaceae
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| -- - 7 ' ' a system engineer, an SRO, and an HP *ael=icia= on the tour. A thorough walkdown, including SITS and mamariatad piping, the header penetration area, and the pipe trench containing header piping, failed to
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| ; ne licammaa later determined the inde= sad leakage to be typical of normal oscillariaaa in reactor cavity leakage. 1
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| ; his conclusion was based upon a review of strip chart recorder data and the results of a HPSI run (made in an jy attempt to recreate the leakage while the team inspected ena*=3a-aat) which failed to reproduce the indicasad leakage. The inspector reviewed the available data and found the llemamma's conclusion pinusible.
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| d While no actual leakage appeared to have occurred, operators' identification of the apparent leakage, and the i correlation of the leakage to the HPSI surveillance test being conducted at the time showed good operator
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| ; attention to control board ladirmaiana Purther, the inspector concluded that the tie ===a's decision to perform a 1; walkdown in canaata===# displayed an appropriate ==pliamia on safety.
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| : 2) Unit 1 Ouanch Tank In-Lankape Pollowing the return to power from the recent refuehag outage, Unit 1 j operatore noticed increased in-leakage to the pressuriser quench tank. b leakage resulted in operators i drainins the tank approminwaly every six to eight hours. During the inspection paiod, in-leakage began to increase, requiring quench tank cooling or draining approxi=ainly every three hours, ns souses of the leakage
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| . was not obvious from iame=11ad plant equipment. PORV and pressuriser anfaty valve tailpipe ^ , c ^ = all i
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| ;. ladie=*=8 higher than normal temperatures. Acoustic flow monitors also failed to indicate the source of the j
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| l On February 3, licensee manarammar formed a team to evaluate the increased in-leakage and to develop a
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| ; strategy to identify its source, identify root causes, and formulate corrective acelaan to be ' ;'- ' during a SNO......An additiona! operator was assigned to the control roosa, whose sole duty was to manitar and ==iatala 7- quench tank parameters (level, ^ --; A_4, and pressure were being =miata=ad wkhin bands developed by
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| ; m engissanag to mini =Ima stresses on the quench tank rupture disk). De inspector sta-lad -sa-a=*
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| :, ( j meetings and team meetings -iasad with this issue and found =aang===# attention to the issue to be
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| :' V_ impressive. A stress ===l*===* to developing root causes and =l=I=l=lar operator estraction was esplayed. Team meetings wese characteriand by a =aehadical approach to the issue, with proper focus
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| ! -taealaad by the tana leader.
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| b team prepared a multifeceted approach to the identification of the in-leakage sources, and employed surface
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| ; temperature data, thermographic imagery, and acoustic monitoring services provided by an offsite contractor.
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| ! Preparation to obtain the required data necessitared the removal of lamlation from components in the pressuriser i
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| cubical, where ^ ;a.i== ranged from the high nineties to one hundred and twenty degrees. He tensa ,
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| ji included a .+. ^:ve from the liew ladustrial s safety organization and appropriate attentaan was directed l to heat stress.
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| i l h team's conclusion, based on the data obaalaahle, was that leakage was occurring past pressurimer code ,
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| , safety valves V-1200 and V-1201, and that leakage was possible past V-3482, a relief valve downstream of V.
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| : l. 3430, the 2A SDC return isolation valve. b conclusions formed the basis for corrective =aintanaaea j lj performed during the Unit 1 SNO, which co-awarad February 27. During maintanaara conducted on the code l l safety valves, the tailpipes to all three code safeties were broken free at the valves
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| * discharge flanges, h l
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| , lica=== discovered leakage past the seats of all three valves nadar solid water conditions at approvi=ealy 100 i j peig. b three valves were replaced.
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| . b licensee's team concluded that the most probable root cause for the leaking safety valves involved a failure to properly insulate the valves' upstream piping .....h kn===a's conclusions appeared to be validated when
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| -l valve V-1202 was found leaking. Several days before the SNO, the la=Intian for all three valves was removed to allow the p1-t of acoustic monitoring devices in an attempt to identify leaking valves. While V-1202 d Page 6 of 16 i
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| 'i n EXCERPTS IR 9544
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| : b was not identified as leaking at the time, the ia-lation ramaiaai removed for several days, 'llas, the valve i
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| was insdvertently exposed to the same a-hanisms as V 1200 and V 1201 b valve was later identified to be
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| ; leaking by alw seat.
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| i The inspector found the lica==a*'s ar1ons relative to the issue of quench tank lo-leakage to be marhadleal, technicauy sound, and fae==I on p.6at and werbe safety.
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| : 3) Unit 2 Reactor Trin A Unit 2 automatic reactor trip from 100 percent power occurred on February 21.
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| b inspector was onsite and responded to the control room. Initial iadicast- were a loss of feedwater but it
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| ; was later determined that the trip resulted from an SG level transmitter, LT 9011, failing high and leading to a
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| ; low SG water level on SG A. LT 9011 senses narrow range SG level and provides a signal to the FW
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| ; . regulating system for FWRV 9011. 'Ihis high level signal caused the 'A' FWRV to go shut. ' Ibis resulted in a Iow SG water level and a reactor trip.
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| When the inspector entered the control room he noted that the operating crew was carrying out the EOP for a l 3
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| i reactor trip. N FWIVs had closed and the steam generators were being fed with murliiary feedwater. l Pressuriner safety valves did not liA but two main steam line safeties had lined and resented. Overall plant
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| : responses were as expected for a trip frasa 100 percent power. 'the inspector observed the recovery for i,* approximately forty-five mi==*a= until the plant was stabdized.... control room crew eformance and l; 9- "*i- were good. Several members of the operations staff and plant ==aaga==r entered the control l
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| .- roose to provide assistance as needed....they stayed clear of all operating areas and did not interfere with the trip recovery.
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| * An investigation into the event found that LT 9011 had failed high and would not reset when power was removed. I&C perananal removed and replaced the defective tran==itter, performed a loop calibration and :
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| returned this system to service. Initial lic-aa inves.igations found no evidence of oil leakage in the l transmitter. 'Ibey believe the failure was in the electronic portice of the transmitter. 'Ibe defective transmitter
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| ! was ablpped to P=a-aunt (the esc"a vendor) for further evaluation.
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| h heensee i, fcd a survey to determine if minular failures had occurred in the industry. 'Ibeir efforts
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| ' revealed that sixty.nine failures had been documaar=1 on the P-=* 1152 DP transmitter since 1984 but that
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| ; none of the failures were vevy ai-ilar to this event in which the electronic output failed high and would not respond to a calibration. Base.t on the above information the lic==aa, as a precautionary measure, replaced the
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| , LT 9021 tran==itter on SG 28.
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| j- 'Ibe inspector reviewed the licensee post trip review package and agreed with the licensees conclusions. He
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| ;j additionally followed the lican=aa's activities in trip recovery and other repairs performed during this forced outage. 'Ibe activities included.......All outage work was completed and Unit 2 ws.s restarted on February 24.
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| N inspector observed the startup from the co--' of CEA withdrawal until criticality. Generally, the ,
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| inspector found the startup to be characterised by good ennununicatlees and ten-work. ECCs were l verified to have been completed properly. One minor procedural deficiency of a typographical mannar was !
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| :1 noted and referred to the reactivity manager for resolution. 'Ibe unit was returned to full power on February ;
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| : 25. Overall, the forced outage was well ananaged with good management oversight. l l
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| : 4) 1A IESI Rehef Valve IJA On February 28, during the process of placing the A shutdown cooling systema j into service, relief valve V3483 liAed. 'the inspector observed the i==adiata corrective actions and some of the
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| ; initial investigative work na-Inen=I froma the control roosa. b control races operators were infonned of the problem through a report of a loud noise in the HUT area. A decreasing pressurimer level was noted. N i valve appeared to liA when the pump was started, which was some period of time aAer RCS pressure had been l
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| l'. / placed on that portion of the system. N relief was resented by the operator simating valves V3400 and V3481
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| ; (A SDC hot leg leolation valves). ..... actions were taken to vent portions of both trains of the ==aciatal
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| ! piping.....although no specific procedure was utilized to complete the venting processes, the evolutions were 1
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| discussed in detail and a ===6e of operations management was actively involved in the evolutions. The
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| ;3 control room operators were sensitive to enJuring that system configuration control was ==iatainad and that i procedural requirements were met.......
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| b licensee formed a team to investigate the root cause of the problem. 'Ibe team's conclusica was that a
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| , minor water h===ar event had taken place when the 1A LPSI pump was started b tie ===aa attributed the
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| ,I water hamaser to a ea=hiaatiaa of 1A SDC suction piping geometry, the temperature of the RCS and the SDC f' train at abs initiation of SDC, and the ==thad of placing SDC in service. A combination of relatively hot RCS fluid, combined with a rapid increase in flow at the initiatica of SDC, was daa-ad to estabhah suitable candi*iana for water ha==ar. An inspection of the subject piping, ~=dae*-8 la accordance with FID-M-N 031.... revealed signs that a minor water ha==ar event had occurred .....
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| J l{ Corrective actions wee tracked under STAR 950208, in which it was concluded that a aminor water ha===r event had occurred. As one corrective action for the event, the team rana ==== dad that a new methodology be j employed for initiating SDC which involved a slower laitianian of flow. N new enethodology was ==a sad under
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| ,j IAI-T-95, *l A IESI Suction / Shutdown Cochng laitiation Test Procedure. on March 4. h -- " '- -g ji involved starting the IESI pump with discharge paths isolated and then slowly initiating flow with the 1751
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| ! header injection laolation valves. By this method, the ticaa-a hoped to avoid conditions in the IESI suction f line, due to a rapid increase in flow, which could lead to water ha==ar. N test resulted la a =F '- ----y 4 pump start with no water ha==ar.
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| i l m The inspector eenehsded that the liesasse had aggressively pursued the root cause of the SDC relief valve lift and had vertfled their fladags he the fleid.
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| , 5) Unit 1 I. mas of Shutdown Coolina On March 3, at 9:42 pm., Unit 1 experienced a 14 minute loss of j akutdawn coohng event. During the event, core exit thermocouples ladie=#ad an RCS bestup from 99 to 114 l
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| degrees Fahrenheit. At the time, both trains of shutdown cooling were operable, as were two steam generatore 4 which could have beau employed in natural circulation decay heat removal. 'the licensee's investigation concluded that the most probable cause was operator error in inadvertently closing the RCS hot leg suction valve for the operating, 'B," shutdown cooling train while removing the 'A' ahuidawn cooling train from service. h bcanand operator involved was r ; '=' from all ticanaad activities.
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| , At the time of the event, the unit was in cold simidown with the RCS intact, having completed r-f
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| * of i leaking pressurimer code safety valves. RCS temperature was 99 degrees Fahneheit and pressure was 250 paia.
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| j h unit was in a solid water condition employing CVCS letdown pressure control. b loss of shutdown i coohng was identified when RCS pressure began to rise. A d=lleatal board operator, =*=*iaa-I at the CVCS
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| : station to monitor RCS pressure, increased letdown flow to reduce prhnery plant pressure. 'Ibe event was
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| . terminated when the "B' shutdown cooling train was returned to service. N peak prunary pressure observed 2
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| we 343 peia, just below the LTOP setpoint of 350 peia. During the pressure excurmon, the shutdown coohng suction relief valve apparently lifted at 312 paia and neented in approximately one minute.
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| 'Ibe resident inspectors are following the ticaa=='s investigation and corrective acticas. h issue will be addressed in greater detail in IR 95 07.
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| : No violations or deviations were ident: fled.
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| 4 3.c. Plant Housekeepina (71707) Storage of material and components, and cleanliness conditions of various 1
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| . V Page 8 of 16
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| ?
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| 4 i
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| q I EXCERPTS IR 95-04 p
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| I s / areas throughout the facility, were observed..... 'Ihe inspector noted a number of areas of larali=I corrosion in the Unit 1 and 2 CCW pump and heat exchanger areas. Similar conditions were noted in both intake structures.....During a routine tour of the Unit 2 fusi pool area, the inspector noted several signinennt
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| ,i t=dt==*4a== of poor housekeeping. 'Ibers were numerous hoses running in and out of the pool. Various items
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| ! were hung froni the side of the pool with copes. A short piece of frayed line was floating in the transfer canal section of the pool. Several loose shoes covere were lying close to the edge of the pool. 'Ibers was at least one
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| ! empty clear plastic bag located in the pool area (in a protection clothing storage rack). 'Ibe bag had apparently
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| } been the packaging material for a face shield. A sign on the doos to the area stated that no clear plastic material was allowed.
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| l l, 'Ihese observations were co===airasad to plant management. Subsequently, the inspector was infonned that major work had been ongoing in the pool and had been ==pandad for the Unit 1 mainta== ace outage. ' Ibis i
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| j explained some of the observed conditions. 'Ibe licaa-a inunadiately initiated corrective actions to address the j more significant issues.
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| ;: No viatariana or deviations were identified.
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| 3.d. Clearances G1707) During this lampareian period, the inspectore reviewed the following tagouts (clearances): 2-9542-030 - 14V-2110P Pressuriser Level Control Valve & 2-9449 084 - Penetration I=alasian i Valve SE 03-2B for SIT /RWT Return Hender...... No violations or deviations were idantified. )
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| f 3.e. Technical Specification Compliance 01707) ficammaa - :;"- M with selected TS ILOs was verified.....During observation of the cooldown of Unit 1 on February 27, the inspector verified that the i- requirements in Operstag Procedure 10030127, ' Reactor Plant Cooldown-Hot Standby to Cold nuadawn,'
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| ! % were being met. b inspector verified that the procedure fulfilled the 1:- - of TS 3.4 regardag RCS
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| !j .; and pressuriser cooldown rate limitations and monitoring . , ' Nr : -e '-- . ad-iaint atively limiand cooldown rate to 75* F per hour as Aari==ad in FSAR sectaan 5.2.1.2.....No deficiencies were noted.
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| j No violations or deviations were identified.
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| 3,r Pfractiv--- of I k--- Caa* mis in Id a+ifyinn. Pa alvian. and Le=h MF= (40500) l Facility Review Group Meetings b inspector attended a FRG meeting conducted February 9 and verified a quorum was present. Items discussed included a proposed license amand=aat to Unit 2 'I3 involving a l 1
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| radar *laa of required shutdown cooling system flow for certain Mode 6 conditions, several PC/Ms, a VTM i
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| . change, and several procedure changes... the meeting was chaired by the Technical Manager, who ensured the
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| ; meeting progressed per the agenda- Further, it was noted that the Operations Department .y. ' ''ve to the j FRG was unprepared to discuss the PLA being raamid~ed and that the chairman properly deferred consideration
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| ! of the PIA to a fhature meeting.
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| h inspector attended a Unit 1 Mode 4 FRG meeting on March 3. b meeting was inen= dad to review items j'
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| for their impact on Unit 1 maranalaa from Mode 5 to Mode 4. Items considered included PCRs required due to TS changes, the Jil., log for impact on upward nede changes, PC/Ms and their affects on mode - , and
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| . an IDI prepared for testing the linaaaaa's corrective actions following an appenet water ha==en event in the 1 A SDC train which resulted in the lifting of a relief valve Overall.... the meeting included a thorough l series of discussions on the iteses considered. Mode dap==d==et= were applied to itens under consideration as - ,, y.* ~ No violations or deviations were identified.
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| i
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| . 3.g. Egilowun of Opmatimaal2 ear 2200) i O Page 9 of 16 J
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| 4 i
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| s:
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| i p EXCERPTS IR 95 04
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| -%./ 1) (Closed - Unit 1) IIR 335/93 005, Stmedown Reqmred by Technical Spec 15 cations due to an Ualaschad Control Element Assembly can=d by Personnel Error......
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| j
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| : 2) (Closed - Unit 2) LER 389/93-005 and IIR 389/93405-01, High Reactor Coolant Panp Vibration l.
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| Resulting in a Controlled Unit Shutdown due to a Cracked Shaft......
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| . 3) (Closed - Unit 2) IIR 389/93 008, Manual Ranctor Trip due to High Gas Temperatures in the Main Generator caused by a Procedural Deficiency........
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| J
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| : 4) (Closed - Unit 2) LER 389/94 002, Pressurimer Instrument Nonle Wald Cracking due to Fabrication
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| } Defects.... ...
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| No violations or deviations were identined.
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| 1 3.h. Followun on Previous Onar=*i== T--- *1= Fladia== (22291)
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| I (Closed - Units 1 and 2) VIO 335,389/91-11-01, Failure to malaamia operability of the Unit 2 -*ala===* epray i system. & (Closed - Units 1 and 2) VIO 335,389/91-1142, Pailure to verify valve position and failure to j discover a misaligned CCW valve.
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| 4 Both of the above vial =*i== resulted from a CCW valve being locked closed instead of open for a period of Eve
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| : months. 'Ihis slignment rendered the 2A ~=8a====at spray systesa != c " . ' Ibis itsen was the subject of an
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| ,. enforcesanat conference and issuance of a civil penalty under EA 91062. 'Ibn heensee provided a d=*ailad
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| ~
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| =;' "'= of their plaaaad and completed corrective actions for & item at the Enforcement Confesence on
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| ^
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| May 30,1991. This item and the corrective actions were also covered in IIR 389/9103.
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| 'j g j Due to a typographical error, & itsen was inadvertently setered into the NRC tracking system as violation v 335,389/89-1141 and 89-1102. Violations 335,389/89-11-01 and 89-1142 had already been entered into the systema in 1989 and had been closed, so the computer tracking system rejected these entries and they never appeared in the NRC tracking systena. An audit in 1994 identi5ed & error. ;
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| i I
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| l- A review of all available information by the staff found that the corrective actions stated in the response to the violations had also been listed as corrective action in IIR 389/9143. ' Ibis LER was subsequently reviewed
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| ! and closed in IR 335,389/92-24 'Ibe inspector verified & through a review of that report and discussions with the inspector who canducted those inspections.
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| . in addition to the above closure the inspector again reviewed the corrective actions stated in the Iwanaa
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| '! rampa=== to e violation dated July 26,1991. He found that the procedures and instruction that have been reviewed to correct this area had been is-ig,..: ,: into a revision of Administrative Procedures, Conduct of Operators AP 0010120 and Ad=ialatrative Control of Locks, Valves, and Switches AP-0010123, both of which l' were recently revised in December 1994 to provide added a=phaala and to centralize several g+T 1 ! j requirements involving valve control. 'Ibe inspector reviewed these recently revised procedures and found that ;
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| they appear to provide adequate requirements and guidance to ensure that correct valve positions are mainamiand.
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| No violations or dev1=ela== were identified.
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| : 4. Maian==e= and Survaillmace 4
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| 4.a. M=1=*=aana Obaarvations (62703. 40500) Natina mala 8=maca activities involving malaenad safety-related
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| . systems and <- , ---- were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were raaducead in accordance with .
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| i requirements..... Portions of the following main manaca a activities were observed:
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| i
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| ' ' U Page 10 of 16
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| . , - . , ~ - ,-, ,, -- , , - --- --- -- - - -
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| P -
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| p EXCERPTS IR 95-04 l- %,) 1) NPWO 65/0528 - Time Delav Rnlay Replacement De inspector witnessed portions of the preparation and i executie. of this work activity, which involved the r;'--- ' of Unit I relay 2X-5, which provided degraded ,
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| voltage protection for tiu 1A3 4160V bus. N relay in question had fallad surveillance testing perfonned l February 9. '
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| t i Unit I degraded voltage protection employed relays 2X-5 and 2X4 in a two-out of-two coincidance. Normally l open contacts from the subject relays were wired in series and closed on a degraded voltage condition.
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| ? Following the identification of the failed 2X-5 relay, the licensee installed a jumper around the relay's output i contact, effectively tripping the relay as called for in TS 3.3.2. In this conAguration, the licensee was permitted to cane-na operation until the next required ch-aal functional test. As the relay failure was identified during the chaaaal fi=e*=aaat test, the licensee was required to correct the condition by February 20, the class of the j
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| anoothly functional test period. ,
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| As . f ^ of the failed relay offered the possibility of an inadvertent load abed of the A lE busses, the
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| : lica==a employed General Policy PSte105, ' Plant Operation Beyond the Envelope of Approved Plant Operating ll Procedures." h policy was developed following a 1994 Unit 1 trip which resulted frosa an unusual plant
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| ; electrical lineup. h policy, when invoked, aquired a amitidisciplinary technical rwiew of abe propond plan, lj . with the asults pe== tad to the FRO.
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| I' De inspector =**= dad meetings of the Tachaical Review Group....%e issue was clearly identified and abe l' proposed relay .=;'= - " plan was discussed De Technical blanager directed that the group split into two teams to provide indapaadaae a-* of the .:;5 -" plan, to isclude a field walkdown of the cabinet in which the work was to be performed to verify (to the entaat possible) that drawings adequately reflected the l
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| cimult and to assess the working conditions. h team concluded that the relay could be safely replaced and q offered a an=har of comunants on the work package .... inspector met dad the FRG meeting which discussed
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| ;j g .) the lasus and found that the issue was e ,./ - 'y addr===d, with probing questions posed by all =a=h==e.
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| W He group's conclusion was endorsed by the FRO, with direction to include aakaacad language and 4 _---' la the work package over that which was offered.
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| %e inspector observed activities related to the relay replacame=8, eaadnetad on February 16. On entering the Unit I control room, the inspector found the ANPS briefing the operating crew on off-normal procedures i relating to loss of the affected IE bus. An additional briefing was ~ 8-*=d with maintenance personnel i performing the repair. In both cases, the lampactar found the briefings detailed and well structured. I
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| !" .....h inspector observed the relay replaeamant, and found that the area surroundag the work had been isolated by caution tape to limit access. Two electricians were assigned to perform the work and an electrical
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| -1 supervisor was providing support asr a .~'.:. r.; k. Jumpers to be employed during the replaca-aat won inspected for continuity prior to beginning and the sept-t relay had been shop-tested for operability. Of particular note, the PWO required a number of indapanda=# verifications as jumpers were lastalled and removed and included explicit guidance as to what was meant by the term.
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| 1 Work was found to be conducted in a c=tiana mannar with frequent reference to the e. In the final phases of I the job, howwer, an error on the part of the elecidelen running jumpers roultal in a lend shal of the f; 1A 1E busses. Imnd shedding occumd as designed, the 1A EDG started properly, and lands sequenced
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| :_;; ,,l :.',.
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| h root cause of the load-shed was inadvertent cantare made by a jumper clip with the 2X4-2 degraded voltage relay contact terminal wh'le removing the jumper. N net effect of this action was to provide, momentarily, a jumper around both the 2X-5 and the 2X4 degraded voltage relay caa*= eta, providag a false V Page 11 of 16 1
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| e
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| , .c . . . , - . . _.,m.,
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| --- . - - --. _. ~ - . - _ . - . - - - - . . - . - - ..- - - -. -.- . -- .- -
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| j EXCERPTS IR 9544 q
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| t
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| .. j input to the load shed circulty. %e jumper in question had been installed earher in the evolution and was l
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| required to allow removal of the failed relay without dsamptang contiruity in the degraded voltage circuit. h
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| ; terminal with which the jumper made contact was located directly adjacent to the terminal from which the jumper was being removed. A contributing factor in the load-shed was a procedural waalmaan The step which directed the removal of the jumper failed to identify the close pmaimity of the 2X4-2 terminal to the 2X41 terminal, from which the jumper was being removed. Additionally, had the pM . directed that the other l
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| . end of the subject jussper be removed first, the electrical continuity which was established around the 2X-5 and
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| ; 2X4 relays could not have taken place.
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| t'
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| !i h inspector verified that the licensee made the appropnate notifications under 10 CPR 50.72. Additionally, the inspector witnessed post-==laea=== testing performed following the .g'----- ^ and verified that the relay performed satisfactorily.
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| ne inspector concluded that the Mc== displayed 2,,m.'.A planning, be;' " " , and caution in approaching this -taid-a- activity. risadas, , ";, "; va-- + - and tg _ "- -' r . m"= for a potential loss of a 1E bus were considered good. De p--
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| : wenkases eBscussed above imBesied rooms for improvenannt in the field walkdown aspects of the ach=le=1 e review pswesas; however, the bulk of the review process was considered good.
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| I
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| : 2) RWPO 42/2227_ _2Bl2SLhtan_Appsamin_hnMacmipled During the quarterly survaillamaa run on l February 20,2B IESI pump failed to develop any discharge pressure. AAer several attempts to resolve this item, it was declared inoperable and the 72 hour LCO action statement was entered. It was suspected that the
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| , pump impeller had sheared the key or the shaA was broken. h pump was removed and the inspeller was found to be intact. h suction check valve was removed and found to be fully operable. A boroscopic laaraatia= was performed on the auction piping from the suction check valve to the pump casing through the j.1 startup strainer area from the check valve to the suction isolation valve. No obstructions were identified. M V pump was temporarily bolted back in place to permit inspection of the -celaa MOV. VCYTES testing found the auction taala*la= MOV to be working correctly.
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| Since the pump may have been run without water, the licensee decided to replace the pump seal prior to returning the pump to service, t
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| N inspector observed the initial pump and motor removal, and the removal and pump dia===a=hly for seal rept -
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| * He additionally reviewed the other inspections that were ~=ducead to determine the root cause of the problem..... the inspections were canducted in a me*hadie=1 and conservative manner. The group fonned to work this items embibited good teamwork and a good dace ==*=8ad and ==adhadteal approach to i resolving this problem. Plant management involvesment and support was very evident throughout this investigation and work.
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| b 11- concluded that the pump had become air-bound at some tian since the last survail1==c= test run (November 1994)....De licensee did not conclude how the air binding hau occurred, identifying that improper venting, adgration and =cen==d=*ia=, and air infusion into the system were possible contributors. As a result, the licenses prepared a plan for sy=*a==*ie venting evolutions in an attempt to identify what =arh=i- were at work. b plan included......h lie === prepared LOI448, ' Filling and Ventag the 2B Low Pressee Safety lajection Hender From the RWT," to support the return to service to the 2B LPSI pump. The inspector observed the parfannance of the LOX and the laitial pump runs and found both to be satisfactory. M ,
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| pump was returned to service on February 23.
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| 1 No violations or deviations were identified.
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| .~s-U. Page 12 of 16
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| c EXCERPTS IR 9544 1
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| / 4.b. Surveillance Observations (61726) Various plant operations were verified to comply with =alarsad TS requi ernents..... following surveillance tests were observed:
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| : 1) OP 1-0030150. Rev 71. ' Secondary Plant Operntmp Checks and Tests' He inspector observed turbine i trip lasting, conducted on Unit 1 on February 11. De testing was performed as a =amehty verification that portions of the turbine trip equipment were functioning properly. He test was enaddared to present a high risk of turbine trip if performed improperly. De test was performed by two ANPOs, one control room SRO, and the NWE. He NPS was observing locally, as was the Operadons Manager.
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| %s inspector noted that all operators involved in the test had procedures in hand. Good an===ie=* lana was i, noted between operators, as actions were coordinated among these prior to the performanos of misjor procedure esquences. He tests were performed with amen =f=ca-y results, with the exceptica of tests for sonsooid valves 20-1/OPC and 20-2/OPC, for which DEH pressure failed to drop to the procedurally mandated value of less than 100 peig. The test values were 150 and 145 peig, respectively. Operators initiated PWOs to check the l
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| . calibrance of laat=Had pnesure sages. l l' l R---- v D' -- ' C - - - - N='L- Test and C-- =' c--- "- a
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| : 2) OP 1-MMOA. Rav 18. *lA Ipstructions' no inspector observed portions of this test, r L.. ' March 1. De test involved an idle (400 rpm) start, followed by an increase to synchronous speed and a loaded run. De lamp =esar found that operators 1 performing the sat had pmceduas in hand and performed their functions cornetly. Additianally, the lampaesar noted close coordiaa*Ian betwesa the RCO performing the synchronization and loadmg and the ANPS on the actices which would be required. De inspector has noted this to be a good practice among control room personnel performing this test, and it was noted that this practice has been observed ==ime=*Iy in several past EDO survaillaan== on both units.
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| 1' .. j-i No vtal=*i- or deviations were identified.
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| 4.c. Followup on Previous Maintenance Findians (92902)
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| ; 1) (Closed - Units 1 and 2) VIO 335,389/94-24-02, Inadequate Process for Changes to Vendor Technical
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| ! Manuals.. .. ..
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| : 2) (Ciceed - Unit 1) VIO 335/93-1241 Inadequate LPSI Pump Malata===ca Fie-A.e......
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| No violations or deviations were identified.
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| ]I 5. "=f ---L.g Support (37551) 5 5.a. Reactor Coolant Oas Vent System Reshynment Following the trip of Unit 2, the he-aa identified
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| . leakage past V-1465, a block valve isolating the RCGVS at=amphaeic vent line. %e system provided the
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| ] capability to vent games from the reactor head or pressurizar =aaam space to any of three taeaniana; the qu==ch j tank, the HVAC system, or the contaia===t atmosphere. De vent paths from each source each naamistad of a solanoid valves in parallel joining in a comunaa discharge header. Each solenoid valve in a given path was powered fmaa a diffennt emergency power supply, thus providing single-failure praeacew= ne common i
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| discharge handar supphed the three vent da=*ia=*ia== with each path isolable by a block valve. De block valves 4
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| for the paths leading to the quench tank and the HVAC system were powered frosa the SB bus, the path leedag l to the aaaaal=-* =*-a phane was powend from the SA bus. TS 3.4.10 required that two paths, aa==iating of l two vent valves and a block valve powered from emergency busses in each path, be operable.
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| i In appmaching this problem, the hcensee elected to isolate the affected path by blanking the line downstream of
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| ; U Page 13 of 16 !
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| I l
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| , 4
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| ..
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| * 1 j- I j..
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| ,~ -, -n- . _ . - - _ _ _
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| i
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| ,~s EXCERPTS IR 95-04 I. ,
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| J/ V-1465. Doing so required that the power supply to one of the two rammining block val as be shifted such that it was supplied frm the SA bus. 'Ibe licensee chose to realign the power supply to V-1465 to V-1464, the block valve isoladas the vent systern from the quench tank. Engineering prepared Safety Evalundan JPN-PSle SENS-95405 to effect the corrective actions under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
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| h inspector reviewed the subject Safety Evaluadon and found it to be satisfactory. Calculations were provided "" "- ; the adequacy of the proposed blind flange and wiring daagrams were included dedading the necessary changes in power supplies. Additionally, the document included prae =nt*m== to be considered when installing the blank, as the system pressure boundary was to be extended in the process. Appropriate sections of I the PSAR and TS were referenced and di==ad in reaching the conclusion that an unresolved safety question
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| .i did not exist. N inspector attended a FRG meeting on February 23, where the document was ,; ed for use. The inspector found that the tie ===e's engineering organiantion had produced a high quality dae====* In support of operations with very little lead time.
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| No violations or deviations were identified.
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| : 6. Plant Support 01750,40500) 3 6.a. Fire Protection During the coures of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely ====inad facets of the i Pire Protectaan Program.......No vial =*iaan or deviations were id==*ified.
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| 6.b. Phvalcal Protection During this i==paceian, the inspector toured the protected area and noted that the r -_ - r - fence was intact and not -- _- ;--- '" by erosion or disrepair....Isoladon zones were malatalaad on both sides of the barrier and were free of objects which could shield or conceal an individual.....
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| w personnel and packages entering the protected area were searched either by special purpose detectors or by a
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| , , . physical paedown for Arearms, explosives, and contrabend. 'Ibe processing and escorting of visitors was
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| %^ observed. Vehicles were searched, escorted, and secured as described in the PSP. LJghting of the perimeter and of the protected area met the 0.2 foot-candle criteria.
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| In -:=' 'n adar**d th=cela== and espdp==* of the security progreen west amp l =4ad and found to consply with the PSP i: ; . No vial =*la== or deviations were id==*1 fled.
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| 6.c. Radiological Protection Program Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in confor===ca with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with re.p;h:ssy 1-g- -te.....No violations or deviations were identified.
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| 6.d. Unit 2 Spant Fuel Pool Ian Exchanger Failure h licensee identified a high differential pressure on the Unit 2 spent fuel pool los exchanger in late December 1994. Further review found that filter changeout
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| ., frequency had been increasing so the licensee conducted an investigation to determine if the ion exchanger was operating correctly.
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| A sample on the discharge of the ion exchanger during the week of January 16 found resia fines.- A decision was then made to isolate the system and open and inspect a valve on the outlet of the ion exchanger. ' Ibis
| |
| ! inspection during the week of January 23 found that the valve c<=*=iaad resia. b strainer downstream of the valve was than removed and found to be ruptured. h heensee then opened the ion exchanger and found that approximately twenty-five of the twenty-eight cubic feet of resia was aussing.....h resia, through systent
| |
| , operation, has been :.-- , r J to the spent fuel pool, RWT, and possibly into the ECCS systema piping through ECCS pump surveillance testing..... Chemistry sampling had found that sulfates have lacreased from 5 ppb to about 6000 ppb in the spent fuel pool and the RWT sulfates have increased frcm approximanaly 40 ppb to i .
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| N- Page 14 of 16
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| _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - #-------#-- . - . , v_-
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| i i-I e
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| p, EXCERPTS IR 95 04 1i }
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| ; 1
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| {1 ,,
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| ^"y 300 ppb. Bare is no evidemos that resia has entered the RCS. !
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| 4 Sinos industry experience has found that increased sulfur level snay promote : ^ g --* attack (IGA) on alloy l 600 material, the plant asked engineering to decennine if any adverse effects could be c==d by resia in the j; spent fuel pool, BCCS system, and spent fuel. Engineering is still reviewing the issue and had ladicanad that :
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| ; their preliminary finding shows no serious adverse effects. Their evaluatica is due to be c- ,'':I in March. l De plant has lasued instructions to prevent the spread of resia to other systems and is currently developing laal=e*1= and cleanup plans and manamhling matenal as needed. It is anticipated that the RWT will be
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| 'j. inspected and clemmed by filtration la March with cleaning as needed in the SFP to follow shortly theresAer.
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| e' Pleas are also being developed to repair and return the ion exchanger to service.
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| ~
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| (
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| The lampeeder found that the lienusse investigatism and recovery pleas for this items to be tinuely and 3
| |
| detened. The laspector wW miew the Econsee eagleeering paluation of this itan and foBow au sorrective assesures taken.
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| No violations or deviations were identified.
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| 1 -
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| 6.e. Nuciant Safety Speakmq Program De lie ==aaa Speekout Program perfonned a post <mtage review of
| |
| 'j concerns that were submitted during the recently completed Unit 1 refheling outage. His review covered
| |
| ; employee concerns that were submitted during this period and the results of a survey which was caaducead on l
| |
| all m: ,._ " personant who worked on the site dunng the refueling outage. Appromi=maaly 98 percent of
| |
| , them people responded to the swvey..... His survey attempted to klantify problems that may have been i =a==a==ed by workers in parfanning their asmaned work, and also tried to idanaify any concerns that
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| ,j q employees experienced lavolving plant safety. Here were twenty-four comoerns expnosed involving nuclear
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| .] -
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| L)
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| V safety or quality. De majority of theos items have bosa resolved and only one that had a potential nuclear safety concern is still under investigation. ;
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| 4 1
| |
| De inspector reviewed the survey and noted that the aujority of concern involved industrial safety and
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| . aa====le=*ia= h report was discua=d with the manager for the Speakout Program and all questices wese j ,
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| =tta'=caa=ily answered. It appears that the licensee is very laterested la promoting an enviremment where
| |
| , worker concan can be addressed and resolved. This survey is only one facet of the licensee's overall i pengraan and appears to be effective in promoting a good work envira====#
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| i 6.f. Quality Assurance De inspectors met with site QA =anagamant on February 15 and diae==ad the j current status and recent audits and '- , P-a completed by the QA orgariivaniaa. b inspectors laterface 1- with thses r = '' ca a daily basis, but this was a arhadalad quarterly meeting where completed Imag=ceia-
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| ; and audits are discussed and reviewed. b inspections and topic covered included......De contractor oversight j received special ==phaata since problems had been previously identified in this area in the previous outage.
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| ] ,
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| h ladvandaan technical reviews were diaci-ad since the ISEG function had recently been datatad from Technical Specifications and transferred to QA.
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| No significant findlags, negative trinds or decuning ladle =*ars were identitled la the above areas. The 1
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| . laspector noted that several of the ausBis and perfonnance - - , activities were detaued and
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| , .'- *ve and !=dicasad that the lle==== aa=#1=== to have an effective QA prograan.
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| j 6.g. Corponte Nuclear Review Board h laspector anended the a.m. portion of the CNRB meetag held at l the St. Iacio Plant on February 21. His board is composed of senior cosporate managers and an outside oboarver. Day are raalrad with reviewing the overall safety performance of the hes==a's nuclear plants. N
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| h di h . . EXCERPI'S IR 9544 f' .,
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| meenda for ibis meeting inclated.... l The inspector attended the above asesting for .--- " "., three hours. AH anembers appeared to
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| ^ ' -
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| * actively M';-" la the seestias. The laspector was very bepressed with the depth of , ; om ,
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| h plant issues by the outside CNRB -ha . This board does appear to add value to the lle====*'s pursuit i h of safe operation. ;
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| +
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| ' 6.h. Followup to Previous Plant Support Findings (92904)
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| : 1) (Closed - Units 1 and 2) DEV 335,389/94-13-02, Inadequate F- .
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| y Supplies in Contact Rooms....
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| : 2) (Closed - Units 1 and 2) IFI 335,389/92-1842, Evaluate Adequacy of Accident Preparations Per FSAR Section 6.4......
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| I No violations or deviatices were identified.
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| i . 7. Exit Interview 0
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| a 'Ibe laag-*ia= scope and findings wwe m-narized on March 3,1995, with those pereces ladicanad in i
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| ! paragraph 1 above.......
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| n i (closed) IER 50-335/93-05, Shutdown Required by Tachaical Specificadoes due to an Unlaaehad Control j- Ela===a Assembly Caused by Personnel Error, T 3 31).
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| y (closed) IER 50-389/93-05 & 0541, High Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration Resulting in a Contreued Unit j l t Simadown due to a Cracked ShaA,13.g.2). ;
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| /
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| e g ~.3 (closed) IER 50-389/9348, Manual Reactor Trip due to High Oss Temperatures in the Main Omerator i . Caused by a Procedural Deficiency, i 3 3 3).
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| U (closed) IER 50-389/9442, Pressurizer Instrumant Nozzie Weld Cracking due to Fabrication Defects,1 3.g.4).
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| I (closed) VIO 50-335,389/91-1101, Failure to Maintain Operabdity of the Unit 2 enatalamana Spray System, T
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| ;~ 3.h.
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| h (closed) VIO 50-335,389/91-11-02, Pailure to Verify Valve Pesition and Failure to Discover a Mienligned
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| " CCW Valve,13.h.
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| (closed) VIO 50-335/93-12-01, Inndequase IESI Pump Maiana==ana Proceduse, T 4.c.2).
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| (clamad) DEV 50-335,389/94-13 02 Inadequate is 7- y Supplies in Control Rooms,16.h.1).
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| (closed) VIO 50-335,389/94-24-02, Inadequate Process for Changes to Vautor Tachaical Maanala,14.c.1).
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| (closed) IPI 50-335,389/92-18-02, Evaluate Adequacy of Accident Preparadcas Per PSAR Section 6.4,1
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| ( 6.h.2).
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| '/ Page 16 of 16 i
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| ; 3 EXCERPTS IR 95 07 i
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| j April 19,1995
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| , Florida Power and Ught Company ATIN: Mr. J. H. Ocidberg
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| * President - Nuclear Division ,
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| j P. O. Box 14000 Juno R==ch, FL 33408 0420 3
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| '' SUBIBCT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-335/95-07 AND 50-389/95-07 .
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| !: G.asta-an-n 1 . ' Ibis refers to the la= par *iaa eaadace=1 by R. L. Prevette of this office on March 5 through April 1,1995. 'Ibe
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| .l i
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| lampae*laa included a review of activities authoriand for your St. Imcie facility. At the canehuo f the laspection, the findings were discussed with those ===ha s of your staff identified in the enclosed report.
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| Areas e=amiaad during the lampartia= are identified la the report. Within these areas, the inspectica ca==i=8ad
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| '[; of selective ===alaasia== of p-:- '- _ and supresentative records, interviews with personnel, and observation or activitim in prosa=s N urpom P of the laapar*1= wm to determine whether activities authorimd by the noense was raad a afely and in accordance with NRC requinuments.
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| 'Ibe enclosed Inspection Report identifies activities that violated NRC requirements that will not be subject to
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| . , enforcement action haeauma the licaaman's efforts la identifying and/or correcting the violation meet the criteria
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| 'f r
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| specified la Section VII.B of abe Enforcement Policy......
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| Sincerely, Orig signed by Kerrry D. Imadia Kerry D. Imadia, Acting Qilef Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 Ucense Nos. DPR-67 NPF-16
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| ==Enclosure:==
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| NRC Inspection Report Report Nos.: 50-335/95 07 and 50-389/95 07 Ucensee: Florida Power & Ught Co 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL' 33102 l
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| Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 11c==a Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16 Pacility Name: St. Lucie 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March 5 through April 1,1995 ;
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| t V' Page 1 of 13
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| m EXCERPTS IR 95 07
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| . Iand Inspector: _R. Schin for _4/13/95 ,
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| R. L Proatu, Senior Raident Date Signed Inspector Accompanying laspectors-Julio P. lara, Resident Inspector, Watts Bar Mark S. Miller, Resident Inspector Robert P. Schin, Project Engmeer, NRC Region II
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| , Mataal= T. Widmana, Rendent Inspector, Vogtle
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| :I Approved by: _K. D. Iandis , _4/18/95 K. D. Iandis, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Sectics 2B
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| } Division of Reactor Projects
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| Scope:
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| nis routine resident insp-41aa was ~=Aw-s on site in the areas of plant operations review, -h observations, surveillance observations, engineering support, plant support, followup of previous inspectica
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| . - nadings, and other arem. '- . += wee - fm M during normal and in house and on weekends and Qh
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| * Results:
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| Plant operations area- Operations were ~=Awat well during the lamp =*iaa period. Unit 1 experienced a loss
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| ; of shutdown cooling event, and the licensee's root cause investigation was found to be objective, thorough, and timely. The event resulted in a non<ited violation relating to procedure compliance. De restart of Unit 1 following a -ineaaaaaa outage was found to be well controlled. A post-trip review meeting, a=Awas to ;
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| develop corrective actions to the February 21 trip of Unit 2 involving approximately 50 per=anaal from a number of '--;=+- ^ , was an innovative approach to problem solving.
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| !. Maintenance and Survedlance aren: A lose cf configuration control was identined by the licensee, involving the failure to remove a temporary switch frosn an electrical circuit, and resulted in a non-cited violation. A weakaa= was identined in piecedurs] guidance provided for the 's 3 of a preventive ==iananaaaa activity. Surveillances were performed satisfactorily.
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| Ensinaaring area: One plant modi 5 cation, involving the modincation of diesel generator loef-neld relays, t was reviewed by the NRC and found anti = factory.
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| t
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| '). Plant Suponrt area: Plant support activities continued to be conducted satisfactorily. De liaaaaaa's Are ,
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| . brigade promptly :==pa~i-a to and extinguishad a Are in the Unit 1 pressuriser cubicle.
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| !; Within the areas lamp-*~I, the following non-cited violations were identined associated with events reported by ,
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| the linanaam: ;
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| l.
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| l EXCERIFI3 IR 9547 5' .- NCY 335/954741, " Failure to Pollow Shutdown Cooling Opera.ing Procedures," 13.f n
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| NCY 335/9547-02, ' Failure to Maintain ConAguration Control of Unit 1 ECCS Aron Va=edatian Electrical
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| . Circuit,' 14.a.1........
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| i' j' 2. Plant Status and Activities 2.a. llaill On March 8, Unit 1 returned to power operations following an eight day Short Notice Outage for i tbs ; ;'- " of pressurizar code safety valves. N unit operated at =====tially full power for the ha anaa of ii the l==pae*la= period.
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| 2.b. llaiL2 Unit 2 operated at essentially full power throughout the '- , fa= period.
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| I 2.c. NRC Activity During this period, an inspection of the licensee's Security program was eaaartant from
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| !;. March 27 to 31 by W. Tobin of NRC Region II. 'Ibe i== pac *ia= results were reported in IR 335,389/9548.
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| q f Kerry D. I. andes, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2, NRC Region II, visited the site on March 29. His
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| * activities included a meeting with the Site Vice President and delivering the keynote address at a gradundan l, ceremony for newly licensed operators.
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| j! Robert P. Schin, Project Engineer, NRC Region II, visited the site froma March 6 thecogh 10. Julio F. I.arn, NRC Resident Inspector /Waus Bar, visited the site from March 20 thmugh 24. Malcolm T. Wiensan, NRC
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| ; Resident Inspector /Vogtle, visited the site fross March 27 through 31. 'Ibeit activities included augmenting the sosident ==p-eela= effort and are detailed in this report.
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| 4 h f ain 2.d. Plant Mannamment Trainins During the period, a ammher of plant managere and y v'-- began a six--
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| month plant systems training couros. Temporary (acting) managers were named as follows.....
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| 3 i 3. Plant Operations
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| ' 3.a. Plant Tours 017qD The inspectors periodically ca=Ame* ant plant tours to verify that monitoring
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| ; equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operatiana personnel were aware of plant
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| ; aa=dieta==, and plant *- ;% efforts were adequate......'Ibe inspector perfanned walkdown l==partia== of i:- system flow path valves to conArm equipment lineups. N valves verified were ==aet=*='t with Unit 2 IJSt i and CS systems.1hese valves were verified to be in the correct position as reflected in systeam flow diagrams 4, 2998-G478,2998 G488 and by position tags located on the valves.... Equipment conditions were determined to ii be ace =r*=Ma The inspector also performed walkdown inspections of other plant areas including Unit 2 EDO scoms, Units 1 and 2 electrical switchgear rooms. Unit 2 APW pump rooms, Units 1 and 2 electrical 3
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| ; --- ^ rooms, and Unit 1 safe shutdown panels. The areas inspected were observed to be clean and free of j , obstructions. At the safe shutdown room, operating procedures were available. The inspector verified that the s
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| procedures were controlled copies and were the latest approved revision....
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| ;;. 3.b. Plant Operations Review G1707) 'Ibe laspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records,
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| : 4. including data absets, instrument traces, and seconis of equipment malfi=e*ia==.... status was verified.
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| : 1. -
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| ; 3.c. Plant Houankeepina 01707) Storage of material and componesta, and clannhaams conditions of various areas tiuoughout the facility were observed.......No violations or deviations were identified.
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| -32. Clearances 01707) During this inspection period, the inspectors aviewed the following tagouts (clearances): 2-9543 Clearance on BA gravity fuel valves (V2508, V2509) from BAM to permit MOV
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| )* D' J
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| amiatan=aca and VCYTES testing. & 1-95 03 Containment purge supply isolation valve.
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| Tags were la place and fuses, valves, and breakere were correctly positioned as required by the applicable --
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| l clearance.
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| 1 3.e. Technical Specification Compliance 01707) T ie=== compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified.
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| 7 j 'Ihis lacluded the review of selected surveillance test results.....
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| i j - 3.f. Unit 1 ia== of **%n 'nonia e 01707) On March 4, Unit i experienced a loss of abundown coohng j while realigning shutdown cooling trains. b event lasted approximanaly 14 minutes. Initial RCS conditions I were 99'F and 247 pais. 'Ibe RCS was in a solid water condition, with pressure being maintainad through
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| . CVCS letdown pressure control. Peak RCS ^ , ~ during the event was 113'P and peak pressure was 343 Pela.
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| ji i At 9:35 p.m., an RCO was placing the A SDC train in standby aAer placing the B SDC train in service. OP 1-t 0410022, Rev 19, 'Shu*down Coohng,' section 8.2 described the snethod for placing one SDC train in standby j with the other train la service. N methodology (presented in the order specified by the procedure) involved
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| ;_ securing the pump in the train of interest, verifying adequate SDC flow miaad, abutting the affected pump's
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| ! discharge valve, and then shutting the affected pump's suction valve.
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| 'Ibo performance of thses steps required operation at two different control panels; the CRAC which =*=iaad controls for LPSI pump discharge isolation valves, and R'IUB 106 which contained controls for IESI pumps
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| ; and LPSI pump suction isolation valves. 'Ibe two panels were located at extreme ends of the Unit 1 control 2
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| roons, requiring operators to traverse the control room in the course of placing a train la standby. h SDC r==137
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| * was being ca=Araad by the Desk RCO, one of two reactor operators on watch at the time. h
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| : l. e other reactor operator, the Board RCO, was dadwa8ad to menitoring RCS pressure and controlling letdown jj flow, as the unit was la a solid water aandiela=
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| 1 A timalina was established, by the licensee, for the event based upon interviews with the operating crew, output froni the SOER, and ERDADS. Major aspects of the timaliam are as follows.....
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| 'Ibe licanaaa concluded that the loss of SDC was the direct result of V3651 closing. ERDADS data, ladenting i reductions in SDC flow, combined with SOER data would support the conclusica. In c "=; rag the cause for
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| ;' the valve closure, the licensee pursued parallel paths which ecosidered electrical malfunctica and operator error.
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| ! With regard to possible electrical malfunction, the licensee composed two indapaadaae cross-fimerumat teams to l consider failure scenarios which might lead to the closure of V3651. b teams analysed the control circuitry t
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| , for the valve and pa=ent= tad electrical faults that might result in valve closure. Field tests for lamlation between ji individual eaaAeeane and between , a-*~s and ground were conducted with satisfactory results.
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| Additionally,la= par *ia== were made of valve limit switch co paa-as and physical conditions at the valve. No deficiencies were noted. b two teams concluded that there was no credible electrical fault that could lead to
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| : the noted valve closure.
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| 'the hcenses then ca=Armad two additional reviews of the circuitry by engineering personnel not previously j -i=*ad with the event. Mimilar conclusions were ranchad. 'Ibe inspector reviewed the apphcable control wiring diagram for V3651 and determined that the licensee's conclusions were sound. 'Ibe inspector further concluded that any electrical fault which inny have lead to valve i.losure must have aviaand for a penod of
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| ; , approximately 60 =aaada (the valve's stroke time) and then cleased, allowing the valve to open.
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| l The licensee convened a meeting of the crew on watch during the event, provided a facilitator and
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| ) ERDADS/SOER data and taalrad the crew with creating possible scenarios which could lead to the noted i behavior. 'Ibe crew determinad that the caly credible cause for the event would involve a mispositioning of the
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| p EXCERPTS IR 95-07 i
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| % - key-lock coat-d switch for V3651, followed by a return of the valve's control switch to the open position aAer
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| ; the valve had cycled closed. Olven the timelme for the event and the results of crew interviews, the only person in a position to make such an error was the Desk RCO.
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| h mispositioning would involve the Desk RCO securing the 1 A IESI pump and attempting to close V3481
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| ! (the 1A LPSI pump SDC suction isolation valve) prior to moving to the CRAC to close the 1 A discharge 1 isoladon valve. Instead of closing V3481, the Desk RCO would have to missairaaly operate the control switch i for V3651. This would appear credible, as the two switches are oriented beside one another on RMB 106. ;
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| This scenario would allow V3651 to stroke closed while the Desk RCO moved to the CRAC and would result in 1 i- the Aret an==cianae noted.1his scenario would also represent a departure froni the govendag procedure, as
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| . the suctieu valve is listed as the last valve to be operated la placing a SDC train la standby.
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| ]
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| . b scenario in question would Aarther require the Desk RCO to raall= his error upon returning to R10B 106 l and return the control switch for V3651 to the open position in an attempt to correct the error. Oiven that RCS pressure =emadad the pressure interlock associated with V3651, the valve would fail to cycle completely open l j, until pressure was reduced below the interlock setpoint. This would explain the dual position noted by both the 4! Desk RCO and the crew.
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| 1be Desk RCO was presented with the tie ===a's conclusions and =alanalaad that he did not misposition V3651.
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| : f. 11e licensee relieved the Desk RCO of he===d duties and placed him on =ag===ian with pay while j ,
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| !.l lavestigations were being eaaducead As data began to 8adic=*= that electncal malfunction was not credible, the l licensee withdrew the Desk RCO's site access. The licensee later elected to take strong disciplina y action l against the operator. The operator resigned prior to disciplinary action taking place.
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| l, ' .
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| b safety consequences of this event were minor. TSs were not violated. TS 3.4.1.4.1 required, in Mode 5 with RCS loops Alled, at least one shutdown cooling loop be operable and either one additional shutdown
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| :l cooling loop be operable or secondary side water level of two stenni generatore be greater that 10 percent of narrow range indication. During this event, both shutdown cooling loops were operable, RCS loops were Alled, j and both steam generators had water level greater than 10 percent of narrow range indacasian TS 3.4.1.4.1 also required that at least one shutdown cooling loop be in operados. With no shutdown cooling loop in
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| ; operadan, Action Maa8=nant b. allowed one hour to initiate corrective action to return the required ahnidawn
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| ! cooling loop to operation In this event, one thindown cooling loop was restored to operation in about 14 l minuaa=.
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| l, b inspector concluded that the licanaaa's actions in response to this event were timely, thorough, and i_ objective. Due c- " Mon was paid to the potential for equipment failure as a root cause for the event. The 1 3 inspector found that the licensee's conclusion that operator error was the root cause reflected the only plausible
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| : explanation for the event.1he inspector further concluded that operator response to annuacianar R-30, 'IESI PP 1B RUNNING /V-3651/3652 CI.OSING," was weak, in that the actions =aadad in the annunciator response procedure (checking valve positions, securing the operating pump) were not fully carned out until more than two minutes following the annunciation. Had the actions been carried out at the time of the l annunciation, the event may have been prevented.
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| t
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| : b attempted closing of valve V3481 (valve 3651 was actually closed instead) followng the securing of the 1A 1ESIpump.,,, - i a failure to follow procedure OP 10410022, Rev 19, ' Shutdown Cooling,' in that valve l V3206 (the 1A IPSI pump discharge valve) should have been closed Arst. This . - ' a violation of i Tachale=1 Specincation (13) 6.8.1.a. which required that written procedures be ==*=hti kad, M' -i, and
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| , ==lanalaad covering, in part, procedure adherence. Procedure QI 5-PR/PStel, Rev 60, " Preparation, Revision, Review / Approval of Procedurce," Section 5.13.2 stated that all procedures shall be strictly adhered to. This
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| : % EXCERPTS IR 95-07 I s vlointion will not be cited because the lleensee's efforts in Identifying and correcting the vlointion unset the
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| ; eriterin specified in Section VILE of the NRC enfestament policy. It will be Identitled as NCY 335/95 o7- :
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| j e1, rnihn, te rail w shutdown cooling es="-- Procedures." l 3 3. Unh 1 startun 01707) The inspectore observed the Unit 1 startup on March 8. f lamaa== personnel conducted the evolution in a deliberate and well-catrolled mannar. 'Ibey delayed the startup to get FRG l approval to reset the alarm point for the 1 A1 RCP seal so that the alarm would stop caame=81y coming in and i j out and disturbing the operatore during the startup. An SRO, who was designated as the reactivity manager, l j i and a reactor engineer augmented the normal control room staff and each applied their full met-tian to the ,
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| , ! startup. A 1/M curve was picaed by the reactor engineer, and it worked well in providing a periodic q4 =========* of the status of the startup with respect to the ECP. M reactor was brought critical at 5:15 a.m. at l 65 inches on group 7, which was very close to the ECP of 60 inches on group 7.
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| i i
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| 3.h. Post-Trip Review Meeting 01707) On March 29, the inspector =**= dad a post-trip toview meeting covering the Pobruary 21 automatic trip of Unit 2 due to the failure of a steam generator level transmitter, b
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| .q -
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| , meeting was =**= dad by the President of the ticaaaaa's Nuclear Division, the Site Vice-Prendant, the Plant General Manager, a number of other ksy managere la the licensee's organization, and appronimately 50 ;
| |
| personnel frons the areas of training, operations, maintaaaaca and =f- -i g. 'Ibe meeting's purpose was to 1
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| ; thoroughly review the trip with the goal ofidentifying areas of improvement to prevent ihture occurrences.
| |
| The meeting included the showing of a video recreating the event in the bcensee's siandmaar, displaying alarms
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| ; and plant :==pa==. b meeting then took the form of an open diacim in which all parties offered ideas for
| |
| ; improvesesnt. b meeting resulted in the identification of a munbar of potential =h-e====a= in the areas of
| |
| ===el=an e, ahift staffing, control board c- __, =1--a=#- and unit d=dantization. 'Ibe inspector
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| ~
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| concluded that the meeting was an innovative approach to probleen solving.
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| -l 7y 3.1. Effectiveness of IJcansee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Paventing Problems (405U0)
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| , Facility Review Group Meetings b inspector =evaadad the FRG meeting ca ulne*ad on March 15. 'this
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| . meeting covered several IERs and an LOI involving the resin intrusion into the RWT and spent fuel pool amas.
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| l A quorum was present and estanaive questioning occurred on one IIR. N LER did not appear to be of final .
| |
| submittal quality and several technical and administrative changes were made by the FRG. l 3.J. Followup of Operations IIRs (92700)
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| : 1) (Closed) IIR 50-335/9349-00 and 93 0941: Engineered Safety Features Actuation due to Spurious a 4 Subgroup Ae*umalaa Module Trip.......
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| a j 2) (Closed) LER 50389/9347 and 93-0741: Manual Reactor Trip AAer the Simultaneous Dropping of Control Flamaat Assemblies due to Equipment Failure......
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| : 3) (Closed) IER 50-335/94-03: Automatic Reactor Trip can=ad by Manipulation of the Main Generator Breaker Exciter Field Breaker due to Cognitive Per=anaal Error.......
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| l 4) (Closed) LER 50-389/9441: Pressurimer Auxihary Spray Out of Service canaad by a Mispositioned
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| . Isolation Valve Due to Per=anaal Error.......
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| , 5) (Closed) LER 50-389/9443: Automatic Reactor Trip During Functional Testing of the Reactor Protective System Due to Bypass Miswiring During Original Construction.......
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| , Page 6 of 13
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| c EXCERPTS IR 9547 i
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| .;, 4. brainaa==aa and Surveillance 1 l
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| i i
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| ; 4.a. Maintenance Obaarvations (62703) Station ==iasaamana activities involving selected safety-related systemas !
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| and compa===sa were observed / reviewed...... Portions of the following = alan ==n activities were observed:
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| l
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| : 1) HVE-9B ECCS Ventilation Outlet Damper Ie7B On March 29, HVE-9B ECCS ares exhaust air Alter train B was returned to service following maine ===a work on Ie7B discharge damper. Inadequate coanguration ,
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| control of the v=eil=*ia= system electrical damper circuit during ==lan===ca resulted in Operahams returning ;
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| j- the system to service with a temporary switch still installed....... j l; )
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| i ne inspeetor inveedgated the causal factors that contributed to the BCCS v==t:1=*ia= fan electrical circadt not l being waarolled. He laspector determined through di=ci== ions with electrical and ==eh=le=I =aiaaan=ra I i .- '' operadoes permannel and licensee ====g===a that aba loss of con 5guration control resuhed from
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| .. breakdowns in several different areas. he electrical == tan ==e= PWO scope used to support the ==ch==le=1 ,
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| a=las==aa during damper ;.1- - ' ="I=- was not revised as required by AP 0010432, Rev 78, ' Nuclear
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| .t Plant Work Orders,' when abs temporary switch was lastalled in tbs circuit. Electrical pereommel did not use ;
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| - abejumper/ lined lead process to dae====* tbs tesaporary switch in the ciscuit as required by procedure l
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| } ' 0010124, Rev 34, ' Control and Ues of Jusspers and Di-aaread Imads." He release of the electrical j' clearamos by the madaalcal ==3d- , A 4 without verincados that the electrical PWO was = - f^ '
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| 1 comenbuted to the breakdown la -:- 1 ' controls, f la==== management not clearly '' ";
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| l* awpae*=*ia= and responsibilities of supesvisors ce peaks and midnight shiAs contributed to the event. Pbor t --le=*ia= between electrical and ==ehaaie=1 ==i=8a===aa organi=tiaan and Operations led to confunica i on the status of both the ==chaale=1 and electrical NPWOs status. %s ANPS did not '' , '- ^'y verify the
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| : j. ca=Taamme status versus system status other aban the clearances being rolessed by ==ian==ca supervisors.
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| j; ~
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| Dis led abe ANPS to believe the systems was ready to be returned to service. j
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| ;{~
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| j g De licenses laidated STAR 950361 to dae===* the issue and to develop corrective actions. Ia4touse Event i '
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| Sumasary 95416 was prepared with a narrative ' -( = of the event and a deter-i==*ia= of the cause and
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| ;_ corrective actions. Conective acticas included......
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| N lia===a's failure to =ainemia configuration control of the electncal circuit on the safety related HVE-9B
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| ; ECCS aren v==tilmaian Train B systeen supresents a violation of 10 CPR 50 Appendix B, Criterica HI, Design i Control. This violation will not be cited because the liosasse's affests in identifying and corroeting the
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| : violation asset the criteria specined la Seeden VH.B of the NRC enforesment policy. The monwited i violaties wul be identined as NCY 56 335/95-4742, "Fallure to 3 sal =*=I= Configuration Control of Unit 1 i.
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| A ECCS Area V=ellettaa Electrical Circuit." ;
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| '') NPWO 62/2728 Charmina Pump 2B Suction / Discharge Accumulator Preventive Maintenance De inspector ;
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| j i observed the i = of Unit 2 charging pump 28 suctica and discharge scen=>laear PM on March 23. j j Work was i donned per =achmaical ==lataamana procedure 2-M 0018, Rev 42, 'Oiarging Pump Accumulatore !
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| ; 2A,28, & 2C P sesure Check / Recharge."......%e auction anei=nlanar stabilizer as-found pressure was
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| ;- measured at an aboonnally low value of approximately 4 peig. Proceduse guidanem accar*=ca criteria was 25
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| ' - to 29 peig. AAer acting the as-found condition, -la8==aaa aa=*i==d with the procedure and charged the aar===l=*ae to witbla the maa=r e aaaa criteria. De discharge maca-d=aar measured low at 1560 peig. M ,
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| 4 maa=pe==aa criteria was 1625 to 1675 psig. De technicians properly charged both 2B charging pune j
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| aae===la*=s per i = * --- 2-M 0018.
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| , he inspector discussed the as-found condition of the suction accu =>lasar with the maine ===aa chief and system '
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| i aa=ra===8 engineer. He suction accu-danar bladder had been replaced on February 28,1995. De inspector i
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| f~ Page 7 of 13 t
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| e I.
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| - - ~ .
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| ~ EXCERPTS IR 9547 v =, : ' a concern that the as.found pressee may indicate a fault la the bladder. h na=pa==* engineer
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| ==paesad that the metal plug in the bottom of the bladder may have started to leak or that the valve steen may.
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| not be seated properly. However, no i===&=*= actions were taken by ====s===aa penommet to detenmine if a
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| - leek existed on March 28. 'Ihe system aa-pa==at engineer did listen to the operation of the -ald-stabdiant the next day for problems. Based ca discussions with the beenese, the aa=Ta===* engineer plassed to continue to monitor the 2B -: --- ' ^ + bladder pressure for evaluation of accumulator stabilimer perfor== ace.
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| Also, corrective action by the system e -- ^ engineer, as pad of STAR 950369, m=aadad that a revision to the PM procedure be made, ==hmacing the maintenance instructions to allow ==ch=1e= to test the bladder when a potential leak is suspected during the PM (e.g, as-found condition of 4 pounds). No provision to test for suspceted ane==dd= leaks existed in the procedwe.
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| 'Ibe inspector considered the ==iae- procedural guidance to be weak in delineating direction to the
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| -h le= in the event that potential problems are identified during the PM. "Ihe lack of a questioning attitude
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| ' by ==I=ama=<w: y woonnel allowed the facts relating to the se-found conditica to resnain within the maintenance
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| ' ; -- " untiv ae inspector q===tianad the liaanmaa as to troublaahandag or diagnosis.
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| 's ' well with t
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| 'Ibe overall, ' - of the PM was aa=Anca-d in accordance with the = " -.and the exception of the lack of ==latansaca actions for the as-found condition. 'Ibe PWO was completed and the post ==lat===a= test was conducted =*i=f=esarily. M inspector did not identify any other concerns during the
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| -ian==a= observations or review of the west package.
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| : 3) NPWO 6114425 D- '-- of M= 2 = 6 1B Aca i* 88 Ma* b inspector observed
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| ==ian===aa work on the Unit 1 charsmg pump 1B suction mee===1= ear on March 29. Work was performed per vandor ach= e leal manual procedure 5770-9596, Rev A, "10 Gallon es=lala== Steel 150 PSIG Suction e*= hill =n diarging Pump A+
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| ^- . 2A,2B, & 2C Pressure Check / Recharge."
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| j V
| |
| C h h inspec%r reviewed the ==iana==a= work package, the associated clearance, and the vendor technical manual. During . ;' - - - ' of the IB suction =*=lati=n bladder, lan==ca personnel -=*= ed problemas in removing the cap on the top of the nocu=dasar. 'Ibe procedme had the =ach=ica release nitrogen pressure from the bladder, remove the valve core, and then unscrew the acemmutator cap. However, the nachale=
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| failed to remove the valve core, which lea pressure in the bladder and resulted in the cap being difficult to remove. Once the technician malized the error, he removed the valve core and completed the i -; = ---- '
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| . without complication. 'the licensee initiated STAR 950362 to review the mainta==aa work practices and
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| ; individual-h=ic compliance to procedures during perfor==aca of the charging pump PWO.
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| 'Ibe inspector's ===a===aat of the failure to remove the =ren- i-*r valve core was that it did not resuh in a safety significant probless or a personnel safety issue. b failuie to remove the valve core only resulted in
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| , difficulty la the resnovel of the accu-d=sar cap. b mining portions of the accu ==tanar stabdiaer bladder
| |
| . ;'- - ^ were -:=-'- ' =tisf=ctority. HP controls established for, and ==inaminad f=ron,,'. as, the performance of the maina ===aca activity wwe considered good. N inspector did not identify any other concerns during the ==ineaanaca observations or review of the work package.
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| : 4) NPWO 65/0712 ". r'!ve W = of 1A.1B. IC. and ID 125 Volt DC "- " ".= b inspector reviewed work packages for the weekly battery inspection of 125V DC battenes IA,1B,1C and 1D. Work was performed per -kanical ==intaamaar procedure 0960163, Rev 13, "125 V DC System Weekly Maineaa ." h completion of the maine ===<= inspection satisfied reqmsesnants of TS 4.8.2.3.2.a and Table 4.5-2.
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| l-i .
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| 'Ihe inspector reviewed the documentation to verify that the weekly inspection war performed in w./ a with written i,.4= and that battery latogrity had been maintained. Data recorded for the inspection
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| ;- Page 8 of 13 4
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| a
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| , EXCERPTS IR 9547
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| '. d included specine sravity, electrolyte temperature, electrolyte level, and wuery tenniaal voltage. Visual checks were 'w--- ' by electnciens to ensure the baneries were free of corrosion ca inner cells.
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| N l==pacia 's review concluded that the battery inspection was completed satisfactorily and the recorded data w=e withiniC . limits. h inspector vwified that MddE wwe within their calibration pwiods. N inspector ocasidered the bettery inspectica procedure to have appropriate procedural guidance la perform the !
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| l==paesi- 'Ibe inspector did not identify any items of concern during the review.
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| : 5) PWO 69/4185 - Build Shed for Valve Test Insach h inspector reviewed this PWO and observed some of the work in progress for building a shed, attached to the F-4 wanhouse, for a valve testing bench. N bench I '
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| was intended for testing secondary sysassa setief valves, both safety and non-emisty related h shed' construction work was non-eafety reisted and the lle===='s nuclear QA program did not apply. " Ibis facility ,
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| will enhance the licensee's ==ih work area.
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| 4.b. Surveillance Obaarvations (61726) Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS j requirements......h following survaill==ca tests were observed-
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| : 1) OP 2 0700050. Rev 37. ' Auxiliary Feadwater Periodac Test' N iraspector observed AFW pump testing, :
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| aaadme*=d March 21 on Unit 2. The testing was fw:- ' to satisfy the requirements within AP 0010132, Rev j 18, *ASME Code Testing of Pumps and Valves.' N onde testing requins the running of the APW pump for
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| , a mi=3=== of 5 =iansa, aAer which pump ,, '- - -- is to be compared against the pump baseline data. N tests observed were fw_- ' on Unit 2 APW motor <lriven pumps 2A and 28.
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| i
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| * t h inspector reviewed the test pr-- 'x and discussed the scope of testing with the operators. 'Ibe inspector
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| ^ reviewed the puimp , f.,. - = test resuhs and confirmed that the acquired , f, = data (penp suctica,
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| {
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| j j-disaharge, and diffenanal pressums) anst the aaa r*==aa criteria.
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| 3
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| : 2) OP 2-2200050B. Rev 16. "2B Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General Operatma Instructions' 'Ibo inspector observed the perfonnance of 2B EDG surveillance test i fw- ' on March 22.
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| j 'Ibe EDO test was i, f n ' following the N'-- ^'--- of modification PC/M 138-294M and prior to
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| [ returning the EDG to service.
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| !! N inspector observed the preparations being mande for the EDO run. 'the SNPO , ' __ ' the paroquisite j checks and reconhag of data as prescribed by the i.i--- ' _ N SNPO started the EDO la accordance with
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| ; step 22 which consisted of a local stant and warmup prior to loadas. N EDO was verified to idle at 375 -
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| l 475 RPM prior to relemaing the idle. b EDO reached appronunately 900 RPM, nominal voltage and j frequency. N EDG was then synche-imd to the offsite power systern and set to carry real and reactive loads i, la accordance with the limits psovided in the procedure (3450 to 3685 kW while ==insaining 0.5 to 1 MVAR
| |
| ! lagying). M inspector ladap-daatly verified that the EDO was operating while supplying a load of
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| !* approximately 3650 kW and 1000 kVAR.
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| l l 'Ibe EDG was loaded for at least one hour and the inspector reviewed the recorded data and verified that l =====ed parametere met the expected limits. Para ==nare include jacket watee -- , _ , lube oil
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| '-;- _z.- , and cylinder ==1==* 4
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| . b EDO was subsequently unloaded and shutdown in
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| ; accordance with the EDG procedure instructions. No deficiencies were identified with the = of the test.
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| j 1he inspector also reviewed the operator logs and performed a control room board review to detennine the i status of the redundant 2A EDO and other train A equipment. b inspector verified the availability of 2A ;
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| i HPSI pump and flowpeth,2A LPSI pump and flowpath,2A EDO, and 2A CS pump and flowpath. Review of a
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| O f Page 9 of 13 l
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| i m, _ , . - _ . .
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| -.-.- ~.. -- . - .. . . . - . - . _. . - _ ~ . -- .- - . - . - - - . ..-
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| l
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| -~ EXCERPTS IR 9547
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| (./ the operator log identified that aAer taidag the EDO out of service at 0554 hrs, NVE10A, MVS4A, sad HVS3A were brieAy teksa out of service. N inspector verified that tbne + ; - __
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| were not included in Appendix B of OP 2-22000505. Appen&x B identifies the equipment that nest be la service prior to resmoving the 2B EDG fraes service.
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| : 3) OP 24400053. Rev 19. " Engineered Sdeauards Relsv Test' %e purpose of this test was to verify proper
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| !=F--t of Unit 2 ESP relays as required by Tachaical Specification Servaill=aca 8 7'- - " 4.3.2.1. His surveillance requirement sequires the i f - = of ESFAS functional tests as specified la Table 4.3-2. In accordance with the TS requir====es, this test was being , f, _ ' to most the semi-ensual frequency (at least once per 134 days) for ESPAS fh=c*ia==I tests.
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| On March 23, the licenses performed the ESPAS Ametional test which required the awa== tic actuation of HPSI, IESI, and CS pumps. N inspector +--- , - ' ' tbs SNPO during the restoration of equipment hasups
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| - following the testing of train A pumps, and during the lineup and restoratica of train B pumps.
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| With respect to train A ESPAS testing, the inspector observed the restoration of valve lineups including abs opealag of abe CS pump 2A discharge valve and providing locidag devices. Dess actions were f ' la accordance with the instmetices la Data Sheet 3A of OP 24400053. De inspector also e-- , - ' ' the SNPO during the valve aligmnant prior to the starting of tbs train B ESPAS =cen=*iaa (Data Sheet 3B of OP 2-r 0400053). his included closing abe normally locked opsa CS pump 25 discharge valve. Following abs starting of the HPSI, IESI, and CS 2B pumps, operating data was takse at the control rooms followed by the securmg of the pmaps.
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| . %s inspector verified that the SNPO properly re1digned the af5setad valves to the correct positions, including j x the opening of CS pump 28 discharge valve and instaliania= of a locidag device. N inspector oboarved that j g ;, the valve liasup restosution was __ ," '' in acconlamos with the peonedues requiremssets followed by as
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| '- independsat verification by a Watch Engineer.
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| ; 4.c. Followup of Maintenance 12Rs (92700)
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| !)t (Closed) IRR 50-389/9444: Plant Vset Wide Range Monitor Out of Servia due to Perecenal Error....
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| i 4.d. Followup as Pmvious Maintenance Findinas (92902) i Discrenant Material Found in Rosemount Transmitters IR 94-24 doen===a=1 the nearly min =ltaneous failures i . of two Unit 1 Rosemount pressure transmitters which resulted la the initiation of a SIAS while the unit was la
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| !- Mode 5. IR 94-25 documented the ====iaatiaa of the sensing elements on site and the discovery of distanded ;
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| j t=l=*iaa despbragas, which ladicated potential gas intrusion into the transmitters' sensing cells. During abe la=p=celaa period, one of the transmitters' asasing element was sampled at Southwest Rassen:h Instituem in an i attempt to determine the nature of the apparent gas. De conclusion was that the gas was pure diatomic
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| . hydrogen.
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| A sample of abs transmitter's All oil indie=*=I that the hyd dges was not the result of oil breakdown or water la l
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| : l. formed on the isolator material, which was found to be Mosel, an '
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| the oil. A metallurgical analysis was
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| ;I alloy uusceptible to hydrogen permention. The transmitters in question were to have been fabncated with
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| ='=i=1=== steel isolatore. As a result of these findings, it was detennised, by Da==a==e, that at least 450 transmitters were similarly conAgwed. De subjet was addressed la IN 95-20.
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| j As a result of the 10 CPR 21 report tran==itted by Rosemount, the licensee determined that a number of transmitters with Monel 400 isolatore were employed at St. Imcie in safety-related applications. Unit 1 i'. Page 10 of 13 -
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| f'
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| ~ . - . 3_
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| -. ~ .- _ -- - - - . - - . .. . - . . - - _ - -
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| l p EXCERPTS IR 95-07
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| ,;"- ^'= included: (1) 1 Presswiser Passwo Safety Chanaal ("PS/ ESP input)
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| (2) 1 Pressuriser Presswe Control nanaal (3) 2 L10P Manaala & (4) 7 of 8 Steam Generator Pressee Safety '%aaala (RPS/ ESP input).
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| , Unit 2 applienstana included one LTOP cAmanal, b IIcaa- evaluated the existing g;"- ' and developed a replacement strategy based upon the existence of spare transmitter as==ing cells.1he licensee's plan called for the replaca==# of LTDP chanaals first, as a failure of these traammitters in cold shutdown conditions would lead to a PORV liR.
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| ll 1he licenses perfonned an operability a--aaat of the discrepeat transmitters in service in both units and elad that they were all operable. N =a-aaae, as well as the actions taken relative to the issue, was
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| , perfonned under STAR 954310. N inspector reviewed the assessment and found it to renset the current
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| ; industry t of the issue.
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| ! The inspector ==4= dad that the liesia- has beam proactive in addresslag this issue, which required rapid
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| ; generic ==ld-atles. The liesasee's actions renected well on their comunitament to root cause dataMaa*laa and has resulted la a est safety benant to the laa=try as a whole.......
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| : 5. E-f - ' .g Support (37551) 5.a. Onsite Engineanns lhe inspectors and the ihrkey Point resident staff =**= dad a meeting with the licaa 's Onsite and Corporate Engineering organiratian at the Thrkey Point Plant on March 14. At this meeting the licanese provided the resident staffs with an update on their plan and project status ser the following iteam: (1) Thennolag, (2) Reactor vessel neutros anbrieelamaar, (3) NRC Generic Imater 89-10, (4) q unian- Rule, (5) Current site ensinaaring issues, (6) lurkey Point soif namaammaat, (7) Design basis j* "
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| dac===*=, (s) Operator workarounds, (9) Thekey Point lastruammt air upgrade, (10) Abandoned equipseset, (11)1hrkey Point EDO sequencer issue, (12) FPL futwo power needs and pians, (13) Plant life satension, (14)1hrkey Point thennal uprate, (15) 24 month fuel cycles, & (16) Spent fuel storage A short pe=aaatatian was provided on each of the above items and resident questions were answered by the fica-='s staff. b meeting provided a benencial update on Iran =a issues and plans to the resident staff and
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| ) allowed direct laterface with plant and corporate engmeeting peraaanal from both sites.
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| 5 b. PC/M 138-294M. Madifienstaa of ici N Ratavs (37551) This PC/M pertained to a modificataca to the loss of-fleid relay ==ariasad with Unit I and Unit 2 EDGs, b modification revised the loss +f-field design within the relay to facilitate an EDG trip upon a loss of excitatice when the EDG is synchronized to the offsite j Power system.
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| N inspector reviewed the engmeering package documa=#atian and observed that the modification had been classi6ed as a minor design change b modification package included a 10 CPR 50.59 acreening evaluation to determine if a safety evaluation was required prior to impl-aatiar the modification. Based on the screemng process, the modification was determinad to be minor and a detailed safety evaluation was determined not required. N inspector performed a dotaded evaluation of the modification for Unit 2. & design change was reviewed and evaluated with respect to eachaical adequacy, compliance with PSAR commitments, and adequacy of 10 CPR 50.59 screening evaluatices .....
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| N inspector observed the i=f- ^ 's of the modification manace=8ad with 2B EDG perfonned on March 22 via work order 95 0002, ' Modify 2A and 28 EDG KIE Relays.'....1he modification canaiaead ofjumpering the UV trip unit within the relay. h inspector reviewed the in-progress NPWO " --- % and verified
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| . that it renected the status of the ongoing work. The inspector observed the post-modification terting on the Page 11 of 13 rf&t b nu%n * : ws , w y
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| . -- . -- . . .-~.- . .- .-- . .-- --- - __-- .-_ __. . _
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| A l
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| i I' EXCERPTS IR 9547 e
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| : i. ' M
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| ! Y/ reby which e== alan =d of functional testing in accordance with procedure FPL pra*-ti= and Control Quality test i lastruction Qf!1-PS/ PSI-2.09, Undervoltage Unit Test. Post-modification testang of the relay was daa====*ad
| |
| -5 in a loss-of-fleid relay test report. h recorded test results were reviewed by the inspector and conAnned that j the relay test =~=pe- criteria was met. Test instrunnants were obearved to be calibrated. No deft,sa-es=
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| ,j were observed with respect to the engineertug design pedage, * .'
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| ^'
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| -- of the esomtention
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| !' package, and fi=cela==3 testing of the relay. Following the causplation of the relay f==cela=al testing, a j surveillance test was performed on the EDG. The usodfication package and im;'- ^ ^*n of sanne were
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| ; detenmined to be = , "-
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| )
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| 11, 6. Plant Support (71750)
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| ~
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| j 6.a. Fire Protaction During the course of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely er==inad facets of the Fire Pran~*iaa Program......No denciencies were identified.
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| l At 9:30 p.a2. on March 6, a fire was reported stop the Unit 1 pressurizer. h fire was limited to a 2' x 6'
| |
| ; board which was being employed as a walkway by personnel monitoring pressuriser code safety valve l
| |
| , ; -- = Pareceaal at the scene reported seeing saan11 flames and smoke ===aating from a board which 3
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| rested. at one end, on a platform and, on the other end, on the upper head of the pressuriser. 'Ibe board was
| |
| ! removed from its locatica, passed down to parecenal in the pressurimer cubicle, and sprayed with a fino
| |
| -- ' " ' 'the board la questica had been tiented with flame retardsat paint, per the licensee's fire l protection program. 'Ibe licensee found that the cause for the fire was the placa==nt of the board in a position
| |
| : j. which gradually resulted in the compression of the in-nati- on the pressurimer head which allowed the board to j come in contact with the metal. 'Ibe high - ,2m of the pressuriser ultin=aaly resulted in ignition and 1
| |
| charring.
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| "j ......'Ibo inspector reviewed STAR 950247, which had basa prepared to h sad evalunas minor damage i to two lasulation penals as a result of the event. M engineering evaluation perfonned in response to the STAR j onesidered abs decrease la insulating capability of approri==*aly two square feet of insulation which had been ,
| |
| ; crushed due to board pl-t 'Ihe evaluation concluded that the original design ===r ia== e regardag i pressuriser 3==l=*% weee valid, even if the t==tating value of the dananged area was assumed to be zero.
| |
| l Acceptabdity of the damaged area frosa saianuc and conamin===* r---; " 4=== points of view were also considered. As a conservative action, the addition of redi= dant lacing wire was directed in the damaged area.
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| The laspector concluded that the issue was appropriately addressed and evaluated.
| |
| !, 6.b. Physical Pmtection During this inspection, the inspector toured the protected area and noted that the
| |
| !l peria=ame fence was intact and not compromi=d by erosion or disrepair. h fence fabric was secured and j barbed wire was angled as required by the licensee's Physical Security Plan. Isolation zones were maintained
| |
| ; - on both sides of the barrier and were free of objects which could ahiald or conceal an individual.
| |
| ,j ..... personnel and packages entering the prn8-aad ana were anarched either by special purpose danar*are or by a physical patdown for firearms, explosives, and contrahand. 'Ihe processing and escorting of visitors was
| |
| 'i observed. Vehicles were searched, socorted, and secured as described in the PSP. Ilghting of the perimeter
| |
| '. and of the protected area met the 0.2 foot candle criteria.
| |
| 6.c. Radiolonical Protection Program Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with .;.g ' * =y i requirements....No violations or deviations were identified.
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| : 7. Exit Interview i-I /
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| \/ Page 12 of 13 i
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| - - - _ . . . -.. .. . - -.=
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| EXCERPTS IR 9547 I
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| 'C/ 'Ihe inspection ey and Andings were au-aarimod on Mach 31,1995, with those persons indicated in peregraph I above.....
| |
| (closed) NCV 50-335/954741, " Failure to Follow %* lawn Cooling Operating Proceduree,' 13.f (closed) NCV 50 335/95-0742, ' Failure to Maintain Configuration Control of Unit 1 ECCS Ares Ventilation Electrical Circuit," 14.a.1).
| |
| t (closed) IER 50-335/93-009, ' Engineered Safety Features 9340941 Actuation due to Spurious Subgroup
| |
| ]' Actuation Module Trip," 13.J.1).
| |
| i (closed) IER 50-389/93407, ' Manual Reactor Trip AAer the 93-00741 Simultaneous Dropping of Control Elar==t haa =Mia= due to Equipment Failure," 13.J.2).
| |
| (closed) LER 50-335/94-003, ' Automatic Reactor Trip Caused by Manipulation of the Main Generator Breaker Exciter Field Breaker due to Cognitive Personnel Error," 13.J.3).
| |
| I i (closed) IER 50-389/94-001, 'Pressuriser Auxiliary Spray Out of Service Caused by a Mispositioned Isolation Valve Due to Personnel Error," 13.J.4).
| |
| (closed) LER 50-389/94-003, ' Automatic Reactor Trip During FiAa1 Testing of the Reactor Protective Syssen: Due to Bypees Miswiring Dunng Original ran=ametion," 13.J.5).
| |
| (closed) IER 50-389/94 004, ' Plant Vent Wide Range Monitor Out of Service due to Personnel Error," T ;
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| 4.c.1). I
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| Page 13 or 33
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| EXCERPTS IR 9549
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| May 19,1995 Plorida Power and Ugid Company i ATIN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg I
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| Preeldent - Lclear Division P. O. Box 14000 3 Juno Beach, FL 33408 4 420 i j rs= t = .
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| ==SUBJECT:==
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| NRC INSPECI1ON REPORT NOS. 50-335/9549 AND 50-389/9549 i= 'Iliis refers to the inspection mantacted by R. L Pavatte of this office on April 2 through April 29,1995. De 7
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| ',- '= laciudad a review of activities authoriand for your St. Imele facility. At the conclusion of the j ' , - ^ *=. the Andings were discussed with those ===== hare of your staff identified in the = eta ==,1 report.
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| Areas exandrad during the inspection are idendfied in the report. Within these areas, the la par *ia= ===id
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| ; ''ve records, laterviews with personnel, and observation -
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| of selective examinations of procedures and .m of activities in progress. He purpose of the l==pacei= was to determine whether activides authoriand by the license were aandae*=d safely and in accordance with NRC requirements De ancta=ad lampae'i= Report identifies activities that violated NRC . 7 u that willnot be subject to i enforc====1 action h=e==a the licensee's efforts in identifying and/or correcting the violation meet the criteria
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| specified in *=celaa VII.B of the Enforcenset Policy.......
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| :i @' Sincerely, Orig signed by Kerry D. Imadis Kerry D. Imadia, Acting Chief i Baaetae Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
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| ! Docket Nos. 50 335, 50-389
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| ' I Acaa= Nos. DPR-67, NPP 16
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| ==Enclosure:==
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| NRC Inspection Report 4 Report Nos.: 50-335/95-09 and 50-389/95-09 I I-: Florida Power & Ught Co 9250 West Plagler Street Miami, FL 33102 4
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| Docket Nos.: 50 335 and 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPP-16 ;
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| - Pacility Name: St. Imcie I and 2 Ia=pae*ian Conducted: April 2 tiucush April 29 Inspectors: _R. Schin _5/19/95 l Page 1 of 8 r
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| 2 p ExCsRrrS IR 9549 d R. L. P=ste, Senior na sama.
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| Inspector Dee Signed ,
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| M. S. Miller, Resident Inspector l I
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| 1 Approved by: _K. D. Imlis _5/19/95 K. D. I-lia, Chief Date Signed ;
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| , Reactor Projects Section 2B
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| }, Division of Reactor Projects i
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| , Scope:
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| i nis routine resident in parei- wm -A-e-i on site in the are of plant opmations misw. -:- )
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| ohnervations, savallance observations, plant support, followup of previous inspection Andass, and other amas.
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| Ta= par *ian were performed during nonnel and haelrah A hours and on weekends and holidays.
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| ' Results:
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| 1 i Plant Omarations: Operators were well-prepared for, and maneuvered the plant without incident during, the
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| ; down power and reasoval of the gansrator frona the line to perform repairs on a digital electro-hydraulic system j m power supply. De darlaiaa to perflorm this activity off-line desmonstrated ====g====''s consesvative approach
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| :[ % to ease operation. u -*---
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| wm a.a.na.,
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| and ausse. -g = => plannias, :* *"; and support of this short outage
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| . Maintenance and Smveillance: Mainiansaca perfonnance during the short outage was annallaat. De planned
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| ! critical work activities were E+ ;"* ' ahead of achadata and pennitted an orderly return to power. No
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| ; deficiancian were identified during the observation of inminemanca activities. A late surveillance due to a scheduling oversight resulted in a non<ited violation. His was the first regularly scheduled survaill==cm not i,
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| / '' on schedule since 1991.
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| 6 Enmineerina: Engineering support for the short notice outage was nati= factory.
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| Plant Support: %e plant cantinued to perfonn well in the Fhe Protection, Radiological Controls, and Physical l Security areas.
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| i Within the areas inspected, the following non<ited violation was identified associated with events reported by the licanaaa:
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| l NCY 389/954941, ' Missed Surveillance of Unit 2 Personnel Air lack",14.b.
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| : 2. Plant Status and Activities
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| : 2.a. llaill operated at essentially 100 percent power for the reporting penod.
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| 4 j 2.b. Ilnill main senerasae wm taken offline on A rilP25 to repair a faulty power supply in the DEH system.
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| ' e EXCERFIS IR 9549 l v Dis and other seiscellaneous vaalasanance activities were performed and the unit returned to power on the same
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| ! day. Otbarwise the unit operated at manaatially 100 percent power for the reportag period.
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| ! 2.c. NRC Activity McKenzie nomas, Machmaical Engineer, NRC Region II; George T. MacDonald,
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| ; Electrical Ensineer, NRC Region H: and Roy K. Mathew, Electrical Engineer, NRR, wmo on site during the
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| !- weeks of Mash 20, April 10, and April 24 conducting an inspection in the Engineering and Technical Support i areas. De Resident Inspector also assisted in this inspection. De inspection results are docu-tad in IR 1 335,389/95 05.~
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| j 3. Plant Operations I
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| 3.a. Plant Tours 01707) De inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring 1,' eqail "aaa' was recordag as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel wess aware of plant conditions, and plant h-+ arias efforts was adequate......h followins acce==ble-mes ESP systen and j'* area walkdowns were made to verify that system lineups wese la accordance with heensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were antisfactory: (1) Unit 1 and 2 Control Rooni Vaati1=tian and i
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| j Air Canditioning Systeen, (2) Unit 1 and 2 Shield Buildmg Va=#ilmeiaa Syssesn, & (3) Unit 1 and 2
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| ; r%aemianiane tantaeina Systeen
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| . 4 The following list of defs,a,a,a== (13) wme provided to the liconese for eerrective action.....
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| l %e above systems were verified to be aligned correctly for normal plant operation. Identification of controls
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| ; . was verified using the respective Operating, Off-Normal and E g - y Operating Procedures. Two amas I that need aMieta==' licanese =**=*ta= were identifled: 1) Procedues -l=*== was met ahrays j esamistent with control board ===*pla8a labels (esameples above). 2) Operator aids (color coded j j "deughnuts" around smala control board ins 5cating lights), used to identify systema nsponse followig jj ESFAS, were met lastened as per procedure. Alabogh thus is no legal equirement that theos be utiliand,
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| ! one operator when ; ~ runarked that in addition to the BOPS, he routinely uses this tahtiar %e
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| : largest an= har of these problems were identified on Unit 2 (a==>ap1== above).
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| 3.b. Plant Operations Review U1707) %e inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records,
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| { including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions......No significant defieleaciaa j were identified. Minor defletamelam, whema indicated, west corrected la a timely unnamer.
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| . 3.c. Plant Housaksenian 01707) Storage of material and components, and clanaliaana conditions of various i areas throughout the facility were observed.....It was noted that the licensee was r L., - ' . estensive cleanup, palating, and ==*alising of cesvoded compaa*=*= and supports la the Units 1 and 2 CCW anos.
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| !i This action is la response to deficienries identified by NRC inspectors in the past several =a=*h=
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| t No viana*taan or deviations were identified.
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| 3.d. Clearances 01707) Durms this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following tagouts
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| ! (clearances): (1) 2-95 03-123 on Unit 2A ICW pump motor which has been removed for repair. All tags were i verified to be la place and all switches / breakers and fuses were found to be in the correct position.
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| ; (2) 19544469 on Unit I hold up drain pump 1A. His clearance was placed to permit g'- ^ of the f , peup seals. De inspector observed awchanical vaniaaananea work in progress and verified that all tags were in place and valves and breakers were in the correct position. (3) 1-95 04493 on auxiliary feedwater MOV 09-
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| ; 13. All tags were in place and the +w -- were in the correct position.
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| 3.e. Technical Specification Comphance 01707) Licensee compliance with selected TS If0s was verified.
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| His included the review of selected marveillance test results.....No deficiencies were identified.
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| i-1 EXCERFTS IR 9549 s
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| 3.f. Followirp of Onerations IERs (92700)
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| (Closed) LER 335/9448, Rev 1, Inadvertent t'a=* alan ==8 Isolation Signal Caused by Failure of the B
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| ; Instrument Inverter Concurrent with chaa=al D CIS in Tripped Condition........
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| i l j . 3.g. Followup on Previous Operations inspection Findmss (92901) 1 1) (Closed) VIO 335/94-2241 ' Inadequate Corrective Action to NRC Violation Regarding Emergency Dweel l Generator Operability *.......
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| ;l 2) (Closed) VIO 335/94-2242 ' Improper Modification of Control Room Logs."......
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| : 4. Maian-- and Surveillance 4.a. Maintenance Obaarvations (62703) Station ==iatan= arm activities involving selectsd safety-related systems ej and v a were nobserved and reviewed to ascertain that they were aand-ead in accordance with
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| *! .,' ..... Portions of the following ==iaeaa-as activities were observed: ;
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| $ 1) NPWO 66/0909 Periodic Maintenance of MV 21-2 De inspector witnessed portions of the periodic
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| ==las performed on valve MV 21-2, the 2B ICW to 'IUW/ blowdown taal=*== valve. Activities were
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| !l . performed la accordance with the subject NPWO and ==iataamana i,.+-- % 'Proventive mi=*aa- of Non-Enviscamentally Qualified IJanitorque Motor Operated Valve Actuatore* MP 0940069 Rev 12. De inspector
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| ; verified that the PM was performed within its ==la*===aa laterval. Activities included snapling grease, limit i switch inspection, and inspection and verification of wiring The work was performed in accordance with the
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| !; m subj.ct procedme.
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| {' 2) Unit 2 was takaa offline on midshiA April 25 to replace a 11mitad 48VDC DEH Ptmer Supph per PWO l .
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| M403. h unit remained at 7 peroset reactor power feeding both SGe via the 15 percent bypasses using the
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| ! 'A' Main Feedwater Pump. De feedwater block valves were shut to alsminmaa leakage past the PRV allowing l for better control of SO water level while at low power. De steam dump and bypass system was in service with one bypass valve open.
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| b failed power supply was removed and field inspected. A connector which supplies power to the module
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| ,; was found looes. b lie ===a later bench tested the failed power supply and found a failed resistor which j reduced the overvoltage protection device seapoint from 53 VDC to 44 VDC. His was below the required
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| output voltage of 48.7 VDC. His hardware fault precluded mergizing the power supply. De replaca==a' power supply module was installed, energiand, and adjusted to approximately 48.7 VDC. Pg --- " of the
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| ; failed power supply was accomplished without comphcation b work direction and engineering support provided by the Supervisory I&C Engineer was excellent.
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| 4 While the ,;-- w we off line, the RO controlling feedwater observed a slow increasing trend in anaam flow
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| > on the feed flow / steam flow recorder. Another operator rampaadad to the turbine control system and switched
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| } frons antamatic to manual control aAer observing the intercept valves cycling and turbine speed slowly increasing from 1800 rpm to 1819 rpm. An - ful assempt was made to return the systema to automatic, however, turbine speed was at 1854 rpm and increaang when a high turbine vibration alarm was received. b
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| ; NPS directed the operator to manually trip the turbine.
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| De ! 7 ^ evaluation of the turbine speed control problem revealed that one of three speed sensors 4
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| supplying input to the turbine supervisory control system had failed and the turbine governor valves, with zero demand, were off their main seat admitting steam to the main turbine. De lic==a believed that since the
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| p EXCERPTS IR 9549 i
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| i V; govemeer valves were calibrated cold dunng an outage, the aero da==adant position w . _, " ; to -3% of full stroke valve position did not maintain the valves shut when hot. h governor valves were fully shut aAer being recalibrated hot per IAC 1400174, Rev 6, "Drbine Governor Valve Calibration Unit 2*.
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| j De above work activity was completed and all equipment post ===*=aaca tests were performed ==ti f=ceacily.
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| 4 h turbine was placed on line at 11:45 am and the unit returned to full power on the night of April 25.
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| ; During this short outage raadaa-a cooling water side cleaning and several other mala *=ance activities were
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| " * ' . (4_ ^' - control of power manoeuvers was perfonned well and emesilent eapport of the
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| j work activities by other cry ==3=*ia== was also noted. The decislam by management to accesspilsh this j repair eK ilne denoastrated a conservative approach to safety.
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| ; 4.b. Surveillance Observations (61726) i Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements Typical of these were conArmation of TS compliance for reactor coolant chemistry, RWT conditions, contala===* pressum, control roosa vaatil=*ian, and AC and DC electrical sources.
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| At 11:00 am, on April 10, the licenses's tachalcal staN organization discovered that the six month survaillaaem q- on Unit 2 aaa*=la==at personnel airlock was not candue*ad within the periodicity required by TS 4.6.13. N 25 percent allowab;e a=*=aiaa of TS 4.0.2 did not apply to this test, h airlock test had base tested on
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| , nreahme 28,1994, and the next test was due on March 28,1995. b airlock was declared out of service as
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| ! required by TS 3.6.1.3 the 24 hour action statement was entered. b survallmaca test was : --f^'
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| . antisfactorily at 3:00 pm returning the airlock to service, i
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| m De root cause of this event was week controls la the scheduling of *=ehaie=1 sta# surveillanaam. N lj i 4 administrative ,.-:-- 'u for scheduling eachainal staN surveillanos AP 001041, Rev 12, did not require
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| '';-' ^ review of future survedlance dates. It only required review of completed tests. His procedure did l
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| } not provide a formaal means or chackliae for '----- <-: when the next surveillanca was due. His error i resulted when the person tasked with scheduling and completing the test made a math *==*ieml error when 3
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| -''- " ; this test and since it did not receive supervisory or '' ;- '- ^ review it was not daeae*=1. M
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| , existing =''+: and tracking ==chania= ca==i=*ad of a notebook of achadulad tests ==*ainant on a technical j sta# supervisor's desk. IJcensing oversight of the survedlance existed and that individual was aware that the
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| ;- surveillance was missed but he was under tbs false perception that a 25 percent extension was allowed and being
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| !. u.ed.
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| I i- N licensoe's corrective actions included issuing STAR 950394 to am J c the root cause and required
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| : j. corrective actions %ey also fonned a Tachaical Subcommittee to review this issue, identify root cause and
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| ; underlying issues, and make reco===d=*ians for improvements to correct & waakaa== and prevent repetition.
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| This cross-functional, multi-disciplined committee held maa*>ags on April 13 and 19 to cover this issue. b inspector attended the April 13 meeting at which the probable causes, countermeneures, and interim action plan were developed. Each probable cause and required countermeasure was discussed in detail by the committee and C ts were made for investigation and followup of Idantified items, h inspector was very Impressed with the depth and scope of di=e==3aa on this issue and the interim and long range corrective actice i plans that were developed.
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| , h team developed an extensive corrective action plan which was due to be submitted to managemsat around i . the Arst of May. Hey additionally are preparing LER 389-9543 on this item. His LER will be reviewed by ii the inspector for any additionallie==aa corrective action.
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| p EXCERPTS IR 9549 :
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| ! / 'I1ds is the first routteely achhdad survanilaart missed by the liccusee since 1991. This violation wSI not be cked because the licensee's efforts la identifying and correcting the viala*Iaa meet the criteria specified
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| - in Sedios VII.B of the NRC Enforemment Pelley. It will be idsstified as NCV 389/95 4S41, " Missed a
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| Surveluanee of Unit 2 Persomaal Air 14ck". ,
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| 4.c. Followup on Previous Survaillance Inspection Findmas (92902)
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| !- (Closed) VIO 335,389/94-1241, Inadequate Corrective Action for a Previous Violation for Inndequate Surveillance Testing of the C ICW Pump........ l i
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| 4.d. Followup of Maintenance IJsRs (92700)
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| : 1) (Closed) IER 335/94-10, Rev 1, Inadvertent B Train Engineered Safeguards Features Ae*i=*iaa Signal (ESPAS) due to a Deficient Instrument and Control Test Fis t e......
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| 1 i I 2) (Closed) IER 335/94409, Rev 1, Inadvertent Safety Idection Arenatiaa Signal /ca=8aia==* Taalati= Signal due to na Invalid High Pressuriser Pressure Signal........
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| i 6. Plant Support (71750) i' l 6.a. Fire Protectaan During the course of their normal tours, the inspectore routinely a===iaad facets of tlw l
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| : Fire Pietection Program. b inspectors reviewed tranment fire loads, fla====Ne materials storage,
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| ! i--- f ; control hazardous el==icals, ignition source / fire risk radaa'taa efforts, fire protectaas training,
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| ; fire protection system survedlance program, fire barriere, fire brigade qualifications, and QA reviews of the
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| program. No defldencies west identified.
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| Q. 6.b. Phvalcal Protection During this ' . "'
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| . the inspector toured the penaar*=d area and noted that the
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| . perimeter Isace was intact and not -:- , . '" by erosion or disrepair. 'Ibe fence fabric was secured and barbed wire was angled as required by the tiraa 's PSP. Taalahan zones were ==lataland on both sides of the
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| : barrier and were free of objects which could shield or -1 an individual.
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| ..... personnel and packages entering the protected area were searched either by special purpose detectors or by a physical paklown for firearms, exploelves and contrahand 'Ibe processmg and escortang of visitore was
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| , observed. Vehicles were searched, escorted, and secured as described in the PSP. IJghtang of the perinver
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| ! and of the protected area met the 0.2 foot-candle criteria. In conclusion, asheiad f==r*la== and equipament of the security program were laspected and found to comply with the PSP . :; '. - .
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| j 6.c. Radaolonical Pmtection Pmaram Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these j activities were la conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and la compliance with regulatory
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| . requirements .....No violations or deviations were identifled.
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| 6.d. Effectiveness of Ilcensee Controls in Identifying. Resolving. and Preventing Problems (40500)
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| OA AuditReview 1) b iampac8ar reviewed QA audit report QSleOPS-9544, dated March 30,1995. ' Ibis audit evaluated the site's implamantatiaa of the offsite does eabda*iaa ====a1, process control program, and radioactive effluents. It included a review of existing procedures; changes made to thsee r e- ' in the past year; an analysis of Int ==aa and industry events and data; self ========* activities; ,. ' = momsoring l activities; NRC reports; and corrective action documaana on the above areas. In addition to a review of the
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| ; above records and docummatation the audit included field observations, walkdowns of plant areas, iampachana, l
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| EXCERFTS IR 9549 jl D and hterviews.
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| J h audit identified three minor findags that were ad=ialairative in nature and did not indicate any significant program wenkaamaan h audit also -nalaad three achalcal e recourmandarinan that if i_,' ' could result l
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| 3 . la program improvemset. The inspector found the suet to be thorough and well-written. It used field f f' observations to strengthem the report's creditability. The laspector noted that the audit mise ===Aar*=d a followup on past identitled weaknesses to ensure that coevective actions had beam fully kn;'- -' and 1
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| ; were still effective.
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| : 2) h laspector reviewed the QA audit, QSL OPS-95-05, perfonned la the Security and Safeguanis area la l l Febniary through April 1995. 'this audit assessed the adequacy and ' ;'--- += of activities associated 2
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| with: (1) b Site Physical Security Plan, (2) h Site C-- ^! ;- y Plan, (3) b Security Trainsag and i
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| 4 Qualification Plan, & (4) Nuclear Saisguards Information Control h audit a===laad records and loss, observed activities and training la prognes and included physical
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| ;} wallulowns in the plant. h audit identified a stangth in the Security I' . ^ ^*s routine self a=========*r l' including the use of outside associes such as the FBI to en=Ance , - -1 - "=d training, TTAR prog v to dac=name and resolve -N - Two negative findings were idsstified lavolving the lack of and the use of the site
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| .. current addresses for some badged personnel and the need for L , c. -- la transmining '; -2.
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| ! infonnation.
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| !~ The inspector found the audit to be d=*=Had and thorough. Based on the audit repost it appears that the
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| ; security ' ; ^ " continues to effectively hapleasant the site Security Plan and provide for the control of safeguards infonmassen. '
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| ;j ( i, 3) ' Ins inspector reviewed the licensee QA i '--- = monitoring activities e _f ^ ' in March 1995 and daea-*=d in QSIX)PS-95-06 dated April 14,1995. Perfonnance meamitoring activities were aaaanetad la the i areas of:
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| * Key control during bypass of ESPAS channals while in Mode 5 & 6 ;
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| i e Train swap activities during CCW system on line mainianmace
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| * VOTES testing of ECCS valves l
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| * Preventive = alan =amana on 2B IESI circuit breaker
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| * An evaluation of high radiation ares requiramanes and postings
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| * LPSI expanded surveillance testing
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| * In-plant clearances
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| ! 'Ihe audits appeared to be detailed and no significant deficiencies were identified.
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| i j 4) IJcensee Self Ammanament (40500)
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| I, N licensee met with the NRC la the Region II office in Atlanta on April 10 and provided the results of their
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| -* of overall plant performance during the past year. ' Ibis manaammana laAcasad that they are aware of their .i. ^2 and areas that need additional attention. 'Ibey additionally discussed the challenges and plans for I the next several years. This meeting was assaadad by the majority of site senior managere and senior Region II staff members. 'Ibe licensee was responsive to questions asked by the NRC. h meeting was beneficial to the hcenses and the NRC.
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| ; 7. Other Areas 5
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| Md Maintenance RW tadustry Meeting De inspector a**=lai a two day licenses sponsored meeting on the
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| : ==la*==aara rule on April 5 and 6 at Jensen Beach, Flonda. De meeting was ameaa<lant by repr==tatives from
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| ! eleven plants and NRC ..r. ''ves froma Headquarters, Region II, and Region IV. N agenda for the Erst
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| ; day consisted of utility i ^6 on perfonnance criteria. %e second day caa==eani of, = in the areas of on line n=lasanmara; observations and ==paesa*ian frees the pilot inspoetions; goal setting of(a)(1) ,
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| systems and goal monitoring; MPFF identificataan; and resolutions and periodic -ta. Panel discussions ;
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| and audaeace questions and answere followed each of the above topics.
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| ; De inspector was impressed with the progrees that have been made to date on rule if ' ^6 by some j utilities. A**-taaaa at this meeting was to gain a better knowledge of the manana === rule and the licensee's
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| '', process and steps in impla-aaentina. N informatiaa pramaanant was fowwi to be very beneficial. ,
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| : 8. Exit Interview The iampareiaa scope and findings were su==arized on April 28,1995, with those persons indacated in paragraph I above.....
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| (closed) NCV 50-389/95-09-01, " Missed Surveillaara of Unit 2 Per=anaal Air lack",14.b.
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| , i (closed) VIO 50-335,389/94-12 01, ' Inadequate Corrective Action for a Previous Violation for Inadequate I
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| ; Surveillance Testing of the C ICW Pump *,15.a.
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| 1 I
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| (closed) VIO 50-335/94-2241, ' Inadequate Corrective Action to NRC Violation Regardmg E-. :y Diesel I
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| Oenerator Operability",13.h.l.
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| jj ,; (closed) VIO 50-335/94-22 02, ' Improper Modification of Control Room Iogs',13.h.2.
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| I (closed) LER 50 335,94408, Rev 1, 'Inadverteet raaenian==u Isolation Signal (CIS) Caused by Failure of the
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| ; B Instrumsat Inverter Concurrent with Chanaal D CIS in Tripped raanlition,13 3
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| ,; (closed) IER 50-335/94-009, Rev 1, ' Inadvertent Safety Injection Arenariaa Signal /caarnian==t Isolation Signal due to an Invalid High Pressurizer Pressum Signal',14.c.2.
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| 1 (closed) LER 50-335/94-010, Rev 1, ' Inadvertent B Train Engineered Safeguards Features Actuataan Signal (ESPAS) due to a Deficient Instrumant and Control Test Procedure",14.c.l.
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| .- ... . -. . - -~. .- . . .
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| !f 4 EXCERPTS IR 95-10
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| %/ l
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| } June 23,1995
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| , 4 Florida Power & Ught Company
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| ! ATTN: J. Goldberg
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| ; Pr==idaat - Nuclear Division P. O. Box 14000
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| . Juno Beach, Florida 33408 4420 5 {
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| SUBIIICD NRC INSPECI10N REPORT NOS. 50-335/95-10 AND 50-389/P5-10 >
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| j ,
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| n nei .
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| 1 Jhis refers to the Ia pareia= ca=Ae*=d by R. Prevette of this oNice on April 30 through Juas 3,1995. N ,
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| , l inspection included a review of activities authoriand for your St. Lucie facility. At the conclusion of the '
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| laspection, the Andags were discussed with thoes ==n1-e of your staffidentified la the a=elamad report. =
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| ^
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| Areas ====3aad during the la=paceiam are identified la the report. Within these areas, the i==p=ceia= consisted )
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| . , of selective ==== ==*ia== of g,c-r ' _ and + ''ve records, laterviews with persommel, and observation 1 l of activities la progress, h purpose of the laspectica was to determine whaehar activities authoriand by the license were raaAeead safely and la accordance with NRC requirements.
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| . . 1hs ==ela==d Inspection Report identifies activities that violated NRC requiresunds that will not be subject to l N enforcensat action because the licassee's enbets la identifying and/or correcting the vialatian meet the criteria lj- specified la Section VILB of the Enforcesset Policy. 'thesofore, a response is not requind.....
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| 4 Sincerely, ;
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| . 1 Kerry D. Iandis, Acting Chief !
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| ;. Reactor Projects Branch 2 jl Division of Reactor Projects c7
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| ;.' Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389
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| ; IIr===a Nos. DPR47, NPF 16 33=e W : NRC inap=ediaa Report Report Nos.: 50-335/95-10 and 50-389/9510 Ucensee: Florida Power & Light Co 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102
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| ; Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50389 Ucense Nos.: DPR47 and NPP-16
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| ~
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| r Facility Name: St. Lucie 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: April 30 through June 3,1995
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| ,- V Page 1 of 14 4
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| EXCERPTS IR 9510 ,
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| j- M Land Inspector: i
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| ! R. Prevetts, Senior Baandaat Date Signed i' Inspector i
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| l R. Baldwin, IJeanse naminar
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| ! M. Miller, Resident Inspector i
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| Approved lyy:
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| ,. K. Landis, Chief Date Signed ,
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| ; A. Ranctor Projects Section 2B l Diviaien of Reactor Projects
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| .i
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| : l. Scope:
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| jj-5
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| ' Ibis routine resident inspection was eaadne*=d onsite in the areas of plant operations review, -ia*=-
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| observations, surveillaana observations, engineering support, plant support, and other areas. '7 ^- were 4 , 4 :- M during nonnel and b=aalA hours and on weekends and holidays.
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| 1 Results:
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| I 5
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| Plant operations area: System walkdowns identified missing identification labels and operator aids, procedural w=4======, and drawing errors. A review of clearances also identified several ad-tainerative enors. A i danciency involving the lack of filter =ian==== on the reactor building and emergency core cooling system
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| .; , penp room vaatilanian systems was also identified, paragraph 3.a.4)B.r2). Individually, these errors were not
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| ,j- 62 j
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| . safety sigolacent. However, they ladicate a lack of attention to detail. Overall, 0 -- - continued to be N y.
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| Maintenance and Surveillance ama: Several waa====== lavolving procedures and strict +- ' I compliance -
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| were idanaified during anhae -i=*==== activities. Discr=p==elas involving the tracking of electrical
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| . -lan==aa training and quali5 cation were also identified,14.a.3)C. A weak surveillance tracking systeen for
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| : emergent suivaitta- resulted in a non<ited violmelaa for missing several surveillances on diesel ganarator 1B,
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| {b 14.b.4). ;
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| , Enginaaring Support: Completice of the review for Anticipated Tr=== =4 Without a Scram (Temporary
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| , Instruction 2500/020) found that the licensee had installed and implemented an approved design,16.a.
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| Plant Support area: Perfonnance la this area eaa nanad to be satisfactory.
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| Within the areas inspected, a non<ited violation was identified involving a missed surveillance:
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| i l NCY 335/95-10 01, " Missed Survaill==ca on IB Emergency Diesel Generator", paragraph 4.b.4).......
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| 3 ,
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| , 2. Plant Status and Activities 2.a. UniL1 operated at essentially 100 percent power for the inspection penod.
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| 1 ,
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| . 2.b. Mall 2 began the la=pae'i period at 100 percent power. On May 22, power was reduced to approximately 65 percent to permit turbine valve testing and eaadaaaar sea water side cleaning (shake and bake).~ 'Ibene activities were completed and the unit returned to full power on May 23. l i /- Page 2 of 14
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| d ay%q g %%%.r %+s < 1 v m e.m. t.-cu ,%qu 9y,
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| e EXCERP'I5 IR 9510 i
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| ~
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| v: 2.c. NRC Activity Mr. R. Baldwin, Reactor Pma=inar, NRC, Regica H, assisted the resident inspectors i dunas the week of May 1. His inspection results are aa=*=laad in & report.
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| ( :
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| Mr. J. Norris, St. Lucie Project Manager, NRR, visited the site on May 23 through May 26. He attended the 1 j
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| NRC, PFL, NMPS, PDEP Envimamental Consukation meeting that discussed sea turtle intake on May 23, toured the site and held several infonnat meetings on current issues and ehadala= with the beensee i '
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| Mr. S. Reynolds, Environmaatal Review Project Directorate, NRR, and Mr. M. Masnik, Non-Power Reactors i and twnommi=ianing Projects Directorate, NRR, visited the site on May 23 and met with the beansee, NMPS, 14 and PDEP for consultation on the current status of sea turtle lataka.
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| l .
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| : Mr. B. Parker, Radiatiaa Specialist, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguanis, NRC Region H, conducted .
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| I casite la pae*ia= during the week of May 29 in the health physics ans. 'Ibs ta=pacew= results are reported la IR 335,389/95-11.
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| l i
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| i Mr. S. Y. Jang, Foreign Assignee front Korea (KINS) reported to the site on May 30 for ' hands on' training in
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| ] NRC la paceiaa ' *-Y - He is assigned to the site untilJune 22,1995.
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| a j 3. Plant Operations l 3.a. Plant Tours 01707) 'Ibe inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring j equipment was recording a required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant ,
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| I conditions, and plant i-- * ;' g efforts were adequate.....h following accessible-area ESP systema and area
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| ! walkdowns were mada to verify that systeen lineups wese in accordance with lica== .+;- :_ - - for
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| ; ~% operability and equip ===* susesnal aaadittana were "* '7-y:
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| j.h iI 1 ) Units 1 and 2 Hydrogen Purge System. All valves and breakers wese found to be in the correct positica for mode 1. 'Ibe following is a heting of drawing, procedural, equipment labelling, and miscellaneous deficiancias (5) identified to the lica==== for correction.....:
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| i
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| ! 2) Unit 2 Continuous Containment /Hvdrogen Purne System (14 descrepancies)....
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| 1 1
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| : 3) Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Buildmg/ECCS Area Ventilation (10 ' , -ies). ...
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| i i
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| : 4) Unit 2 Reactor Auxiharv Building /ECCS Area Ventilation (7 descrepancies)... 1 1
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| s l
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| l N review of & problem also found that two unine- Procedure Change / Review Raquests for QI 5-1 PR/PStel, 'Machanical Malat-- Safety-Ralated Preventative u=tas- Program,' were partially processed on March 9,1993, and March 1,1994, to include a quarterly lampactiaa of the filtere for Unit 2.
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| Neither of these changes had been issued. 'Ibe current revision of & procedure did not contain any filter inspectica requirement. Main ===ca e has stated that & procedure will be upd=aad and implemented by mid July.
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| b l h above systesa walkdown discr=p-ri- were provided to the Operaticas Supervisor. He, in turn, noted that i the identified items may indicate a waakaa= involving procedures and malasannaca on the vanhiatu=, systems. ,
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| j He stated that operations procedures dealing with vanhinhan systeens will be evaluated....'Ihe expected j
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| , _ - 7"*=: date for the above is August 1,1995.
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| ., 'Ibe walkdown of the RAB/ECCS V=hl=*iaa Systems verified that lineup was correct for the current ,
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| ; mode / condition. h licana=a response to the list of deficiencies was appropriate and will be followed up by the !
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| EXCERFTS IR 9510 g l
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| 'i JN.j ' ; " + 1ho HVS-4 filter deficiency was ,,,--i'-----+ in that it: (1) D==a==erated that although the lame of l
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| rep 1==ame filters was recognized early on, the licensee's followup was ineffective in resolving the problem.
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| (2) Revealed that the maintenance program for inspection of the filters was not !=f - ' due to the lia====a's inability to procure a suitable repl==nant.
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| 4 These wa=I===== need to be addressed by the 1t==*. The licensee is -r'- ^N an investigation into !
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| l the history of the =malai-aaee perfonned in this aren and will provide the results to the inspectors for l
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| evaluation.
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| l 3.b. Plant Operaticas Review G1707) b inspectors periadically reviewed shiA logs and operations records, ;
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| inc!= ding data absets, lastrunnet traces, and roomds of equipannt malfeia==....h following dWa= l were identified:
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| : 1) Reviewed CMM PSA Evaluation MRA-95-008. This -t was used to determine the increase la core
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| , damage frequency due to removal of A train ECCS system for online malaiananca b HPSI, IESI and Core j Spray train A - , - - were removed from service, b assessment found the increase in core melt
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| . pae-eial was well below the allowed lindt. h inspector ;- "---'' operators concerning the work on the Unit 2 BCCS 'A' aa apaaaan= The operators appeared fandBar witis the work but ed not appear to be fansiliar with the use of PRA/IPE in evalundag online ===l=a====ae and entry into an 140 AS.
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| ! Operations training in this area is scheduled to be plan-e in June 1995.
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| : 2) A review of Unit 2 Control Room Denciency Log idsstified that tag 954106495 was attached to ch====t D SG 2A pressure sage but there was no paperwork associated with this PWO in the donciency log. The SCRO, when ;-- -+" looked up the PWO on the computer. He found that the tag on PI-8013D (pressure gege)
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| 'N should have been placed on pressure recordar PR-8013D. The SCRO moved the tag to the proper recorder and conected the Control Rooma Denciency log sheet.
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| ; 3) Reviewed the Unit 1 & 2 Control Room Discrepancy Log and the Night Order Book. It was noted that enci !
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| l dacu-e in each of these books has a grid panern that allows for signature of operators for review. These l signatures were not being done aanalata=*Iy. An operator told the inspector that this grid was not required to j be signed hac== it is adundane to the turnover sheet which is signed by the operators and the requirements for j i
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| signature are on the turnover sheet. This appears to be operatacas general policy. l
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| ,j 3.c. Plant Housekeeping G1707) Storage of material and - ,--- ^ , and cleanliness conditions of various
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| ! areas throughout the facility were observed.....The plant continues to paint and upgrade appearance in preparation for the June INPO evaluation. No violations or deviations were identified.
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| 3.d. Clearances 01707) During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following clearances-
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| : 1) llaill (2 descrepancies)...
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| l
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| : 2) llnil.2 ....
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| : 3) General Remarks a) OP 0010122, Rev 58, Instruction 8.5, step 2 required that "An up-kHlate index (aimilar to Figure 6) shall be amintained in the log." The inspector e-l=~t the index on May 9 and fossed that indes for Unit 1 l Worting E-, '. " Clearnace Order Los was dated May 5,1995 and did not include clearances issued
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| : between May 5 and May 9. The index for Unit 2 Working Equipme tt Clearance Order Img dated May 9, l
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| %4v - W - Ve
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| EXCERPTS IR 95-10 w;./ 1995 did not list open Clearance 2-9544 067 (Coat O2 Anlyar Conticuous Oxygen Analyant Amma-hly RAB/20/N-RA2/E-RA) s.hich was lasued on April 20,1992.
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| b) The effective date listed in Indes was not eensistemt with all clearances, i.e., in some cases it was the authorintion date which differed from the issued-to date, in other cases it was the issued date, and in a few casse it was the positioned and tagged date.
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| c) The locator code used in limus of the Equipment Clearance Orders (Fig 2) was incomplete, e.g., tag showed 'RAB/30/S-RAIZ/W-R' lastead of 'RAB/30/S-RAIZ/W-RAE.* 'Ibe clearance SROs stated that the consputer data field is limited and would not accept additional characters i
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| - l d) A large ===har Equipament Clearance Orders did not candala the NPWO nisaber.
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| OP 0010122, Rev $8, Instruction 5.3, step 8 required that the NPWO nussber and the clearance holder (s) )
| |
| mame(s) be printed and that the clearance holder sign to signify areape==ca of the clearance prior to ,
| |
| na==anca=aat of work. It also required that the date and time of day the clearance is accepted be indicated.
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| The above deft,a-eta agala ladlea** a lack of strict attention to detail is the area of y.+
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| -l l 3.e. Technical Specification Compliance (71707) Ilcenses a --;"--= with =alaesad TS ILOs was verified. <
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| ' Ibis included the review of selected surveillance test results......No deficiencies were identified. l
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| : d. Main- and Su,vammac.
| |
| 1 4.a. Maintenance Observations (62703) Station =ala*==e= activities involving selected safety-solated systems !
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| p s
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| a.d -=.r--*= were observeur is.ed.....e rdo.s of ihe s iiowi.g snai ans e a.dvid.s - oh.or.ed:
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| i !
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| : 1) NPWO 63/3555 - Replace ammambly #1 CEDM #56 power sunnly 12D ' Ibis power supply is part of a dual l unit =e*1a=aaned power supply. P ;'-- --- of this - --;--- " was accomplished under the controls of AP 0010142, Rev 12, " Unit palial=lity and Manipulation of Sensitive Systems' and MP 1-IMP 456.02, Rev 1
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| ** :;': - - " of A=ceiaaaaned Power Supply in CEDM Power Cabinet." b inspector observed the projob briefing conducted in the control room and the work activities at the power cabinets. b test equipment was calibrated and the task was performed without incident. The tarhateien's work efforts were eBreeted by an i IAC engineer. Both ladividuals were very '- - ' '; **: et the ,ee- ' I.:,* and work
| |
| ; practices needed to mecaniplish this task. No deficiencies were idendfled.
| |
| : 2) NPWO 66/0992 - Troubleshoot and renair Unit 2 reactor trip breaker TCB-1. ' Ibis breaker could not be
| |
| ! closed aner being tripped during RPS testag. ' Ibis NPWO directed removal of the breaker, a physical i==p=cela= for damage and mach = leal ';- '"!- to verify freedosa of movement of -h-teal parts. ' Ibis was followed by electrical continuity chach and manually cycling the beenker. No deficiencies were identified.
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| l L Since operation with this (+----;--- " removed increased the potential for a plant trip, a decision was rende to
| |
| , replace the breaker with one from stores. A spare was obtained, calibrated, tested, lamaallad and returned to
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| !- service. The lampactor witnessed these activities, verifled that g ' /; procedures were used, that test equipment was calibrated, and that engineering support and x;_ .* *n was provided as needed.' This task was ace ==pHahad la a thnely summer without incident. 'Ihe removed breaker was still being analyzed
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| ;j; j to detenmine the cause of failure at the end of the reporting period.
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| n EXCERPTS IR 95-10 l
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| 1
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| ,_ s . 3) Unit 2 maadactad a two day omilme =ala*===a= outage on Unit 2 train B ECCS eensponents en May.
| |
| ; 14 through May 16. These work activities were scheduled and performed under the heansee's procedure AP 0010460, Rev 2, " Critical Malasananca y- . " Trec.a .." This procedure was recently U --
| |
| l and evaluated the risk of accomplishing work activities online and included strict controle over the remaining ;
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| j .
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| i ECCS train, h procedure also provided for added 7- ^ and supervisory oversight to ensure that the J work was accomplished in a thnely maanar. The following activities were observed.
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| l A. h preiob briefing conducted in the TSC at 7:15 no on May 15, for craft and supervisory j personnel working on the CMM activities..... The inspector felt that he did a good job la this benfing.
| |
| ], However, the inspector neced that a large ===har of craft pereommel were late for the brieflag li and scene showed up near the and of the brieflag. It was also noted that only see questies was i asked out of about thirty people present. Several of the people ed not appear laterested la the j brieflag. This was d=====d with plant management immediately aAer the projob briefing.
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| $. B. PWO 62/4160 - Ina=*a and raaale 14a= tube on 2B CCW HX. This work involved isolating i1 and draining of the HX; resnoving the and covers; cleaning as needed; locating and plugging the t leaking tube (s); and reassembling and returning the HX to service, h msority of these activities were completed and the cover bolts were being torqued when the inspector arrived at the work site.
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| l
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| : 1he inspector verified that the bolts were torqued to the correct value with a calibrated torque wrench.
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| l . A review of the paperwork by the inspector found that only the first four steps of this work y.+- *-- . -
| |
| l were signed off at the completion of work...1his iteam was di===ad with the job foreman who stated that the maaster copy of the paperwork was back in the shop and it was routano not to sign off on the individual steps until thejob was completed....It was also identified to the inspector that QC had also i covered the job and had only signed off as the shop ===tae PWO. The ananager of liesasing and tLe 7 maintenamee manager stated that each ,.= " : step should be signed as they ase i d=*ad la
| |
| !l, the fleid. The maintomasse manager stated that this ed not smeet the latent of the " Conduct of ,
| |
| ; Malatemancea procedure and would be corrected.
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| C. PWO #0524.18 maath PM on Valve V3457 IN+vn Cnalian Heat hekaa-ar 2B a=dt=* creas-j tie to L. PSI Hander Bl. N =aintanmacm was performed on the operator with the valve in the closed position using MP 0940072, Rev 9, ' Preventative Maina an=aca of Envirna==atally Qualified !
| |
| Ilmitorque Motor Operated Valve Actuators." h Inspector observed the work activities involving ]
| |
| l 1DL device laag=etiaa and overcurrent testing of the TOL per MP 0940061, Rev 17, unias.a- of l
| |
| ! hrmal Overloads.'
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| (
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| Two electricians performed the TOL inspection and testing. h procedure required that the TOL lead
| |
| ,I I be liAed to insert an AC current using a portable high current test set Model MS-2. % electricians i determined that a 9.30 amp test current was required and that the allowable range for trip times was 24-47 =acanda from the above maintaaaaca procedure. h test current was inserted and the TOL trip l time measured and recorded on Data Sheet 1.
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| ( ,
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| . N el.csiws when adjusting the test current appeared uncertain whether the display mode switch should be in the ' Normal' or ' Memory" position. N inspector questioned the function of this switch, but was not satisfied with the explanan'a=i provided. The electricians ed not appear to be thoroughly E- t _" - ": on the p '' 7 of the Multi-Amp test set.
| |
| & first 'IDL test was aborted prior to tripping the 1DL device. A repeat test was performed. The i! inspector noted that the electrician adjusted the test current mammatarily exceeding the 9.30 amps prior to stabilizing. h TOL device tripped at 42 =acands which was within the W--a criteria. The i
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| j-EXCERPTS IR 95-10 l D l'' b electricians aconied the moults and then miswed the yr:-::S for e ;'
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| slap 9.3.2.0 was then initialed as e- ;' ^ ' based on verbal verification. h final step 9.4.8 re-
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| . A prior sigmoff for !
| |
| ter daa*.e the lead to the 'IDL contact. ' Ibis ea-planad testing of the 'lVL device. ,
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| ; & inspector noted that there was a separate ' verified by' signature sad an initial block in step 9.4.8.
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| la a d1===lan with another electrician who completed 'IDL testing of an adjacman valve (V-3658), he stated that he did not believe that the ' verified by' signature was an i=dapaada=* vwification
| |
| .:;;'- '. He based & on the fact that step 9.6.3 contains a ' verified by' and '''; - '-
| |
| miswer" signoff. For tbs test that the inspector observed on V3457, the ==aand electncian present j, during testing verified that the lead was relanded.
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| 1 When the Acting ht=Intanaaca Manager was makad if the ' verified by' signature in step 9.4.8 is an
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| ' ' , ' ' verification, he, also, did not believe so since an operabdity check would verify that the liAed lead had been properly re 4erminated. Other licenses management diengreed, referring to
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| ; Ad=laia*>ative Policy, AP17.06, Rev 0, 'Indap=da=# Verification" which required that relanded electrical lands on safety systema be ' ' , ***y verified. & = alan ==aara r.-:- appeared to n j
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| ' - unclear in this agard.
| |
| 'Ibe ==i=*=amaaa activity on V3457 shined from the breaker cubicle to the acei=ene located in the ;
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| j ECCS Pump Room. A third electrician ==lamad & effort by ''.. % the steps in the procedme.^ ]
| |
| Tampae*iaa of the limit switches discovered that two rotors were damaged and required .:;*- ,
| |
| that requimd Work performed on & valve was well controlled and effective in identifying e "1 m following day, the inspector miewed both electricians training records and discovered only one 1
| |
| Q had e- ;' ' formal training on the Muld Amp eut at on Noweber 12,1992...... 'the procedme assances the Muld-Amp test est opmWors ===al. 'Ibs signout card locemi in the MEI1B cego, miswed by tim inspector, shown! that & mammt wm last signed out in late 1992.
| |
| 'Ihs inspector autandad his miew of indivkhaal electrician training to that of training at the Department level to better understand how an electrician could be assigned work using test equip ===* without formal training. He found that initial qualification training was tracked on a separate database by the training ' , - ^ - t, ' Ibis separete database listed courses na-planad with test scores. Once an electrician completed initial qualification training, their name, SSN, and date of initial qualification was entered by the training '--- ^-- - ^ lato a POXPRO database. ' Ibis datal== provided a listing of electricians who have completed initial qualification and a record of other preoutage/ infrequent training !
| |
| received. Supervisors and Gief Electricians used & list when assigning work; however, they did not l
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| ; have access to the separate database used by the training department- As a consequence, they were not j l . able to determine whether a qualified electncian has or has not received specific training if the initial i,
| |
| qualification training requiremsets had been augmented over time.
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| h previous mathad of maintaining training records was the on-line Training Record Informatica
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| !l Mn - Symem, or 'Iurus. 'Iurus printed an => io procedum liming qualified l' electricians by task. However, due to difficulty in ==intalaiar & system, the licenses recently
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| ; adopted the FOXPRO d=eal== =athad. The weakness la this area is that those indviduals nasigning work cannot easily detennine if a specific training .- g' ' has been smet. M last enesting of the Temining Review t'a==letaa (TRC-5/95) had also recognised this as a loophole and i> developed a snatrix listing electricians who lacked courses curnatly required for lettial 7 "S "' N Electrient Malada==aca Manager stated that he ladanAid to provide training as
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| . Page 7 of 14
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| p EXCERPTS IR 95-10 4 .
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| -1 b./ expedeush as possible. This anstrix listlag has hose provided to Supervisees and Chief Electricinas as as laterism anessure when assigning work.
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| D. PWO A0733 was issued during this critical maintenance netivity to perform maintenance and renair an HCV-3616 IHigh Pressure Systaan Ingection Feed to Imap 2A2 through Hiah Pressure Header Bl.
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| De =iala8==e= was i Tw-- ' to the operator with the valve in the closed position using MP
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| . 0940067, Rev 7, ' Maine == ara and Repair of Unitorque Valve Actuators Type SMB/SB-00.' De inspector observed those work activities involving reassembly of the actuator up to :;'; ^ of the torque switch. The two electricians woridag the job were organised, had their tools prestaged and 1 signed err procedural steps as risaad supervides pededicany observed the work and j ==== red that it preenoded he a thmely fasides. Work was * .y for' beach testing of tim replaca===e torque switch removed from Unit 1 MV 0913 (Auxiliary Peedwater Cross-tie valve) per PWO M821. De inspector verified traceability of the . , *----- ' torque switch to the original purchase order.
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| l As a result of the deAciencies pointed out during several of the CMM activities, the loyectors held a meeting with the managere of aiminaan==aa, scheduling, and training to ensure that the idsedded deflei=ela= were being corrected. De licensee has or plans to implement the following (14) corrective actions......In addition to the
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| , above, the licenses canaeted a work standdown at the and of the above CMai activities to provide training on i ta===a learned.
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| The above items t==Re=*=d weakness in the CMM procsas levolving unclear F-7 '-- a, a lack of strict -
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| ." --- . a less them fully esciplined approach to CMM work activities, and a need for heprovement in craft training and the queuficaties tracidag systems. De inspector dear ==ad each of the r 7 above actions with the licemene and eencluded that this eersective acties will strengthem the lleensee's conduct of ' ^--- and provide heproved centres et CMM activities.
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| : 4) PWO 6549841B Emergency Dianal Generator Governor Failure. During the monthly survaillanca of EDO
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| - 1B aandnetadt he morning of May 17,1995, control room operators observed a 50 percent step decrease from Adiload approximately 30 minutes into the 1 hour run. EDO 1B was quickly unloaded and shutdows. On-the-scene Tech Support reconun= dad that the EDO be restarted within 15 minutes for a i; " ' - y evaluation.
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| , Otherwise, the EDO would have to be allowed to cooldown for three hours for prelubrication prior to a normal restart. When the EDG was restarted, the cognizant engineer determined by manual Aiel rock manipulatica that l the actuator in the Woodward Governor on the 1B2 Diesel Engine had failed (EDG 1B is a tandens gemorator j consisting of two diesel engines, i.e., the 1B1 16 cylinder and IB212 cylinder raaaaread by a shaA with the ele:tric generator between them). EDO 1B was secured and declared inoperable at 9:17 am.
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| ;l
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| , , Unit 1, which was operating at 100 percent power, entered the 72 hours ILO Action mana=====t and verified the breaker lineup for offsite power. PWO M5-0984 was issued to replace the Woodward Governor on the 182
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| { Diesel Engine per MP 1-EMP-59.02, "1B Emergency Diesel Electric Periodic Mainoananea and Inapareina
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| * l A ; ;'- ^ governor was procured from central stores and hench tested prior to installatica. Part of the
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| ?
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| beach test involved an in pareiaa of the condition of the limit switches for the governor's electric drive motor.
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| ; All beach M- ' were ==*i=*=ena=y. He . f - ^ governor was lastallad late la the evening of May 17 j ,
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| 1995, and EDG 1B started. At tids point, due to difficulty in adjusting speed, an ia par *ian of the la=*allad
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| . .-;'- ^ governor discovered that the limit switches were defective, i.e., the internal apring in the l- microswitch did not enhed the plunger when off cam. He defective limit switches were replaced and a second run personned the anorning of May 18,1995. Ia=*and of starting at the idle speed of approvinianaly 450 rpm, F
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| EDO IB lacreased speed to approximately 900 rpm. %e cognizant engineer quickly deterrainad that the p
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| ; Page 8 of 14 t:
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| EXCERPTS IR 95-10 I' V indexing of 482.C ^ governor was not correct. In a disci = Ion with the inspectors, the cognizant engineer identitled the cause as poor comuna-le=*laa to the electricians who lastaHed the . ."
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| governor. He had instructed the electricians that the splined shaft could only be lastaued in one position based on a imachimad flat on the spline shaft, when in fact it could be la=#ahd in any position. His y problema was identined during the second run when adjume===# of tbs governor to aero position did not place the fhol rack in the shutoff position. At this point, EDO IB was secured and plans de eloped to d-aac8/raca==act the splined shaA to reindex the governor (determined to be one spline tooth off). Also, the assistance of ae -hatral representative was requested. Since this work would require more than 15 minutes, a third run was not possible untillate in the aAernoon. Meanwhile, control room operators =wully 4 -
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| ' ^ ' the operability run of EDO 1A as required by the ILO Action he-t
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| .i h governor was removed and realigned correctly. A post maintenance test was satisfactorily cr ' 1+3 and the DG was declared operable at 8:17 am on May 19,1995.
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| Although probians were experian-t in ,-.t '; the above ic--i'" "N and repairs, the personnel perfosuming this task worked well as a team. An additional deficiency noted was that the repair effort was q
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| very dependent on one engineer who directed the activity. His absence could lead to praha=== on future repairs of this nahme.
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| 4.b. Survedlance Observations (61726) Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements.....h following surveillance test (s) were observed:
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| : 1) OP 2-0410026, ' Unit 2 HPSI Recise Valve 3659 Delta Pressure Measurement for A Imop." b test was satisfactory, b inspector idatified that the valve number for the isolation valve that was used for the DP
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| ^
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| gage was written on the lagging and the piping support. b ANPS was notined of this situation and took g
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| ; action to have it corrected. I
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| : 2) OP 2 04100050, " Unit 2 HPSI/LPSI Periodic Test, for 2A IESI Pump." his test ran the 2A IPSI pump for vibration measura==at- No discrepancies were Idaatified.
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| : 3) OP_1-0700050, ' Monthly Periodsc Test of the 1A and IB Anniliary Feed Water Fump." bre were no ducrepancies for the 1A pump; however, the IB pump bearing cooling line produced a small leak on the ,
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| , , coupling between the front and aft bearing. A PWO was written to repair the coupling leak.
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| ,t l
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| f *
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| : 4) TS 3/4.8.1.1 Table 4.8.1 requires increasing the frequency of diesel generator surveillances to every 7 days l if 2 or more failures occur in the last 20 valid tests or if greater than 5 failures occur in the last 100 valid tests.
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| ; Footnote ** states that test frequency of 7 days shall be malatalaad until 7 consecutive failure free dammada j have been performed and the number of failures in the last 20 valid demseds has been reduced to 1 or less.
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| However, Table 4.8.1 also requires that the number of failures must be less than 5 in the last 100 valid tests to increase the test frequency to 31 days.
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| . On October 28,1994, the IB EDG failed it's sixth survaillance in the last 100 valid tests and was placed on a seven day surveillance achadale. On The==har 21,1994, the seventh ca==acutive failure free test was i achieved. b Diesel Generator System Engineer, who is responsible for tracking failures and ?- _ * *;
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| survaillanca frequency, then directed that IB EDG be returned to the regular 31 day survaillance period. His error was identified by the lie ===aa on May 17, 1995. As a result of this incorrect interpretation of TS, the
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| ! seven day surveillance on IB EDG was not accomplished from December 28,1994 to May 17,1995. Upon 1
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| identification of this error, the EDG was tested and testing will continue until the requi t of'I3 for failures j in the last 100 valid tests is less than five, h licensee is currently conducting a root cause evaluation to
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| \sy
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| ' Page 9 of 14
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| l-i i ,,m EXCERPTS IR 95-10
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| : 3. l l s/ detenmine the required corrective action for this item.
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| E i The liesasse has =l=ad two other surveluances in the past sis =a=sh=; VIO 335/954141 on sasapling of a l Sff after filling in Jaamary 1995, and 389/954941 on the Containment Air Iack IAnkage Test in April j
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| - 1995. The corrective action to review all T=ekairal Specifwae=== and verify that g-= are in place to initiate unscheduled survedlances and the review to identify 13 surveillance testing that relies on a single person j to schedule are currently ongoing. Since this event occurred prior to the above items, the corrective actions for j those two items could not have prevented this occurruece However, the corrective action for the violatma and j, the NCY should help prevent occurrence of this type, 2 <l
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| * It is generally accepted that increased testing of EDGs do not increase EDG rehabdity and av=ilmhility N - l now Standard TS for CB Plants does not indude the requirement for increased testing based on the number of I J failures in the last 100 starts. NRC GL 94-01 permits l'- to submit a heensing ====d===8 to reenovo the ,
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| i accelerated testing requirements for 15. b he===a has submitted this request and it is currently being l
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| !j . evaluated by the NRC.
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| Since the adssed surveillance has minimmi safety haportance, and corrective actions are currently planned
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| : or underway to prevent recumace and the lle=== siforts in identifying and correcting this ilmes mest
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| ! the criteria specified in Le*1a= VII of the NRC Enfortsament Policy it will not be cited. It will be l Identified as NCY 335/96-1841, "lWlaamd Surval==ae on 1B 5'--- ; 7 Diesel Generator".
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| : 6. N' . g Support I 6.a. Anticipated Transient Without Scram Review (I12500/020) The inspector ar==inad various aspects of
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| ;. f* the liesasee's ATWS modifications, made pursuset to 10 CPR 50.62.....
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| 14 h7 A review of the ATWS ... r _ "- and mitigation design provisions apphed to both units indicated that the l'
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| licensse's desip has W=ad aa==i *==* with that described in the PSAR and endorsed in the NRC Safety Evaluation. As[ects of the Diverse Scram System were conAramed to be classiAed as nuclear safety related and l 1 seismic category I...NRC approval of the lic===a's design was noted, in the SER, to be contingent upon a l j human factors review of the (then) proposed use of a single annun:iator to indicate both A1WS actuation and (
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| 4 ATWS bypass for testing, b inspector verified that the licensee has since snodified the design to employ two l
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| ; ma==cianars in each control room; one for actuation and one for bypass status. !
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| The SER noted that, in the originally proposed design, an inadequate level of diversity existed between matrix 4
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| relays employed in the RPS and APAS systems and that, accordingly, the licensee modified the reed switches of i APAS natrix relays to increase diversity to an acceptable level. b inspector veriRed that the subject matrix
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| ; relays were still employed in their respective applications and that sufficient diversity ra==inad. b inspector i
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| ; qaa=*lanad the licensee as to the provisions in place to assure that the current level of diversity would be l malatalaad over time (in many applications, the licaaaaa has modified co g.r.r.r.: designs due to a lack of j rept-t parts). The licensee referred the inspector to VTM 2998-154'i7, which included a discussion on the I diversity bases for the APAS matrix relays. Additionally, the PSAR contained discussions of diversity in APAS l
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| ] and ESPAS sections. b inspector then questioned whether similar provisions were included in the RPS VTM
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| ; or PSAR. 'Ihe licensee stated that such provisions were not included, but committed to include a discussion of RPS diversity from ESPAS and APAS in the RPS section of the PSAR.
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| l The inspector reviewed selected component designations within the liaaa=a's material managamana systern. l C-g - - included I/I converters, actuation bistables, logic relays, and isolation relays. 1he inspector found
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| : that the components were categorined as nuclear safety related, as specified in design documentation.
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| * Page 10 of 14 4
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| : p EXCERFTS IR 95-10
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| ,/ fa=talla*% of the ATWS equipment was observed by the inspector at the time of the In=talisaiat 'Ibe la=rac*ar noted ensanalve involva-ant on the part of pon==al from design / vendor engineering, vendor / site QC, and i
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| !. systent engineenng. Minor errors in printed circuit board maanfachive and CEAMG diaea==ar* ca=*=etar j wiring work ==== hip were identified and corrected. Post-modification testing was observed and found to be amnisfactory. ]
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| h inspector reviewed testing procedures (4) associated with ATWS c- " " - ^*m .... L =ilme g +: ' - -
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| were available for Unit 2. b inspector found that the procedures provided a comprahanaive methodology for
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| : periodic testing of ATWS DSS companants. Together, the procedurea enveloped the system frosa detection to l actuation devices. N inspector also verified that on-line testing of DSS e __c was being perfonned by
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| ]- the A'I1 ibaction of the ESPAS cabinets, as described in the PSAR and SER.
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| ]
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| i h inspector reviewed operational procedures associated with ATWS concerns. M following g= ^ ' w 2
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| were reviewed: (1) ONOP 10030030, Rev 6, ' Anticipated Tran=Imt Without SCRAM (A'IWS)* A (2) ONOP 2 0030030, Rev 5, " Anticipated Traamimat Without SCRAM (ATWS)'. In both cases, the ge-- M_ indicated j
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| <j. symptoms of an ATWS and described i=== diana operator actions to be taken in such an event. Actions j included: (1) Verifying that automatic actions occurred, (2) Manually tripping the reactor and turbine, I (3) Initiating emergency boration, (4) Ensuring AFAS flow, (5) Opening 'IUBs locally, (6) Securing CEA l
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| : j. MG sets locally and, if CEAs were still not inserted, reenergizing CEA busses and manually driving CEAs into
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| :' the core.........
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| 1 l' In ea=el==laa, the inspector found that the licensee had ggi ' ;4 l== plan *= tad the apprwed ATWS
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| ; design and has inaladalaad the appswed levels of divenity, and prwisions were in place, or have been l i
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| }. I**ad to, to ensure that diversity is ==t=*elaad in the future. Test i w
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| * m were found to address testing fauna sensor to actuation device for the DSS. Levels of quality ea===itimi to in FSAR and ij j
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| %j g,
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| approved in the SER was found to be ==t=8at=ad This -pt=*== I==parola= activity based upon TI '
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| ; 2500/20 (Closed).
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| 3 i 7. Plant Support (71750) l l 7.a. Fire Protection During the course of normal tours, the inspectors routinaly e===inad facets of the Fire l Protection Program..... No deficiencies were identified.
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| i 7.b. Physical Protection During this inspection, the inspector toured the protected area and noted that the i perimeter fence was intact and not compromised by erosion or disrepair.....In conclusion, =alaetad fi=et- and equipament of the security program were inspected and found to comply with the PSP requi *=.
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| 7.c. Radiological Pptection Pronram Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.....
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| $ 7.d. Emergency Preparednsas Drill (82301) b inspector observed the off year annual emergency exercise conducted on Unit 2 on May 3. The drill scenario caamissad of: evacuation of an iqiured eaa8a=ia=8ad worker; fire in a startup transformer with offsite fire fighting ===i=a ana; loss of offuite power, failure of all control rods to insert on a reactor trip; and fuel failure followed by a catastrophic failure of main steam piping to the
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| ; anulliary feedwater pump. 'Ibe drill senario led to the declaration of an Unusual Event, Alest, Site Area and General Area Emergency. 'Ihis exercise had limited participation by local and state agencies.
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| % following observations were made by the inspector during the exercise:
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| ; Page 11 of 14 l
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| i s
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| If p EXCERPTS IR 95-10
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| !i 1) Cameral Room (Sinaalator) Operations personnel r==paadad to the medical emergency in an expeditious maanar. Offsite medical ==i=8aara was requested and an ambulance transported the injured ~=*==iamaal j
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| 1 worker to the lawnwood Regional Medical Facility at Pt. Pierce. An HP Technician = ,
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| " the worker j and assisted in the da~=a==ia=*iaa offsite. b sicammaa's response was observed to be timely and appropriate.
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| ia Shortly therenAer, a fire occurred in the *2B' Startup Transformer with a failure of the deluge system to l actuate. % licensee declared an Unusual Event which escalated to an Alert when the fire lasted longer than
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| : i.
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| * ten minutes in an area containing equipment important to safety. Offsite fise fighting ==isenaea was requested
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| : and provided, The licensee's response was, again, both timely and offective. b control room ordered the affected transformer deemergized and mada all required notifications and requests for offsite ==id-a= Aa
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| ;j actual failure of the HRD phone delayed motifteaetaa to the state for several =l=d= umill an altermate
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| , cosannumications path could be adahMahad This fauure, although not part of the seseado, added an
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| ] sa====* of realism to the ddll.
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| : 2) Technical Suonort Center h TSC was activated when the Alert was declared for the transformer fire.
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| 'Ibe PGM mann=ad responsibility as the EC when the TSC haean= operational. Shortly therenAer, the control
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| ]< room reported that the 2B steam generator tube leakage had increased to 10 span. Operators e====acad an l orderly shutdown.
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| Approui-maaly 30 minutes later, the control room reported entering the off normal procedure for loss of
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| .l i
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| instrument air due to a piping failure. Station Air was out of service for maintanaara 'Ihe Problem Solving Team in the TSC began evaluating alternate means of restoring instrument air, which included a temporary
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| ; patch or enanaating portable compressors. Within about 5-10 miautaa, the reactor was manually tripped and j steam generator tube leakage lacreased to 200 gpm. An offsite release occurred due to arenarian of the SO l
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| , anfety and =#=ampharic dump valves. Offsite dose -t was initially hampered due to computer operator's
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| ! ; difficulty in obtaining data from the ERDADS. Two plant support staff working in the ERDADS equipment ij rooma weso unshie to provide the time when ERDADS was activated and whashar the simulator was interfaced to 1i ERDADS for the drill. Although the two ineviduais may not have been players, is a real amargency i support staff should be '- ' ( M of systems later===acam and ".,,_.i It was also noted there was a delay of _- ^'y several =t=das la ----
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| ' 5 the LOOP and stuck control rods. However, following this annan-8, the Problem Solving Team shined their amph==Is to developing a procedwe for reenergizing non-vital buses from Unit 1. Status boards were maintaiaad and the EC exerted positive control in j . focus ~ng recovery efforts. Overall, the TSC functioned effectively.
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| +
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| j 3) Ocarations Support Center A cursory inspection of the OSC showed that a status board was being updated
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| . for changes in plant conditions and tracking of recovery teams, b OSC was organized by discipline, i.e.,
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| i I&C, Electrical, Mark-deal, etc., to support the drill. No other observations were made in this area.
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| , 4
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| . 4) Emergency Offaite Facihty 'Ihe EOF ==amad responsibility for offsite communientinam aAer being declared operational. b state of Florida and lica==a offsite dose naas==-t results were updated on the EOF status board approximately every thirty minutes. A notable exception occurred aAer the 12:15 pm results which were i- not updated for about an hour. 'Ihe Recovery Manager maintained positive control of the EOF and performed
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| ;, briefings to ensure all pernaanal werem' formed. A poet drill critique was held which identified the lapse in unisting the status board and the one hour delay in briefing the media aAer declaring a General F== ;y.
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| Overall, the EOF fi=celamad well.
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| 4
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| : 5) Post Drill Critiane on 5/4/95 Controllers / Evaluators attended the post drill critique' held by the E.-.py Planning Depart:nent from 8:00 am until 11:30 nm. Diaen=laaa were frank and thoughtful. Areas in which the drill highlighted both strengths and waann=== were identified. One area that may have warranted additional
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| ; dancussion was the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Problem Solving Team. With respect to the TSC,
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| \/ 1 Page 12 of 14 1
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| w&n %+ w. , n 4% s e
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| A EXCERPTS IR 95-10 1
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| 4 Ns - dI=cu alaaa focused on the coordinarian difficulties between the offsite does mana===# teams in the TSC and
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| - EOF. Overall, the critique was sneaningful and, if all the twc-- +ons discussed are !7 - ', will Aarther =h=a= the lican=a's emergency response capability, j 'Ibe exarcise was well'plannad and effectively tested the ability of the heamaaa and local and state agencies to
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| { respond to plant events: (1) Overall exercise co===ications were ave =Ilent. (2) Management ocatrol and 1
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| discipline was strong. (3) Post exercise critiques were detaded and thorough. (4) h TSC problemi solving i team was slow and ineffective la responding to repairs on the start up transformer and loss of instrn= ant air.
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| k was noted that the above problems, with the exception of the problem solving team, were also Idantified by the licaa-a's observances and discussed in the critiques.
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| . 7.e. Hurricane Paparedness Drill N licensee naaairead a hurricane y+ ' --- drill on May 23,1995.
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| ' Ibis drill verified the operability of their satellite telephaa*, HF-AIE and VHF radio equipment. Training was
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| ' with this equipment and operating j:
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| i conducted to refamiliarim the STAS and OSC administrative r --
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| lastructions were verified to be current. 'Ibe stop logs used to limit flooding in the RAB were verifled to be in i place. h conex boxes eaaraining prestaged hurricane supplies were also inventoried. 'Ibe inspector did not j observe the above drill but discussed it with drill r -- ' 'the licensee plans to critique the drill and present the meults to the PRG by mid June. i a
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| i! l l 8. Effectiveness of f le=== Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems (40500) t 8.a. Facility Review Grouo Meetinas
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| !, ') 1) 'Ibe inspector =**= dad a special FRG meeting conducted on May 9. A quorum was present and the agenda j Q covered changes to BOPS. 'Ibe changes incorporated 8 adhack response record changes of CEN-152 Rev 3 and included ai==Imaars aadhack rana ==aadaria== and human factor * , . . h majority of the changes E resulted fman incorporating changes in the 'IRIP 2/IEAVE 2 RCP LOCA ANALYSIS. 'Ihis analysis now j permits operation of two RCP'S at less than 1300 PSIA if subcooling is greater than 20 degrees F. ' Ibis 4
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| meeting included a presentation by operations staff and then achairal staff reviewer of these changes. 'Ibe i pressatars were very '- ' 'M on the proposed procedure changes and their effects on EOPs...all l PRG ma-hars actively participated in Aar===i== on agenda items. l lj 1
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| : 2) 'lhe Inspector art =ded the Pacility Review Group (FRG) Meetings held on May 31 and June 1,1995, where l
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| l the 10 CPR 50.59 evaluation and plans for an alternate arrangement of the NIS Excore thaaetans on Unit I were reviewed. ' Ibis alternate arrangement involved connecting the Control Channel 2 detector signal to flamar Power Range Channel D. ' Ibis was required to return failed NIS cAmanal D to service and restore the reactor i trip logic to a two out of four coincidence.....'Ibe hea==aa's plans called for making this change by j
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| 4!= - M - the failed linear range detector input to RPS chanaal D in the RPS cabinet and routing a jumper ,
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| l from R'IUB 104 through the control room overhead to RPS channal D cabinet to connect control channel 2 to
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| ' RPS ch=aal D. h 10 CPR 50.59 evaluation; companantary action being taken until the activity could be j E-- 4"'', i.e., chanaal D variable High Power, SUR, 'IMLP, LPD, and IDL trips in trip; work l
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| . Instructions to perform this task; and testing required to place channal D back in operation were discussed in '
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| '- detail in the meeting. All issues appeamd to be :_'n ' 'j addressed. An infonnation call to the NRC was minde to infonn these of the actions being taken on this item.
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| 'Ilie Inspector observed portions of the work ==aelatad with this activity which was acconsplished on June j 1,1995. No deficiencies were id-elfled.
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| p EXCERPTS IR 95-10 V' 8.b. Ilcaname Self Annasament (40500) h inspector myiewed the QA Fim Praaar*i- Audit, QSI OPS-95 02, -: n' " in April 1995. 'Ibe evalendon appeared to be a detailed evaluation of the plant Are protection program. ' Ibis lact idad a review of
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| - p+- -
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| l par *iaa activities. Strengths were identified in the roving Are patrol
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| , records, and in-plant a=
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| training and identification of deficiencias and the Are protection groups aggressive promotion on verincation of Are protection requirements. Areas needing improvement included; Are barrier description provided la fire fighting strategies; Are barrier inspection procedure TS 10.36 review and approval; and the lengthy ext ==aa permitted on Are breaches. h audit also contained a *=ekale=1 recomunsadados that engineering evaluate the adequacy of detail provided in the PSL Safe hadawn Analysis regarding failed cables frosa a ; ^ '"4 Are.
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| 1 STARS were issued to ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken on the above items.
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| The inspector found the above aunt to be a detailed review of the Are protection program, and changes
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| . that have occurred la the past two years. The report was well written and ladicated that the nea==* has am 1 ," " programa la this area.
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| }
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| ~
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| 8.c. OA Ouarterly Activities (40500) 1he la paesa s met with QA on May 26 and discussad the results of their activities for the last quarter.1he assada included QA % '=81 plans, the site industrial safety program, plant oversight, a ===ary of recent audits and monitoring activities, QC lampartian activities and findings, cross traaning of QC laap=e'i ,
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| and receipt inspection activities. No site wide issues or negative trends were identified by QA. This review ladiras== that QA/QC is still performing all required audit and inspectica activities and raatianas to e79 ort safe Pl ant operanian.
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| m j 8.d. Corporats Nuciant Review Board (40500)
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| The inspector =**= dad the manahly CNRB meeting ce May 16, at the St. Lucio site. A quoora was present and the meeting agenda included.....b inspector at*= dad approximately two hours of the meeting and noted
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| ;. that the board asked daranad and sawthing q==rL== on safety sigalAcant items.
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| j' 9. O: hor Areas 9.a. Consultation with National Marine Fisheries Services - TAC 9201415 h @ =#tandad an initial areting for the consultatica process between the NRC and NMFS regarding po;.A'. species of marine turtles on May 23, at the St. Lucie site. N =**=d== laciudad FPL plant and corporate g d, NRC j (Envir===tal and Project ''- ; -t Branch), State (FDEP), and the NMFS. The diari-i== facumawl on i the lacrosse la turtles appearing in the plant intaka canal in recent years. This meeting included a site orientauon, a tour of abs intake canal arena, and equipment insaalled to prevent turtle entry into the intake pump area. A discussica on the licensees preliminary biological ==a===t of this item was held in the aAernoon.
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| b heenses provided infonnation on additional equipment they plan to install in the intake canal in December j 1995. by also d1=e=====d an ======aat of the increase la turtle intake and established a time table for a
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| =h-istal of this ===== ant to the NRC and NMPS.
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| 9.b. Public Document Room lhe inspector and the IJcensing Project Manager, NRR, visited the St. Imcie Plant Pubhc Docenent Room in the library at the Indian River ra-namity College in Ft. Pierce on May 24, 1995.1he da=====*= were amatly stored and indexed for easy retrieval. N mqiority of Ales are now on micronche and the microfiche reader was verified to be operab'm the librarian was able to access NUDOCS through a computer and modem and appeared to be familiar with this equipment. The latest NUDOC document V Page 14 of 14 e -.
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| + .,- .,, n , - , - - - - - - - , - -,- ,
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| ,. l EXCERPI3 IR 95-10 i
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| k./ available was delad May 19. The latest micsofiche ftle was dated May 22,1995. 'Ihe librarian stated that NRC
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| ' assistance was easily available by dialing 1800438-8081. She also stated that this docummt room received j
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| : very limited use, and primarily by media personnel. b public docu=aat rooms overall condition was found to be excellet. !
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| 4
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| : 10. ExitInterview l
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| b inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 2,1995, with those persons idi~u in paragraph 1 above.....
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| l
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| ! (closed) NCY 50-335/95-1041, Missed Surveillance on IB L af Diesel Generator',14.b.4).
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| Page 15 of 14
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| EXCERFTS IR 95-12
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| ~g 1 y i v
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| July 28,1995 4
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| Plorida Power and IJght Company ;
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| ATTN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg i Praaida=# - Nuclear Division P. O. Box 14000 !
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| Juno Beach, FL 33408 0420 I
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| SURIECT: NRC INSPECIlON REPORT NOS. 50-335/9512 AND 50-389/95-12 i i Ga=*1a===:
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| I nis reists to the inspection ==Awad on June 4 through July 1,1995, at the St. Iacie facility. The purpose of the inspection was to detenmine wbstbar activities authoriand by abe license were maAwad safely and in
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| ? acconlance with NRC ;7' "-
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| At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those nosebers of your staff identified in the enclosed report.
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| Areas a===inad during the inspartian are identified in the report. Within these areas, the iaapae*ian ud of selective ama-,a=*ia== of,,.-:- and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.
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| Within the scope of the inapartian, vial =*iana or deviations were not identified......
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| c Sincerely, Kerry D. T=Ila, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.- 50-335,50-389 IJoense Nos. DPR47, NPP 16
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| ==Enclosures:==
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| NRC Inspection Report
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| ;f Report Nos.: 50-335/9512 and 50-389/95-12 LE Plorida Power & Light Co 9250 West Plagler Street '
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| Miami, FL 33102
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| ;+ Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50 389 Ilconse Nos.: DPR47 and NFP-16 b
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| Pacility Name: St. Imcie 1 and 2 laspection canadad June 4 through July 1,1995 Iaed Inspector:
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| R. Pmatte, Senior Rendent Date Signed Page 1 of 22 k
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| EXCERPTS IR 95-12
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| / .T l s.j Inspector !
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| M. Miller, Resident Inspector
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| ; O. MacDonald, Reactor Inspector q
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| Approved by:
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| K. Lands, Chief Date Signed l Reactor Projects Section 2B f Division of Reactor Projects a
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| 4
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| ~
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| il >
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| nis routine resident t==partia= was maA eaad onsite in the areas of plant operations review, =ial-observadons, surveilianos observadons, plant support, and engineering support.1==gw*== were performed l' j during normal and backabiA hours and on weekends.
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| * Results:
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| * j Plant operations area: Operations canti===8 to be conducted in a safe inannar. Preparations for the installation 4 of a jumper amund an inoperable Unit 1 battery cell were thorough. Two examples of week operator log-keeping were identified.
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| 1 Mainimace and Surveillance area: Maintananca activities observed during the period wert ea=E'e**d weII.
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| l
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| - Repeated osmaples of a failus, to properly apply the lie ====a's Jumper /UAed lead program wese idendfied and
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| , were the subject of a non-cited violation.
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| Plant Support area: A review of the licensee's fire praeactian program t=Acasad that wa=1m===== eristad in fire fighting techniques and the respirator qualification program. An audit of the licensee's Special Nuclear -
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| . Materials storage resulted in a non-cited violation involving a failure to properly tag three pieces of radioactive i material.
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| Within the areas inspected, the following nons:ited violations were identified:
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| 4 I- NCY 50-335/95-1241, Pailure to Invoke the Jumper /UAed lead Process, T 3.d.1).
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| NCV 50-335,389/95-12 02, Failure to Properly Tag Radioactive Materials,15.c.....
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| I
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| : 2. Plant Status and Activities u !
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| J
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| - 2.a. llaill Unit 1 operated at -*ially full power througho t the inspe tion period, with the exception of a ;
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| :=&ieniaa to approximately 40 percent power on June 11 to support the installation of a jumper across a 1B l l
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| l 4
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| i, .
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| 2.c. NRC Activity S. Y. Jang, a representative of the Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety, visited the site from j
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| 4 EXCERFTS 1R 95-12 n
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| !# %> -f = of resident May 30 timough June 22. His activities included accompanying the inspectors in the i==paa*i- activities and familiarization with site operations, j
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| : 3. ' Plant Operations
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| : t. 3.a. Plant Tours 01707) N inspectors periodically canAwaad plant tours to verify that monitoring 1 4 equipment was recordes as required, equipment was propwly tagged, opwations pasonnel wae aware of plant i eenditions, and plant W";5 efforts wee adequeu....m fonowins accessible-ar= ESP syska and arm j walkdowns were made to verify that system lineups were in accordance with le==aa requir-aan*= for j -
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| operability and equipment material conditions were =*i=fartary:
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| ;f 1) 1A Cantainssant Snray Train Walkdown ne inspector s - ' __:' a walkdown of the Unit 1 'A' train of )
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| i the t'aatalamaan Spray system, including the NaOH injection system. In general, the walkdown inde=8ad that j the systmas was in good condition and was adequately ==intainad; however, the following div6 (5) were I
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| ; noted and provided to the Unit 1 ANPS for correction.... ,
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| 1 a l
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| !j 2) Unit 2 A Train HPSI/IESI Walkdown b inspector ~=Ae*ad a walkdown of Unit 2 A train HPSI and ,
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| IPSI andor system flowpath valve alignments. N inspector found the lineup and the ~=di*ia== of system components generally satisfactory; however, the following discrepancies were identified: (1) V3821, V3826, j i and V3805 were found locked ciceed, as opposed to closed as called for in OP 24410020, Rev 23, 'HPSI/IESI i - Normal Operation." PCRs were prepared to change the g -- * ' designation to locked cloemd.
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| j (2) HCV-3615, IJSI loop 2A2 isolation valve, was found to imbcate 10 percent open, as opposed to closed as required by the subject ,, -:-- ' .. Work Raquest 95010357 was initiated to correct this condition.
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| {
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| : 3) Unit 1 Emergency Diment Generator Pual Oil System Walkdown N inspareae ca=Aeead a walkanwa of
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| ) the Unit 1 EDO PO systema and found the systero's alignment to be - ^* ' ^+y, however, amnerous areas of jl 1
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| gg tacali=d corrosion was, identified....%sse itemas were discussed with the hoensee, who stated that painting for i
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| (VA) tbs EDO PO storage men was =rhadalad for the near futune.
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| : 4) Equipment Tap / Procedure Discrecencias he inspector A=en==d abe equipment tagging / procedure
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| : l. ''y''-m discrepancies identiRed above (and in IR 95-10) with Operations personnel. He licensee stated that
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| '}. the issue was being naa=idared, and that initial plans included ava=ining electrical and instr ===an=*ia= labeling, comparing the labeling applied to the needs of both =mintanaaca and operations personnel, and companng l existang labels to the Total Equipment Dat= ham danigantsaan for cc- ' " y. Additionally, the lic==e stated l that 36 month g+- '- . noviews were being caamidaned as a means for companns field labeling to procedural
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| ! designations. De inspectors concluded that the lleensee was prudsetly considering the issue and wili ,
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| ea=#1== to follow the licensee's actions la this area.
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| 3.b. Plant Operations Review 01707) b inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, l
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| l including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions....No deficiencies were j obeaved.
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| i
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| ;4 3.c. Clearances 01707) h inspector reviewed clearances 1-95-06 CCW Heat M 7 1A and 1 l 06-050 - 1A EDO Control Power. All valves and breakers were found to be in the correct position and all tags were la place.
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| ! 3.d. Technical Specificatian Compliance 01707. 40500. 62703) T la==== compliance with =alaa*ad TS LCOs
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| !' was verified. His included the review of selected surveallance test results.....
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| ,, ' 1) IB n-a--v Cell 431m Vah== On June 5, the lacensee identified a low voltage condition on the 1B
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| l' EXC'ERITS IR 95-12 m
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| : l. s/ bettery, cell 43. De raadi*iaa was identified during the performance of Maiana=== Procedure 0960164, Rev c
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| 11, 125 VDC System Quarterly Mainsaaaara * %e cell la question measured 2,06 volts. TS 3.8.2.3 requimd the operability of the IB battery, and TS surveillmara requirement 4.8.2.3.2 required that individual cell float voltage be greater than 2.07 volts. De AS associated with the subject TS requimd that the bettery be returned to operability within two hours or the unit be placed in Hot Standby within the next six hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours.
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| j, De battery was declared out of service at 2:32 p.m. Approximately 15 minutes later, a single cell charger was
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| : applied to the cell in quassian and the IB battery was placed on an equalizing charge. AAer approximately one j, hour, the single cell charger was removed, the battery returned to a float charge and the cell voltage was
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| ~i verified to be greater than the 2.07 VDC TS limit. De cell was monitored for the next 45 ===a== and voltage j stabalized at greater than 2.07 VDC. At 4:32 p.n, operatore began recirculating the pressurimer in preparation
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| ; for a downpower maneuver. At 4:40 p.m, the bettery was decland operable due to the ===*=ia=d recovery of
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| * voltage. He TS AS was exhed and no reductica la reactor power was initiated (although the con =aaarament (f I, recirculation of the pressuriser wse performed as a , , --E= for a downpower maneuver). At 4:50 p.m. the
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| . battery was again placed on an equalizing charge and resnained on the equalizing charge until approximate'y l 8:00 a.m on June 7, when a 24 hour annisaring period on a float charge was initiated.
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| i i, ne subjece cell was monitored for voltage tiuoughout the equalizing period. At approul==aaly 3:00 a.m om
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| ; !- June 6, the inspector discussed the current status of the battery with the Unit 1 ANPS. He ANPS stated that ,
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| 1 operators were recordmg cell voltage every hour with an lastalled voltmeter and that electricians were l determining cell specific gravity every two hours. He mapector ==kad whether a J/I1 request had been l I,
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| prepared for the lastallation of the voltmeter across cell 43. He ANPS stated that one had not been prepared j j and that ons should be employed unless the data taken with the meter was obtained with a ' hand held' jumper,
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| ,] as described la AP 0010124, Rev 34.... He vole == ear was subsequently remo j!'
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| $ h battery room found the voltmeter removed.
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| 4 i s AF 0010124, Rev 34, " Control and Use of Juusper. and thlaaa==ar+=d Iaads," 3.2, "Discasmism," stated, la
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| !' part, that "When an alteration is not controlled by as approved procedure (i.e. traadismhandlag slettronie equipment or temporary modifications to perndt laterim operation) and is ima8*= dad (not hand held), it shall he reeerdad in the..." J/LL log. The liesasee's failure to control the suidect voit anster via the J/Il l process was not in compliance with the J/11 progress. This failure constitute a viasselam of minor
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| ! significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation, consistant with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This will be identified as NCY 50-335/95-12 01, "Fallure to Invoke the ji Jianper/ Lifted Idad Process."
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| l STAR 9500595 was initiated to documsat the oceditions experienced in cell 43. Its resolutica directed, should i the cell in qua=*iaa require an equalizing charge, that a single cell charger be placed across the cell for 72
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| ; hours. Safety evaluatica JPN-PSleSEES-95 Cll was prepared,' which found that the p1=ramaat of a single cell
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| ~
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| . charger across cell 43 with in-line IE fuses would act represent an unreviewed safety question. The inspector reviewed the safety evaluation and found that it satisfactorily considered the issue.
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| l nroughout the week endag June 10, the' licenses had been preparing plans to install a jumper around cell 43.
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| ! Safety Evaluation JPN PSleSEES-95-009 was prepared per 10 CPR 50.59 which concluded that the IB battery could perform its safety function with up to two cells jumpered out. He SE also considered the method of jumper i==a=11=aica, which involved aligning the IC bet'ary to the IB bettery bus (replacing the IB battery, which would be removed from the bus while the jumper was installed) via the I AB bus. De IC battery was a v Fage 4 of 22 i
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| i, EXCERPTS IR 95-12 t
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| p i
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| , % / non-emissy-related badery, and its use was chassa to niinimi= the potential for voltage wa=*ia== ce the DC J bus due to ripples in bettery charger output sometimes encountered when the chargers supply a DC bus without a battery present.
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| j De licenses formed a crose-functional team to assess the installation of the jumper and to provide
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| !' rocc====ad=*4as and a procedure for the evc,lution. De team prepared an initial draft of 1 IDI-100, "1B
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| ! D.C. Battery Bus, Cell 43 Jumper Installation." he team's :-- , ^*== was that the jumper would be installed in Mode 3. A =araad team was them formed, with the task of performing an indapaad=8 review of the
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| ,, evolutica with the assum un that the jumper would be inmaalled la Mode 1. %e second team utilimi the plant l1. simulator and design renews to produce the final version of the IDI.
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| ib
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| { On June 8, a complete set of individual cell voltages were obaniaad on the IB battery. Cell 43, while meeting
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| . TS E , + criteria fbr voltage, was found to - - _, "y deviate (based upon IEEE and vendor j reco===ad=*1ana) Ikom average cell voltage. At 12:00 noon on June 8, a single cell charger was applied to cell 1 43, co=== acing a 72 hour single cell charge. At 1:05 p.m. ca June 11, the ningle cell charger was di-aaasad and cell voltage I=naadianaly began to decrease frona 2.118 VDC. At 3:22 p.m. the same day, cell i soltage dropped below the TS limit of 2.07 VDC and the ===aela** AS was entered. A unit downpower
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| ; coenmenced at 3:40 p.m.
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| 1
| |
| :; %e inspector observed control roons activities and found the downpower to be well-controlled. With the IB i- battery inopweble, TS required the lic===== to be la Mode 3 by 11:22 p.m. %e lic====a stated that it was their l tas-eiaa to install the battery Juanper with the unit la Mode 1, employing the following ==eliadalagy:
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| I (1) De unit would be reduced in power to allow the removal of the B MPP froaa service, due to the loss of B MPP control power in the event of a loss of the IB DC bus. (2) Contreuers (e.g. pressurimer ;
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| m level) would be transferred to channels powered frena A side instrument buses. Major raA=d=* l i1 equipment would be similarly aligned. (3) De 1B instrumsat bus would be transferred to the i
| |
| )! =aiaaaaaaaa bus such that a failme deemergizing the 1B DC bus would not result in two desmargiand
| |
| . Instrument buses (such an occurrence would have resulted la a reactor trip and =e*=atiaa of a an=l=r of ESPAS subsystems). (4) De IC battery would be aligned to the IB DC bus via the 1AB DC bus. (5) no IB battery would be removed frosa service and thejumper installed. (6) %s 1B battery would be,
| |
| - realigned to the IB DC bus, the 1 AB DC bus would be divorced froni the 1E bus (separating the IB and 1C batteries) and original equipment 'Joeups would be reestablinhad j ne inspector =**=adad the tailboard meeting candneted prior to the execution of the Ihl. h meeting was I l{ =#e-dad by operators, main ama= ara permanaal involved in the upcoming work, engineering personnel, and a )
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| : anad=r of plant managers. %e discussions included background infor==elaa on the issue, a discussica of ;
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| : industry events relating to the loss of DC buses, a step-by-step review of the LOI to describe the bases of the h steps, and the delineation of management expectations for the evolution. h inspector found the briefings to be conducted la a thorough ==anar.
| |
| %e inspector observed the conduct of the LOI and found thtt the 119mee performed the activities in accordance
| |
| , with its instructions......De In=*allation of the jumpers p ---N well, untilit was found that the original f==e-ans used to secure the intercell links on cell 43, which were to be used in lamaalhas the jumpers, were too long for the applicatloa. De terminating harduan on the jumpers was found to be thinner than the original links; thus, when nuts were threaded caso the origial =8n=1dar boks, there were insufficient threads to allow for complete engagement and torquing....a scope chage to the PWO was prepared to allow for the use of
| |
| ; washers as spacers, which e5ectively thielr-ad the joint the bolts wee fastening....the scope change was reviewed in a PRO meeting.....A quoruni, made up of licenses management covering the evolution, was present. N critical charactenstics of the fdstening hardware were establi ,w ' , ~ , -
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| to allow proper torqu:ng was approved.
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| m I EXCERFI3 IR 95-12 i
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| * _ ./ h lasp clos itnessed the final lameaMaalaa activities ===aciasad with the jumpers. Additional washers wese
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| ! lamaallad per the PRO-approved scope change to the PWO. QC was present for the torouine of the fastenern i
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| 1 1
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| j 'Ibe inspector reviewed the RCO chronological log during and after the events surroundmg the failure of cell
| |
| '~
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| : 43. 'Ihe inspector noted the following deficiencies
| |
| 'Ibe log did not reflect:
| |
| { (1) Placing the IB battery ca an equalizing charge or the installatice of a single cell charger at 2:45 f i p.m. on June 5 (2) Placing the IB battery on a float chuge and the remmoval of a single cell charger at j 3:45 p.m on June 5 (3) Placing the IB battery on an equalizing charge at 4:50 p.m on June 5 (4) i 0-- % a 24 hour float on the 1B battery at 8:00 a.m on June 7 (5) lassalliar a single cell j charger acrees cell 43 at 12:00 acon on June 8 (6)'Ihe log costeined an entry at 4:40 p.m en June 5 )
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| which stated that a resolution to FTAR 9500595 was received, the cell was placed on a single cell l 4
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| i aberger and abe 1B hattery was returand to service. Ia actuality, the single cell charper won l==tallad at 2:45 p.m, was resnoved at 3:45 p.m, and the battery was declared back in service at 4:40 p.m l
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| ! i
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| ,. h inspector reviewed AP 0010120, Rev 72, ' Conduct of Opwations," Appendix F 'Img Keeping," and found the following guidance:
| |
| i j Per step 2.A.2.1, the RCO log doedd contain "New or aboonnel lineups.' N felining examples were gives:
| |
| ' '' *1. Safety related and other important equipment with mainamanaea in progress "
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| l i
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| ;j qw.) '4. InstallaaW of temporary modificaelana (includingjumpers) and their effect on plant equipsnant." l
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| : l l 'Ibe inspector concluded that, while the procedural guidance above did not constitute a firm requir==nant (as ;
| |
| i would be dana *=d by dou versus doedd), an arpae*=tiaa of log entnes similar to the deficiencies listed above ij ==Imaad. C-- ; M y, the inspector found that control room operators were weak in seconhag activities related 4i to the IB battery malas performed ce cell 43.
| |
| In conduelos, the Inspector found the licemese's actions relating to the acted deft,sma,a== la eeu 43 to be
| |
| : cautious and deuberate. Actions relatlag to the lastaustles of the jumper around the cell showed proper i
| |
| , review and exaentia= Wa=l====== were identified la the areas of J/LL control (volinweer installed across !
| |
| ,; the cell) and control roosa log keeping (aanissions and inaccuracies).
| |
| , 3.e. Operator I.ngs On June 12, the licensee began a mid-cycle clamaing of the 1A CCW heat exchanger.
| |
| i b work was c ;*- " under the heaaaaa's CMM process. During the process, the inspector reviewed the control rooni equipment out<>f-service log and found that, while 1A CCW, I A HPSI, and 1 A IESI were declared out of-service, other safety-related - - -- which required CCW to perform their faae*i- were L not.
| |
| h la=pae*ae ; ' M the need to declare the 1A and IB aantaia=aat fan coolers, the 1A ar=*aia=aat spray train, and the 1A shutdown coohng heet exchanger out-of service. Operesors stated that they had aa==ida ed 1 that, but had decided that, by declaring the CCW train out-of earvice, the other, dependent, systems were f '
| |
| a-=ad to be out-of-service.
| |
| ; & inspector reviewed OP 0010129, Rev 24, ' Equipment Out-Of-Service,' and found section 3.2, i
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| I EXCERFI'S IR 95-12
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| / ' ' Discussion " to state, in part, 'All equipment required by Tech Specs shall be logged in the Equipment Out of Service leg when the equipment is determined to be inoperable.' h inspector brought this to the =88=*iaa of
| |
| * operators, who -
| |
| * 7 *!y recorded the appropriate equipment out-of-service. Additionally, Operations
| |
| -ag==aat reinforced this requironmit in a memo to operators Additional examples of weak log-keeping
| |
| .' practices were identined during events relating to Unit 1 battery malan==e= and are Am==ad in paragraph 3.d.l.
| |
| j 3.f. Effectiv==== of licensee Controle in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems (40500)
| |
| ! !, 1) QA AuditReview j A. OSL OPS-95 07. OA Audit of Emergency Plannma 'Ihis audit reviewed the Emergency Plan 1
| |
| t=;'- ' : Pro:edures and the annual drill. 'Ibe review consisted of a dae====t review and observation of field activities. h review appeared to be detailed and thorough. No significant deficiencies were identified.
| |
| If
| |
| * B. OA Audit Raport OSL-OPS 44-26 'Ihe inspecter reviewed the subject QA audit report, which dae====*ad
| |
| . the results of a ammber of ,,.d -- = smanitoring activities ~= duce =d at the end of 1994. Areas ===f==d
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| )
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| )
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| included survey / release of clean waste from the RCA, the use of Merlin 4 erin alarming &=i=anars, RWP l 4
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| i
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| ;"- =, desar=i=ania= of Unit 1 MTC, a number of outage-related ==i=*=== activities, and radioactive
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| 'I
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| . source control. Two findings, both related to radioactive source control, were Id==tified; one related to source labeling and the second related to the storage of SNM. 'Ihe inspector reviewed STAR 0-94120539, which
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| ! dae=== sad the SNM storage findag, and found the issue to be addressed adequately.
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| 4 i
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| Overall, the inspector found the audit to be comprohsesive in scope and thossugh la detail. The results
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| ; et the laspector's followup to issues of SNM storage is ==8alaad in paragraph 5.c.
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| j ,
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| ~)
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| _%./ 2) STAR Program Quarterly Trend Report 4
| |
| h hcensee m ly completed e their Arst trend report of the STAR psogram which was F;'- "' in mid
| |
| . 1994. 'Ibe STAR program was i='- ' to ca== lid =#a the several reposting systems that they had used to documsat danciancia= AAer approximataly nine vaaedha' use, the hcenses deternuned that they had sufficient l Information to develop useful trends and indicators. b first quarter 1995 report showed the following'
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| ! (-
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| * 371 S'I*ARS were generated between January 1 and March 31,1995
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| * Average age of open STARS was 100 days
| |
| .
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| * 59 STARS were QC deficiency reports
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| <?
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| * 38 STARS were NCR issues l 4
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| * 24 STARS were identified as operator work arounds I
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| . -* h four predominant categories of STARS were:
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| Equipment 1
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| Procedure / Policy 4 - Regulatory /Industryitem
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| - Others
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| * The three predominant causal factors of STARS were:
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| - work practices l - writteri ca=====leariaan equipment conditions
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| )l -
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| b licensee's conclusion from this summary was that:
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| V Page 7 of 22 l
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| 4 9
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| w .w
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| l .
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| l'.
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| l.
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| p' i
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| EXCERPTS IR 9512 j- Kd o Procedures need to be followed more closely o Siga+ffs were not always being -: -_,'" '
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| l o Procedural deficiencies have led to mistakes
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| ; o n-:-- 'n; eachaie=1 reviews need improvement o 1:nprovements were needed to reduce harsh envinna===t corromon
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| {,,
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| 1 The laspector reviewed the above report and noted that it closely =afehad leformatina that the laspector I i has obtalmed fresa routine NAR reviews and daily plant * , ''- . This is the licensee's initial effort at developing trends based on NAR reports. It appears to be a tool that can he used to develop corrective
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| ,l l action for adverse trends or constions.
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| 1 i j- 4. Maintanaaca and Surveillance
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| ; 4.a. Maintenance Observations (62703. 40500) Santion =Wa8====ca activities involving selected safety-related systeams and canponents were observed / reviewed.... Portions of the following ==iatananca activities were lf li obearved:
| |
| i i 1) NPWO 65/09701A EDO Sneed/Prequency Contml Problems ' Ibis NPWO was prepared on June 7 aAer i !
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| control room operatore reported being unable to control EDO frequency during a survaill==a= test. Whea
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| ' released froan idle speed (400 rpm), the EDO accelerated to 62 Hz imbcated frequency and did not respond to j, sovenor control inputs from the control room. N EDG was admequendy secured by operatore.
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| f T. - " * -:^!= performand following the failure involved checks of governor cont.nl power and power supply l j Aases and a verificatica that the K-13 relay, which shifted governor power sources from the 1A 125 VDC bus to l 1, the output of the EDO, picked up
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| '"y. No diserapanciaa were found, the EDO was restarted, and the i surveillance test was f, :-- ' with e'- ---y results. .
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| As the cause for the lack of speed control was not positively identified, the licensee d;d not declare the EDO i' operable per TS and plant management directed that additional ;.- " * -:'t=: be performed. N inspector
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| ; =
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| -, electrical mainaananca department personnel as the - - ' ; initially performed per the NPWO was repeated. The inspector noted that the peroommel fc * ; the work were =Indful of the NPWO's scope, linaiting their activities to verifications of fuse continuity and K-13 eaadae* ramasema,* No adational Inforunation was obtained.
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| *js
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| !' .......A scope change was prepared for the subject NPWO which allowed for a changeout of the governor's power supply, a calibration of the speed switch which actuated the K 13 relay, and inspection for tightness of various tenminal eaaaae*ia==. Prior to the lamaallatiaa of the new power supply, a two hour burn-in was j: i, f,. : ' on a test bench to assure proper power supply operation.
| |
| ; .....laspector witnessed portions of the tenninal board lampaeslaaa ..Tenniaal ca=aae*iaam were tightened as ;
| |
| appropriate. 'Ibe inspector witnessed the calibration check of the speed switch, cr=h in accordance with the appropriate sections of mains ===ca procedure 1-EMP-59.01. The laspector found that the procedure '
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| was _,. ' , employed and that MATE was withis calibration latervals. The speed switch was i
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| shows to perfonn emelsfactosity. The sutqjesd power supply was than replaced and the EDG was tested satisfactorily. The EDG was r * . ^5 returned to an operable status.
| |
| Pollowing the I-;'^ ---- ^ of the governor power supply, the removed power supply was bench tested and found to exhibit low tenninal voltage under load. *lhe licensee determiaad that this was the mot probable cause
| |
| , for the originally identified inability to control EDO speed. 'Ihe inspector agreed with the licensee's conclusion.
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| i' - V Page 8 of 22 .
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| t
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| , .- c ,a -
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| EXCERFTS IR 95-12
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| 'g.,,
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| l 'I w/ The inspector condaded that the suidect i. - l'- ' " ; dfoot was plan =ad and eamancead la a
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| ! neetheecal and weil<entreued =manar. .
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| : 2) NPWO 61/50821A CCW Heat Exchanger Cleanina/Inspectica b inspector observed portions of the l- mid<ycle cleaning and inspection of the 1A CCW heat exchanger, conducted hane 13 as a part of a CMM ,
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| outage on Unit 1 A train components. b CMM was conducted in smdi cc with AP 0010460, Rev 3, j
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| i ' Critical Maintenance W- t. "
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| l
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| ' Ins inspector reviewed the work package, which specified that the rimaning be performed in accordance with
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| ;i, Job 28A of Appendix A to 1 M 0018, Rev 40, 'u.ek te.1 u.i.e e. safety-Related Proventive u.s.a n.
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| !' Program," which directed the cleaning to be r a _ ' by hydrolaning the tubes. A pressure band of 7,500 to ,
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| l 10,000 psig had been specined for the operation of the hydrolaning equipment, with a total time of spray head j transit specified to be one minute to one minute, fiAsea =aaanda.
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| IR 94-13 docu=ansad a similar cleaning, in which the inspector discovered spray pressure in excess of 12,000 ;
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| ;ij peig. h inspector verified that tbs curnet evolution was performed within the specified pressure band, at a t nominal pressure of 9,000 peig. A dedicated worker was monitoring pressure, and red duct tape had been
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| ; applied to the periphery of the pressure sage to highlight the allowsh e pressure band. The inspector witnessed j a number of tube cleanings and timed the period of spray travel and found thema to be :--- , ". -
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| : 3) PWO 61/5243 Repair of MSIV Drain Line 'Ibe subject PWO was initiated when a small steam leek was identified in a main steam drain line in=aa&ataly upstream of the IB MSIV. STAR 950670 was propend to dac====8 the condition. Tampar*iaan of the ama indicated that a pin-hole leak had developed due to corrosion on the OD of the pipe downstream of V08476 (the root valve for the affected line).
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| j
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| 'Ibe inspector reviewed the interim engineering " , ' tion to the FTAR, which called for . ;'- - - ' of the
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| ,d afsected pipe by cutting boundmg socket-welded dbews, amoving one abow and the affected pipe, and replacing the pipe and albow b .-;'- ^ was compheated by a small amount of seat leakage past V08476 froma the B main steam line. N =P -i.g evaluation addressed the .7 - of the affected = -;--
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| and detailed a ==*hadalagy for fabrication of two new socket welds, involving drawing a vacuum on the line l aRar fitup, to ensure that the welds would not be adversely affected by moisture due to the seat leakage.
| |
| l* An additional ca-plir=*iaa was aaaa==a.=ed when, due to the operating condidons upstream of V08476 and the i noted seat leakage, a hydrostatic test of the new weld was deemed as impractical. C- , -^8y, engineering referenced ASMB code case N-416, referenced in the Unit 1 ISI program (ISI-PSle100, App B), which allowed deferral of a hydra =*= tic test, pmvided each weld pass was satisfactorily PT'd or MT'd and a satisfactory laservice leak test was performed.
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| . 'Ibe subject FTAR and implementing PWOs were reviewed by the PRO in a meeting naaducead June 27. h inspector =*e.ad.d the meeting and found that the FRG appropriately considend the technical adequacy of the proposed resolution, the replacement methodology, and contingencies to be affected should moisture due to seat leakage adversely impact the ability to obtain a satisfactory weld. Of particular note, the Operations
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| ..r. ''ve to the PRO identified unsatisfactory retest specifications in the subject PWO, necessitating revision.
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| h inspector observed portions of the work performed per the PWO. Observed activities included removal of
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| , the discapant pipe, fabrication of the .=;'= ---- ^ pipe, Pr of welds, and initial fitup of the i:;'- pipe.
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| j' 'Ibe inspector noted that procedures and packages were on-hand, QC involvement was caa=* ant, the raplacamaa*
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| pipe was properly cut and pre fabricated, and replar.===* fitup was di -- *= ally satisfactory, allowing for Page 9 of 22 4
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| i t
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| 5 EXCERPTS IR 95-12
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| [ n easy inneallanian Welds were made satisfactorily and a VT-2 e===ination of the rep 1====t under nonnal system pressure verified th rep!=ca===* to be leak-free. b portion of the pipe which had developed the leak was forwarded to the beensee's engineering laboratory for root cause determinarian.
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| i In addition to the above, several PWOs were observed in the fire pmtection ama, paragraph 5.
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| . 4.b. Maintenance Ouick Response Team In order to provide for rapid response to minor maintanance and minor masarial condition deficiencies, the licensee impia-aatad a quick response team in June 1995. ' Ibis team is 9-- M of and an Operations SRO, a foreman or comparable position from each malana==ca discipline, two ==chanica, one electncian, one IAC specialist and two or three utility workers. b SRO is assigned the
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| ====*=hility of team leader and identifbe the itsens to be worked on. N = alan =anca __g_-h assigns the appropriate mainiananca permannal needed to accomplish the task. All work must meet the following guidance to be =e----f ' ' by this team:
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| {,
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| * Work will be performed under the duection of the assigned SRO
| |
| -fr ' IAW AP 0010432, Rev 8, Section 8.4.3.A. ' Nuclear Plant Work Orders' jt e Work will be which states that the minor malataa-aa work must meet the following criteria:
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| i
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| - Not safety related or 'I5 equipment
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| ,l i
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| - Not EQ equipment
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| ! - Not naimmically mounted
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| - No welding involved
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| . - No clearance required No packing adjustment
| |
| ) - Work not used to close a STAR
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| " - ^ '
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| . - Work is not -- -
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| - Can be worked n'ader existing minor ==i=aan=aca work order for Unit 1 or Unit 2
| |
| } - Work can be perfonned under nonnal skills of journeyman i
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| h heensee perfonned several activities under this program durms the month and seeks to build and improve on this program as experience is developed.
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| : Tlw inspector rulewed this program with mal =*- management and de SRO team leadw. It appears to provide timely repairs for minar work without knposing significant work planning and
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| ; im;'- ^ ''- paperwork. The licensee also appears to have provided adequate controls to ensure that
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| ; the work activities will not degrade or jeopardise kuportant plant a '; -"
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| l,;
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| j 4.c. Surveillance Observations (61726) Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS
| |
| ; requirements ....The following surve=11ance test was observed:
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| ; 1) OP l-MnnrHOB. Rev 21. 'IB F=- --a Diesel G-~ator Perialic Test and Gaaaeal Oner=elaa ,
| |
| ;-} Instructions
| |
| * b inspector witnessed the June 12 surveillance test on the subject EDG. 'Ihe SNPO l perfonning pre etast checks had the procedure in-hand and was found to comply with its requirements. Prestart chaelra pracaadad satisfactorily. Upon engine idle-start, the inspector noted the EDO to come to approni==ealy 430 rpm and operate ==aaehty. 'Ibe inspector wiena==ad the EDG being paralleled to off-site power, followed by loading, from the control room. b RCO performing the evolution was found to be complying with the
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| ; subject procedure. The test was completed satisfactorily.
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| .i Four survaillaaema la the fire protection aren were also observed and documented la paragraph 5.
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| ; +.
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| j.
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| I *V Page 10 of 22 1
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| 1 4 .
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| f.
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| ' p) EXCERPTS IR 95-12 s .
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| {
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| ) Nr 5. Plant Support (71750) i 1
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| l 5.a. Fire Pmtection/hvention Ngram (64704)
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| : 1) Pmcedure Review h inspector performed a detailed review of the following Fire I l
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| a besetical."' ' wive Control beedures (5)....Overall these procedures were found to be satisfactory 1 with the following doestpancies or observations:
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| 1 l
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| ) A. AP nnn4729. Rev 10. " Fire Pr<_d-r*1a= TW ta . Qualifte=*6 and F --Hfta=*6' j
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| ; (1) Section 5.2 required that the h Pmtectica 4 visc,r a=*=hli=h the b Pra*areian Training Guide, j Section F of this Guide, "Self Canami==,1 Braathing Apparatus," dated 12/9/91, required that training in the use i j of. ,' r-. be provided to Are brigado per=aaaal by the h beection Supervisor. AP 0010598, Rev 1,
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| ! *Non-Radiological Respirator Program', Section 5.2, stated that the Training Department would provide training fori - - " who may be required to use respirators. M inspector qua eianant the b Protection Supervisor as to who is really responsible for implementing respiratory training and about this apparent lI;: contradicdon. He stated that Fire Brigade training on the use of SCBAs is the responsibility of the Fire
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| '
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| * Protection Supervisor and not the Training r , - ^-- ^.
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| . )
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| * l (2) Section 7.3 stated that the Medical F===ianelan Computer Pnntout Record of St. Imcie Plant Personnel or
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| ; its equivalent would be prepared by the HP staff. ' Ibis record identified the health status information required l to qualify perarmaal for fire Ashting activity. 'Ibere was no equivalent record prepared or mainaminart by the HP l
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| ! staff. b computer printout record available was REMACS, prepared by time Training Department, which
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| ! tracked the status of respiratory a===laa81a== for respiratory qualification. This record did not track b
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| , , (. Brigade physicals.
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| , I \p ' '
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| : 'Ibe health unit maimaaimart a separate computerised database known as OHM ('hnp=*ianal Health l "-- ; ^), however, no informadan on an employee's health status was available outside of the health unit.
| |
| ; h I- plans to add a new computer code to REMACS for tracking fire brigade physicals. {
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| ! (3) Section 8.5, " Fire Brigade Trainee Proficiency Evaluation and Qualification," rtated that the PSL Fire :
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| blaction Supervisor should establish a maahant of trainee proficiency evaluation which may include the )'
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| l fo!!owing techniques:
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| i .
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| I i
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| 'A) Written aramination - (multiple choice, matching, fill-in, essay, etc.)
| |
| l : B) Oral board or interview e===== tion i C) Walk-through aramiantion D) Other type as appropriate to assess the level of fire praeacelan knowledge and performance capability" s .
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| 'Ibeen requirements wenn met in initial training; however, requalification training proficiency was evaluated by
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| , j the Are protection supervisor using only direct field observation and a-r % the training and topics covered. No written test was maal=la8 9 ed to evaluate ladividual knowle4e. The . - .--- ""- =''= program -
| |
| was found to be very suldective and ed not contala strong daa====ameta= The licassee has agreed to evaluate and leiprove this area.
| |
| B. 1800022. Rev 15. " Fire besetion Plan' (1) Section 8.7.6 stated that the fire brigade would respond to areas outside the protected ater. In event of a fire Page 11 of 22 s .
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| i I
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| j A EXCERPTS IR 95-12 emergency. ' Ibis included the Nuclear Training rwaar and the B-11 and B-12/Pitness for Duty complex. 'Ibo Fire Protection O_,_-h 4id not schankila drills for these areas due to the Operations E. ' " not wanting j on-abiA licensed operators to go outside of the protected area. '!his approach could neult in the Are brigado not
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| ; salains familiarity with & area. 'the licanaam is currently evaluating this item to determine what changes are ij aseded.
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| 1 l (2) Seedon 8.7.6.A required that fire brigade members pass an annual Are bngade physical. 'Ibe Health Unit used various =arheal and respirator ===iaasina fonns, i.e., fire brigade member, licensed operator, respirator j only, diver, etc. ' Ibis practice has, at least on one occasion, resulted in a fire brigade -a-har not receiving the i, , correct annual physical araminatian. 'Ibo hc=ama= corrective actions stated la paragraph 5.a.5.b will address
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| '(
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| 1 this items.
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| , 2) Fire Protection Surveillance Pmeedures 'Ibe inspector reviewed OP 1000053, Rev 38, " Fire Protection i Water System
| |
| * annual and three year tests lacluding a verification of selected Are water header taal=*la= valves.
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| 'Ibe twelve month Are systemi Aush as performed in step 8.2 provided for ten parary installation of a hydrant gate valve at Are hydrant #13 for flushing of the power block Are headers and them at fire hydrant #31 to Aush
| |
| 'f
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| !, the ease dead les portion outside the power block. b inspector ;r'- ' both the Are protection engineer
| |
| ; and fbe protection supervisor as to the ==i== length of the dead les Are hydrants, specincally Are hydrant
| |
| : j. #12, which are act Aushed per this procedure. M As protection engineer =*imasai that the unnushed dead
| |
| ; lI leg was approximately 50 A la langth. A lic=a=a review of NFPA F24 (Private Fire Mains) found that it did
| |
| : not address flushing of deed legs. 'Ibe inspector also questioned why Auslang of the ace-power block dead leg l through fire hydrant #31 (east portion) was performed with no s,.._,- ''s flush through fin hydrant #38
| |
| ;.* (west portion). h fire protection supervisor stated that Aushing of the man-power block portion is based ce j good Are practices and that the west portion of piping was recently added. N lica==aa agreed to review this
| |
| ; O procedure to ensus that NFPA r ; ' --- and good fim practices for Aushing are met.
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| !i j;' '!he inspector noted that the valve descriptions la the procedure diNered from the n==arlata descriptions appearing on the valves. An example of this is the 2-V15531 (West Sectianalime Post Indicator) whose
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| , nameplate reads V15531 (PP Main Imop West Isol).
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| !4 Other than the above, the procedure was found to be adequate and the system's i< material condition was satisfactory.
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| !l 4
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| !j 3) Fire Pmtection System Surveillance Inspections and Tests 'Ibe inspector reviewed several completed ji surveillmac== and observed the monthly inspection of fire extinguishere, fin hoses and a startup transformer
| |
| ;, deluge test.
| |
| :4 A. b following -:=g' ^ 'savallancma (4) on Unit 1 were reviewed and no discrepancies were identified....
| |
| . B. Routine monthly fire protection surveillances on Are extinguishers and hoses.
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| I i (1) PWO 61/5036 performed the manehty fire hoes station inspection for Unit 1 per GMP 1-M4018P, Rev 21,
| |
| ; Appendix A (PM260). b inspector - =3 * ' and observed thejourneyman =acha=le perform this PM at 4
| |
| 11 hoes stations in the Unit 1 turbine building. 'Ibe inspector verified that the journeymen ==rh==le observed the requir==anta specified in the PM and was knowledgeable of the acceptance criteria. . Each fire hoes station was lampaes-I for (7 attributes)....Once the above inspections wese -:----J - ' for a fire hoes station, the 3
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| js.a y- =achante entered the inspection date and initialed the lamparei- record astachai at each hoes
| |
| ! station.
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| The inspector identified thme itmas, one related to M' -
| |
| ,*; and two aamael=*=1 with base station
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| ; Page 12 of 22 i
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| t 1
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| EXCERPTS IR 95-12
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| ; g
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| ;j identincadon. b housekeeping item involved storage of replacement lamps inside hose a4ation 15-13 cabinet l for the fire protection panel hydrogen seal oil and a hoes ap==aar wrench inside home station 15-1 cabinet. The j other two items appeared to be stated. Each fire hoes station was uniquely lamaified by a plastic placard and j had an inspection record attached. The inspection record has three columns for Date, i==pacead By, and i j F *;' * -- Laa=*6- The extinguisher location is lea blank with the hoes station identificataan maaaaaaad in l the top lea corner of the tag. In general, thejourneyman =achaaie verified the laratian by comparing the 1 plastic placard with the la=paa*6 record. However, the inspector noted that the inspection record for the last '
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| ; two hoes stadoes was annotated the same, i.e., HS-15-1. A comparison of the next to last hoes station
| |
| 'j determined that the inspection record should have read HS-15-12 and that the journeyman =arhaale had signed off this lampar*6 as HS-15-1,11 e la par *6 mcord was corrected and the PM reviewed for e-1he other item related to this miskientification appeared to be fadeout of certain handwritten entries on !
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| 1 ia=partia= records exposed to direct sunlight. This problem was noted on the inspection tocords for hose l stadon HS-15-14 (replaced by the =achaale) as well as HS 15-12. The bcensee is curready attempting to find a l solution for this probleni. ,
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| Overau, the inspector found that the sury.maa,* was perforened in a satisfactory ma==ar.
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| l:
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| i (2) PWO 69/4446 performed the maaehty Are - ^* ; '* -- tampacela= for Unit 2 per GMP 2-M4018F, Rev 16, Appendix A (PM5401). The laspector =---- y ' ' and observed the journeyman =achanic perform this PM lf for appmaimately ten fire extinguishers in the Unit 2 turbine baitd nr 1he inspector verified that the j g- =arhaair observed the requirements specified in the PM and was knowledgeable of the acceptance criterin. Each Are extinguisher was inspected for (7 attributes)...Once the above ia= par *W= were e:--g* ^ _' for _
| |
| i a Are *;"* , the journeyman machaair entered the lampar*6 date and initialed the lampar*== record
| |
| =**acAad to each Are extinguisher a
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| - l ll
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| [
| |
| G The inspector noted two itsens, the first being the fim '' . ** at location T-44 was specined in the checidist provided by the fire ,.J ^'- __ ~ '- as a dry chandcol when, in fact, it was CO., and a i praeaanral danciency in that the date of annual inspection was not included as a maadhly lampar*la=
| |
| .....1he journeyman =ach==le's lampartina of the fire auda;"* . observed by the inspector was thorough and
| |
| =atkadical Overall, the inspector frmed that the susedlance was performed in a utisfactory ==anac.
| |
| C. Startup Transformer Deluge and Sprinkler Test f7 b inspectors observed the annual surveillance testing of the Unit 1 startup transformer deluge and sprinkler
| |
| ;> 1 system conducted on June 9. Testing was supervised by a fire protection inspector who exercised positive control and ensured that ca==naie=*iaa= via h=adhald radios kept all parties informed. M inspector noted several problems ==aariatad with MP 0959063, Rev 8, ' Deluge and Sprinkler System Test," Section 1 and the
| |
| . system under test:
| |
| , (1) Step 8.1.3 identifies 4 valves for repositioning by stating 'Close the OS&Y (Outside screw & yoke) isolation valve and open the main drain valve'. The non-lacensed operator M-- ' whether these valves were uniquely identified. The laatatina valves had tags with valve identifiere V15907 (1A Startup Transformer) and V15901 (2A Stanup Transformer), however, the drain valves did not. b heensee has placed temporary tags on this equipment until per-maaar tags can be made.
| |
| 4 (2) Step 8.1.4 verified that the local panel trouble light and horn actuate aAer closing the isolation valves.
| |
| b results were recorded on data sheet #5. bre were two separate headers, each with an isolation V Page 13 of 22 4
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| l
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| ; f s, EXCERPTS IR 95-12 i
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| ! . O valve and limit switch which actuated a common local trouble alarm & hora. De 1 A header t=lasiaa i valve V15907 was 5-y-t^t--- ' Arat. Neither the trouble alarm or hora actuated. An lampaceh= of the
| |
| ! . limit switch found that its thimble was broken not allowing the alarm circuit to electrically actuate.
| |
| De IB isolatica valve V15901 was then closed. De trouble light actuated but the hora did not. De
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| ]
| |
| Are protection supervisor tapped the face of the hora which then soundad. A PWO was issued and the
| |
| ; born was replaced on June 23. His step had no alsnoff an data sheet #5 &-:= - "Ng that control
| |
| ' room annunciator C-57, 'XFMR FIRE DELUGB SYS LOCAL ALARM," actuated. De procedure MP 09509063 was modified to correct this item.
| |
| (3) Step 8.1.5 activated each H.A.D. device with verincation that the =l-aid valve thh and reset i' when the heat was removed and checked the local alarm light & bell. His step also included " Verify control room received alarms ce the system.' b results were reconied on data sheet #5. %e l ,
| |
| inspector observed that the Are protection laspector -= '-M=; the test had a=tahhahad radio cosan=aica*ian with the individuals applying the heat source, but not with the control room. When l
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| : ^9- ' how data sheet #5 step 8.1.5 (control roose alarm received) would be signed off, the Am protection laspector contacted the control room to verify that they had received an alarm. De Aro j protection laspector laformed the inspector that a single control roosa alarm verifles this signoff i;
| |
| J E; ^. He inspector reviewed the CWDs and qm=*iaaad asveral IAC magineers regarding
| |
| }l control soons ma==eisiae C-58, ''IRANSPORMER FIRE.' CWD #559 incorrectly showed a total of j# 20, tadaad of 24, detectors installed, each ca==aetad la parallel to 'IB-2 of the transfonner Am j protection local control panel. Appropriate changes have been made to the test g-:-- * ; to correct 4 theos items. De discrepancy noted on the CWD was documented on Drawing Change Request Notice 074-195-5211 for correction.
| |
| !, P -(4) A portion of the 2A startup transfonner deluge piping developed a leak during testing. He apparent
| |
| !j!' L., cause was piping falhue due to conesian as a result of prolonged service (about 23 yen.3). He , i k discrepancy was noted and a soA patch applied. STAR 95060s was ganarated to evaluate Unit 1
| |
| ; transfonner deluge system piping. De current plans are to replace the affected piping at the nearest
| |
| . practical date. An engineering evaluation and inspection of the piping on Unit 2 is also plannad.
| |
| 1
| |
| : (5) Step 8.1.8 identified between six and eight partially or completely clogged heads on startup transformer
| |
| [ 1A deluge system. %e heads were diamanamhled, cleaned and stested. Additional heads clogged i, during the Arst retest. De hands were dianseembled, cleaned and ratested. Again, several amore hands l j' clogged. A visual anminatina of the material removed from the clogged heads concluded that I sloughing of the pipe was occurring and that further testing would not result in a nati= factory survaillmana test. h fim protection supervisor terminated the surveillance and directed test penannel l
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| 1- to reset the clappere for both headers. At 11:35 a.m. the startup transfonners deluge and spriaktar i system was declared '=5-- " and a clearance was issued. Appropnate - ^ - , measures were
| |
| ; taken which included the staging of Are fighting equipment at a nearby Are hydrant.
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| i Overall, the survaill-ca was conducted in a professional =manar and all participants were well-briefed and li prepared to conduct the test. De Are protection inspector candneaad the test la a very controlled mannar and signed off g -- *-- J steps as they were completed. Discrepancies noted during testing were =aa*=*=d la the procedure margia to ensure that a STAR would be generated. Declaring the startup transfonner deluge and i apriaktar systesa inoperable aAer repeated clogging of the heads was prudent and will ensure that proper
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| -ga===t asematian is focused on a .wi g this problem. The numiher of pracadural deflet-et==
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| ; Identined by the laspector clearly losBeate that test personnel have not besa paying strict attamalan to
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| ^
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| 1- : -_ __ : detnias dusing previous tests.
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| j ..A' Page 14 of 22 4
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| i i
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| _ _. _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . ._._ _ . _ _ ._ ._ _ . =_. _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _.
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| p p
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| ,n EXCERPTS IR 95-12 L
| |
| l w 4) Pire Pmtsetion Audat 'Ibe inspector reviewed Quality Assurance Audit QSI< OPS-95 02 perfonned on
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| : April 21,1995, h audit was thorough with no Andings in the fire protection program. ' Ibis audit was previously reviewed by the NRC and documented in IR 95-10.
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| . 5) Fire Brigade A. Composition h shiA Are brigade ==i=*= of Ave ma=h-s including the Am brigade leader (usually the 4 NWE) selected each shiA from the current, up-to-date E=argency Team Roster. b brigade did not include
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| %e NPS, nor the three other ===k==s of the minia== shiA crew necessary for the safe shutdown of tbs unit
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| , and any personnel required for a==ametal Ametions during a Are eensejency." h composition could be less d than the Ave suombers for a period not to erraad two hours to accourmodate naarpareart =h===ca=, provided i==adiata action was taken to restore the composition to Ave.
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| 'Ihe inspector noted that the Are brigade was staffed entirely by operators. Farmat industry events have found
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| : l. that this could result in conflicting duties and weaken the plant's ability to mapand to a concurant Are and other d plant event or emergency. ' Ibis was discussed with the licenses and they agreed to mysew this itsen and d detennine if staffing changes are needed.
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| q
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| ^'
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| U 'Ibe inspector , - " several items on the emergency team roster.
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| '
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| * b fact that homo M-f == numbers and addneses for fire brigade ===hars were not current.
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| ;
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| * h inclusion of ladividuals who have past Are brigade training but are not currently qualified and have
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| - no emergency team response function.
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| ]
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| O h Are praeartina supervisor agreed that the emergency team roster is used to assign on-shiA Are brigade
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| ]
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| i
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| ( v_ h members and was not aware of any markani== or . , ' - ^ to maintain current personnel hans eataphana numbers and addresses. 'Ibe ' alumnus
| |
| * Are brigade mesabers have no emergency team Amotion. 'Ihe licensee
| |
| : j. is currently reviewing this list and has agreed to conect any administrative errors.
| |
| B. Trainina and Ouahfication AP 1800022, Rev 15, " Fire Pranae*== Plan," specines the qualiAcations of the
| |
| !: fire brigade. Each ===har must meet the following requirements-
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| !i e Pass annual fire brigade physical e - Satisfactory completion of initial and requalification training i e Areandanem at a minimum of two fire brigade drills annually
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| ..
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| * Annual participation in Are brig.& practical field exercises
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| : d.
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| * Respirator qualified i
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| !' 'Ihe annual IIm brigade physical is adminiatared at the onsite health unit staffed by contract employees under the i'
| |
| supervision of the Protective Services I%.-ta.a.t. Included in this physical avaminatinn is a respirator a= = =i==tiaa 'Ihe results of the physical are provided in the su==ary block , i.e., 'h e===iaaa is p, QUAIJFIED WTlHOUT RES'IRICI1ONS*, 'N ava=iaaa is NOT QUAllFIED' and 'N avaminaa is QUAIJFIED WTIM 'lHE Poll 4 WING RES'IRICI10NS." h inspector reviewed the medical records of all currently qualified fim brigade persannel (55 total) and noted the following-o' ~ One flue brigade team ma=har completed the respirator-only a===inarian. in February 1995. A prior lica=aad operator medical ====3==*ian gives February 1994 was on file, b fire proaartir=
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| supervisor's training records showed that the medical qualifleation was met on 1 March 1995. A 4 search of records in the vault could not verify medical qualification. As a result, the hcanaam removed this individual from fire brigade duties pending a =adic=1 =====ation.
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| 1.
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| Page 15 of 22
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| - . - . - . . ~ - . - .- . _ _ . . -~ - . - -- _--_
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| 1
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| .t i
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| p EXCERPTS IR 95-12 j '
| |
| * One Are brigade team leader in 1992 and 1994 was reported as ''Ibe awaminaa is QUAllPIED WTIH j '!WB POLLOWING RESTRICI1ONS,'specifying the use of corrective lenses. In 1993 the anme j
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| * ladividual was reported as **Ibe ====i=== is QUAllPIED WTIMOUT RESIRICITONS." " Ibis ,
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| individual wore contact lenses. b =adeal history portion of the form did not speci5cally ask if one l I
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| l, woes contact lenses.
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| e Several fire brigade permannat had a twensed operator e===ia aion and respirator ====laatiaa given !
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| i within the past twelve months. According to the Fire Protection Supervisor, this a===inarian satis 5ed l I
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| ! . the requirement for an annual Are brigade ==al=r e===ination and respirator e====aasiaa, as it was
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| :i ' more stringent. 'Ihis was a blaaanal ====laatia= and would only apply for twelve months aAer the j
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| - ===1==*ia= was ad=ial= eared. Nro was no written instruction describing this practice svallable for ;
| |
| j laspector review. W licaamaa had the various procedures and medical e===iastions forms used under I
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| review.
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| i !
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| l
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| * Ten of the 55 nre brigade personnel were ==Iwally quali5ed with restrictions requinas the use of !
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| ! cornetive lenses. M visual acuity criteria for no restrictions was 20/40 or better in either eye uncorrected. 'Ihe results reported for these individuals ranged from >20/40 to 20/200 (largest character on eye chart). ' Ibis medical resenction precluded the use of glasses with temple pieces as
| |
| ; specined in HP-73, Rev 3, 'PORTACOUNT PLUS FIT 'IliFr SYSiliM.* During the respirator fit
| |
| . . test, contact lenen could not be worn. Additional training was provided by the Am proaction
| |
| ! supervisor in the use of SCBAs. As stated by the Are protection supervisor, it was not FP&L policy to
| |
| ! require the use of corrective lenses for those individuals assigned to the Am brigade. However, PP&L
| |
| ; would provide, at no cost, either cormative lenses for rapitators or RK if mquested by the individual and approved by the Operations Supervisor. A list of Are brigade per=aanal requiring corrective lenses
| |
| ~S was provided to the licenses for clarincation.
| |
| ;jj ,
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| pa)
| |
| * A review of the REMACs SCBA qualified operations personnel showed that in one instance, a recently a qualined fire brigade team leader was not SCBA qualified. h nie pranae*iaa supervisor and the
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| ; inspector conArmed this individual had completed training and that REMACs was in error.
| |
| i In response to the above denciencies, the lica=== formed a team to review this area and develop a plan to correct all identined waakaa-as. This team was composed of supervisors fmm Protection Services, Security, IIsalth Physics, Corporate Safety, and the contract alte medical officer. 'Ibe team reviewed .+-L 1, industry I
| |
| standards and decided to !q'-- a alte wide manadard requirement for wearing corrective lens with respirator.
| |
| ; This standard will require corrective lens if uncorrected vision is greater than 20/40 far vision. ' Ibis new
| |
| : standard, when imptamaatad, will permit wearing of respirator face piece glasses or contact lens with a l7 44 . If contact lens are worn, then that person amst qualify and practice wearing a respirator with contact j lers to ensure that they can perform effectively in that envirana=d I
| |
| j b licenses will also modify the REMACS da'al== to ensure that all persons who may use respirators are Adly qualined. 'Ibe tracking system for this program will be maintalaad by HP. W licensee has stated that
| |
| ,4 this new program will be fully implemented by September 1,1995.
| |
| 'lhe inspector had discussed this issue in detail with the licensee and believes these changes will improve fire brisado effectiveness.
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| C. Fire Briands Fire Pinhtmg Stratenies 'Ibe inspector rev' awed . the Arenghtmg strategies for Unit I and Unit
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| ~
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| 2 turbine buikhng and found thern to be satisfactory.
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| i D. Fire Brimade Drill An unanaaunced Are drill +8ad on June 5 was observed and evaluated. ' Ibis Page 16 of 22 4 .
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| d W
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| d-
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| i.
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| L i s J
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| O EXCERPTS IR 95-12
| |
| ' V exercies involved a simulated Class "B' fire on the Unit 2 DEH Platform. b Am was callad in to the control
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| ! room from the scene by the exercise evaluator. b tacariaa and class of Are was correctly =aaa==ca 8 over the
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| ! plant page system. A non lica==d operator arrived on the scene approximately three minutes mAer the
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| =aaanaea-mt and partially removed a Are hose from the closest hose stataca. Five additional plant operators arrived on the scene to assist as needed None of the above j ---- " were dressed in Arefighting gear.
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| Appromassaly one minute later the fire brigade appeared on the scene. All brigade ma=hers were dressed out but only one person was wearing a SCBA N inspector noted that the first hoes to approach the fire was not j completely removed from the rack and properly faked out on the floor to prevent hoes kinking. A second hose
| |
| : j. that was used to approach the fire for the opposite side of the turbine building was also not completely removed and faked out properly until 7- -+- ' by the inspector.
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| lt Approximately seven minutes aAer the fire was announced over the page system the brigade made an approach
| |
| - with a Hre hoes and the evaluator declared the Ass out. b laspector made the following additional j j . observations of the exercise:
| |
| i e the response by the brigade was timely a;
| |
| * no clear guidance is provided as to the use of SCBAs in the turbine buddag fires
| |
| * hoses were not properly removed from the racks and . ended during Arefighting ,
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| l
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| * Are teams turned their back on the fim and walked away froen the scene when the fire was declared out. A reflash could have resulted in personnel injury
| |
| * no reflash watch was established
| |
| * cae fire brigade mamher was wearing glasses. 'Ibe inspector q==*inaad if he had SCBA glasses. b individual stated that he generally wore glasses for readmg and did not need '
| |
| r glasses when wearing SCBA. Followup la=pacelaa found this individual's vision to be 20/200
| |
| ; and 20/50, which requimd corrective lenses. ' Ibis area was looked into further. See g
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| jj; par. graph 5.a.5.b.
| |
| * the brigade leader did not appear to take positive control and direct fire ishting efforts i
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| * ea====icatia== from the brigade leader to the control room were good
| |
| ; e security . ,- *' with keye to tacarad areas and to request offeite ===t e , if needed l
| |
| * the drill critique was not thorough and did not add value to the exercise A second inspector observed the fire drill from *he lower level of the turbine building. Two operators were assigned by the Are brigade leader to this area to assist. Neither operator had turn rmt gear. 'the closest Are hoes was removed from the rest with one operator manaiag the hoes and the other merged at the shutoff valve.
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| One turn of the Are hose ra==laad on the rack which the operator removed when the inspector asked whether j''
| |
| this would interfere with the pressurizmg the hose properly. 'Ibe fire brigade leader briefed both operators, had them refake the Are hoes such that it ramalaad behind the operator holding the nozzle and dama==* rated a circular pattern for spreying the area. h inspector verified that both operators were knowledgeable of where to draw turn out gear. Located beneath the DEH platform on the first deck of the turbine buildag was a locked l maine - case containing a fla===hle liquid storage locker. Neither operator was aware of this locker. b inspector veri 5ed that this area was accessible by requesting on-scene security to unlock the cage.
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| J Overall, the drill was considered satisfactory. The inspector noted that the drilllacked nelism and that -
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| , Arefightlag eacams9== were week and need additional =*rs=ela= The lle-ase has stated that adational amphasis wiu be placed on these exercises.
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| : 6) Plant Tour and Inspection of Fire Protection Equipment A. Svstem Ilneuon/ Aron Walkdowns During the inspection period selected portions of the fire protection i
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| system and general area walkdowns were performed.
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| ; Page 17 of 22 5
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| . , . , ~ . _ . _ _ - . . . - v re , t'*
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| 4 1
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| 1 j' ,% EXCERPTS IR 95-12 i.
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| j .
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| (1) On June 22,1995, the inapaesar walked down that postson of the five pe=*ae*ian systasa adjma==* to both 3
| |
| city water storage tarts ir.cluding suction piping, valves, pasps and above smund discharge piping to the buried Am protection headers. 'Ibe inspector veriRed an adequate water supply existed in both city
| |
| : water tanks (> 300,000 gallons each). However, the inspector noted that auction emes-tie valve V15282 placarded as a locked open valve did not have the lock installed. ' Ibis naadislan was bsought
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| ; to the ='t=sion of a Unit 1 control room operator for correction. A followup inspection of this valve on June 23,1995, verified that a replaeannaar lock was installed. All valves inspected were found in a the normal operating lineup.
| |
| i~- (2) 'Ibe inspectors also perfonned an area walkdown of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 switchaser and cable ji spreading rooms, the ESP battery rooms and the EDG buildings, ====iining Are - ' - * * - ., Are hoses, emergency lighting, Ase detectors and Are barriers to include Are doors, stops, piping j' ,
| |
| electrical cable trays. b abesace of combustibles and fire hazards was also verified.
| |
| ; b following deAciencies were identified:
| |
| i e In the Unit 1 RAB, a gap in cable tray #10 mounting frame adjar==d to HS 15-32, and a cover off Are detector in 1A battery room. 'Ibo lica=== submitted PWOs to correct these laanas.
| |
| * In the Unit 1 EDG Buildings, the fire protection piping was not painted red- ,
| |
| a o j' e In the Unit 2 RAB, fire extinguishar A-91 was overcharged. 'Ihis extinguisher was subsequently replaced. A loose wire, taped above RA-RB-1, PP-223 p - M=: wall, was also found. ' Ibis item was identified to electrical =iaina===ca who i currently investigating it.
| |
| l e In the Unit 2 EDO buildings, fire - P--f *-- D-7 annual lampartian that expired at the end of
| |
| : j. i
| |
| ) Februnsy 95, was found. 'Ihis --"-7* - was replaced on June 29.
| |
| ; B. Permanmit Plant Fire Pmtection Features 'the inspector visually inspected the accessible Are barrier penetrations in the above areas and they appeared to be satisfactory condition. All visible Thermo-Iag and
| |
| {j cable tray Flammatic appeared to be intact and in good physical condition.
| |
| H 2: ,
| |
| On June 16,1995, the inspectors accompanied both the corporate fire protection engineer and the fire protection supervisor in a random check of Are barriers located in the Unit 1 piping penetration nues and ECCS pump rooms. Several observations were made during this :-- an**
| |
| * Penetration 050-S-8 (24' diameter opening with a 14' diameter pipe passing through Iccated in the
| |
| !I noor alab in the piping penetration area) was idaatified and examined. An evaluation of the fire barrier i;
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| ~
| |
| itself was inconclusive due to the presence of an installed boot. h inspectors learned that the fire barrier ia par *Ian for this type of penetration involves a visual inspartiaa of the condition of the boot which is Del removed. b boot is =**= chad with adha=ive. b penetration is also iampacead from the side that does not have a boot installed.
| |
| a .
| |
| * Penetration 050-S-2 (22' di===atar opening with a 12' disaiasar pipe passing through located in Soor slab accessible from at the -10 A elevation in the 1A IESI pump room) showed evidence of slumping between 2'-4' with a circumferential crack autanding approviaimaaly 180' on the side facing 4
| |
| ennemiani=* h inspector requested that the Picaa-a evaluate this ;-- t '=. 'this item was raia=partad on June 19,1995 (see below).
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| !'
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| * Several conduit fire stops were chaelrad. Cracking of the spray on fire istardant material was noted on the side with the installed Are rmint=i board.
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| Page 18 of 22 4
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| a f
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| l
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| . EXCERPTS IR 9512
| |
| !; D 'Ibe inspector requested that a qualified QC inspector accompany the fire protection supervisor and inspector on
| |
| ! a snore thorough walkdown of selected Are dampers, ECCS pump roora pipe penetrations, and fim stops.
| |
| 5 On June 19, 1995, the inspector was =e -- , 9 by the Are pootection supervisor and a QC inspector in the l{
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| j.
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| continuing evaluation of fire barrier seals in the ECCS pump rooms, electncal conduit fire stops, and two fire i dampers lacasad in the rod drive MG set area.
| |
| 4
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| }
| |
| Penetration 050-S-2 was evaluated using a feeler sage. Separation of the fire barner material had occurred up j to approximately It" as measured from elevation -10 A upwards through the aleb. As a result of &
| |
| 14 danciency, the lie asas issued a breech pennit which requires hourly roving Are watch inspection of & area.
| |
| j' h inspector roe aested that the boot installed on the topside of & p ^- "-= be rernoved for i==pae+ia= h
| |
| , licaamaa concW in the need for & laspection and is issuing a STAR. A safety evaluation of a suitable boot i rept-r will d6v the ac.ual lampartiaa several weeks. 4 1
| |
| One additiceal pipe penetration located through the well above the stairs going down to the 1 A RCIyr Pump l l l ., showed signs of separation frees the wall. A closer inspection of this penetration will be performed by the j licensee.
| |
| i Fire damper FDPR-25-110 and PDPR 25-110 access covers were removed and the fire dampers araminad.
| |
| Direct observation conArmed that the dampers were intact and ciman 'Ibe licaa=== recendy tampar*=d all plant Are dampers and replaced a large nusnber of broken springs. A routine inspection of several other fire dampese did not identify any additional deficiencies.
| |
| An av==laatian of an electrical conduit fire stop found a void portion in an area on the top. Observation on the
| |
| ~
| |
| ha**am side of the Are stop showed that the void did not extend through due to the pr==ance of the fire retardant j board. 'Ihis was datannined to be E-V"': by QC and the inspector.
| |
| : 7) Fire Protaction Engineer 'Ihe Are protection engineer graduated from an accredited university in 1978 with a dual degros in both nuclear and =achaaical engineering He has been emp oyed by FP&L since graduation in progressively more responsible engineering positions including smalgamaar as the corporate Are pranae*ian engineer since 1986 and meets the qualification requimments for & positios .
| |
| It wi.s noted that the Are protection engineer works in the corporate office in Juno kach and is responsible for St. Iacia and 'nukey Point plants. He is charged with engineering oversight of this program. A review of the site access log for the last twelve swaths showed monthly visits with sufficient time onsite to perform assigned duties including access to vital areas, h actual day-to< lay operation and administration of the plant Are protection program is directed by the plant fire protection supervisor.
| |
| : 8) Anpandix R Fire Protection Features Appendix R to Part 50 - Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January,1979, Section III.H states, 'Self. contained breathing apparatus ..shall be provided for Are brigade, damage control, and control room per=a==al'.
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| 1
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| +
| |
| b liemanama does not maintain an emergency roster of damage control or 're entry team' perscenel. HP and shop workers receive SCBA training as determinad by their department conducted by either qualified HP l instructors or the training department. No control room per=aanal other than SROs qualined as Are brigade ;
| |
| leaders are currently SCBA qualified. ' Ibis was discussed with the licammaa and they are currently evalcating I this item to determine what changes are naadad.
| |
| Overall, the lica==a= fire protection program was found to be satisfactory. h waalraa-a= identified during the q inspection have been discussed in detail and the licensee has agreed to make the necessary changes. 'Ibe Page.19 of 22
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| . __ _ L - ___ - ___-_________
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| d i
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| EXCERPTS IR 95-12 4;
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| N./, inspector clans to review these changes as they are implamaatad.
| |
| l4
| |
| ; 9) Pire Pmtsetion Survey 'Ihe following information was provided by the t- in response to questions
| |
| ; anang from the Waterford 3 fire of June. 'Ibe responses are presented in the format requested by NRC Region
| |
| ?-* 11.
| |
| a A. What la the ea --ition of the fire brl==da and thair normal Adi- (aeka ^== fire bri-=Aa)7 h PSL Fire l Brigade is composed of plant operations personnel. b Ave man bngade includes the Nuclear Watch Engineer
| |
| ! (Senior Reactor Operator, Fire Brigade Iaader) who is in charge of the r===iaiar four brigade members, the on-shiR Aeld operators. 'Ibe Nuclear Watch Engineer is the operating foreman for the field operators under
| |
| . normal operations, and has no specine duties called out under the Emergency Operating Procedures or the Emergency Plan. N Associate Nuclear Plant Operator is responsible for the water trs=8vaana plant, iaenka
| |
| ; areas and other =incall aar- out-lying facilities. 'the Nuclear Plant Operator is responsible for the turbine
| |
| ' buikhng and it's ===aciasad equipment. 'Ibe Senior Nuclear plant Operator is responsible for the equipment located inside the RCA.
| |
| r <
| |
| a B. Whan would the fire bri- d- he activated? (i.e. first renort of ==aka anar fia- are -#ir--A anar !
| |
| stabilizina the plant. aAer beina relieved for nost. etc.) h PSL Fire Brigade would be activated to respond to f
| |
| , a fire aAer the contml room has received notincataca of a Am. In the event of a fire concurrent with additteemessiussessmasas )
| |
| ! plant events, the Nuclear Plant Supervisor would analyas plant conditions and prioritize the appsopriate i
| |
| ,- correctiv. actions to en=re reactor =fety is -iniminad l I '
| |
| C. Would <dk-- n - 'Adi= *=ka nrincity over "- the fire bri- A-7 (e.n. w we' - I = r.:. = - Giv -
| |
| e '. i W lae a P --
| |
| * loss of incur to =-_ *iv alarm reaniring a w-- --- 'w -t_ etc.) See response to
| |
| : /N itesa 2 above. ,
| |
| w i
| |
| , . D. What is the critaria to call a fire? (i.e. -aka only is ==' fi are r-ani_ed. etc.) VeriAcetion of )
| |
| amaka is sufAcient to report a fire to the control room.
| |
| E. Is the fire alarm in the -* ol room ==*hla and visible durina ak-- -n wi=*iaa= such as would be seen i durina a reactor trio or IDOP7 Annunciation, both audible and visible, for sprinkler systems and fire pumps running are located on the Reactor Turbine Gauge Boards in the control rooms. N Pire Detection Computer
| |
| {-
| |
| providse an audible alarm in the control room. 'this system also psovides ladwatian of the affected zone and i* provides the control room operators with the ability to call up a graphical repramantation of the alarmed area.
| |
| i P. Would the lica==aa ca=ha' an alae
| |
| * ical switeh-r fire with water for and u~ta what enamtlaa=7 (i.e.
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| ;l i verify busses are deenergized) Dunns training, Fire Brigade members are trained in the use of water for
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| ;' fighting fires in motors and metal clad switchgear. N first step is to deemergize the equipamit. Brigade
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| ===ha s are trained to use electrical fog nozzles and malatala at least six feet of diae= ara from the equipment and always assume it is energized. Initial training involves use of a video tape presentation regarding the use of
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| ., water on energized equipment. Training does not involve actual water spray on energized electrical equipment.
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| O. Am there any fire brigade manning differences durina backshift? h five man fire brigade is mainanlaad 24 hours a day agardless of shin, day of week, holiday or other cire===*= .
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| 4 H. How oAen does the licenses test the fire brigade durina backahins? 10 CFR 50 Appandu 'R". states each
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| , shift should have at least one fire drill on the hackshift a year. In 1994, a total of 12 fire drills were given on the hackahin at PSL; each shift received at least one drill on the back shiR, most received rnore than one.
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| ' I. What fire eaaAleiaa= would e- the dactar=#iaa of an NOUE. alert. etc.? From Emergency Plan Page 20 of 22 i
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| l n EXCERPTS IR 95-12 Il .
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| ._ / Implementing Procedme 3100022E 'Classincation of Emergencies': )
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| i Notice of Unusual Event: Uncontrolled fire within the plant lasting more than ten mianama. )
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| i Alert: Uncontrolled Are,1. Poemati=11y affecting safety systems AND 2. Reg ring off-site support in i the opinion of the Nuclear Plant Supervisor / Emergency Coordmatar.
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| I Site Area Emergency; Fire compromising the function of safety systems (i.e. both trains rendered
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| ; INOPERABLE)
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| ;' General Es-. :y: Refer to Poemanial Cosa Melt Event
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| [ J. What criteria is used to reauest off-site assistance? From Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 3100025E ' Fire Emergencies *:
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| ? If the fire is too large to be controlled by available plant forces, then off-site fire ==Ime- shall be ca!!ed by the Emergmey Coordmator.
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| 5.b. Phvalcal Protsetion During this inspection, the inspector toured the protected area and noted that the !
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| perunster fence was intact and not compromised by erosion or disrepair....No violations or deviations were I u- ideniined. l i
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| n
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| ;1 5.c. Radmlogical Protection Program Padiaelaa protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in conformanca with the facility policies and precedures, and in comphance with regulatory i- requimeents .....
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| .. As a result of QA audit findings of two examples of SNM control deficiencies (material stored in areas not in
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| ! comphance with AP 0010433, Rev 27, 'Special Nuclear Material Control, Records and Reports') the inspector conducted an audit of the licensee's storage of accessible SNM. & laspector reviewed the licensee's inventory of SNM, prepared in accordance with the subject procedure, and, with the ==latanca of HP personnel, verified l jl{ 4j the laeatla== of 18 pieces of SNM. I Of the 18,12 piecw were stored as replaca==at items (incore and excore fission chambers) in the G-1 warehouse. Of the 12,3 pieces (,En - " moveable incere fission chamhars) west found without radoactive material identiftentiaa tags. 'the halanca were properly identified. Further, the 12 total pieces
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| , stored in the warehouse were found to be stored on racks amid=# other stores items. ;
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| ;i l jl'
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| ......Following the identification of the 3 pieces in question. HP persanaal surveyed and tagged the outer l j
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| containers appropriately, b inspector noted that the caatainars had been originally identified via a form,
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| ,' placed on the containers in accordance with a previous revision of AP-0010433, which required HP notification prior to the movement of the SNM. On the form, the sources were identified isotopically as .01 micro-Ci of U-it 235, .25 micro-Ci of U-234, and .01 micro-Ci of Co-60.
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| ; . . I 3
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| h inspector noted that 10 CFR 20.1904(a) required, in part, that each container of licensed material bear *...a !
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| durable, ciently visible label bearing the radiation symbol and the words ' CAUTION, RADIOACIIVE MATERIAL' or ' DANGER, RADIOACIIVE MATERIAL..',' unless, as provided in 10 CPR 20.1905, the
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| , cantalaar held material in quantities less than those specified in appendu C to 10 CFR 20.1001-20.2401. W inspector referenced the subject appnada and found the threshold levels for U-234 (.001 micro-Ci) and U-235
| |
| . (.001 adcro Cl) to be below the investoried levels in the subject pieces. Consequently, the beensee's failure to appropriately label the subject containers prior to the inspector's finding is a violation. However, the inspector noted that the licensee took quick action to place radioactive material tags on the caatainars in question and that HPP-80 (which came into effect aAer the material was received) required tagging of radioactive material containers upon receipt (conceivably protecting against recurrence. This failure constitutes a violation of salnor significance and is being treated as a Non Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC 1
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| Page 21 of 22 I
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| ! l EXCERPTS IR 95-12
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| [
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| (N
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| 'l %M Enfereement Policy. This will be ldmaalSed as NCY 50 335,389/95-12 42, "Fallure to L-W, Tag ,
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| l MaAlanctigg Maggrialg a i 1 . b laspector noted that 10 CPR 20.1903(c) stated that "A room or area is not required to be posted with a
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| . can*ina sign because of the presence of a sealed source provided that the radiatina level at 30 cm from the
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| ; surface of the source container or liousing does not exceed 0.005 rem (.05 mSv) per hour.' b inspector ;
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| , verilled that surveys taken of the consalames ladicated does rates below this threshold value. However, the !
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| j licanaaa's failure to poet a radioactive matenals area around the 12 pieces stored in the G-1 warehouse was in j j contradictica of the requirements of step 7.20 of HPP-80. b inspector discussed this matter with ===hans of ;
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| l , the licensee's HP m. '=^'==, who pointed out that the materials in question wese received on site prior to the lasuance on HPP-80 (May,1995), tims the procedure had not bensi apphed to the subject material upon receipt. l l
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| l N inspec'.or a=====ad previous revisions of HP-40A, ' Receipt of Radiaartive Matenal," the pradar===ae of
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| < HPP-40, and verified that there was no previous m *E -
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| - for the storage of the subject pieces in designated
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| ' radioactive material storage areas. 'Iberefore, the inspector concluded that the failure to store the subject material per HPP-80 requirements was the result of an ovenight on the part of HP per=anaal, in that material l I
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| stored previous to the issuance of HPP-80 were not reviewed under the new requir==aaan. 'lhe area aantaining a the materials was t ; Ay lahalad as a radioactive materials storage area.
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| l
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| . 6. Engineering Support (37550)
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| I n,._ n- Nurlaae Ine = ub Ta-a~arv MadiBr=*6 (IP37550) On May 30,1995, Unit 1 Power
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| : Range Nuclear Instr ===atariaa Systens (NIS) Excore naearear thanal D (detector no. 8) was exhibiting erratic behavior. % axial shape index showed a drop which led to the initiation of Nuclear Plant Work Order NPWO j 63/3639 to investignie this condition. b low output signal from safety related NIS linear power range chanaal
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| :, < D (IRD) could be caused by a faulty detector or a short in the detector cable, h problem was decennined to l{, %'
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| i be located inside the aaatala-a=8 and could not be repaired at power. h detector / cable insulation resistsace acceptanos criteria was at one mogohm and the measured values reported in the work order ranged from 90 to
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| ! 20,000 aluns from center @*~ to shield. 'Ibe normal Reactor Protective System NIS trip logic was two out of four. However, with the faulty detector cAmanal in trip the trip logic was reduced to one out of three.
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| i St. Imcle Action Report, STAR 1-950581 was written for % issue. 'Ibe STAR recommanded using non-eafety related B train control chanaal (CC2) NIS detector No.10 to replace IRD, detector No. 8, by use of ajumper l
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| in the main control room from detector No.10 to NIS chanaal D drawer. Unit I temporary modification,
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| [ Jumper and IJfted ined (J11), JIL 195-018 Implemented this change A part of the STAR 1950581
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| ; evaluated the initial operability and concluded that the temporary modification did not affect plant operability.
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| , Safety Evaluatica JPN-PSleSENP-95 049, Alternate NIS Excore Detector Arrangement, revision 1, provided j- justification for the jumpers, h safety evaluation concluded that plant technical specifications were met and ;
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| ; that the plant design basis was met except for electrical separation between excore NIS ch==aala B and D.
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| ! 'Ibe Unit i design basis required conformanca to IEER standard 279-1971, Criteria For Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations b standard requires chmanal ladapaadane* to pectect against environmental factors of electrical transients, physical accidents, and to reduce interactions due to channel
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| ; malfuac*la==.
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| ; Electrical separation design basis requirements of 4 feet verucal and 18 inches hori==tal for NIS channel B and control cha==al 2 (now chanaal D) were not met from inside enatalamana junction box B1072 to ocatrol room i- penal R*IGB104. h channel B and control channel 2 eables were routed in the samma raceways. N safety
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| ,, evaluation decennined that this was =--J"- hacan=a the cables were not part of the Unit 1 safe shutdown circuits and that the cables were signal cables of low power / energy. Additionally, the cables were not routed in i areas where they would be exposed to significant physical harards. 'Ibe A and C chanaal NIS cables were not
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| EXCERI'TS IR 9512 1
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| ;L / routed with the B and D chanaal NIS cables. b safety evaluation concluded that the ' ;x qjumpering of 4 the CC2 detector to NIS IJtD drawer was a:ceptable and that at the Arst outage jumpers would be lamaallad inside caneala===* between IJtD dela. tor No.10 and CC2 danar*ae No. 8 which would mainsaia the ch===al separation requirements until the next refueling outage when the dasaesar/ cable could be repaired or replaced.
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| b inspectors performed a walkdown and verined that the jumper configuration was installed in accordance with Jumper and IJAed I.and (JLL) 1-95 018 requirements. b control room Jumper and UAed Iaad Los contained marked up drawings showing the jumpers. All the jumpers and affected switches were properly j Instahd and tagged. 'Ibe reactor regulating switch was selected to chanaal 1 and the power ratio e t '-*
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| . switch for control ch= anal 2 was in the off positica.
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| i 'Ihe inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 Fasaatial Equipment Ust 8770-B-049, revisica 1, and verified that the NIS linear power range detector circuits were not required for Appendix R safe ahn8Aawn. b inspectors reviewed i drawing 8770-B-327, sheet 61, revision 10, and 8770-B-327, sheet 63, revision 11 and verified that isolation
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| : t betwesa safety relased and non-eafety related circuits was malatalaad. No non-eafety related power was jj, caaaaeead to the safety related NIS linear chanaal D drawer / cabinet.
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| 4t I h inspectors reviewed licensee printouts from the procuramaar dan hama e and noted that detectors no. 8 and 10 l were supplied on the same purchase order to the same specification requirements and quality level.
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| NIS chanaal A and C received power from the same train of power and NIS ch===ala B and D received power
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| ; from the opposite train of power. b inspectors reviewed selected cables from receways MB-L121, L125, L31, L35, and L39 and verified that the cables were not chanaal A or C cables. The inspectors also verified
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| , that these trays which carried signal cables did not ennemia power cables. b cables reviewed included:
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| 1 10056D,10056E,10056F,10083A,10098B,10376D,10376E,11031H,11031J,11031S,11031T, and
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| ^ 11031P.
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| 12 - !
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| ;j
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| ; ' .N4 AAer reviewing the JLL 1-95 018 lastallariaa and the safety evaluation, the inspectors concluded that the safety evaluation determined that the alternate excore detector arrangement was acceptable. 'Ibe anangement did not
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| ; violate achaical e specifications and met the Unit 1 plant design basis except for electrical separation. %
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| temporary alternate detector electrical separation arrangement was judged to be acceptable due to the low power 4
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| . of the circuits involved and the lack of physical harards in the locations of the circuits. b safety evaluation steted that the licensee will place jumpers from detector no.10 to detector no. 8 inside the enatalaavait at the i next mode 3 or mode 4 outage and will repair or replace the faulty detector / cable at the next refueling outage.
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| . 7. ExitInterview I h iampacelaa scope and findings were summarized on June 30,1995, with those persons tadic-'ad in iI paragraph 1 above.....
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| i (closed) NCV 50-335/95-1241, Failure to Invoke the Jumper /UAed Iend Process,13.d.1).
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| j (closed) NCV 50-335,389/95-1242, Failure to Properly Tag Radioactive Materials,15.c.
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| EXCERPTS IR 95-14 ]
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| , k L:LJ
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| ~
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| August 22,1995
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| , t Florida Pbwer and Ught Company ATTN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg l President - Nuclear Division
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| : F. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408 4420 i
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| SUBfBCT: NRC INSPEC'110N REPORT NOS. 50 335/95-14 AND 50 389/95-14 j G==*la=== :
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| * ~
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| c His refers to the inspection conducted on July 2 through July 29,1995, at the St. Imcie facility. He purpose j .o fht t e aapar* a= d I was to eterm nei w et hh er act v t iesiiaut or zeh i d by the license were ~=daenad safely and in lj accordance with NRC i:0 . At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those i[ ===hane of your staffidentified in the enclosed report.
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| j Areas ana-land during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection a==l=*ad
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| ; of selective ====ia=*ia== of procedures and i : "=+!ve records, interviews with personnel, and observation
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| ! of activities in prosress. ;
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| Within the scope of the inspection, violations or deviations were not identified........
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| I
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| * 1 G Orig signed by Kerry D. Iandis !
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| ''. Kerry D. Imadia, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 Ucense Nos. DPR47, NPF-16 3
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| Raela = ne: NRC Inspection Report
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| '. 1 '
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| i#
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| Report Nos.: 50-335/95-14 and 50-389/95-14
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| #- f leaa-a. Florida Pcwor & Ught Co 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 Ucense Nos.: DPR47 and NPF-16 Pacility Name: St. Imcie 1 and 2 L '- ; :t!= Conducted: July 2 through July 29,1995 imad Inspector: _R. Schin for _8/8/95 R. Prevatte, Senior Ranident Date Signed Inspector
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| 'd' . Page 1 of 11 W
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| 1 EXCERFIS IR 95-14
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| '* %,/ M, Miller, Resident Inspector Approved by: _ K. I m dis _8/22/95 3
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| K. Landis, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects j
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| I Scope:
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| 'Ihis routine resident inspection was catM onsite in the areas of plant operations review, ==infanaam j
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| , observadons, surveillance observations, engineerms support, plant support, review of nonroutine events, followup of previous inspection findings, and other areas. Inspections were p-fws4 during normal and i backshift hours and on weekends and holidays.
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| 1 l
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| Plant operations area: Operations continued to perform well. Operator response to a reactor trip on July 8 was excellent. Operations response to deficiencies identified during plant systems walkdowns was satisfactory.
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| Mainee and Surveillance area: Maintenance pa formance was found to be good. Critical main ..
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| j .,
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| the IB Auxillary Pcedwater Pump was performed very well; in contrast, a lack of proper planning and (l';'
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| preparation resulted la increased out of service time for preventive maina-naa on the 2C Aurillary F ,
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| Pump. A si d error during main turbine trip surynillana testing resulted in a trip on Unit 1. An i procedural w=k-= was identified during testing of the 2B Diesel Puel Oil Day Tanks.
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| 1 Fmineering ares: Performance in this area continued to be satisfactory.
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| Bant Sunoort area: Performance in this area continued to be satisfactory.
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| In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified......
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| : 2. Plant Status and Activities 2.s. Unit 1 Unit I entered the inspection period at full power. A reactor trip was experienced on July 8 due to personnel error during a surveillance test. b unit achieved criticality on July 11 and was placed back on-line on July 12. h unit remained at full power for the balance of the period.
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| 2.b. Unh.2 Unit 2 operated at essentially full power ?.hroupout the period until a planned power reduction on July 23 for c*- waterbox cleaning. 'Ibe unit was maintdned at approximately 60 to 70 per cent power during the cleaning, and was retumed to full power operation on July 28.
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| 2.c. NRC Activity K. D. Landis, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2. NRC Region II, visited the site ;
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| on July 14. His activities included meetings with licensee management and a review of resident inspection [
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| i activities.
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| l
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| ~, R. P. Carrion of the Division of Radiological Safety and Safeguards, NRC Region II, conducted an inspection U Page 2 of 11 l
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| _ _ _ . ~. . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _. __ _ _ .___ .__ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
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| 1 4
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| 1 i
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| j p.. EXCERPTS IR 95-14 3 u of the lica==='s chemistry program with the NRC Region II Mobile I.aboratory on July 17 and 18. His I
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| activities are documented in inspection Report 95-13.
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| l
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| : 3. Plant Operaniana 3.a. Plant Tours U1707) 'the laspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring equipment was recordmg as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant ;
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| conditions, and plant honaahaping efforts were adequate.....'Ihe following accessible-ares ESP system and area walkdowns wwe made to verify that system lineups were in accordance with licensee requiramanna for l 1l operability and equipment material conditions were natiat=etary: i l1 .
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| I
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| ; 1) Unit 1 Boric Acid Makeup 'Ihe inspector found major flowpath valves properly aligned. , ;
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| 1
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| : 2) Unit 1 Auxilia:V Poodwater M inspector found major flowpath valves properly aligned. Corrosion was
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| { found brealdag through exterior paint on welded joints on either side of V09303 and on the downstream side of
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| !ji V9104. 'Ibese conditions were brought to the a**==*ian of the systeen anginear for resolution.
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| l Add **lanally, the inspector ar==laad the governor valve stems of turbinsMiriven auriliary feedwater pumps IC and 2C for evidence of corrosion that could inhibit free movement as identined in NRC Information Notice 94-66, " ;, ' -
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| - ^ 1. No significant evidence of corrosion was identified on either stent. h inspector discussed the issue of stesa corrosion with the AFW system engineer and found that the issue was being ecosidered and tracked under STAR 950496 and that the systesa engineer was extmanaly know't ": of the issue.
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| . 3) Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater 'Ite inspector performed a walkdown of the Unit 2 AFW System in the CST 4 % ann, APW Pump Rooms. Steam Trestle aren, and the Unit 2 Control Room. All valves in the above areas ,
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| ,j were in the psoper position for curnet plant naaditlana Generel and specine ea====*a (4 ' , ^-)are l taa=l=d below.....'Ibese conditions were referred to the licenses for correction.
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| 5
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| : 4) Unit 2 Component Cooling Water b inspector verified the major CCW flow paths, reviewed applicable j
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| ,.r--- and walked down the system in the CCW Surge Tank area. Unit 2 Control Rooea HVAC aren und
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| ,{ the CCW structure. All valves in the above areas was in the proper position for current plant conditions.
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| '; General and specific co-ts (17 descrepancies) are itemized below....'Ibese conditions were oferred to the
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| .! licensee for coirection.
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| l;' '
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| 3.b. Plant Operations Review U1707) b inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.....Except as noted below, no s deficiencies were observed.
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| : 1) Vehicle Accident in Plant Discharge Canal On July 9, an automobde was inadvertently driven into the
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| '. plant discharge canal, h automobile was occupied by three teenagers, who later reported that they were j' looking for a place to surf. b occupants escaped by crawling out of the windows just prior to the vehicle being sucked into the 12' diacharge pipe which routes water from the diarharge canal, under the beach, into the Atlantic Ocean.
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| % ansa-ahila " - , -dy became lodged in the discharse Pi Pe at a 'Y' which split the 12' pipe into two dissarge paths. b obstruction created by the vehicle did not adversely affect safety at the facility, as a 16' pipe also a=lanad parallel to the D' pipe. 'Ibe co-hiaad diarharge capacity was more than sufficient to pass the
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| ; effluent frasm both units' ICW pumps without raising discharge canal levels to a level which would have resulted in a spillover of water into the adjoining mangroves.
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| A V Page 3 of 11 sw m. y u nm' ,
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| a EXCERFTS IR'95-14 3*r I
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| )l '% s N vehicle was removed by a combination of divere, who repositioned ti e vehicle, and : t;:r boat, which '
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| l, pulled the vehicle from the pipe. h vehicle was subsequently raised and removed fro Ge area.
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| i j 2) Unit 1 Rastart N inspector observed activities associated with the approach to criticality of Unit 1 on July ,
| |
| ,J 11. 'Ibe evolution was supported by a reactivity manager, Reactor hf - " g, and plant - -- , J 'the j inspector verified that ECCs were prepared correctly and were within penods of applicabdity, that a 1/M plot i j was being prepared and maintained, and that control room staffing was adequate and controlled. Overall, the j ovolution was performed in a professional mannar. 'Ihe unit was placed on-line at 12:35 a.m. ce July 12.
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| ii 3) CEDM Conting Fan Failure On July 22, Unit I control room operatore noted that HVE 21B, the B CEDM !
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| j{ malinqr inn, had tripped off and that HVE 2f A, the standby ima, had started. E ' ^ testing indicated that j the motor for HVB-21B would start and run; however, amperage readings insEented the fem to be running at ac.4eed 4 A ~=*=i====* entry and inspection revealed that the faa had failed -,"='8y, '
| |
| resulting la a low air flow trip.
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| l..
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| !i. h inn in question was one of two designed to draw air fross the reactor cavity around the CEDMs, pass the
| |
| ' air tiuough coolere, and discharge it to the am*=lamaa8 envir===aat- One fan was required at all times for
| |
| {
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| ! power operation, and a loss of both fans required the unit to be suberitical withia 45 minutes per ONOP 2-
| |
| ; innnrvt0, Rev 9, %ss of Reactor Cavity, Reactor Support, CEDM, or 'ananiammar r Coohng Fans."
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| l N failure resulted in the cocking of the fan at an angle from horiscatal, cocking of the motor shaA/ fan shaA at i -
| |
| the coupling, damage to the variable vane linkage and supports, damage of pilot tubes in the discharge plenum, i
| |
| ; and damage to palow No k bearings supporting the motor / pump union. At the point of failure, parts were ;
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| i dialodged and thrown from the unit, creating holesin the fan sivuud and in the screen which covered t e fan discharge. 'Ibe licensee found debris scattered about the aren surrounAng the fan. 'Ih debris which was
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| ~
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| afected did ant darnage adjacent equipannt.
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| At the dose of the inspection period, the Beensee was atlasepting to deterndne root causes and corrective actions. Corrective action options included repair at reduced power, repair during a shutdown, and repair during the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage.
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| 3.c. Plant Housakseping Ol70D Storage of material and components, and clesaliness conditions of various ij. arena d { f =^ the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed. No violations or devistic: a were identified.
| |
| l l .. 3.d. Clearances Ol70D h inspector reviewed clearances 2-95 04452,2-9546-106,and 2-9546-095. All tags were la place and cq-- were found to be correct!; positioned.
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| l 3.s. TaGhaiN ;%ecification Comoliance 0170D Ilaan=== compliana with selected TS ILOs was verified.
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| ' Ibis included the review of selected surveillance test resulta....
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| 1.
| |
| id 1) Ervated Sea Water Temperature On July 7, the licensee noted that increased see water temperatures were ;
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| W="; the operstag limits for the Unit 2 ICW/CCW heat exchangers. Sea water temperature had reached
| |
| . appromineraly 87'F. Control room operating curves for the heat exchangere, which plotted assimum allowable !
| |
| 4 intake * ,
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| :e v, against eMag heat exchanger differential pressure, were clamped such that iae=tra i temperatures in excess of 88"P would result in heat exchanger inoperability. Dual heat exchanger inoperabdity
| |
| ; would have necessitated entry into TS 3.0.3, requinns a unit shutdown.
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| 1 i
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| 'Ibe 1 's i==adiata actions were to check the calibration of the installed ,~. inAr= tare on the B
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| 1 EXCERPTS IR 95-14 p
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| h . heat exchanger (the higher reading of the two) and to install a more acewate, digital, temperature indaeafar la its place. N taapaena, observed portaans of the calibration and data gathenns effort and noted good .
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| involvessant by the NPS, who sought to ensure that limits were not being violated, b M&'IE employed for the menswoments was verified to be within its calibration interval. N inspector spoke to control room operators about the issue and found that they had been issued clear instructions to co==an= a unit shutdown abound ^ , z.;.,re exceed 88T.
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| ; h mose accurate temperature lastrumania indicated that intake " , -_.: ie planaanad at approni==taly 87'F.
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| ; Concurantly, Engineering began to develop new operating cwves which incorporated actual heat exchanger
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| : i. ,J_ -- data (e.g. =n=l=r of tubes plugged, actual pump '17'-4= values) to arrive at new 1
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| ^
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| " 1' flow rdationrhips. As a result, Engineering detennined that the = aria == allowable temperatures for each heat exchanger awe = lad 897 at conditions of greatest flow. 'Ibe inspector discussed the ,
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| l M '- '=f= employed in deriving the curves with "=g- :--g pomannel and found them to be accapaahla i 3.f. E _r. - of Mea ==a r'. - :- A in '' =Mfvi .. n==.M== and L---S M ' - -
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| 1 I
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| !) OA Audit Review (40500) a) . 'Ibe lamparda reviewed Q A. Audit QSteOPS-95-14 ' Corrective Action" dated June 29,1995. ' Ibis h and effectiveness of the plant's corrective action program. N audit evaluated the * /- ;
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| r ort found that the program was offectively implemented but identified three areas that needed improveenant. 'Ibese included:
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| e h dat=hana did not provide accurate information regarding the responsibility for and current status of pending corrective actions. Changes that occur in status were not elways
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| ; . vi -=lamaad to the RAR Coordinator.
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| I e Several tana-a= were identined where STARS requirms work or repair on ASME Section XI j
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| - , - - - were not routed to the ANil or ISI Coordinator. j l e h authem 1carian process for STARS that hanama quality records was not clearly daliaarded. !
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| !, 'Ihis resulted in some STARS in the quality records system not meeting procedural and quality l I
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| records requirements.
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| ii b audit appeared to be detailed and provided - - " with a clear undero e= ding of the current i STAR system status.
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| ; b) 'Ibe inspector reviewed QA Audit QSleOPS-95-13, which an==arized performanca monitoring
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| ], activities in the areas of IMT/LMT programs, CMM, corrections of discrepent field conditions, usine==ca Ik,,, c^ t corrective actions, M&TE programs, and protected area controls. In general, the audit found the subject activities to 'oe i,.dw- ' satisfactorily, h inspector noted that a au-hae
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| ; of ininor changes in M&'IE control and storage ==thada resulted from one of the PMONs and that the netwo of the changes appenrod to offer opportunities for greater control of MATE. N *==pareae
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| . concluded that the audit was both detailed and multidisciplinary.
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| j 2) Post-Trin Review 192901) h inspector ata= dad a meeting, candaenad on July 21 by Operations
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| ====gaawar which discussed the Unit i High Pressure trip di===ad in paragraph 4 b, below. ' Ibis was the second such meeting following an automatic trip, and was designed to elicit co==anen fross plant operations and
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| ; support permaanal on ways to avoid similar trips in the future. Presentations covered the ciren==ea-r e surrounding the event, the effect on the unit, prah==ary lessons learned and an open discussion of options to l V- Page 5 of 1I i
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| EXCERPTS IR 95-14
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| ; I w.i prevent recurrence. 'ihe meeting was heavDy attended and imput and eschenges were frank. The inspector somehided that this practice ==*l- to provide plant management with practical options for reducing
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| ! the summer of automatic trips is the future, i
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| j, 3.g. Followup of Operations IIRs (90712)
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| (Closed) IER 50-389/94 006, Rev 1, " Trip Circuit Breaker Failure due to a Broken Piece of Pbemolic Block j Imdged in the Trip Iatch Mechanism'........
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| 3.h. Sakf Cantaiand Breathina Appantur (SCBA) Naads and Avadabdity Survey (71707. 64704) 'Iho
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| ;i j' following information was provided by the hoensee in response to a thise prepared by NRC Regica H:
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| : 1) Facihty Name. St. Iacle Nuclear Power Plant
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| : 2) Wai wM * . - -% =- =..s la the = 2- ' s to waar w'nA to anfelv ---- 21 * "
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| the =' '
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| PSAR states chlorias but chlorine is no longer stored or used easite.
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| ; i 3) For the limiting event, does the licenses have SCBAs available for each staff ===h e Alling a required j panation for oneration or safe shutdown? 5 SCBAs stored la each Control Room.
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| : 4) Am all staff members Allina renuired positions for operations or safe shutdown SCBA quahfied? No, but l hosesse has plans that will qualify required Operations personnel by July 31,1995.
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| 1
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| [ 5) ' Am SCBAs readdy available at requimd use location? Yes r
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| ij j 6) Have pmvisions baan providad for special mands associated with $CSA uma. i.e.. mye alasses with faca mask j
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| jantal No, on eye wear. IJoenses will correct by July 31,1995.
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| 4
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| : 7) What is the anninum number of spare air bottles for each user? None provided in Control Room. Stored in Are house and RCA.
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| l 8) Has tbs licanans established plan to protect personnel not assinned a SCBAI Yes. If emergency . -;---4=-
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| wul be SCBA quali6ed.
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| ;J
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| : 9) Does the licensee have SCBAs available for NRC use? None specifically aseigned to NRC, but available
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| ,! for issue at HP.
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| } i*
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| : 10) Initials of each resident and indicate if be/she is SCBA quahfied. RLP - Yes, MSM - Yes i
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| l 11) If not - tined. discuas =*- == --y to have r==tda=*= SCBA nualified with your Br a h ekt r. N/A i
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| : 12) Comment neld. Chlorine not onsite - PSAR will be corrected next update.
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| ! 4. u=ine===aca and Survaill==ca J
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| 4.a. Maintenance Observations (62703) Station malataa=ca activities involving =alactad safety-related systems and ~=Ta==e= were observed / reviewed........ Portions of the following =mine===e= activities were observed i
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| '1) 2C Aunharv Feedwater Pump Preventive Mamtenance 'Ibe inspector observed an oil change on the 2C Page 6 of 11 4 l
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| -.v., . ..]
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| EXCERF13 IR 95-14
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| .n vj ' AFP, aa= Anes-1 per PWO 62/4389. Work was performed in accordance with 2-M 0015, Rev 42, au.ekaaicat
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| ^
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| Mal =*==aa Safety-Related Preventive Maine ===aca Program." h inspector verified that proper . ;*-
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| oil was used, that tbs old oil was free of visible eaan==ia-ta, that the Anal oil level was adequate, and that the new oil Alter was a direct n y- for the old one. N inspector also observed the lubrication of the j tabine's trip throttle linkage, performed under PWO 62/4421, and verified that the proper grease and graphite spray was used.
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| The lampactor found that the quality of the work perforsned was satisfactory; however, the theeEmass of the work was found to suffer frens landequate prior planning. b work had bres arhaAdad to begin at j- undmight on July 18. In support of the evolution, Operations declared the subject AFP OOS at 9:20 p.sa. on 1 July 17. At 1:00 a.m., an electricina arrived at the work site to diacannacs a lube oil l==arsion hester which required removal for the oil change to take place. 'Ihis task was completed in approximately five =i=das. At approxiantely 3:10 a.m., =ack-lea arrived to perform the oil change. As a result, the subject pump was out of servios for appro=Imataly six hours before the subject task was begun in earnest.
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| ) i h inspector discussed the tunehmens of the ==ia*==a= with uaianaaaa,a Supervision, who stated that the persommel involved in the oil change had questioned a procedure revision which changed the specincetion of the lubricating oil front that used the last time they had performed the task. Additional complicaria== were
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| _; esperisaced in employing the licensee's new PASSPORT systesa to obtain spas, bottles and jugs to support the work. It was acknowleted la these diac-da- that the job was not propesty i;n f '!p -^- 7 ,and that the confusion could have been dealt with peior to the laitiation of work.
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| Given the licensee's development of a critical (co-line) =alaamanaea process, the inspector reviewed AP 0010460, Rev 3, "Critica! Winsanaaca "--. ^ " In general, the procedure required that work co 'I3
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| ,m equipment, lavolving a vea y entrance into a TS AS, be peuplanned and expedited. However, the laspector
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| : h. meted that secties 3.1.3 of Cse suhlact pseesdare stated that the procedure mood met apph to " Routine preventive maintamasse on equipuneet seguired maore lhequeath than 18 mmonths that is met risk significant..." h sulject =i=*- activity constituted a quarterly PM sad therefore was outside the
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| . : ;,i - of the proced:are. . 'Ihe inspector discussed the issue with heaa=a management, who acknawledged the appesent dichotomy between tbs CMM process's taandate that time in a 'I5 AS be mialmiand for some smaintemence evolutions but not for othere. b licensee stated that they would ca==idae the issue.
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| l' The laspector concluded that me regulation was violated, as the licensee was well wkhim the A(Fr for the 2C AFP and the -ta*=== in question was performed satisfactoruy and within the bound of the j' licensee's programs and precedures. However, the inspector found that preplanning for the evolution was p, poor and p==ac==acity increased the out of service time for the 2C AFF.
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| ja i 2) Auxiliary Feodwaist Pump 1B Cntical Maintenance h inspector observed -ian==ca activities l performed ce the 1B AFP on July 20. b work was eaadace=d under the guidance of AP 0010460, Rev 3,
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| ; ' Critical Malat==ca Managear it.' Specine observed activities included:
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| !. (1) FWO 61/4933 - Raplacement of puny bearing Trico oders with indicating authi alamans and
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| - installation of oil sample test 5ttings. N rep 3=a===8 was canducaad per 1 MMP-09.01, "Auxilia,y
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| . Feedwater Pumps IA and IB Disassembly, Inspection, and Pa===a=hly Mach == cal Masat==ca," and
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| ) Procuramant Engmeering evaluation 036912. b inspector verined that the installatina was conducted i satisfactorily and in accordance the governing docu= mats.
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| i
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| ; , (2) PWO 61/4974 - IB AFP ~=aliaa and thrust h==-las ekaelra- h subject activity was canduce=wl under 1-MMP-09.01, "Auxihary Feedwater Pumps 1A and IB Di-kly, "- ; -Gaa, and i
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| U Page 7 of 11 i
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| * c.'
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| EXCERPTS IR 95-14 lI ' 6/ - Reassembly Mach ==le=I hiat=*====ca " 'Ibe inspector observed couphag ''- "', and cleanup, '
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| , Pump thrust bearing endplay measurement, coupling reassembly and final torquang. 'Ibe inspector ;
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| ! . moted that pump andplay was = , "- (.006') and that the ==chaaie= performing the work properly
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| ; r=====hlad and torqued the pump coupling. b torque wrench was verified to be la calibration.
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| [
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| 3 Overall, the inspector found that the ==l=*-=e= evolution was perfonned very well. Jobs were worked
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| . ",, QC eoverage was detailed and thorough, parts and tools were adequately prestaged, and the 3
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| l l evolution was rt=*ad 9; ^t'i. The inspectar noted that the thne the -ra,==* was DOS, ,
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| Inclumag the ; " " ' - = surveinanes run, was only 1 ' ", eight hours. ;
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| o
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| [j' 3) PWO 64/4966 - Unit 2 Plant Vant WROM Ims of Counts 'Ibe inspector observed postions of the . i
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| ! .- "--' -- "=: effort in response to a failure of abe Unit 2 WRGM. IAC personnel perfenning the evolution
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| ^*--
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| ! were found to be very knowle4emble of the equipament's constructies and :;1_ Tr=dd==ba=88=g l' . was ==*hadte=1 and thorough. MATE used in the effort was verifled to be withis its calibration interval.
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| ;; The seures of the failure was deterndmed to be a high voltage power supply to the unit's detector.
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| 4.b. Surveillance Ohaarvations (617261 Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected is
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| '{ .,' ...'1he following surveillance tests were observed.
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| l' -
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| : 1) OP 10030150. Key 74. " Secondary Plant Operatana Checks and Tests. Section 8.2 throuah 8.81hrbine Trip Test.' h inspector =**andad the projob briefing and found that the g-:-- ' - ' steps, , , * - and
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| ]- -
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| I precautions wees da=e===d in detail with all personnel involved la the test.
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| N inspector aban observed the e , - ', thrust bearing and low vacuum trip tests. The low bearing oil D pressure trip could act be done since valve V22174, low bearing oil pressure trip drain valve could not be j '@ . operated. PWO M4457 was attached to the valve indicating that work was needed.1he other above tests were ]
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| N completed ==63=t=eaaelly. j h operator than g-:-- *' to test the 20/ET, EH Fluid Trip Header hianald valve and the 201/OPC and 20-
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| ! 2/OPC Overspeed Pr=*aa*ia= hiamaid valves.1his test consisted of opening the EH test header valves to the !
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| + solenoid under test; unlocking and closing the EH inlet laolation valve under test; inserting and turning the trip test key.
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| This test was completed satisfactorily on 20/EI'. When the seccad solenoid valve was tested, the operator opened the EH test header valve, V22493, and nalacirad, but dui not class, the solenoid inlet taal=*ia= valve V22482 as required by the procedure. After unlocking and removing the lack he laid down the lock, read abe f.- procedure, and then inserted the test key into the 20-1/OPC test switch and turned it to the test position. A loud noias was noted as the governor valves went shut, the turbine tripped, and the main steam safety valves opened, b inspecter and the NWE then went to Unit I control room. In the control room, the operatore responded to
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| ! the event as required by EOP-01, 'Stande d Post Trip Actions.' All rods inserted and equipment :==pa= dad to
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| ] the event as designed. 'Ibe reactor tripped on High Pnesuriser Pressure as a result of the Governor and Rebset
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| .- valves going abut. Steam Generator "A" expenenced a high level, but operator action leolated feed and the level was restored to nonnat. Overall, operator response to the event was considered ===11==*
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| *the NID perfonning the survedlance test openly acknowledged that he inadvertently failed to close the EH inlet isolation valve V22482 per procedural step 8.6.5.(B) while performing the =ala= aid valve tests and that this resulted la tripping the unit. N NWE supervising the test stated that he became too involved la radio
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| -iale=*ia== with the rmtrol room and did not verify that each step was completed la sequence.
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| Page 8 of 11
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| p EXCERPTS IR 95-14
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| .f. % ,/ The inspector aise noted that F *- : step 8.6.5.3 and several other steps ea=*alaad two required :
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| actions in one precedural step and that this many have led to the erver. He also noted that the use of hand held rados vice sound powered head sets for comma =leaeta== niay have been a contributing factor.
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| N unit was placed in a stable plant condition using 1-EOP-02, " Reactor Trip Recovery.' A decision was then made to accomplish several outstanding maintenance activities prior to plant restart. This work included:
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| * Relocate Chanaal 'D' NIS jumper from the control room to the Reactor Building Keyway area
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| * Rework 3 CEA reed switches
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| * Repair IA PW Regulating valve
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| * Inspect / repair RCP vibration probe
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| * Repair RPS chanaal "C" Wide Range NIS (failed low after reactor trip)
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| * Repair Main Generator excitation power supply e Repair loose connectics on IB Motor Generator set e Stroke test MV 08-8 e Repair MV-094
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| {
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| e cleaning Main candan=ar Water boxes Al and B2 e Other minor maineanance activities l The above work activities, except the NIS Channel 'C' Wide Range, were completed by the morning of July 9.
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| C---f d=- of the repair to NIS amanal 'C' Wide Range, and ocacerns relating to high discharge canal levels resulting frosa unusually high tides and an automobile lodged in a discharge canal pipe (discussed in paragraph 3.b.1), delayed reactor restart until July 11.
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| . x h inspector reviewed the above work activities and found thema " ' "--y. The reactor trip package was j also reviewed and it was detennimod that all immes had been setasfactorily resolved to pennit plant restart.
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| : 2) OP l 0700050. Rev 50. ' Auxiliary Pendwater Periodic Test" h inspector observed the surveillance test, conducted per the above procedure, un the IB AFP following CMM work diaen=ad in paragraph 4.A.2, above.
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| 1he test involved an ASME Section XI code run of the subject pump. The inspector noted that the operator
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| , c '-H=: the test locally had pmcedure in-hand and that MATE employed for obtaining vibration and
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| ; e--=ture data was within its calibrataon interval. b required time interval was observed prior to data collectaan (5 minutes), discharge pr.asurs was greater than the mininuun specified for compliance with 13
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| ! (1342 peig), and results were satisectory (3241.7 ft developed head).
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| l 3) OP 2-2200050B. Rev 20. '2B Emerqtency Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General Operatins l Instructions' The inspector witassmed portions of this test, =dami July 26. b test involved a fast start of the 2B EDO to satisfy 'I3 survan11= ace requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4, which required that the EDG actueve rated speed and voltage within 10 =arnada at least once per 184 days.
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| } h inspector witnessed pre-start charka performed by the SNPO and found them to be p.fm ' satisfactorily
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| ! with g+- '- x in-hand. h inspector observed the EDG start and awa=iaad the operating =nehia== for signs
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| ! of previously unidentihed leaks. None were noted. b =acht- started and loaded satisfactorily, with a start l time of 9.65 =aranda.
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| l 4) EDG Day Tank Izvel Switch Survedlance b inspector observed portions churveillance tests, performed l*
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| iri acconisace with 1&C Procedure 2-1400064L, Rev 32, " Installed Plant Equipment Calibration (Level),"
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| Appendix B, Tab 10, ' Diesel Oil Day Tank Lo/Io level Verification," to verify day tank level switch setpoints I
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| on the 2B EDG day tanks.1he tests were performed by attaching tygon tubes to drain valves located, hydranheally, at the bottoms of the day tanks and routing the tubes vertically to the tops of the tanks. Rulers
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| , b- ' Page 9 ef 11 l
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| ! EXCERPTS IR 95-14 ll W
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| , wornham lacesed next to the tubes to provide local level indic=*ian in the tanks to assess alarm setpoints. ;
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| i l .
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| i ne test - "- '" -;y for testing hi/hi level alanns was to align the temporary standpipes with their respective .
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| : day tanks and manually operate the tanks' All =al== aid valves to adimit fuel until the hi/hi level alanns were
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| !i received. De inspector noted that the IAC personnel perfonning the tests were sensitive to the fact that i=dicanad level increase rates would accelerate as the levels approached tiw tops of the tanks, as the tanks were i
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| , horimamaally oriented cylinders. Na==*hal===, while Alling the 281 day tank, the level in the tygon tube rose i
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| rapidly and resulted la a small spill (approximately two cups) of PO. De spill was quickly tenninated, .
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| aa=*=iaad to a small area around the day tank, and cleaned up by the IAC personnel perfonning the test.
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| l, . ' ' " ^ * "y, the hi/hilevel alarm did not energlas. Upon inspectica, it was nosed that a PWO tag was hung ca l 3 , the level alana, t=dia=eing inoperability of either the circuit or the sensor. %s IAC personnel perfonning the test acknowledged not checlung the PWO tag prior to beginning the test. Testing of the lo/lo level alanus l
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| { resulted in - ^' ' ^+y results.
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| i
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| ! %s inspector discussed the performance of the test with IAC personnel, who stated that the bl/hilevel alarm !
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| did not emargias due to the fact that the 2B2 day tank hl/bl alarm was energiand as a result of perfonning the I l I earme test on it , _'My. As the hi/hi level alanns had no renash capability, the second day tank's alarm
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| , could not snaumeiste. IaC per ommel canoeded ihet the sovaning Peucedme wm inadequate to test the hi/hi
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| : alenes as wrisena, and stased that the proo.dme would be sovised. Pouible new test # '-P included.
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| i; e Testing the second tank's alarm after the Arst tank's alarm had cleared due to engine fuel ocesemption, or l
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| e Perfanning the test by monitoring level switch output state, as opposed to the alann a===ciasar
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| ' ' lac personnel stated that the PWO which was writtaa to dac=====8 bi/hllevel swiscL inoperabihty was most q
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| ("
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| probably the result of a mismilar ibilme in a sisadar test. De inspector -1= dad that the PO spill could have been avoided if althat the tygon tubing had been run father la elevation above the day tank or if the workers personning the test had recognised that the level switch they were testing would not result in =====eia*ia= due to the alarm -di*ian la the 2B2 day tank. In reviewing the governing procedme, the inspector noted the following waalr======:
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| * De title for Tab #10 of the procedure (" Diesel Day Tank Lc/IA Level Verificatace') was ==iala= ding in that l i
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| bl/hilevel alarm verification was also included. This point was reinforced in the body of the procedme in step i B.2 when personnel were directed to place a measurement scale from 20' to 25' up the sight glass, when hi/hl level alarm verification would also require a measurement scale at approximately 34". Personnel performing the observed test showed foresight in extanding the measurement scales along the full length of the sight glasses.
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| - o De p,4;; directed that tygon tubes be taped to the top of the day tanks. De physical arrangement of the day tanks' overflow lines was such that the PO level could increase appronnimaaly l' above the tops of the tanks prior to the overflow being directed away, increasing the posantial for spills.
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| i I- The laspector comel.aded that the pasfonnance of the suidect surveillance test suffered freen r ee- _E :
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| weakness and as ' '- ; ^ pre test oboarvation of the pa===8 to be tested.
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| : 5) Cantainment Anomalies Inspection - Unit 2 he i==pactar accomp== tad Unit 2 NLOs on an i== pac *ian of accessible -*=ia-* areas on July 25. Damage to HVE-21B, described in paragraph 3.b.3, above, was noted. De status of a packing leak from V8453, a root valve for B channel SG level and pressure instruments, was inspected and found to be nach= aped Several i==t==can of boric acid buildup on instrument tubing was also noted. Otherwise, no adverse conditions were identified. De inspe-tor found that the NLOs =4=d- -
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| m EXCERPTS IR 95-14 d - the inspection proceeded swiftly but were thorough in their l==g-da==, allowing for a -- , 've tour while
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| ==intala ng does rates AIMA.
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| - 5. Engineering Support (37551) 5.A. Safety Evaluation JPN-PSleSENS-95413 h inspector reviewed the subject SE, prepared to allow 1 operation with a manual isolation valve closed in the 2B EDO PO line from the DO5T to the day tanks. The i configuration was proposed when the a leak was determinad to exist in the underground line between the two tanks. 'Ibe action was designed to minimize the amount of PO released to the environment until the leak could j be identined and corrected.
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| t a As a -- - y measure, the tieaaama proposed dedicating an NI4 to the task of opening the closed valve la the event of an EDG start. ' Ins licensee calculated that the EDO day tanks contained enougk PO to allow 126 !
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| minutes of EDG operation at fullload before a transfer of FO was required b he==aaa than specified that
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| ; the NLD would be required to open the valve within 20 minutes of an EDG start. Procedures were revised to
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| ] include direction to open the valve on an EDG start, and ad=3=i=hetive controls were put in place to ensure that l
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| -. the NID would not be required to perform any other 1==ad=*= response duties. Additionally, the licensee i,. 'C' a response time test, placing the operator at the G-2 warehouse (as far away immi the EDG as he could credibly be in the PA) and requiring the NID to proceed to the valve and open it. 'Ihe NID r ' _- ' -
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| this task la approximasaly sevea =i=da=.
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| In =- " ' g the lasus, the licensee employed PRA techniques to ==d==8= the increase in the risk of the loss of tbs 2B3 bus due to a failure of either the operator to open tbs valve or a failure of Ibe valve to be able to be j opened. 'Ibe licenses concluded that the lacrease in probability was approul-maaty 6 percent. However, la
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| . N - " g 10 CPR 50.59 criteria, the licenses -ladad that no increase in the probability of failure of a l ig component insportant to safety was created by the proposed action. 'the inspector questioned the licensee on tids issue. 'Ibo boensee explaland that a deterministic conclusion of no increased probability was reached when the avlan-e= of procedural guidance and heightened awareness was halaa,=e against the approximate 6 percent
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| ,, increase la inilure probability presented by the two new failure modes.
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| U i . In the canamut of regulatory compliance, the inspector noted that 10 CPR 50.59 was written in terms of absolute
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| , increases in the probabilities of failure represented 'oy a proposed change N inspector winnad to question wbsther 10 CFR 50.59 criteria coald ever be satisfied when new failure snodes are imposed on a previously
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| : reviewed system (i.e whether added risk, once qualitatively manahhnhmt, could be completely soitigated). 'Ihe inspector concluded that insufficient guidance existed from a .C=y perspective to take i==admaa issue with
| |
| : j. the beensee's rationale. Further, the inspector concluded that the t- had taken prudent measures to ensure
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| ;i the eaatianad operability of the 2B EDG while minimizing the FO leak's effect on the envisn==aat The i inspector referred the question to NRR for resolution.
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| l.
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| : l. 6. Plant Support (71750)
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| [i 6.a. Fire Pmtection During the course of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely ar==inad facets of the l
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| ! Pise Protection Program.....No deficiencies were identified.
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| i-6.b. Phvalcal Protection During this inspection, the inspector toured the protected area and noted that the perimeter fence was intact and not c- , " by erosion or daarepair....In conclusion, selected fi=ed- and i, ,
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| equipment of the security program were inspected and found to comply with the PSP . ;- '
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| ; 6.c. Radiological Protection Program Radiation protection control activities were observed.......No violations j
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| ,, or deviations were identified.
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| : I Page 11 of 11 L
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| n --e-- -.
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| r EXCERFIS IR 95-14
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| ! %,,,/ 7. ExitInterview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 27,1995, with those persons imie=*M in paragraph 1 above.....(closed) IER 50389/94406, Rev 1, ' Trip Circuit Breaker Failure due to a Broken Piece of Phaeolic Block Imised in the Trip f *h Mechanism",13.g.2).
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| s Page 12 of 11 l
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| . p EXCERPTS IR 95 ;f.
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| October 16,1995 L
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| i' Ploride Ptmer and IJght Company ATTN: Mr. J. H. Goldberg l President - Nuclear Divisiou ]
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| P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL- 33408 4 420 l
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| 1
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| ==SUBJECT:==
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| NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-335/95-15 AND 50-389/95-15 AND NO11CE OF VIOLA 110N. ,
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| l Gentlemen:
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| j ui 1his refers to the inspection ~=dactad on July 30 through September 16,1995, at the St. Imcie hility h l purpose of the insportion was to deiennine whether activities authoriand by the license were ~=aM safely 1 and la accordance with NRC requirements. ' At the conclusion of the inspartian, the Radings were discussed with those members of your staff Lia=*ined in the anela=ad report.
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| Areas awa-laad during the laarwlan are identified la the report. Within these areas, the lampaceiaa -=*ad of selective a===ina*iana of j.e+- ' m and ;,; 've records, laterviews with personnel, and observation of activities la progress.
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| G* . Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that vialasia== of NRC , ' occurred. l
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| ; .- Q)
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| U These violations are cited in the snolosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the cir===*=a= -- "; them me described in detail la the subject laap=e*8= report. h violations are of concera because they Idantiff psobiens of psocedural ' ' 7 7, the lack of prowdural compliance, perecomel '-- -- med equipment reliability and renect on your ability to identify and correct donciencies before they adversely impact plant I operations... ...... ...
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| j Sacerely, j Orig signed by Keny D. Iandia ;
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| Kerry D. Imdis, Chief j
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| [ Reactor Projects Bran 6h 3
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| ; Division of Reactor Projects
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| ;- Docket Nos. 50-335, 50 389 IJoense Nos. DPR47, NPP-16 Facta-es:
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| , 1. Notice of Violation
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| : 2. NRC Inspection Report NOFI1CE OF VIOLN110N
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| ;' Florida Power & LJght Company Docket No. 50-335
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| ~ St. Imcie 1 IJcense No. DPR47 i
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| During an NRC inapacei- conducted on July 30 through Sepeanear 16,1995, violanone of NRC requirements
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| - . . were Idaatified. In accordance with the ' General Statement of Pohey and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Page 1 of 24 n.
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| 4
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| ! EXCERPTS IR 95-15 n
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| l
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| +d- Actions,' (NUREG-1600), the viata*ia== are listed below:
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| l ,
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| A. Technical Specification 6.8.1.s requires that written procedures be established,1 ,'--- ^",
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| mad-la*=1=ad covering the activities m=aadad in Appsadax A of P7' ' -y Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, February
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| , 1978. Appsodix A, paragral.h 1.d inchut= =d-icia* stive p.= " _ for procedural adherence. Procedure Qt i 5-PR/PSlet, Rev. 62, ' Preparation, Revision, Review / Approval of Procedures,' Section 5.13.2, states that all F -- ' ._ shall be strictly adhered to.
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| OP 10050127, Rev 68, " Reactor Plant Cooldown - Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown," required, in part, that e operatore block Main Steam Iaalatia= Systens (MSIS) actuation when block permissive ====ciatia== were received. ONOP l 0030131, Rev 60, " Plant Ananacintor Su==ary,' requimd that, upon valid moeipt of annunciators Q 18 and Q-20, operators Immadutaly block MSIS c1=anals A and B, respectively.
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| Contrary to the above, on August 2,1995, during a cooldown of St.12acie Unit 1, valid block pannissive
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| ;- =====A=*ane were received, Iwwever, operators failed to ==tah11=h the required MSIS blocks, resulting in A and l[ B channel MSIS ae*i=*ia==
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| $ His is a Severity 1.svel IV violation (Supplement I).
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| i B. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written g= -.?__.; be establiahad, E ,' ', and mainamined ,
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| covering the activities recommandad in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, February 1978.
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| Appsodax A, paragraph 1.d includes admial=* ative procedures for procedural adhanece. Procedure QI 5-PR/PSlel, Rev. 62, " Preparation, Revision, Review / Approval of Procedures,' heelan 5.13.2, states that all g=- shall be strictly adhered to.
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| l l
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| j j Contrary to the above, procedures wese not aAssed to strictly in the following saamples: I
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| : 1. OP 10120020, Rev 72, " Pilling and Venting the RCS," pracaasia= 4.2, required that Reactor ('aalaat Systema (RCS) venting, described in the procedure, not be attempted if RCS ^ , a was above 2CO'F.
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| On August 2,1995, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal venting, performed in an attempt to correct seal package leakage la the I A2 RCP in accordance with Appendex E of the subject g= ' ;, was -
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| p Rx f while RCS ternperature was approata=naly 370'F. As a result, design ^ , 21 . of RCP seal companants were approached or exceeded.
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| : 2. - OP 10120020, Rev 72, ' Filling and Venting the RCS,' Appendix E, ' Restaging Reactor Coolant Pump Seals," required the use of RCP seal injection while restaging was attempted.
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| On August 2,1995, restaging of the I A2 RCP seal package was attempted without seal injection aligned to the seal package. As a result, design temperatures of RCP seal componcets were
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| . appenachad or neaadad His is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
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| C. Tachaical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be estabhahad, 3- t- d and malatalaad covering the activities recommandad in Appnadir A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, February 1978.
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| Appendix A, paragraph 1.d includes administrative procedures for procedural adherence. Procedure Qi 5-PR/PSlet, Rev. 62, " Preparation, Revision, Review / Approval of Procedures," Section 5.13.2, states that all procedures shall be strictly adhered to.
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| # Page 2 of 24
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| - .._ ~.- . ...- - _ . .- - . . - - . - . . . .
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| EXCERPIS IR 95-15 i
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| V AP 10010123, Rev 99, 'Ad=ialstrative Controls of Valves, lacks, and Switches," step 8.1.6, required, in l
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| part, that all valve position deviations be documannad in the Valve Switch Deviation leg.
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| l
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| ! Contrary to the above, on or about August 1,1995, HCV-25-1 through 7 were repositiaaad and left in the .
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| ,; closed position without the required entries being made in the Valve Switch Deviation leg. 'Ibe valves'
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| . positions complicated a loss of RCS inventory.
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| I 3
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| . 'Ihis is a Severity level IV violation (Supplement I).
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| i D. Tacha'e=1 Specincation 6.8.1.a requires that writtant procedures be established, implamaneat, and
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| ==iaaalaal covering tbs activities raca==aadat in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, February
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| . 1978. Appendix A, paragraph 1.d includes ad-laistrative procedures for procedural adherence. Fide QI 5-PR/PSbl, Rev. 62, " Preparation, Revision, Review / Approval of Procedures," Section 5.13.2, states that all procedures shall be strictly adhered to.
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| 4 l1 OP 10410022, Rev 22, " Shutdown Cooling,' step 8.2.7, required that V3652, the B Shutdown Coohng (SDC) j
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| ;j hot les suction inalatian valve, be lackat open while placing the B SDC loop in service.
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| ;1 Contrary to the above, on August 29, a control room operator failed to place V3652 in a locked open condition
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| * ' while placing the B SDC loop in service. As a result, the IB low Pressure Safety Injectaan Pump was operated with its suction line isolated.
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| 'Inis is a Severity level IV vic'stion (" g '-
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| ^ I).
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| ,m E. Tachale=1 Specification 6.8.1.s requires that written pe- ' a be estabhshed, impl-*=8, and ==iatal==8 j a covering abs activides raaa==== dad in Appendax A of P;- ' ^ -i Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, February 1978.
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| ~~-
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| i Appendix A, paragraph 1.d inchades ademnistrative procedures for ge- *-- --! adherence. Procedure Qt 5-PPfe'bt, Rev. 62, ' Preparation, Revision, Review / Approval of Procedures,' hetiaa 5.13.2, states that all powedures shall be strictly adhered to.
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| QI 16-PR/PSb2, Rev.1, 'St. lecie Action Report (STAR) Program,' required that STARS be initiated for Quality Assurance audit findings and ladapandaar technical review i--- - -- 4=h Contrary to the above, a STAR was not generated when a Quality Assurance review of an inadvertent Unit 1 aantai====t spraydown, h ^ ' la interoffice corr-pandanca JQQ-95-143, identified the practice of pre-lubricating PCV-071A, Caatain= ant Spray header A flow control valve, when performing valve stroke time testing.
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| 'Ihis is a Severity level IV violation (Suppla===r I).
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| P. Tachaical Specification 6.8.1.s required that written pracadures be established, impla=== sad, and maintalaad 1 - covering the activities reco==aadal in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 Rev. 2, February 1978.
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| Appendix A, paragraph 1.d includes ad= aimerative procedures for praeahwal adherence Procedure QI 5-PR/PSbt, Rev. 62, ' Preparation, Revision, Review / Approval of Procedures," Sectaan 5.13.2, stated that all ge- ' ; shall be strictly adhered to. i ADM 08.02, Rev 7, " Conduct of Maia*===aca," Appendix 5, step 5, required that procedures be present dunas work and that individual steps be initialed once perfonned.
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| Contrary to the above, inspection of work in progrees revealed that individual steps were not initialed once
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| '~ i Page 3 of 24
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| ~ --
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| p EXCERFTS IR 95-15 i %.j i, f.,.--
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| -- ' upon completion for work conducted in accordance with Plant Change / Modi 5 cation 11-195.
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| 'Ihis is a Severity I.svel IV violation (^ ,1 ; I).
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| G. 10 CPR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, ' Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by doc ===8ad procedures of a type appropriate to tie i Circumstances.
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| Contrary to the above, on August 18,1995, venting of the Iow Pressure Safety Injection (IESI) System was ca=Aeead in accordance with a procedure which was inappropriate to the ciremn=s-cas. Specifically, OP 1-0420060, Rev. O, ' Venting of the Emergency Core Coolms and c=tal====* Spray Systems,' did w require a verification that the portions of the system being vented were hydraulically isolated from adjacent systems and flowpaths. As a result of this failure to wahhah proper initial ca=ditia==, water driven by the 1 A IESI pump was inadvertently directed to the A Train ca=*ala===t Spray header, resulting in a spraydown of the Unit 1 Reactor enaamia===t Building.
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| ' Ibis is a Severity Ievel 'IV violation (E;;'-- ^ I). . . . . . .
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| I Report Nos.: 50-335/95-15 and 50-389/9515 IJcensse: Florida Power & IJght Co i 9250 West Flagler Street 1 Miami, FL 33102 l f ~' - Docket Nos.: 50-335 and 50-389 IJoense Nori.: DPR-67 and NPF-16 av Facility Name: St. Imcie 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted. July 30 through September 16,1995 Imad Inspector: _Edwin Ima Jr. for _10/16/95 R. Prevette, Senior Famidaat Date Signed
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| , inapaceae
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| *- M. Miller, Resident Inspector R. Aiello,Ilcense Examinar Approved by: _K. Iandis _10/16/95 i K. Iandia, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Branch 3
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| . Division of Reactor Projects ,
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| 1
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| ==SUMMARY==
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| Scope:
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| , 'Ihis routine resident inspectm was caaertad onsite in the areas of plant operations review, maintenance i observations, survaillanc= observatiana, engineering support, plant support, and other areas. Tamp =e'ia== were
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| ! Performed during normal and hack =hiA hours and on weekands. ,
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| ; es b +
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| Page 4 of 24 f~
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| , 4 _______.______________________o
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| 1 i
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| i I e EXCERFrS IR 9515 j''
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| ,j . Results: ,
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| 1 Plant Operations area: Operator performance declined during this -e period. However, the i==partar l obearved control room activities during the RCS draindown to reduced inventory conditions and found that ,
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| .l , operators controlled the evolution well. l J Six violations were identified in abs operations area. b first five violations involved a failure to follow i r.+- ; which resulted in incorrect safety system alignments, damaging reactor coolant pump seals, an l
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| - inadvertsat main steam isolation signal actuation, the failure to document a deficiency, and inadequate i - operations logs. The sixth violation resulted in a spraydown of the Unit i ennemia==ne. A Non-Cited Violation l 1 involving W ;' ; was also identified. Five waalma-a= were idaatified: a hydrogen overpressurization of the i i
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| main generator, a Unit 2 downpower from a bester drain pump trip, the extenmon of a forced outage due to :
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| poor work screening and planning, inadequate control room logs, and the inappropriate delegation of line I L
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| I management faae*ia== to Quality Control. !
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| * \
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| ! Maintenance and Surveillance area: Performance in this area was found to be areapeable. A vial =et=, which I
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| ]. _
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| tadie=#ad that ==iana==ce personnel were not signing off procedural steps as they were + f ', was identified. A similar occurrence had been previously Idantified in IR 95-10. A procedural wealmons involving
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| {
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| l the amount of supervisory oversight required for unqualified workers was slao identified. During the Unit 1
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| ; outage, that started on August 1, a large asaount of maiasmamart work occurred. Several of these nialata==ca
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| ? activ ties were on ea-pana=*= that had been overhauled during the last refuelag outage.
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| Enginsenag area. b support t f diesel generator ==ian==ca and root cause evaluation was found to be
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| ; timely and helpful.
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| Plant Support area: Plant support by health physics and radi=*ian during the Unit 1 outage was good. Unit 1 was daaa=*====*ad to pre outage conditions aAer the inadvertent spraydown.
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| j Overall, abe Unit 1 outage was very challenging and dammadiar, but the llcmanaa's response to each issue was i acceptabl3.
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| i Within the areas inspected, the following violations and unresolved items were identified:
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| l 'do 335/95-1541, ' Failure to Follow Procedures and Block MSIS Actuation," 13.b.
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| l' VIO 335/95-15-02, Two examples of ' Failure to Follow Procedures during RCP Seal restaging," 13.b.
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| !' VIO 335/95-15 03, ' Failure to Follow Pid- and Documnat abnormal valve position in the Valve Switch
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| ! Deviation Log," 13.b.
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| ! VIO 335/95-1544, " Failure to Follow Procedures during Alignment of Shutdown Cooling Syste:n," 13.b.
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| i VIO 335/95-15-05, 'Failum to Follow Pid e and Docua-e a deficiency on enatala==a Spray Valve
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| ; Surveillance Test Procedum," 13.b.
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| VIO 335/951546, ' Failure to Initial Maintaaaaca Procedure Steps as work was completed,' 13.b.
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| VIO 335/95-1547, " Failure to Follow Procedures during ventag of ECCS System resulted in t' natal ===at Spraydown," 13.b.
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| w NCV 335/95-15 08, ' Failure to Follow Logkeeping Procedures," 13.b.......
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| U Page 5 of 24 l
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| : m. EXCERPTS IR 95-15 i sj
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| : 2. Piet Status and Activities 2.a. llaii.1 was shutdown on August 1 as a result of Hurricane Erin. As a result of a series of equi;-- -
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| problems and personnel errors, the Unit remained shutdcwn for the remaindar of the inspection period. ,
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| i 2.b. llaill was also shutdown on August 1 as a result of Hurricane Erin. The Unit was restarted August 4 and achieved Mi power on August 5. On August 17, high enadannar back pressure resulted in reducing power.
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| M Unit operated at power levels of 50 to 90 percent while the eaadanaae water boxes were riamaad, ,
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| sendifications were performed on the_ heater drain pump electrical controls, and other equipment problems were
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| ) corrected. 'Ibe Unit returned to fbil power on August 29. Power was reduced again on Scytember 15, for h waterbox cleaning.
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| 2.c. NRC Activity R. P. Aiello, an Operator IJeanse Fumminar from NRC Regica II, was on site on August 14-18. His activities involved augmenting the resident in partian effort and his i== pac +ian results are na=*=inad j la this report.
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| : 3. Piant o,erations i
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| . 3.a. Plant Tours G1707) h inspectors penodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring equipasant was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.......
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| During a tour of the Unit I coatsol roosa, canduc*ad on tar ea-har 12, the laag=cear noted that the PI 3312, flow indicator for 1 A2 LPSI flow, was indicating 50 spm. As the unit was not employing SDC, the larlicator
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| ]
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| j Q should have indicated 0 sym. ' Ins inspector becusht this to the attention of the RCO. Work Regnest 95014580 was saamaaed to conene the -d *i-
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| ....1he following accessiblessen ESP system and ama walkdowns were made to verify that systema lineups l
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| ; were in accordance with licensee . - ; ' for operability and equipment material conditions weso satisfactory: (1) Unit 1 Containmane Building & (2) Unit 2 Contmiamant Spray Trains A and B t
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| : l. Ihe inspector verified that major flowpath valves were corretly positioned, that indicated pump oillevels were
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| ,( appropriate and that control room ladicarians were antisfactory. b following minor deficiencies (2) were f
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| ;' identified.....
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| . 3.b. Plant Operations Review G1707. 62703. 37551. 40500. 93702) h inspectors penodically reviewed I
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| shift logs and operations records, including data =haa*=, instrumant traces, and records of equipment j malfunctions.....Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed. ;
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| I - 1) Hurricane Erin On July 31, at 11:28 a.m., an Unusual Event was declared due to a hurncane warning
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| {, (Hurricane Erin) for the East coast of Florida in the vicinity of the St. lacie Plant. At that time both Units I were at 100 percent power. in the afternoon, the NRC dispatched a van with emergency radio equipesnt from I Atlanta to provide assistance to the Florida plants as needed. In the late afternoon additional ==-l= s of the
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| , NRC staff were dispatel=d from Atlanta to provide assistance as naadad to Florida plants.
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| - Ibo resident inspector was casite and monitored the licaa- preparation for severe weather as required by AP 0005753, Rev 13, " Severe Weather Preparations.' hee preparations were verified to be N'~ ' on the morning of August 1.
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| T Page 6 of 24
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| . ,- EXCERFfS IR 95-15
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| ! V At 8:05 a.m., on August 1, the ti==aa com d a shutdown of both nuclear units. A Senior Resident Inspector returned fram the Rll office and the nsident staff monitored the shutdown of both units to hot standby and other 11=== preparations for the approach of Hurricane Erin. At appronimataly 3:00 p.m., the NRC, van i with emergency communications equipment, arrived on site. All equipment was tested and placed in storm protected areas.
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| : h 1i==== established and ==iaeala-l raaena=== ca===icata== with the NRC and corporate EOF at
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| . . approximately 9:00 p.m. h hurricane made landfall about midnight on August 1, approximately 20 miles
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| ; notth of the plant with winds in that area of approximately 70 mph. Actual winds at the plant averaged about 40 mph with periods of heavy rain.
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| i!
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| '' h plant =asaia=I no significant damage due to the wind or rain. At 5:00 a.m., on August 2, Erin was j iw gr al to a tropical stone and the Unusual Evset was terminated at 5:42 a.m. Plant preparation, staffing, 3 planning, and response to Erin was excellent.
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| lj It was later discovered that dunas burncane preparations the licensee had tested ECCS Rooni floor drain valves HCV 21-1 through HCV-21-7. During testing raadne*=1 by control rooni operators, some of the valves had failed to stroke properly. As a result, the valves were lea closed for ;. * '- * = - and were not ---; -- '
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| :' OP 10010123, Rev 99, 'Adminiatrative Control of Valves, Locks, and Switches,' required, in step 8.1.6, that "All valve or switch position deviations or lock openings shall be daen-eal in Appendix C, Valve Switch
| |
| { Deviation Log...' h inspector reviewed archived Appendix C logs completed in July and August and control roosa open Appendix C logs and found no evidaaca that HCV-25-1 through 7 were logged as being out of position. He failure to enter the valves' closed status into the valve deviation log is a violation (VIO 335/95-
| |
| ,. 15 03, " Failure to Follow Procedure and Document abnormal valve position in the Valve Switch Deviation m Ims". His ultimately led no Acadang of this space when a SDC Relief Valve lined and did not resent (IR 95-20). FTAR 950917 was initiated to develop a PM for verifying that floor drains were unclogged.
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| l t Unit 2 was restarted on August 4 and returned to Adi power operation on August 5. h Iaq=e*ar reviewed i and verified the unit's =d=a= for restart. b restart was achieved without experiencing significant problems.
| |
| Unit 1 sonnained shutdown for the miadar of the inspection period.
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| ; 2) Umt 1 Forced Outane AAer Hurricane Erin, the plant scheduled a restart of Unit 1 for August 2. A failed i RCP seal resulted in placing the unit in cold shutdown. A series of personnel errors and egoipment failures resulted in the unit being shutdown to perform repairs and conect deficiencies. h following major work j activities were accomplished during this outage:
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| i
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| * RCP 1A1 and 1A2 seal replamnant j
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| * Replaced and adjusted SDC relief valve 3439 j
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| * Redaced jumpered cell 43 on B safety related battery
| |
| * Repair / replace PORVs 1402 and 1404
| |
| * Cleanup and decenaamination of containment as a result of spraydown
| |
| * Inspection of caataiamane equipausit
| |
| * Repair of contnianwat spray valve FCV 07-1A
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| * PCM cn DG 1A/B to improve trip solenoids and temperature monitors
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| * Inspection sad repair of damaged EDG 1B2
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| ;
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| * Replacement and setpoint changes for eight safety related relief valves i Work on the above items was monitored as it occurred. Several of the above items are discussed in detail in this report. This unplanned outage became a challenge to the lieermee because as each itan was npaind V Page 7 of 24 4
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| 4
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| i l
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| EXCERFTS IR 95-15 l I
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| ; _/ another event or equipment failure occurred that lengthened the outage duration.
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| i l AAer the restart was delayed, the licensee added to the work scope. During this thne span, the landvertent j spraydown of containneemt broight other w "wi.-arounds into question. After questions about the
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| ;i number of open STARS, Caution Tags, J/Ile, and OWAs by the NRC, the He===s* ca=Aaread a rwiew of all open STARS, Caution Tags, PW0s, J/Lla, PCMs, OWAs, and Equipment Out Of Service on Unit 1.
| |
| 4 Based on this review, approximately 80 of these items were also added to and completed dunng the forced
| |
| ; outage.
| |
| 1 ii The laspector noted that several of the -paa==*= that were worked on had also been worked on during the last Unit I refueling outage. 'Ihe lican=== plans to evaluate this item and determine if they have a j, repr4itive failure or rework issue.
| |
| In addition to the equipment problems, sevemi - . " changes occurred that may have affected the outage
| |
| ; , duradon. Vendor support was obtained as needed during the outage and site and wyv.ee engineering provided ij assistance as needed to resolve issues as they occurred. Overall, the Unit 1 outage was very challenging and
| |
| ]l '--%, but the licensee's response to each issue was acceptable.
| |
| . As a result of several events that have occurred during the Unit 1 outage, the NRC requested that FPL i management discuss these issues and their actions being takse. A meeting was held in the Region II office in Atlanta on August 29 on.this item. At that meeting the lea ==== covered the events that had occurred and their i planned and corrective actions = ;' ^" They also noted that they had fanned an inspection team composed ,
| |
| primarily of three senior managere from two utilities and a sister plant to assess these recent events and provide j recan==aadahans for improvement. I
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| ;, m l
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| .j I
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| g Ihis team was composed of a Unit Manager from ANO, the Operations Manager fmm North Anna, and the
| |
| ' Assistant to the Vice President froen Turkey Point. " Ibis team was ammsted by a Plant QA j l
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| v knowledge on plant r.= ' _ and interface.
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| ]
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| i ll
| |
| 'Ibe team arrived on site September 5, completed their ==========t, and exited on September 9. 'Ibe inspector noted that the team members observed operations in the control room on various shifts, conducted interviews l
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| ]
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| i; with a large ====l= of personnel and worked long days to complete the -e 'Ihe inspector =**= dad the j
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| !~ axit on "' , " r 9 and noted that the majority of the taasn= findings closely paralleled previous NRC identified
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| ! deficiencies.
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| : l. .
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| 'Ibe licensee submitted the results of this team inspection and an action plan to the NRC on September 15.
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| The unit again attempted a restart dudag the week of September 10. After achieving 5327 and
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| ; ry, --- ^ ",1700 psia, a leak at the flange of r. -- _: safety valve 1241 resulted in returning the plant to cold shutdown to repair this liesn. A review by the licensee found that this defielmey had been
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| : . Identifled on August 3, but had not been adequately evaluated to determine the need for rewont prior to
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| ! plant restart. As a result of this, the unit was still shutdown at the end of the laspection period. This l
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| } ^ items is identified as a weakness in the work screening and planning process. !
| |
| ! 3) RCP Seal Failure Backsmund. St. Imcie employed Byron 4ackson RCPs and seal packages. 'Ibe
| |
| ; packages ca==isead of 3 primary seals and a fourth vapor seal. 'Ibe primary seals acted to break down RCS
| |
| ; pressure in 3 equal stages of approximaamly 750 paid 'the seal stages segregated the seal package into 4
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| . cavities, the lower (below the lower seal), the mHdle (between the lower and middle seals), the upper (between
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| ; the middle and upper seals), and the controlled bleedoff(between the upper and vapor seals). Each seal was i
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| i V. Page 8 of 24 h
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| 1
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| EXCERPTS IR 95-15
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| ,f-.s ,.
| |
| m j rated for hall RCS presswe. h pressee breakdown process resulted in a controlled bleadoff flow to the VCT
| |
| . of approul==*aly 1 spas per punp. Seal injection into the lower seal cavity was possible via the CVCS system, however, the licenses #h=d soutase use of seal injection in 1993 (via safety evaluation JPN-PSteSBNJ-93 001) following ladic=*iaan abat the cooler iq)ection water led to damage of RCP shaAs. 'Ibe seals were cooled and lubricated by controlled bleadoff flow which was cooled by a ca=hia=*iaa of the thennst barrier heat exchanger (below the seal package) and a seal water heat exchanger (which cooled flow rising froen the RCP casing driven by an auxiliary impeller affixed to the pump shaA).
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| Seal Failme: On August 2, while performing a Unit I heatup following Hurricane Erin, operators noted that the middle seal cavity of the 1A2 RCP ladic=*=d a pressure which approximated RCS pressure, ladicaring a -
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| failure of the lower seal of the package. Operators subsequently entered ONOP 10120034, Rev 34, " Reactor raal==* Pump,' which required, upon identification of a failed seal, that seal parameter data be recorded every 30 miruses so ensus that additional seal stages ww not degradag.
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| ne f =mho day, the 11--= considmed the option of 'emiasing' the seal package. h procam involved opening vents associated with sech seal cavky in an effort to incream iba diffeantial m across each asal
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| . stage which, in principio, would saan naving and =*=*ia== y mal face tagesbar more tightly, thus :===*=h8i=hiar the seal. h evolution was described in OP 10120020, Rev 72, " Pilling and Vesting abs RCS,' Appendix E,
| |
| " Restaging Rosetor Coolant Pmny Seals.'
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| Acconbag to various personnel in the licensee's Operations organization, the process had been successfully appind avmal times in the past. h 11,==== opted to perform the procedme, and infonned the inspector of abair ian==*ia==. N inspector wm not familiar with the pm bowever, in di-=la== with the license, the
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| . Inspeame was infonned that the proces had been puformed maisfactorily in the past, that a procedes existed sor abo ps oems, and that expmienced ANPSs, who had , f---- ' the procedme in the past, were being
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| [ Qm amigned to tim task.
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| j At 5:17 p.m. on abo sene day, the lic==== began abo restaging process. Plant conditions at the time were j Mode 3,1450 pain,3707, with RCPs in operation. Per the governing procedure, the controlled bleadoff cavity .
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| l ,
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| was vented, sollowed by the upper and middle cavities. At this point, flow out the vents was expected to
| |
| ! decrease a the lower seal stage restaged; however, flow did not diminish and, aAer approri==8aly 1 minute,
| |
| ! black material was noted to be in =5=aalaa in the vented reactor coolant fraea the middle cavity. Additionally,
| |
| ! the water ^ , - . was noted to increase rapidly. Operatore closed the middle cavity vent valve and noted i that, ahnost i==adi=*aly, black, hot, water issued from the upper seal cavity vent, ladicating a middle seal j failure. Operators i===diately closed the vent valves associated with the upper seal cavity and the controlled bleedoff cavity.
| |
| ,(
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| i l At 5:50 p.m., ocatrol room differential pressure indacations were received which confirmed that both the lower j and middle seal stages had fallad. Controlled bleadoff flow increased to greater than 3.5 spm., whia indicated
| |
| ; degradation of the upper seal. At 6:10 p.m., a cooldown and depressurizatica of the unit ca==== cad At 6:40 j p.m., the 1A2 RCP was seemed and lower seal cavity ' ,
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| _.i wme noted to increase to 300'F due to the
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| ! lacreased leak rate through the seal package and the lack of auxiliary impeller-driven cooling (as a result of l securing the punp).-
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| i
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| ; A. MSIS Ace =*ian I
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| l' As the cooldown proceeded, SG pressmo decreased and, at approni==*aly 700 peig, ====cimaans Q.13 and Q-
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| : 20, *MSIS Actuation ch===ala A/B Block Permiseve,' illumlaatad. These were expected alarms, as cooldowns
| |
| ; naturally result in SG pressme decreases below the MSIS setpoint. MSIS block keys were provided for this j - eventuality to prevent MSIS =cen=*ia== under non-accident related conditions of low SG pressure.
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| ! V Page 9 of 24 t
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| I f
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| 2 i' P
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| ]*p EXCERPIS IR 95-15 1
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| s The desk RCO, who was r L-- '; cooldown-related duties at the subhet area of the control panels,
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| ;. acknawledged the annunciators and later reported observing that the MSIVs and MPIVs were in their post-MSIS l - positions as a function of the cooldown. C- ; stly, the RCO miected not to insert the MSS block and i returned to VCT desassing operations. b RCO was then 74" by an STA as to the failure to block the
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| ! MSIS. The RCO r=paaAut that, as the MSIVs and MFIVs were in their post-trip positirms, the me*==*iaa j would not present a problem. b board RCO (the second of the two RCOs p h * ; the cooldown) became lavolves and directed that the MSIS be blocked. Before the keys could be inserted to block the signals, SO l pressure fell below the actuation seapoud and an MSIS was received. & signal was later blocked and reset.
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| i 1he lampactar reviewed HPES 95 07 Rev 2, the lie ==a's review of the event. In it, the lica=== detennined
| |
| ! that, in %==ary of Factors that Influenced Human Performance,' the event was the result of a lack of
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| ! knowledge on the part of the desk RCO that an MSIS was ip' *- to the NRC whathat or not 9--;-- --
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| changed state. Under "Su== nary of Causes," the licensee cited the following causal factors:
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| * Training / Qualification-1 }.
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| i ij h I- decennised that training had not educated operatore as to the reportable natue of ESP Ji actuations, whether or not e 1; - ^ changed state.
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| ii
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| {; *
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| * Supervisory Methods - Progress / Status of Task not .* b; ''y Tracked:
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| 1he ficaaa= daarmined that the ANPS and NPS were too involved in the daagnosis of the RCP seal
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| - failures and were not observing the overall cooldown in progress at the time.
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| !.
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| * Work Practices - Pertinent Information not Transmitted:
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| !f ~
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| 2; h liosasse decennised abat the desk RCO did not announce to the rest of tbs control secen that the
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| ====ciatars had been received; thus, ANPS/NPS involvement to establish the MSIS block was not ahealaad.
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| f-
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| * Work Practices - Document Use Practices - Docua==t= not Followed Correctly:
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| b licensee decennised that OP l 0030127, Rev 68, "Ranctor Plant Cooldown - Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown," name=I=ad a step requiring the operator to block the MSIS when the pennissive was l )'
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| received; however, the step was ea-talaad further into the procedure than the operator had proceeded.
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| Additionally, the licensee determined that the operator had failed to refer to the annunciator response ii- procedure, which directed that the block keys be inserted.
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| h licensee's proposed corrective actions for this event included:
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| ,:
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| * Revising operator training to include "the necessity to block ESPAS and other reportable actuations
| |
| !' when they alarm...h plant's operating philosopby of keeping Ilcammaa Event Reports to a niininum
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| . should also be included and stressed."
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| * Including the event in IJcensed Operator Requalification Training.
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| f
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| * r f %- that control roosa managemeent should ==intain a " big picture" view of plant evolutions, that fonnal crew co===inications should be employed, and that procedures are followed.
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| e b inspector concluded that the licensee's investigation was weak in that:
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| ! V Page 10 of 24 -
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| l N
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| 4 4
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| ;1
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| r EXCERPTS IR 95-15 l C/
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| * h operator's knowledge of procedurat rwp'irements prior to the event was not reported (i.e. did the operator know that the OP 14030127 required that the MES be blar3 rad 7).
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| * %e conclusica that the operator's lack of knowledge of the W.dlity of the MSIS ae*=*ia= was a principle contributor to his actions appeared to place more importance on avoiding an ad=laimerative burden and the visibili:y of reporting actuations to the NRC, than it did on knowledge of, and adherence to, procedural requimamas.
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| %e inspector discussed the subject report with the licensee. Operations -aga==* stated that the operator in I* q==*Ian reported being confused at the time and that it was their ==pae*=*i- that, under such cir===* , -^
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| operators would refer to the naminciator response procedures provided for each =a==riator panel. *n Aarther stated that it was not their expectation that RCOs would be familiar with NRC reportag requiramansa (reportability knowledge was said to be the responsibility of ANPS/NPSs and STAS) and that operator actions i should be based upon procedure .7 -, as opposed to reportability.
| |
| De inspector reviewed OP 14030127 and found that step 8.21 direcsed that "At 700 psia S/G pressure, Aa==rt=8-s Q18 and Q20, MSS Actuation t'hanaala A/B Block Permissive, will alarm Block MSS by
| |
| ' placing MSS block key switch to BLOCK position.' Additianally, ONOP 14030131, Rev 60, " Plant A-==riaa~ h==ary," specified that, upon valid receipt of annunciators Q18 and Q20, operators were to i==adianely block MMS ch=aala A and B, respectively. De inspector concluded that the failure of the Desk RCO to perform step 8.21 of OP 1-0030127 is a violation (VIO 335/95-15-01, ' Failure to Follow Procedures and Block MMS Arenatia='. .
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| ! Following the MSS, the cooldown was temporarily : ;"'. At approximanaly 8:18 p.m an ====eiaa~
| |
| was received indicatinh : hat reactor cavity leakage ==adad 1 spm. Operators verified that control rocas if* h.g instmments indicated an inemased leek rate Aom _ -
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| 'y .25 spa to approximately 2 syn. De leakage was identified as being related to the 1A2 RCP vapor barrier. Operators aneered ONOP 10120031 Rev 23,
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| 'Exosesive Rasesor Coolant Systent IAakage," at 8:24 p.m At 8:44 p.m safety fbaction status checks were
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| '" ' anti =fae*~ily. At 9:25 p.m., the licensee declared an Unusual Event based upon occurrences that W warrant increased awareness, specifically, due to concerns over further RCP seal degradation. At 6:30 a.m on August 3, the Unusual Event was termiastad based upon the reduction in RCS leakage through the 1A2 RCP
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| ; . seal (due to depressurization) and on stability of plant conditions.
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| : . De linaama performed a cooldown/depressurization of Unit 1 and replaced the subject seal package. De failed package was then dian=amhled in an attempt to determine the soot cause for the failures. At the close of the laspectica period, the laa- had not concluded its root cause investigation. De inspector discussed the effort with the licensee. De most probable root causes for the noted conditions were described as follows:
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| i
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| * b nwat probable root cause for the indicanad failure of the lower seal was destaging. Upon restaging, the carbon face of the lower seal was believed to have bece forced, rapidly, against its j- =ating seal face, resulting in fracture. l l
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| * De most probable cause for the middle seal failure and degrad=*iaa of the remaining seals was statef to be a reduction in cooling and lubricating flow though the seal as a result of the venting of the seal cavities. b subsequent torque, imposed due to pump rotation without lubricatica, fractured the
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| ; middle seal rotating face.
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| Ii.j Following the failure of the IA2 RCP seal package, the PGM initiated STAR 950849 to perform a self-
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| -* of the decision making process that led to the restaging of the seal. De conclusions r== chad in the
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| ,i ?
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| .s self-ammaammant were that the one-on-one nature of the decision mairing process precluded a " synergistic
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| * V Page 11 of 24
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| EXCERFili IR 95-15 i Q enviran=n=t
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| * h study went on to state that, while several individuals expressed concern over the prospects fm =eca=, no specific technical issue was raised. 'Ibe licensee deternuned that the existing Nuclear Pohey 105 procean, which required mitidisciplinary review of proposed abnonnel activities, should be arpaad=1 such that it is employed when questions of procedure applicability are raised.
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| W laspector reviewed available informadon regarding RCP seals and restaging. W following was noted: j
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| * OP 10120020, Rev 72, 'Fillbg and Venting the RCS,' ~=talaad, in the base ge-S, preautie= l 4.2 which stated "Do not attempt to vent if the RCS temperature is above 200'F.* Initial conditions specified in the base procedure were enamisesar with the Cold Shutdown mode of operation.
| |
| * OP l-0120020, Rev 72, " Filling and Venting the RCS,' Appendix E, ' Restaging Reactor Coolant Pump Seals," included only two saatamaata that could be construed as initial ~=diti<=a or pre =*1<w One was in the form of a note and the other in the form of a caution. b note stated "Ensee seal injection is aligned and in service.' b caution stated."If RCS is greater than 200"F, 'Iben use caution when venting."
| |
| * FSAR ae*ie= 5.5.5.2 stated that the vapor seal was designed to withstand RCS operating pressure when the RCPs were idle.
| |
| * h restaging process described in Appendir B of OP l 0120020 was anhataatially the same as the seal 4
| |
| package venting procedure described in the venoor eacharal manual for the RCP. However, tbs manuel directed that the venting be r ' r ' at approximaialy 200 venting procedme in the achaical e
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| poi with an idle pump. l
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| / l
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| * Safety Evaluation JPN-PSteSENJ-93-001, Rev 1, " Deletion of RCP Seal Liection,' included, by 8% reference. PPL letter Irgl-107 to the NRC reporting test results for RCP seals in postulated station j
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| j
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| * hiacaraad conditions. 'Ihe results of the tests were that, under sin =lanad Hot Standby e'a=litie=s a ;
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| =ari=n= of 16.1 gph was recorded after 50 hours without coohng water flow to the seal package. ,
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| 1
| |
| * 'Ibe vendor reco==andad a marin== seal package - ,
| |
| -w of 250'F based upon the rubber components in the seal package. Safety evaluation JPN-PSleSENJ-93-001 provided analyses to iyL inc.rease the temperature limit to 300'F.
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| 4
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| )
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| * % licanama produced a Byrou-Jackson letter, dated November 16,1990, which reported a review of l
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| j St. Imcie's proposed restaging process. b letter stated that the proposed process was acceptable. i
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| 'j* h letter also stated that application of the process should consider initial seal condition and age in
| |
| ;i determining whether to apply the process.
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| M inspector concluded that the licensee had reason to believe that restaging the 1A2 RCP seal package would correct the identified condition. Vendor information and knowledge of previous successful restagings tended to ll d
| |
| support the evolutim. However, the inspector found that the procedure appendix which duected the evolution did not require initial conditions sufficient to ensmo that seal package n-- - t=e limitations would be observed. In fact, the ' Caution' =*asa==* of the Appendix (advising caution if RCS ^ ,
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| - _ a = adad 200'F) ran counter to precaution 4.2 of the base ps J e (precluding ventag if RCS temperature amadad 200'F). Absent any modifying information in Appendix E, the inspector concluded that the initial corelitions
| |
| , specified in the been procedwo applied to the procedwo and its appendices. C-. . _tly, tim failure of the i hemanaa to adhere to the initial conditions specified in OP 10120020 is the first example of a violation of failure to follow gec J . durms RCP Seal restaging (VIO 335/95-1542, ' Failure to Follow Procedures during RCP
| |
| , 6 Seal restaging').
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| i Page 12 of 24 i
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| r 4
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| i EXCERPTS IR 95-15 n
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| I j De inspector noted that control naosa logs did not reflect the alignment of seal iqjection, while the note of j Appendix E of OP 1-0120020 required seal injection. When M-M 'he leammaa stated that seal injectica
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| ; ,. Was not aligned due to concerns for tbs affect it'might two on / a RCP shaA. When asked why a TC had not
| |
| : j. been made to the Ap '% the licensee had no explanation. Le licensee's failure to align sent injection to the a IA2 RCP prior to restaging the pump's seal is the maraad example of a violation of failure to follow procedure i, during RCP Seal restaging (VIO 335/95-15 02, 'Pailure to Pollow Procedures during RCP Seal restaging').
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| & inspector reviewed ONOP 10120034, Rev 34, ' Reactor Coolant Pump,' and found that, while actions
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| ',, were described for the failure of one RCP seal (30 minute readings to ensure degradation is not occurring - step lt 7.2.3.C), and more than one RCP seal (unit shutdown, secure RCP when TCBs open - step 7.2.8.D), no actions were specified for the instance when 3 seals had failed. As stated above, the fourth, vapor, seal was only
| |
| }' designed to contain system pressure when an RCP is idle. b failure of ONOP 1-0120034 to direct the
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| ' securing of an RCP when 3 seals have failed was found to be in contr=direiam to the design parametere of the
| |
| $ RCP. & inspector brought this to the =*ea=*ian of the licenses. M "wa==aa reviewed the issue and stated i that PCRs would be prepared for the RCP off-normal procedures for each unit, adding a requirement to trip the 1 unit and secure the affected RCP should third stage seal failure occur, i
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| j L In conclusion, the inspector found that the activities relating to the failure of the lower seal of the 1 A2 RCP
| |
| !- were poor!y eaaaida ed in that the restaging process was applied in inappropriate plant conditions. De failure to ==*=hliah propee initial conditions for the restaging was found to exacerbate the seal's already degraded
| |
| .I condition. %e inspector fharther concluded that two examples of gve.J .a noncompliance were associated with the seal restages effort and that one example of procedural noncomphance was maaarianad with the MSIS
| |
| : j. anmaalaa. De ficaa==a's evaluation of the MSS =cena* a= was found to be inappropriately focused on event i reportability, as opposed to g-:-- ' . compliance. h li=amaa's self a-# of the darialan maldag i m process that led to the restaging of tbs 1A2 RCP was found to be ea====adahia. OP 1-0120034 was found to inelade 8=aa==1=s==ela= between the base procedure 13==ismeia== and those found in Appendix E of the sans l {'
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| y''
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| procedure. A wealmess was identified in ONOP 10120034, is tha; design Ihnits of the RCP seal package vapor seal were not properly into the procedure.
| |
| : 4) Raduced Inventory for RCP Seal Replacessats On August 5 Unit 1 entered a reduced RCS inventory j condition to support RCP seal replacement work. h following items were observed during this evolution:
| |
| (1) c'~" 8-* Closure Capability.....(2) CS Temperature Indication - Normal mode 1 CEre were avail 4.4 j
| |
| ' for indication. (3) RCS Level Indication - hdape=daat RCS level ladientions were available....(4) RCS Level Permrbations When RCS level was altered, additional operational controls were invoked......(5) RCS l Inventory Volume Addition Capability - %:ee charging pumps and a HPSI pump were available for RCS addition. (6) RCS Nozzle Dams - Due to the type of outage, the nonle dams were not laan=11ad this thne.
| |
| jd (7) Vital Electrical Bus Availability - Operations would not release busses or alternate power sources for work during this evolution. Both EDOs were operable, as were all offsite power sounes. (8) Pressurizer Vent Path j - De manway stop the pressurimer has been removed to provide a vent path.
| |
| I j, h inspector cheerved control room activities during the RCS draindown to reduced inventory conditions. N evolution was performed in ma,id ca. with OP 1-0410022, Rev 21, ' Shutdown Cooling," Appendix A, 3
| |
| " Instructions for Operation at Reduced Inventory or Mid-loop Conditions,' and OP 1-0120021, Rev 38,
| |
| ! " Draining the Reactor Coolant System.' The inspector verified that specified conditions were met prior to the evolution. The inspector found that operators controlled the evolution well, that _a " L cross 4
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| checidag between level ladle =ela== werv 0 - '. and that g-:-- '- .d c;
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| * for waiting periods
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| ; between draining stages were met. b licensee exited reduced inventory conditions following the RCP seal
| |
| !W . g '- " on August 7.
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| i Page 13 of 24 4
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| 1
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| EXCERPTS IR 95-15 g
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| 1 v, f 5) Containment Spravdown j A. Background The St. Iacle Unit 1 IESI and CS systems.... are interrelated in that they share the SDC heat
| |
| * ; .. In an accident anode, tim SDC heat enchangers serve to cool water drawn from the aaaamia==at
| |
| ; sunp prior to delivery to the naasala-* environment via the -e=ta-ame pray s headers.......In a SDC mode, the SDC heat exchangers, in conjunction with the IESI pumps, serve to remove heat fross reactor coolant. The l flowpath in this mode (again, for the A train) involves water flowing froaa the RCS hot leg and through the A 1ESI pump. b fluid flow is then split at FCV-3306, with some water passed through the valve and the ,
| |
| belance diverted through the SDC heat exchangers, through MV-3456 and/or MV-3457, and returned to the 1ESI systema for delivery to the RCS cold legs.
| |
| I During power operations, the two systems are isolated from one another and each is aligned to perform its safety function. In the case of the CS system, this alignmane involves an open flowpath from the RWT, through
| |
| . the CS pumps, and up to PCV 07-1A and PCV 07-1B, normally closed AOVs which receive open signals in response to a CSAS.
| |
| B. IESI System Ventina In February, the licensee experienced a waterha==ae event in the Unit 11ESI i system while placing SDC in service (see IR 95-04). 'Ibe lica=== determined that one of the potential
| |
| ! contributors to the event was air, trapped in system piping. At approuimasaly the same, the licensee idamalfied a Unit 2 IESI pump in an air bound condition during a survaillaman run of the pump. In response to these events, the tiraa== developed aggressive venting programs for the systems. As a part of the effort, OP l- ,
| |
| i 0420060, 'Vensing of the Eanergency Core Cooling and Contala==at Spray Systems," .... required, in part, that venting be performed following SDC system operation. The p+- * : was approved on August 13.
| |
| l n ' As a part of the venting procedure, tic licornes , - _ _ : : the linas landlag to the SDC heat exchanger '
| |
| via the LPSI pumps and ., * " ="y dretted flow to the RWT in an effort to sweep air frena the f ~4 systeen. The boundary of this venting psecess included the CS lines up to the CS handar Isolation valves.
| |
| i C. FCV-07-1A Inoperability On August II, CS flow contrul valve PCV 07-1A failed a stroke time test and was declared OOS. As shown on Figure 1, the valve leolated the A CS header from the CS system outside ;
| |
| ll
| |
| ;~ eaatala==e b valve was designed to open on a CSAS and was a fail-open AOV. h valve was required
| |
| , by AP l 0010125A, Rev 39, ' Surveillance Data Sheets,' Data Sheet 8A, ' Valve Cycle Test - Non-Geck i' Valves," to stroke in less than 8 =ca wim. In the failed test, the stroke was recorded as 20'.3 =aanda, l As a result of the failed surveillance test, STAR 950869 was generated. The stroke time failure was docu= mated and the STAR was assigned to Engineering for disposition. Engineermg proposed pixing the valve
| |
| , in its safeguards position (open) and prepared SE JPN-PSbSENS-O 016, Rev 0, " Alternative Valve Position ll for Spray Hender Isolation Valve 1-PCV 071 A.'......The SE concluded that no unreviewed safety question was jt introduced by placing the valve in an open position. The SE went on to pmvide 3 ' required /reca===adart' actions... . ..
| |
| t L b ".iB was approved by the PRO on August 12. Upon completion of the evaluation, the STAR was turned over to Mechanical Mainsananca with a required action of restoring the valve to original design and to perform i . a root cause investigation into the failure.... the subject STAR included no latheatina that the required actions listed above had been c-----;'" prior to E=P *ng releasing the STAR to Mack-leal Mal =*=anea and prior to Operations repositioning PCV 07-1A...... The inspector reviewed QI 16-PR/PSb2, Rev 1, "St. Imcie
| |
| [ Action Report (STAR) Program,' and found that the procedure was unclear as to who was responsible for
| |
| ; ensuring the activities were completed. As a result the inspector concluded that a wenkasse adsted la the l STAR program with regard is ensuring that required corrective actions were dae====**d and completed.
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| i
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| : b. Page 14 of 24 i
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| ;e
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| p EXCERFIS IR 9f 15 I i On August 15, a Night Order was issued which informed operators that the unit would be enerated with PCV-07-1 A open. b N5ht Order went on to state "See a***charl Engineering evaluadon which includes actions to
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| . be taken to avoid an aceldaasal spraydown of eaatala===8
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| * b SE limited its consideradon for the potential of inadvertent spraydown to inadvertent CS pump starts, except as provided in the macand required actun
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| =namaciand above. On August 16, caintiaa tags were hung and the valve was takaa to an open position.
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| D. Cantainment Soraydown On August 18, venting of the LPSI A train was commenced per OP 1-0420060, Rev 0, " Venting of the Emergency Core Cooling and Contain=aat Spray Systems." Whsm the A trala was
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| -- M through the SDC heat exchangers, the open flow path created to the A CS hender through FCV 47-1A allowed water to be drawn frian the RWT and passed into the ea=f=In===* ~ ;M e via the spray bender.
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| Operators were alerted to the event by an ====ri=>ae indicating high reactor cavity inleakage. Indicanad now into the cavity was increasing rapidly and operatore entered ONOP 1-0120031, Rev 23, ' Fun ==ive Reactor ,
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| Coolant System leakage.' Apprortmataly one minute aAer the mamancianar was received, operators idaatified '
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| j the flowpath leading to the spraydown and secured the A IPSI pump. b spraydown resulted in a slight ,
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| i decrease in -emia--t - - ; 1 : . and m. b 11oensee noted that 90 percent of -emia===t smoke !
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| detectors alarmed or faulted and an electrical ground developed in the 1A2 SIT sample valve as a result of the event.
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| E.1-# on Unit 1 'Ibe licensee determined that approximately 10,000 gallons of water from the RWT was transferred to anaamamant during the event. 'Ibe water was borated at approximataly 2200 ppm. b spray 8 2 r== dead in an increase in cana==i==*1aa levels inside na=#aia===t, with levels amanding 1x10 dpm/100 cm in many areas.
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| m ig Following the event, the licenses placed a hold on all work on Unit 1. 'Ibe unit was maintained stable in Mode 3 and ==amg==aar ananancad that it would conduct a series of meetings with all plant personnel to discuss the recent events on Unit 1 and to reiterste sannagement expectatiana for worker perfwmance. Meetings were held on August 18 in which the Division Presidest, the Site Vice President, and the Plant General Manager stressed j the need for worker vigilance, procedural compliance, and a gn==*ianing attitude on the part of all plant I
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| , personnel. Additionally, plant management mado plans to cool down Unit 1 to allow for a damata=inatiaa of containment, a repair of PCV 07-1A, and a number of other work items prior to returmng the unit to service.
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| l'*
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| % heaaaaa's initial plans for containmaat cleanup did not bring the cant ==inarian levels to pre event conditions. ARer discussions with management, a decision was made to expand the scope of this cleanup and deconhmination to reduce the need for additional cleanup durir.g the next refueling outage.
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| ! h inspector toured the contain=aat on August 19. HP brienngs prior to entry indicated that the majority of the r e=t=Sa was in a amanrable form. Containment cleanup had begun, and guidahaan had been
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| .' developed and promulgated under LOI-HP-23, "Decontammatian Following Inadvertent Spraydown of the Unit l
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| 1 RCB.* b inspector noted that the 62 A. elevation of containmaat had been separated into quadrants for i initial decontamination. While light water spotting was noted on the outer surfaces of some equipment, no obvious boron deposits were identified. Water was observed to be puddled in upturned I-beams supportig floor grating, but floor surfaces were dry.
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| l h licensee evaluated the event in Engineering Evaluation JPN-PSleSENS-95 017, "Asseeswt of Inadvertent r*naamin==t Spray Event."..... Corrective actions resulting from the evaluation included a compraha==ive Inspection of components inside canema-e Included were visual inspections of all snubbers inside caneal==ane following containmaat washdawn for decon e ==ination. 'Ibe inspection list compiled by engineering I
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| j N/ Page 15 of 24
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| }
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| 1 i- .
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| i iI p EXCERPTS IR 95-15 li~ s ~; included items to be inspected by tag annaae, the type of inspection to be performed, areapeaaca criteria, aml 1''
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| actions to be performed if acceptance criteria was not met. In all, approximanaly 1000 individualinspections wese performed. Of the items 3== pace =d, only minor deficiencies were identified.
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| I h F. Evaluation of the Licensee's Activities The inspectors ==ehadad that the mot cause of the aa=8=1===8 i'
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| spraydown event was a failure of OF 10430060, Rev 9, " Venting of the F--_ i Core Cooling and j t'a=8ala==* Spray Systems," to require a verificatloa of laitial constions. Specincelly, the i,i+- t c failed to verify that the CS system was in an alignment which was appropriate for the evolution being j conducted. 'the procedure was revised to remove the subject portion, leaving only static venting, on ( --' r i 1. b Ile=aaa reached a similar conclusion in LER 335/95407, and added that contributing flectors included
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| , operators failing to realize that plant conditions at the time of the evolution would result in the event.
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| Additionally, the licammaa identified that the decision to defer the repair of FCV 47-1A contributed to the
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| : j. event. The fathew to include appropriate initial candl*laas in OF 10430060 constitutes a violation (VIO
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| ;' 335/951548, arnada,pmen Pmeedural Initial Conditions").
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| il' l h inspectors reviewed the licanaaa's corrective actions as they related to matainmaat lamparola== following the event.1he inspectors found that the lie ===='s evaluation of the event and the lampartiaa scope readting from the evaluation was in agraa-aae with the NRC position on the subject (as described in the NRR DST Safst/
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| 1_,
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| Evaluation on the subject, transmitted to regional offices via letter from T.E. Murley en March 13,1991). The lic=aa=='s iampar*iaa was determined to be c---5-- ' - sive in scope and detail and adequate to ensure future
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| . component reliability, i
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| ! 6) Primary Water Storane Tank Overfill On August 19, at appmmimately 5:30 p.m., the Unit 1 RCO directed 8
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| the SNPO and ANPO to fill the PWST. At approximmialy 7:45 p.m., the ' Primary Water Tank level c High/Iow' alarm annunciated in the control room. The RCO daracted the SNPO to have the ANPO secure the
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| ;i j. fill valve to the PWST while making his rounds. N decision to delay secunng the valve was based on the
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| \ RCO using a tank strapping table in the control roosn which showed a margia of approximately 1.5 feet from the high level alann to tank overflow. At 8:30 p.m., a call was received from the Unit 1 -*=3===* ramp that
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| ,. the PWFr was overflowing. At that time tbs ANPO and SNPO were directed to inunadmaaly secure from
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| {j filling the PWST. h fill valves were then closed. It was estimated that about eleven thousand gallons overflowed form the tank. Chemistry samples found that no release limits were arraadad as a result this event.
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| }* The cause of this event appeared to be ' se,s'.s.te and untimely operator response to an alarsa coupled j with am r Mag operator work around on the level control system for the PWFr.
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| 1I l.
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| ji The PW$ r level control valve LCV15 6 had a history of unreliability. Because of this umwilahility, the operator had been manipulating V15106 or V15105 which are in series with LCV15 6. If this constion
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| : had been corrected, the systens would have been able to a=8ammelenHy malaista PWSr level.
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| : 7) 2A Heater Drain Pump Trio At 8:20 a.m., on August 23, the 'LP Heater 2-4A Level Hi/Im' annunciator
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| ;; alarmed in Unit 2 control room. b operator observed that 2A candaneae back pressure had increased froma i! , 4.5 to 4.9 inches Hg. Immadiately therenner, the 2A heater drain pump tripped. The control room operator j, launadia8aly entered ONOP 2-0610031, Rev 13, Imse of r'aade==ae Vacuum, and began reducing power to
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| ==inemin eaadan=e back pressure to less than 4.0 in Hg. Power was reduced and the unit was stabilized at 82 percent. The inspector responded to the control room and observed this power reduction.
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| ! Investigation of the event by the hcenace found that relay 63X-4A (a OE HOA relay), common to both the 4A i
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| alternate and 5A normal heater drain valves had failed. This failure caused the 4A alternate drain valve solenoid to de-energime and the valve to fail open. It also caused the 5A normal drain valve to fail closed.
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| l O Page 16 of 24 i
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| p EXCERP13 IR 95-15 s ,/ 'Ibese failume resulted in a rapid decrease in level in the 4A hester and tripped the 4A heater drain pump.
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| The laspector found that operators response to the event was timely and correct. N failed relay was subsequen'Jy replaced. An investigados by the licensee deterndned that the relay failure was due to aging.
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| A review of other applicable uses of this t;Te relay by the licensee found and replaced severa! other HGA relsys la the bester drain system.
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| The inspector noted that at least eight other heater draln punp trips had as-.4 over the past two years. None of these trips were the result of a HGA relay failure. The 11e====a' review of this and other recent HDP trips led these to install a FC/M in the henter drala pump protection circuiting during this outage that should result in a raaeelaa of these and similar HDP trips.
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| The inspector found that the 13e==ma*'s corrective action for this event was dadaltat and thorough.
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| However, taidag lato consideration the previous ammber of HDP trips that had occurred and the licensee's 'nt f; of this probian and the ===1-1 changes clearly indicate that corrective action on this
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| ! itan was not timely. This itan is identified as a waak==== in corrective meelaa
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| : 8) Control Room Imps On August 24, during a review of the Unit 2 control room RCO log, the inspector noted an entry which stated that 2B EDO had errade load swings during the performance of the monthly
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| + survastiaana tests. Further review of the log lademe=1 that the EDG was taken out of service to replace an air start aata=atd valve and then tested and returned to service. N RCO, on the shift after this item occurred, was qua=*iaa-a on the entry involving the erratac load swings and was not aware of the cause or any corrective
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| ; action taken on this potendal deficiency. ' Ibis items was discuaned in detail with the system engineer who was able to satisfactorily address this item.
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| l tN-; }
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| AP 0010120, Rev 74, Ta=Ae* of Operations," section 2. A.3, requires that problems ==' '' with nWor equipment be logged. N laspector noted that the control room log should have ca=*=i==I adequate informadan to allow the operator on a =ecaading shift to clearly understand this potential problem and know 1 fit had been adequately addressed to ensure operability of this ESP component.
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| . In addition to the above, on saa*= abae 1, a review of the Unit 1 OOS log found that contairimemt purge valve l
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| . FCV-25-4 had PWOs 95013857 and 95004327 and STAR 94110479 issued against it. b valve had been I i placed in the failed closed position but had not been entered in the OOS log. OP 0010129, Rev 24, " Equipment l Out of Service,' section 3.2, required that inoperable "I3 equipment that is out of service be logged. Upon identification by the inspector this item was entered in the OOS log.
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| ' 1 I
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| i On September 2, the inspector noted that clearance 1-95409411 had bem issued to deenergize IB EDO fuel oil tr.;efer pump to permit wont on a local switch. A review of the OOS log and control room log also found that t.de had not been entered in either as required by the clearance procedure OP 0010122 step 5.6.5. A discussion with the RCO revealed that he did not think this entry was caraamary since the EDO su out of service for other 3
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| maintanaara activities. 'Ihis item was discuaned with the ANPS who directed that the a 4 ropriate log mtries be 1 Inade. I b inspector noted that. all of the above items were in a safe condition and did not affect systern operability. l
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| *Ibene items do ladicana a waakne== in logkeeping that could result in operstmg the plant with equipment out of l service that could be required for that operational mode. ' Ibis item is identified as a waakna== in logkeeping j
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| . and a failure to follow procedures The He==== response to this item has led to significant improvanents la I the amount of detail provided la control roorn Icss. They also plan to irnplanced computerised control rooms legs. Since this itan has minimal safety importance and corrective action is underway to prevent l
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| b Page 17 of 24 I i
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| : r. , EXCERFI'S IR 95-15 '
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| ~,. , ;
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| 4 i ;./ reenrvenes and the Heenses afterts enest the erheria speelned in meretan VII of the NRC Enfereennent :
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| Poucy, it wiu not be ched. M wig be identifled as a Non Cited Violation (NCY 335/95-15 48 "Falhse to :
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| Feuer IAgbesping Pkteedures").
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| ,a 9) Opstation of IB IESI Panp with the Suction Valve Claand On August 29, Unit I was in mode 5 with l both trains of SDC in operation. At 2:20 p.m., the B train of SDC was placed in standby to allow a SDC hot
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| =
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| leg suctica valve leak test to b* r- U -- ' as specified in data sheet 25 of AP 10010125A. Step 6.5.4.B of l
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| } this test leR one hot leg suction valve V3651 open and the other hot leg injection valve closed at the - _a ' ^*= ,
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| i of the test. 'Ibe SDC normal operating procedure OP 10410022, sectica 3.3, was than used to return the B
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| ; train of SDC to service.' Instead of using the procedure, the RCO transposed the procedural steps of section 3.3
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| ' to a esperate piece of paper ard used this to perfona the v .---- '- : steps. Using this guidance he fallad to t
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| open and lock open B hot leg suction valve V3652 as required by procedure step 8.3.7. I 2
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| h IB LPSI pump was then started by the board RCO who noted the starting surge on the pump anunster and L that the amperes had
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| * n''y declinad and steadied out at about 15 amperes 'Ibe ANPS opened the IJSI !
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| jj discharge valvo at the CRAC panel to so. establish flow in the B IJSI loop. 'Ibe board RCO did not recognise that IJSI pump B amperes wese lower than naticipatad h board RCO than went to the CRAC penet to initiate flow to B SDC HX. . ,
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| I
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| . At about 4:45 p.m., the NPS identified that LPSI pump amperes were lower than ^" ^- " At the samme time . :
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| i =; the desk RCO found that the hat leg suction valve V3652 was almt. 'Ibe IB IESI was secured and the IB SDC train was returned to the standby hasup. A ' , ^ inspection of the pump detonnised that no apparent i
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| ! damage had occurred dunas the short period of pump operation. AAer sa % ami evaluation the pump 5
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| was returned to service and all parameters were normal. An ASME Sectica XI test was * ,
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| ^'y I '
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| Perfonned satisfactorily.
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| j i t (
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| j h Emiluse of the operator to follow OP l 4410022 is a violation (VIO 335/95-15 04, 'Faihne to Follow i
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| Procedures during Alignment of Shutdown Cooling Systesa"). ' Ibis failure could have resuhed in the failme l the IE LPSI pump and - ' - 7 ^ loss of one loop of SDC.
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| : 10) 1B Emergnacy Diesel Generator Failure On August 31, the IB EDO tripped due to high crankcase I pressure in the 12 cylinder engine during the perfonnance of the manthly savaillanca test, OP l-22000508,
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| 'IB EDO Periodic Test and General Operating Instructaans." f ica==== perscanal found that the sagine aaalaat a=p===iaa tank had drained and the engine oil sump level had increased approximately eight inc6se above
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| .' l' .
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| ,,,,,g ,
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| I "-,
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| ^'
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| -- by heenses per=aan=1 revealed that abe number eine power pack crown and cylinder head had sustained severe damage, apparently due to separation of the northeast exhaust valve head froen its staan. &
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| s- failed valve head became loose within the na=helaa ch==har and during nmnerous strokes ; z ^ _ : the .-
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| pistoa crown and cylindar. 'Ihe engine coolant then leaked through the cyliadar head and piston into the oil and )
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| entered the engine sump. b source of the high craalre==a pressure trip was a combination of intake air and j i ==6=* gases escaping through the failed piston into the cr==ba . j
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| . J h licensee developed a root cause investigation team composed of personnel from ==ch==ical malata===ce, nachaical staff, site and corporate engineering, and an engine vendor i.r. -t ve. ' Ibis team perfonned a detailed investigation over several days which concluded that the most probable root cause was:
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| e cytiada, nu=har 9 lash adjuster lock nut looserad. 'Ihe lash adjuster screw was then able to back out of position due to normal operational vibration.
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| b Page 18 of 24 a-
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| * w - - p- % w - - - -.--
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| ;- i EXCERPI3 IR 95-15
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| ; . .r~
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| ^
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| l v? * - As the imh adjudw screw laa-=I, the hydamlic lihan initially em "' for the inenend height of the valve bridge assembly. Eventually the increased height of the valve bridge nauhed in impact j loading at the locking ring in the lower spring seat. %e locidag ring is nonnally unloaded during 1 l OPwation. ;
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| 2; 4
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| * b impact loading eventually caused the bridge guide to fail. His allowed further bridge movement ;
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| l and loss of "mero lash' la the valve train. De lacreased clearances moulted la hepact loads being
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| ! . transmitted to the valves themselves. De bndse guide failure also increased wear on the guide's lower 1
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| 8pring seat.
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| 4 4
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| * De impact loadmg caused the lock grooves of both east valve spring stems to deform due to fretting wear from the valve spring seat locks. b norehan=# valve spring sent eventually failed due to hoop stresses induced by the wedging action of the seat locks. i 4
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| * h failed spring seat was r=*=inal by the halical spring coil which initially prevented valve stesa j d=*=nh===8 De additional clearances provided by the fail-l spring seat allowed the seat locks to !
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| ij i psogressively fait due to wedging and point loads until they Anally released the valve and allowed it to 1 '
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| drop into the magine cylinder.
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| i
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| * h valve head =pwated from the dem due to impact lo=has by th8 Pi don. b mparWed valve head i wm then loose la the cyni d and v a .: the pidea crown and the cylindw head whom me pidon j
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| \
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| a rene.
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| i .
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| * Ensim tripped on high cr=al- m da to now of turbocharged iakt air and exhaud gum
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| _, ,N through the piston into eranire==a Water fross broken cylinder head water passages flowed tiuough the j g., pistem into the crankcase to drain the ==p===taa tank. Smaller particles from the piston and cyliadar 4 ' had wme blown into the enhand ducting.
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| 4 h inspector oceducted daily meetings with the manager of the root cause team and discussed the status of their
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| : : ;- t '= and sadings. m aho obenved nun rous imets of the heansee invatisation '- ;"' , and 1 j* repairs to the affected dimal ensine.
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| ; i 4
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| ;. N initial plans called for ; ;' - of the ===ha 9 power pack (cylinder and piston) and inspection of all
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| ; shaA bearings. AAw in= parti- found several snetal parts from the damaged number 9 cyllader la the exhaust L ports of other cylinders and on the ensine exhaust turbochars= iaralra scaans, the ensine inspectica was i expanded to include all cylinders, exhaust headers, and bearmgs. His '--; '- found some rust in ===ha,12 ii cyliadar and led to replacing that power pack also N in=partia= of the remaining cylinders also led to )
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| *3 replacing number 3 and 4 cylinder heads due to leaking valves.
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| 1 AAer the above repairs and bearing inspections, the cagine was reassembled and flushed with new lubricating ;
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| 3 oil and all filters were replaced. As a result r,f the root cause investigation the lash adjuster locking nuts were !
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| !4 torquad to a 50 A-lbf value given by the EDO service company (this value had not been previously specified in the vendor ====a1 or heanseo mainta==ana i,.en * ._). His torquing was accomplished on 41 cylinders for 4
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| both the 1A and 1B Unit 1 diesel engines. AAer a series of ==i=*- runs and adja*==== on hr a-hae e 5 j and 6, the IB EDO =ar==4 ally e- / ^ ' its surveillance test and was declared operable on br a-l=r 6.
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| e
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| )
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| l3 The inspector found the root causes investigation team to be ==pa=ad of " n"".=d indviduals. Dey i
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| puround the issues ===ael=*ad with the failure in a sligent manner and worked wdl with the pessonnel 3 perfenming engine repain. The inspector noted that the licensee's service vendor plans to also performs a
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| - root cause investigation of this failure.
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| :: g' l V Page 19 of 24 l I i
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| - ~ . -- - -. -- . .- - ._ - .. . - . - . - - --- - .
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| 'i f.- ~ . EXCERFI3 IR 95-15 I1 N The inspector was very kapresed with the teams that worked the sugime repairs around the clock. Their j de'alled investigation resuhed le expandag the scope of laspection and repair to cover the entire ensime. I
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| , The overmE repair effort was strongly -,; 34 by site and corporate sagineering and resulted in timely l If i 1) Unit 2 Main Generator Hydmgan Overpressurization On September 7, at approximately 1:30 a.m., a NPO noted that the hydmgen pressure on Unit 2 generator was at 58 peig. This pressee is nonnally maintalaa'l at 4 57 to 60 peig. 'the NPO contacted the RCO and notified him that he would be bnngang the pressure up to l
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| approni==aaly 60 peig. When the hydrogen supply header was aligned to tbs ganarstor, control roomi j j ammunciator 'H2 Manf Sply Press Ha/Lo* alaramed as expected due to low head =e pressure and remained ,
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| !4 ligamiaanad. 1 i}}
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