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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000373/1986004]]
| number = ML20154B737
| issue date = 02/27/1986
| title = Safety Insp Repts 50-373/86-04 & 50-374/86-04 on 860113-27. Violation Noted:Failure to Install Fire Detection & Alarm Sys Per Governing Code Requirements
| author name = Falevitz Z, Guldemand W, Guldemond W, Holmes J, Ramsey C
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000373, 05000374
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-373-86-04, 50-373-86-4, 50-374-86-04, 50-374-86-4, NUDOCS 8603040383
| package number = ML20154B698
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 19
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000373/1986004]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:- _ - .
        '
  ,'  .
                                U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                REGION III
      Reports No. 50-373/86004(ORS);50-374/86004(DRS)
4    Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374                            Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18
.    Licensee: Conzonwealth Edison Company
                  P.O. Box 767
i
                  Chicago IL 60690
;    Facility Name: LaSalle
      Inspection At: LaSalle Nuclear Power Station, Marseilles, Illinois
      Inspection Conducted: Jan ry 13-27,              6
      Inspectors:    .
                                                                            <#  7
                                                                          Date
                    C. Ramsey          ENh                              Date
                                                                                  b
                                                  /
                      . Holmes                    '
                                                                            Mb
                                                                          'Date
                    I. N            N~
                    Z. Falevitz                                            2/27Mt
                                                                          .Date
                            /
      Approved By:      .  ul ' n't  ,                                    #/27M
                      Operational Programs Section                        Da te
:
      Inspection Summary
      Inspection on January 13-27, 1986 (Report No. 50-373/86004(DRS)1
      50-374/86004(DRS))
      Areas Inspected: Special announced safety inspection conducted to close out
      previous open items, to assess licensee conformance to routine fire protection
      program requirements and review allegations concerning fire brigade training.
      The inspection involved 156 inspector-hours by four NRC inspectors, including
      zero inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
      Results: Of three areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
      identified in two areas. One violation was identified in the remaining area
      (Failure to install fire detection and alarm systems in accordance with
      governing code requirements - Paragraph 4.a.).
          8603040383 860228
          $DR  ADOCK 05000373 -
                              PDR
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                                - _        . . -        .-    - _ . .-.          -
 
      . _                      .    -          -          ._              _  -.        .
    .'      .
              '
                                                  DETAILS
          1.  Persons Contacted
                *G. Diederich, Station Manager
                *R. Bishop, Services Superintendent
l                C. Allen, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
>
                  R. Rybak, Station Nuclear Engineering Department
                  C. Barnes, Station Nuclear Engineering Department
                *D. Roberts, Fire Protection Engineer
i              *T. Gray, Fire Protection Engineer
l              *T. Novotney, Fire Brigade Instructor
                *D. Trager, Station Fire Marshal
'
l              *J. Kodrick, Maintenance Staff Engineer
-
                *B. Collins, Assistant Fire Marshal
                *P. Manning, Technical Staff Supervisor
                *A. Settles, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
                                                                                                  '
                *T. Hammerich, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
                *M. Jeisy, QA Supervisor
                *T. Gallagher, QA
                *J. Kocek, Technical Staff
  '
                  W. Sheldon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
                  D. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services
                  M. Shiable, Training
                  G. Roberts, Technical Staff
                *G. Morey, Electrical Maintenance Foreman
                *T. Meyer, Braidwood Station Fire Marshal
                *P. Hart, QA
                *R. Crawford, Training Supervisor
j              U.S. NRC
                *S. Stasek, Resident Inspector
                *R. Koprivra, Resident Inspector
                * Denotes those in attendance at the exit meeting of January 27, 1986.
          2.  Licensee _ Ac_tions on Previous Inspection Findings
                (Closed) Violations (373/82-54-03; 374/82-22-03): These violations
                documented inadequacies in the licensee's cable tray cleanliness program
                as evidenced by the discovery of miscellaneous debris in cable trays.            '
;              The licensee has implemented the following procedures addressing plant
!
                cleanliness including cable trays: LES-GM-101, " Cleaning Cable Tray and
                Electrical Panels" and LAP-900-15, " Housekeeping Practices." These
                procedures provide explicit directions on how to clean cable trays and
,
                require periodic cable tray inspections.
                (Closed) Violations (373/82-54-01; 374/82-22-01): These violations
e                consisted of three parts. The first two parts dealing with a lack of
                acceptance criteria for fire seals and failure to prepare Nonconformance
t
4
                  -            .                    -      --            .-.    .    -  _. _.-
 
            .                        -    .-        -        .              .                      . ___ _ - .
      -        -
              .
    .
,
                      Reports for deficient seals, were closed in IE Inspection Reports
*
                      No. 50-373/83-44 and No. 50-374/83-48. The third part dealt with a
                      failure on the part of the licensee to ensure procedures were in place to
                      specify proper mix control of Fire Code CT Gypsum. The inspector reviewed
                      Transco procedures entitled, "Special Process - Fire Code CT Gypsum," and
                      " Fire Code CT Gypsum Cement Application and Installation Procedures."
                      These procedures specify explicit mix proportions for various
'                    applications.
                      (Closed) Unresolved Items (373/84-33-05; 374/84-40-04): These items
                      documented concerns over the adequacy of procedural controls placed on
                      the use of ignition sources. The inspector reviewed Procedure LAP-900-10,
                      " Fire Prevention Procedure for Welding and Cutting," and LAP-900-22, "Use
                      of Heat Generating Equipment and Heat Sources." LAP-900-10 provides the
'
                      controls necessary to ensure proper control is exercised during and after
                      welding, grinding, cutting, and open flame operations. LAP-900-22
:                    provides the controls necessary to ensure proper control is exercised
                      during the use of heat generation or heat source equipment capable of
                      generating a temperature high enough to cause ignition of combustible
                      material in the vicinity of the equipment.          It was noted that the
                      procedures overlap in establishing controls over the use of propane
                      torches. While LAP-900-22 speaks explicitly to use of propane torches,
                      it does not require the use of the welding and cutting permit system.
                      LAP-900-10 does not speak explicitly to propane torches but does cover
                      open flame work. As propane torches de produce an open flame, they fall
                      under LAP-900-10. The licensee is encouraged to clarify their procedures
                      in this area.
                      (0 pen) Unresolved Item (373/82054; 374/82022-05): Floor penetration
;                    seals in the control room exceed the dimensions of the fire stop designs
                      actually tested.
                      In response to this issue, there were meetings held at NRC headquarters
                      with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Region III (RIII),
                      and licensee personnel in the fall of 1983. Subsequent to this, the
                      licensee made several submittals to NRR of fire test data to support
                      penetration fire seal designs. NRR evaluated the licensee's submittals
                      and made determinations of acceptability that were not published.
                        It is not clear which tests were reviewed and accepted by NRR as being
                      representative of particular penetration fire seal installations. The
                      inspector was unable to determine if any of the tests submitted by the
                      licensee were representative of the control room penetration fire seal
                      configuration. Therefore this item is being referred to NRR for
                      resolution.
.
                        (0 pen) Unresolved Item (373/83044-01):    10 CFR 50, Appendix R,
                      Sections III.G.3 and III.L require that if the licensee elects to establish
4
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                      alternative safe shutdown capability, that provisions for direct readings
                      of process variables necessary to perform and control the reactor shutdown
                      function shall be provided. Current NRR supplied guidance requires the
i                      following instrumentation be available for safe shutdown of BWR plants:
                                                              3
  ,    -.      __.          .      -.      -      ,_ . -    .  - - , -          - . ,      -, ,
 
      v            A  y,e              -      &  -- m.4~            --      .L                    w u4
'
          .    .
            ,
        ,
                        a.    Reactor water level and pressure
                        b.    Suppression pool level and temperature, and
1
                        c.    Diagnostic instrume.tation for shutdown systems,
]
i                      The licensee has. supplied instrumentation to monitor reactor water level
4                      and pressure, suppression pool level and temperature, RHR service water
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                        flow, RHR flow, and RCIC flow in both the control room and at the remote
                        shutdown panel. The licensee previously stated that the only instrumenta-
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                        tion not reviewed for fire damage were suppression pool level and
                        temperature.
                        The licensee is providing instrumentation for Unit'l suppression pool
i                        level and temperature during the current outage which will prevent a
                        single fire from damaging cable for Remote Shutdown Panel indications and
;                        the Control Room indications which is identical to that installed in
!                      Unit 2. This item will remain open pending completion and inspection of                ,
J                        the modifications to this instrunentation for both units.                            ,
1
4                        (0 pen) Open Items (373/83-44-03h; 374/83-48-24): The licensee failed to
,                        establish adequate quality assurance acceptance / rejection criteria as
                        required by NFPA codes and standards for several surveillance tests.
.                        The inspector reviewed the following surveillance procedures for quality
'
                        assurance acceptance / rejection criteria as required by NFPA codes and
i                        standards:
i
'
                        a.    LES FP03, " Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit Deluge Initiation Circuit
                                Functional Test."
:
                        b.    LOS FPA1, " Fire Protection Flow Path Valve Cycling Test."
                        c.    LOS FPA2, " Fire Protection System Function Test."
                        d.    LOS FPA3, " Fire Protection Sprinkler and Deluge System. Drain Flow            i
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                                and Cycling Test."
                          e.    LMS FP06, " Fire Protection hose Station Valve Operability and Flow
                                Verification."
;                        No deviations were identified except those noted below:
i
,
                          Procedure LOS FPA2 entitled " Fire Protection Functional Test" does not
j-                        incorporate NFPA requirements. The procedure should outline the.
                          necessary steps to assure that the fire pumps are tested in accordance
,                        with applicable HFPA Code requirements-and design documents as-well as-
.
                          satisfy Technical Specification Surveillances.
                          Procedure LOS FPA3 " Fire Protection Sprinkler and Deluge System Drain
                          Flow and Cycling Test" outlines the steps necessary to:
1
1,.
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                                                                    -4
    -      _ _ _- . _.          .- -      ,  . ~ . _      , _ _ _    . _ . . . - _ . _ . - . _ _ _ _      _
 
                        _      _
                                            _ - . - _ . _    __          .          __ __
,-  .~
      a.    Cycle the Sprinkler Alarm Check Valves
      b.    Cycle the Sprinkler and Deluge Inlet Stop Valves and verify
            that the associated Tamper alarms are Operational
      c.    Conduct Drain Flow Test on Sprinkler Systems
      d.    Conduct Full Flow test on Deluge System.
      For sprinkler systems, the licensee conducts two-inch drain tests but does
      not include an inspector's test, which is required by NFPA-13A to be
      conducted quarterly.
      In this procedure, the deluge system is tested by conducting a drain' test.
      This is one of several tests that may be conducted on a deluge system.              '
      The licensee is requested to contact the manufacturer and develop a
      procedure that will be adequately address testing of the deluge systems.
                                                                                            ,
  3.  Followup cn Allegatiens
      The inspectors performed followup activities relative to an a*1egation
      received by the NRC frcm an individual outside of the licensee's
      organizaticn pertaining to the-adequacy of training provided to fire
      brigade members and qualifications of certain staff members responsible
      for the fire protection program at LaSalle County Station. Results are as
      shown for each subject of the allegation..
      Allegation RIII-85-A-0205
      a.    (0 pen) Training provided to members of the LaSalle fire brigade was
            not adequate to permit the brigade members to perform their duties
            as firefighters. The alleger identified a fire drill in one of the
            ECCS rooms which apparently was not handled well by the station fire -
            brigade.
            The inspectors examined fire brigade drill critique records and
              records of training sessions held during the years 1984 and 1985-
              to detennine the quality of these activities. Thornugh interviews
            were held with selected fire brigade members, the licensee's training
              staff, the station fire marshal and cognizant-licensee pe .,nnel.
              The following are the results of these activities:
              (1) Fire Brigade Drill Critiqu_es
                    Fire brigade drill critiques were incomplete in some instances
                    because they did not contain adequate assessment of the drills.
                                      -
                    For example, in an August 10,.1984-drill that simulated a 4160V'
                    switchgear fire, the drill critique did not assess the fire              ;
                    brigade leader's ability to determine the need for offsite fire          l
                    department assistance. -The critique did not mention whether any
                                                                                  -
                    decision was made in this regard.
                                                  5
                                                                                    .
 
                                                  ,-                                          .-
                                                                                                              None of the drill critiques examined made any assessment of
                                                                                                              individual fire brigade member performances during drills (i.e.,
                                                                                                              physical, mental and emotional fitness to perform the required
                                                                                                              duties).
                                                                                                        (2) Fire Brigade Drills
                                                                                                              It appears that the drills were conducted at regular intervals
                                                                                                              and each brigade member received a minimum of two drills per
                                                                                                              year, including one drill per year that consisted of the use of
                                                                                                              a self-contained breathing apparatus in a artificially smoke
                                                                                                              filled environment within the smoke house. -The nature of the      ,
                                                                                                              drills conducted was diversified and contained a variety of
                                                                                                              simulated fire conditions such as internal structural fires
                                                                                                              involving electrical equipment, internal structural fires
                                                                                                              involving oil storage tanks, external fires involving flammable
                                                                                                              liquid spills, and fires involving motor vehicles.
                                                                                                                                                                                '
                                                                                                              All of the drills conducted appeared to rely on the use of
                                                                                                              portable fire extinguishers as the primary method of fire
                                                                                                              extinguishment. Fire hose stations appear to have been used in
                                                                                                              the drill simulaticns, but, according to the licensee's staff,
                                                                                                              fire brigade trainir.g has been largely focused on the use of
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                                                                                                              portable fire extinguishers.
;
,
                                                                                                        (3) Hands on Practice - Use of Fire Hose Stations
                                                                                                              The use of fire hose stations on practice grounds or on practice
                                                                                                              fires under actual fire conditions is not required of individual
                                                                                                              participants to become a member of the fire brigade. The
                                                                                                              licensee's staff indicated that sometimes line fire hose
                                                                                                              practice was conducted in the summer months on practice grounds,
                                                                                                              but this activity was difficult to continue due to objections
                                                                                                              raised by station operations because of recurring problems with
                                                                                                              the station fire pumps. All fire brigade members have not been
                                                                                                              trained in the use of the high pressure hose streams used at      i
                                                                                                              LaSalle while fighting internal structure fires.
                                                                                                        (4) Hands on Practice - Use of Portable Fire Extinguishers
                                                                                                                                                                              .
                                                                                                              According to the licensee, live fire extinguishment of actual
                                                                                                              fires with portable fire extinguishers is provided to all
                                                                                                              station employees, but no documentation was provided to verify
*
                                                                                                              that all fire brigade members received this training prior to-
                                                                                                              becoming a fire brigade member.
                                                                                                        (5) Smoke House Training Facility
                                                                                                              According to the licensee, one drill per year includes a
                                                                                                              challenge to fire brigade members within the licensee's smoke
                                                                                                              house training facility. Artificial smoke is introduced into
                                                                                                              the smoke house and fire brigade members dressed in complete
                                                                                                              turn-out gear and self-contained breathing apparatus have to
                                                                                                              find their way through the smoke-filled area.
                                                                                                                                          6
:
  - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
      .                .                        .
    -  -
      .
  .
                          The smoke house is a concrete and steel structure approximately
                            15 feet by 50 feet with a 20 foot ceiling. Wooden props are
                          erected in part of the building area that simulate obstacles in
                          the form of walls, three steps, and crawl-through spaces.
                          While the licensee's smoke house facility provides some
                          challenge to fire brigade members, this challenge is not
                          equivalent to the challenges or the quality of training that is
                            provided by State Certified Firemanship Training Facilities
                          such as those required by NFPA Standard No. 27 and Chapter XVII,
                          of Federal OSHA Standard No. 1910.156 (Subpart L).
                      (6) Fire Brigade Classroom Instruc Ron Trai_nin.g
                            The inspector's review of the licensee's fire brigade classroom
                            training lesson plans and interviews with selected fire brigade
                          members indicate a broad range of firefighting subjects are
                            covered in classroom lectures; however, no objective measurement
                            is made of individual brigade member's comprehension of this
;                          training because written or oral qualifying examinations are not
'
                            administered on any of the subject matter at any time.
                            Furthermore, an initial 20 hour classrocm training session
                            is all that is required for individuals to qualify as a fire
                            brigade member. Based on the inspector's review and interviews
                            with fire brigade members, this training does not contain the
                            quality and depth of training that is intended by the
                            requirements of Chapter 4 of NFPA 27, NRC guitelines or Federal
                            OSHA requirements.
                      (7) Selection of Fire Brigade Members
                            The licensee's employment policy is that a particular class
                            of employee (Operators classed as "B" men) must be members
                            of the fire brigade. Though not stated in a job description
                            (according to the licensee), this is a condition of employment.
                            During the inspector's interview with fire brigade members', some
                            brigade members expressed discontent with this policy because of
;                          a fear of firefighting; personnel impositions placed on them
                            and/or improper training and experience in the hazards involved
                            in firefighting at the facility.
                            While other fire brigade members interviewed expressed
                            enthusiasm and genuine interest in the fire brigade, the
                            licensee's employment policy is not consistent with the
                            requirements of Section 3-2.3.3 of NFPA Standard No. 27,
                            which states in part, "only persons meeting physical,
                            mental and emotional requirements should be considered
i
                            eligible to serve on the fire brigade." The licensee has
#
                            not established mental and emotional requirements for fire
                            brigade members.                                                    l
                                                                                                  !
;
                                                                                                  !
                                                                                                  1
                                                      7
          . ..- . -.            ..  -            -  -
                                                          ,-    .  .      -    , . . -  - .- -
 
  .                                                  -        -            -                    -
    .
      .
        .-
                    Based on the NRC's direct _ investigation, review of pertinent fire
                    brigade records, and brigade training programs, and interviews with
                    cognizant licensee personnel, this allegation was substantiated and
                    the following s:2cific conclusions were reached:
                                                                                                    '
                    (1) Fire brigade drill critiques did not contain adequate
                          assessments of individual fire brigade member performances
                          during drills.
                    (2)  Fire brigade drills did not include practice sessions using hose
                          lines in actual fire extinguishment during continuing practice
                          sessions.
                    (3) Hands on practice using fire hose stations was inadequate                  -
                          because individual brigade members are not required to be
                                                                                                    '
                          trained in the use of hose lines prior to becoming a brigade              i
                                                                                                    '
                          member.
                    (4) Fire brigade members are not required to use hose lines to
                          extinguish actual fires prior to becoming a fire brigade member
                          and this is not a stated requirement of the licensee's fire
                          brigade training program.
                    (5) No documentation is available to verify that fire brigade
                          members have been properly trained in the use of high pressure
                          hese streams that exist in the plant for internal structural
                          firefighting.
!
)                    (6) High pressure hose lines that exist in the plant deviate from
'
                          the licensee's commitment to NFPA Standard No. 14.
                    (7) Fire brigade yard hose line practice without fire extinguishment
                          for the fire brigade was discontinued for the fire brigade
                          because of operations problems with the station fire pumps.
                    (8) The licensee could not verify that individual fire brigade
                          members received hands on practice using portable fire
                          extinguishers in actual fire extinguishment prior to their
                          becoming a fire brigade member. This is not a stated                      l
                          requirement of the licensee's fire brigade training program.
                    (9) The licensee's smoke house training facility does not provide
                          equivalent training experience for internal structural
                          firefighting to that which is provided by State Certified
                          Firemanship Training Facilities that are referenced in NFPA
                          Standard No. 27.
                    (10) Fire brigade classroom instruction training was inadequate
                          because it did not require qualifying examinations at any time
                          for any subject matter.
>
                                                    8
,
            - - - -                - ,  -
                                              ,        -  , ,  ,      -          ,n, ,
                                                                                          n ,-,
 
  -
.-
        (11) The licensee's employment policy dictates that certain employees
              must become members of the fire brigade. No criteria has been
              establish to assure that these employees are suitable to
              perform firefighting duties as required by the licensee's
              comitment to NFPA Standard No. 27.
        These specific conclusions indicate that the licensee has not
        adopted a performance-based training approach for the fire brigade.
        That approach would have identified these and other weaknesses which
        may exist in the fire brigade training program. Licensee management
        was encouraged to adept a performance-based training progran for the
        fire brigade.
    b. (0 pen) Training Departnent personnel were not qualified technically
        to give fire brigade training.
        Direct investigation of the licensee's training staff and interviews
        with training instructors responsible for fire brigade training
        revealed that the fire brigade training instructor has had some fire
        protection related classes over a five year period. The assistant
        fire brigade training instructors have had a number of one to three
        day firefighting courses over a two year period and one seven day
        firefighting course at Great Lake Naval Training Center in 1973.
        The fire brigade training instructor does not claim any firefighting
        or fire prevention and control experience other than his volunteer
        firefighting experience and certification as a Firefighter II
        Instructor through the University of Illinois Extension. The
        assistant fire brigade instructor claims firefighting experience as
        an officer in charge of a U.S. Naval Damage Control and Firefighting
        Team from 1977 to 1979; U.S. Naval Damage Control and Firefighting
        Team tember from 1973 to 1979, and active member of the Mazon,
        Illinois volunteer fire department from 1982 to the present.
        While NRC Fire Protection program guidance docurrents do not specify
        technical qualifications for fire brigade training instructors, the
        licensee's FSAR Comitment to NRC Branch Technical Position 9.5.1
        commits the licensee to comply with the requirements of NFPA
        Standard No. 27 for fire brigade training. Sections 4-2.1 and 4-2.2
        of NFPA Standard No. 27 require that fire brigade training be
        conducted and supervised by a state certified fire service instructor,
        public fire department, or qualified private consultant. Members of
        the fire brigade are required to be afforded opportunity to improve
        their knowledge of firefighting and fire prevention through
        attendance at outside meetings and special hazard training classes.
        The fire brigade training instructore      aining and experience in
        firefighting and fire prevention doe r t appear to meet the            j
        requirements of NFPA Standard No. 27, and according to interviews      I
        with cognizant individuals of the licensee's staff, all fire brigade  '
        members are not afforded the opportunity to'attsnd outside training
        classes by qualified instructors on the special hazards of internal
        structural firefighting at nuclear power plants.
                                        9
 
. .
      Based on the NRC's investigation and review of the fire brigade
      training instructors' qualifications and interviews with cognizant
      licensee personnel, this allegation was substantiated because of
      the fire brigade training instructors' minimum qualifications, and
      because the outside special hazards training that satisfies the
      requirements of NFPA Standard No. 27 is not being provided to fire
      brigade members. Again, it is felt that had the licensee applied
      the principles of performance-based training to this functional
      area, this problem would have been avoided,
    c. (0 pen) Training department and station management have not supported
      fire brigade training.
      Interviews with cognizant licensee personnel revealed that the
      licensee's training department and station management have been
      reluctant to provide outside fire brigade training and have
      discontinued fire brigade live hose stream practice sessions because
      of operations problems concerning the station fire pumps. It appears
      that the licensee considered fire brigade classroom sessions with no
      examinations adequate for initial fire brigade training. At some
      point in an employee's tenure, portable fire extinguisher training is
      provided for all general employees. This is the extinguisher
      training that is relied upon for fire brigade members to receive
      initial hands-on practice with portable fire extinguishers. For
      continuing training, the licensee considered each brigade member's
      attendance at a minimum two fire drills per year, with one drill
      consisting of the smoke house challenge, to be adequate fire brigade
      training.
      Based on the NRC's investigation and review of fire brigade training
        records and interviews with cognizant licensee personnel this
      allegation was substantiated. The review of selected fire brigade
      member training records revealed that fire brigade members were not
        receiving outside special hazards training in internal structural
      firefighting. The licensee's fire brigade training staff and station
      management personnel stated it had been their position that the
      onsite fire brigade training program was adequate; therefore it was
      not necessary to provide outside fire brigade special hazards
        training. Furthermore, the licensee's training and management staff
      acknowledged the discontinuation of fire brigade training in the use
        of line hose streams due to operations problems with the station
        fire pumps.
    d.  (0 pen) The station fire marshal wat not qualified technically.
        Currently, the NRC has not specified any formal qualification
        requirements for the position of fire marshal; however, based on the
        NRC's investigation, review cf the staticn fire marshal's
        qualifications, and interviews with cognizant licensee personnel, the
        inspectors concluded that the station fire marshal has only a minimum
        of training in firefighting. He has no fire prevention, fire
        technology or fire protection engineering formal training or
        experience, and he has been the station fire marshal for four months.
                                      10
                                                                              l
 
        .            . . . .  - -.            ~  .          - ,  -~            _ . . , -      . .-
.
      .      .                                                                                        ,
          ,
I
!
                    This is viewed as a serious disadvantage to the individual filling
                    this position and to fire protection program implementation because
i                  the responsibilities of the station fire marshal entail duties that
;                  require a broad range of fundamental and_ in-depth technical knowledge
;
                    and expertise in fire science, fire engineering, firefighting, fire
                    prevention,'and regulatory and code interpretation.
                    Within the licensee's organizational structwe, the station fire
                    marshal is assigned responsibilities that include establishing
                    authority and assigning responsibilities for fire protection pr.ogram
                    implementation, recommending program improvements to management,
:
                    establishing firefighting strategy and its impact on plant .
i                  operations, inspecting the plant for control of fire hazards,
                    developing procedures and reviewing surveillance test results to
                    determine operability of equipment, reviewing all fire prevention                  ,
i                  inspections, preplanning fire hazards and targeting problem areas,
                    recommending to management the purchase.of needed equipment, keeping
j!                management infonted as to the condition of equipment and the status
                    of the fire brigade, monitoring welding and cutting activities,
                    performing fire investigations, and making fire reports.
                    Although NRC guidelines do not specify technical qualifications for
                                                  ~
*
:                  individuals filling the position of station fire marshal, it is
                    Region III's position that this individual should have a_ thorough
                    knowledge of fire prevention and control methods that is supported
.                  by formal training and actual experience in fire protection, as well              '
7
                    as a thorough knowledge of the plant, prccedures, and regulatory and
  .
                    code requirements, or have such knowledge and experience imediately
"                  available in the form of an assigned staff while the necessary
                    knowledge and experience are gained.
)
                    Based on the NRC's investigation and review of the station fire
                    marshal's qualifications, this allegation was substantiated.
                    The station fire marshal's limited training and experience in fire
                    protection serves as a potentially serious disadvantage to his
j                    position as well as the licensee's overall fire protection program
                    implementation.
              e.    (0 pen) Tests were not administered after fire' brigade training.
f
                                                                                                      >
l'                  The NRC's investigation of this allegation is discussed in
                    Paragraph 3.a of the report. Examinations are not administered on
;
                    any subject at any time during the licensee's fire brigade training
                      program.
                    Based on the NRC's investigation discussed in Paragraph 3.a of_the
                      report, this allegation was substantiated.
!            In sumary, the NRC conducted a review of an allegation- received' relative
j              to inadequacies-in fire brigade training and deficiencies in the
              qualifications of ce'rtain personnel responsible for implementation of the
1
              licensee's fire protection program. As a result of-the review, it was-
  :
,                                                    11
-
    _  -_      _  __              _ _ . _ _.          - .__      .  - . _ - _ . ._      _ _,_
 
,-  .-
      determined that, while no explicit regulatory requirements were violated,
      the concerns expressed by the alleger possessed merit. Taken in
      aggregate, the deficiencies identified during the review create the
      potential that fire brigade effectiveness and fire protection program
      implementation may be compromised. Further, it was the conclusion.of the
      inspectors that the deficiencies identified resulted from a failure on
      the part of the licensee to clearly establish their expectations of and
      priorities for these aspects of the fire protection program and build
      training and qualification requirements around those expectations and
      priorities . Rather, it appeared to the inspectors that the licensee had
      based training and qualification requirements on minimum regulatory
      requirements and guidance.
      The findings and conclusions resulting from the inspectors' review of the
      allegation, including the . conclusions relative to the methodology and
      basis for establit.hing training and qualification requirements for fire
      protection personnel, were discussed with the licensee during the exit
      interview on January 27, 1986. The licensee did not take exception to
      any of the specific findings and proposed corrective actions responsive
      to those findings. With respect to the more general conclusions relative
      to expectations for fire protection personnel, their training, and their
      qualifications, the licensee stated that Comonwealth Edison had recently
      undertaken a reevaluation of these a M other issues on a corporate-wide
      basis. This reevaluation, initiated as a result of internally and
      NRC-identified issues at other Commonwealth Edison nuclear stations, is
      scheduled for completion late in the second quarter of 1986, at which time
      actions will be initiated to resolve the findings of the reevaluation.
      This comprehensive approach to resolution of the identified deficiencies
        is acceptable to Region III. The allegaticn which prompted the' review
      documented above will remain open pending review of the results of the
        licensee's reevaluation and inspection of implementation of the resulting
      corrective actions. This is currently expected to occur in September
        1986.
  4.  Implementation of Routine Fire _ Pr_o_t_ec_ tion _ Program _ Requirements
        Facility operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 require that the
        license maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection
        program for LaSalle Station, Units 1 and 2. The inspectors assessed
        selected areas of the licensee's fire protection program for compliance
      with stated regulatory requirements. The results of these. assessments
      are as follows:
        a.    Building Design-Fire Detection System Installation
              Appendix A to NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9.5-1, its
              supplemental guidance, and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 mcke up the
              requirements for an approved fire protection plan that satisfies
              Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50. The licensee's FSAR response
              to NRC Question No. 010.45 committed to installation of fire
              detection systems installed in accordance with National Fire
              Protection Association Standard No. 720. Based on this commitment,
                                                12
 
      ..        -                          -                                        .  ,.-_ -_.
          .  .
        ,
                  the NRC staff concluded in Section 9.5.1.4 of the-original. Safety
                  Evaluation Report (SER) that fire detection systems for both LaSalle
                  units were installed or would be installed in accordance with NFPA
                  Standard No. 720. No deviations from NFPA 72D requirements were
                  granted to the licensee in subsequent SER supplements one through six
                  by the NRC and none were identified to the NRC by the licensee prior
                  to this inspection.
                  Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1. requires that fire detection systems give
                  audible and visual alarms in the control room and a local audible
                  alarm that sounds at the location of the fire. A local alarm is
                  defined by NFPA 720 as an intermediate fire alarm or fire supervisory
                  control unit used to provide area' fire alarm or area fire supervisory
                  service. Sections 4-1 and 4-2.3 of NFPA 72D specify that signal
!                  notification requirements in a central. supervisory station and, if
l                  provided, signal notification for evacuation of occupants, or signals
l                  directing aid to the location of an emergency, comply with the
l                  provisions of NFPA Standard No. 72A in addition to the provision of
                  NFPA 72D.
                  Section 3-9.1 of NFPA-72D references Table 3-9.1 of NFPA 72D to
                  explain the performance of alarm initiating device circuits.
                  Table 3-9.1 allows users to identify minimum performance of present
                  and future fire alarm systems by determining the trouble and alarm
                  signals received at a central supervising station (control room) for
                  specified abnormal conditions. According to Table 3-9.1 of NFPA 720,
                  intermediate fire alarms (local alarms) or fire supervisory control
                  units (control room fire detection system annunciator) are required
                  to be supervised to give distinct trouble alarms in the control room
                  under specified abnormal conditions.
                  Section 2-4.1 cf NFPA 72A requires that all fire alams and process
                  monitoring alarm systems be electrically supervised so that the
                  occurrences of a single open or a single ground fault condition of
l                  installation wiring which prevents the required normal operation
'
                  of the system, or failure of its primary power supply source will
                  be indicated by a distinct trouble signal. This is graphically
                  displayed in Table 3-9.1 of NFPA 720. Furthermore, Section 2-7.1
                  of NFPA 72D requires that all interconnecting equipment, devices
                  and appliances to proprietary signaling systems be monitored for
                    integrity so that the occurrence of a single open or a single ground
                    trouble condition will be automatically signaled to and recorded in
                    the central supervising station within 200 seconds.
                    During the inspection on January 14, 1986, local alarms in the Unit I
                    reactor building were giving audible fire alarms simultaneously
                    as a result of a wire to wire short. No trouble alarm indication was
                    received in the control room because the local alarm circuits, which
!                  are manually initiated only from the control room, are not
                    electrically supervised in accordance with NFPA 720 and 72A
                    requirements. According to interviews with cognizant licensee
                    personnel, this was a recurring event that confused employees and
l.                                                                                                !
                                                                                                  l
i                                                  13
!
'
                                                                                                  1
                                            -
  ..    -  -        .-      ..
 
                                        -          -      -.                      -
!
  .- ..
            diminished employee and fire brigade member confidence _ in the fire
            alarm system to the extent that it is difficult for employees to
            distinguish an actual fire alarm from a false alarm.
            The inspector's investigation of the actuated alarms _resulted in the
            determination that the local alarms were not electrically supervised
            in the control room. Because of this lack of electrical supervision,_
            control rocm operators were unable to pinpoint the location of the
            actuated alarms and the manual reset button for the local alarm
            circuits was inoperative; therefore, the alarms rang in the Unit 1
;          reactor building for approximately six hours while the inspectors
i          were onsite until the licensee's staff de-energized the fault
'
            that was causing the problem.
                                                                                                    '
            In addition, the licensee identified to the inspector, and the
:          inspector verified, that the control room visual alarm annunciator
            circuit for the fire detection system was not electrically supervised..
            A single open or a single ground fault condition in this circuit
*.
            cculd cause the loss of all control room visual alarm annuciation                      ,
:!          for the fire detection system without any notification to control                      *
            rocm operators of abnornal conditions in the circuit.
            For the local fire alarm condition, the' licensee took exception
            to NFPA 72D and 72A and indicated their position was that the local
            fire alarms were supplementary alarms and therefore not required
            to be electrically supervised. This position is a misinterpretation
            of NFPA 72D and 72A.
            For the control rocm visual alarm fire detection system annunciation
            circuit, the licensee stated that the compensatory measures already
            being taken were to have an operator verify the status of this
            circuit once per eight hour shift. This is not equivalent to the
            continuous electrical supervision that is required for this circuit
            by NFPA 720 and 72A and is therefore unacceptable to Region III.
'
            These deviations from the requirements of NFPA 72D and 72A constitute
            a failure to comply with the approved fire protection program and
            are a violation of Condition No. 24 of Amendment No.1 to Facility
            Operating License No. NFP-11 (Unit 1) and Condition No.15 to
            Facility Operating License No. NPF-18 (Unit 2) (373/86-004-01(DRS);
            374/86-004-01(DRS)).
        b. Fire Detection and Local Alarm Systemt Drawi_ng Discrepanc_ies
            The inspector reviewed the fire detection and alarm systems as
            delineated on the applicable electrical drawings and schematics
            for technical adequacy, circuit presentation, standardization, and
            conformance to regulatory requirements and industry standards.
:                                          14
                    __
                          ,  _  _ , _ _
                                                  .    _      _ _          . . _ __  _ _
                                                                                            . . _ _
 
    .-  .. .      -          .                    -  ..          .  .  ..  -  -
        4 O
  '        The following observations were made:
            (1) Schematic .Diagr!.m 1E-1-4033AJ,- Revision E, titled " Fire
                  Protection Central Relay Panel 1FP08J":
                  (a) Sub-titles under the functional portion of the circuitry
,
.
                        do not exist.
                  (b) Time delay relay ITDR does not contain time delay
,                        description.
i'
                  (c) Contact designation for push button IPB4 are missing.
>                  (d) Contact 2-4 of Relay 1ELX1 does not indicate a reference
                        drawing.
            (2) Schematic Diagram 1E-1-4033AK, Revision C, titled "7.5KVA,
                  120VAC DC to AC Inverter (Panel IFP01E)":                          ;
                  (a) -Breaker rating not indicated on breakers 1 through 8.
                  (b) 250A and 130A fuses internal to the inverter are i.' series
                        with 100A breaker upstream at the 125V DC emergency feed
                        to the inverter. This is of concern because normally the
                        sequence would be that higher rated breakers for' fuses
                        are placed upstream of the circuit.
              (3) Schematic Diagram 1E-0-4421AH, Revision F, titled "RX Building
                  Local Control Box No. 2 (Panel 0FP02J)":
                  (a) Fire and evacuation sirens and local indicating lights
                        relating to the fire detection zones' circuitry are not      ,
                        continuously monitored as required by NFPA 72D-1975.
                  (b) Siren and light circuitry do not contain a protective
                        fuse. A 15A breaker located at the IFP01E inverter is
                        used for circuit protection. Contact 2-4 of Relay IFR02
                        to this circuit failed open just prior to this inspection,
                        preventing reset of local fire alarms. In addition,
                        relay contacts in this circuit are rated at 2A resistive      i
                        at 120VAC 60HZ per vendor drawing No. 005346, Revision 0.    l
                        Therefore, it is possible that a current in the circuits      i
                        of more than 2A could cause the contact to fail. This is
                        possible because-the only circuit protection is a 15A
                        breaker.
                                                  '
                    (c) 120VAC feed to Relays 1ER02 and 1FR02 is noted on the
                        drawing as coming from inverter 1FP03E. Review of design
                        drawings indicated that it is presently fed from Inverter
                          IFP02E (which was verified to be a drafting error),
                    (d) Sub-titles.under.the functional portion of the circuitry
                          do not exist.
                                              15
                                                                                      i
                                                                                    ._
 
    . .
  ,
          (4) Connection Diagrams 1E-0-4604AF, Revision G, and 1E-1-4594AQ,
                  Revision J:
                  No observations made.
          (5). No functional schematic diagram existed delineating the
                  continuously monitored fire detection circuits for the
                  detectors, end of line resistors, and alarm to the main
                  fire anrunciator panel (1FF04JB) in the main control room.
                  This (items 4.b(1), (2), (3), and 4.b(5)) is considered an Open
                  Item (373/86-004-02(DRS); 374/86-004-02DRS)) pending further
                  review by Region III.
        c. Field Inspe_c_t_ ion of Inverters _an_d Panels
          The inspector conducted a field visual inspection of in'      *ers
                                                                          .
          IFP02E and 1FP03E, Fire Protection Panels IFP08J and 0Fi        ,and
          the control rocm alarm panel. Except for missing desigta. ions on
          several relay contacts, no violations or deviations were identified.
        d. Administrative Controls
          In the LaSalle County Facility Operating License for Units 1 and 2,
          it indicates that the licensee shall maintain in effect all provisions
          of the approve <i fire protection program.
          Supplement 2 of the Safety Evaluation Report dated February 1982,
          Section 9.5.8 entitled " Appendix R Statement", states in part, "The
                                                                                  '
          applicant's fire protection program will meet the technical require-
          ments of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, and the applicant is
          committed to meet guidelines for the administrative controls for
          fire protection."
          The Commonwealth Edison LaSalle County Station (LSCS) Units 1 and 2
          response to the NRC's Request for Conformance to Branch Technical
          Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 (letter dated January 24, 1978 from
          M. S. Turbok to A. Bournia), indicated that LSCS is in compliance
          with the NRC position on Administrative Procedures and Controls.
          Section B.1 of the BTP requires that administrative procedures
          consistent with the need for maintaining the performance of the fire
            protection system and personnel be provided. The inspectors reviewed
            the licensee's procedure entitled " Fire Protection Program", numbered
          LAP-900-14, Revision 9 dated September 4, 1985.      The procedure
          states "The purpose of this procedure is to define the Fire Protection
            Program at LaSalle County Station by assigning responsibilities,
          defining the organization, and providing infonr.ation and procedures
            pertinent to fire protection.
            The procedure outlines that the offsite members of the CECO staff for
            fire protection are:
1
                                            16
 
                                                          .-                                      .        -      , -    ..-          .        . . .  .-_    . ..                . . .- -
                                                                                                                                              .                                                    .
.
                                                    ,.                                          ..
                                                                                                        (1) Division Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Station
                                                                                                              and Division                                                                        ,
I                                                                                                        (2) LSCS Quality Assurance Supervisor                                                    ,
                                                                                                        (3) CECO Fire Protection Coordinator (Fire Protection Engineer).
!
!                                                                                                        (4) CECO Fire Protection Engineer
i
                                                                                                        The ensite responsibilities are assigned to:
:
                                                                                                        (1) Fire Commissioner - Station Manager                                                  ,
,
]                                                                                                        (2) Fire Marshall
I
                                                                                                        (3) Shift Engineer                                                                        ,
l                                                                                                        (4) Fire Chief
4
]                                                                                                        No deviations were identified in this area except as noted in
                                                                                                        Paragraph 2 of this report.
                                                                                                        The inspectors also reviewed a selected sample of the licensee's
                                                                                                        administrative controls established to minimize fire hazards such as
                                                                                                        fire prevention procedure for welding and cutting, use of lumber and
i                                                                                                      other combustibles in the plant, 6nd control of flamrc.able liquids.
l                                                                                                        fio deviations were identified in this area.
1
                                                                                                      e. Op_er.a_ tin.g_ Technical Specification Surveillances
;                                                                                                      Section 9.5.1.4 of the LSCS UFSAR states " Periodic inspections and
1                                                                                                        cperational checks to demonstrate integrity are routinely performed
"
                                                                                                        on all fire protection systems. These tests and inspections are
r                                                                                                        identified in the Technical Specifications."
t
'
                                                                                                        The inspectors reviewed the following technical specification                            *
'
                                                                                                          su'veillances:                                                                          ,
,                                                                                                          Technical        Description of            Procedure
                                                                                                        Specification          Surveillance            Number
                                                                                                          4.7.5.1.1.a          Valve lineup              LOS-FP-M3, Rev. 7
                                                                                                                                                                                                  l
                                                                                                                                                                                                  '
1                                                                                                                              Combined outside          LOS-FP-M3
!                                                                                                                                fire protection
                                                                                                                                  flow path valve
                                                                                                                                  position
                                                                                                          4.7.5.1.1.b          Valve Cycling            LOS-FP-A1, Rev. 3
                                                                                                          4.7.5.1.3.a.1        Electrolyte              LOS-DC-W1, Rev. 9
                                                                                                                                  level above
;                                                                                                                                plates.
,
'
                                                                                                                                          17                                                      :
'l
  - _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ -                                                                          _ _ _ - - -          ._
 
- - -
      .. .~
            4.7.5.1.3.a.2      Pilot Cell            LOS-DC-W1, Rev. 9
                                  specific gravity
            4.7.6.2.e          Inspect auto hold-    LTS-1000-14
                                  open, release and
                                  closing mechanism,
                                  and latches at least
                                  once per 6 months
            Areas reviewed that were found unacceptable are discussed below:      ,
            Fire Pro _tection_ Valve Surveillances
            The inspectors reviewed " Fire Protection Flow Path Valve Cycling
            Test (FPFPVCT)," Procedure No. LOS-FP-A1, which requires the
            valves in the open position in the fire protection system to be
            lubricated and cycled once every six months. This procedure            '
            requires three attachments of Procedure LOS-FP-M3, entitled " Valve
            Lineup (VL)", which identify the valves to be lubricated and
            cycled to be utilized and attached to the FPFPVCT surveillance.
            The inspector could not verify that all the valves required to be
            lubricated and cycled per FPFPVCT procedure were completed because
            the three VL surveillances were not attached as required. Instead,
            several of the individuals performing the surveillance signed the      '
            FPFPVCT surveillance and included a note to see the VL surveillance.
            The inspector reviewed the VL surveillance and noted that one
            individual that had not signed FPFPVCT surveillance was on the VL
            surveillance and it was not known if the valves this individual had
            signed off on in the VL surveillance were cycled as per FPFPVCT
            procedure. The individual was questioned by the NRC inspectors and
            it was concluded that the individual conducted the FPFPVCT procedure.
            The procedure will be revised to insure that adequate documentation
            will be available to insure that valves in the fire protection system
            have been properly lubricated, cycled, ard locked in the proper
            position. This is considered an Open Item (373/86004-03(DRS);
            374/86004-03(DRS)).
            Procedures for Firefighting Foam
            The inspectors observed two types of 31% firefighting foam concentrate
            (produced by two different manufacturers) in the fire protection
            equipment area in the Unit 2 turbine trackway located at R-27 Eleva-
            tion 710. At the request of the inspector the licensee contacted
            the manufacturers to verify if the foams could be used together. The
            manufacturers indicated that the foams are incompatible. The licensee
            took corrective action and separated the two types of foam. As
            discussed with the licensee, there is 50 gallons of one type of foam
            which will be stored in the warehouse and used only for fire brigade
            trai.ning purposes. In addition, the licensee indicated that only one
            type of foam will be utilized at this facility. The licensee
                                            18
 
    .    .  . -          -.                .            ..            - . -        . . ,          -      .. . - - - - _
          .-  t+
:
                              indicated that procedures were being developed for the fearc concen-
i                            trate to insure that it is tested according to NFPA and manufacturers'
,
                              instructions. This is considered an Open Item (374/86004-04{GRS)).
,
                              Oppli_ty Assurance Program
i
3
                              The Safety Evaluation Report dated April 3,1981, Section 9.5.7,-
!                            stated that the applicant has agreed to implement the fire protection
1                              program contained in NRC supplemental guidance document ''Huclea'r                                                ,
;                              Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrat5ve
                              Controls and Cuality Assurance," dated August 29, 1977.
                              The inspector's review of the licensee's Quality Assurance Program
i                              included review of the following:
  '
                              (1) Quality Assurance Audit' Report dated August 2, 1984-and
                                    July 31, 1985.
                                                                                                                                                  '
J
,                            (2) Audit Checklist and Record Sheet 01-BS-1, March 19-22,1985,
;                                    and 01-BS-11, September 10-13, 1985.                                                                        !
.
                                (3) Triannual Audit by M and M Protection Consultants dated                                                      .
                                    December 4,1984.
j                              No violations or deviations were identiffEd.
            8.    Open Items
                  Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which                                                      ;
I
                  will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action                                                      3
:                on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during
                  the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3, 4.b, and 4.e.
                                                                                                                                                  ^
1
i            9.    Exit Interview
!                  The inspectors met with the licensee representatives at the conclusion of
                    the inspection on January 27, 1986, and sucraarized the scope and findings
i                  of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged ttte statemerts trade by the
'
                    inspectors. The inspectors aIso discussed the likely informaticnal
                  content of the inspection report with regard to documents reviewed by the
                    inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such
,
                  dccuments as proprietary. Subsequently, in a telephone conversation with
;                  the licensee, additional concerns regarding failure to install fire
                    detection and alarm 17;tM.:s in accordance with governing code requirements
'
                  were discussed with the licensee.
.,
                                                                                                            *
                                                                                                                              4
                                                                .
}
!
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