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                              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
                                            REGION I
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
        Docket No.:   50-293
REGION I
        Report No.:   50-293/88-21
Docket No.:
        Licensee:     Boston Edison Company
50-293
                      Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Report No.:
                      RF0 #1, Rocky Hill Road
50-293/88-21
                      Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360
Licensee:
        Facility:     Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Boston Edison Company
        Location:     Plymouth, Massachusetts
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
      Dates of Inspection:       August 8-24, 1988
RF0 #1, Rocky Hill Road
        Inspectors:   (See Attachment E)
Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360
      Approved By:  '
Facility:
                            i whc e T.           nn       Dw   -
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
                                                                        _ _ ' 7/89
Location:
                      A. Rt.ndy Blough, Ch'ief       ~f                     Dath
Plymouth, Massachusetts
                      Reactor Projects Section No. 3B
Dates of Inspection:
                      Division of Reactor Projects
August 8-24, 1988
      Inspection Summary:
Inspectors:
      Areas Inspected:   Integrated Assessment Team In:,pection to assess the degree
(See Attachment E)
      of readiness of licensee management controls, programs, and personnel to sup-
_ _ ' 7/89
      port safe restart and operation of the plant. The scope of the inspection is
i whc e T.
      further detailed in Section 2.2.
Approved By:
      Results:
'
      The team concluded that licensee management controls, programs, and personnel
nn
      are generally ready and performing at a level to support safe startup and
Dw
      operation of the facility.       Results are further summarized in Sections 1.0
-
      (Executive Summary) and 2.3 (Summary of Findings).
A. Rt.ndy Blough, Ch'ief
  .
~f
Dath
Reactor Projects Section No. 3B
Division of Reactor Projects
Inspection Summary:
Areas Inspected:
Integrated Assessment Team In:,pection to assess the degree
of readiness of licensee management controls, programs, and personnel to sup-
port safe restart and operation of the plant.
The scope of the inspection is
further detailed in Section 2.2.
Results:
The team concluded that licensee management controls, programs, and personnel
are generally ready and performing at a level to support safe startup and
operation of the facility.
Results are further summarized in Sections 1.0
(Executive Summary) and 2.3 (Summary of Findings).
.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                              TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
                                                                                                                Page
ACR0NYMS.......................................................
    ACR0NYMS.......................................................                                               iv
iv
    1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.........................................                                                 1
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.........................................
    2.0   INTRODUCTION..............................................                                               2
1
          2.1   Background...........................................                                               2
2.0
          2.2 Scope of Inspection..................................                                                 3
INTRODUCTION..............................................
          2.3 S u mm a ry o f I AT I R e s u l t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     4
2
                2.3.1       Overall Summary............................                                           A
2.1
                2.3.2         Summary of Results by Functional Areas.....                                           5
Background...........................................
          2.4 Licensee     Commitments.................................                                           9
2
                2.4.1       Procedure Validation and Training..........                                           9
2.2 Scope of Inspection..................................
                2.4.2         Identifying Procedure Changes Requiring
3
                                Training.................................                                         9
2.3 S u mm a ry o f I AT I R e s u l t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
                2.4.3       Temporary Modifications....................                                           9
4
                2.4.4       Operations Review Committee................                                         10
2.3.1
                2.4.5       Maintenin     e.               .........................                           10
Overall
                2.4.6       Survei,ionce..               .         .....................                       10
Summary............................
                2.4.7       Formalizing Personnel Qualification
A
                                Reviews..................................                                       11
2.3.2
                2.4.8       Mission, Organization and Policy Manual....                                         11
Summary of Results by Functional Areas.....
                2.4.9       Familiarizing Workers with t'xpected
5
                                Radiological Conditions..................                                       11
2.4 Licensee Commitments.................................
                2.4.10       Control Room Human Factors.................                                         11
9
    3.0 DE TAI LS O F I N S P EC T ION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4.1
          3.1 Management 0versight.................................                                               12
Procedure Validation and Training..........
                3.1.1       Scope of Review............................                                         42
9
                3.1.2       Organization...............................                                         12
2.4.2
                3.1.3       Staffing...................................                                         15
Identifying Procedure Changes Requiring
                3.1.4       Qualifications..... . .....................                                         16
Training.................................
                3.1.5       Administrative Policy and Procedures.......                                         18
9
                3.1.6       Communications and Observations............                                         19
2.4.3
                3.1.7       Conclusions.......................                                 .   ......       20
Temporary Modifications....................
                                                              i
9
2.4.4
Operations Review Committee................
10
2.4.5
Maintenin
10
e.
.........................
2.4.6
Survei,ionce..
10
.
.....................
2.4.7
Formalizing Personnel Qualification
Reviews..................................
11
2.4.8
Mission, Organization and Policy Manual....
11
2.4.9
Familiarizing Workers with t'xpected
Radiological
Conditions..................
11
2.4.10
Control Room Human
Factors.................
11
3.0 DE TAI LS O F I N S P EC T ION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
3.1 Management 0versight.................................
12
3.1.1
Scope of Review............................
42
3.1.2
Organization...............................
12
3.1.3
Staffing...................................
15
3.1.4
Qualifications..... . .....................
16
3.1.5
Administrative Policy and Procedures.......
18
3.1.6
Communications and Observations............
19
3.1.7
Conclusions.......................
.
20
......
i


                                                                              . _______
. _______
. e
.
    Table of Contents (Continued)
e
                                                                          Page
Table of Contents (Continued)
        3.2 Operations...........................................         21
Page
              3.2.1     Scope of Review............................         21
3.2
              3.2.2     Conduct of Operations......................         21
Operations...........................................
              3.2.3     Shift Staffing and Overtime Controls.......         23
21
              3.2.4     Procedure Va11dation.......................         24
3.2.1
              3.2 5     Temporary Modification Controls............         25
Scope of Review............................
              3.2.6     Required Reading Books.....................       28
21
              3.2.7     Logs.......................................       29
3.2.2
              3.2.8     Timely Update of Lif ted Lead / Jumper Log. . . . 29
Conduct of Operations......................
              3.2.9     Tagouts and Operator Aids..................       31
21
              3.2.10   Plant Tours and System Walkdowns...........       31
3.2.3
              3.2.11   Conclusions................................       34
Shift Staffing and Overtime Controls.......
        3.3 Maintenance..........................................       36
23
              3.3.1     Scope of Review............................       36
3.2.4
              3.3.2     Observations and Findings..................       36
Procedure Va11dation.......................
              3.3.3     Conclusions................................       50
24
                                '
3.2 5
        3.4 Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control.........         52
Temporary Modification Controls............
              3.4.1     Scope of Review......................... ..       52
25
              3.4.2     Observations and Findings..................       52
3.2.6
              3.4.3     Conclusions................................       61
Required Reading Books.....................
        3.5 Radiation   Protection.................................       63
28
              3.5.1     Scope of Review............................       63
3.2.7
              3.5.2     Observations and Findings..................       63
Logs.......................................
              3.5.3     Conclusions................................       73
29
        3.6 Security and Safeguards...... .......................         75
3.2.8
              3.6.1     Scope of Review............................       /%
Timely Update of Lif ted Lead / Jumper Log. . . .
              3.6.2     Observations and Findings..................       75
29
              3.6.3     Conclusions................................       82
3.2.9
                                            11
Tagouts and Operator Aids..................
31
3.2.10
Plant Tours and System Walkdowns...........
31
3.2.11
Conclusions................................
34
3.3
Maintenance..........................................
36
3.3.1
Scope of Review............................
36
3.3.2
Observations and Findings..................
36
3.3.3
Conclusions................................
50
'
3.4 Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control.........
52
3.4.1
Scope of
Review.........................
52
..
3.4.2
Observations and Findings..................
52
3.4.3
Conclusions................................
61
3.5 Radiation
Protection.................................
63
3.5.1
Scope of Review............................
63
3.5.2
Observations and Findings..................
63
3.5.3
Conclusions................................
73
3.6 Security and Safeguards...... .......................
75
3.6.1
Scope of Review............................
/%
3.6.2
Observations and Findings..................
75
3.6.3
Conclusions................................
82
11


_
_
  O. 6
O.
      Table of Contents (Continued)
6
                                                                            Page
Table of Contents (Continued)
            3.7 Training.............................................     83
Page
                  3.7.1     Scope of Review............................     8'.
3.7
                  3.7.2     Observations and Findings..................     83
Training.............................................
                  3.7.3     Conclusions................................     88
83
            3.8 Fire Protection......................................       89
3.7.1
                  3.8.1     Scope of Review............................     89
Scope of Review............................
                  3.8.2     Observations and Findings..................     89
8'.
                  3.8.3     Conclusions................................     90
3.7.2
            3.9 Engineering   Support..................................     91
Observations and Findings..................
                  3.9.1     Scope of Review............................     91
83
                  3.9.2     Observations and Findings..................     91
3.7.3
                  3.9.3     Conclusions................................     93
Conclusions................................
            3.10 Safety Assessment / Quality Verification...............   94
88
                  3.10.1     Scope of Review............................     94
3.8 Fire Protection......................................
                  3.10.2     Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee..     94
89
                  3.10.3     Operations Review Committee................     97
3.8.1
                  3.10.4     Quality Assurance Audit and Surveillance
Scope of Review............................
                              Programs.................................   102
89
                  3.10.5     Corrective Action Process and Programs.....   104
3.8.2
                  3.10.6     Conclusions................................   115
Observations and
      4.0 UNRESOLVED ITEMS..........................................       117
Findings..................
      5.0 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS.......................................       118
89
      Appendix A - Entrance Interview Attendees......................     A-1
3.8.3
      Appendix B - Exit Interview Attendees..........................     B-1
Conclusions................................
      Appendix C - Persons Contacted.................................     C-1
90
      Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed................................     D-1
3.9 Engineering Support..................................
  .    Appendix E - IATI Composition and Structure................ ...     E-1
91
      Appendix F - Resumes...........................................     F-1
3.9.1
      Appendix G - September 1, 1988 Letter from NRC to Commonwealth
Scope of Review............................
                        of Massachusetts................................   G-1
91
      Appendix H - September 6, 1988 Letter from Commonwealth of
3.9.2
                        Massachusetts to NRC...........................   . H-1
Observations and Findings..................
                                                111
91
3.9.3
Conclusions................................
93
3.10 Safety Assessment / Quality Verification...............
94
3.10.1
Scope of Review............................
94
3.10.2
Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee..
94
3.10.3
Operations Review Committee................
97
3.10.4
Quality Assurance Audit and Surveillance
Programs.................................
102
3.10.5
Corrective Action Process and Programs.....
104
3.10.6
Conclusions................................
115
4.0 UNRESOLVED ITEMS..........................................
117
5.0 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS.......................................
118
Appendix A - Entrance Interview Attendees......................
A-1
Appendix B - Exit Interview
Attendees..........................
B-1
Appendix C - Persons Contacted.................................
C-1
Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed................................
D-1
Appendix E - IATI Composition and Structure................
E-1
...
.
Appendix F - Resumes...........................................
F-1
Appendix G - September 1, 1988 Letter from NRC to Commonwealth
of Massachusetts................................
G-1
Appendix H - September 6, 1988 Letter from Commonwealth of
Massachusetts to NRC...........................
.
H-1
111


                                                          . _ _ _ _
. _ _ _ _
  . .
.
                                  ACRONYMS
.
      ALARA   -
ACRONYMS
                As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ALARA
      ANSI   -
As Low As Reasonably Achievable
                American National Standards Institute
-
      ASME   -
ANSI
                American Society for Mechanical Engineers
American National Standards Institute
      BECo   -
-
                Boston Edison Company
ASME
      BEQAM -
American Society for Mechanical Engineers
                Boston Edison Quality Assurance Manual
-
      CAS   -
BECo
                Central Alarm Station
Boston Edison Company
      CQI
-
              -
BEQAM
                Commercial Quality Item
Boston Edison Quality Assurance Manual
      CS    -
-
                Core Spray (System)
CAS
      CST   -
Central Alarm Station
                Condensate Storage Tank
-
      DC     -
CQI
                Direct Current
Commercial Quality Item
-
Core Spray (System)
CS
-
CST
Condensate Storage Tank
-
DC
Direct Current
-
i.
i.
      DCRDR  -
Detaiied Control Room Design Review
                Detaiied Control Room Design Review
DCRDR
      DG   -
-
                Diesel Generator
DG
      DR   -
Diesel Generator
                Deficiency Reports
-
      E0P   -
DR
                Emergency Operating Procedures
Deficiency Reports
      E0   -
-
                Equipment Operator
E0P
      EPRI -
Emergency Operating Procedures
                Electric Power Research Institute
-
      EQ
E0
            -
Equipment Operator
                Environmental Qualification
-
      ESF   -
EPRI
                Engineered Safety Feature
Electric Power Research Institute
      r     -
-
                Engineering Service Roquest
EQ
  '
Environmental Qualification
      F6MR  -
-
                Failure and Malfunction Reports
ESF
      FYI  -
Engineered Safety Feature
                For Your Information
-
      GET  -
r
                General Employee Training
Engineering Service Roquest
                                    iv
-
'
Failure and Malfunction Reports
F6MR
-
For Your Information
FYI
-
General Employee Training
GET
-
iv


Y'
Y'
  . .
.
      Acronyms
.
            HP     -
Acronyms
                      Health Physics
HP
            HPES   -
Health Physics
                      Human Performance Evaluation System
-
            HSA   -
HPES
                      Housekeeping Service Assistance
Human Performance Evaluation System
            IATI -
-
                      Integrated Assessment Team Inspection
HSA
            I&C   -
Housekeeping Service Assistance
                      Instrumentation and Control
-
            ICA   -
IATI
                      Immediate Corrective Actions
Integrated Assessment Team Inspection
            INPO -
-
                      Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
I&C
            IST   -
Instrumentation and Control
                      In-Service Testing
-
            LCO   -
ICA
                      Limiting Condition for Operations
Immediate Corrective Actions
            LL/J   -
-
                      Lifted Lead / Jumper
INPO
            LSFT -
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
                      Logic System Functional Test
-
            M&TE -
IST
                      Measuring and Test Equipment
In-Service Testing
            MCAR -
-
                      Management Cnrrective Action Requests
LCO
            MCIAP -
Limiting Condition for Operations
                      Material Condition Improvement Action Plan
-
            MO&AT -
LL/J
                      Management Oversight and Assessment Team
Lifted Lead / Jumper
            MOP   -
-
                      Mission, Organization and Policy Manual
LSFT
            MPC   -
Logic System Functional Test
                      Maximum Permitted Concentration
-
            MR   -
M&TE
                      Maintenance Request
Measuring and Test Equipment
            MSC   -
-
                      Maintenance Summary and Control
MCAR
            MSTP -
Management Cnrrective Action Requests
                      Master Surveillance Tracking Program
-
            MWP   -
MCIAP
                      Maintenance Work Plan
Material Condition Improvement Action Plan
            NCR   -
-
                      Nonconformance Report
MO&AT
            NED   -
Management Oversight and Assessment Team
                      Nuclear Engineering Department
-
            h0P   -
MOP
                      Nuclear Organization Procedures
Mission, Organization and Policy Manual
                                          y
-
MPC
Maximum Permitted Concentration
-
MR
Maintenance Request
-
MSC
Maintenance Summary and Control
-
MSTP
Master Surveillance Tracking Program
-
MWP
Maintenance Work Plan
-
NCR
Nonconformance Report
-
NED
Nuclear Engineering Department
-
h0P
Nuclear Organization Procedures
-
y


  . .
.
      Acronyms
.
            NRC   -
Acronyms
                    Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRC
            NRR   -
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                    Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
-
          NSRAC   -
NRR
                    Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
          NWE     -
-
                    Nuclear Watch Engineer
NSRAC
          OMG   -
Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee
                    Outage Management Group
-
          ORC   -
NWE
                    Operations Review Committee
Nuclear Watch Engineer
          P&ID   -
-
                    Piping and Instrument Diagram
OMG
          PCAQ
Outage Management Group
                  -
-
                    Potential Condition Adverse to quality
ORC
          PDC   -
Operations Review Committee
                    Plant Design Change
-
          PI     -
P&ID
                    Pressere Indicator
Piping and Instrument Diagram
          PM     -
-
                    Preventive Maintenance
PCAQ
          PNPS -
Potential Condition Adverse to quality
                    Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
-
          PCIS -
PDC
                    Primary Containment Isolation System
Plant Design Change
          QAD  -
-
                    Quality Assurance Department
PI
          RCIC -
Pressere Indicator
                    Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
-
          RETS -
PM
                    Radiological Environmental Technical Specifications
Preventive Maintenance
          RHR   -
-
                    Residual Heat Removal (System)
PNPS
          RO   -
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
                    Reactor Operator
-
          ROR   -
PCIS
                    Radiological Occurrence Report
Primary Containment Isolation System
          RP   -
-
                    Radiation Protection
Quality Assurance Department
QAD
-
RCIC
-
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RETS
Radiological Environmental Technical Specifications
-
RHR
Residual Heat Removal (System)
-
RO
Reactor Operator
-
ROR
Radiological Occurrence Report
-
RP
Radiation Protection
-
'
'
          RWP   -
RWP
                    Radiation Work Permits
Radiation Work Permits
          SAA   -
-
                    Simulated Automatic Actuation
SAA
          SAS   -
Simulated Automatic Actuation
                    Secondary Alarm Station
-
                                        vi
SAS
Secondary Alarm Station
-
vi


. ;.
;.
    Acronyms
.
          SBLC   -
Acronyms
                    Standby Liquid Control (System)
SBLC
          SDR   -
Standby Liquid Control (System)
                    Security Deficiency Reports
-
          SE   -
SDR
                    Safety Evaluations
Security Deficiency Reports
          SEG   -
-
                    Systems Engineering Group
SE
          SES   -
Safety Evaluations
                    Senior Executive Service
-
          SFR   -
SEG
                    Supplier Finder Reports
Systems Engineering Group
          SGI   -
-
                    Safeguards Information
SES
          SI   -
Senior Executive Service
                    Station Instruction
-
          SRO   -
SFR
                    Senior Reactor Operator
Supplier Finder Reports
          STA   -
-
                    Shift Technical Advisor
SGI
          SVP-N -
Safeguards Information
                    Senior Vice President - Nuclear
-
          TM   -
SI
                    Temporary Modification
Station Instruction
          TS   -
-
                    Technical Specifications
SRO
          VP-NE -
Senior Reactor Operator
                    Vice president - Nuclear Engineering
-
          WIP   -
STA
                    Workforce Information Program
Shift Technical Advisor
          WPRT -
-
                    Work Prioritization Review Team
SVP-N
                                        vii
Senior Vice President - Nuclear
-
TM
Temporary Modification
-
TS
Technical Specifications
-
VP-NE
Vice president - Nuclear Engineering
-
WIP
Workforce Information Program
-
WPRT
Work Prioritization Review Team
-
vii


  .
.
.   .
.
      1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
.
            In response to NRC concerns ever longstanding issues regarding the manage-
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
            ment effectiveness of the Boston Edison Company (BECo) in the operation of
In response to NRC concerns ever longstanding issues regarding the manage-
            the Pilgrim facility, the licensee agreed to maintain the plant in a
ment effectiveness of the Boston Edison Company (BECo) in the operation of
            shutdown condition         following operational events which occurred on
the Pilgrim facility, the licensee agreed to maintain the plant in a
            April 11-12, 1986. The NRC conf trmed the licensee's agreement in Con-
shutdown
            firmatory Action Letter (CAL) 86 10.         The CAL, as supplemented in an
condition
            August 27, 1986 letter, also confirmed that the licensee would develop a
following
            comprehensive plan to address those concerns and perfonn an in-depth self-
operational
            assessment of the effectiveness of that Plan.         On June 25, 1988, the
events which occurred on
            licensee reported it had completed these activities to the extent that an
April 11-12, 1986.
            NRC review was appropriate. In order to assess the status and results of
The NRC conf trmed the licensee's agreement in Con-
            BECo's corrective actions, the NRC performed an independent review of the
firmatory Action Letter (CAL) 86 10.
            effectiveness of the licensee's management controls, programs and person-
The CAL, as supplemented in an
            nel during an Integrated Assessment Team Inspection (IATI) conducted
August 27, 1986 letter, also confirmed that the licensee would develop a
            August 8-24, 1988.
comprehensive plan to address those concerns and perfonn an in-depth self-
            The Team consisted of an SES-level manager, a Team leader, and members of
assessment of the effectiveness of that Plan.
            the NRC Region I and Headquarters staff. The inspection team also
On June 25, 1988, the
            included two obseners representing and appointed by the Commonwealth of
licensee reported it had completed these activities to the extent that an
          i;assachusetts.   These observers had access and input to all aspects of the
NRC review was appropriate. In order to assess the status and results of
            inspection as provided by the established protocol. The areas reviewed
BECo's corrective actions, the NRC performed an independent review of the
          during the     inspection included operations, maintenance, surveillance,
effectiveness of the licensee's management controls, programs and person-
            radiation protection, security, training, fire protection and assurance of
nel during an Integrated Assessment Team Inspection (IATI) conducted
          quality.     The Team reported directly to the Regional Administrator of
August 8-24, 1988.
            Region I.
The Team consisted of an SES-level manager, a Team leader, and members of
          Overall, the Team concluded with high confidence that BECo management
the NRC Region I
          controls, programs, and personnel were generally ready and performing at a
and Headquarters staff.
            level to support safe startup and operation of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power
The inspection team also
          Station. Further, although the Team identified certain items which
included two obseners representing and appointed by the Commonwealth of
            require licensee actions or evaluations, there were no fundamental flaws
i;assachusetts.
            found in the licensee's management structure, management performance,
These observers had access and input to all aspects of the
          programs, or program lmplementation that would inhibit its ability to
inspection as provided by the established protocol.
          assure reactor or public safety during plant operation.
The areas reviewed
                                    __
during the
inspection included operations, maintenance, surveillance,
radiation protection, security, training, fire protection and assurance of
quality.
The Team reported directly to the Regional Administrator of
Region I.
Overall, the Team concluded with high confidence that BECo management
controls, programs, and personnel were generally ready and performing at a
level to support safe startup and operation of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station.
Further,
although the Team identified certain items which
require licensee actions or evaluations, there were no fundamental flaws
found in the licensee's management structure, management performance,
programs, or program lmplementation that would inhibit its ability to
assure reactor or public safety during plant operation.
__


_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                o ,   .
.
                                                                      2
o ,
                      .
2
                          2.0 INTRODUCTION
.
                                This report details the findings, conclusions and observations of NRC's
2.0 INTRODUCTION
                                Integrated Assessment Team Inspection conducted at the Pilgrim Nuclear
This report details the findings, conclusions and observations of NRC's
                                Power Station (PNPS) on August 8-24, 1988. The results of this inspection
Integrated Assessment Team Inspection conducted at the Pilgrim Nuclear
                                are to be considered during NRC staff's deliberations as it reaches its
Power Station (PNPS) on August 8-24, 1988. The results of this inspection
                                decisior. regarding a restart recommendation to the NRC Commissioners.
are to be considered during NRC staff's deliberations as it reaches its
                                2.1 Background
decisior. regarding a restart recommendation to the NRC Commissioners.
                                      The NRC's 1985 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
2.1 Background
                                      found programmatic weaknesses in several functional areas at the
The NRC's 1985 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
                                      Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and noted that, historically, the
found programmatic weaknesses in several functional areas at the
                                      licensee could not sustain performance improvements once achieved. A   '
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and noted that, historically, the
                                      special NRC Region I diagnostic team inspection was subsequently per-
licensee could not sustain performance improvements once achieved. A
                                      formed in February and March 1986 to evaluate facility performance.
'
                                      This inspection, which included monitoring plant activities on a
special NRC Region I diagnostic team inspection was subsequently per-
                                      24-hour basis, confirmed the 1985 SALP and concluded that poor
formed in February and March 1986 to evaluate facility performance.
                                      management control and incomplete staffing contributed to the poor
This inspection, which included monitoring plant activities on a
                                      performance.
24-hour basis, confirmed the 1985 SALP and concluded that poor
                                      Following several operational events, Boston Edison Company (BECo)
management control and incomplete staffing contributed to the poor
                                      shutdown PNPS on April 11-12, 1986. The NRC subsequently issued a
performance.
                                      Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) on April 12, 1986, and a supplement
Following several operational events, Boston Edison Company (BECo)
                                      on August 27, 1986, maintaining the ple.nt shutdown and requiring that
shutdown PNPS on April 11-12, 1986.
                                      the licensee obtain NRC approval prior to restert.         The central
The NRC subsequently issued a
                                      issues in the CAL, as supplemented, involved the effectiveness of
Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) on April 12, 1986, and a supplement
                                      licensee management of the facility and technical concerns.
on August 27, 1986, maintaining the ple.nt shutdown and requiring that
                                      SALP evaluations continued during the shutdown, and improvements were
the licensee obtain NRC approval prior to restert.
                                      noted during the 1986 SALP period, although the rate of change was
The central
                                      slow. Several factors inhibited progress, including continued man-
issues in the CAL, as supplemented, involved the effectiveness of
                                      agement changes and prolonged staf fing vacancies. Good performance
licensee management of the facility and technical concerns.
                                      was noted in four areas:       emergency planning, outage management,
SALP evaluations continued during the shutdown, and improvements were
                                      corporate engineering support and licensed operator training.       The
noted during the 1986 SALP period, although the rate of change was
                                      success in these areas reflected a high level of corporate management
slow.
                                      attention and substantial resource commitments. The licensee also
Several factors inhibited progress, including continued man-
                                      had made signi'icant plant hardware improvements, including Mark I
agement changes and prolonged staf fing vacancies.
                                      Containment performance enhancements.                                   ,
Good performance
                                                                                                              !
was noted in four areas:
                                      Consistent with the CAL and its supplement, BECo has addressed the
emergency planning, outage management,
                                      specific technical   issues, developed and submitted the Pilgrim
corporate engineering support and licensed operator training.
                                      Nuclear Power Station Restart Plan and performed a detailed self-
The
                                      assessment of readiness for restart. The NRC staff reviews of these
success in these areas reflected a high level of corporate management
                                      items are complete. The licensee has also submitted a Power Ascen-
attention and substantial resource commitments.
                                      sion Test Program, for which the staff review is ongoing.
The licensee also
                                    .                                                 - -           _
had made signi'icant plant hardware improvements, including Mark I
Containment performance enhancements.
,
!
Consistent with the CAL and its supplement, BECo has addressed the
specific technical
issues, developed and submitted the Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station Restart Plan and performed a detailed self-
assessment of readiness for restart.
The NRC staff reviews of these
items are complete.
The licensee has also submitted a Power Ascen-
sion Test Program, for which the staff review is ongoing.
.
- -
- _
_
. _ _
___- - -


  . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                                     __ ___     _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
O                   *
__ ___
                                                                                                  3
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                NRC subsequently completed a SALP evaluation for Pilgrim covering the
O
                                                                period February 1,1987 to May 15,1988. It concluded that licensee
*
                                                              managenient initiatives are generally successful in correcting staff-
3
                                                                ing, organization, and material deficiencies. Programmatic perform-
NRC subsequently completed a SALP evaluation for Pilgrim covering the
                                                                ance improvements were evident in areas previously identified as
period February 1,1987 to May 15,1988.
                                                                having significant weakness and in areas that the licensee's self-
It concluded that licensee
                                                              assessment process identified         as warranting                                                                                             further management
managenient initiatives are generally successful in correcting staff-
                                                              attention.
ing, organization, and material deficiencies. Programmatic perform-
                                                              The NRC Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) of April 1986 required the
ance improvements were evident in areas previously identified as
                                                              NRC to perform a review to assess BECo's corrective actions. In con-
having significant weakness and in areas that the licensee's self-
                                                              junction with an augmented inspection program and as part of a con-
assessment process
                                                              tinuing effort to monitor BECo's program improvements, the NRC
identified
                                                              planned this IATI to independently measure the effectiveness and
as
                                                              readinass of the licensee's management controls, programs and per-
warranting
                                                              sonnel to support safe restart of the facility. A Restart Readiness
further management
                                                              Assessment Report that includes staff assessment results will be
attention.
                                                              prepared by the NRC in conjunction with development of an NRC staff
The NRC Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) of April 1986 required the
                                                              recommendation regarding plant restart.
NRC to perform a review to assess BECo's corrective actions. In con-
                                                          2.2 Scope of Inspection
junction with an augmented inspection program and as part of a con-
                                                              The IAT inspection was performed to provide an indepenuent, in-depth
tinuing effort to monitor BECo's program improvements, the NRC
                                                              assessment of the degree of readiness of licensee management con-
planned this IATI to independently measure the effectiveness and
                                                              trols, programs, and personnel to support safe restart and operation
readinass of the licensee's management controls, programs and per-
                                                              of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The inspection covered
sonnel to support safe restart of the facility. A Restart Readiness
                                                              a variety of functional areas, including operations, maintenance,
Assessment Report that includes staff assessment results will be
                                                              surveillance, radiation protection, security, training, fire protec-
prepared by the NRC in conjunction with development of an NRC staff
                                                              tion, and assurance of quality. Particular emphasis was placed on
recommendation regarding plant restart.
                                                              management ef fectiveness and on the status of the licensee's recent
2.2 Scope of Inspection
                                                              program improvements in maintenance.                               The inspection consisted of
The IAT inspection was performed to provide an indepenuent, in-depth
                                                              interviews with licensee personnel, plant tours, observations of
assessment of the degree of readiness of licensee management con-
                                                              plart activities, and selective examinations of procedures, records,
trols, programs, and personnel to support safe restart and operation
                                                              and documents.     The Team also directly observed ongoing plant
of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS).
                                                              activities on ali shifts from August 10-13, 1988.
The inspection covered
                                                              The 15-member Team consisted of a senior manager, inspection team
a variety of functional areas, including operations, maintenance,
                                                              leader, five shift inspectors, and several specialist inspectors from
surveillance, radiation protection, security, training, fire protec-
                                                              both NRC Region I and the NRC Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
tion, and assurance of quality.
                                                              (NRR).   Two representatives from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Particular emphasis was placed on
                                                              were also on the Team as observers throughout the inspection. The
management ef fectiveness and on the status of the licensee's recent
                                                              team roster and member resumes are attached as Appendices E and F to
program improvements in maintenance.
                                                              this report.
The inspection consisted of
                                                              Onsite IATI preparation, which included site familiarization and
interviews with licensee personnel, plant tours, observations of
                                                              plant tours, was conducted during the week of July 18, 1988. The Team
plart activities, and selective examinations of procedures, records,
                                                              was onsite full-time from August 8 through 19, 1938. Some IATI mem-
and documents.
                                                              bers were on site during the documentation period of August 20-24,
The Team also directly observed ongoing
                                                              1988.   Attendees at the entrance and exit interviess are listed in
plant
                                                              Appendices A and 8, respectively. Senior licensee managers contacted
activities on ali shifts from August 10-13, 1988.
                                                              during the course of the inspection are listed in Appendix C.                                                                                                 Many
The 15-member Team consisted of a senior manager, inspection team
                                                              other persons at all levels of the organization were also contacted
leader, five shift inspectors, and several specialist inspectors from
                                                              or interviewed.
both NRC Region I and the NRC Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
(NRR).
Two representatives from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
were also on the Team as observers throughout the inspection.
The
team roster and member resumes are attached as Appendices E and F to
this report.
Onsite IATI preparation, which included site familiarization and
plant tours, was conducted during the week of July 18, 1988. The Team
was onsite full-time from August 8 through 19, 1938. Some IATI mem-
bers were on site during the documentation period of August 20-24,
1988.
Attendees at the entrance and exit interviess are listed in
Appendices A and 8, respectively. Senior licensee managers contacted
during the course of the inspection are listed in Appendix C.
Many
other persons at all levels of the organization were also contacted
or interviewed.


.   .
.
                                          4
.
          The licensee was not p/esented with any written material by the NRC
4
          during this inspection. The licensee indicated that no proprietary
The licensee was not p/esented with any written material by the NRC
          material was presented for review during this inspection.
during this inspection. The licensee indicated that no proprietary
      2.3 Summary of IATI Results
material was presented for review during this inspection.
          2.3.1     Overall Summary
2.3 Summary of IATI Results
                    The T2am concluded, with high confidence, that licensee
2.3.1
                    management controls, programs, and personnel are generally
Overall Summary
                      ready and performing at a level to support safe startup and
The T2am concluded, with high confidence, that licensee
                    operation of the facility. Technical items requiring reso-
management controls, programs, and personnel are generally
                      lution or completion prior to restart are being addressed
ready and performing at a level to support safe startup and
                    and tracked by the licensee.     The Team identified a rela-
operation of the facility. Technical items requiring reso-
                    tively small number of additional items for which licensee
lution or completion prior to restart are being addressed
                    actions or evaluations appear appropriate; during the
and tracked by the licensee.
                      inspection, the licensee made acceptable commitments in
The Team identified a rela-
                    these areas. There are currently no fundamental flaws in
tively small number of additional items for which licensee
                    the licensee's management structure, management perform-
actions or evaluations appear appropriate; during the
                    ance, programs, or program implementation that would
inspection, the licensee made acceptable commitments in
                      inhibit its ability to assure reactor or public safety dur-
these areas.
                    ing plant operation.
There are currently no fundamental flaws in
                    The inspection generally confirmed the results of the SALP
the licensee's management structure, management perform-
                    report for February 1,1987 through May 15, 1988, as well
ance, programs,
                    as validating the general SALP conclusion that performance
or program
                    was improving at the end of the SALP period.         Further,
implementation
                    licensee performance appeared to be consistent or improving
that would
                    in all functional areas examined during the IATI, with the
inhibit its ability to assure reactor or public safety dur-
                    current level of achievement for overall safety performance
ing plant operation.
                    equal to or better than that described in the SALP. For
The inspection generally confirmed the results of the SALP
                    maintenance and radiation protection, the performance is
report for February 1,1987 through May 15, 1988, as well
                    noticeably improved.
as validating the general SALP conclusion that performance
                    The inspection generally confirmed the effectiveness of
was improving at the end of the SALP period.
                    various licensee self-improvement programs and of the
Further,
                    licensee's self-assessment process.     The Team identified
licensee performance appeared to be consistent or improving
                    relatively few issues that had not been previously identi-
in all functional areas examined during the IATI, with the
                    fied by the licensee.       In the interest of continually
current level of achievement for overall safety performance
                    improving its self-assessment process, the licensee should
equal to or better than that described in the SALP.
                    evaluate those cases where NRC either identified new issues
For
                    or assigned a higher sense of prior;ty than identified by
maintenance and radiation protection, the performance is
                    the licensee.
noticeably improved.
                    The inspection confirmed that important organization and
The inspection generally confirmed the effectiveness of
                    attitudinal changes had occurred since 1986. Of particular
various licensee self-improvement programs and of the
                    concern to NRC during the diagnostic inspection in 1986
licensee's self-assessment process.
                    were several f actors inhibiting progress. These included:
The Team identified
  _
relatively few issues that had not been previously identi-
fied by the licensee.
In the interest of continually
improving its self-assessment process, the licensee should
evaluate those cases where NRC either identified new issues
or assigned a higher sense of prior;ty than identified by
the licensee.
The inspection confirmed that important organization and
attitudinal changes had occurred since 1986. Of particular
concern to NRC during the diagnostic inspection in 1986
were several f actors inhibiting progress.
These included:
_


O *
O
                                5
*
          1)   Incomplete staffing, especially of operators and key
5
                mid-level supervisory personnel;
1)
          2)   The prevailing licensee view that improvements to date
Incomplete staffing, especially of operators and key
                had corrected the problems identified;
mid-level supervisory personnel;
          3)   Reluctance by Itcensee management to acknowledge some
2)
                problems identified by NRC; and
The prevailing licensee view that improvements to date
          4)   Dependence on third parties to identify problems
had corrected the problems identified;
                rather than implementing an offective licensee program
3)
                to identify weaknesses.
Reluctance by Itcensee management to acknowledge some
          The Team found these inhibitors to be substantially re-
problems identified by NRC; and
          moved, and noted that a significantly improved nuclear
4)
          safety ethic exists at management levels and is developing
Dependence on third parties to identify problems
          successfully at the worker level.
rather than implementing an offective licensee program
          Based on a review of the management structure, staffing,
to identify weaknesses.
          goals, policies and administrative controls, the Team con-
The Team found these inhibitors to be substantially re-
          cluded that the licensee has an acceptable organization and
moved, and noted that a significantly improved nuclear
          administrative process, with adequate management and tech-
safety ethic exists at management levels and is developing
          nical resources to assure that the plant can be operated in
successfully at the worker level.
          a safe and reliable manner during normal and abnormal con-
Based on a review of the management structure, staffing,
          ditions.   Further, this performance-based inspection pro-
goals, policies and administrative controls, the Team con-
          vided an integrated look at overall management effective-
cluded that the licensee has an acceptable organization and
          ness in ensuring high       ' andards of nuclear safety. The
administrative process, with adequate management and tech-
          overall conclusions o#         is inspection confirm facility
nical resources to assure that the plant can be operated in
          management effectivene       especially its ability to perform
a safe and reliable manner during normal and abnormal con-
          self-assessment functh 3, to improve performance, and to
ditions.
          raise nuclear safety awareness and attitudes throughout the
Further, this performance-based inspection pro-
          organization.
vided an integrated look at overall management effective-
    2.3.2 Summary of Results by Functional Area
ness in ensuring high
          Within each functional area, conclusions were reached
' andards of nuclear safety.
          including the identification of various strengths and weak-
The
          nesses. Those are summarized below. The basis for these
overall conclusions o#
          items, as well as the many significant observations made by
is inspection confirm facility
          the Team, are explained in Section 3 of this report.
management effectivene
          2.3.2.1   Operations
especially its ability to perform
                    Strengths
self-assessment functh
                    --
to improve performance, and to
                            Experienced and knowledgeable senior licen-
3,
                            sed operators
raise nuclear safety awareness and attitudes throughout the
organization.
2.3.2
Summary of Results by Functional Area
Within each functional
area,
conclusions were reached
including the identification of various strengths and weak-
nesses. Those are summarized below.
The basis for these
items, as well as the many significant observations made by
the Team, are explained in Section 3 of this report.
2.3.2.1
Operations
Strengths
Experienced and knowledgeable senior licen-
--
sed operators


,
,
  O e
O
                        6
e
              --
6
                    Effective shift turnover
Effective shift turnover
              --
--
                    Excellent plant housekeeping
Excellent plant housekeeping
              Weakness
--
              --
Weakness
                    Lauk of thoroughness and attention to detail
Lauk of thoroughness and attention to detail
                    in validation and training of Emergency
--
                    Operating satellite procedures
in validation and training of Emergency
      2.3.2.2 Fire Protection
Operating satellite procedures
              Strengths
2.3.2.2
              --
Fire Protection
                    Effective program staffing and supervision
Strengths
              --
Effective program staffing and supervision
                    Effective prioritization, control, and
--
                    tracking of fire protection equipment
Effective
                    maintenance
prioritization,
              Weaknesses
control,
              None
and
      2.3.2.3 Maintenance
--
              Strengths
tracking
              --
of
                    Good organization and structure
fire
              --
protection
                    Thorough program procedures
equipment
              --
maintenance
                    Clear maintenance section internal communi-
Weaknesses
                    cations and interactions
None
              --
2.3.2.3
                    Good control and support of field activities
Maintenance
              Weaknesses
Strengths
  .
Good organization and structure
              --
--
                    Examples of poor implementation of planning
Thorough program procedures
                    for post-work testing
--
              --
Clear maintenance section internal communi-
                    Poorly controlled storage of Q-listed items
--
                    at   two locations   outside the warehouse
cations and interactions
Good control and support of field activities
--
Weaknesses
Examples of poor implementation of planning
--
.
for post-work testing
Poorly controlled storage of Q-listed items
--
at
two
locations
outside
the warehouse


                                                                    _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
  . .
.
                          7
.
      2.3.2.4 Radiological Controls
7
                Strengths
2.3.2.4
                --
Radiological Controls
                      Effective    use of   a maintenance   health
Strengths
                      physics (HP) advisor
Effective
                --
use
                    A well-organized training program
of
              Weaknesses
a
                --
maintenance
                      Examples of a lack of continuity and pro-
health
                      ficiency in certain highly specialized jobs
--
                    because   of   frequent technician   rotation
physics (HP) advisor
                --
A well-organized training program
                      Indications of weak vertical communications
--
                    within the HP group
Weaknesses
      2.3.2.5 Surveillance
Examples of a lack of continuity and pro-
                Strength
--
                      _
ficiency in certain highly specialized jobs
              --
because
                    Management commitment to improve an already
of
                    satisfactory program
frequent
              Weakness
technician
              --
rotation
                    Incomplete resolution of proper frequency
Indications of weak vertical communications
                    and scheduling of once per-refueling outage
--
                    tests
within the HP group
      2.3.2.6 Security
2.3.2.5
              Strength
Surveillance
              --
Strength
                    Overall management attention
_
              Weaknesses
Management commitment to improve an already
  .           None
--
      2.3.2.7 Training                                                         .
satisfactory program
              Strengths
Weakness
              --
Incomplete resolution of proper frequency
                    Excellent management support for operator
--
                    training programs
and scheduling of once per-refueling outage
tests
2.3.2.6
Security
Strength
Overall management attention
--
Weaknesses
None
.
2.3.2.7
Training
.
Strengths
Excellent management support for operator
--
training programs
-
-


,-
,-
  . .
.
                          8
.
                --
8
                      Strong relations between the plant opera-
Strong relations between the plant opera-
                      tions and training departments
--
              Weakness
tions and training departments
                --
Weakness
                      Lack of a defined process to assure timely
Lack of a defined process to assure timely
                      identification and implementation of train-
--
                      ing needs resulting from newly approved or
identification and implementation of train-
                      revised procedures
ing needs resulting from newly approved or
      2.3.2.8 Engineering Support
revised procedures
                --
2.3.2.8
                    Not directly reviewed. No specific strengths
Engineering Support
                    or weaknesses identified
Not directly reviewed. No specific strengths
      2.3.2.9 Safety Assessment / Quality Verification
--
              Strengths
or weaknesses identified
              --
2.3.2.9
                    Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee
Safety Assessment / Quality Verification
                    (NSRAC) composition, plant tour program,
Strengths
                    frequency and location of meetings, open
Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee
                    forum, and focus of reviews
--
              --
(NSRAC) composition,
                    Attitude and performance toward identifying
plant tour program,
                    problems
frequency and location of meetings, open
              --
forum, and focus of reviews
                    Effective, meaningful communications between
Attitude and performance toward identifying
                    the Quality Assurance and plant Operations
--
                    departments
problems
              Weaknesses
Effective, meaningful communications between
              --
--
                    Operations Review Committee does not perform
the Quality Assurance and plant Operations
                    an effective independent group review of
departments
                    operations     and   Technical Specification
Weaknesses
                    violations
Operations Review Committee does not perform
              --
--
                    Multiplicity of corrective action programs
an effective independent group review of
                    without centralized tracking
operations
              --
and
                    Poor tracking of Potential Condition Adverse
Technical
                    to Quality (pCAQ) reports
Specification
violations
Multiplicity of corrective action programs
--
without centralized tracking
Poor tracking of Potential Condition Adverse
--
to Quality (pCAQ) reports


                _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  ,   .
,
                                                        9
.
                                  2.3.2.10 Management Oversight
9
                                              Strengths
2.3.2.10 Management Oversight
                                              --
Strengths
                                                  Well-defined organization,       incorporating
Well-defined
                                                  appropriate span-of-control   and including
organization,
                                                  highly qualifted, experienced managers in
incorporating
                                                  key positions
--
                                              --
appropriate span-of-control
                                                  Well-defined and well-conceived corporate
and including
                                                  goals
highly qualifted, experienced managers in
                                              Weaknesses
key positions
                                              None
Well-defined and well-conceived corporate
        2.4 Licensee Commitments
--
              During the IAT inspection, the licensee made certain commitments to
goals
              the inspection feam. These commitments relate to licensee corrective
Weaknesses
              or enhancer.ent actions planned in response to Team findtegs or con-
None
              cerns.             These commitments, summarized below, are discussed in more
2.4 Licensee Commitments
              detail in subsequent sections of this report, shown in parentheses.
During the IAT inspection, the licensee made certain commitments to
              Commitments were confirmed during the exit interview. The status of
the inspection feam. These commitments relate to licensee corrective
              these issues will be reviewed by the NRC prior to any restart of the
or enhancer.ent actions planned in response to Team findtegs or con-
              plant (83-21-01).
cerns.
              2.4.1               Procedure Validation and Training (Section 3.2.4)
These commitments, summarized below, are discussed in more
                                  isy restart, the licensee will confirm effective implementa-
detail in subsequent sections of this report, shown in parentheses.
                                  tion of all of f-normal and E0P satellite procedures that
Commitments were confirmed during the exit interview. The status of
                                  have been substantively revised during this outage.
these issues will be reviewed by the NRC prior to any restart of the
              2.4.2               Identifying Procedure Changes Requiring Training (Section
plant (83-21-01).
                                  3.7.2.1)
2.4.1
                                  Before restart, the licensee will implement a process to
Procedure Validation and Training (Section 3.2.4)
l                                 allow more timely identification of new procedures and
isy restart, the licensee will confirm effective implementa-
tion of all of f-normal and E0P satellite procedures that
have been substantively revised during this outage.
2.4.2
Identifying Procedure Changes Requiring Training (Section
3.7.2.1)
Before restart, the licensee will implement a process to
l
allow more timely identification of new procedures and
l
l
                                  procedure changes which require training.
procedure changes which require training.
    .
.
              2.4.3               Temporary Modifications (Section 3.2.5)
2.4.3
                                  By restart, the licensee will either prepare a justifica-
Temporary Modifications (Section 3.2.5)
                                  tion for operation for each active temporary modification
By restart, the licensee will either prepare a justifica-
                                  or apply the temporary modification extension request
tion for operation for each active temporary modification
                                  process to all temporary modifications, including those
or apply the temporary modification extension request
                                  with outstanding engineering seevice requests.
process to all temporary modifications, including those
with outstanding engineering seevice requests.


O 8
O
                                  10
8
    2.4.4 Operations Review Committee (ORC) (Section 3.10.3)
10
            Prior to restart, in order to strengthen its operational
2.4.4
            focus, the ORC will begin to: (1) review plant incident
Operations Review Committee (ORC) (Section 3.10.3)
            critiquas; (2) review licensee event reports before their
Prior to restart, in order to strengthen its operational
            issuance to NRC; (3) review failure and malfunction reports
focus, the ORC will begin to:
            on a regular basis; and, (4) provide for a monthly presen-
(1) review plant incident
            tation and discussion of plant operations as a specific
critiquas; (2) review licensee event reports before their
            agenda item.
issuance to NRC; (3) review failure and malfunction reports
    2.4.5 Maintenance
on a regular basis; and, (4) provide for a monthly presen-
            --
tation and discussion of plant operations as a specific
                  Before restart, the licensee will re-evaluate all
agenda item.
                  priority 3 maintenance requests to ensure that they
2.4.5
                  have   been properly   scheduled.   (Section 3.3.2.4)
Maintenance
            --
Before restart, the licensee will re-evaluate all
                  The licensee will complete training addressing the
--
                  revised post-work testing program by September 9, 1988. '
priority 3 maintenance requests to ensure that they
                  (Section 3.3.2.6)
have
          --
been
                  The licensee will resolve the inability to align
properly
                  valves in the Torus Water Makeup Line in accordance
scheduled.
                  with current operating procedures and drawings prior
(Section
                  to restart.   (Section 3.3.2.4)
3.3.2.4)
          --
The licensee will complete training addressing the
                  The licensee will issue a procedure to provide appro-
--
                  priate controls for the "Q" oil storage facility by
revised post-work testing program by September 9, 1988.
                  September 7, 1988, and perform an evaluation of the
'
                  possible addition of "non-Q" oil to "Q" equipment and
(Section 3.3.2.6)
                  its potential effect.   (Section 3.3.2.3)
The licensee will resolve the inability to align
          --
--
                  The licensee will complete, before restart, the dis-
valves in the Torus Water Makeup Line in accordance
                  position of a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality
with current operating procedures and drawings prior
                  (PCAQ) identifying the need for a review of Commercial
to restart.
                  Quality Item procurement documents for consistency
(Section 3.3.2.4)
                  with approved engineering specific 3tions.     (Section
The licensee will issue a procedure to provide appro-
                  3.3.2.3)
--
    2.4.6 Surveillance
priate controls for the
.
"Q"
          --
oil storage facility by
                  Before restart, the licensee will review and evaluate
September 7, 1988, and perform an evaluation of the
                  the once per-refueling-outage surveillance tests to
possible addition of "non-Q" oil to
                  determine if they should be repeated to enhance the
"Q" equipment and
                  assurance of system operability and document the basis
its potential effect.
                  for its decision.   (Section 3.4.2.1)
(Section 3.3.2.3)
          --    Before restart, the licensee will provide the tech-
The licensee will complete, before restart, the dis-
                  nical basis for the current test frequency of the
--
                  Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System logic
position of a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality
                  System Functional Test (LSFT) on the initiation logic.
(PCAQ) identifying the need for a review of Commercial
                  (Section 3.4.2.2)
Quality Item procurement documents for consistency
with approved engineering specific 3tions.
(Section
3.3.2.3)
2.4.6
Surveillance
.
Before restart, the licensee will review and evaluate
--
the once per-refueling-outage surveillance tests to
determine if they should be repeated to enhance the
assurance of system operability and document the basis
for its decision.
(Section 3.4.2.1)
Before restart, the licensee will provide the tech-
--
nical basis for the current test frequency of the
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System logic
System Functional Test (LSFT) on the initiation logic.
(Section 3.4.2.2)


    . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
  e                 0
e
                                                    11
0
                          2.4.7   Formalizing Personnel Qualification Reviews
11
                                The licensee will verify before restart the qualifications
2.4.7
                                of all personnel within the organization required to meet
Formalizing Personnel Qualification Reviews
                                ANSI 18.1-1971; and, prior to completion of the power       ,
The licensee will verify before restart the qualifications
                                ascension program, will have a formalized process in place
of all personnel within the organization required to meet
                                to ensure future auditability. (Section 3.1.4)
ANSI 18.1-1971; and, prior to completion of the power
                          2.4.8 Mission, Organization and Policy (MOP) Manual
,
                                The licensee will issue MOP policy instructions prior to
ascension program, will have a formalized process in place
                                restart and the organizational position descriptiens prior
to ensure future auditability.
                                to completion of power ascension. (Section 3.1.5)           ,
(Section 3.1.4)
                          2.4.9 Familiarizing Workers with Expected Radiological Conditions
2.4.8
                                Before restart, the licensee will provide training and
Mission, Organization and Policy (MOP) Manual
                                briefings to the appropriate plant staff regarding expected
The licensee will issue MOP policy instructions prior to
                                radiological conditions resulting from plant operation and
restart and the organizational position descriptiens prior
                                hydrogen addition. (Section 3.5.2.14)
to completion of power ascension.
                          2.4.10 Control Room Human Factors
(Section 3.1.5)
                                The licensee will evaluate control room human factors dur-
,
                                ing the power ascension program and include an update
2.4.9
                                regarding the schedule and scope of "Paint, Label and Tape" :
Familiarizing Workers with Expected Radiological Conditions
                                items in their report to the NRC at the completion of the   l
Before restart, the licensee will provide training and
                                Power Ascension Program.   (Section 3.9.2)                 ;
briefings to the appropriate plant staff regarding expected
radiological conditions resulting from plant operation and
hydrogen addition.
(Section 3.5.2.14)
2.4.10
Control Room Human Factors
The licensee will evaluate control room human factors dur-
ing the power ascension program and include an update
regarding the schedule and scope of "Paint, Label and Tape"
:
items in their report to the NRC at the completion of the
l
Power Ascension Program.
(Section 3.9.2)
;
1
1
i
i
                                                                                            i
i
                                                                                            ,
,
                                                                                            1
1
                                                                                            !
!
.
-.-


      _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _                                                   . _ _ _ _
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
    .                                             .
. _ _ _ _
                                                                                                                                      12                                   -
.
                                                                3.0 DETAIL 3 0F INSPECTION
.
                                                                                    The following sections contain the scope of inspection, the detailed                   i
12
                                                                                    findings, and the conclusions for each functional area the Team assessed.
-
                                                                                    3.1 Management Oversight
3.0 DETAIL 3 0F INSPECTION
                                                                                          3.1.1                Scope of Review
The following sections contain the scope of inspection, the detailed
                                                                                                              The IATI assessed the organizational structure currently in  :
                                                                                                              place at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The      :
                                                                                                              assessment also included the administrative processes in    :
                                                                                                                                                                          '
                                                                                                              place to control and coordinate the activities and actions
                                                                                                              affecting safe and reliable operation of the PNPS. Other
;                                                                                                            areas inspected included the adequacy of staffing, qualifi-
                                                                                                              cations of personnel, and mechanisms to enhance and promote
                                                                                                              stability in the organization's technical and managerial
                                                                                                              staff.
                                                                                                              Several management meettags were observed by Team members
                                                                                                              to assess the interactions of managers and the effective-
                                                                                                              ness of the policies and procedures being implemented.
                                                                                                              Continual observations were made and shared by Team members
                                                                                                              to augment findings and conclusions in the effectiveness of
.                                                                                                            the organization, management controls, and communications
I                                                                                                            throughout the functional areas.    The Team members inter- '
'
                                                                                                              viewed a cross-section of personnel at all levels of the
                                                                                                            organization to determine if the overall attitude towerd
                                                                                                            performance of safety-related activities has improved.
                                                                                                            These obrervations and interviews also provided the Team
                                                                                                            with insight into the worker perception of management
                                                                                                            policies,    involvement, effectiveness and its resulting
j                                                                                                            impact on safety,
i
i
                                                                                        3.1.2               Organization
findings, and the conclusions for each functional area the Team assessed.
,                                                                                                            The NRC staff noted in the most recent SALP report No.
3.1 Management Oversight
'
3.1.1
                                                                                                            50-293/87-99     for February 1, 1987 through May 15, 1983,
Scope of Review
                                                                                                            that an organizational transition had taken place.       The
The IATI assessed the organizational structure currently in
:
place at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS).
The
:
assessment also included the administrative processes in
:
place to control and coordinate the activities and actions
'
affecting safe and reliable operation of the PNPS. Other
;
areas inspected included the adequacy of staffing, qualifi-
cations of personnel, and mechanisms to enhance and promote
stability in the organization's technical and managerial
staff.
Several management meettags were observed by Team members
to assess the interactions of managers and the effective-
ness of the policies and procedures being implemented.
Continual observations were made and shared by Team members
to augment findings and conclusions in the effectiveness of
.
the organization, management controls, and communications
I
throughout the functional areas.
The Team members inter-
'
viewed a cross-section of personnel at all levels of the
'
organization to determine if the overall attitude towerd
performance of safety-related activities has
improved.
These obrervations and interviews also provided the Team
with insight into the worker perception of management
policies,
involvement, effectiveness and its resulting
impact on safety,
j
i
3.1.2
Organization
The NRC staff noted in the most recent SALP report No.
,
50-293/87-99
for February 1, 1987 through May 15, 1983,
'
that an organizational transition had taken place.
The
report also noted tnat several temporary changes, including
i
i
  .
.
                                                                                                            report also noted tnat several temporary changes, including
numerous changes in personnel, had been made to strengthen
                                                                                                            numerous changes in personnel, had been made to strengthen
planning, control and performance at PNpS. Many of these
                                                                                                            planning, control and performance at PNpS. Many of these       '
'
                                                                                                            temporary changes were incorporated into a permanent reor-
temporary changes were incorporated into a permanent reor-
                                                                                                            ganization in February 1988. The licensee continued to re-
ganization in February 1988. The licensee continued to re-
                                                                                                            fine the new organziation and control process through
fine the new organziation and control
!
process through
t
!
,
t
                                            , , _ _ - , . . - - - - _ . _ - - - . ,         . - .           - . - - ,   n-       , - - , ,
,
, , _ _ - , . . - - - - _ . _ - - - . ,
- .
- . - - ,
n-
, - - , ,
.


                                                                  _ _ ____________ -.                   _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ ____________ -.
      ,   .
_ _ _ _ _ _
              ,
,
        ,
.
                                                    13
,
,
13
.
.
                                July 1988, notified NRC of the reorganization, and subse-
July 1988, notified NRC of the reorganization, and subse-
                                quently requested an amendment in August 1988 to the admin-
quently requested an amendment in August 1988 to the admin-
                                istrative section of its Technical Specifications (TS) to
istrative section of its Technical Specifications (TS) to
                                reflect the new organization. The notification and request
reflect the new organization. The notification and request
                                were in accordance with the PNPS TS, Section 6.2.C.
were
in accordance with the PNPS TS, Section
6.2.C.
"Changes to the Organization," which allows organizational
a
a
                                "Changes to the Organization," which allows organizational
changes to be implemented without prior NRC approval, pro-
"
"
                                changes to be implemented without prior NRC approval, pro-
vided notification is made and a subsequent license amend-
                                vided notification is made and a subsequent license amend-
ment request is submitted for NRC review and approval.
                                ment request is submitted for NRC review and approval.
I
I
he organization assessed during this inspection is the
                                  he organization assessed during this inspection is the
j
j                               subject of the licensee's amendment request dated
subject
                                August 1, 1988, and approved by the Senior Vice President -
of
s                               Nuclear (SVP-N) on August 4, 1988.                   The discussion that
the
,                              follows does not describe in complete detail the entire
licensee's
i                             organization, focusing instead on that portion that affects
amendment
j                               the functional areas being evaluated during this inspection
request
dated
August 1, 1988, and approved by the Senior Vice President -
s
Nuclear (SVP-N) on August 4, 1988.
The discussion that
follows does not describe in complete detail the entire
,
i
organization, focusing instead on that portion that affects
j
the functional areas being evaluated during this inspection
(See Figure 1).
The results of this inspection will be
,
,
                                (See Figure 1). The results of this inspection will be
considered in NRC's review of the licensee's amendment
'
'
request.
4
4
                                considered in NRC's review of the licensee's amendment
                                request.
I
I
;                            The Team noted that the licensee has incorporated a balance
The Team noted that the licensee has incorporated a balance
]                             between the number of management levels from the first-line
;
,                              supervisors to the SVP-N and the span of control for each
]
i                             functional unit. The SVP-N has the Station Director, Vice
between the number of management levels from the first-line
l                             President - Nuclear Engineering (VP-NE), Emergency Pre-
supervisors to the SVP-N and the span of control for each
,
i
functional unit. The SVP-N has the Station Director, Vice
l
President
Nuclear Engineering (VP-NE), Emergency Pre-
-
paredness Department manager and Quality Assurance Depart-
t
t
                              paredness Department manager and Quality Assurance Depart-
}
}                              mert manager reporting directly to him. The two department
mert manager reporting directly to him. The two department
;                             managers report directly to the SVP-N to assure that inde-
;
                              pendence and appropriate management attention are provided
managers report directly to the SVP-N to assure that inde-
                              based on their functional requirements and responsibilities.
pendence and appropriate management attention are provided
                              The committee charged with offsite satety, the Nuclear
based on their functional requirements and responsibilities.
i                             Safety Review and Audit Committee (NSRAC), reports directly
The committee charged with offsite satety, the Nuclear
}                             to the SVP-N. The committee for onsite safety review, the
i
!                             Operations Review Committee (ORC), reports directly to the
Safety Review and Audit Committee (NSRAC), reports directly
:                             Station Director. The reporting of the of fsite committee
}
to the SVP-N. The committee for onsite safety review, the
!
Operations Review Committee (ORC), reports directly to the
:
Station Director.
The reporting of the of fsite committee
!
!
to the SVP-N and the onsite committee to the Station
Director are appropriate based on their responsibilities.
'
'
                              to the SVP-N and the onsite committee to the Station
Details on these standirg committees, their functional
                              Director are appropriate based on their responsibilities.
requirements, responsibilities and accountabilities, are
                              Details on these standirg committees, their functional
contained in Section 3.10 of this report.
                              requirements, responsibilities and accountabilities, are
,
,                              contained in Section 3.10 of this report.
!
!.
The VP-NE has two department-level managers reporting
;
Jirectly to him.
These departments are the Nuclear Engi-
i
neering Department av the Manatement Services Department
i
both of which are located offsite.
The Station Director
1
has four department-level managers reporting directly to
l
him:
the Plant Support Department, Plant Manager (Opera-
tions), Planning and Outage Department, and the Nuclear
1
!
!
!.                            The VP-NE has two department-level managers reporting
Training Department.
;                              Jirectly to him.    These departments are the Nuclear Engi-
i                              neering Department av the Manatement Services Department
i                              both of which are located offsite. The Station Director
1                              has four department-level managers reporting directly to
l                              him:    the Plant Support Department, Plant Manager (Opera-
1
1
                              tions), Planning and Outage Department, and the Nuclear
.,
!                              Training Department.
,.
1
- , _ . - - , - -
  .,  ,.  - , _ . - - , - -                                                                                       r
r


      _ - _ . . _ _                   _.       __     _ _ _ _ _                               _ _ _ _             .-     _.
_ - _ . . _ _
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                                                                                            Chairsdn, Board of Directcr5
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                                                                                                              and CEO
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                                                                                                Senior Vice President -
q
                                                                                                                Nuclear
.
    1
.
                                                                                                                                14uclear Safety Review and Audit Coasnittee   I
I
                                                  Director - Spec 141 Projects
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                                                                                                                                                                                  W
Chairsdn, Board of Directcr5
                                                                                                                                                                                  4
and CEO
                                                                                                                                                l
Senior Vice President -
                                    Wice President -                                             Quality Assurance               Erergency Planning         Station Direc ar
Nuclear
                                    rauclear Engineering                                         Department flanager             Departinent m nager
1
i                                                                                                                 I                                     :               1
Director - Spec 141 Projects
,
14uclear Safety Review and Audit Coasnittee
                                    Nuclear Engineering            14uclear Management            Operations fteview              Plant Department              Plannirs &
I
l                                                                                                        Consmittee              (Plant N nager)                Outage
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Wice President -
Quality Assurance
Erergency Planning
Station Direc ar
rauclear Engineering
Department flanager
Departinent m nager
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I
:
1
,
,
                                    Department stanager             Services Department
l
                                                                                                                                                                  Department
Nuclear Engineering
  '
14uclear Management
                                                                            Manager                                                     .
Operations fteview
Plant Department
Plannirs &
Department stanager
Services Department
Consmittee
(Plant N nager)
Outage
Department
,
'
Manager
.
tianager
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I
                                                                                                                                                                  tianager
,
,
                                                                                                                                                            l
l
,
'
'                                                                                                  Plant Support                                           i  Wuclear Training
Plant Support
                                                                                                    Departs,aent
Wuclear Training
                                                                                                                          -                                J Department
,
-l                                                                                                                                                               "*"*9'#
i
                                          9"                                                      Manager
J Department
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Departs,aent
-
"*"*9'#
.
.
l                                                                                                                                  Plant Operations         '
9"
1
Manager
                                                                                                                                  Sc tion Manager
Plant Operations
l
'
'
                                                                              Figure 1.   BOST0i1 E0150ri C0ftPAf4Y - PILGRIF. ORGAf41ZAT104
1
                                                                                                                                                                                        l-
Sc tion Manager
                    - - _ ~ , . - -                               .     .-.           ,.             -   .-       -   .- -       _   , -
Figure 1.
BOST0i1 E0150ri C0ftPAf4Y - PILGRIF. ORGAf41ZAT104
'
l-
- - _ ~ , . - -
.
.-.
,.
-
.-
-
.- -
_
, -


    _.
_.
, n
,
                                  15
n
              The senior manager of the functional areas is at the
15
              department level, which is then subdivided into section
The senior manager of the functional areas is at the
              levels and division levels. The first-line supervisors, in
department level, which is then subdivided into section
              some cases senior supervisors, report to the division
levels and division levels. The first-line supervisors, in
            managers.
some cases senior supervisors, report to the division
            The station organization, now under a Station Director who
managers.
            has no direct corporate (i.e., off-site) responsibilities,
The station organization, now under a Station Director who
              represents a substantial change frcm previous organiza-
has no direct corporate (i.e., off-site) responsibilities,
            tions. The current structure was instituted to strengthen
represents a substantial change frcm previous organiza-
            management attention to plant activities. The narrowing of
tions.
            the span of direct control and responsibility of the Plant
The current structure was instituted to strengthen
            Manager allows a more focused management and control of
management attention to plant activities. The narrowing of
            operational activities, which should result in the enhance-
the span of direct control and responsibility of the Plant
            ment of safe and reliable operation.         The   martments
Manager allows a more focused management and control of
            reportir.g to the VP-NE have been restructured r ., 1 more
operational activities, which should result in the enhance-
            even distribution of responsibilities.
ment of safe and reliable operation.
            The Team concluded that the current organizational struc-
The
            ture provides for an appropriate distribution (span) of
martments
            responsibilities and accountabilities for the activities
reportir.g to the VP-NE have been restructured r ., 1 more
            being performed by the functional units within it.         The
even distribution of responsibilities.
            depth (number) of managers in the functional areas should
The Team concluded that the current organizational struc-
            contribute to improved performance and organizational
ture provides for an appropriate distribution (span) of
            stability by providing managers with increased opportun-
responsibilities and accountabilities for the activities
            ities to participate in professio.tal technical and manage-
being performed by the functional units within it.
            ment development programs and by increasing the framework
The
            for career growth.
depth (number) of managers in the functional areas should
            The Team also concluded that the redistribution of func-
contribute
            tional responsibilities and increased depth in management
to
            provides the framework necessary to enhance stability and
improved performance and organizational
            support safe and reliable operation at PNPS. The evidence
stability by providing managers with increased opportun-
            for these changes thus far has been management's effective-
ities to participate in professio.tal technical and manage-
            ness in creating a much-improved nuclear safety ethic and
ment development programs and by increasing the framework
            in improving the functional areas described in the subse-
for career growth.
            quent sections of this report.
The Team also concluded that the redistribution of func-
      3.1.3 Staffing
tional responsibilities and increased depth in management
            The most recent SALP Report (No. 50-293/87-99) indicated
provides the framework necessary to enhance stability and
            that the allocated staffing levels were significantly         ,
support safe and reliable operation at PNPS.
            higher than in the past.   The Nuclear Organization is cur-   '
The evidence
            rently authorized a staffing level of 985. Approximately
for these changes thus far has been management's effective-
            90'. of the autho-ized positions are filled, of which 86*4
ness in creating a much-improved nuclear safety ethic and
            are licensee personnel; the remaining 4*4 cc.mprise contract   ,
in improving the functional areas described in the subse-
            personnel. Licensee personnel fill all Key positions from     '
quent sections of this report.
            Section Managers and above, with less than       15*. of the
3.1.3
            remaining managers and first-line supervisor positions
Staffing
            filled by contractors or licensee personnel in acting         ,
The most recent SALP Report (No. 50-293/87-99) indicated
            capacities.
that the allocated staffing levels were significantly
                                                                            I
higher than in the past.
The Nuclear Organization is cur-
,'
rently authorized a staffing level of 985. Approximately
90'. of the autho-ized positions are filled, of which 86*4
are licensee personnel; the remaining 4*4 cc.mprise contract
,
personnel. Licensee personnel fill all Key positions from
'
Section Managers and above, with less than
15*. of the
remaining managers and first-line supervisor positions
filled by contractors or licensee personnel in acting
,
capacities.
I
_ - -__ - - -- -_.


                                          _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____                 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____
, *
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                              16
______ _
          Increased staffing in all levels of the Radiologica', and
,
          Maintenance Sections are examples of how the licensee has
*
          provided the necessary management attention and resources
16
          to areas that need them. The increased staffing, specif-
Increased staffing in all levels of the Radiologica', and
          ically at the craf t and technician level, appears f.uffic-
Maintenance Sections are examples of how the licensee has
          ient to allow for a planned and controlled preventiv, main-
provided the necessary management attention and resources
          tenance program that should result in overall saf2ty en-
to areas that need them.
          hancement.   The increased staffing levels also allow for
The increased staffing, specif-
          training on a routine schedule.
ically at the craf t and technician level, appears f.uffic-
          The Team concluded that the authorized staffing has been
ient to allow for a planned and controlled preventiv, main-
          filled to a level acceptable for the licensee to perform
tenance program that should result in overall saf2ty en-
          all the necessary functions for all plant canditions,
hancement.
          including operations. This finding is reinforced by the
The increased staffing levels also allow for
          evidence of improvements in the functional areas, described
training on a routine schedule.
          in the subsequent portions of this report.
The Team concluded that the authorized staffing has been
    3.1.4 Qualifications
filled to a level acceptable for the licensee to perform
          The PNPS TS, Sectirn 6.4, "Facility Staff Qualifications,"
all the necessary functions for all
          requires that PNPS personnel meet tSe requirements of the
plant canditions,
          American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N18.1-1971,
including operations.
          "Selection and Training of Personiel for Nuclear Power
This finding is reinforced by the
          Plants." The TS also requires that the Radiation Protec-
evidence of improvements in the functional areas, described
          tion Manager shall meet or exceed the qualifications of
in the subsequent portions of this report.
          Regulatory Guide 1.8, "Quali fica tion and Training for
3.1.4
          Personnel at Nuclear Power P1'.nts," September 1975.
Qualifications
          The Team audited resumes and position descriptions of key
The PNPS TS, Sectirn 6.4, "Facility Staff Qualifications,"
          managers and other selec.ed pe c.onnel throughout the organ-
requires that PNPS personnel meet tSe requirements of the
          ization. Their educational ana experience backgrounds were
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N18.1-1971,
          compared with the requiremerts delineated in ANSI N18.1-
"Selection and Training of Personiel for Nuclear Power
          1971, with special attention on t.he management experience
Plants."
          of key personnel. No deficiencief, were identified relating
The TS also requires that the Radiation Protec-
          to the qualification requirements of the ANSI standard.
tion Manager shall meet or exceed the qualifications of
          More significantly, the Team noted the staffing of key
Regulatory Guide
          management positions with persornel having extensive and
1.8,
          successful management experience.
"Quali fica tion and Training for
          During its review, the Team fouid that some resumes needed
Personnel at Nuclear Power P1'.nts," September 1975.
          updating, and that no formal, detailed instructions or
The Team audited resumes and position descriptions of key
          guidance in establishing qualifications were available. The
managers and other selec.ed pe c.onnel throughout the organ-
          Team reviewed a Quality Assurance Department (QAD) audit
ization. Their educational ana experience backgrounds were
          report of the organization's administrative controls which
compared with the requiremerts delineated in ANSI N18.1-
          was conducted June 22 througn July 22, 1988 and which
1971, with special attention on t.he management experience
          resulted in similar findings.                                   The report, Audit Report
of key personnel. No deficiencief, were identified relating
          8S-25, "Administrative Controls," dated August 18, 1938,
to the qualification requirements of the ANSI standard.
More significantly, the Team noted the staffing of key
management positions with persornel having extensive and
successful management experience.
During its review, the Team fouid that some resumes needed
updating, and that no formal, detailed instructions or
guidance in establishing qualifications were available. The
Team reviewed a Quality Assurance Department (QAD) audit
report of the organization's administrative controls which
was conducted June 22 througn July 22, 1988 and which
resulted in similar findings.
The report, Audit Report
8S-25, "Administrative Controls," dated August 18, 1938,


                                                                    :
:
,   e
,
                                                                    .
e
                            17
.
        indicated that personnel qualifications were audited by the
17
        QA0 to determine compliance with the ANSI N18.1 require-
indicated that personnel qualifications were audited by the
        ments for the organizational positions held.     No defici-
QA0 to determine compliance with the ANSI N18.1 require-
        encies were identified as the result of the QA0 audit. The
ments for the organizational positions held.
        report did, howeser, provide a recommendation consistent
No defici-
        with the NRC inspector's finding. Specifically, Reccmmen-
encies were identified as the result of the QA0 audit.
        dation No. 88-25-03, notes the need to update resumes,
The
        develop guidelines and procedures for documenting qualifi-
report did, howeser, provide a recommendation consistent
        cation status, and maintain retrievable files.              .
with the NRC inspector's finding. Specifically, Reccmmen-
        The licensee has committed to the Team to reverify the
dation No. 88-25-03, notes the need to update resumes,
      .
develop guidelines and procedures for documenting qualifi-
        qualifications of all personnel within the. organization to
.
        confirm they comply with ANSI N18.1-1971 prior to restart
cation status, and maintain retrievable files.
        and to have a process in place prior to completion of the
The licensee has committed to the Team to reverify the
        Power Ascension Program to ensure future auditability of
qualifications of all personnel within the. organization to
        personnel qualifications.
.
        Within the scope of the NRC review, the Team deter-
confirm they comply with ANSI N18.1-1971 prior to restart
        mined that the licensee's personnel are generally well
and to have a process in place prior to completion of the
        qualified for the positions hsid within the organization.
Power Ascension Program to ensure future auditability of
        The licansee's commitment to reverification of all per-
personnel qualifications.
        tonnel qualifications prio: to restart will provide addi-
Within the scope of the NRC review, the Team deter-
        tional assurance of full compliance relating to personnel
mined that the licensee's personnel are generally well
        qualifications.
qualified for the positions hsid within the organization.
        The results of the IATI effort in assessing the adequacy of
The licansee's commitment to reverification of all per-
        the staffing and qualifications of the PNPS organization is
tonnel qualifications prio: to restart will provide addi-
        consistent with the overall facility evaluation in the most
tional assurance of full compliance relating to personnel
        recent SALP report (No. 50-293/87-99). It noted the addi"
qualifications.
        tion of management personnel who lack extensive commercial
The results of the IATI effort in assessing the adequacy of
        nuclear power plant operating experience.       However, as
the staffing and qualifications of the PNPS organization is
        acted above, recent changes have resulted in the addition
consistent with the overall facility evaluation in the most
        of personnel in key management positions with extensive and
recent SALP report (No. 50-293/87-99).
        successful management experience, much of which is in
It noted the addi"
        nuclear areas. Also, many mid-level management positions
tion of management personnel who lack extensive commercial
        are held by individuals who have extensive Pilgrim NPS (or
nuclear power plant operating experience.
        other boiling water reactor) experience.     The Team con-
However, as
        cluded that the combination of commercial nuclear power
acted above, recent changes have resulted in the addition
        plant operating experience in the organization with the
of personnel in key management positions with extensive and
        increased management capebility provides the qualifications
successful management experience, much of which is in
        necessary to support safe and reliable operation at PNPS.
nuclear areas.
        In the event of a restart authorization, licensee safety
Also, many mid-level management positions
        performance will be closely monitored by the NRC during the
are held by individuals who have extensive Pilgrim NPS (or
        Power Ascension Program.
other boiling water reactor) experience.
  _
The Team con-
cluded that the combination of commercial nuclear power
plant operating experience in the organization with the
increased management capebility provides the qualifications
necessary to support safe and reliable operation at PNPS.
In the event of a restart authorization, licensee safety
performance will be closely monitored by the NRC during the
Power Ascension Program.


    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - __ _ _ _ _     . _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - __ _ _ _ _
  ,                               ,
. _ _ _ _
                                                                      18
,
                                    3.1.5       Administrative Policy and Procedures
,
                                                  The licensee has a variety of procedures to provide policy,
18
                                                  control and coordination of organization activities. Cor-
3.1.5
                                                  porate policy is provided in the form of company Bulletins
Administrative Policy and Procedures
                                                  maintained   in a   Boston Edison Company Organizational
The licensee has a variety of procedures to provide policy,
                                                  Manual. The manual includes information about the corpor-
control and coordination of organization activities. Cor-
                                                  ate organization, its policy statements, corporate instruc-
porate policy is provided in the form of company Bulletins
                                                  tions, and committees which affect the entire company,
maintained
                                                  including the Nuclear Organization. The corporate level
in
                                                  policy specifically affecting the Nuclear Organization is
a
                                                  contained in a Mission, Organization and Policy (MOP)
Boston
                                                  manual.
Edison
                                                  The Nuclear Organization Procedures (NOPs) provide guidance
Company Organizational
                                                  for the control and coordination of the Nuclear Organiza-
Manual. The manual includes information about the corpor-
                                                  tion. They include administrative pro edures affecting the
ate organization, its policy statements, corporate instruc-
                                                  entire organization, as well as proceduret affecting func-
tions, and committees which affect the entire company,
                                                  tional portions of the organization.     Each department also
including the Nuclear Organization.
                                                  has procedures in place specifier 11y for its functional
The corporate level
                                                  areas.   The Team reviewed several :0Ps to assure that the
policy specifically affecting the Nuclear Organization is
                                                  guidance provided was current, reflected the organization
contained in a Mission, Organization and Policy (MOP)
                                                  in place, and addressed coordinating activities within the
manual.
                                                  organization.   The Team also reviewed department-level
The Nuclear Organization Procedures (NOPs) provide guidance
                                                  procedures to assure they included the current organiza-
for the control and coordination of the Nuclear Organiza-
                                                  tion, toals, department function, position descriptions,
tion. They include administrative pro edures affecting the
                                                  qualti, cations required, responsibilities, and accounta-
entire organization, as well as proceduret affecting func-
                                                  bilities.
tional portions of the organization.
                                                  The Team concluded that the proceoures are, for the most
Each department also
                                                  part, current.   They adequately identify corporate policy,
has procedures in place specifier 11y for its functional
                                                  organization,   coordination,     functional   requirements,
areas.
i                                                 responsibilities,   accountabilities,   and   qualifications
The Team reviewed several :0Ps to assure that the
                                                  nacessary for the control and coordination of actions
guidance provided was current, reflected the organization
                                                  within the organization.
in place, and addressed coordinating activities within the
                                                  The Mission, Organization and Policy Manual (MOP) is not
organization.
                                                  fully up to date; however, and is currently being revised
The Team also reviewed department-level
procedures to assure they included the current organiza-
tion, toals, department function, position descriptions,
qualti, cations required, responsibilities, and accounta-
bilities.
The Team concluded that the proceoures are, for the most
part, current.
They adequately identify corporate policy,
organization,
coordination,
functional
requirements,
i
responsibilities,
accountabilities,
and
qualifications
nacessary for the control and coordination of actions
within the organization.
The Mission, Organization and Policy Manual (MOP) is not
fully up to date; however, and is currently being revised
to accurately reflect current policy and to include all the
-
-
                                                  to accurately reflect current policy and to include all the
position descriptions within the organization.
                                                  position descriptions within the organization.     The licen-
The licen-
                                                  see has identified additional refin1ments in the organi t a-
see has identified additional refin1ments in the organi a-
                                                  tional position descriptions to assure consistancy and to
t
                                                  provide accurate definitions of responsibilitias necessary
tional position descriptions to assure consistancy and to
                                                  to assure accountability.     The licensee was previously
provide accurate definitions of responsibilitias necessary
                                                  aware of this and has been working to finalize the updates.
to assure accountability.
                                                  The licensee committed to issue the revised MOP which
The licensee was previously
aware of this and has been working to finalize the updates.
The licensee committed to issue the revised MOP which
L
L
v


  a e
a
                                                                              h
e
                                                                              F
h
                                19
F
              includes updated policy prior to restart and to complete
19
            the organizational position description refinements before     ,
includes updated policy prior to restart and to complete
            the end of the Power Ascension Program. This commitment is
the organizational position description refinements before
            acceptable, based on the status of the other procedures
,
            previously discussed which assure adequate administrative
the end of the Power Ascension Program. This commitment is
            controls.
acceptable, based on the status of the other procedures
      3.1.6 Communications and Observations
previously discussed which assure adequate administrative
            Corporate policy for the Nuclear Organization 1.4 the MOP
controls.
            manual includes, among its goals, the nced to strive to
3.1.6
            raise standards of performance, for dedication to protec-
Communications and Observations
            ting the environment and public, and for rigorous adherence
Corporate policy for the Nuclear Organization 1.4 the MOP
            to procedures.     The Team, through its observations and
manual includes, among its goals, the nced to strive to
            interviews, noted a positive change in the attitude toward
raise standards of performance, for dedication to protec-
            nuclear safety throughout PNPS. This change is evident in
ting the environment and public, and for rigorous adherence
            improved performance of safety-related activities.       These
to procedures.
            improvements are indicated in the most recent SALP Report
The Team, through its observations and
            (No. 50-293/87-99), and progress in the other functional
interviews, noted a positive change in the attitude toward
            areas is addressed in this inspection report.         The Team
nuclear safety throughout PNPS.
            also noted during interviews that the corporate goal of
This change is evident in
            adherence to procedures has been conveyed to all levels of
improved performance of safety-related activities.
            the organization.     These c'sservations attest to manage-
These
            ment's ef fectiveness in communicating corporate goals and
improvements are indicated in the most recent SALP Report
            management's oversight in assuring that the goals are being
(No. 50-293/87-99), and progress in the other functional
            pursued.
areas is addressed in this inspection report.
            The Team noted that the licensee established several mech-
The Team
            anisms to assure adequate communications within the organ-
also noted during interviews that the corporate goal of
            ization. Meetings at all levels of the organization are
adherence to procedures has been conveyed to all levels of
            held on a routine basis.     Plant meetings are held every
the organization.
            morning to discuss plant status and to coordinate daily         ,
These c'sservations attest to manage-
            activities. Several of tiase meetings were observed by the
ment's ef fectiveness in communicating corporate goals and
4           Team to assess the interaction of the managers and the
management's oversight in assuring that the goals are being
            resulting effectiveness. The Team concluded that the meet-
pursued.
            ings were effective and that safety-related activities are     ;
The Team noted that the licensee established several mech-
            being planned, scheduled, and prioritized in accordance         '
anisms to assure adequate communications within the organ-
            with their safety significance and plant status. These and
ization.
            other observations by the Team indicate that teamwork at
Meetings at all levels of the organization are
                                                                            *
held on a routine basis.
            the site is evident. There are programs in place, such as
Plant meetings are held every
            the Workforce Information Program (WIP), For Your Informa-
morning to discuss plant status and to coordinate daily
            tion (FYI), and Management Oversight and Assessment Team
,
            (MO&AT) to enhance management involvement, overall communi-
activities. Several of tiase meetings were observed by the
            cations, and management visibility in the plant.
4
Team to assess the interaction of the managers and the
resulting effectiveness. The Team concluded that the meet-
ings were effective and that safety-related activities are
;
being planned, scheduled, and prioritized in accordance
'
with their safety significance and plant status. These and
other observations by the Team indicate that teamwork at
*
the site is evident.
There are programs in place, such as
the Workforce Information Program (WIP), For Your Informa-
tion (FYI), and Management Oversight and Assessment Team
(MO&AT) to enhance management involvement, overall communi-
cations, and management visibility in the plant.
!
!
                                                                            t
l
l
t
f
f
I
I


    ___ _ _ _ _ _         _             __               _ _ _ _ _ _
___ _ _ _ _ _
0 *
_
                                            20
__
                        The licensee has also established a set of performance
_ _ _ _ _ _
                        indicators to track performance issues, restart issues,
0
                        plant condition reports, and activity status.               These per-
*
                        formance indicators are used as a management tool to
20
                        measure the effectiveness and results of established
The licensee has also established a set of performance
                        programs.
indicators to track performance issues, restart issues,
                        The Team concluded, based on its evaluation of programs
plant condition reports, and activity status.
                        in place, that communications throughout the organization
These per-
                        have improved, that teamwork is evident, and that corporate
formance indicators are used as a management tool
                        goals are being conveyed to all levels of the organization.
to
                  3.1.7 Conclusions
measure
                        The Team concluded that the licensee has an acceptable or-
the
                        ganization and administrative process in place with ade-
effectiveness
                        quate management and technical resources to assure that
and
                        pNPS can operate in a safo and reliable manner during
results
                        normal and abnormal conditions.               This conclusion is based
of established
                        on the details discussed above,                 th'e performance-based
programs.
                        inspection in the functional areas covered by the IATI, the
The Team concluded, based on its evaluation of programs
                        overall consistency in the findings of this inspection with
in place, that communications throughout the organization
                        the most recent SALP (No. 50-293/87-99), and the plan for a
have improved, that teamwork is evident, and that corporate
                        structured and controlled power ascension program prior to
goals are being conveyed to all levels of the organization.
                        operation.
3.1.7
                        This performance-bc -d inspection of a wide range of func-
Conclusions
                        tional areas provic.c an integrated look at overall manage-
The Team concluded that the licensee has an acceptable or-
                                            .
ganization and administrative process in place with ade-
                        ment effectiveness in ensuring high standards of nuclear
quate management and technical resources to assure that
                        safety. The overall conclusions of this inspection confirm
pNPS can operate in a safo and reliable manner during
                        f acility management ef fectiveness, especially with respect
normal and abnormal conditions.
                        to management's ability to perform self-assessment func-
This conclusion is based
                        tions,   to make performance improvements, and to raise
on the details discussed above,
                        nuclear safety     awareness and             attitudes   within the
th'e performance-based
                        organization.
inspection in the functional areas covered by the IATI, the
overall consistency in the findings of this inspection with
the most recent SALP (No. 50-293/87-99), and the plan for a
structured and controlled power ascension program prior to
operation.
This performance-bc
-d inspection of a wide range of func-
tional areas provic.c an integrated look at overall manage-
.
ment effectiveness in ensuring high standards of nuclear
safety. The overall conclusions of this inspection confirm
f acility management ef fectiveness, especially with respect
to management's ability to perform self-assessment func-
tions,
to make performance improvements, and to raise
nuclear
safety
awareness
and
attitudes
within
the
organization.


    - _ _ _ __   .. .                     _ _ _ _ _ _                 __       _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _           - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _       .____________ __
- _ _ _ __
          .   .
.. .
                                                                                                          21
_ _ _ _ _ _
                              3.2 Operations
__
                                                      3.2.1   Scope of Reviev
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.____________
__
.
.
21
3.2 Operations
3.2.1
Scope of Reviev
i
i
                                                            The Team evaluated operations by observing how supervisors,
The Team evaluated operations by observing how supervisors,
                                                            operators and staff performed in the control room and
operators and staff performed in the control room and
                                                            throughout the plant. The Team observed plant operations
throughout the plant.
                                                            during backshifts from August 10 through August 13, 1988,
The Team observed plant operations
                                                            and reviewed staffing levels to determine if they were
during backshifts from August 10 through August 13, 1988,
                                                            sufficient to support restart with minimal reliance on
and reviewed staffing levels to determine if they were
                                                            overtime.       The ability to implement recently written E0P
sufficient to support restart with minimal reliance on
                                                            satellite procedures and the quality of thesce procedures
overtime.
                                                            were evaluated through a field walkdown of a procedure.
The ability to implement recently written E0P
                                                            The implementation of administrative controls for opera-
satellite procedures and the quality of thesce procedures
                                                            tions was evaluated through inspections of overtime con-
were evaluated through a field walkdown of a procedure.
                                                            trols, temporary modification controls, operator-required
The implementation of administrative controls for opera-
                                                            reading, logkeeping, tagouts, and operator aids. The line-                                                   .
tions was evaluated through inspections of overtime con-
                                                            up of two safety systems was independently verified by the                                                   !
trols, temporary modification controls, operator-required
                                                            inspectors.       Housekeeping was observed during frequent
reading, logkeeping, tagouts, and operator aids. The line-
                                                            plant tours.
up of two safety systems was independently verified by the
{                                                     3.2.2 Conduct of Operations
.
                                                            The Team observed control reor,. operations en all shifts.
!
                                                            They were conducted in a formal manner, with effective
inspectors.
Housekeeping was observed during frequent
plant tours.
{
3.2.2
Conduct of Operations
The Team observed control reor,. operations en all shifts.
They were conducted in a formal manner, with effective
l
,
,
                                                                                                                                                                          l
communications between
                                                            communications between the operators and supervisors,                                                         ;
the operators
                                                            including repeat backs for certain functions. There was no                                                   '
and
                                                            unnecessary traffic in the control room.                                                   Supervisors
supervisors,
                                                            briefed shift personnel on significant functions before
;
                                                            they occurred. prior to energizing the recirculating pump
including repeat backs for certain functions. There was no
  '
'
                                                            heaters, which could have produced smoke in the drywell,
unnecessary traffic in the control
                                                            the watch engineer thoroughly briefed to the reactor oper-                                                     ,
room.
                                                            ator, equipment operator, and fire brigade leader,
Supervisors
                                                                                                                                                                          t
briefed shift personnel on significant functions before
                                                            The watch engineers, shif t supervisors, and reactor opera-
they occurred.
                                                            tors were knowledgeable about plant conditions and ongoing
prior to energizing the recirculating pump
                                                            work in the plant. Shif t turnover briefings were thorough                                                   i
heaters, which could have produced smoke in the drywell,
;                                                           and were followed by control room panel walkdowns. Attend-                                                     i
'
;                                                           ance at these briefings was inconsistent in that not all
the watch engineer thoroughly briefed to the reactor oper-
                                                            wa:ch enginaars include other shift personnel, och as
,
                                                            health phytics shift workers in the pre-shift briefing.
ator, equipment operator, and fire brigade leader,
                                                            The Teata observed that the health physics shift workers
t
                                                            receive separate briefings. .ae Team discussed this prac-                                                     t
The watch engineers, shif t supervisors, and reactor opera-
                                                            tice with plant management, which stated that it was their                                                   [
tors were knowledgeable about plant conditions and ongoing
work in the plant.
Shif t turnover briefings were thorough
i
;
and were followed by control room panel walkdowns. Attend-
i
;
ance at these briefings was inconsistent in that not all
wa:ch enginaars include other shift personnel, och as
health phytics shift workers in the pre-shift briefing.
The Teata observed that the health physics shift workers
receive separate briefings.
.ae Team discussed this prac-
t
tice with plant management, which stated that it was their
[
intent to include non-operations shif t workers in the pre-
!
t
t
                                                            intent to include non-operations shif t workers in the pre-                                                    !
!
!
                                                            shift briefing and that they would review its implementa-
shift briefing and that they would review its implementa-
                                                            t i o r, .                                                                                                     l
t i o r, .
                                                                                                                                                                          J
l
                                                                                                                                                                          t
J
l                                                                                                                                                                         I
t
l
I
'
'
                                                                                                                                                                          ,
,
<
<
                      - - _ . _ - - _ _ .                                 --,                             - _ - __ _                             _
- - _ . _ - - _ _ .
                                                                                                                                                    .-
--,
- _ -
__ _
_
.-


              _       _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
  . .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                          22
.
      Control room operators received good support from the shift
.
      technical advisors (STA), administrative assistants, and
22
      other departments. The STA's were used in developing fail-
Control room operators received good support from the shift
      ure and malfunction reports (F&MR), and in the initial
technical advisors (STA), administrative assistants, and
      followup of an EOD satellite procedure issue. The admin-
other departments. The STA's were used in developing fail-
      istrative assistants do much of the administrative paper-
ure and malfunction reports (F&MR), and in the initial
      work and help to lessen traffic in the control room. There
followup of an EOD satellite procedure issue.
      was very good support of operations from other departments
The admin-
      in understanding and deciding che proper course of action
istrative assistants do much of the administrative paper-
      in response to F&MR events.
work and help to lessen traffic in the control room. There
      The Team accompanied several non-licensed equipment oper-
was very good support of operations from other departments
      ators (E0's) on their tours.         The E0's performed their
in understanding and deciding che proper course of action
      plant tours in accordance with Procedure 2.1.16, "Nuclear
in response to F&MR events.
      Power Operator Tour." Readings were taken and recorded, as
The Team accompanied several non-licensed equipment oper-
      required. The operators also checked for abnormal condi-
ators (E0's) on their tours.
      tions,   such as vibrations, noise, leakage, odors, and
The E0's performed their
      inadequate ventilation. The E0's commented that they now
plant tours in accordance with Procedure 2.1.16, "Nuclear
      have more time to check general piant conditions on their
Power Operator Tour." Readings were taken and recorded, as
      rounds beer.use the rounds are assigned to two E0's per
required. The operators also checked for abnormal condi-
      shift.   Previously, only one E0 made the plant tour.                                                     The
tions,
      E0's showed good regard for radiological protection and
such as vibrations, noise, leakage, odors, and
      ALARA practices. The operators were very familiar with the
inadequate ventilation.
      plant, systems, and components, and were knowledgeable
The E0's commented that they now
      about their duties and responsibilities.       The performance
have more time to check general piant conditions on their
      by these operators demonstrated the effectiveness of the
rounds beer.use the rounds are assigned to two E0's per
      non-licensed training program.
shift.
      Watch engineers or operating supervisors accompany E0's on
Previously, only one E0 made the plant tour.
      plant tours at least once per week. Operations management,
The
      including the chief ope atug engincar and operations
E0's showed good regard for radiological protection and
      manager, were observed totring the control room frequently
ALARA practices. The operators were very familiar with the
      and discussing plant status and evolutions with the watch
plant, systems, and components, and were knowledgeable
about their duties and responsibilities.
The performance
by these operators demonstrated the effectiveness of the
non-licensed training program.
Watch engineers or operating supervisors accompany E0's on
plant tours at least once per week. Operations management,
including the chief ope atug engincar and operations
manager, were observed totring the control room frequently
and discussing plant status and evolutions with the watch
engineer.
i
i
      engineer.
The Team discussed the licentee's use of NRC's NUREG-1275,
      The Team discussed the licentee's use of NRC's NUREG-1275,
"Operati.ig Ex9erience Feedback Report-New Plants" and ver-
      "Operati.ig Ex9erience Feedback Report-New Plants" and ver-
iftad that licensee managemett had reviewed NUREG-1275
      iftad that licensee managemett had reviewed NUREG-1275
recommendations for applicabili'y,
      recommendations for applicabili'y,       BECo had independently
BECo had independently
  .  Initiated a number of improvemeats related to NUREG-1275
Initiated a number of improvemeats related to NUREG-1275
      recommendations before they reviewed the ruort.                                                     This
.
      action was considered by the Team as a positiva example of
recommendations before they reviewed the ruort.
      the quality of BEco self-improvement ef forts.       Some self-
This
      identified improvement items include operator communica-
action was considered by the Team as a positiva example of
      tions training, seminars to improve attention to detail,
the quality of BEco self-improvement ef forts.
      splitting tours and revising tour sheets to improve equip-
Some self-
      ment operator performarce, and doing dry run training on
identified improvement items include operator communica-
                                                .
tions training, seminars to improve attention to detail,
                                                              _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .
splitting tours and revising tour sheets to improve equip-
ment operator performarce, and doing dry run training on
.
_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .


      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _       _ _ _ _ _ _                   ._.   ._ __ __ _ . - _________.-____ _-_______-____       . _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  O O
_ _ _ _ _ _
                                                              23
._.
                                        the pcwer ascension and alternate safe shutdown evolutions.
._ __ __ _
                                        Some improvement items resulting from the NUREG review
. - _________.-____ _-_______-____
                                        include seeking a more positive method of performing on-
. _ _ _
                                        shift instructions, repeating all logic system functional
O
                                        tests, and performing a comprehensive review of inadvertent
O
                                        emergency safety feature (ESF) actuations. The ESF actua-
23
                                        tion review has resulted in several corrective actions.
the pcwer ascension and alternate safe shutdown evolutions.
                                        In summary, the licensee conducted operations in a profess-
Some improvement items resulting from the NUREG review
                                        ional manner. Operators are knowledgeable about their
include seeking a more positive method of performing on-
                                        duties and plant conditions and management keeps an active
shift instructions, repeating all logic system functional
                                        and effective oversight of operations.
tests, and performing a comprehensive review of inadvertent
                      3.2.3             Shift Staffing and Overtime Controls
emergency safety feature (ESF) actuations.
                                        The licensee's Ser.ior Reactor Operators (SRO) are ver/
The ESF actua-
                                        experienced and strengthen the operations organization.
tion review has resulted in several corrective actions.
                                        To take advantage of this experience, an extra SRO will be                           t
In summary, the licensee conducted operations in a profess-
                                        assigned to each shift during the Power Ascension Test
ional manner.
                                        Program. Only 8 Reactor Operators (RO) have unrestricted
Operators are knowledgeable about
                                        licenses because the 14 newly licensed RO's are limited
their
duties and plant conditions and management keeps an active
and effective oversight of operations.
3.2.3
Shift Staffing and Overtime Controls
The licensee's Ser.ior Reactor Operators (SRO) are ver/
experienced and strengthen the operations organization.
To take advantage of this experience, an extra SRO will be
t
assigned to each shift during the Power Ascension Test
Program. Only 8 Reactor Operators (RO) have unrestricted
licenses because the 14 newly licensed RO's are limited
pending on-watch training and reactivity manipulations dur-
'
'
                                        pending on-watch training and reactivity manipulations dur-
ing the Power Ascension Program.
                                        ing the Power Ascension Program. Therefore, the licensee
Therefore, the licensee
                                        will initially staff a four-shift rotation during plant
will initially staff a four-shift rotation during plant
                                        restart. At an appropriate point after restart, the licen-
restart. At an appropriate point after restart, the licen-
                                        see will go to a six-shif t rotation of two SRO's and two
see will go to a six-shif t rotation of two SRO's and two
                                        RO'S per shift.       There are also sufficient non-licensed
RO'S per shift.
                                        equipment operators to staff six shifts. STA's will work a
There are also sufficient non-licensed
                                        five-shift rotation for at least the not year.                         These         ;
equipment operators to staff six shifts. STA's will work a
                                        staffing levels are considered adequate.
five-shift rotation for at least the not year.
                                        It should not be necessary to work ope ators in excess of
These
                                        the overtime guidelines of NRC Generic Letter 82-12. Senior                           i
;
                                        plant management has been active in restricting overtime.
staffing levels are considered adequate.
                                        Procedure 1.3.6.7, "Use and Control of Overtime at PNPS,"
It should not be necessary to work ope ators in excess of
                                        adopts NRC guidelines, provides procedural controls for
the overtime guidelines of NRC Generic Letter 82-12. Senior
                                        overtime hours, and requires advance approval of overtime.
i
                                        The   inspector reviewed Operations Department overtime
plant management has been active in restricting overtime.
                                        records for the period of July 6,1988 to August 16, 1988.                             l
Procedure 1.3.6.7, "Use and Control of Overtime at PNPS,"
  .
adopts NRC guidelines, provides procedural controls for
                                        During this period, there were only three occasions when                             !
overtime hours, and requires advance approval of overtime.
                                        staff worked greater than 56 hours in a 7-day period. Dur-
The
                                        ing this period, there was one instance of overtime in                                 ,
inspector reviewed Operations Department overtime
                                        excess of NRC guidelines. This occurred August 1 and 2
records for the period of July 6,1988 to August 16, 1988.
                                        when a radwaste worker worked 28 hours in a 48-hour period.
l
                                        This worker had approval to work up to 60 hours that week
During this period, there were only three occasions when
                                        but did not have approval to exceed the 48-hour guideline.
!
.
staff worked greater than 56 hours in a 7-day period. Dur-
ing this period, there was one instance of overtime in
,
excess of NRC guidelines.
This occurred August 1 and 2
when a radwaste worker worked 28 hours in a 48-hour period.
This worker had approval to work up to 60 hours that week
but did not have approval to exceed the 48-hour guideline.
This worker is not a licensed operator and was not doing
;
;
                                        This worker is not a licensed operator and was not doing
'
'
                                        safety-related work. The licensee identitied this incident
safety-related work. The licensee identitied this incident
                                        and counseled the individual on overtime requirements.
and counseled the individual on overtime requirements.


                  _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
  o *
o
                                24
*
24
l
3.2.4
Procedure Validation
The Team walked down Procedure 5.3.26, "Reactor Pressure
Vessel Injection During Emergencies," with a non-licensed
equipment operator who had been trained in the procedure,
i
The procedure involved connecting a fire water crosstie to
the residual heat ro;noval (RHR) system.
Minor procedure
(
errors were found. A drain valve labeled 1-DR-122 in the
l
l
      3.2.4 Procedure Validation
field is referred to as 1-DR-121 and the fire water storage
            The Team walked down Procedure 5.3.26, "Reactor Pressure
'
            Vessel Injection During Emergencies," with a non-licensed
tank low level alarm is referred to as annunciator B-7,
            equipment operator who had been trained in the procedure,          i
whereas it is actually 0-3.
            The procedure involved connecting a fire water crosstie to
Also, the procedure instructs
            the residual heat ro;noval (RHR) system. Minor procedure
the operator to "connect the locel flow meter" without
(          errors were found. A drain valve labeled 1-DR-122 in the
specifying
'          field is referred to as 1-DR-121 and the fire water storage
the
            tank low level alarm is referred to as annunciator B-7,
instrument
            whereas it is actually 0-3.         Also, the procedure instructs
number.
            the operator to "connect the locel flow meter" without
The
            specifying the instrument number.             The procedure was
procedure was
            actually referring to a st ra t r.e r differential pressure
actually referring to a st ra t r.e r differential pressure
            indicator, instrument number 33-PID-4610. The operator did
indicator, instrument number 33-PID-4610. The operator did
            not simulate connecting this instrument and when questioned
not simulate connecting this instrument and when questioned
            by the Team, he stated that the step referred to flow n)eter
by the Team, he stated that the step referred to flow n)eter
            FI 4609 which was already connected. Of more significance
FI 4609 which was already connected. Of more significance
            was confusion caused by step IV.B.2.b, which instructs the
was confusion caused by step IV.B.2.b, which instructs the
            operator to install jumpers to defeat LPCI initiation and
operator to install jumpers to defeat LPCI initiation and
            PCIS isolation signals and operate LPCI injection valves 28
PCIS isolation signals and operate LPCI injection valves 28
            and 29. The equipment operator requested the assistance of
and 29. The equipment operator requested the assistance of
            the watch engineer and the STA.               These watchstanders
the watch engineer and the STA.
            initially felt the jumper was not needed, iha jumper is
These watchstanders
            not directly ' elated to LPCI valves 28 and 29, but is
initially felt the jumper was not needed,
            needed to provide a flow path for a fire pump and to pre-
iha jumper is
            pare for contingencies in the E0Ps.
not directly ' elated to LPCI valves 28 and 29, but is
            Procedure 5.3.26 was one of eight new procedures written by
needed to provide a flow path for a fire pump and to pre-
            contractors and validated by contractors. All eight of
pare for contingencies in the E0Ps.
            these procedures are therefore suspect and will be revali-
Procedure 5.3.26 was one of eight new procedures written by
            dated by licensee operations staff before restart.             All
contractors and validated by contractors.
            other E0P satellite procedures and other abnormal operating
All eight of
            procedures substantially changed daring this outage will
these procedures are therefore suspect and will be revali-
            also be revalidated before restart.
dated by licensee operations staff before restart.
            The licensee did not perform any QA audits or surveillances
All
            on the writing of procedures by contractors. However, the
other E0P satellite procedures and other abnormal operating
            licensee has performed surveillances of the procedure
procedures substantially changed daring this outage will
            validation process used on procedures other than the E0P
also be revalidated before restart.
            satellite procedures.     Surve111ances #87-9.3-9 and #88-1.
The licensee did not perform any QA audits or surveillances
            1-56 found that half of the procedures being revised and
on the writing of procedures by contractors. However, the
            implemented in April and May 1988 were not being validated.
licensee has performed surveillances of the procedure
            As a result of this finding, procedure 1.3.4-4, "Procedure
validation process used on procedures other than the E0P
            Validation," was issued August 15, 1983.
satellite procedures.
                                      - _ _____
Surve111ances #87-9.3-9 and #88-1.
1-56 found that half of the procedures being revised and
implemented in April and May 1988 were not being validated.
As a result of this finding, procedure 1.3.4-4, "Procedure
Validation," was issued August 15, 1983.
- _ _____


    __   _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _                       _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _       . _ _ . _     _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     ___ _______ _ __.
__
  .   .
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
                                                                                                                                  25
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                          There were also somt, training aspects to this procedure
. _ _ . _
                                                                          issue. The equipment operator was trained on Rev. O of
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                          5.3.26 which did not include the instruction to connect the
___ _______ _ __.
                                                                          local flow meter, whereas the inspector used Rev. 1. Licen-                                                                                 ,
.
                                                                          sed operators were trained on the control room portion of
.
                                                                          the E0P satellite procedures and equipment operators were
25
                                                                          trained in the procedural steps outside the control room.                                                                                   :
There were also somt, training aspects to this procedure
                                                                          The problem with the jumpers occurred at the interface
issue.
                                                                          between these operators.                                   Following the procedures revali-
The equipment operator was trained on Rev. O of
                                                                          dation discussed above, the licensee will provide addt-
5.3.26 which did not include the instruction to connect the
                                                                          tional training as needed.
local flow meter, whereas the inspector used Rev. 1. Licen-
                                                                          During a NSRAC meeting conducted ' on August 2,1988, the
,
                                                                          committee discussed an open concern on the validation and
sed operators were trained on the control room portion of
                                                                          upgrade of plant procedures.                                             NSRAC concluded that they
the E0P satellite procedures and equipment operators were
                                                                          were concerned that all of tne routine operating procedures
trained in the procedural steps outside the control room.
                                                                          had not been validated by one o' the validation processes.
:
                                                                          Following the meeting, the committee forwarded a concern to
The problem with the jumpers occurred at the interface
                                                                          the SVP-N concerning the operating procedures necessary for
between these operators.
                                                                          long-term operation of the plant.                                                 The plant staff is
Following the procedures revali-
                                                                          scheduled to respond to NSRAC on September 14, 1988.                                                                   The
dation discussed above, the licensee will provide addt-
                                                                          NRC will review this response during a subsequent inspec-
tional training as needed.
                                                                          tion.
During a NSRAC meeting conducted ' on August 2,1988, the
                                                                    3.2.5 Temporary Modification Controls
committee discussed an open concern on the validation and
                                                                          The Team observed that current logs show that about 15 tem-
upgrade of plant procedures.
                                                                          porary modifications (TMs) are in effect, some of which
NSRAC concluded that they
                                                                          date back to 1983. Fif teen is not an unusual or unmanage-
were concerned that all of tne routine operating procedures
                                                                          able number of TM's, and represents a significant reduction
had not been validated by one o' the validation processes.
                                                                          from previous conditions.
Following the meeting, the committee forwarded a concern to
                                                                          The Team reviewed nine TM's initiated 1987 and prior years
the SVP-N concerning the operating procedures necessary for
                                                                          and noted (1) only three of the nine modifications affected
long-term operation of the plant.
                                                                          safety-related systems; (2) licensee safety evaluations
The plant staff is
                                                                          (SE) were filed in the TM package, which demonstrated the
scheduled to respond to NSRAC on September 14, 1988.
                                                                          interio   configurations created were acceptable; and,
The
                                                                          (3) licensee actions to address the TM's by conversion to
NRC will review this response during a subsequent inspec-
                                                                          permanent modifications were apparently based on engineer-
tion.
  .                                                                      ing service requests and plant design changes referenced in
3.2.5
                                                                          the TM packages. Team review of the SE's on a sampling
Temporary Modification Controls
                                                                          basis did not identify any inadequacies. Further, the Team
The Team observed that current logs show that about 15 tem-
                                                                          noted that reduction of the TM backlog has been a licensee
porary modifications (TMs) are in effect, some of which
                                                                          priority.
date back to 1983. Fif teen is not an unusual or unmanage-
able number of TM's, and represents a significant reduction
from previous conditions.
The Team reviewed nine TM's initiated 1987 and prior years
and noted (1) only three of the nine modifications affected
safety-related systems; (2) licensee safety evaluations
(SE) were filed in the TM package, which demonstrated the
interio
configurations
created
were
acceptable;
and,
(3) licensee actions to address the TM's by conversion to
permanent modifications were apparently based on engineer-
ing service requests and plant design changes referenced in
.
the TM packages.
Team review of the SE's on a sampling
basis did not identify any inadequacies. Further, the Team
noted that reduction of the TM backlog has been a licensee
priority.
I
I
t
t
!
!
L
L
                                                                          ~
~


. _ _ _ _ _ __ _
.
                                      26
_ _ _
                                                                                !
_
                                                                                l
_ __
                  Plant Procedure 1.5.9, "Temporary Modi fications," allows
_
                  temporary modifications to be open for six months and pro-
26
                  vides a mechanism for active TM's to be extended. However,
Plant Procedure 1.5.9,
                  this mechanism is typically not used. Procedure 1.5.9 does
"Temporary Modi fications," allows
                  not require a review of the TM for extension of the expira-
temporary modifications to be open for six months and pro-
                  tion date if an engineering service request (ESR) for a
vides a mechanism for active TM's to be extended. However,
                  permanent design change is in effect for the TM. Of seven
this mechanism is typically not used. Procedure 1.5.9 does
                  TM's reviewed, six had ESR's and therefore did not have a
not require a review of the TM for extension of the expira-
                current approved extension date.       The inspector indicated
tion date if an engineering service request (ESR) for a
                  that good engineering practice would dictate continuance of
permanent design change is in effect for the TM. Of seven
                  the periodic reviews for all TM's, and licensee management
TM's reviewed, six had ESR's and therefore did not have a
                agreed. The licensee committed to either prepare a justi-
current approved extension date.
                  fication for operation for every TM that is still open
The inspector indicated
                prior to startup or to revise the procedure to apply the TM
that good engineering practice would dictate continuance of
                extension request process to all TM's, including those with
the periodic reviews for all TM's, and licensee management
                outstanding ESR's.
agreed. The licensee committed to either prepare a justi-
                TM 84-77 was selected for detailed followup review to
fication for operation for every TM that is still open
                assess the technical adequacy of the change on a temporary
prior to startup or to revise the procedure to apply the TM
                basis and to evaluate the extent and timeliness of licensee
extension request process to all TM's, including those with
                followup actions to either remove the temporary modifica-
outstanding ESR's.
                tion or convert it to a permanent change to the facility.
TM 84-77 was selected for detailed followup review to
                The modification involved the replacement of an FCR-type
assess the technical adequacy of the change on a temporary
                relay in cubical 72-754 of the DC motor control center for
basis and to evaluate the extent and timeliness of licensee
                the RCIC 1301-22 valve.     The valve is in the suction path
followup actions to either remove the temporary modifica-
                from the condensate storage tank (CST), is normally open
tion or convert it to a permanent change to the facility.
                for RCIC standby and initial operation, and will cycle
The modification involved the replacement of an FCR-type
                closed on low level in the CST.         After failure of the
relay in cubical 72-754 of the DC motor control center for
                existing TCR relay (an open circuit coil), an HFA-type
the RCIC 1301-22 valve.
                relay was installed on December 17, 1934 and made elec-
The valve is in the suction path
                trically equivalent to the original circuit. An HFA was
from the condensate storage tank (CST), is normally open
                used because an FCR relay was not available onsite.         The
for RCIC standby and initial operation, and will cycle
                change did not affect the normal function of the valve.
closed on low level in the CST.
                Engineering     Service   Request   (ESR)   85-368,   dated
After failure of the
                July 22, 1985, requested engineering to convert the change
existing TCR relay (an open circuit coil), an HFA-type
                to a permanent modification, with a completion date of
relay was installed on December 17, 1934 and made elec-
                November 22, 1985.     ESR response memorandum NED 86-1275,
trically equivalent to the original circuit.
                dated December 31, 1986, rejected the ESR request to make
An HFA was
                the change permanent because of two concerns involving the
used because an FCR relay was not available onsite.
                need to keep the wiring in the 72-754 cubical consistent
The
                with other DC motor control centers (MCC) and the assumed
change did not affect the normal function of the valve.
                differences in the inrush and coil holding currents between
Engineering
                the two types of relays.     In rejecting the request, engi-
Service
                neering found that the change was acceptable on a temporJry
Request
                basis, but recom. mended restoration of the original design.
(ESR)
85-368,
dated
July 22, 1985, requested engineering to convert the change
to a permanent modification, with a completion date of
November 22, 1985.
ESR response memorandum NED 86-1275,
dated December 31, 1986, rejected the ESR request to make
the change permanent because of two concerns involving the
need to keep the wiring in the 72-754 cubical consistent
with other DC motor control centers (MCC) and the assumed
differences in the inrush and coil holding currents between
the two types of relays.
In rejecting the request, engi-
neering found that the change was acceptable on a temporJry
basis, but recom. mended restoration of the original design.


  . .
.
                          27
.
      A Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) Report (No.
27
      NED 86-110) was issued to assess the deviations. Further
A Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) Report (No.
l     engineering evaluation was requested by ESR 88-080, dated
NED 86-110) was issued to assess the deviations.
      January 27, 1988, with action requested by May 1, 1988.
Further
      Further engineering review determined that the change would
l
      be acceptable as a permanent modification, which was made
engineering evaluation was requested by ESR 88-080, dated
      by FRN 87-80-52 to PDC 87-80 dated June 14, 1988.
January 27, 1988, with action requested by May 1, 1988.
      The plant design change (PDC) modified the drawing to per-
Further engineering review determined that the change would
      manently document the change and addressed the scismic ade-
be acceptable as a permanent modification, which was made
      quacy of the HFA relay installation. The HFA relay was not
by FRN 87-80-52 to PDC 87-80 dated June 14, 1988.
      certified to be environmentally qualified since the 1301-22
The plant design change (PDC) modified the drawing to per-
      valve is not nn the EQ master list and environmental qual-
manently document the change and addressed the scismic ade-
      ification (EQ) is not required. The PDC also addressed the
quacy of the HFA relay installation. The HFA relay was not
      adequacy of the inrush and holding current characteristics
certified to be environmentally qualified since the 1301-22
      of the HFA reley. The second engineering review found the
valve is not nn the EQ master list and environmental qual-
      HFA current characteristics to be better than those of the
ification (EQ) is not required. The PDC also addressed the
      FCR relay.
adequacy of the inrush and holding current characteristics
      The Team discussed the bases for the original and final
of the HFA reley.
      engineering determinations via telephone on August 17, 1988
The second engineering review found the
      with engineering (NED)     .  The Team noted that engineering
HFA current characteristics to be better than those of the
l    initially rejected the proposed design change based on
FCR relay.
The Team discussed the bases for the original and final
engineering determinations via telephone on August 17, 1988
with engineering (NED)
The Team noted that engineering
.
initially rejected the proposed design change based on
l
!
!
      information indicating larger power consumption by the HFA
information indicating larger power consumption by the HFA
      relays, and based on a concern that, if replacement of the
relays, and based on a concern that, if replacement of the
      FCRs with HFAs became a general practice, a problem could
FCRs with HFAs became a general practice, a problem could
      result in the increase in DC loads.     Those concerns were
result in the increase in DC loads.
Those concerns were
.
.
      not realized since the FCR failure was a random one, and
not realized since the FCR failure was a random one, and
l     the operating current characteristics of the HFAs are
l
l     better than initially assumed.
the operating current characteristics of the HFAs are
      Based on the above, the Team identified no technical con-
l
      cerns with the licensee's dispositioning of the adequacy of   >
better than initially assumed.
      the modification.
Based on the above, the Team identified no technical con-
      The Team noted that licensee action on the original 1985
cerns with the licensee's dispositioning of the adequacy of
      ESR was not timely in either the preparation of the
>
      original ESR or the followup actions by NED in response to
the modification.
      the site request. However, the actions to respond to ESR
The Team noted that licensee action on the original 1985
      88-80 and disposition the issue in 1988 were greatly
ESR was not timely in either the preparation of the
      improved.
original ESR or the followup actions by NED in response to
      The Team audited the six tag outs for TM 84-22 and found
the site request. However, the actions to respond to ESR
      that MCC R25 was missing two TM tags. Since this is a non
88-80 and disposition the issue in 1988 were greatly
      safety-related modification which is about to be withdrawn,
improved.
      this was not considered by the Team to be of safety signif-
The Team audited the six tag outs for TM 84-22 and found
      icance.     It does indicate; however, the need to period-
that MCC R25 was missing two TM tags. Since this is a non
      ically recheck TM tagouts.
safety-related modification which is about to be withdrawn,
this was not considered by the Team to be of safety signif-
icance.
It does indicate; however, the need to period-
ically recheck TM tagouts.


      ._ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
._ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  . .
.
                                                          28
.
                                        An additional concern is that in the following example the
28
                                        licensee performed a TM without implementing the formal
An additional concern is that in the following example the
                                        review and approval process. During a tour of the reactor
licensee performed a TM without implementing the formal
                                        building on August 8,1988, the Team noted that reactor       '
review and approval process. During a tour of the reactor
                                        pressure boundary leak detection system monitors C-19A and
building on August 8,1988, the Team noted that reactor
                                        C-19B had their doors propped open, and each monitor had a
'
                                        large fan tied to the opening.     Investigation identified
pressure boundary leak detection system monitors C-19A and
                                        that no temporary modification had been processed to
C-19B had their doors propped open, and each monitor had a
                                        evaluate and authorize this alteration.         The licensee
large fan tied to the opening.
                                        stated that elevated temperatures in the cabinets result in
Investigation identified
                                        failure of the monitor electronics and have been a long-
that no temporary modification had been processed to
                                        standing problem.     Engineering response to Engineering
evaluate and authorize this alteration.
                                      Service Request (ESR) 85-462 implemented a reduction in
The
                                        system heat-tracing temperature. This alteration did not
licensee
                                        resolve the problem, and on August 6,1988, the licensee
stated that elevated temperatures in the cabinets result in
                                        initiated ESR 88-558 requesting further engineering review,
failure of the monitor electronics and have been a long-
                                      Monitors C-19A and C-19B are required to be operable by
standing
                                      Technical Specifications during power operations so that
problem.
                                        some short-term action and long-term resolution are needed.
Engineering response to Engineering
                                      Since the monitors are not currently required to be oper-
Service Request (ESR) 85-462 implemented a reduction in
                                      able, the licensee has de-energized them and removed the
system heat-tracing temperature.
                                        fans pending evaluation.
This alteration did not
4                                      In sumary, even though the licensee has been aggressive in
resolve the problem, and on August 6,1988, the licensee
                                      reducing the number of TM's, there have been some lapses in
initiated ESR 88-558 requesting further engineering review,
                                      their control of temporary modifications. This indicates a
Monitors C-19A and C-19B are required to be operable by
                                      need for continued licensee management attention to this
Technical Specifications during power operations so that
                                      area,
some short-term action and long-term resolution are needed.
                                3.2.6 Required Reading Books
Since the monitors are not currently required to be oper-
                                      The Team reviewed the "Required Reading" books in the con-
able, the licensee has de-energized them and removed the
                                      trol room. The books consist of three large binders that
fans pending evaluation.
                                      contain procedure changes. They provide a method for
In sumary, even though the licensee has been aggressive in
                                      promptly updating operators on plant and procedure changes.
4
                                      Each piece of information in the book had a sign-off sheet
reducing the number of TM's, there have been some lapses in
                                      to ensure that all operations personnel read the material.
their control of temporary modifications. This indicates a
                                      The Team noted that information in the books dated back to
need for continued licensee management attention to this
                                      April 1983 and many of the procedure changes had not been
area,
                                      signed of f as read by all personnel. This appears to indi-
3.2.6
                                      cate that the program is not being monitored routinely by
Required Reading Books
                                      operations management. Material remaining in the book for
The Team reviewed the "Required Reading" books in the con-
                                      long periods defeats the purpose of providing timely infor-
trol room.
                                      mation on changes to the operators.       Conversely, if the
The books consist of three large binders that
                                      changes are not important to operations personnel, it may
contain procedure changes.
                                      not be necessary to put them in the books.
They provide a method for
                                      The Team discussed these observations with the Plant Opera-
promptly updating operators on plant and procedure changes.
                                      tions Section Manager. Some improvement was noted later
Each piece of information in the book had a sign-off sheet
                                      during the IAT inspection, as a result,
to ensure that all operations personnel read the material.
The Team noted that information in the books dated back to
April 1983 and many of the procedure changes had not been
signed of f as read by all personnel. This appears to indi-
cate that the program is not being monitored routinely by
operations management. Material remaining in the book for
long periods defeats the purpose of providing timely infor-
mation on changes to the operators.
Conversely, if the
changes are not important to operations personnel, it may
not be necessary to put them in the books.
The Team discussed these observations with the Plant Opera-
tions Section Manager.
Some improvement was noted later
during the IAT inspection, as a result,
,
,


  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
.                                         .
.
                                                                              29
.
                                                    3.2.7 Logs
29
                                                          The Team reviewed the implementation of the Technical Spec-
3.2.7
                                                          ification Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO) log, the
Logs
                                                          Otsabled Annunciator Alarm Log, and the operations super-
The Team reviewed the implementation of the Technical Spec-
                                                          visor log procedures.         The LCO   log was implemented
ification Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO) log, the
                                                          August 18, 1988,     by   Procedure   SI-OP.0008, "Limiting
Otsabled Annunciator Alarm Log, and the operations super-
                                                          Conditions for Operations Log," dated July 25,1988, and
visor
                                                          was   being used on a trial basis from August 8 to
log
                                                          August 18, 1988. The only LCO entered after the log was
procedures.
                                                          implemented, LC0 A-88-002, was properly entered, tracked,
The
                                                          and cleared. Procedure SI-OP.008 is being revised to
LCO
                                                          incorporate lessons learned in its initial implementation.
log was
                                                          The Disabled Annunciators Alarm Log is controlled by Pro-
implemented
                                                          cedure 2.3.1, General Action Alarm Procedures, Item VII.
August 18, 1988,
                                                          The inspector observed eight disabled annunciator tags on
by
                                                          control room annunciators. All eight were properly logged.
Procedure
                                                          However, only two of the eight annunciators had a mainten-
SI-OP.0008,
                                                          ance request (MR) issued. The shift supervisor informed
"Limiting
                                                          the Team that disabled annunciators without MRs occurred
Conditions for Operations Log," dated July 25,1988, and
                                                          due to plant conditions and will be returned to service
was
                                                          before startup.   The licensee aud'ts disabled annunciators
being
                                                          monthly under preventive maintenance (FM) Procedure S. A.24
used
                                                          "Audit of Control Room Annunciators and Instruments," which
on
                                                          should assure that these annunciators are returned to ser-
a
                                                          vice before startup.
trial
                                                          There was little activity in the control room during this
basis
                                                          inspection, but the Team did observe the following items
from August 8
                                                          properly logged in the operations supervisor's log: LCO's,
to
                                                          Failure and Malfunction Reports, a fire drill, and spent
August 18, 1988.
                                                          fuel pool temperatures while the fuel pool pumps were
The only LCO entered after the log was
                                                          out of service for maintenance. However, as discussed in
implemented, LC0 A-88-002, was properly entered, tracked,
                                                          Section 3.I .8 below, changes in jumpers or lif ted leads
and cleared.
                                                          were not logp i in the operations supervisor's log.
Procedure SI-OP.008 is being revised to
                                                          The Team concluded that log keeping practices are generally
incorporate lessons learned in its initial implementation.
                                                          adequate.
The Disabled Annunciators Alarm Log is controlled by Pro-
                                                    3.2.8 Timely Update of Lif ted Lead / Jumper Log
cedure 2.3.1, General Action Alarm Procedures, Item VII.
                                                          During a review of the Lif ted Lead / Jumper (LL/J) procedure
The inspector observed eight disabled annunciator tags on
                                                          and program implementation on August 16, 1988, the Team
control room annunciators. All eight were properly logged.
                                                          identified that the log was not being n;aintained comoletely
However, only two of the eight annunciators had a mainten-
                                                          up-to-date. Eight entries in the LL/J log involved lif ted
ance request (MR) issued.
                                                          leads or jumpers installed on July 14, 1988, to perform
The shift supervisor informed
                                                          main station battery werk anc testing per Maintenance Work
the Team that disabled annunciators without MRs occurred
                                                          Plan (MdP) S7-46-173. All eight requests were associated
due to plant conditions and will be returned to service
                                                          with the same M4P. All log entries showed the LL/J request
before startup.
The licensee aud'ts disabled annunciators
monthly under preventive maintenance (FM) Procedure S. A.24
"Audit of Control Room Annunciators and Instruments," which
should assure that these annunciators are returned to ser-
vice before startup.
There was little activity in the control room during this
inspection, but the Team did observe the following items
properly logged in the operations supervisor's log: LCO's,
Failure and Malfunction Reports, a fire drill, and spent
fuel pool temperatures while the fuel pool pumps were
out of service for maintenance.
However, as discussed in
Section 3.I .8 below, changes in jumpers or lif ted leads
were not logp i in the operations supervisor's log.
The Team concluded that log keeping practices are generally
adequate.
3.2.8
Timely Update of Lif ted Lead / Jumper Log
During a review of the Lif ted Lead / Jumper (LL/J) procedure
and program implementation on August 16, 1988, the Team
identified that the log was not being n;aintained comoletely
up-to-date. Eight entries in the LL/J log involved lif ted
leads or jumpers installed on July 14, 1988, to perform
main station battery werk anc testing per Maintenance Work
Plan (MdP) S7-46-173.
All eight requests were associated
with the same M4P. All log entries showed the LL/J request


                        _ _ _ _ _ _ .       ._. _ _______ -_ ___ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _               _ _ - _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ .
  .   .
._.
                                          30
_ _______ -_ ___ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
    ,    was still active on August 16, 1988. The Team found that
_ _ - _ _ _
          the batteries had been returned to normal and LL/J request
.
          was closed out on July 29,1988, and that Maintenance
.
          Request 87-46-173 was completed on August 1,1988, inclu-
30
          sive of the post-work testing.                                             Step 5.3.1.5 of Station
was still active on August 16, 1988. The Team found that
          Procedure 1.5.9.1, "Lif ted Leads and Jumpers," states that
,
          the person performing the LL/J request is to notify the
the batteries had been returned to normal and LL/J request
        Watch Engineer when the system is returned to normal by
was closed out on July 29,1988, and that Maintenance
          removing the jumpers or landing the lif ted leads.. The
Request 87-46-173 was completed on August 1,1988, inclu-
        Watch Engineer is responsible for updatino the LL/J log.
sive of the post-work testing.
        The findings were referred to operations personnel on
Step 5.3.1.5 of Station
        August 16, 1988 for followup.
Procedure 1.5.9.1, "Lif ted Leads and Jumpers," states that
          Licensee followup review confirmed that the work had been
the person performing the LL/J request is to notify the
        completed and the log should have been updated. The log
Watch Engineer when the system is returned to normal by
        was updated to show the correct status on August 16, 1988.
removing the jumpers or landing the lif ted leads.. The
          In response to the inspector's findings, the licensee co..-
Watch Engineer is responsible for updatino the LL/J log.
        ducted an audit of the log. The licensee's audit identi-
The findings were referred to operations personnel on
          fied (1) two instances where the log had not been updated,
August 16, 1988 for followup.
        and (2) that operations personnel were not making entries
Licensee followup review confirmed that the work had been
completed and the log should have been updated.
The log
was updated to show the correct status on August 16, 1988.
In response to the inspector's findings, the licensee co..-
ducted an audit of the log.
The licensee's audit identi-
fied (1) two instances where the log had not been updated,
and (2) that operations personnel were not making entries
;
;
          in the Operation's Supervisor log when LL/J log entries
in the Operation's Supervisor log when LL/J log entries
        were made.   These matters were referred to the Operations
were made.
!       Section for followup and corrective action.                                             QA followup
These matters were referred to the Operations
,        and trending will be covered by QA Surveillance Report
!
        88-94-61.
Section for followup and corrective action.
QA followup
and trending will be covered by QA Surveillance Report
,
88-94-61.
4
4
        The licensee reported that the cause of the discrepancy was
The licensee reported that the cause of the discrepancy was
:       the failure of m61ntenance personnel to inform operations
:
j       that the jumpers and lif ted leads were cleared when the
the failure of m61ntenance personnel to inform operations
i       systems were returned tb normal. Inspector interviews with
j
j.       the Maintenance Supervisor responsible for MR 87-46-173
that the jumpers and lif ted leads were cleared when the
i
systems were returned tb normal. Inspector interviews with
j.
the Maintenance Supervisor responsible for MR 87-46-173
noted that he failed to discuss the closecut action on the
*
*
        noted that he failed to discuss the closecut action on the
4
4        LL/J request as a result of a misunderstanding on the
LL/J request as a result of a misunderstanding on the
        status of the work package closeout during shift turnover
status of the work package closeout during shift turnover
        with another maintenance supervisor.
with another maintenance supervisor.
        Team review concluded the inaccurate LL/J log had minimal
Team review concluded the inaccurate LL/J log had minimal
        significance and no impact on safe plant eperations for
significance and no impact on safe plant eperations for
        these cases.                 There was no loss of control of the physical
these cases.
        plant configuration. Plant operators would have reviewed
There was no loss of control of the physical
        the LL/J log as a prerequisite to plant restoration and
plant configuration.
        startup.   This review would have identified the open log
Plant operators would have reviewed
        entries and                 the completed closecut actions.                                   Further,
the LL/J log as a prerequisite to plant restoration and
        licensee followup to the discrepancies identified by the
startup.
        Teara were prompt and appropriate.                                           Based on the above, and
This review would have identified the open log
        in recognition that the jumper and lifted lead log is a new
entries and
        tracking system, no further NRC action is warranted at this
the completed closecut actions.
        time.     This area will receive further review during
Further,
        subsequent routine NRC inspections.
licensee followup to the discrepancies identified by the
Teara were prompt and appropriate.
Based on the above, and
in recognition that the jumper and lifted lead log is a new
tracking system, no further NRC action is warranted at this
time.
This
area will
receive
further
review during
subsequent routine NRC inspections.


                                                            _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
  . .
.
                                  31
.
        3.2.9 Tagouts and Operator Aids
31
              The Team reviewed the licensee's administrative controls
3.2.9
              for use of protective tagging at PNPS. The Team reviewed
Tagouts and Operator Aids
              Procedure No.1.4.5, "PNPS Tagging Procedure," Revision 23,
The Team reviewed the licensee's administrative controls
              which is to be implemented September 1,1938, and noted
for use of protective tagging at PNPS.
              that this procedure was revised to address concerns with
The Team reviewed
              tag controls identified during the licensee's self-assess-                                                     L
Procedure No.1.4.5, "PNPS Tagging Procedure," Revision 23,
              ment.   Specifically, the procedure limits the use of Nu-
which is to be implemented September 1,1938, and noted
              clear Watch Engineer (NWE) tags; prohibits the use of dan-
that this procedure was revised to address concerns with
              ger (red) tags for identification purposes on lifted leads;
tag controls identified during the licensee's self-assess-
              and requires documented monthly reviews, including field
L
              verification, of NWE, Caution and Master Danger tags and
ment.
              tagout sheets. The Team reviewed the NWE and caution tag
Specifically, the procedure limits the use of Nu-
              logs and independently verified that several NWE, caution,
clear Watch Engineer (NWE) tags; prohibits the use of dan-
              danger, and master danger tags were properly filled out,
ger (red) tags for identification purposes on lifted leads;
              properly hung, and positioned as required on the compon-
and requires documented monthly reviews, including field
              ents.   No discrepancies were identified.     Based on this
verification, of NWE, Caution and Master Danger tags and
              review, the Team concluded that the licensce's control of
tagout sheets.
              protective tagging was adequate and properly implemented.
The Team reviewed the NWE and caution tag
              The Team also reviewed the licensee's control of operator                                                       1
logs and independently verified that several NWE, caution,
              aids as established by Procedure No. 1.3.34, "Conduct of
danger, and master danger tags were properly filled out,
              Operations." An operator aid is information in the form of
properly hung, and positioned as required on the compon-
              sketches, notes, graphs, instructions, or drawings used by
ents.
              personnel authorized to operate plant equipment. The Team
No discrepancies were identified.
              reviewed the operations and chemistry operator aid log and
Based on this
              determined that it was maintained in accordance with the                                                       i
review, the Team concluded that the licensce's control of
              procedure. The Team noted that periodic licensee reviews                                                       1
protective tagging was adequate and properly implemented.
              and verification of the need for and placement of operator
The Team also reviewed the licensee's control of operator
              aids were documented. The Team independently verified
1
              proper posting of selected operator aids, and no unauthor-
aids as established by Procedure No. 1.3.34, "Conduct of
              ized aids were identified during the Team's plant tours.
Operations." An operator aid is information in the form of
-
sketches, notes, graphs, instructions, or drawings used by
              Based on this review, the Team concluded that the licen-
personnel authorized to operate plant equipment. The Team
              see's control of operator aids was adequate.
reviewed the operations and chemistry operator aid log and
      3.2.10 Plant Tours and System Walkdowns
determined that it was maintained in accordance with the
              3.2.10.1 Miscellaneous Tour Observations                                                                       !
i
                        The IATI Team made frequent plant tours.                                                         The
procedure. The Team noted that periodic licensee reviews
                        overall material condition of rooms and equip.                                                       I
1
                        ment was excellent. Particularly notable was
and verification of the need for and placement of operator
                        cleanliness, fresh paint, and obvious decontam-                                                     ,
aids were documented.
                        ination efforts to make major portions of plant
The Team independently verified
                        and equipment accessible. Comnonent labeling and
proper posting of selected operator aids, and no unauthor-
                        tagging was very good,                                                                               j
ized aids were identified during the Team's plant tours.
                                                                                                                              i
Based on this review, the Team concluded that the licen-
-
see's control of operator aids was adequate.
3.2.10
Plant Tours and System Walkdowns
3.2.10.1 Miscellaneous Tour Observations
!
The IATI Team made frequent plant tours.
The
overall material condition of rooms and equip.
I
ment was excellent.
Particularly notable was
cleanliness, fresh paint, and obvious decontam-
,
ination efforts to make major portions of plant
and equipment accessible. Comnonent labeling and
tagging was very good,
j
i
l
l
l
l
l
[
l
l
l                                                                                                                            l
[                                                                                                                            l


  _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
O                   8
O
                                                              32
8
                                                      The Team observed activities in progress. Per-
32
                                                      sons interviewed on tour (HP, security, opera-
The Team observed activities in progress.
                                                      tions contractor) had experience in their
Per-
                                                    positions and were knowledgeable about their work
sons interviewed on tour (HP, security, opera-
                                                    and duties. HPs were cognizant of work activ-
tions
                                                      ities in progress. Housekeeping controls were
contractor)
                                                    being maintained during work in progress.
had
                                                    The Team reviewed the status of indicators and
experience
                                                    controls on selected local panels. Controls and
in
                                                      indications were operable and no deficiencies
their
                                                    were noted. Operating procedures required to be
positions and were knowledgeable about their work
                                                    posted at the local panels were available and
and duties.
                                                    adequate, based on Team review.
HPs were cognizant of work activ-
                                                    The Team observed loose cable tray covers includ-
ities in progress.
                                                    ing one that was laying on top of an in place
Housekeeping controls were
                                                    cover.   The licensee reviewed this finding and
being maintained during work in progress.
                                                    documented the review and corrective actions in
The Team reviewed the status of indicators and
                                                    an engineering "white paper." This review deter-
controls on selected local panels.
                                                    mined that loose covers do not compromise the
Controls and
                                                    design but that covers laying on top of in place
indications were operable and no deficiencies
                                                    cable tray covers could be a seismic concern.
were noted. Operating procedures required to be
                                                    The misplaced cover found by the Team was deter-
posted at the local panels were available and
                                                    mined to not be needed. The licensee surveyed
adequate, based on Team review.
                                                    cable trays throughout the process buildings and
The Team observed loose cable tray covers includ-
                                                    found additional loose covers but no more that
ing one that was laying on top of an in place
                                                    were completely unfastened and laying on top of
cover.
                                                    other covers. Corrective actions completed in-
The licensee reviewed this finding and
                                                    clude refastening the loose covers, removing the
documented the review and corrective actions in
                                                    misplaced cover, revising procedure SI-SG.1010
an engineering "white paper." This review deter-
                                                    "Systems Group System Walkdown Inspection Guide-
mined that loose covers do not compromise the
                                                    line," to use periodic walkdowns by the system
design but that covers laying on top of in place
                                                    engineering division to identify seismic con-
cable tray covers could be a seismic concern.
                                                    cerns, such as misplaced tray covers, and prepar-
The misplaced cover found by the Team was deter-
                                                    ing F&MR No. 88-200, which will be used to deter-
mined to not be needed.
                                                    mine how to keep future maintenance and modifica-
The licensee surveyed
                                                    tion work from creating loose or misplaced
cable trays throughout the process buildings and
                                                    covers. The Team concluded that the licensee's
found additional loose covers but no more that
                                                    response to this issue was thorough and adequate.
were completely unfastened and laying on top of
                                                    The Team considers this issue resolved.
other covers.
                                          3.2.10.2 Diesel Generator Walkdown
Corrective actions completed in-
                                                    A walkdown of the 'A' diesel generator (DG) was
clude refastening the loose covers, removing the
                                                    completed on August 15, 1988, to verify opera-
misplaced cover, revising procedure SI-SG.1010
                                                    bility and standby readiness of the emergency
"Systems Group System Walkdown Inspection Guide-
                                                    power supply, and to observe the general condi-
line," to use periodic walkdowns by the system
                                                    tions in the 03 area.   The valve checkof f lists
engineering division to identify seismic con-
                                                    of Procedure   2.2.8, "Standby AC power System
cerns, such as misplaced tray covers, and prepar-
                                                    (Diesel Generators) " were used as acceptable
ing F&MR No. 88-200, which will be used to deter-
                                                    criteria to establish the proper system valve
mine how to keep future maintenance and modifica-
tion work
from creating
loose
or misplaced
covers.
The Team concluded that the licensee's
response to this issue was thorough and adequate.
The Team considers this issue resolved.
3.2.10.2 Diesel Generator Walkdown
A walkdown of the 'A' diesel generator (DG) was
completed on August 15, 1988, to verify opera-
bility and standby readiness of the emergency
power supply, and to observe the general condi-
tions in the 03 area.
The valve checkof f lists
of Procedure
2.2.8,
"Standby AC power System
(Diesel Generators) " were used as acceptable
criteria to establish the proper system valve


  - _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ _
.           s
.
                        33
s
                positions.   The procedure checklists were also
33
                reviewed for adequacy agatast Drawings M219 and
positions.
              M224, and by comparison with the physical plant
The procedure checklists were also
              during a walkdown of the diesel skid and room.
reviewed for adequacy agatast Drawings M219 and
                Proper valve lineup was verified for the DG fuel
M224, and by comparison with the physical plant
              oil and air start systems. This review confirmed
during a walkdown of the diesel skid and room.
                that the 'A' DG was operable in the standoy modo.
Proper valve lineup was verified for the DG fuel
              Cleanliness and the general condition of equip-
oil and air start systems. This review confirmed
              ment and components in the diesel rooms were
that the 'A' DG was operable in the standoy modo.
              excellent. Valve and component identification
Cleanliness and the general condition of equip-
              (tags) and labeling were very good and showed
ment and components in the diesel rooms were
              significant improvement in performance in com-
excellent.
              parison to past reviews. Several minor discrep-
Valve and component identification
              ancies were noted, as follows:     (1)identifica-
(tags) and labeling were very good and showed
              tion tags were missing on valves 104C and 118,
significant improvement in performance in com-
              and the tag was loose on valve 105C; (2) valve
parison to past reviews. Several minor discrep-
              118 was required to be locked in the closed
ancies were noted, as follows:
              position and a chain and padlock were provided
(1)identifica-
              for this purpose; however, the chain was suffic-
tion tags were missing on valves 104C and 118,
              iently loose that the Team would have been able
and the tag was loose on valve 105C; (2) valve
              to defeat the lock and thereby move the valve;
118 was required to be locked in the closed
              (3) the inner fire door granting access to the
position and a chain and padlock were provided
              'A' DG skid had worn and damaged gaskets along
for this purpose; however, the chain was suffic-
              the closing surface and the door latching mech-
iently loose that the Team would have been able
              anisms (dogs) were misaligned with the position
to defeat the lock and thereby move the valve;
              indicators; (4) no permanent lighting was instal-
(3) the inner fire door granting access to the
              led in the ' A' and 'B' diesel day tank rooms --
'A'
              lighting, if installed, would aid operator re-
DG skid had worn and damaged gaskets along
              views during plant tours; and, (5) two isolation
the closing surface and the door latching mech-
              valves for pressure switches 4555A and 4556A were
anisms (dogs) were misaligned with the position
              not labeled with an 10 tag in the plant and were
indicators; (4) no permanent lighting was instal-
              not identified on system drawings or procedures.
led in the ' A' and 'B'
              The valves were properly positioned. Addition-
diesel day tank rooms --
              ally,   proper valve position is demonstrated
lighting, if installed, would aid operator re-
              indirectly during the monthly functional test of
views during plant tours; and, (5) two isolation
              the diesel air start system.
valves for pressure switches 4555A and 4556A were
              These discrepancies were noted by the Nuclear
not labeled with an 10 tag in the plant and were
              Plant Operator accompanying the Team and were
not identified on system drawings or procedures.
              discussed with the duty Watch Engineer. Actions
The valves were properly positioned.
              were taben to document and correct the discrep-
Addition-
              ancies, inclucing the issuance of Maintenance
ally,
              Request 88-61-83 for the fire door.       Inspector
proper
              followup review on August 16, 1988 confirmed that
valve
              actions were in progress and had been completed
position
              to correct the tag on valve 105C and to properly
is demonstrated
              lock valve 118. Licensee response to the Team's
indirectly during the monthly functional test of
              findings was appropriate and timely. No other
the diesel air start system.
              inadequacies were noted.
These discrepancies were noted by the Nuclear
Plant Operator accompanying the Team and were
discussed with the duty Watch Engineer. Actions
were taben to document and correct the discrep-
ancies, inclucing the issuance of Maintenance
Request 88-61-83 for the fire door.
Inspector
followup review on August 16, 1988 confirmed that
actions were in progress and had been completed
to correct the tag on valve 105C and to properly
lock valve 118.
Licensee response to the Team's
findings was appropriate and timely.
No other
inadequacies were noted.


                                                                            __-______ __ ___
__-______ __ ___
. .
.
                                34
.
            3.2.10.3 Standby liquid Control System Walkdown                                 '
34
                      The Team walked down the standby liquid control
3.2.10.3 Standby liquid Control System Walkdown
                      (SBLC) system using the valve checklist in Pro-
'
                      cedure No. 2.2.?4, "Valve Lineup for Standby
The Team walked down the standby liquid control
                      Liquid Control System," and piping and instrument
(SBLC) system using the valve checklist in Pro-
                      diagram (P&ID) M-249. This review was performed
cedure No. 2.2.?4, "Valve Lineup for Standby
                      to verify the adequacy of the procedure checklist
Liquid Control System," and piping and instrument
                      and P&ID, evaluate the valve labeling, evaluate
diagram (P&ID) M-249. This review was performed
                      the control of locked valves, verify the opera-
to verify the adequacy of the procedure checklist
                      bility of instrument and support systems, and
and P&ID, evaluate the valve labeling, evaluate
                      assess the overall material Condition of the sys-
the control of locked valves, verify the opera-
                      tem and general cleanliness of the area.         The
bility of instrument and support systems, and
                      Team noted that the checklist control of vent and
assess the overall material Condition of the sys-
                      drain capped connections differed from other
tem and general cleanliness of the area.
                      safety system procedures, such as those for the
The
                      residual heat removal (RHR) and core spray (CS)
Team noted that the checklist control of vent and
                      systems. For example, an outboard vent valve on
drain capped connections differed from other
                      the CS checklist would be "locked, closed and
safety system procedures, such as those for the
                      espped." The SBLC procedure only checks "locked,
residual heat removal (RHR) and core spray (CS)
                      closed." No deficiencies with capped connections
systems. For example, an outboard vent valve on
                      were noted, however. The Team also noted that
the CS checklist would be "locked, closed and
                      the vent valve for pressure indicator (PI) 1159
espped." The SBLC procedure only checks "locked,
                      was not on the valve checklist.         The licensee
closed." No deficiencies with capped connections
                      agreed to review these observations to determine
were noted, however.
                      if the procedure needed to be revised.       No other
The Team also noted that
                      deficiencies or concerns were noted.
the vent valve for pressure indicator (PI) 1159
                      Overall, the Team found the valve labeling, mate-
was not on the valve checklist.
                      rial condition, and general cleanliness to be
The licensee
                      excellent.
agreed to review these observations to determine
    3.2.11 Conclusions
if the procedure needed to be revised.
            The operations staff conducted their activities in a pro-
No other
            fessional manner. Operators were knowledgeable about their
deficiencies or concerns were noted.
            duties and about plant status. The depth of experience and
Overall, the Team found the valve labeling, mate-
            knowledge of senior licensed operators is a strength and
rial condition, and general cleanliness to be
            will be a major asset du ri r.3 restart.         Shift turnover
excellent.
.         briefings by individual operators and for the shift are
3.2.11
            thorough; however, non-operations shift workers do not
Conclusions
            routinely attend these briefings. Site management involve-
The operations staff conducted their activities in a pro-
            ment in operations was evident by their frequent presence
fessional manner. Operators were knowledgeable about their
            in the control room.     Shift staffing levels are adequate
duties and about plant status. The depth of experience and
            and plant housekeeping was excellent
knowledge of senior licensed operators is a strength and
will be a major asset du ri r.3 restart.
Shift turnover
.
briefings by individual operators and for the shift are
thorough; however, non-operations shift workers do not
routinely attend these briefings. Site management involve-
ment in operations was evident by their frequent presence
in the control room.
Shift staffing levels are adequate
and plant housekeeping was excellent


    O O
O
                            35                                       1
O
                                                                    !
35
            .
1
        A weakness was noted in the validation and/or training of
!
        E0P satellite procedures. The licensee's commitment to
.
        confirm effective implementation of E0P satellite and off-
A weakness was noted in the validation and/or training of
        normal procedures before restart is responsive to NRC con-
E0P satellite procedures.
The licensee's commitment to
confirm effective implementation of E0P satellite and off-
normal procedures before restart is responsive to NRC con-
cerns.
Administrative controls and log-keeping practices
,
,
        cerns. Administrative controls and log-keeping practices    i
i
l       are generally adequate, although required reading materials '
l
!       are not being reviewed by all personnel on a timely basis.
are generally adequate, although required reading materials
l       There are lapses in the licensee's control of temporary     4
'
        modifications, particularly the absence of periodic reviews :
!
        and scheduled completion dates for temporary modifications
are not being reviewed by all personnel on a timely basis.
        covered by an engineering services request,
l
                                                                    i
There are lapses in the licensee's control of temporary
4
modifications, particularly the absence of periodic reviews
:
and scheduled completion dates for temporary modifications
covered by an engineering services request,
i
!
!
l
l
Line 2,031: Line 2,958:
L __
L __


      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - _________ ____-__ _                               .. __     _ _ _     _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                 _   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - _________ ____-__ _
    .                             .
..
                                                                                      36
__
                                                3.3 Maintenance
_ _ _
                                                      3.3.1   Scope of Review
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                              The licensee's maintenance program has undergone signifi-
_
                                                              cant change during the past several months. Weaknesses had
_ _ _ _
  ,                                                            been identified during the SALP period ending May 15, 1988,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                              and by Special NRC Maintenance Team Inspection 50-293/
.
                                                                                                                                                                                                ,
.
                                                                                                                                                                                                ~
36
                                                              88-17. During the present inspection, the licensee's main-                                                                       '
3.3 Maintenance
                                                              tenance policies and program procedures were reviewed.
3.3.1
                                                              Maintenance activities were evaluated during the planning,
Scope of Review
                                                              implementation, post work testing and closecut                                                 stages.
The licensee's maintenance program has undergone signifi-
                                                              Emphasis was placed on direct observation of ongoing werk
cant change during the past several months. Weaknesses had
                                                              in the field. Interviews were conducted with personnel at
been identified during the SALP period ending May 15, 1988,
                                                              each level within the maintenance department to determine                                                                       '
,
                                                              their depth of understanding of program goals. The Team                                                                         ,
,
                                                              also assessed the size and significance of the licensee's                                                                       l
and by Special NRC Maintenance Team Inspection 50-293/
                                                              maintenan'.e backlog, and reviewed established licensee
~
                                                              performance indicators.
88-17.
                                                                                                                                                                                                :
During the present inspection, the licensee's main-
1                                                   3.3.2   Observations and Findings
'
;                                                            3.3.2.1   Management Policies and Goals
tenance policies and program procedures were reviewed.
                                                                                                                                                                                                '
Maintenance activities were evaluated during the planning,
                                                                          The Team reviewed the licensee's Mission Organ -
implementation, post work testing and closecut
                                                                          tration and Policy Manual, Nuclear Operations
stages.
                                                                          Procedures Manual,                                                 and Maintenance   Section
Emphasis was placed on direct observation of ongoing werk
                                                                          Manual. These documents describe the licensee's
in the field.
  l                                                                      policy and performance goals for the maintenance                                                                     l
Interviews were conducted with personnel at
                                                                          program. The licensee has also established the
each level within the maintenance department to determine
their depth of understanding of program goals.
The Team
'
,
also assessed the size and significance of the licensee's
l
maintenan'.e backlog, and reviewed established licensee
performance indicators.
:
1
3.3.2
Observations and Findings
3.3.2.1
Management Policies and Goals
;
'
The Team reviewed the licensee's Mission Organ -
tration and Policy Manual, Nuclear Operations
Procedures
Manual,
and
Maintenance
Section
Manual.
These documents describe the licensee's
'
policy and performance goals for the maintenance
l
l
program. The licensee has also established the
,
Material
Condition
Improvement
Action
Plan
!
,
(MCIAP).
The MCIAP, which is described in the
,
i
licensee's Restart Plan, is designed to achieve
!
long-term improvement in the maintenance program.
>
In addition, maintenance performance indicators
r
are being used by the licensee to evaluate the
;
success of recent program changes and the allo-
cated maintenance staff has been increased sig-
'
'
                                                                                                                                                                                                ,
'
,                                                                        Material Condition Improvement Action Plan                                                                            !
nificantly.
,                                                                        (MCIAP).      The MCIAP, which is described in the
Interviews with maintenance person-
i
nel at various levels within the department indi-
                                                                          licensee's Restart Plan, is designed to achieve                                                                      !
, .
                                                                          long-term improvement in the maintenance program.                                                                     >
cate
                                                                          In addition, maintenance performance indicators                                                                      r
that
                                                                          are being used by the licensee to evaluate the                                                                        ;
the
                                                                          success of recent program changes and the allo-
organization
                                                                          cated maintenance staff has been increased sig-                                                                      '
and
                                                                                                Interviews with maintenance person-
management
                                                                                                                                                                                                '
,
                                                                          nificantly.
policies are generally well understood.
, .                                                                      nel at various levels within the department indi-
,
                                                                          cate that the organization                                                 and   management                         ,
,                                                                        policies are generally well understood.
                                                                                                                                                                                                ,
1
1
                                                                                                                                                                                                i
,
                                                                                                                                                                                                $
i
$
l
l
                                                                                                                                                                                                i
i
                                                                                                                                                                                                !
I
I
!
,
,
                                                                                                                                                                                                (
(
l
l
,                                                                                                                                                                                               <
,
,                                                                                                                                                                                               6
<
6
,
'
'
                                                                                                                                                                                                ;
;
.


  , .
                                                                      l
                                                                    ,
                          37
      3.3.2.2  Organization and Staffing                            i
                The maintenance organization and staffing levels
                were reviewed. Interviews were conducted with
                division supervisors and staff personnel to
                determine whether organizational relationships
                were well understood. The current staffing
                status was evaluated, particularly in the super-
                visor, maintenance engineer, and planning post-
                tions, to determine whether staffing levels were
                adequate, responsibilities clearly defined, and
                resources effectively used.
                The maintenance section consists of three pro-
              duction divisions (electrical,    instrumentation
              and control and mechanical), plus a planning        ,
              division and an engineering group. All division
              manager positions and all first-line supervisor      i
,
,
              positions in the production divisions are filled
.
              with licensee employees, except for two positions
,
                in the equipment tool room, which are presently
37
                filled by contractors.   Increased stiffing at the
i
              craft level in the production divisions has been
3.3.2.2
i             authorized.     Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
Organization and Staffing
'
The maintenance organization and staffing levels
              will increase from 22 to 30 positions; Electrical
were reviewed.
              Maintenance will increase from 14 to 18 post-
Interviews were conducted with
              tions; and Mechanical Maintenance will increase
division
              from 27 to 33 positions. Staffing of the plan-
supervisors
              ning division has not baen completed.         Twelve
and
              contractor personnel are presently being used to
staff personnel
              perform the planning function, with assistance
to
              from the licensee's outage management group.
determine whether organizational
              This arrangement is performing acceptably, as
relationships
              described in Section 3.3.2.4
were well
understood.
The
current
staffing
status was evaluated, particularly in the super-
visor, maintenance engineer, and planning post-
tions, to determine whether staffing levels were
adequate, responsibilities clearly defined, and
resources effectively used.
The maintenance section consists of three pro-
duction divisions (electrical,
instrumentation
and control and mechanical), plus a planning
,
division and an engineering group. All division
manager positions and all first-line supervisor
i
positions in the production divisions are filled
,
with licensee employees, except for two positions
in the equipment tool room, which are presently
filled by contractors.
Increased stiffing at the
craft level in the production divisions has been
i
authorized.
Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
will increase from 22 to 30 positions; Electrical
'
Maintenance will increase from 14 to 18 post-
tions; and Mechanical Maintenance will increase
from 27 to 33 positions.
Staffing of the plan-
ning division has not baen completed.
Twelve
contractor personnel are presently being used to
perform the planning function, with assistance
from the licensee's outage management group.
This arrangement is performing acceptably, as
described in Section 3.3.2.4
Team
interviews
with
supervisors
and
craft
'
'
              Team    interviews with supervisors and craft
empicyees showed that personnel clearly under-
              empicyees showed that personnel clearly under-
stand the new program and their area of respon-
              stand the new program and their area of respon-
sibility. The interviews covered personnel with
              sibility. The interviews covered personnel with
a wide range of experience in their positions,
              a wide range of experience in their positions,
including those newly assigned.
              including those newly assigned.   The Team noted;
The Team noted;
however, that the recently revised job descrip-
)
)
              however, that the recently revised job descrip-
tions for the section have not been disseminated
              tions for the section have not been disseminated
to the staff.
              to the staff.     The Maintenance Manager stated
The Maintenance Manager stated
              that they would be issued in the near future.
that they would be issued in the near future.
!
!
!
!
!
!


    . _ _ - - . __
. _ _ - - . __
  e               O                                                     l
e
                                                                          l
O
                              38
38
                                                                          i
Two positions in the new maintenance section
                      Two positions in the new maintenance section       l
organization, the Deputy Manager and the Radio-
                      organization, the Deputy Manager and the Radio-     I
logical Advisor, are effectively being used. The
                      logical Advisor, are effectively being used. The   l
Radiological Advisor is a permanent staff post-
                      Radiological Advisor is a permanent staff post-     l
tion and provides a focus for interface with the
                      tion and provides a focus for interface with the   l
Radiological Protection Group. Team observations
                      Radiological Protection Group. Team observations   I
indicated that the Deputy Manager was effective
                      indicated that the Deputy Manager was effective
in scheduling and coordinating activities through
                      in scheduling and coordinating activities through
his interface with other sections,
                    his interface with other sections,
j
                                                                          j
The Team's review indicated that licensee staff-
                    The Team's review indicated that licensee staff-
ing is ample to meet targeted production goals
                      ing is ample to meet targeted production goals
without reliance on the use of excessive over-
                    without reliance on the use of excessive over-
time. While some variations occur, the percent
                    time. While some variations occur, the percent
of overtime worked has been at or slightly above
                    of overtime worked has been at or slightly above
the operatirg goal of 20*4, which equals a 48-hour
                    the operatirg goal of 20*4, which equals a 48-hour
work week.
                    work week. Work schedules for craf t and super-
Work schedules for craf t and super-
.
.
                    visory personnel provide I day off in a 7-day
visory personnel provide I day off in a 7-day
!
!
                    period. The maintenance staff is working pri-
period.
                    marily on the day shif t, with night shif t cover-
The maintenance staff is working pri-
                    age provided for certain critical jobs in pro-
marily on the day shif t, with night shif t cover-
                    gress.   The licensee plans to provide around-
age provided for certain critical jobs in pro-
                    the-clock 8-hour shifts that will match the
gress.
                    Operations   Section   rotating   shift   schedule,
The licensee plans to provide around-
                    beginning with plant startup. Maintenance shift
the-clock 8-hour shifts that will match the
                    coverage will continue through the power escala-
Operations
                    tion sequence and on a redaced scale afterwards.
Section
                    Licensee staffing is sufficient to staff the
rotating
                    shift schedule without reliance on excessive
shift
                    overtime.
schedule,
                    New personnel assigned to the division manager
beginning with plant startup. Maintenance shift
                    and production supervisor positions have adequate
coverage will continue through the power escala-
                    prior experience in related assignments.       The
tion sequence and on a redaced scale afterwards.
                    Team's observations of the first- and second-line
Licensee staffing is sufficient to staff the
                    supervisors in conducting their daily activities
shift schedule without reliance on excessive
                    showed that the supervisory, oversight, and con-
overtime.
                    trol functions were effectively performed. Based
New personnel assigned to the division manager
                    on these observations, the Team concluded that
and production supervisor positions have adequate
                    the newly hired supervisory staff does not have a
prior experience in related assignments.
                    negttive impact on the quality of control over
The
                    maintenance activities.
Team's observations of the first- and second-line
supervisors in conducting their daily activities
showed that the supervisory, oversight, and con-
trol functions were effectively performed. Based
on these observations, the Team concluded that
the newly hired supervisory staff does not have a
negttive impact on the quality of control over
maintenance activities.


    . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  ,                                               .
,
                                                                      39
                                                                                                                  I
                                                            In summary, identified strengths in the present      l
                                                            maintenance section organization include the use
                                                            of the Deputy Manager and the Radiological
                                                            Advisor.      The increase in supervisory positions
                                                            in the production divisions has been effective in
                                                            increasing oversight and control of work activ-    j
                                                            ities. While temporary staffing of the planning      ;
                                                            division with contractors is sufficient and pro-
                                                            vides for an effective planning function (as
                                                            measured by the quantity and quality of mainten-
                                                            ance packages produced), plans to staff these        '
                                                            positions with permanent licensee employees by
                                                            October 1988 should remain a management priority
                                                            to assure timely integration of the planning and    i
                                                            scheduling functions. Management has controlled      :
                                                            overtime for the craf t and supervisory positions.
                                                            Plans to provide for maintenance staffing during
                                                            and after restart on an 8-hour rotating shift
                                                            basis should provide continued ef fective over-
                                                            time control.
                                                    3.3.2,3 Communications and Interfaces
                                                            Communication between the maintenance department    l
                                                            and other portions of the organization, particu-
                                                            larly operations and radiation protection, had      [
                                                            previously been a weakness. The licensee has
                                                            taken successful steps towards improving communt-    ,
                                                            cation, both internal to the maintenance depart-    ,
                                                            ment and with other station groups.                  ;
                                                            The    Team attended a variety of maintenance
                                                            department status and turnover meetings. Based      ,
                                                            on observation of the:S meetings and interviews
                                                            with maintenance personnel at each level of the      i
                                                            organization, the Team concluded that communica-
                                                            tions internal to the maintenance staff are ef-
                                                            fective. Maintenance department managers vare        [
                                                            cognizant of the status of activities and of        f
                                                            emerging problems.                                  J
                                                                                                                l
                                                            The    licensee has initiated several programs      ;
                                                            directly    addressing the past weaknesses in      j
.
.
                                                            interdepartment communications.   In an effort to   ,
39
                                                            improve the interface with radiation protection      !
In summary, identified strengths in the present
maintenance section organization include the use
of the Deputy Manager and
the
Radiological
Advisor.
The increase in supervisory positions
in the production divisions has been effective in
increasing oversight and control of work activ-
j
ities. While temporary staffing of the planning
;
division with contractors is sufficient and pro-
vides for an effective planning function (as
measured by the quantity and quality of mainten-
ance packages produced), plans to staff these
'
positions with permanent licensee employees by
October 1988 should remain a management priority
to assure timely integration of the planning and
i
scheduling functions. Management has controlled
:
overtime for the craf t and supervisory positions.
Plans to provide for maintenance staffing during
and after restart on an 8-hour rotating shift
basis should provide continued ef fective over-
time control.
3.3.2,3
Communications and Interfaces
Communication between the maintenance department
l
l
and other portions of the organization, particu-
[
larly operations and radiation protection, had
previously been a weakness.
The licensee has
,
taken successful steps towards improving communt-
cation, both internal to the maintenance depart-
,
ment and with other station groups.
;
The
Team attended a
variety of maintenance
department status and turnover meetings.
Based
,
,
                                                            and to raise worker sensitivity to health physics
on observation of the:S meetings and interviews
with maintenance personnel at each level of the
i
organization, the Team concluded that communica-
tions internal to the maintenance staff are ef-
[
fective.
Maintenance department managers vare
cognizant of the status of activities and of
f
emerging problems.
J
l
The
licensee
has
initiated
several
programs
;
directly
addressing
the
past
weaknesses
in
j
.
interdepartment communications.
In an effort to
,
l
improve the interface with radiation protection
!
!
                                                            issues, the licensee created and staffed the
and to raise worker sensitivity to health physics
l                                                           nsintenance Radiological Advisor position. Inter-   ;
,
l                                                           views with a spectrum of individuals indicated       l
issues, the licensee created and staffed the
!
l
nsintenance Radiological Advisor position. Inter-
;
l
views with a spectrum of individuals indicated
l
'
'
                                                            that this &ffort has had a positive impact on
that this &ffort has had a positive impact on
                                                                                                                :
:
                                                                                                                f
f
                                                                                                                .
.
                                                                                                                h
h
.
.
.
. . .
.
.


  . - __ _ _--
. - __ _ _--
! .           .                                                           ,
! .
                                                                            6
.
                                                                            !
,
l                               40
6
                        day-to-day working relationships and performance.
!
                        The licensee also formed the Vork Prioritization
l
,                      Review Team (WPRT), composed of representatives
40
l                       of various station departments.       The WPRT pro-
day-to-day working relationships and performance.
I                       vides a forum for discussion of the relative
The licensee also formed the Vork Prioritization
Review Team (WPRT), composed of representatives
,
l
of various station departments.
The WPRT pro-
I
vides a forum for discussion of the relative
I
I
                        importance of each maintenance item as it arises.
importance of each maintenance item as it arises.
                        The WPRT has been effective in improving opera-
The WPRT has been effective in improving opera-
                        tion's departtent involvement with the mainten-
tion's departtent involvement with the mainten-
                        ance process. The maintenance department is also
ance process. The maintenance department is also
                        involved in daily and weekly meetings intended to
involved in daily and weekly meetings intended to
l                     ensure coordination between station groups. !!eet-
l
                        ings attended by the Team were generally
ensure coordination between station groups. !!eet-
                      effective.
ings
l                       The need for continued efforts to improve commur +
attended
!                       Ications and interfaces were noted in some arers.
by
                      The licensee's Stores Department practices .re
the
                      not alway: < >lly supportive of specific mainten-
Team were
generally
effective.
l
The need for continued efforts to improve commur +
!
Ications and interfaces were noted in some arers.
The licensee's Stores Department practices .re
not alway: < >lly supportive of specific mainten-
ance department needs.
For example, lubricating
,
,
                      ance department needs. For example, lubricating
l
l                      oil can only be withdrawn in bulk quantities,
oil can only be withdrawn in bulk quantities,
l                     such as a 55 gailon drum. Typical maintenance
l
such as a 55 gailon drum.
Typical maintenance
I
I
                      activities require use of only a fraction of this
activities require use of only a fraction of this
                      amount.   Similar restrictions apply to materials
amount.
                      routinely used by the 1&C, electrical, and mech-
Similar restrictions apply to materials
                      anical maintenance divisicns. This policy places
routinely used by the 1&C, electrical, and mech-
                      the burden for control and storage of unused
anical maintenance divisicns. This policy places
                      material on the individual requesting the with-
the burden for control and storage of unused
l                     drawal. The Team noted that maintenance person-
material on the individual requesting the with-
                      nel were routinely using a cabinet in the main-
l
drawal. The Team noted that maintenance person-
'
'
                      tenance shop to store uoused "Q" materials. No
nel were routinely using a cabinet in the main-
                      prccedure existed to specify the appropriate con-
tenance shop to store uoused "Q" materials. No
                      trols for the storage area. The need for estab-
prccedure existed to specify the appropriate con-
                      lishment of the storage cabinet had been dis-
trols for the storage area.
                      cust.ed previously between the Quality Assurance
The need for estab-
                      Department (QAD) and matntenar.ce. QA0 believed
lishment of the storage cabinet had been dis-
                      that the cabinet was nc,t currently in use, while
cust.ed previously between the Quality Assurance
                      maintenance personnel believed that Q).O had con-
Department (QAD) and matntenar.ce.
                      curred in its creation, demonstrating a lapse in
QA0 believed
                      interdepartment     communications.   The licensee
that the cabinet was nc,t currently in use, while
        ,
maintenance personnel believed that Q).O had con-
                      subsequently per ormed an inventory of the mate-
curred in its creation, demonstrating a lapse in
                      rials in the cal:1nct, and removed all non-Q ar.d
interdepartment
                      suspect materials. Procedure 3.M 1-32, "Contrcl
communications.
                      of *Q* Hold A. ea ," wa s subsequently issued to
The
                      provide appropriate controls and surveillance of
licensee
                      the cabinet.
subsequently per ormed an inventory of the mate-
                _____
,
rials in the cal:1nct, and removed all non-Q ar.d
suspect materials.
Procedure 3.M 1-32, "Contrcl
of
*Q*
Hold A. ea ," wa s subsequently issued to
provide appropriate controls and surveillance of
the cabinet.
_____


                                                    _ _ _ _ . ____ - _ _ _
_ _ _ _ .
  . .
____
                    41
- _ _ _
        The Team also noted that partially used drums of
.
        both Q and non-Q lubricatinq oil and grease were
.
        being kept in a storage shed outside the process
41
        building. Several of the drums were not properly
The Team also noted that partially used drums of
        sealed. No procedure addressing this storage
both Q and non-Q lubricatinq oil and grease were
        arca existed. Discussions with operations per-
being kept in a storage shed outside the process
        sonnel indicated that the difference between Q                     '
building.
        and non-Q drums of material was not clearly                         ;
Several of the drums were not properly
        understood. Routine withdrawals and their equip-
sealed.
        Mnt application were not A ecorded. In response,
No procedure addressing this storage
        a ..e   licensee removed all non-Q reaterials and
arca existed.
      comitted to issue e procedu.*e to establish
Discussions with operations per-
        aopropriate controls by Septecer 7,1988, in-
sonnel indicated that the difference between Q
      cluding provisions to ensure that, the lubricants                   <
'
      are traceable to their application in the field.
and non-Q drums of material was not clearly
        In addition, the liceasee committed to evaluate
;
      the possible addition of non-Q oil to Q equipment
understood. Routine withdrawals and their equip-
      and its potential significance.
Mnt application were not A ecorded. In response,
      During followup to this issue, the Team reviewed
a ..e
      Engineering Specification M-547, which decuments                     :
licensee removed all non-Q reaterials and
      the procurement and receipt inspection re?vire-
comitted to issue e procedu.*e to establish
      ments for the purchase of lubricants as a Commer-
aopropriate controls by Septecer 7,1988, in-
      cial Quality Item (CQI).       The Team 70tsd that                 l
cluding provisions to ensure that, the lubricants
      M-547 requires sampling and testing of each b4tch
<
      of material purcFased as a CQI. At the Yeam%
are traceable to their application in the field.
      request, the licensee reviewed records and iden-                     I
In addition, the liceasee committed to evaluate
      tified two cases in which a CQI procurement order
the possible addition of non-Q oil to Q equipment
      had been issued which did not invoke thia samp-                     !
and its potential significance.
      ling require. tent.     The   licensee subsequently                 ;
During followup to this issue, the Team reviewed
      issued a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality
Engineering Specification M-547, which decuments
      (PCAQ) to initi.te a review of CQIs issuod for                       i
:
      consistency wit.h approved engireering specifica-                   l
the procurement and receipt inspection re?vire-
      tions. The licenste committed to disposition                         !
ments for the purchase of lubricants as a Commer-
      this PCAQ prior to restart.                                         ,
cial Quality Item (CQI).
                                                                            L
The Team 70tsd that
      Overall ce:nunications between the maintenance                       i
l
      department and other groups within the organira-                     l
M-547 requires sampling and testing of each b4tch
      tion are effective. However, the interface prob-                     !
of material purcFased as a CQI.
At the Yeam%
request, the licensee reviewed records and iden-
I
tified two cases in which a CQI procurement order
had been issued which did not invoke thia samp-
!
ling
require. tent.
The
licensee
subsequently
;
issued a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality
(PCAQ) to initi.te a review of CQIs issuod for
i
consistency wit.h approved engireering specifica-
l
tions.
The licenste committed to disposition
!
this PCAQ prior to restart.
,
L
Overall ce:nunications between the maintenance
i
department and other groups within the organira-
l
tion are effective. However, the interface prob-
!
lems dis. usseo &bove, among the Stores Ospart-
:
'
'
  ,   lems dis. usseo &bove, among the Stores Ospart-                      :
,
      men ,1AC, and the Maintenance Department. $ndi-
men ,1AC, and the Maintenance Department. $ndi-
              .                                                             r
r
      catt . hat continued at'.ention is needed.                           T
.
                                                                            ,
catt . hat continued at'.ention is needed.
                                                                            i
T
                                                                            l
,
                                                                            i
i
                                                                            P
l
                                                                            i
i
                                                                            i
P
                                                                            f
i
i
f
-
-


          '
'
      '
'
    .       .-
.
        ,                               42
.-
                3.3.2.4   Maintunence Planning and Prioritization
42
                                    ' ensee has established a Mainte,a ce Plan-
,
                          r. . .   Ji . stor within the Maintenance Department.
3.3.2.4
                          The       !-   af the Planning Division is clearly
Maintunence Planning and Prioritization
                          deline           in approved maintenance procedures and
' ensee has established a Mainte,a ce Plan-
                          the           .see's Maintensnce Section Manual . The
r. . .
                        . Planning         Division Manager position     has been
Ji . stor within the Maintenance Department.
                          filled and the licensee is actively pursuing
The
                          candidates for the eight allccated staff post-
!-
                          tions. When staffing efforts are corolete, the
af the Planning Division is clearly
                          division will corsist of a work package planning
deline
                          group and a scheduling group. In the interim,
in approved maintenance procedures and
                          the licensee is utilizing twelve contractor per-
the
                          sonnel to perform the package planning function.
.see's Maintensnce Section Manual .
                          The licensee's Outage Management Group (OMG) is
The
                          currently providing scheduling guidance. The
. Planning
                          licensee expects to complete the staffing effort
Division Manager position
                          by October 1988,           Team reviews indicate that the
has been
                          present staff of contractors, in conjunction with
filled and the licensee is actively pursuing
-
candidates for the eight allccated staff post-
                          OMG assistance. is functioning well.
tions.
                          Implementation of the revised maintenance work
When staffing efforts are corolete, the
'.                       process, particularly the need to generate de-
division will corsist of a work package planning
                          tailed job-specific maintenance work plans (K4P)
group and a scheduling group.
                          for each maintenance request (MR), has resulted
In the interim,
                          in a heavy emphasis on the planning function.
the licensee is utilizing twelve contractor per-
                          The Team reviewed a large sample of completed
sonnel to perform the package planning function.
                          KdP's, and KdP's in the field. Interviews with
The licensee's Outage Management Group (OMG) is
1
currently providing scheduling guidance.
'
The
                          craf t personnel and first-line supervisors indi-
licensee expects to complete the staffing effort
                          cated that these individuals were knowled;eable
by October 1988,
                          about the new maintenance process requirements
Team reviews indicate that the
                          and considered KdP's issued by Planning to be of
present staff of contractors, in conjunction with
                          generally good quality. One weakness was noted
OMG assistance. is functioning well.
-
Implementation of the revised maintenance work
'.
process, particularly the need to generate de-
tailed job-specific maintenance work plans (K4P)
for each maintenance request (MR), has resulted
in a heavy emphasis on the planning function.
The Team reviewed a large sample of completed
KdP's, and KdP's in the field.
Interviews with
craf t personnel and first-line supervisors indi-
1
'
cated that these individuals were knowled;eable
about the new maintenance process requirements
and considered KdP's issued by Planning to be of
generally good quality.
One weakness was noted
i
i
in the area of post-work testing specification,
'
'
                          in the area of post-work testing specification,
as discussed in Section 3.3.2.6.
                          as discussed in Section 3.3.2.6.
The lum not"d that the completion of job plan-
                          The lum not"d that the completion of job plan-
ning,
                          ning, ano approval of the F#P are typically
ano approval of the F#P are typically
                          restraints to commencement of the activity.         This
restraints to commencement of the activity.
                          results in the need to expedite the review pro-
This
                        cess, making scheduling difficult.             It appears
results in the need to expedite the review pro-
1                         that this is primarily attributable to the new-
cess, making scheduling difficult.
                        ness of both the program and the Planning staff.
It appears
;                       Other factors also contribute. For example, the
1
                          licensee's procedures currently do not provide a
that this is primarily attributable to the new-
                          simplified process for non-intert changes to the
ness of both the program and the Planning staff.
;
Other factors also contribute.
For example, the
licensee's procedures currently do not provide a
simplified process for non-intert changes to the
:
:
              M     e           -                                                 m
M
e
-
m


  o -
o
                43
-
      MWP after issuance. MWP's require a complete re-
43
      review to incorporate minor changes. The licen-
MWP after issuance. MWP's require a complete re-
      see rtated that a revision to the program to
review to incorporate minor changes.
      include provisions for non-intent changes         is
The licen-
      planned for the future. The licensee's engineer-
see rtated that a revision to the program to
      ing department is presently reviewing each MR/fiWP
include provisions for non-intent changes
      and approving the use of any replacement mate-
is
      rials.   This practice provides positive control
planned for the future. The licensee's engineer-
      of all materials, but delays issuance of ;.he MWP
ing department is presently reviewing each MR/fiWP
      and   is a significant drain on engineering
and approving the use of any replacement mate-
      resources. While these factors inhibit efficient
rials.
      planning, no instance of inadequate planning was
This practice provides positive control
      identified.
of all materials, but delays issuance of ;.he MWP
      The licensee has created a WPRT to assist in the
and
      assignment of the proper priority to each MR.
is
      The WPRT meets daily and is composed of represen-
a
      tatives of various station groups, including
significant
      maintenance, operations, outage management, con-
drain
      struction management, and fire protection.         It
on
      performs a multi-disciplined review of new main-
engineering
      tenance items to identify potential plant impact.
resources. While these factors inhibit efficient
      The IATI Team attended a WPRT meetir.g and ob-
planning, no instance of inadequate planning was
      served that discussions were properly focused and
identified.
      priorities weie assigned appro,-iately.
The licensee has created a WPRT to assist in the
      The Team also independertly reviewed outstanding
assignment of the proper priority to each MR.
      maintenance requests for the RHR system and the
The WPRT meets daily and is composed of represen-
      electrical   distribution   system.   This review
tatives of various station groups,
      focused on MR's not designated for completion
including
      before restart. The Team noted that MR 88-10-105
maintenance, operations, outage management, con-
      documented electrical ground and potential cable
struction management, and fire protection.
      insulation damage in the circuit for pressure
It
      switch PS-1001-93A.     This switch is environmen-
performs a multi-disciplined review of new main-
      tally qualified (EQ) and provides a         safety-
tenance items to identify potential plant impact.
      related interlock function for the automatic
The IATI Team attended a WPRT meetir.g and ob-
      depressurization system.     The MR had been sched-
served that discussions were properly focused and
      uled for work af ter restart, leaving the switch
priorities weie assigned appro,-iately.
,     EQ in an indeterminate state. In response t the
The Team also independertly reviewed outstanding
l     Team's question, the licensee rescheduled tne MR
maintenance requests for the RHR system and the
      for completion r~ior to restart.
electrical
distribution
system.
This
review
focused on MR's not designated for completion
before restart. The Team noted that MR 88-10-105
documented electrical ground and potential cable
insulation damage in the circuit for pressure
switch PS-1001-93A.
This switch is environmen-
tally qualified (EQ) and provides a
safety-
related interlock function for the automatic
depressurization system.
The MR had been sched-
uled for work af ter restart, leaving the switch
,
EQ in an indeterminate state. In response t
the
l
Team's question, the licensee rescheduled tne MR
for completion r~ior to restart.
!
!
l
l
Line 2,473: Line 3,649:
i
i
l
l
_


                .       -           ~ -.                     -
.
                                                                y                 .-
-
  -,
~ -.
    .
-
              ,
y
  4    8
.-
                                                44
-,
                                                                                                              ,
,
                            Tne -Team also noted that MR 88-10-26 documents                                   i
.
                            that valve A0-8901 is currently open and cannot                                   '
4
                            be closed using the ~ hand switch. A0-8001 is
8
                            installed in series with a check. valve in the
44
      -
,
Tne -Team also noted that MR 88-10-26 documents
i
'
that valve A0-8901 is currently open and cannot
be closed using the ~ hand switch.
A0-8001 is
*
*
                            tor'us fill line. The check valve satisfies the                                   ,
-
                            primary containment isolation function for the
installed in series with a check. valve in the
                            line. While A0-8001 is not rewired for contain-
tor'us fill line. The check valve satisfies the
                          ment isolation operability, h does serve as a                                     ;
,
                            redundant isolation valve immediately adjacent to
primary containment isolation function for the
                            the check valve. A0-8001 was originally designed         .
line. While A0-8001 is not rewired for contain-
                                                                                                              ,
ment isolation operability, h does serve as a
                            to receive an automatic open signal on sensed low-                               t
;
                            torus level. Because normal torus level is now
redundant isolation valve immediately adjacent to
                          maintained below the instrument low level. set-
the check valve. A0-8001 was originally designed
                          point, the valve continuously receives an open
.
                            signal, thus preventing manual closure.                               This
,
                          condition has existed for at least several years.
to receive an automatic open signal on sensed low-
                          The licensee has relied on closure of a maqual                                     ;
t
                          block valve located in the turbine building to                                     ;
torus level.
                          compensate for the problem. The Team expressed                                     ;
Because normal torus level is now
                          concern that. the distance between the containment                                 !
maintained below the instrument low level. set-
point, the valve continuously receives an open
signal, thus preventing manual closure.
This
condition has existed for at least several years.
The licensee has relied on closure of a maqual
;
block valve located in the turbine building to
;
compensate for the problem.
The Team expressed
;
concern that. the distance between the containment
!
isolation check valve and the redundant isolation
U
U
                          isolation check valve and the redundant isolation
valve have been unnecessarily extended outside
                          valve have been unnecessarily extended outside
the reactor building. In addition, a lineup that
                          the reactor building. In addition, a lineup that                                   '
                          is inconsistent with the design drawings and
                          operating procedures resulted.                        The WPRT had
                          designated this MR as post-restart. In response
;                          to the Team's concerns, the licensee initiated an
                          Engineerirg Service Request (ESR) to identify an
'
'
                          acceptablo repair.                    The licensee committed to
is inconsistent with the design drawings and
                          resolve tTis item prior to restart.
operating procedures resulted.
                                                                                                              l
The WPRT had
:                          These tw o examples of misscheduled MR's were
designated this MR as post-restart.
                          discussed by licensee management with the WPRT.
In response
i                        In addition, the licensee committed to re-evalu-
;
i                          ate all priority 3 MR's before restart.                                The
to the Team's concerns, the licensee initiated an
                          licenser's process for review and prior tization                                  '
Engineerirg Service Request (ESR) to identify an
!                          of MR's is thorough, and with the exuption of
acceptablo repair.
                          the twc instances described above, appears well
The licensee committed to
l                        implemented. The vffectiveness of the licensee's
'
'
                          plannirg and prioritization program is demon-
resolve tTis item prior to restart.
                          strated by the overall decrease in the number of
l
                          outsta1 ding maintenance tasks, their average age,                                 i
:
                          and their significance.                                                           l
These tw o examples of misscheduled MR's were
discussed by licensee management with the WPRT.
In addition, the licensee committed to re-evalu-
i
i
ate all priority 3 MR's before restart.
The
licenser's process for review and prior tization
'
!
of MR's is thorough, and with the exuption of
the twc instances described above, appears well
l
implemented. The vffectiveness of the licensee's
plannirg and prioritization program is demon-
'
strated by the overall decrease in the number of
outsta1 ding maintenance tasks, their average age,
i
and their significance.
l
3
3
                                                                                                              L
L
                                                                                                              i
i
i
i
                                                                                                              I
I
4
4
                                                                                                              :
:
<                                                                                                           i
i
                                                                                                              :
<
          - ._    - . -   - . . - . _ _ - - _ _ _ - - - . -               - -       - _ . _ _ - . . . - .
:
- .
- . -
- . . - .
- -
- - - . -
- -
- _ . _ _ - . . . -
.


~     -
~
  . >
-
                            45
.
                  The licensee tracks several maintenance perform-
>
                  ance indicators which are indicative of backlog
45
                  status.   Those performance indicators generally
The licensee tracks several maintenance perform-
                  display a favorable trend. The Performance Indi-
ance indicators which are indicative of backlog
                  cator Report for August 9,1988, shows a total
status.
                  backlog of 2177 open MR's, of which 746 are in a
Those performance indicators generally
                  test / turnover status. Of these, 220 cannot be
display a favorable trend. The Performance Indi-
                  tested until the plant system becomes operable
cator Report for August 9,1988, shows a total
                  during startup. Of the 1431 remaining open MR's,
backlog of 2177 open MR's, of which 746 are in a
                  the   licensee has identified 652 required for
test / turnover status.
                  restart.     The physical work had yet to be done
Of these, 220 cannot be
                  for 145 of these 652 MR's. Based on tho above,
tested until the plant system becomes operable
                  and an average closeout rate of about 25 packages
during startup. Of the 1431 remaining open MR's,
                  per week, elimination of the restart backlog
the
                  with)n 6 to 7 weeks appears to be manageable
licensee has identified 652 required for
                  effort.     The licensee's goal, i r, addition to
restart.
                  addressing the restart MR's, is to reduce the
The physical work had yet to be done
                  total number of open MR's from 1431 to less than
for 145 of these 652 MR's.
                  1000 Dy plant restart.   The Team noted that this
Based on tho above,
                  would constitute an acceptable open MR backlog
and an average closeout rate of about 25 packages
                  for an opersting plant, and that the licen>ee's
per week, elimination of the restart backlog
                  goal was reasonable.
with)n 6 to 7 weeks appears to be manageable
        3.3.2.5   Control and Performance of Maintenance
effort.
                  Inspection in this area was performed to deter-
The licensee's goal, i r,
                  mine whether maintenance activities are being
addition to
                  properly controlled through     -tablished proced-
addressing the restart MR's, is to reduce the
                  ures, and the use of approve       2chnical manuals,
total number of open MR's from 1431 to less than
                  drawings and job-specific instructions. Mainten-
1000 Dy plant restart.
                  ance activities were observed to determine how
The Team noted that this
                  well   the new prog am was being implemented.
would constitute an acceptable open MR backlog
                  The new maintenance program is nrimarily defined
for an opersting plant, and that the licen>ee's
                  in Procedures 1.5.3, "Maintenance Requests," and
goal was reasonable.
                  1.5.3.1,   "Maintenance Work Plan," which were
3.3.2.5
                  implemented on June 20, 1988.       The procedures
Control and Performance of Maintenance
                  were reviewed and found to provide strong con-
Inspection in this area was performed to deter-
                  trols for identification, planning, performance,
mine whether maintenance activities are being
                  and closecut of maintenance tasks. Issuance and
properly controlled through
                  control of materials used for replacement / repair
-tablished proced-
                  assure that requisite quality requirements are
ures, and the use of approve
                ' maintained.     Super /isory oversight of work in
2chnical manuals,
                  progress and the final review of work packages
drawings and job-specific instructions. Mainten-
                  for completeness is a strength.       Based on its
ance activities were observed to determine how
                  review of the above procedures and observations
well
                  of work in progress, the Tear concluded that the
the new prog am was being implemented.
                  r,swly defined program provides excellent control
The new maintenance program is nrimarily defined
                  and docu entation of activities.
in Procedures 1.5.3, "Maintenance Requests," and
                                                                      .
1.5.3.1,
"Maintenance Work Plan," which were
implemented
on June 20, 1988.
The procedures
were reviewed and found to provide strong con-
trols for identification, planning, performance,
and closecut of maintenance tasks.
Issuance and
control of materials used for replacement / repair
assure that requisite quality requirements are
' maintained.
Super /isory oversight of work in
progress and the final review of work packages
for completeness is a strength.
Based on its
review of the above procedures and observations
of work in progress, the Tear concluded that the
r,swly defined program provides excellent control
and docu entation of activities.
.


          ,w   . . n. . -           ..       ..               .
,w
      .e-     0
. .
            4
n.
                                      46
. -
                                                                ,
..
                                                                                  !
..
    '
.
        .
.e-
                          .The new program and proced',ies formalize controls-    i
0
t                          that were previously in place, but inconsistently.
4
                            applied and not . recognized by ' procedures.  The
46
                            procedures now require better documentation of
,
                            the initial problem description, the rcpairs          ;
!
                            made, and the post-work test requirements. They    *  '
                            require detailed work instructions, which should
                            provide for consistent high quality in mainten-
                            ance work packages. An. additional improvement in
                            the maintenance procedures is that the mainton-
                                                                                  [
                            ance work plan now provides for detailed documen-      I
                                                                                  I
                            tation of installation and removal of lifted
                            leads and jumpers (LL/J).      This documentation    i
                            assures proper performance of the . task and is        i
                            supplemented by the tracking;provided in the LL/J    !
l                          Log initiated by the Operations Department per        :
                            Procedure 1.5.9.1.                                    ;
'
'
                                                                                  I
.The new program and proced',ies formalize controls-
.                           To eliminate a previously identified weakness,
i
                            the   licensee has     stopped   using Procedure
.
that were previously in place, but inconsistently.
t
applied and not . recognized by ' procedures.
The
procedures now require better documentation of
the initial
problem description,
the rcpairs
;
made, and the post-work test requirements. They
'
*
require detailed work instructions, which should
provide for consistent high quality in mainten-
ance work packages. An. additional improvement in
the maintenance procedures is that the mainton-
[
ance work plan now provides for detailed documen-
I
tation of installation and removal of lifted
I
leads and jumpers (LL/J).
This documentation
i
assures proper performance of the . task and is
i
supplemented by the tracking;provided in the LL/J
!
l
Log initiated by the Operations Department per
:
Procedure 1.5.9.1.
;
'
I
To eliminate a previously identified weakness,
.
the
licensee
has
stopped
using
Procedure
3.M.1-11, "Routine Maintenance," which was found
+
+
                            3.M.1-11, "Routine Maintenance," which was found      ,
,
                            to be too general to adequately control work         i
to be too general to adequately control work
                            activities. Instead, detailed work instructions
i
                            are provided by the work plans prepared in ac-
activities.
l                           cordance with Procedure 1.5.3.1. Further, the
Instead, detailed work instructions
i'                          licensee has stopped using the Maintenance Sum a     i
are provided by the work plans prepared in ac-
                            mary and Control (MSC) form. The documentation
l
;                           provided by the form has been replaced by the
cordance with Procedure 1.5.3.1.
:
Further, the
'
licensee has stopped using the Maintenance Sum a
                            detailed work plans, maintenance logs, and             '
i
                            special process control sheets now required by         '
i'
                                                                                  '
mary and Control (MSC) form.
                            procedure. 1.5.3 and 1.5.3.1.
The documentation
                                                                                  1
;
                            The maintenance activities and packages listed in
provided by the form has been replaced by the
:
detailed
work
plans,
maintenance
logs,
and
'
'
special process control sheets now required by
'
'
'
                                                                                  [
procedure. 1.5.3 and 1.5.3.1.
                            Appendix 0 of this report were reviewed to verify    ,
1
                            proper implementation of program requirements.       '
The maintenance activities and packages listed in
t
[
                            The Team found that detailed work packages were
'
'
                            prepared and in use in the field with adequate         ,
Appendix 0 of this report were reviewed to verify
                            job specific instructions to accomplish the as-     !
,
                            signed tasks.   No ad-hoc changes of the work       '
proper implementation of program requirements.
        .                 scope were observed.      Pre-job briefings were
'
                                                                                ;
t
                            conducted and were appropriate to outline the
The Team found that detailed work packages were
                            activities planned. Coordination and in-process     !
prepared and in use in the field with adequate
                            communications with operations personnel were
,
                                                                                  [i
'
                            proper and assured good control of plant
job specific instructions to accomplish the as-
                            equipment.
!
                                                                                I
scope were observed.
                                                                                  f
Pre-job briefings were
                                                                                t
'
                                                                                i,
signed tasks.
  .
No ad-hoc changes of the work
                                                                                  h
.
                                                                                  ?
conducted and were appropriate to outline the
;
activities planned.
Coordination and in-process
!
communications with operations personnel were
[
proper
and
assured
good
control
of
plant
i
equipment.
I
f
t
i
,
.
h
?
-.- - - - -.-. -


              _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  ..       ..
. .
                                                                  47
. .
                                                        Maintenance   personnel, including contractors,
47
                                                        have been trained in and were knowledgeable about
Maintenance
                                                        the new program and procedure requirements. Al-
personnel,
        '
including
                                                        though the new controls were deemed cumbersome by
contractors,
                                                        some, overall worker attitudes about the new
have been trained in and were knowledgeable about
                                                        procedures were positive. There is a general
the new program and procedure requirements. Al-
                                                        acceptance of the present progra:n and a desire to
though the new controls were deemed cumbersome by
                                                        "do the work right."     Personnel performing the
'
                                                        work wrre qualified, as verified by the training
some, overall worker attitudes about the new
                                                        and qualification status board maintained in the
procedures were positive.
                                                        maf-*.enance shop.
There is a general
                                                        The licensee has made progress in filling vacan-
acceptance of the present progra:n and a desire to
                                                        cies in the. first-line supervisor positions.with
"do the work right."
                                                        personnel having the requisite experience and
Personnel performing the
                                                        expertise in the associated disciplines.         The
work wrre qualified, as verified by the training
                                                        present supervisory staffing is adequate to cover
and qualification status board maintained in the
                                                        work production schedules and provides adeouate
maf-*.enance shop.
                                                        oversight. In an addition 21 program improvement,
The licensee has made progress in filling vacan-
                                                        supervisor review of work packages is now re-
cies in the. first-line supervisor positions.with
                                                        quired by procedure to assure management review
personnel having the requisite experience and
                                                        of packages for completeness. First-line super-
expertise in the associated disciplines.
                                                        visors were ruutinely observed in the field di-
The
                                                        recting work in progress.     Supervisory involve- ')
present supervisory staffing is adequate to cover
                                                        ment was effective to assure completion of work
work production schedules and provides adeouate
                                                        correctly, to help resolve technical problems,
oversight.
                                                        and to coordinate engineering support, as re-
In an addition 21 program improvement,
                                                        quired. The oversight function has been enhanced
supervisor review of work packages is now re-
                                                        by the larger number of first-line supervisors
quired by procedure to assure management review
                                                        who have been relieved of the excessive adminis-
of packages for completeness.
                                                        trative burden associated with planning and pack-
First-line super-
                                                        age prepar' tion.
visors were ruutinely observed in the field di-
                                                        The effectiver.ess of maintenance staff engineers
recting work in progress.
                                                        and system engineers in supporting field activ-
Supervisory involve-
                                                        ities was particularly noted in the repairs for
')
                                                        the fuel pool cooling pump and the repair of RHR
ment was effective to assure completion of work
                                                        discharge valve 288. The engineers are also used
correctly, to help resolve technical problems,
                                                        in the root cause analysis of component failures.
and to coordinate engineering support, as re-
          .                                              The repair of valves 28A and B involved the
quired. The oversight function has been enhanced
                                                        fabrication of new valvo yokes, which resulted in
by the larger number of first-line supervisors
                                                        a large and complicated work control process that
who have been relieved of the excessive adminis-
                                                        was appropriately broken down into several work
trative burden associated with planning and pack-
                                                        packages. Oversight and control of these jobs,
age prepar' tion.
                                                        which spanned several weeks, were notable. The
The effectiver.ess of maintenance staff engineers
                                                        quality of the final product was evident, as was
and system engineers in supporting field activ-
                                                        the welding of the yoke subparts. Good inprocess
ities was particularly noted in the repairs for
the fuel pool cooling pump and the repair of RHR
discharge valve 288. The engineers are also used
in the root cause analysis of component failures.
The repair of valves 28A and B involved the
.
fabrication of new valvo yokes, which resulted in
a large and complicated work control process that
was appropriately broken down into several work
packages.
Oversight and control of these jobs,
which spanned several weeks, were notable. The
quality of the final product was evident, as was
the welding of the yoke subparts. Good inprocess
t
t
  . _ .
. _ .


    -,     -
-,
            it
-
  .,-   ,               ,
i
      ,                             48
. , -
                            controls resulted in an acceptable root weld on
,
                            the first attempt for valve 288.             Although a '
t
                            problem was encountered in the fabrication of the
,
                          yokes (short by 3/8 inches), . this item, consid-
48
                            ered minor, was properly dispositioned by the
,
                            licensee   through Nonconformance       Report (NCR)
controls resulted in an acceptable root weld on
                          88-99.
the first attempt for valve 288.
                3.'3.2.6   Post-Maintenance Testing Program
Although a
                          The licensee's program for identification and
'
                            implementation of post-maintenance testing was
problem was encountered in the fabrication of the
                          considered weak during         previous     inspections.
yokes (short by 3/8 inches), . this item, consid-
                          During the current period, the Team revieweo the
ered minor, was properly dispositioned by the
                            licensee's post-maintenance testing program pro-
licensee
                          cedures and other approved test technical guid-
through Nonconformance
                          ance. A sample of maintenance tasks was reviewed
Report (NCR)
                          to determine if planned testing adequately demon-
88-99.
                          strated correction of the cited deficiency. Test-
3.'3.2.6
                            ing was observed in the field, and completed test
Post-Maintenance Testing Program
                          documentation was       reviewed for thoroughness.
The licensee's program for identification and
                          The licensee recently implemented a major revis-
implementation of post-maintenance testing was
                          ion to Procedure 3.M.1-30, "Post-Work Testing
considered weak during
                          Guidance." The current revision establishes a
previous
                          conservative philosophy designed to ensure that
inspections.
                          prescribed testing verifies correction of the
During the current period, the Team revieweo the
                          original deficiency, as well as potential prob-
licensee's post-maintenance testing program pro-
                          lems which could have resulted from performance
cedures and other approved test technical guid-
                          of the task. Organizational and individual
ance. A sample of maintenance tasks was reviewed
                          responsibilities are clearly defined.         Procedure
to determine if planned testing adequately demon-
                          3.M.1-30     incorporates   by   reference       Station
strated correction of the cited deficiency. Test-
                          Instruction SI-MT.0501, "~os t-Work Test Matrices
ing was observed in the field, and completed test
                          and Guidelines." SI-MT 0301 serves to further
documentation was
                        define the method by which post work testing is
reviewed
                          to be specified and documented.       It includes an
for
                          individual matrix for each type of component
thoroughness.
                        describing the possible maintenance tasks and the
The licensee recently implemented a major revis-
                        corresponding post-work test requirement. Each
ion to Procedure
  ,
3.M.1-30,
                        matrix references an appropriate data sheet which
"Post-Work Testing
                          provides more dctailed testing guidance. Proced-
Guidance."
                        ure 3.M.1-30, in conjunction with SI-MT 0501, is
The current revision establishes a
                          to be used by the Maintenance Planning Division,
conservative philosophy designed to ensure that
                        with needed technical input from other mainten-
prescribed testing verifies correction of the
                        ance department and systems engineering depart-
original deficiency, as well as potential prob-
                        ment personnel, to establish comprehensive test-
lems which could have resulted from performance
                          ing requirements for each maintenance request.
of
                        The testing program as described in these docu-
the
                        ments is well conceived and is considered a
task.
                          strength,
Organizational
and
individual
responsibilities are clearly defined.
Procedure
3.M.1-30
incorporates
by
reference
Station
Instruction SI-MT.0501, "~os t-Work Test Matrices
and Guidelines."
SI-MT 0301 serves to further
define the method by which post work testing is
to be specified and documented.
It includes an
individual matrix for each type of component
describing the possible maintenance tasks and the
corresponding post-work test requirement.
Each
matrix references an appropriate data sheet which
,
provides more dctailed testing guidance. Proced-
ure 3.M.1-30, in conjunction with SI-MT 0501, is
to be used by the Maintenance Planning Division,
with needed technical input from other mainten-
ance department and systems engineering depart-
ment personnel, to establish comprehensive test-
ing requirements for each maintenance request.
The testing program as described in these docu-
ments is well conceived and is considered a
strength,
i
i
i
i
I
I


      ,
,
  ,
,
    _  a.
a.
                    49
_
49
c
c
          The. Team reviewed a sample of ongoing maintenance
The. Team reviewed a sample of ongoing maintenance
            tasks and evaluated the technical adequacy of
tasks and evaluated the technical adequacy of
          prescribed testing. In three of the examples re-
prescribed testing. In three of the examples re-
          viewed, the planned testing was not adequate to
viewed, the planned testing was not adequate to
          ensure proper performance of the task. and com-
ensure proper performance of the task. and com-
          plete correction of the problem:
plete correction of the problem:
          (1) Testing identified for the replacement of       i
(1) Testing identified for the replacement of
                the fuel pool cooling pump _ and _ motor under
i
                MR 86-109, included only motor current and
the fuel pool cooling pump _ and _ motor under
                vibration monitoring.     No pump head / flow
MR 86-109, included only motor current and
                test was specified.
vibration monitoring.
          (2) The package for replacement of a safety 4
No pump head / flow
                related 4160-VAC bus leekout relay under
test was specified.
                MR-88-110   initiall/   contained only the
(2) The package for replacement of a safety 4
                general guidance which should have been used
related 4160-VAC bus leekout relay under
                for development of detailed testing. Subse-
MR-88-110
                quently, suggested testing verified only a
initiall/
                portion   of the lockout relay functions.
contained
          (3) Post-maintenance testing following repair of
only
                a motor operated valve limit switch under MR
the
                88-10-179 was also not adequate to ensure
general guidance which should have been used
                that the prcblem had been completely
for development of detailed testing. Subse-
                corrected.
quently, suggested testing verified only a
          In response to the Team's f_indings, the licensee
portion
          Maintenance Section Manager audited task-ready MR
of the lockout relay functions.
          packages and identified one additional case of
(3) Post-maintenance testing following repair of
          inadequately specified testing. In each of the
a motor operated valve limit switch under MR
          above instances, the licensee subsequently de-
88-10-179 was also not adequate to ensure
          veloped and performed adequate post-work tests.
that
          Discussion with the personnel involved and main-
the
          tenance department management revealed that no
prcblem
          training on the newly developed post-work testing
had
          procedures and guidance had been corducted. The
been
          licensee immediately briefed appropriate super-
completely
          visors and workers on the program, and committed
corrected.
          to complete formal training in this area by
In response to the Team's f_indings, the licensee
          September 9, 1988.     A second potential contrib-
Maintenance Section Manager audited task-ready MR
          utor to the problem in planning post-work tests
packages and identified one additional case of
          is the press of business, particularly in the
inadequately specified testing.
          planning area, in that the planners are currently
In each of the
          just able to keep pace with the schedule for
above instances, the licensee subsequently de-
          field activities.     Liensee management appeared
veloped and performed adequate post-work tests.
          to be sensitive to this issue. The Team reviewed
Discussion with the personnel involved and main-
          an additional sample of in process and completed
tenance department management revealed that no
          MR's and did not identify any further problems.
training on the newly developed post-work testing
procedures and guidance had been corducted. The
licensee immediately briefed appropriate super-
visors and workers on the program, and committed
to complete formal training in this area by
September 9, 1988.
A second potential contrib-
utor to the problem in planning post-work tests
is the press of business, particularly in the
planning area, in that the planners are currently
just able to keep pace with the schedule for
field activities.
Liensee management appeared
to be sensitive to this issue. The Team reviewed
an additional sample of in process and completed
MR's and did not identify any further problems.


      _ __ _ _ _ _
_
' "
__
      n
_ _ _ _
  '-
' "
                                        50
n
                                Overall, the Team concluded that the licensee has
'-
                                established a . thorough post-work testing program
50
                                demonstrating a sound safety perspective.       Al-
Overall, the Team concluded that the licensee has
                                though sne program is generally well implen;ented,
established a . thorough post-work testing program
                                some problems were noted. The newness of the
demonstrating a sound safety perspective.
                                program, the current press of business, and some
Al-
                                weakncss in personnel training appear to be af-     t
though sne program is generally well implen;ented,
                                fecting its implementation. Therefore, this area
some problems were noted.
                                requires continued licensee attention.
The newness of the
          3.3.3    Cor.clusions
program, the current press of business, and some
1
weakncss in personnel training appear to be af-
                    The licensee has established a viable maintenance organiza-
                    tion. Allocated staffing levels have been substantially
                    increased and are sufficient to support routine maintenance      ,
                    activities. Of particular significance is the addition of        i
                                                                                    '
                    first-line supervisory positions, and the creation of an
                    expanded maintenance planning and scheduling division. The
                    licensee has been largely successful in filling previously      ,
                    vacant positicas.      One exception is the staffing of the      l
                    maintenance planning division. While none of the permanent      ;
                    staff in this area is in place, the licensee is effectively      i
                    utilizing contractors to perform tae function. Full staff-
                    ing and training of the planning division is important to
                                                                                      ,
                    improving its overall ef fectiveness. Aggregate management
,                  and supervisory qualifications were also found to be
                    adequate.                                                        !
                                                                                    '
                    Newly revised maintenance and post - ek testing program
                    procedures provide significantly impre..d control and dccu-
                    mentation of field activities.      They also result in an
                    increased emphasis on detailed job planning. Observations
                    by the Team indicate that implementation of the program is      j
.                  generally effective.      Some  implementation problems are
                    evident; however, the problems affect production and not        i
                    the ov.'ity of completed work.      Additional attention  to
                    post-w rk test program applicrtion by the licensee          is  ;
;                  needed.                                                          '
t
t
                    The licenseo appears to have identified and properly pri-      ,
fecting its implementation. Therefore, this area
'                  oritized outstandino maintenance tasks, with only minor        F
requires continued licensee attention.
                    exceptions noted. A process to ensure continued proper          [
3.3.3
                    prioritization has been established.     Both licensee senior  r
Cor.clusions
L                  management and maintenance section management are using a
1
i                  set of indicators to monitor performance.
The licensee has established a viable maintenance organiza-
tion.
Allocated staffing levels have been substantially
increased and are sufficient to support routine maintenance
,
,
                                                                                    !
activities. Of particular significance is the addition of
                                                                                    !
i
                                                                                    L
first-line supervisory positions, and the creation of an
                                                                                    t
'
                                                                                    !
expanded maintenance planning and scheduling division. The
licensee has been largely successful in filling previously
,
vacant positicas.
One exception is the staffing of the
l
maintenance planning division. While none of the permanent
;
staff in this area is in place, the licensee is effectively
i
utilizing contractors to perform tae function. Full staff-
,
ing and training of the planning division is important to
improving its overall ef fectiveness. Aggregate management
and supervisory qualifications were also found to be
,
adequate.
!
'
Newly revised maintenance and post - ek testing program
procedures provide significantly impre..d control and dccu-
mentation of field activities.
They also result in an
increased emphasis on detailed job planning. Observations
by the Team indicate that implementation of the program is
j
generally effective.
Some
implementation problems are
.
evident; however, the problems affect production and not
i
the ov.'ity of completed work.
Additional attention to
post-w rk test program applicrtion by the licensee
is
;
needed.
'
;
t
The licenseo appears to have identified and properly pri-
oritized outstandino maintenance tasks, with only minor
,
F
'
exceptions noted.
A process to ensure continued proper
[
prioritization has been established.
Both licensee senior
r
L
management and maintenance section management are using a
set of indicators to monitor performance.
i
!
,
!
L
t
!


  .. .
..
                            51
.
        In summary, the licensee's current maintenance staff and
51
        program are adequate to suppo-t plant operations.     Con-
In summary, the licensee's current maintenance staff and
        tinued close licensee management monitoring of the newly
program are adequate to suppo-t plant operations.
        implemented program will be required until additional
Con-
        experience is gained. The long-term supaort programs, such
tinued close licensee management monitoring of the newly
        as preventive maintenance, will requir : licensee enhance-
implemented program will be required until
        ment to further strengthen performance.
additional
experience is gained. The long-term supaort programs, such
as preventive maintenance, will requir : licensee enhance-
ment to further strengthen performance.
l
l
l
l
Line 2,898: Line 4,299:
l
l
)-
)-
1
1


                                                                                .
o a
                                      52
    3.4 Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control
        3.4.1    Scope of Review
                  The Team reviewed the licensee's administrative controls
                  and implementation of the surveillance testing and cali-
                  bration control program to assess its adequacy. As part of
                  this review, the Team examined the licensee's corrective
                  action to address past problems which included: ef fec tive-
                  ness of test scheduling; the technical adequacy of proced-
                  ures; and lack of centralized control of the program.      The
                  inspection consisted of a review of various procedures,
                  drawings, and records; observations of testing in progress;
                  and personnel interviews.
        3.4.2    Observations and Findings
                  3.4.2.1    Master Surveillar    Tracking Program              i
                              The Team reviewed the licensee's program for the
                              control and evaluation of surveillance testing
                              and calibration required by the Technical Specif-
                              ications (TS), inservice testing (IST) of pumps
                              and valves required by 10 CFR 50.55.a(g), ans
                              calibration of other safety related instrumenta-
                              tion not specified in TS.      The program is pre-
                              scribed by Procedure No. 1.8, "Master Surveil-
                              lance Tracking Program." The Systems Engineering
                              Division Manager has overall adminsitrative re-
                              sponsibility for the Master Surveillance Tracking
                              Program (MSTP). A plant Surveillance Coordinator
                              has been assigned within the Systems Engineering
                              Division to implement the program, which includes
                              reviewing and approving the various lists, sched-
                              ules, and reports generated by the MSTP, and
                              maintaining the MSTP data base. Each division
                              has appointed a Division Surveillance Coordinator
                              to interface with the plant Surveillarice Coor-
                              dinator.    The  plant Surveillance Coordinator
.
.
                              meets weekly with the Plar t Manager to review the
o
                              status of the surveillance program.
a
                              The purpose of the MSTP is to ensure the timely
52
                              perfnrmance of all surveillance testing.       The
3.4 Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control
                              MSTP data base contains information such as:
3.4.1
                              commitment reference (TS, preventive maintenance,
Scope of Review
                              regulatory commitment, etc.); the applicable
The Team reviewed the licensee's administrative controls
                              procedure number and title; scheduler interval
and implementation of the surveillance testing and cali-
                              and basis; the group responsible for performing
bration control program to assess its adequacy. As part of
this review, the Team examined the licensee's corrective
action to address past problems which included:
ef fec tive-
ness of test scheduling; the technical adequacy of proced-
ures; and lack of centralized control of the program.
The
inspection consisted of a review of various procedures,
drawings, and records; observations of testing in progress;
and personnel interviews.
3.4.2
Observations and Findings
3.4.2.1
Master Surveillar
Tracking Program
i
The Team reviewed the licensee's program for the
control and evaluation of surveillance testing
and calibration required by the Technical Specif-
ications (TS), inservice testing (IST) of pumps
and valves required by 10 CFR 50.55.a(g), ans
calibration of other safety related instrumenta-
tion not specified in TS.
The program is pre-
scribed by Procedure No.
1.8,
"Master Surveil-
lance Tracking Program." The Systems Engineering
Division Manager has overall adminsitrative re-
sponsibility for the Master Surveillance Tracking
Program (MSTP). A plant Surveillance Coordinator
has been assigned within the Systems Engineering
Division to implement the program, which includes
reviewing and approving the various lists, sched-
ules, and reports generated by the MSTP, and
maintaining the MSTP data base.
Each division
has appointed a Division Surveillance Coordinator
to interface with the plant Surveillarice Coor-
dinator.
The
plant
Surveillance
Coordinator
meets weekly with the Plar t Manager to review the
.
status of the surveillance program.
The purpose of the MSTP is to ensure the timely
perfnrmance of all surveillance testing.
The
MSTP data base contains information such as:
commitment reference (TS, preventive maintenance,
regulatory commitment,
etc.);
the
applicable
procedure number and title; scheduler interval
and basis; the group responsible for performing


                                -
_
    _
-
,- ,
,-
                  53
,
          the test / calibration; and the date last performed,
53
          the next due date, and the last date by which the
the test / calibration; and the date last performed,
          surveillance test must be completed (plus 25%
the next due date, and the last date by which the
        date). Completed tests are rescheduled to ensure
surveillance test must be completed (plus 25%
          the combined grace period for any three consecu-
date). Completed tests are rescheduled to ensure
          tive tests does not exceed 3.25 times the spec-
the combined grace period for any three consecu-
          ified surveillance interval'   The accuracy of the
tive tests does not exceed 3.25 times the spec-
        data base was verified by a contractor during the
ified surveillance interval'
        current outage. Procedure No. 1.8 contains spec-
The accuracy of the
          ific controls on changing any of the data fields
data base was verified by a contractor during the
      ,
current outage. Procedure No. 1.8 contains spec-
          in the MSTP data base to maintain its accuracy.
ific controls on changing any of the data fields
        In addition, a second contractor verification of
in the MSTP data base to maintain its accuracy.
        the MSTP data base is scheduled to be performed
,
          in the near future. The Team selected several
In addition, a second contractor verification of
        TS-required surveillance tests to ensure that
the MSTP data base is scheduled to be performed
        they are in the MSTP data base, that' approved
in the near future.
        procedures existed, and that the test frequency
The Team selected several
        was proper.     No discrepancies were identified
TS-required surveillance tests to ensure that
        with the data base during the Team's review; how-
they are in the MSTP data base, that' approved
        ever, the Team was concerned with a potential
procedures existed, and that the test frequency
        problem involving the schedulir;g of once per-
was proper.
        operating-cycle versus once per-refueling-outage
No discrepancies were identified
        tests, as discussed below.
with the data base during the Team's review; how-
        As part of its review, the Team examined the pro-
ever, the Team was concerned with a potential
        cess established by Procedure No. 1.8 to deter-
problem involving the schedulir;g of once per-
        mine its adequacy in ensuring that surveillance
operating-cycle versus once per-refueling-outage
        tests were properly scheduled and performed with-
tests, as discussed below.
        in the required time period.     A "Division List"
As part of its review, the Team examined the pro-
        is issued to each division and to the Control
cess established by Procedure No. 1.8 to deter-
        Room Annex each Friday which provides a schedule
mine its adequacy in ensuring that surveillance
        of tests due for performance the following week.
tests were properly scheduled and performed with-
        A "Monthly Forecast" is also issued weekly to
in the required time period.
        assist the Section Managers in planning and
A "Division List"
        scheduling resources. When a surveillance test
is issued to each division and to the Control
        is satisfactorily completed, the Control Room
Room Annex each Friday which provides a schedule
        Annex copy of the Division List is signed off.
of tests due for performance the following week.
        Daily, the Planning and Scheduling Division
A "Monthly Forecast" is also issued weekly to
        transcribes the completion dates and updates the
assist the Section Managers in planning and
        MSTP data base. A "Surveillance Day File Report"
scheduling resources. When a surveillance test
        is issued daily to identify all changes made to
is satisfactorily completed, the Control Room
        the MSTP data base since the last time the report
Annex copy of the Division List is signed off.
        was issued. This report is reviewed by the Plant
Daily,
        Surveillance Coordinator and used to verify pro-
the
        per transcription and data entry.           "Variance
Planning and Scheduling Division
        Reports" are issued weekly to Section Managers to
transcribes the completion dates and updates the
                                                      _
MSTP data base. A "Surveillance Day File Report"
is issued daily to identify all changes made to
the MSTP data base since the last time the report
was issued. This report is reviewed by the Plant
Surveillance Coordinator and used to verify pro-
per transcription and data entry.
"Variance
Reports" are issued weekly to Section Managers to
_


E. a
E.
    .
.
x
x
                54
a
        identify those surveillance tests that' were-
54
        scheduled, but not performed. A written explana-
identify those
        tion as to why the tests were not performed with-
surveillance
                              ~
tests
        in the required time and why it's act.eptable not
that' were-
        to perform the test is sent to the surveillance
scheduled, but not performed. A written explana-
        coordinator within 24 hours of receipt of the
tion as to why the tests were not performed with-
      Variance Report. A "Priority Notice" is issued
~
        for any surveillance test that has reached its
in the required time and why it's act.eptable not
      deadline date (plus 25% date) and that has not
to perform the test is sent to the surveillance
      been performed by that date to assist in the pre-
coordinator within 24 hours of receipt of the
      vention of TS violations. Failure to perform a
Variance Report.
      TS-required surveillance test on the deadline
A "Priority Notice" is issued
      date requires submission of a Failure and Mal-
for any surveillance test that has reached its
        function Report.. The Team reviewed samples of
deadline date (plus 25% date) and that has not
      each of the above reports, and their responses,
been performed by that date to assist in the pre-
      and concluded that the program was adequate and
vention of TS violations.
      contained sufficient checks to ensure that sur-
Failure to perform a
      veillance tests were completed within the
TS-required surveillance test on the deadline
      required time.
date requires submission of a Failure and Mal-
      Although the Team found the administrative con-
function Report.. The Team reviewed samples of
      trol and implementation of the MSTP to be ade-
each of the above reports, and their responses,
      quate, it noted a commitment by licensee manage-
and concluded that the program was adequate and
      ment to improve the program. These improvements
contained sufficient checks to ensure that sur-
      include: replacing the Division Lists with task
veillance
      cards to reduce the potential for transcription
tests
      errors; adding an alert notice when a scheduled
were
      test is not performed; improving the scheduling
completed
      of conditional surveillances; planning for the
within
      addition of a full-time surveillance engineer;
the
      and instituting an equipment history computer
required time.
      program capable of trending surveillance /calibra-
Although the Team found the administrative con-
      tion results on individual components.
trol and implementation of the MSTP to be ade-
      The Team identified one concern during its review
quate, it noted a commitment by licensee manage-
      related to the scheduling of once per-operating-
ment to improve the program.
      cycle versus once per-refueling-outage surveil-
These improvements
      lance tests. The Pilgrim Technical Specifica-
include:
      tinns define an operating cycle as the interval
replacing the Division Lists with task
  ,    between the end of one refueling outage and the
cards to reduce the potential for transcription
      end of the next subsequent refueling outage. A
errors; adding an alert notice when a scheduled
      refueling outage is the period of time between
test is not performed; improving the scheduling
      the shutdown of the unit prior to refueling and
of conditional surveillances; planning for the
      the startup of the plant after that refueling.
addition of a full-time surveillance engineer;
      The TS contains some surveillance requirements
and instituting an equipment history computer
      that are specified to be performed once per oper-
program capable of trending surveillance /calibra-
      ating cycle, while there are others, such as
tion results on individual components.
      testing the drywell-to-suppression-chamber vacuum
The Team identified one concern during its review
      breakers, which are to be performed during each
related to the scheduling of once per-operating-
cycle versus once per-refueling-outage surveil-
lance tests.
The Pilgrim Technical Specifica-
tinns define an operating cycle as the interval
between the end of one refueling outage and the
,
end of the next subsequent refueling outage.
A
refueling outage is the period of time between
the shutdown of the unit prior to refueling and
the startup of the plant after that refueling.
The TS contains some surveillance requirements
that are specified to be performed once per oper-
ating cycle, while there are others, such as
testing the drywell-to-suppression-chamber vacuum
breakers, which are to be performed during each


                                        _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
, .o
,
    r
.o
                          '55
r
                  refueling outage.   Also, all the safety-related
'55
                  instruments not specified in the TS are cali-
refueling outage.
                brated once per refueling outage. As part of a
Also, all the safety-related
                previously identified issue, the licensee has                                                             ;
instruments not specified in the TS are cali-
                defined once per-operating-cycle to be 18 months;                                                         i
brated once per refueling outage. As part of a
                however, no clarification has been provided for
previously identified issue, the licensee has
                once per-refueling-outage. As a result, there
;
                are several     once per-refueling-outage tests /                                                         l
defined once per-operating-cycle to be 18 months;
                calibrations which were performed in 1986 and
i
                  1987 which are currently scheduled on the MSTP
however, no clarification has been provided for
                  for the "next refueling outage," which is.
once per-refueling-outage.
                projected for some time in 1991.                                                                           i
As a result, there
                Therefore, by strictly interpreting the defini-
are
                tions, the interval for some of the once per-                                                             t
several
                refueling outage surveillance tests could be as
once per-refueling-outage
                long as four or five-years. The Team pointed out
tests /
                that this appears to be beyond the intent of the
l
                TS.   The Team also noted that a licensee task
calibrations which were performed in 1986 and
                force established to determine system operability
1987 which are currently scheduled on the MSTP
                prior to restart had also identified this issue
for
                and recommended that evaluations be performed on
the
                the once per-refueling-outage surveillance tests
"next
                to determine if and when they should be reper-
refueling
                formed. The * 'censee committed to evaluate the
outage," which
                status   of the once-per-refueling-surveillance
is.
                tests and provide justification for those tests
projected for some time in 1991.
                not rescheduled, prior to restart.
i
        3.4.2.2 Logic System Functional Test and Simulated
Therefore, by strictly interpreting the defini-
                Automatic Actuation Procedures
tions, the interval for some of the once per-
                The   Team reviewed         the                                                 procedures     listed in
t
                Appendix 0 of this report to determine the ade-
refueling outage surveillance tests could be as
                quacy of the licensee's performance of logic
long as four or five-years. The Team pointed out
                system functional tests (LSFT) and simulated                                                               ,
that this appears to be beyond the intent of the
                automatic actuations (SAA). The review consisted
TS.
                of the indicated channel / train of the primary
The Team also noted that a licensee task
                containment isolation system (PCIS) and the
force established to determine system operability
                reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system LSFT
prior to restart had also identified this issue
                and SAA, and the diesel generator (DG) initiation
and recommended that evaluations be performed on
                LSFT.   The procedures were reviewed against the                                                           '
the once per-refueling-outage surveillance tests
                system drawings to ensure that they were tech-                                                             !
to determine if and when they should be reper-
                nically adequate, that all relays and contacts
formed.
                were tested, that the procedures were properly                                                             ,
The * 'censee committed to evaluate the
                approved, and that the tests were performed at                                                             ,
status
                the required frequency.                                                           The licensee uses a
of
                series of overlapping tests to satisfy the LSFT
the
      .
once-per-refueling-surveillance
tests and provide justification for those tests
not rescheduled, prior to restart.
3.4.2.2
Logic System Functional Test and Simulated
Automatic Actuation Procedures
The
Team reviewed
the
procedures
listed in
Appendix 0 of this report to determine the ade-
quacy of the licensee's performance of logic
system functional
tests (LSFT) and simulated
,
automatic actuations (SAA). The review consisted
of the indicated channel / train of the primary
containment
isolation
system (PCIS)
and
the
reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system LSFT
and SAA, and the diesel generator (DG) initiation
LSFT.
The procedures were reviewed against the
'
system drawings to ensure that they were tech-
!
nically adequate, that all relays and contacts
were tested, that the procedures were properly
,
approved, and that the tests were performed at
,
the required frequency.
The licensee uses a
series of overlapping tests to satisfy the LSFT
.


  , -       c.
, -
      c   s
c.
  G                           56
c
                                                                          1
s
                                                                          ?
G
"
56
                    and SAA. The Team noted that the licensee had a     ,
1
                    contractor review the adequacy of the LSFT and
?
                    SAA tests during this outage.       The contractor
and SAA. The Team noted that the licensee had a
                    identified several deficiencies, which were cor-     i
"
                    rected.   The Team found that each procedure re-
,
                    viewed was technically adequate and that the
contractor review the adequacy of the LSFT and
                    testing sequence satisfied the Technical Specifi--
SAA tests during this outage.
                    cation LSFT and SAA frequency and scope require-
The contractor
                    ments.     The Team also noted that the format of
identified several deficiencies, which were cor-
                    the procedures was adequate and included:         en-
i
                    vironmental' qualification quality control (QC)
rected.
                  <
The Team found that each procedure re-
                    witness points on transmitter calibrations;           i
viewed was technically adequate and that the
                    double verification on lifting and landing leads;     !
testing sequence satisfied the Technical Specifi--
                    fuse holder fit checks; and I&C management review
cation LSFT and SAA frequency and scope require-
                    upon test completion prior to the NWE review.         i
ments.
                    Ouring the review of the RCIC isolation subsystem
The Team also noted that the format of
                    LSFT, the Team questioned why there was no LSFT
the procedures was adequate and included:
                    on initiation logic. The Team acknowledged that
en-
                    it was not required by TS Table 4.2.B nor was
vironmental' qualification quality control (QC)
                    credit taken for it in the FSAR. However, TS
witness
                    3.5.0.1 re.Jires RCIC be operable (with reactor
points
                    pressure greater than 150 psig and coolant tem-
on
                    perature greater than 365 degrees F) and the TS
transmitter
                    definition of system operability requires that
calibrations;
                    all subsystems also be operable.         This would
i
                    include the RCIC initiation logic.         Also, the~
<
                    guidance provided by the Standard Technical Spec-
double verification on lifting and landing leads;
                    ifications indicates that an LSFT on the RCIC
!
                    initiation logic should be performed every six       l
fuse holder fit checks; and I&C management review
                    months. The Team noted that Procedure No. 8.M.2-
upon test completion prior to the NWE review.
                    2.6.7,   "RCIC Simulated Automatic     Actuation,"
i
                    actually performs an initiation logic LFST; how-     ;
Ouring the review of the RCIC isolation subsystem
;                   ever, it is scheduled at a once per-18-month fre-     !
LSFT, the Team questioned why there was no LSFT
;                   quency, while TS-required LSFT's have a frequency
on initiation logic. The Team acknowledged that
l       ,          of once per 6 months.       This item is unresolved
it was not required by TS Table 4.2.B
i                   pending a licensee evaluation of the adequacy of
nor was
i                   the RCIC initiation logic LSFT frequency (88-21-     i
credit taken for it in the FSAR.
                    02). The licensee committed to pcovide, before       i
However, TS
                    restart, the technical basis for the surveillance     [
3.5.0.1 re.Jires RCIC be operable (with reactor
                    frequency.
pressure greater than 150 psig and coolant tem-
perature greater than 365 degrees F) and the TS
definition of system operability requires that
all subsystems also be operable.
This would
include the RCIC initiation logic.
Also, the~
guidance provided by the Standard Technical Spec-
ifications indicates that an LSFT on the RCIC
initiation logic should be performed every six
l
months. The Team noted that Procedure No. 8.M.2-
2.6.7,
"RCIC
Simulated Automatic
Actuation,"
actually performs an initiation logic LFST; how-
;
;
ever, it is scheduled at a once per-18-month fre-
!
;
quency, while TS-required LSFT's have a frequency
l
of once per 6 months.
This item is unresolved
,
i
pending a licensee evaluation of the adequacy of
i
the RCIC initiation logic LSFT frequency (88-21-
i
02).
The licensee committed to pcovide, before
i
restart, the technical basis for the surveillance
[
frequency.
3.4.2.3
Calibration Procedures
7
7
            3.4.2.3 Calibration Procedures
!
!
                    The Team noted that the licensee established a       !
The Team noted that the licensee established a
!                  series of procedures, known as the 6.E series, to     :
!
,                  calibrate the safety-related instrumentation not     p
series of procedures, known as the 6.E series, to
                    specified in the Technical Specifications.     This
:
calibrate the safety-related instrumentation not
p
,
specified in the Technical Specifications.
This


                                                                                                                                                                _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _             __ .
,
                                ,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
    .        .
__ .
                                                                                                                        57
.
                                                                                              instrumentation is normally used to record data
.
                                                                                              necessary to complete TS required surveillance                                                         i
57
                                                                                              tests or inservice testing of pumps and valves.
instrumentation is normally used to record data
                                                                                              The 8.E procedures are scheduled on a once per-
necessary to complete TS required surveillance
                                                                                              refueling-outage interval.
i
                                                                                              The Team performed a detailed review of Proced-
tests or inservice testing of pumps and valves.
                                                                                              ures No. 8.E.11, "Standby Liquid Control System
The 8.E procedures are scheduled on a once per-
                                                                                              Instrument Calibration," and 8.E.13, "RCIC System
refueling-outage interval.
                                                                                              Instrument Calibration." Overall, the Tecm found                                                       i
The Team performed a detailed review of Proced-
                                                                                              the technical content and format to be adequate;                                                       '
ures No. 8.E.11, "Standby Liquid Control System
                                                                                              however, two discrapancies were identified. Pro-                                                       :
Instrument Calibration," and 8.E.13, "RCIC System
                                                                                              cedure No. 8.E.11 does not calibrate pressure
Instrument Calibration." Overall, the Tecm found
.'                                                                                            indicator (PI) 1159. This PI was installed dur-
i
                                                                                              ing the current outage and is used in the per-
the technical content and format to be adequate;
                                                                                              formance of Procedure No. 8.4.1, "Stendby Liquid
'
however, two discrapancies were identified.
Pro-
:
cedure No. 8.E.11 does not calibrate pressure
indicator (PI) 1159.
This PI was installed dur-
.'
ing the current outage and is used in the per-
formance of Procedure No. 8.4.1, "Stendby Liquid
'
Control Pump Operability and Flow Rate Test."
The Team also noted that Procedure No. 8.E.13
does not calibrate PI 1340-2. This PI is used in
the performance' of Procedure No. 8.5.5.1, "RCIC
,
Pump Operability Flow Rate and Valve Test 9 1,000
;
psig."
PI 1340-2 was installed and last cali-
brated during the 1984 outage when pressure
i
transmitter 1360-19 was replaced with a Rosemount
Transmitter.
The licensee indicated that the
i
procedures .sould be
revised to correct the
l
deficiencies.
1
3.4.2.4
Survefilance Test Observations
'
'
                                                                                              Control Pump Operability and Flow Rate Test."
                                                                                              The Team also noted that Procedure No. 8.E.13
                                                                                              does not calibrate PI 1340-2. This PI is used in
,                                                                                            the performance' of Procedure No. 8.5.5.1, "RCIC
                                                                                              Pump Operability Flow Rate and Valve Test 9 1,000
;                                                                                            psig." PI 1340-2 was installed and last cali-
                                                                                              brated during the 1984 outage when pressure
i                                                                                            transmitter 1360-19 was replaced with a Rosemount
                                                                                              Transmitter. The licensee indicated that the
i                                                                                            procedures .sould be                      revised to correct the
l                                                                                            deficiencies.
1
,
,
.
.
                                                            3.4.2.4                        Survefilance Test Observations
On August 16, 1988, the Team observed a portion
                                                                                                                                                                                                      '
'
'
                                                                                            On August 16, 1988, the Team observed a portion
of the performance of Procedure No. 8.M.2-2.10.
                                                                                            of the performance of Procedure No. 8.M.2-2.10.
1-5,
                                                                                              1-5,               "Core Spray System                 'B' Logic Functional                             !
"Core Spray System
'B'
Logic Functional
!
!
                                                                                            Test," Revision 13.                       The test was performed as                                     !
!
j                                                                                           part of the restoration of the "B" Core Spray                                                           l
Test," Revision 13.
j                                                                                           System and as post work testing of relay 14A-
The test was performed as
                                                                                                                    The test was observed to ensure it was
!
j
part of the restoration of the
"B" Core Spray
l
j
System and as post work testing of relay 14A-
K208.
The test was observed to ensure it was
'
performed in accordance with a properly approved
'
and adequate procedure.
During the test, the
i
Team noted that the technicians' performance was
t
,
.
adequate. They conducted the test in a slow and
deliberate manner and stopped when questions
,
arose concerning mislabelled nameplates and the
'
identification of some relay coil leads.
In both
i
cases, the questions were resolved before they
proceeded.
The Team noted that the I&C first-
line supervisor monitored portions of the test.
.
The test was also monitored by QA personnel as
part of the surveillance monitoring program. QA
i
personnel indicated that they observe approxi-
j
mately one surveillance test a week.
~
'
'
                                                                                            K208.
                                                                                            performed in accordance with a properly approved                                                        '
                                                                                            and adequate procedure. During the test, the                                                            i
,  .                                                                                        Team noted that the technicians' performance was                                                        t
                                                                                            adequate. They conducted the test in a slow and
,                                                                                            deliberate manner and stopped when questions
                                                                                            arose concerning mislabelled nameplates and the                                                          '
                                                                                              identification of some relay coil leads. In both                                                        i'
                                                                                            cases, the questions were resolved before they
                                                                                            proceeded. The Team noted that the I&C first-
.                                                                                            line supervisor monitored portions of the test.
                                                                                            The test was also monitored by QA personnel as
                                                                                            part of the surveillance monitoring program. QA                                                          i
                                                                                            personnel indicated that they observe approxi-                                                          j
                                                                                            mately one surveillance test a week.                                                                    ~
                                                                                                                                                                                                      '
.
.
.\                                                                                                                                                                                                   l
.\\
t                                                                                                                                                                                                     l
l
                                                                                                                                                                                                      1
t
      . - - _ , - _ - - , - , -   . . , , , , , , . _ - , . - . _ , - _ , , , , . - . - , _ _ . , , , _ . - . , , _ , . ,_,   - . , _ ,   , . . , ,     . - - ,                     -- ..,,,e . --
l
1
. - - _ , - _ - - , - , -
. . , , , , , , . _ - , . - . _ , - _ , , , , . - . - , _ _ . , , , _ . - . , , _ , . ,_,
- . , _ ,
, . . , ,
. - - ,
--
..,,,e
. --


                  . . _               _
.
                                                                                    _
.
              *
_
  ~4~
_
    9
_
          f:  ,
~4 f:
                                        -58
*
        i
9
                                The test was stopped at Step 25 when the test
~
                                results did not agree with the expected results
,
                                delineated in the procedure. The step was sup-
-58
i
The test was stopped at Step 25 when the test
results did not agree with the expected results
delineated in the procedure.
The step was sup-
posed to verify the instantaneous pickup of the
-
-
                                posed to verify the instantaneous pickup of the
core spray pump start relay 14A-K128. Subsequent
                                core spray pump start relay 14A-K128. Subsequent     ,
,
;                               licensee investigation revealed that the instan-
;
                                taneous pickup was removed as part c,f the de-
licensee investigation revealed that the instan-
                                graded grid voltage modification (Plant Design
taneous pickup was removed as part c,f the de-
                                Change (PDC) 88-07). The Team noted that PDC           .
graded grid voltage modification (Plant Design
                                88-07 had not yet been closed; however, an impact     !
Change (PDC) 88-07).
                                review performed prior to installing the modifi-
The Team noted that PDC
                                cation failed to identify Procedure 8.M.2-2.10.
.
                                1-5 as being affected by the PDC.
88-07 had not yet been closed; however, an impact
                                The Team noted that one of the licensee's self-
!
                                assessment action items was to review the impact
review performed prior to installing the modifi-
cation failed to identify Procedure 8.M.2-2.10.
1-5 as being affected by the PDC.
The Team noted that one of the licensee's self-
assessment action items was to review the impact
of PDC's
(installed
since October
1987) on
"
"
                                of PDC's      (installed since October 1987) on
L5FT's.
                                L5FT's.     The   licensee's review began       on
The
  ,
licensee's
                                October 1987 because this was the completion date
review
began
on
October 1987 because this was the completion date
,
of the contractor review noted above which ver-
*
*
                                of the contractor review noted above which ver-
ified the adequacy of LSFT/SAA tests.
3'                              ified the adequacy of LSFT/SAA tests. The Team
The Team
i                              noted that the contractor review produced an
3'
noted that the contractor review produced an
i
LSFT/SAA data base which cross references the
*
*
'
'
                                LSFT/SAA data base which cross references the
safety-related components tested to the appli-
                                safety-related components tested to the appli-
cable LSFT/SAA test.
                                cable LSFT/SAA test. This data was being used
This data was being used
                                during the licensee's review. Four of the five
during the licensee's review.
                                PDC's involved in the licensee's review of impact
Four of the five
                                on LSFT's have been completed. The remaining PDC
PDC's involved in the licensee's review of impact
                                (88-07) was under review when the problem with
on LSFT's have been completed. The remaining PDC
                                the core spray LSFT was noted. Twenty-one pro-
(88-07) was under review when the problem with
the core spray LSFT was noted.
Twenty-one pro-
i
i
cedures have been identified as possibly being
'
'
                                cedures have been identified as possibly being
affected by the PDC and are currently under
                                affected by the PDC and are currently under
review.
                                review.   The CS functional te3t appears to be the
The CS functional te3t appears to be the
                                only affected test run prior to completion of the
only affected test run prior to completion of the
!                               PDC procedure review,
!
PDC procedure review,
t
t
'
The licensee indicated that a possible future
                                The licensee indicated that a possible future
e                              improvement will be to use the LSFT/SAA data base
l                              to determine the impact of a PDC on procedures
j      .
                                before implementing the modification.
                        3.4.2.5 Measuring and Test Equipment
                                The Tea;n reviewed records, interviewed personnel,
                                and toured storage areas to determine the ade-
:                              quacy of the licensee's program for control of
'                              measuring and test equipment (M&TE). Administra-
,                              tive control of the program is established by
l                              Procedure No.      1.3.36, "Measurement and Test
                                Equipment."
'
'
improvement will be to use the LSFT/SAA data base
e
l
to determine the impact of a PDC on procedures
before implementing the modification.
j
.
3.4.2.5
Measuring and Test Equipment
The Tea;n reviewed records, interviewed personnel,
and toured storage areas to determine the ade-
:
quacy of the licensee's program for control of
measuring and test equipment (M&TE). Administra-
'
tive control of the program is established by
,
l
Procedure No.
1.3.36,
"Measurement
and Test
'
Equipment."
i
i


            . - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _-.                                                               - _ - _ _ _
. - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _-.
          ,                             -.
- _ - _ _ _
                                                                                                                                                    59
,
                                                                                                                                                                                                            ,
-.
                                                                                                                                                                                                            !
59
                                          ,
,
                                                                                                                                          The licensee has implemented a computerized sys-                 .
!
                                                                                                                                          tem to issue and track M&lE. This system will
,
                                                                                                                                          only allow issuance equipment to authorized per-
The licensee has implemented a computerized sys-
                                                                                                                                                -
.
                                                                                                                                          sonnel, will limit the checkout period to only 24               !
tem to issue and track M&lE.
                                                                                                                                          hours, and will not issue M&TE if the sticker                   r
This system will
                                                                                                                                          calibration date does not match the calibration
only allow issuance equipment to authorized per-
                                                                                                                                          date in the computer. The system also issues a
-
                                                                                                                                          PATE traveler form to the user to identify usage
sonnel, will limit the checkout period to only 24
                                                                                                                                          on each plant device tested and each M&TE range
!
                                                                                                                                          used. This data is later entered into.the com-                   -
hours, and will not issue M&TE if the sticker
                                                                                                                                          puter to assist in evaluations if and when a                     l
r
                                                                                                                                          piece of M&TE is found to be out of calibration.
calibration date does not match the calibration
                                                                                                                                          The Team reviewed two cases where M&TE was out of
date in the computer. The system also issues a
                                                                                                                                          calibratinn and noted that the evaluations per-
PATE traveler form to the user to identify usage
                                                                                                                                          formed were documented in accordance with proced-
on each plant device tested and each M&TE range
:                                                                                                                                         ures   and appeared thorough.     Thus far, only
used.
                                                                                                                                          electrical I&C and electrical PATE are on the new
This data is later entered into.the com-
                                                                                                                                          computerized system; however, similar controls
-
                                                                                                                                          are being manually implemented for mechanical
puter to assist in evaluations if and when a
                                                                                                                                          equipment until it is incorporated into the new
l
                                                                                                                                          system.
piece of M&TE is found to be out of calibration.
,
The Team reviewed two cases where M&TE was out of
l                                                                                                                                        The licensee currently has two storage areas for
calibratinn and noted that the evaluations per-
                                                                                                                                          M&TE:   ene for electrical /I&C and one for mech-               ,
formed were documented in accordance with proced-
:
ures
and appeared thorough.
Thus far, only
electrical I&C and electrical PATE are on the new
computerized system; however, similar controls
are being manually implemented for mechanical
equipment until it is incorporated into the new
system.
,
The licensee currently has two storage areas for
l
M&TE:
ene for electrical /I&C and one for mech-
,
anical equipment.
The Team toured each area and
a
a
                                                                                                                                          anical equipment.    The Team toured each area and
noted that the equipment was identified by a
                                                                                                                                          noted that the equipment was identified by a
unique number and indicated calibration status.
                                                                                                                                          unique number and indicated calibration status.                   ,
,
                                                                                                                                          The Team found that the equipment was properly
The Team found that the equipment was properly
i                                                                                                                                        stored and that P4TE out-of-calibration, on hold
stored and that P4TE out-of-calibration, on hold
;                                                                                                                                         for repairs, or new equipment not yet in the sys-
i
;                                                                                                                                         tem, were properly identified and segregated.
;
i                                                                                                                                        The licensee indicated plans to go to only one
for repairs, or new equipment not yet in the sys-
                                                                                                                                          storage arer and to increase the number of staff
;
!                                                                                                                                        issuing and controlling the P4TE.
tem, were properly identified and segregated.
                                                                                                                                                                                                            '
i
i
!                                                                                                                                         The Team also reviewed the system for recalling
The licensee indicated plans to go to only one
)                                                                                                                                         equipment for calibration.     The recall tracking               !
storage arer and to increase the number of staff
                                                                                                                                          is performed in accordance with Procedure No,                     t
!
issuing and controlling the P4TE.
'
i
!
The Team also reviewed the system for recalling
)
equipment for calibration.
The recall tracking
!
is performed in accordance with Procedure No,
t
1.8.2, "PM Tracking Program." The Team reviewed
l
,
,
                                                                                                                                          1.8.2, "PM Tracking Program." The Team reviewed                  l
severa' equipment calibration stickers during its
          ,                                                                                                                              severa' equipment calibration stickers during its
,
                                                                                                                                          tour of the storage areas and during observations                 I
tour of the storage areas and during observations
                                                                                                                                          of ongoing surveillance and maintenance activ-                   t
I
                                                                                                                                          ities.   No equipment past its calibration due
of ongoing surveillance and maintenance activ-
:                                                                                                                                         date was identified.                                             '
t
ities.
No equipment past its calibration due
:
date was identified.
'
1
1
:                                                                                                                                         The Team found the licensee's control of measur-
:
;                                                                                                                                         ing and test equipment to be adequate.                           L
The Team found the licensee's control of measur-
{                                                                                                                                                                                                           r
;
ing and test equipment to be adequate.
L
{
r
!
!
                                                                                                                                                                                                            l
l
;                                                                                                                                                                                                           L
;
                                                                                                                                                                                                            !
L
                                                                                                                                                                                                            :
!
                                                                                                                                                                                                            I
:
                                                                                                                                                                                                            1
I
  _ _ _ _                                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                                                    _ . _ _ _ . -
1
.
.
.
. -


                                      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .     __           _ _ _ _ . _____ ___
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
  ,   a
__
                        60
_ _ _ _ .
        3.4.2.6 Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves
_____ ___
                The Team reviewed the status of the licensee's
,
                program for inservice testing of pumps and valves
a
                in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure
60
                Vessel Code, Section XI.
3.4.2.6
                The licensee submitted Revision 1A to the inser-
Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves
                vice test (IST) program on October 24, 1985. A
The Team reviewed the status of the licensee's
                meeting was held between BECo and the NRC on
program for inservice testing of pumps and valves
                January 14, 1988, to discuss the licensee's pro-
in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure
                posed Revision 2 to the IST program. To minimize
Vessel Code, Section XI.
                impact on the NRC review cycle, the licensee sub-
The licensee submitted Revision 1A to the inser-
                niitted an interim IST program, Revision 18, on
vice test (IST) program on October 24, 1985.
                March 14, 1988, to address concerns identified by
A
                the NRC during review of Revision 1A. The licen-
meeting was held between BECo and the NRC on
                see plans to subm!t Revision 2 af ter the Safety
January 14, 1988, to discuss the licensee's pro-
                Eva'.uation Report on Revision IB is issued. Pe-
posed Revision 2 to the IST program. To minimize
                vision 2 is to maintain the upgrades made to the
impact on the NRC review cycle, the licensee sub-
                program in Revision 18 and increase the program
niitted an interim IST program, Revision 18, on
                scope by adding more components (e.g., relief
March 14, 1988, to address concerns identified by
                valves).
the NRC during review of Revision 1A. The licen-
                Control of the IST Program is established by Pro-
see plans to subm!t Revision 2 af ter the Safety
                cedure No.   8.I.1, "Administration of Inservice
Eva'.uation Report on Revision IB is issued. Pe-
                Pump and Valve Testing."               The Team reviewed the
vision 2 is to maintain the upgrades made to the
                procedure and noted that while it defines the                                 ,
program in Revision 18 and increase the program
                methodology for compliance to the IST program for
scope by adding more components
                pumps and valves, including analysis of test
(e.g.,
;               data, direction on corrective action, and estab-
relief
l               lishment of reference values (additional guidance
valves).
                is contained in Procedure No. 8. I .3, "Inservice
Control of the IST Program is established by Pro-
                Test Analysis and Documentation Methods"), the
cedure No.
                organizational responsibilities and referenced
8.I.1,
                IST program revision need to be updated.                       For
"Administration of Inservice
                example, the pump and valve testing is now sched-
Pump and Valve Testing."
                uled through the MSTP instead f.,f the compliance
The Team reviewed the
                group, and a Senior ASME Test Engineer has been
procedure and noted that while it defines the
                hired to implement the program.                 The licensee
,
    .
methodology for compliance to the IST program for
                acknowledged the Team's comments and showed it a
pumps and valves, including analysis of test
                draf t revision to Procedure 8.I, which is sched-
;
                uled to be implemented when Revision 2 is submit-
data, direction on corrective action, and estab-
                ted. The Team reviewed the draf t procedure and
l
                noted that     it provided additicnal detail on:
lishment of reference values (additional guidance
is contained in Procedure No. 8. I .3, "Inservice
Test Analysis and Documentation Methods"), the
organizational
responsibilities and referenced
IST program revision need to be updated.
For
example, the pump and valve testing is now sched-
uled through the MSTP instead
f.,f
the compliance
group, and a Senior ASME Test Engineer has been
hired to implement the program.
The licensee
acknowledged the Team's comments and showed it a
.
draf t revision to Procedure 8.I, which is sched-
uled to be implemented when Revision 2 is submit-
ted.
The Team reviewed the draf t procedure and
noted that
it provided additicnal detail on:


  _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .. _ __-
_ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .. _ __-
,                .
                                                                  61
                                                        responsibilities, definitions, test requirements,
                                                        compliance requirements, evaluation, disposition,
                                                        post-maintenance testing, and administration and
                                                        records maintenance. The draft procedure also
                                                        provides a listing of the pumps and valves cur-
                                                        rently within the testing program and includes a
                                                        cross-reference for individual test requirements
                                                        to the approved PNPS procedure.
                                                        The Team noted that other improvements (planned
                                                        or in progress) to the IST program include revis-
                                                        ing all the implementing procedures to upgrade
                                                        them to Revision 2 and creating a position for a
                                                        second ASME test engineer.
                                                        The Team reviewed several pump and valve test
                                                        results for the standby liguid control, core
                                                        spray, salt service water and low pressure cool-
                                                        ant injection systems to verify that the accept-
                                                        ance criteria were met, that the results were
                                                        properly evaluated and trended, and that the fre-
                                                        quency of testing was increased when required.
                                                        The Team noted that Procedure No. 8.I contains
                                                        controls to change the MSTP data base test fre-
                                                        quency when the deviations fall within the alert
                                                        range. The Team reviewed changes to various pump
                                                        reference values to ensure that they were justi-
                                                        fied and documented.      The Team also checked the
                                                        reactor buildirg closed cooling water, salt ser-
                                                        vice water, and standby liquid control system
                                                        pumps to ensure that the IST vibration data point
                                                        was properly marud. No deficiencies were iden-
                                                        tified during this review.
                                      3.4.3 Conclusions
                                            Based on observations, personnel intervieus, and the review
                                            of procedures and records noted above, the Team concluded
                                            that:
,
,
                                            1.   The licensee has established and is implementing an
.
                                                  adequate and effective program to control all surveil-
61
                                                  lance activities at PNPS.
responsibilities, definitions, test requirements,
                                            2.   Responsibility for implementing the MSTP has been
compliance requirements, evaluation, disposition,
                                                  p! aced   in a   centralized, strong, forward-looking
post-maintenance testing, and administration and
                                                  division.
records maintenance.
The draft procedure also
provides a listing of the pumps and valves cur-
rently within the testing program and includes a
cross-reference for individual test requirements
to the approved PNPS procedure.
The Team noted that other improvements (planned
or in progress) to the IST program include revis-
ing all the implementing procedures to upgrade
them to Revision 2 and creating a position for a
second ASME test engineer.
The Team reviewed several pump and valve test
results for the standby liguid control, core
spray, salt service water and low pressure cool-
ant injection systems to verify that the accept-
ance criteria were met, that the results were
properly evaluated and trended, and that the fre-
quency of testing was increased when required.
The Team noted that Procedure No. 8.I contains
controls to change the MSTP data base test fre-
quency when the deviations fall within the alert
range. The Team reviewed changes to various pump
reference values to ensure that they were justi-
fied and documented.
The Team also checked the
reactor buildirg closed cooling water, salt ser-
vice water, and standby liquid control system
pumps to ensure that the IST vibration data point
was properly marud.
No deficiencies were iden-
tified during this review.
3.4.3
Conclusions
Based on observations, personnel intervieus, and the review
of procedures and records noted above, the Team concluded
that:
,
1.
The licensee has established and is implementing an
adequate and effective program to control all surveil-
lance activities at PNPS.
2.
Responsibility for implementing the MSTP has been
p! aced
in
a
centralized,
strong,
forward-looking
division.


_-
_-
                                                                q
q
  O O                                                           l
O
                                                                  l
O
                                                                  1
62
                        62
3.
                                                                  l
The licensee was adequately implementing the IST pro-
                                                                  l
gram for pumps and valves.
                                                                  I
The Team noted that there
      3. The licensee was adequately implementing the IST pro-
are several
          gram for pumps and valves. The Team noted that there
planned
          are several planned improvements to the program
improvements
          involving administrative and implementing procedures
to
          and staffing to upgrade the IST program.
the
      4. Licensee management is committed to improve the sur-
program
          veillance program, as evidenced by the upgrades
involving administrative and implementing procedures
          planned or in progress in each area examined. These
and staffing to upgrade the IST program.
          include: contractor data base reviews; increasing the
4.
          scope of the IST program, increasing staffing; im-     i
Licensee management is committed to improve the sur-
          proved control over issuing and tracking M&TE; estab-   I
veillance program,
          lishing an equipment history computer program; replac-
as
          ing the MSTP division lists with task i:ards; and
evidenced by
          improving conditional test scheduling.                 l
the upgrades
      S. With the exception of the few deficiencies noted
planned or in progress in each area examined.
          above,   the procedures were technically adequate.
These
      6. The one concern identified was the licensee's need to
include:
          resolve   the   once per-refueling-outage scheduling
contractor data base reviews; increasing the
          deficiency.
scope of the IST program, increasing staffing; im-
proved control over issuing and tracking M&TE; estab-
lishing an equipment history computer program; replac-
ing the MSTP division lists with task i:ards; and
improving conditional test scheduling.
S.
With the exception of the few deficiencies noted
above,
the
procedures were
technically
adequate.
6.
The one concern identified was the licensee's need to
resolve
the
once per-refueling-outage
scheduling
deficiency.
i
i
                                                                  l


                                                                        _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  D O
D
                                          63
O
      3.5 Radiation Protection (RP)
63
            3.5.1     Scope of Review
3.5 Radiation Protection (RP)
                    The Team reviewed various aspects of the radiation protec-
3.5.1
                      tion program during the inspection, with emphasis on the
Scope of Review
                      licensee's ability to safely support plant startup. Per-
The Team reviewed various aspects of the radiation protec-
                      formance was determined from:       observation of work in
tion program during the inspection, with emphasis on the
                    progress; periodic tours of plant areas; interviews with
licensee's ability to safely support plant startup.
                    managers,     supervisors, and technicians; and review of
Per-
                      selected documents. The areas reviewed are as follows:
formance was determined from:
                        1) Organization and staffing;
observation of work in
                      2) Training, qualification and continuing education of RP
progress; periodic tours of plant areas; interviews with
                            technicians;
managers,
                      3) General employee training;
supervisors,
                      4) ALARA programs;
and technicians; and review of
                      5) Control and oversight of work in radiological areas;
selected documents.
                      6) Control of locked high radiation areas;
The areas reviewed are as follows:
                      7) Acequacy of laboratory (count room) equipment;
1) Organization and staffing;
                      8) Availability and       adequacy of portable           RP survey
2) Training, qualification and continuing education of RP
                            equipment;
technicians;
                      9) Adequacy of gaseous and liquid release monitoring
3) General employee training;
4) ALARA programs;
5) Control and oversight of work in radiological areas;
6) Control of locked high radiation areas;
7) Acequacy of laboratory (count room) equipment;
8) Availability and
adequacy of portable
RP survey
equipment;
9) Adequacy of gaseous and liquid release monitoring
systems;
'
'
                            systems;
10) Clarity and consistency of RP policies and procedures;
                    10) Clarity and consistency of RP policies and procedures;
11) Audits.
                    11) Audits.
3.5.2
Observations and Findings
'
'
          3.5.2     Observations and Findings
3.5.2.1
Organization and Staffing
i
i
  .
.
                    3.5.2.1    Organization and Staffing
The organization of the radiation protection (RP)
                                The organization of the radiation protection (RP)
department has remained stable since the signifi-
                                department has remained stable since the signifi-
cant changes which were made early in 1983. The
i                              cant changes which were made early in 1983. The
i
                                staffing level has remained constant and is ade-
staffing level has remained constant and is ade-
                                quate to support plant operations.   The RP soc-
quate to support plant operations.
                                tion marager described various enhancements
The RP soc-
tion
marager
described
various
enhancements


                                                                            _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .
_ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .
  p a
p
                      64
a
            planned for the supervisory staff.                 An outline
64
            for qualification as Radiation Protection Man-
planned for the supervisory staff.
            ager, per Regulatory Guide 1.8, has been ap-
An outline
            proved. One or two division managers within the
for qualification as Radiation Protection Man-
            RP section will be expected to qualify as Radia-
ager, per Regulatory Guide
            tion Protection Manager to provide depth in the
1.8,
            organization. Incentives have been approved for
has been ap-
            achieving this qualification.                 In addition, the
proved. One or two division managers within the
            three division managers will rotate assignments
RP section will be expected to qualify as Radia-
            for cross-training purposes, and all will be
tion Protection Manager to provide depth in the
            encouraged to pursue advanced scholastic degrees.
organization.
            These efforts are expected to begin in the near
Incentives have been approved for
            future.
achieving this qualification.
            The Team observed some indications of isolated
In addition, the
          morale problems at the technician and first-line
three division managers will rotate assignments
            supervisor level which were attributed to several
for cross-training purposes, and all will be
          causes.     Contributors include personnel and as-
encouraged to pursue advanced scholastic degrees.
            signment changes within the organization result-
These efforts are expected to begin in the near
            ing from rotation of radiation protection shif t
future.
            supervisors, an influx of new technicians, im-
The Team observed some indications of isolated
        . pending implementation of a new rotating work
morale problems at the technician and first-line
            schedule, and a perceived lack of management
supervisor level which were attributed to several
          presence in the field.         In addition, weaknesses
causes.
          may exist in communications within the RP organ-
Contributors include personnel and as-
            ization as evidenced by technician perceptions of
signment changes within the organization result-
          a lack of technician input or review during the
ing from rotation of radiation protection shif t
          development or revision nf RP policies and pro-
supervisors, an influx of new technicians, im-
.          cedures. In summary, and in spite of these dif-
pending implementation of a new rotating work
          ficulties, the Team observed that the technicians
.
          and supervisors were generally enthusiastic and
schedule, and a perceived lack of management
          competent.
presence in the field.
          Another potential weakness results from the prac-
In addition, weaknesses
          tice of rotating technicians through job assign-
may exist in communications within the RP organ-
          ments each three to six months.                   Although this
ization as evidenced by technician perceptions of
          practice may have merit for familiarization and
a lack of technician input or review during the
          job exposure purposes it may prevent or signifi-
development or revision nf RP policies and pro-
          cantly delay the development of a high profici-                                         :
cedures.
          ency level     in certain specialized technical
In summary, and in spite of these dif-
          areas, a concern particularly evident in the
.
          instrument repair and calibration facility. Here
ficulties, the Team observed that the technicians
          the RP technician is assigned to repair and cali-
and supervisors were generally enthusiastic and
          brate a wide range of instrumentation, including
competent.
          gas flow detector cells, sophisticated computer-
Another potential weakness results from the prac-
          controlled automatic friskers, air pumps, and all
tice of rotating technicians through job assign-
          alpha, beta, gamma and neutron survey meters.
ments each three to six months.
          The area supervisor stated that he was attempting
Although this
          to resolve this problem by requesting an exten-
practice may have merit for familiarization and
          sion of the rotation cycle.
job exposure purposes it may prevent or signifi-
                                                                                                    1
cantly delay the development of a high profici-
                                                                                                    i
:
                                                                        .-_      - _ _ - _ _
ency
      --                    , , _ _ __ __
level
                                            __._._.--,_.c
in certain
specialized
technical
areas, a concern particularly evident in the
instrument repair and calibration facility. Here
the RP technician is assigned to repair and cali-
brate a wide range of instrumentation, including
gas flow detector cells, sophisticated computer-
controlled automatic friskers, air pumps, and all
alpha, beta, gamma and neutron survey meters.
The area supervisor stated that he was attempting
to resolve this problem by requesting an exten-
sion of the rotation cycle.
1
i
--
, , _ _
__
__._._.--,_.c
.-_
- _ _ - _ _
__


  i d
i
                                        .
d
                        65
.
  *
65
*
~.
~.
              The RP section has 42 technicians, of whom 36 are
The RP section has 42 technicians, of whom 36 are
              ANSI 18.1 qualified.     Only 21 have commercial
ANSI 18.1 qualified.
              experience. The section manager provided a shift
Only 21 have commercial
                staffing schedule for power ascension testing
experience. The section manager provided a shift
              that will ensure that the experience will be
staffing schedule for power ascension testing
              adequately distributed among the individual shift
that will ensure that the experience will be
              Crews.
adequately distributed among the individual shift
      3.5.2.2 RP Technician Training
Crews.
              The RP technician training and qualification pro-
3.5.2.2
              gram is certified by the Institute of Nuclear
RP Technician Training
              Plant Operations (INPO), uses INPO guidelines for
The RP technician training and qualification pro-
              development of instructional material, and uses
gram is certified by the Institute of Nuclear
              the INPO exam question bank.     The training is
Plant Operations (INPO), uses INPO guidelines for
              conducted in three phases over a period of two
development of instructional material, and uses
              years or less, depending on experience.       Upon
the INPO exam question bank.
              completion of Phase 2, the technician .is con-
The training is
              sidered to be ANSI qualified and can issue radia-
conducted in three phases over a period of two
              tion work permits.     The third phase includes
years or less, depending on experience.
              specialty tasks such as operation of the whole
Upon
              body counter and respirator fit testing.
completion of Phase 2,
              Classroom training is provided at the offsite
the technician .is con-
              facility. The training facilities were adequate,
sidered to be ANSI qualified and can issue radia-
              well lighted, comfortable and equipped with prac-
tion work permits.
              tice equipment. The Team observed that most of
The third phase includes
              the basic survey instruments were available, but
specialty tasks such as operation of the whole
              laboratory-type gamma spectroscopy equipment, as
body counter and respirator fit testing.
              well as ALARA mock-ups, were not available. This
Classroom training is provided at the offsite
              is typical of a single unit station. Most pre-
facility. The training facilities were adequate,
              sentations appeared to rely on lectures with
well lighted, comfortable and equipped with prac-
              minimal use of audio-visual equipment. A review
tice equipment.
              of selected lesson plans showed adequate tech-
The Team observed that most of
              nical content.
the basic survey instruments were available, but
              Classroom training is followed by an in plant
laboratory-type gamma spectroscopy equipment, as
              phase where the technician receives on-the-job
well as ALARA mock-ups, were not available. This
              training and demonstrates proficiency at various
is typical of a single unit station.
  .          tasks.   This is documented in a qualification
Most pre-
              folder.   Qualified technicians will be provided
sentations appeared to rely on lectures with
              with ongoing training on a six-week schedule.
minimal use of audio-visual equipment. A review
              This will be contingent on implementation of a
of selected lesson plans showed adequate tech-
              new six-section rotating work schedule.       The
nical content.
Classroom training is followed by an in plant
phase where the technician receives on-the-job
training and demonstrates proficiency at various
tasks.
This is documented in a qualification
.
folder.
Qualified technicians will be provided
with ongoing training on a six-week schedule.
This will be contingent on implementation of a
new six-section rotating work schedule.
The


, ,
,
                      66
,
            training department has begun drafting lesson
66
            plans which will cover a broad range of topics,
training department has begun drafting lesson
            including interpersonal skills training. The
plans which will cover a broad range of topics,
            instructors must also complete formal qualifica-
including interpersonal
            tions. They were recently required to begin
skills training.
            spending a certain number of hours in plant be-
The
            tween training cycles. This keeps them abreast
instructors must also complete formal qualifica-
            of changes occurring in the plant.
tions.
            The Team concluded that this program is well-
They were recently required to begin
            controlled and documented and is aided by a dy-
spending a certain number of hours in plant be-
            namic first-line supervisor.     The implementation
tween training cycles.
            and effectiveness of cycle training will be eval-
This keeps them abreast
            uated in the future. The licensee's current ef-
of changes occurring in the plant.
            forts are directed at completing initial qual-
The Team concluded that this program is well-
            ification for the entire staff.
controlled and documented and is aided by a dy-
    3.5.2.3 General Employee Training (GET)
namic first-line supervisor.
            All general employee training and in processing
The implementation
            is conducted at the on-site training center over
and effectiveness of cycle training will be eval-
            a three-day period.     Classrooms were spacious,
uated in the future.
            comfortable, and well equipped. Ample training
The licensee's current ef-
            aids, as well as audio-visual equipment, were in
forts are directed at completing initial qual-
            evidence.   A comprehensive student manual is
ification for the entire staff.
            given to each trainee along with copies of appro-
3.5.2.3
            priate regulations and regulatory guides. Basic
General Employee Training (GET)
            training involves 20 contact hours, while radia-
All general employee training and in processing
            tion workers receive an additional 3 hours. Res-
is conducted at the on-site training center over
            pirator fit testing is also provided.
a three-day period.
            The two instructors associated with GET had com-
Classrooms were spacious,
            pleted the formal     Staff Development program.
comfortable, and well equipped.
            Both have extensive experience and are well qual-
Ample training
            ified. Although their teaching techniques could
aids, as well as audio-visual equipment, were in
            not be observed since no classes were in session
evidence.
            during the week of this review, the Team con-
A comprehensive student manual
            cluded that the training content provided ade-
is
            quate direction to attendees.     Both instructors
given to each trainee along with copies of appro-
            spend time in the plant weekly to assess staff
priate regulations and regulatory guides.
            training needs.
Basic
            The GET training is INPO certified. In addition,
training involves 20 contact hours, while radia-
            the training center offers five courses to all
tion workers receive an additional 3 hours.
            new supervisors. A new industrial safety train-
Res-
            ing program is under development. An instructor
pirator fit testing is also provided.
            has been hired and will begin providing training
The two instructors associated with GET had com-
            in occupational safcty during the first quarter
pleted the formal
            of 1989.
Staff Development
program.
Both have extensive experience and are well qual-
ified. Although their teaching techniques could
not be observed since no classes were in session
during the week of this review, the Team con-
cluded that the training content provided ade-
quate direction to attendees.
Both instructors
spend time in the plant weekly to assess staff
training needs.
The GET training is INPO certified. In addition,
the training center offers five courses to all
new supervisors. A new industrial safety train-
ing program is under development. An instructor
has been hired and will begin providing training
in occupational safcty during the first quarter
of 1989.


    - - .
- - .
  .       .
.
                              67
.
                      The Team concluded that management support of GET
67
                      training was good, that the training was effec-
The Team concluded that management support of GET
                      tively conducted, and that it made a positive
training was good, that the training was effec-
                      contribution to safety.
tively conducted, and that it made a positive
            3.5.2.4 ALARA Programs
contribution to safety.
                    ALARA performance at this station had been a
3.5.2.4
                      persistent weakness over several past SALP report
ALARA Programs
                    periods.
ALARA performance at this station had been a
                    The Team noted recent apparent improvement in
persistent weakness over several past SALP report
                    upper management support for ALARA programs.
periods.
                    Examples of this support are reflected in the
The Team noted recent apparent improvement in
                    re-evaluatien of the 1988 ALARA goal from 600 to
upper management support for ALARA programs.
                    390 manrem and formulation of 'iveral plans to
Examples of this support are reflected in the
                    reduce exposures. Also, the licensee is assign-
re-evaluatien of the 1988 ALARA goal from 600 to
                      ing an experienced manager to survey INPO, Elec-
390 manrem and formulation of 'iveral plans to
                    tric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and several
reduce exposures. Also, the licensee is assign-
                    other nuclear stations to make a list of cost-
ing an experienced manager to survey INPO, Elec-
                    effective exposure source term reduction tech-
tric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and several
                    niques. The Station Director will then formulate
other nuclear stations to make a list of cost-
                    a long-term program based on the findings of this
effective exposure source term reduction tech-
                    survey.   Another plan is to begin removal of
niques.
                    abandoned in place systems in 1989 which should
The Station Director will then formulate
                    remove unnecessary sources of exposure. A th'rd
a long-term program based on the findings of this
                    project is underway to identify hot spotr in
survey.
                    plant piping and determine which of these could               [
Another plan is to begin removal of
                    be reduced by flushing.
abandoned in place systems in 1989 which should
                    The ALARA staff also has plans to attend a train-
remove unnecessary sources of exposure. A th'rd
                    ing course and visit other stations to observe
project is underway to identify hot spotr in
;                    effective techniques.                 This staff i s in the
plant piping and determine which of these could
[
be reduced by flushing.
The ALARA staff also has plans to attend a train-
ing course and visit other stations to observe
effective techniques.
This staff
i s in
the
;
process of filling its final vacancy.
,
'
,
,
                    process of filling its final vacancy.
ALARA performance at the working level remains
'
mixed. Licensing personnel developed a technique
                                                                                    ,
for conducting remote inspections of fire barrier
                    ALARA performance at the working level remains
penetrations using a flashlight mounted on a
                    mixed. Licensing personnel developed a technique
telescope.
                    for conducting remote inspections of fire barrier
This concept may ta appiled in num-
                    penetrations using a flashlight mounted on a
,'
erous situations and has the potential for sig-
nificant dose savings.
On the other hand, in-
stances of f ailure to effectively use low-dose
waiting areas were observed during work.
The
ALARA divisicn manager is working to increase the
.
sensitivity of all workers and technicians to
l
ALARA practices.
(
!
!
l
,
,
'
l
                    telescope.  This concept may ta appiled in num-
..g
                    erous situations and has the potential for sig-
- _ _ - , - - -
                    nificant dose savings.                On the other hand, in-
gm
                    stances of f ailure to effectively use low-dose
                    waiting areas were observed during work.                  The
                    ALARA divisicn manager is working to increase the            .
                    sensitivity of all workers and technicians to                l
                    ALARA practices.                                              (
                                                                                  !
                                                                                  !
                                                                                  l
                                                                                  ,
                                                                                  l
                                    ..g   - _ _ - , - - -           gm


    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ __
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
, .
._ __
                                            63
,
                                  The Team concluded that licensee attention to
.
                                  ALARA programs has significantly improved in
63
                                  recent months. The effectiveness and implemen-
The Team concluded that licensee attention to
                                  tation of AL\RA plans will be assessed in future
ALARA programs has significantly improved in
                                  NRC inspections.
recent months.
                          3.5.2.5 Control of Work
The effectiveness and implemen-
                                  During closure of a Confirmatory Order in the
tation of AL\\RA plans will be assessed in future
                                  fall of D87, NRC noted some improvement in the
NRC inspections.
                                  r91ations between the RP section and the other
3.5.2.5
                                  sections performing work. However, poor planning
Control of Work
                                  and lack of work control continued to be ob-
During closure of a Confirmatory Order in the
                                  served. During this assessment, further improve-
fall of D87, NRC noted some improvement in the
                                  ment in resolving these weaknesses was observed.
r91ations between the RP section and the other
                                  One indicator of poor planning is the number of
sections performing work. However, poor planning
                                  radiation work permits (RWP) issued but not used.
and lack of work control continued to be ob-
                                  A review found that only a small fraction of
served.
                                  RWP's issued are now unusad. In addition, the
During this assessment, further improve-
                                  use of "A" priority maintenance work requests by
ment in resolving these weaknesses was observed.
                                  the Operations Department to expedite work has
One indicator of poor planning is the number of
                                  decreased significantly.
radiation work permits (RWP) issued but not used.
                                  The use of a Radiation Protection Advisor as-
A review found that only a small fraction of
                                  signed to the Maintenance department continues to
RWP's issued are now unusad.
                                  be effective. This position was recently assumed
In addition, the
                                  by an experienced RP technician. He has intro-
use of "A" priority maintenance work requests by
                                  duced innovations, including frequent work group
the Operations Department to expedite work has
                                  training sessions and installation of permanently
decreased significantly.
                                  situated boxes in the plant for ccntaminated
The use of a Radiation Protection Advisor as-
                                  tools.
signed to the Maintenance department continues to
                                  The Planning Division is developing improved pro-
be effective. This position was recently assumed
                                  cedures for planning work.     This section is re-
by an experienced RP technician.
                                  sponsible for coordinating with the RP and ALARA
He has intro-
                                  groups during the early phases of work planning.
duced innovations, including frequent work group
                                  This allows adequats time for RWP preparation and
training sessions and installation of permanently
                                  ALARA   re*
situated boxes in the plant for ccntaminated
                                              *
tools.
                                                      isponsible section managers
The Planning Division is developing improved pro-
,                                stated tt       'N :arly maintenance-HP contact
cedures for planning work.
                                  will be pr.u     s' ted ir. September 1988.
This section is re-
                                  The Team observed that on-the-job cooperation
sponsible for coordinating with the RP and ALARA
                                  between workers and RP technicians was good. A
groups during the early phases of work planning.
                                  minor problem ,vas noted in that RP technicians in
This allows adequats time for RWP preparation and
                                  the controlled area appeared unprepared to deal
ALARA
                                  with a minor first-aid injury. Technicians were
re*
isponsible
section managers
*
stated tt
'N
:arly maintenance-HP contact
,
will be pr.u
s' ted ir. September 1988.
The Team observed that on-the-job cooperation
between workers and RP technicians was good.
A
minor problem ,vas noted in that RP technicians in
the controlled area appeared unprepared to deal
with a minor first-aid injury.
Technicians were


                                                        ___   .-_     _ _ _ _ _ _ - . .
___
  . >
.-_
                          69
_ _ _ _ _ _ - . .
                uncertain in dealing with a worker with abrasions
.
                to his nose that caused bleeding. This was at-
>
                tributed by the Team to a lack of training snd
69
                clear policies.   On the other hand, technicians                         !
uncertain in dealing with a worker with abrasions
                appeared well prepared to handle more serious
to his nose that caused bleeding.
                emergencies,
This was at-
                                                                                          i
tributed by the Team to a lack of training snd
      3.5.2.6 Control of Locked High Radia_ ion Areas
clear policies.
                The   licensee has previously incurred several                           l
On the other hand, technicians
                violations for failure to properly control locked                         !
appeared well prepared to handle more serious
                high   radiation areas.   This issue has been                           l
emergencies,
                tracked as a NRC outstanding item (87-57-01).
i
                The licensee organized a task force to determine                         I
3.5.2.6
              which lasting corrective actions would prevent a                           i
Control of Locked High Radia_ ion Areas
                recurrence of these problems. Based on the find-                         1
The
                ings of th- task force, the control procedures
licensee has previously incurred several
              were revised to placa basic responsibility on the
violations for failure to properly control locked
                RP technician who signs out the door key. Fur-                           i
high
                ther controls are provided by shift tours of all                         l
radiation
                locked areas and by upgrading locking devices.                           l
areas.
              Gased on these actions, the Team concluded the                             l
This
                licensee had appropriately addressed concerns ir.                         ;
issue has
              this area.
been
                                                                                          l
tracked as a NRC outstanding item (87-57-01).
      3.5.2.7 Laboratory Equipment                                                       l
The licensee organized a task force to determine
                                                                                          l
which lasting corrective actions would prevent a
              The adequacy and availability of RP laboratory                             -
i
              equipment to support plant startup was reviewed.
recurrence of these problems. Based on the find-
              The   licensee has available two multichannel
ings of th- task force, the control procedures
              analyzers (Nuclear Data 6700), several beta
were revised to placa basic responsibility on the
RP technician who signs out the door key.
Fur-
i
ther controls are provided by shift tours of all
locked areas and by upgrading locking devices.
Gased on these actions, the Team concluded the
licensee had appropriately addressed concerns ir.
this area.
3.5.2.7
Laboratory Equipment
The adequacy and availability of RP laboratory
-
equipment to support plant startup was reviewed.
The
licensee
has
available
two multichannel
analyzers
(Nuclear Data
6700),
several
beta
counters (BC4), and several alpha counters (SAC
<
<
              counters (BC4), and several alpha counters (SAC
              4). The radiochemistry laboratory has redundant
t
t
                                                                                          ,
4).
              equipment for backup. This equipment is required                             l
The radiochemistry laboratory has redundant
              to perform isotopic analysis of air samples for                           l
,
              maximum permitted concentration (MPC) calcula-                             '
equipment for backup. This equipment is required
              tions, detection of degraded fuel conditions, and
to perform isotopic analysis of air samples for
              to support radwaste analysis. Procedures for the
maximum permitted concentration (MPC) calcula-
              use of the       equipment are available     in     the
'
              laboratory.
tions, detection of degraded fuel conditions, and
              The Team noted that, at the time of the inspec-                           l
to support radwaste analysis. Procedures for the
              tion, several pieces of laboratory equipment wert                         ;
use of the
              awaiting repair or calibration.     Only ;ne BC-4                         i
equipment are available
              and one SAC-4 were operational in the lab. Both
in
              nultichannel analyzers were awaiting repair                               i
the
              parts.   The supe tisor in charge attributed this                         I
laboratory.
              to the lack of proficiency of the technicians due
The Team noted that, at the time of the inspec-
              to the rotating work assignment policy.         This
tion, several pieces of laboratory equipment wert
              issue was discussed in Section 3.5.2.1.
awaiting repair or calibration.
-
Only ;ne BC-4
i
and one SAC-4 were operational in the lab.
Both
nultichannel
analyzers
were
awaiting
repair
parts.
The supe tisor in charge attributed this
to the lack of proficiency of the technicians due
to the rotating work assignment policy.
This
issue was discussed in Section 3.5.2.1.
-


. .
.
                      70
.
    3.5.2.8   Survey Equipment
70
              The svailability of properly calibrated survey
3.5.2.8
              equipment was reviewed. Survey equipment is used
Survey Equipment
            by RP techniciant, to measure dose rates, and sur-
The svailability of properly calibrated survey
              face and airborne contamination levels. Included
equipment was reviewed. Survey equipment is used
              in the review were the automatic personnel con-
by RP techniciant, to measure dose rates, and sur-
            tamination detectors.
face and airborne contamination levels.
            All equipment is calibrated and repaired in a
Included
              facility on site, eFCept for neutron survey
in the review were the automatic personnel con-
            meters.   RP technicians are trained to perform
tamination detectors.
            all   functions in the facility.     The facility
All equipment is calibrated and repaired in a
            appeared to be adequately equipped to perforhi its
facility on site, eFCept for neutron survey
            task,                                               s
meters.
            Stocks of equipment ready for issuance appeared
RP technicians are trained to perform
            ample and the calibration / repair backlog was
all
            minimal.     This readiness may have been aided
functions in the facility.
            somewhat by reduced outage activity.       The Team
The facility
            noted an improvement in that the new manager of
appeared to be adequately equipped to perforhi its
            the g"oup has recently implemented a computer
task,
            program that shows the status of each piece of
s
            equi pme ri t , the data base for which is updated
Stocks of equipment ready for issuance appeared
            each time an instrument is issued.       Information
ample and the calibration / repair backlog was
            that is captured includes users of the meter,
minimal.
            calibration due date, and failure mode if placed
This readiness may have been aided
            out of service.
somewhat by reduced outage activity.
            The Team concluded that an adequate supply of
The Team
            calibrated instruments is on hand te <;pport
noted an improvement in that the new manager of
            routine operation.: and abnormal c cm. '.i o n s .
the g"oup has recently implemented a computer
    3.5.2.9 Monitoring Environmental Releases
program that shows the status of each piece of
            The operability of the environmental         release
equi pme ri t , the data base for which is updated
            monitors was verified. The two paths for a gas-
each time an instrument is issued.
            eous release are the main stack and the reactor
Information
            butiding vent. The monitors were fouiid to be
that is captured includes users of the meter,
            operational     and   properly calibrated,     with
calibration due date, and failure mode if placed
            approvea procedures available. The eculpment is
out of service.
            maintained by the Chemistry Group ' ile the cal-
The Team concluded that an adequate supply of
            culations of offsite doses require     oy the re-
calibrated instruments is on hand te <;pport
            <ised Radio     ical Environmental Technical Spec-
routine
            ifications   StTS) are performed by the RP
operation.:
            seation.
and
    - .   -     -
abnormal
c cm. '.i o n s .
3.5.2.9
Monitoring Environmental Releases
The operability of the environmental
release
monitors was verified.
The two paths for a gas-
eous release are the main stack and the reactor
butiding vent.
The monitors were fouiid to be
operational
and
properly
calibrated,
with
approvea procedures available. The eculpment is
ile the cal-
maintained by the Chemistry Group
'
culations of offsite doses require
oy the re-
<ised Radio
ical Environmental Technical Spec-
ifications
StTS)
are
performed
by
the
RP
seation.
- .
-
-
_


      x,
x,
  e O
e
                            71
O
                    The s'ngle liquid release path monitor was oper-
71
                    ational. Due to elevated background radiation
The s'ngle liquid release path monitor was oper-
                    levels at the sodium iodida e.anitor, a new system
ational.
                    has been installed parallel to the old system.
Due to elevated background radiation
                    The new system will offer increased sensitivity
levels at the sodium iodida e.anitor, a new system
                    and will be tnught on line in the near future.
has been installed parallel to the old system.
The new system will offer increased sensitivity
and will be tnught on line in the near future.
3.5.2.10 Policies and Procedures-
-
A sampling of RP procedures indicates that they
ara generally clear.
The number of procedures
controlling
the RP department
activities
is
extensive. However, the format varies from step-
by-step instructions to a more general format.
The RWP procedure is currently being revised to
make the process less cumbersome and more useful.
In general, the RP technicians Md not feel ade-
quately consulted during the revi.ston of proced-
ures.
This
issue was discussed
in
Section
3.5.2.1.
The Team concluded that ;,he RP procedures were
adequate to support startup.
3.5.2.11 Audits
Previous inspections found the licensee's inter-
nal audits and asssessments of the RP program
-
-
        3.5.2.10 Policies and Procedures-
were primarily compliance-oriented.
                  A sampling of RP procedures indicates that they
Currently,
                    ara generally clear.    The number of procedures
these audits are completed in several ways. Sev-
                  controlling the RP department activities is
eral peer evaluators were trained to make on the-
                  extensive. However, the format varies from step-
job observations.
                  by-step instructions to a more general format.
A Radiological Assessor is
                  The RWP procedure is currently being revised to
permanently assigned to the staff reporting to
                  make the process less cumbersome and more useful.
the Senior Vice President.
                  In general, the RP technicians Md not feel ade-
The Management Over-
                  quately consulted during the revi.ston of proced-
sight and Assessment Team (MO&AT) does monthly
                  ures.    This issue was discussed in Section
plant tours.
                  3.5.2.1.
Also, the QA Dr,artment recently
                  The Team concluded that ;,he RP procedures were
transferred in two expertene.
                  adequate to support startup.
etP personnel.
        3.5.2.11 Audits
In
                  Previous inspections found the licensee's inter-
addition to the above audits and reviews, the
                  nal audits and asssessments of the RP program        -
Radiological Occurrence Report (ROR) system pro-
                  were primarily compliance-oriented. Currently,
vides a method to capture input from workers and
                  these audits are completed in several ways. Sev-
RP technicians.
                  eral peer evaluators were trained to make on the-
A review of these efforts shows that a moderate
                  job observations.     A Radiological Assessor is
level of success has been achieved in finding
                  permanently assigned to the staff reporting to
program weaknesses.
                  the Senior Vice President.   The Management Over-
However, the results i. ave
                  sight and Assessment Team (MO&AT) does monthly
not been commensurate with the ef' ort involved.
                  plant tours.     Also, the QA Dr,artment recently
The RP section manager stated that an ef fort is
                  transferred in two expertene.   etP personnel.   In
. .
                  addition to the above audits and reviews, the
                  Radiological Occurrence Report (ROR) system pro-
                  vides a method to capture input from workers and
                  RP technicians.
                  A review of these efforts shows that a moderate
                  level of success has been achieved in finding
                  program weaknesses.     However, the results i. ave
                  not been commensurate with the ef' ort involved.
                  The RP section manager stated that an ef fort is
                                                          ._.


                                                                                              _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  , *
,
                          72
*
                                                                                                                      ,
72
                underway to shift the emphasis of these audits to
,
                performance rather than compliance. The audit
underway to shift the emphasis of these audits to
                performed by QA in November 1987 is being used
performance rather than compliance.
                as a model.     Licensee efforts in this regard are
The audit
                expected to be long term and are adaquate at this
performed by QA in November 1987 is being used
                time to support plant startup.
as a model.
      3.5.2.12 Control of Radiological Shielding
Licensee efforts in this regard are
                The Tear reviewed the licensee's program for the                                                     ,
expected to be long term and are adaquate at this
                                                                                                                    '
time to support plant startup.
                installation, control, and removal uf radiation
3.5.2.12 Control of Radiological Shielding
                shielding. This review concluded that the licen-
The Tear reviewed the licensee's program for the
                see's program for control of radiation shielding
,
                is well documented and that implementation is
installation, control, and removal uf radiation
                good.
'
                The prograr.; guidelines are contained in PNPS Pro-
shielding. This review concluded that the licen-
                cedure 6.10-008, "Installation and Removal of
see's program for control of radiation shielding
                Shielding." Responsibility for implementation of
is well documented and that implementation is
                the procedural requirements fall under the aus-
good.
                pices of the Radiological Technical Support                                                         '
The prograr.; guidelines are contained in PNPS Pro-
                Division. The procedural requirements for con-                                                       '
cedure 6.10-008, "Installation and Removal of
                trolling this process appear well defined and
Shielding." Responsibility for implementation of
                comprehensive.           Licensee personnel                   responsible
the procedural requirements fall under the aus-
                for implementation of the procedure were well
pices
                versed on procedural requirements and current
of
                field installations.                           l.icensee records of field
the
                it.stallations were current, had been reviewed at
Radiological
                the required intervals, and were accurate.
Technical
      3.5.2.13 Health Physics Training
Support
'
Division.
The procedural requirements for con-
'
trolling this process appear well defined and
comprehensive.
Licensee personnel
responsible
for implementation of the procedure were well
versed on procedural requirements and current
field installations.
l.icensee records of field
it.stallations were current, had been reviewed at
the required intervals, and were accurate.
3.5.2.13 Health Physics Training
;
;
                The Team observed licensee personnel during a                                                       i
The Team observed licensee personnel during a
                contamination control training exercise.
i
                                                                                                                    '
contamination control
                                                                                            The
training exercise.
                exercise simulated a spill of highly radioacLive                                                   *
The
                (3 Rem on contact) resin during transfer opera-                                                     l
'
                tions. The scenerio document was well defined                                                       -
exercise simulated a spill of highly radioacLive
                and included detailed timelines and instructions
*
                to the exercise controllers. The entire exercise                                                   i
(3 Rem on contact) resin during transfer opera-
  .            was videotaped and replayed during the debriefing                                                   [
l
                of participants. The exercise was well control-
tions.
                led and interviews with participants indicated                                                     i
The scenerio document was well defined
                that the individuals involved considered it to be                                                   '
-
                an effective training device.                             Lessons learned
and included detailed timelines and instructions
                and feedback frnm participants appeared to be
to the exercise controllers. The entire exercise
                well disseminated.                                                                                 ,
i
                                                    *
was videotaped and replayed during the debriefing
[
.
of participants.
The exercise was well control-
led and interviews with participants indicated
i
that the individuals involved considered it to be
'
an effective training device.
Lessons learned
and feedback frnm participants appeared to be
well disseminated.
,
*
,
,
4
4
                                                                                                                    i
i
                                                                                                                    t
t
                    ._     -.. .
._
                                    . . -   _ _ . _ - . _ , _         ._     _     . _ .
-..
.
. . -
_ _ . _ - . _ , _
._
_
. _ .


    _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _
  ,         .
,
                                        73
.
                                                                                  l
73
                    3.5.2.14 Hydregen Water Chemistry System
l
                              The licensee has installed a system to inject
3.5.2.14 Hydregen Water Chemistry System
                              hydrogen gas into the fcedwater to reduce the     l
The licensee has installed a system to inject
                              potential for corrosion of ieactor internal pip-   i
hydrogen gas into the fcedwater to reduce the
                                ing. This process will result in increased radi- l
potential for corrosion of ieactor internal pip-
                              ation levels onsite from increased radioactive     l
ing.
                              nitrogen isotope levels in the system. A review   ;
This process will result in increased radi-
                              of the impact analysis showed that a comprehen-   i
ation levels onsite from increased radioactive
                              sive plan to control exposures has been developed. l
nitrogen isotope levels in the system. A review
                              A test run i.1935 resulted in the installation
of the impact analysis showed that a comprehen-
                              of a 16-foot high 20-inch thick concrete shield
i
                              around the turbine. Moreover, special controls     ;
sive plan to control exposures has been developed.
                              are programmed into the computer that controls     i
A test run i.1935 resulted in the installation
                              the hydrogen injection.     The cognizant engineer
of a 16-foot high 20-inch thick concrete shield
                              stated that tFese controls are designed to pre-
around the turbine.
                              vent increased exposure either onsite or of fsite. I
Moreover, special controls
                              Team review of these calculations showed that
are programmed into the computer that controls
                              doses may in fact be lowered.                     J
the hydrogen injection.
                              The Training Department is developing a training   I
The cognizant engineer
                              program for the RP technicians to review the       l
stated that tFese controls are designed to pre-
                              change in '.adiation levels that occur with opera-
vent increased exposure either onsite or of fsite.
                              tions. This program was developed to refresh the
Team review of these calculations showed that
J
doses may in fact be lowered.
The Training Department is developing a training
program for the RP technicians to review the
l
change in '.adiation levels that occur with opera-
tions. This program was developed to refresh the
RP technicians because of the extended shutdown
1
1
                              RP technicians because of the extended shutdown
and the increased levels of radiation in the
                              and the increased levels of radiation in the
shielded areas resulting from the addition of
                              shielded areas resulting from the addition of
'
'
                              hydrogen.   The RP section manager stated that a
hydrogen.
                              condensed revision of these presentations will
The RP section manager stated that a
                              also be given to all maintenance and operations
condensed revision of these presentations will
                              personnel prior to startup.
also be given to all maintenance and operations
              3.5.3 Conclusions
personnel prior to startup.
                    The Team determined that progress has been made, that ade-
3.5.3
                    quate staff and management oversight is in place to achieve
Conclusions
                    further progress, and that performance is adequate to sup'
The Team determined that progress has been made, that ade-
                    port plant startup.
quate staff and management oversight is in place to achieve
  ,                ticenset   strengthr. include a well-controlled and well-     !
further progress, and that performance is adequate to sup'
                    organized training program for general employees and RP
port plant startup.
                    technicians. The use of an RP Advisor in the Maintenance
ticenset
                    Section, which had been effective in improving working
strengthr. include a well-controlled and well-
                    relationships, has led to further initiatives in training
,
                    and control of :ontaminated tools.     The addition of this
organized training program for general employees and RP
                    ocsition has also resulted in improved nianning and control
technicians.
                    of work.                                                     -
The use of an RP Advisor in the Maintenance
                                                                                  1
Section, which had been effective in improving working
                                                                                  l
relationships, has led to further initiatives in training
                                                                                  l
and control of :ontaminated tools.
                  -          -
The addition of this
                              _- _ .   .   _ , _ _ - - -
ocsition has also resulted in improved nianning and control
of work.
-
-
-
-
.
.
_ , _ _
- - -


. .
.
                        74
.
    Notable progress was observed regarding upper management
74
      support and emphasis on ALARA. This attention is expected
Notable progress was observed regarding upper management
      to result in improving levels of performance over the next
support and emphasis on ALARA.
      few years. Staff development programs for all levels of
This attention is expected
    personnel, from technicians through managers, should con-
to result in improving levels of performance over the next
      siderably improve their level of performance. Control of
few years.
    technical problems, such as the radiological impact of
Staff development programs for all levels of
    hydrogen water chemistry and calibration status of survey
personnel, from technicians through managers, should con-
    meters, has improved.
siderably improve their level of performance.
    A weakness was observed as a result of the rotational as-
Control of
    signment of RP technicians that may affect eheir profic-
technical problems, such as the radiological impact of
    1ency in performing certain highly specialized jobs.     An
hydrogen water chemistry and calibration status of survey
    additional weakness concerns the perception of poor ver-
meters, has improved.
    tical communications between management and RP technicians
A weakness was observed as a result of the rotational as-
    and workers. Although this issue has led to some incom-
signment of RP technicians that may affect eheir profic-
    plete understanding of policies and some morale problems,
1ency in performing certain highly specialized jobs.
    it has not significantly affected safety       performance.
An
    Additionally, vertical communications within the RP organ-
additional weakness concerns the perception of poor ver-
    ization appeared somewhat weak. The Team detected a per-
tical communications between management and RP technicians
    ception on the part of technicians that they have not been
and workers. Although this issue has led to some incom-
    adequately involved in the changes being made in the RP
plete understanding of policies and some morale problems,
    Department policies and procedures. This perception ap-
it has not significantly affected safety
    parently has resulted f rom RP management not effectively
performance.
    communicating the b.ses for these changes to the staf f.
Additionally, vertical communications within the RP organ-
    There is also a perception that RP management is remote and
ization appeared somewhat weak.
    not easily accessible. However, the Team determined that,
The Team detected a per-
    despite this weakness, the attitude and safety approach of
ception on the part of technicians that they have not been
    the RP Departmeat staff has significantly improved and is
adequately involved in the changes being made in the RP
    adequate to support plant operations.
Department policies and procedures.
    The licensee advised that a training program is being
This perception ap-
    developed to refresh RP technicians concerning the change
parently has resulted f rom RP management not effectively
    in radiological conditions on plant startup and the unique
communicating the b.ses for these changes to the staf f.
    conditions to be created by the addition of hydrogen. A
There is also a perception that RP management is remote and
    condensed version of this training will be provided to
not easily accessible. However, the Team determined that,
    other radiation workers. Cempletion of this effort will be
despite this weakness, the attitude and safety approach of
    reviewed in a future NRC inspection.
the RP Departmeat staff has significantly improved and is
.
adequate to support plant operations.
                      O
The licensee advised that a training program is being
developed to refresh RP technicians concerning the change
in radiological conditions on plant startup and the unique
conditions to be created by the addition of hydrogen. A
condensed version of this training will be provided to
other radiation workers. Cempletion of this effort will be
reviewed in a future NRC inspection.
.
O


                                  - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
..
                        .
.
                  ..
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,  .
,
                                                          75
.
      3.6 Security and Sateguards
75
          3.6.1     Scope of Review
3.6 Security and Sateguards
                      Prior to the plant shutdown in Anril 1986, NRC had identi-
3.6.1
                      fled serious concerns regarding the implementation and
Scope of Review
                      management support of the security program at Pilgrim. The
Prior to the plant shutdown in Anril 1986, NRC had identi-
                      licensee has been aggressively pursuing a comprehensive
fled serious concerns regarding the implementation and
                      course of action to ider.tify and correct the root causes of
management support of the security program at Pilgrim.
                      the programmatic weaknesses in physical security. The most
The
                      recent SALP (50-293/87-99) covering the period February 1,
licensee has been aggressively pursuing a comprehensive
                      1987 to May 15, 1988, determined that the licensee has
course of action to ider.tify and correct the root causes of
                      demonstrated a commitment to implement an effective secur-
the programmatic weaknesses in physical security. The most
                      ity program. The licensee's security organization has been
recent SALP (50-293/87-99) covering the period February 1,
                      expanded with the addition of experienced personnel in key
1987 to May 15, 1988, determined that the licensee has
                      positions, significant capital resources have been expend.:1
demonstrated a commitment to implement an effective secur-
                      to upgrade security hardware, and equipment and progr m
ity program. The licensee's security organization has been
                      plans base been improved.
expanded with the addition of experienced personnel in key
                      During the IAT inspection, all phases of the security pro-
positions, significant capital resources have been expend.:1
                      gram, including management support, staffing, organization,
to upgrade security hardware, and equipment and progr m
                      and hardware maintenance, have been reviewed to assess the
plans base been improved.
                      eff ectiveness of the program implementation.                 The results
During the IAT inspection, all phases of the security pro-
                      of the review are described below in general terms to
gram, including management support, staffing, organization,
                      exclude any safeguards infor.sation.
and hardware maintenance, have been reviewed to assess the
          3.6.2     Observations and Findings
eff ectiveness of the program implementation.
                      3.6.2.1   Review of Security Program Upgrades
The results
                                The Team reviewed the progress made to date on
of the review are described below in general terms to
                                the security program improvements committed to by
exclude any safeguards infor.sation.
                                the licensee as a result of previous NRC enforce-
3.6.2
                                ment action. The Itcensee was advised by the
Observations and Findings
                                Team that progress on these improvements will
3.6.2.1
                                continue to be monitored during future NRC
Review of Security Program Upgrades
                                inspections. Those commitments and their status
The Team reviewed the progress made to date on
                                are as follows.
the security program improvements committed to by
  .
the licensee as a result of previous NRC enforce-
                                .'roject                         Status
ment action.
                                Protected Area                   The upgrades of tne perimeter
The Itcensee was advised by the
                                Perimeter                         barrier, intrusion detection
Team that progress on these improvements will
                                                                  system, and assessment aid
continue
                                                                  system are complete.
to be monitored during
                                                            - _ .           _                   -
future NRC
inspections.
Those commitments and their status
are as follows.
.'roject
Status
.
Protected Area
The upgrades of tne perimeter
Perimeter
barrier, intrusion detection
system,
and assessment aid
system are complete.
- _ .
_
-


    _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . .-. _   __. _ . _. _ _ .       _ _         ___                     _ _ _ _ _ _ _           _ . _ _ _ .
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . .-. _
  .                                   .
__. _ . _. _ _ .
                                                                    76
_ _
                                                          Project                 Status
___
                                                          Protected Area and Installation of upgraded
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                          Perimeter Lighting lighting is approximately 95%
_ . _ _ _ .
                                                                                complete.     Four light stan-
.
                                                                              chions remain to be instal-
.
                                                                                  led. The lighting system as                             i
76
                                                                                  installed meets regulatory
Project
                                                                                requirements.
Status
                                                          Main and Alternate The       designs for the new                               i.
Protected Area and Installation of upgraded
                                                          Access Control     (upgraded)       access               control
Perimeter Lighting
                                                          Points             points are complete and new
lighting is approximately 95%
                                                                              package search equipment is
complete.
                                                                              on site. Installation of new
Four light stan-
                                                                              package and personnel search
chions remain to be instal-
                                                                              equipment       and   full               length
led.
                                                                              turnstiles is scheduled for
The lighting system as
                                                                              completion on September 28,
i
                                                                              1988, in the site's main ac-
installed
                                                                              cess point.       Installation of
meets
                                                                              new package search equipment
regulatory
                                                                              in the site's alternate et e-
requirements.
                                                                              cess point is also scheduled
Main and Alternate The
                                                                              for September 28, 1988.
designs
                                                          Vital Area         The vital area analysis,
for
                                                          Analysis           including walkdown of                       all
the
                                                                              vital areas to verify barrier
new
                                                                              integrity,       and issuance of                           .
i.
                                                                                                                                          '
Access Control
                                                                              the       report,   is               complete.
(upgraded)
                                                          New Security       The selection of the new
access
                                                          Computer           computer has been made and a
control
                                                                              purchase order for the com-
Points
                                                                              puter has been issued.                     The
points are complete and new
                                                                                                                                          '
package search equipment is
                                                                              licensee is currently working
on site. Installation of new
                                                                              with the vendor on software                                 ,
package and personnel search
                                                                              options. The delivery of the                               !
equipment
                                                                              new computer is scheduled for
and
full
length
turnstiles is scheduled for
completion on
September 28,
1988, in the site's main ac-
cess point.
Installation of
new package search equipment
in the site's alternate et e-
cess point is also scheduled
for September 28, 1988.
Vital Area
The vital area analysis,
Analysis
including walkdown
of
all
vital areas to verify barrier
integrity,
and issuance of
.
'
the
report,
is
complete.
New Security
The selection of the new
Computer
computer has been made and a
purchase order for the com-
puter has been issued.
The
'
licensee is currently working
with the vendor on software
,
options.
The delivery of the
!
new computer is scheduled for
the first quarter of 1989,
l
l
                                                                              the first quarter of 1989,
with installation to follow.
                                                                              with installation to follow.                               ,
,
,
                                                                                                                                          I
,
L
I
L


                                                                                                    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
        .                         .
.
                                                        77
.
                                      3.6.2.2   Followup on Previously Unresolved Item
77
                                                (Closed)     Unresolved   Item   (50-293/87-44-01):
3.6.2.2
                                              Neighborhood checks for licensee employees being
Followup on Previously Unresolved Item
                                              assigned to the site were not being consistently
(Closed)
                                              conducted as part of the access control program.
Unresolved
                                              The neighborhood checks were not a regulatory                           -
Item
                                              requirement and it is a licensee-identified
(50-293/87-44-01):
                                              issue. During this inspection, the Team verified
Neighborhood checks for licensee employees being
                                              that the licensee has conducted a review and
assigned to the site were not being consistently
                                              identified all site personnel who had not been
conducted as part of the access control program.
                                              subjected to neighborhood checks. For those
The neighborhood checks were not a regulatory
                                              employees with less than three years of service
-
                                              with the licensee, neighborhood checks were s';b-
requirement
                                              sequently conducted. For employees with more
and
                                              than three years with the company, a review of
it
                                              the personnel file was conducted and a memorandum
is
                                              was put into the file to indicate that the review
a
                                              was being made in lieu of the netchborhood check.
licensee-identified
                                              The acceptability of this alternative to the
issue. During this inspection, the Team verified
                                              neighborhood checks was reviewed by NRC prior to
that the licensee has conducted a review and
                                              its implementation and was found satisfactory.
identified all site personnel who had not been
                                      3.6.2.3 Security Plan and Implementing Procedures
subjected to neighborhood checks.
                                              The Team met with licensee representatives and
For those
                                              discussed the NRC-approved Security Plan (the
employees with less than three years of service
                                              Plan).   As a result of these discussions, and a
with the licensee, neighborhood checks were s';b-
                                              review of the Plan and its implementing proced-
sequently conducted.
                                              ures, the Team found that the implementing pro-
For employees with more
                                              cedures adequately addressed the Plan's commit-
than three years with the company, a review of
                                              ments.     In addition, all     security personnel
the personnel file was conducted and a memorandum
                                              interviewed demonstrated familiarity with the                             L
was put into the file to indicate that the review
                                              Plan, implementing procedures, an- NRC's security
was being made in lieu of the netchborhood check.
                                              program performance objectives.                                           1
The acceptability of this alternative to the
                                      3.6.2.4 Management Effectiveness - Security Programs
neighborhood checks was reviewed by NRC prior to
                                                                                                                        '
its implementation and was found satisfactory.
                                              An in-depth review of the licensees management
3.6.2.3
                                              ef fectiveness was conducted by NRC in April and                         ;
Security Plan and Implementing Procedures
                                              May 1988 and documented in Inspection Report No.                         1
The Team met with licensee representatives and
                                              50-293/88-18. During that inspection, the Team
discussed the NRC-approved Security Plan (the
                                              concluded that the licensee has continued with
Plan).
                                              its initiatives at' taken significant actions to
As a result of these discussions, and a
                                              further improve the effectiveness         1 security
review of the Plan and its implementing proced-
                                              organization.     It was also cor.         that the                     i
ures, the Team found that the implementing pro-
                                              existing organization should provive the capa-
cedures adequately addressed the Plan's commit-
                                              bility to monitor the program properly.                                   <
ments.
                                                                                                                        t
In addition,
                                                                                                                        P
all
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                        _
security personnel
interviewed demonstrated familiarity with the
L
Plan, implementing procedures, an- NRC's security
program performance objectives.
1
3.6.2.4
Management Effectiveness - Security Programs
'
An in-depth review of the licensees management
ef fectiveness was conducted by NRC in April and
;
May 1988 and documented in Inspection Report No.
1
50-293/88-18.
During that inspection, the Team
concluded that the licensee has continued with
its initiatives at' taken significant actions to
further improve the effectiveness
1 security
organization.
It was also cor.
that the
i
existing organization should provive the capa-
bility to monitor the program properly.
<
t
P
-
.
.
.


    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _.   ._
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _.
  .                             o
._
                                                      78
.
                                              During its inspection, the Team independently
o
                                              concluded that there is a strong management team
78
                                              in place based on the experience of the expanded
During its inspection, the Team independently
                                              proprietary security organization, the effective
concluded that there is a strong management team
                                              interaction both between members of the security
in place based on the experience of the expanded
proprietary security organization, the effective
interaction both between members of the security
organization and with other departments, and the
effective oversight of the contract security
*
*
                                            organization and with other departments, and the
organization.
                                              effective oversight of the contract security
3.6.2.5
                                            organization.
Seci~ity Organization
                                    3.6.2.5 Seci~ity Organization
On
                                            On   ugust 16,1988, at 10:00 p.m., the security
ugust 16,1988, at 10:00 p.m.,
                                            con ractor     for PNPS was changed from Globe
the security
                                            Security Systems to the Wackenhut Corporation.
con ractor
                                            The Team reviewed the licensee's and the contrac-
for PNPS was
                                            tor's transition plans, and interviewed numerous
changed
                                            management and union security personnel prior to
from Globe
                                            the transition. Also, the Team was onsite during
Security Systems to the Wackenhut Corporation.
                                            the   transition for direct observations.       The
The Team reviewed the licensee's and the contrac-
                                            transition was somewhat simplified by the fact
tor's transition plans, and interviewed numerous
                                            that all Globe employees that applied for posi-
management and union security personnel prior to
                                            tions were retcined by Wackenhut.         The   Team
the transition. Also, the Team was onsite during
                                            determined that, because of comprehensive transi-
the
                                            tion planning, the change in the contract secur-
transition for direct observations.
                                            ity force was accomplished without any compromise
The
                                            of security and with minimal disruption to secur-
transition was somewhat simplified by the fact
                                            ity operations.                                     !
that all Globe employees that applied for posi-
                                    3.6.2.6 Security Program Audit
tions were retcined by Wackenhut.
                                            The Team reviewed the monthly corporate audit
The
                                            reports. These c it reports were of gotd qual-
Team
                                            ity and were generated as a result of corporate
determined that, because of comprehensive transi-
                                            oversight of the site security program.         The i
tion planning, the change in the contract secur-
                                            findings in these reports were minor and not
ity force was accomplished without any compromise
                                            indicative of any major programmatic problems.
of security and with minimal disruption to secur-
                                            The corrective actions were appropriate for the
ity operations.
                                            findings.
!
  .                                  3.6.2.7 Records and Reports
3.6.2.6
                                            The Team reviewed various :ecurity records, logs,   ,
Security Program Audit
                                            and reports, including patrol logs, central alarm   l
The Team reviewed the monthly corporate audit
                                            station (CAS) logs, visitor control logs, and
reports. These c
                                            testing and maintenance records.     All records,
it reports were of gotd qual-
                                            legs, and reports reviewed were complete and
ity and were generated as a result of corporate
                                            maintained as committed to in the Plan.
oversight of the site security program.
                                                                                                  !
The
                                                                                                  l
i
                                                                                                  l
findings in these reports were minor and not
                                                                                                  :
indicative of any major programmatic problems.
The corrective actions were appropriate for the
findings.
3.6.2.7
Records and Reports
.
The Team reviewed various :ecurity records, logs,
,
and reports, including patrol logs, central alarm
l
station (CAS) logs, visitor control logs, and
testing and maintenance records.
All records,
legs, and reports reviewed were complete and
maintained as committed to in the Plan.
!
l
l
:


                                                    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. o
.
                        79
o
    3.6.2.8   Testing and Maintenance
79
              The Team reviewed the testing and maintenance
3.6.2.8
              records and procedures. The review disclosed
Testing and Maintenance
              that the preventive maintenance procedures were
The Team reviewed the testing and maintenance
              comprehensive and that the licensee now has in-
records and procedures.
              place a program that provides for prioritization
The review disclosed
              of security maintenance by the security depart-
that the preventive maintenance procedures were
              ment.   The maintenance support to the security
comprehensive and that the licensee now has in-
              department has improved as a result of the secur-
place a program that provides for prioritization
              ity department assigning priority to the mainten-
of security maintenance by the security depart-
              ance work. The use of compensatory measures for
ment.
              inoperative equipment is minimal.
The maintenance support to the security
    3.6.2.9   Locks, Xeys and Combinations
department has improved as a result of the secur-
              The Team reviewed the installation, storage, ro-
ity department assigning priority to the mainten-
              ta ' ion and related records for all locks, keys
ance work.
              ano combinations and determined that the licensee
The use of compensatory measures for
              was meeting the commitments in the Plan and its
inoperative equipment is minimal.
              implementing procedures.
3.6.2.9
    3.6.2.10 Physical Barriers - Protected Areas
Locks, Xeys and Combinations
              The Team physically inspected the protected area                                           l
The Team reviewed the installation, storage, ro-
              barriers. It was determined by observations that
ta ' ion and related records for all locks, keys
              the barriers were installed and maintained as
ano combinations and determined that the licensee
              described in the Plan. Progress on upgrading the
was meeting the commitments in the Plan and its
              barriers is addressed in Section 3.6.2.1 of this
implementing procedures.
              section.
3.6.2.10 Physical Barriers - Protected Areas
    3.6.2.11 Physical Barriers - Vital Areas
The Team physically inspected the protected area
              The Team physically inspected the vital area bar-
l
              riers and determined that the barriers were
barriers. It was determined by observations that
              installed and maintained as described in the
the barriers were installed and maintained as
              Plan.
described in the Plan. Progress on upgrading the
    3.6.2.12 Security System Power Supply
barriers is addressed in Section 3.6.2.1 of this
              The Team reviewed the security system power sup-                                           ,
section.
              ply system and determined that it was in accord-                                           t
3.6.2.11 Physical Barriers - Vital Areas
              ance with Plan requirements. The Team noted that
The Team physically inspected the vital area bar-
              as a result of the approval of a recant Plan                                               !
riers and determined that the barriers were
              revision, improvements for protecting the secur-                                           :
installed and maintained as described in the
              ity power supply are wnderway, with wo-k expected                                         i
Plan.
              to be completed by September 28, 1933.
3.6.2.12 Security System Power Supply
                                                                                                        !
The Team reviewed the security system power sup-
                                                                                                        I
,
                                                                                                        >
ply system and determined that it was in accord-
                                                                                                        f
t
                                                                                                        i
ance with Plan requirements. The Team noted that
as a result of the approval of a recant Plan
!
revision, improvements for protecting the secur-
:
ity power supply are wnderway, with wo-k expected
i
to be completed by September 28, 1933.
!
I
>
f
i


    . _ _ _ _ _   - . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _             _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -__   ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
. _ _ _ _ _
  ,             .
- . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                                            80
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ -__
                                                              3.6.2.13 Lighting
._ _
                                                                        The Team observed lighting within the protected
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
                                                                        area. All areas were lighted in accordance with
,
                                                                        commitments in the Plan. Progress on upgrading
.
                                                                        the lighting is addressed in Section 3.6.2.1.
80
                                                              3.6.2.14 Compensatory Measures                                                                                         ,
3.6.2.13 Lighting
                                                                        The Team reviewed the licensee's compensatory
The Team observed lighting within the protected
                                                                        measures and determined that their use to be con-                                                           i
area. All areas were lighted in accordance with
                                                                        sistent with the commitments in the Plan. As a
commitments in the Plan.
                                                                        result of the security program upgrades addressed
Progress on upgrading
                                                                        in Section 3.6.2.1, the need for compensatory
the lighting is addressed in Section
                                                                        measures for degraded security equipment has been
3.6.2.1.
                                                                        dramatically reduced. Further reductions in the                                                             7
3.6.2.14 Compensatory Measures
                                                                        use of coripeasato 'v measures will occur as pro-
,
                                                                        ject upgrades are t spleted.
The Team reviewed the licensee's compensatory
                                                                                                                                                                                    !
measures and determined that their use to be con-
                                                              3.6.2.15 Aasessment Aids
i
                                                                                                                                                                                    ;
sistent with the commitments in the Plan. As a
                                                                        The Team reviewed the licensee's use of assess-                                                             l
result of the security program upgrades addressed
t                                                                       ment aids and Jetermined by observation that the                                                             I
in Section
                                                                        assessment aids are installed, functioning and                                                               i
3.6.2.1,
                                                                        maintained as committed to in the Plan. Progress
the need for compensatory
                                                                        on upgrading the assessment aids is addressed in
measures for degraded security equipment has been
                                                                        Section 3.6.2.1.
dramatically reduced.
                                                                                                                                                                                    ;
Further reductions in the
                                                              3.6.2.16 Access Control - Personnel and Packages
7
                                                                        The Team reviewed the access control procedures
use of coripeasato 'v measures will occur as pro-
                                                                        for personnel and packages and determinti that
ject upgrades are t spleted.
                                                                        they are corisistent with commitments in the Plan.
!
                                                                        This determination was made by observing person-                                                             ,
3.6.2.15 Aasessment Aids
                                                                        nel access processing during shift changes,
;
                                                                        visitor access processing, and by interviewing                                                               l
The Team reviewed the licensee's use of assess-
                                                                        security personnel about package access proced-                                                             !
l
                                                                        ures. The status of upgrades in the access con-                                                             (
t
                                                                        trol points is addressed in Section 3.6.2.1.                                                                 '
ment aids and Jetermined by observation that the
I
assessment aids are installed, functioning and
i
maintained as committed to in the Plan.
Progress
on upgrading the assessment aids is addressed in
Section 3.6.2.1.
;
3.6.2.16 Access Control - Personnel and Packages
The Team reviewed the access control procedures
for personnel and packages and determinti that
they are corisistent with commitments in the Plan.
This determination was made by observing person-
,
nel
access
processing
during
shift
changes,
visitor access processing, and by interviewing
l
security personnel about package access proced-
!
ures.
The status of upgrades in the access con-
(
trol points is addressed in Section
3.6.2.1.
'
'
  .
[
                                                                                                                                                                                    [
'
                                                              3.6.2.17 Access Control - Vehicles
.
                                                                        Tna Team reviewed vehicle access control proced-
3.6.2.17 Access Control - Vehicles
                                                                        ures and observed vehicle searches at the Main                                                               i
Tna Team reviewed vehicle access control proced-
                                                                        Vehicle Gate. It was d;t.>rmined that vehicle                                                               [
ures and observed vehicle searches at the Main
                                                                        searches were being conducted consistent with                                                               i
i
                                                                        commitments in the Plan.                                                                                     I
Vehicle Gate.
                                                                                                                                                                                    i
It was d;t.>rmined that vehicle
                                                                                                                                                                                    I
[
                                                                                                                                                                                    I
searches were being conducted consistent with
                                                                                                                                                                                    i
i
                                                                                                                                                                                    i
commitments in the Plan.
                                                                                                                                                                                    !
I
                                                                                                                                                                                    t
i
I
I
i
i
!
t
-
-
-
- -
- - -
-
-
.
-
-
.
- -
-
-
-
-
-


  ,   .
,
                            81
.
        3.6.2.18 Detection Aids - Protected Area
81
                  The Team observed penetration tests of approxi-
3.6.2.18 Detection Aids - Protected Area
                  mately 25% of the licensee's intrusion detection
The Team observed penetration tests of approxi-
                  system on August 17, 1983. The remaining 75% was
mately 25% of the licensee's intrusion detection
                  not tested during this inspection; however, pre-
system on August 17, 1983. The remaining 75% was
                  vious test records were reviewed and the records
not tested during this inspection; however, pre-
                  indicated that the system was operating as de-
vious test records were reviewed and the records
                  scribed in the Plan and implementing procedures.
indicated that the system was operating as de-
        3.6.2.19 Detection Aids - Vital Area
scribed in the Plan and implementing procedures.
                  The Team observed the testing of intrusion detec-
3.6.2.19 Detection Aids - Vital Area
                  tion aids in selected vital areas and determined
The Team observed the testing of intrusion detec-
                  that they wer? installed and functioning as
tion aids in selected vital areas and determined
                  committed to in the Plan.
that they wer? installed and functioning as
        3.6.2.20 Alarm Stations
committed to in the Plan.
                  The Team observed the operation of both the Cen-
3.6.2.20 Alarm Stations
l                 tral Alarm Station (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm
The Team observed the operation of both the Cen-
l                 Station (SAS) and found them to be in accordance c
l
tral Alarm Station (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm
l
Station (SAS) and found them to be in accordance
c
i
i
                  with Plan commitments.       During the previous
with Plan
                  inspection (50-293/88-16), a concern was identi-
commitments.
                  fied that the licensee was diverting an alarm
During
t                  station monitor f rom security duty to respond to
the
previous
inspection (50-293/88-16), a concern was identi-
fied that the licensee was diverting an alarm
station monitor f rom security duty to respond to
t
i
i
fire protection system and health physics alarms.
'
'
                  fire protection system and health physics alarms.
During
                  During the IAT inspection,         the Team noted
the
                  improvements in that there is a marked decrease
IAT
                  in the number of nuisance alarms, as a result of
inspection,
                  the removal of the fire door and health physics
the Team noted
                  doors from the security alarm system.
improvements in that there is a marked decrease
                                                                    L
in the number of nuisance alarms, as a result of
        3.6.2.21 Communications
the removal of the fire door and health physics
                  The Team observed tests of all communication       I
doors from the security alarm system.
                  capabilities in both the CAS and the SAS.     The
L
                  Team also reviewed testing records for the vari-
3.6.2.21 Communications
                  ous means of communications available to security
I
    ,              force members and found them to be as committed
The Team observed tests of all communication
                  to in the Plan.
capabilities in both the CAS and the SAS.
                                                                    I
The
        3.6.2 ;2 Training and Qualification - General Requirements
Team also reviewed testing records for the vari-
                  The Team reviewed the licensee's Training and
ous means of communications available to security
                  Qualification Plan and teplementing procedures
force members and found them to be as committed
                  and determined that they we re be'.ng implemented i
,
                  as committed to in the Plan,                       t
to in the Plan.
                                                                    t
I
                                                                    ,
3.6.2 ;2 Training and Qualification - General Requirements
The Team reviewed the licensee's Training and
Qualification Plan and teplementing procedures
and determined that they we re be'.ng implemented
i
as committed to in the Plan,
t
t
,


                                                                    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  . o
_.
                                82
.
            3.6.2.23 Safeguards Contingency Plan Implementation Review
o
                      The Team reviewed the licensee's Contingency Plan
82
                      and implementing procedures and determined that
3.6.2.23 Safeguards Contingency Plan Implementation Review
                      all exercises were being performed by the secur-
The Team reviewed the licensee's Contingency Plan
                      ity organization as committed to in the Plan.
and implementing procedures and determined that
            3.6.2.24 Protection of Safeguards Information
all exercises were being performed by the secur-
                      The Team reviewed the protection and handling
ity organization as committed to in the Plan.
                      procedures for Safeguards Information (SGI) and
3.6.2.24 Protection of Safeguards Information
                      determined that the licensee had completed an
The Team reviewed the protection and handling
                      inspection of each office onsite that handled and
procedures for Safeguards Information (SGI) and
                      stored SGI. The inspection result, indicated
determined that the licensee had completed an
                      that the SGI assigned to each of fice was accoun-
inspection of each office onsite that handled and
                      ted for and was being stored in accordance with
stored SGI.
                      established licensee procedures.
The inspection result, indicated
      3.6.3 Conclusions
that the SGI assigned to each of fice was accoun-
            A comprehensive review of the licensee's security program
ted for and was being stored in accordance with
            determined that the licensee has established and is imple-
established licensee procedures.
            menting a significantly improved seeJrity program over that
3.6.3
            which existed when the station was shutdown in April 1986.
Conclusions
            Upgrades to the security program include a greatly expanded
A comprehensive review of the licensee's security program
            proprietary security organization, major installation of
determined that the licensee has established and is imple-
            state-of-the-art equipment, improved security maintenance
menting a significantly improved seeJrity program over that
            support, and upgrades to plans and procedures,
which existed when the station was shutdown in April 1986.
Upgrades to the security program include a greatly expanded
proprietary security organization, major installation of
state-of-the-art equipment, improved security maintenance
support, and upgrades to plans and procedures,
i
i
l
l
i
i


                                                    . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _         __   _ _ _ _
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  .   .
- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                        83
__
        3.7 Training
_ _ _ _
            3.7.1   Scope of Review
.
                    The Team assessed the scope, quality, and effectiveness of
.
                    the licensee's training programs. Included in this review
83
                    were the licensed and non-licensed operator training pro-
3.7 Training
                    grams and the programs for technical and general training
3.7.1
                    of the plant staff.
Scope of Review
            3.7.2   Observations and Findings
The Team assessed the scope, quality, and effectiveness of
                    3.7.2.1   Operations Training
the licensee's training programs.
                              Operations Training Programs are outlined in PNPS
Included in this review
                              Nuclear Training Manual, T-001, Part 3, and have
were the licensed and non-licensed operator training pro-
                              received INPO accreditation.                                       The Operations
grams and the programs for technical and general training
                              Training Programs include initial and requalifi-
of the plant staff.
                              cation training for licensed operators, initial
3.7.2
                              and continuing training for non-licensed opera-
Observations and Findings
                              tors, Shif t Technical Advisor (STA) training, and
3.7.2.1
                              SRO certification training.               The Team reviewed
Operations Training
                              these programs and discussed various aspects of
Operations Training Programs are outlined in PNPS
                              the programs with members of the licensee's
Nuclear Training Manual, T-001, Part 3, and have
                              training and operation's staff.                                     The Team re-
received
                              viewed eight Operator and Senior Reactor Operator
INPO
                              training records to verify compliance with Sec-
accreditation.
                              tion 3.5.5 of the Training Manual.                                     To evaluate
The Operations
l                             the effectiveness of the training programs, the
Training Programs include initial and requalifi-
l                             Team observed classroom and simulator training;
cation training for licensed operators, initial
                              interviewed licensed operators and senior opera-
and continuing training for non-licensed opera-
                              tors, non-licensed operators and STAS; reviewed
tors, Shif t Technical Advisor (STA) training, and
                              several training evaluation and feedback forms
SRO certification training.
                              from classroom and simulator training conducted
The Team reviewed
                              during the current requalification cycle; and
these programs and discussed various aspects of
                              observed ongoing operations in the plant.
the programs with members of the licensee's
                              Overall, the Team determined that the Operations
training and operation's staff.
                              Training Programs are adequate and effective.
The Team re-
    .                          Classroom and simulator training observed ap-
viewed eight Operator and Senior Reactor Operator
                              peared to be effective.               Instructor preparation
training records to verify compliance with Sec-
                              was good and the lesson plan content was com-
tion 3.5.5 of the Training Manual.
                              plete.   During cbservations of classroom training
To evaluate
                              for PDC 88-07 involving the degraded voltage
l
                              modification, the Team noted that the depth of
the effectiveness of the training programs, the
                              knowledge being presented was adeqaste and stu-
l
                              dant participation was encouraged. After obser-
Team observed classroom and simulator training;
                              ving the conduct of the annual simulator opera-
interviewed licensed operators and senior opera-
                              t.ng exam, the Team noted improved coraunications
tors, non-licensed operators and STAS; reviewed
                                                                                                                          _-
several training evaluation and feedback forms
from classroom and simulator training conducted
during the current requalification cycle; and
observed ongoing operations in the plant.
Overall, the Team determined that the Operations
Training Programs are adequate and effective.
Classroom and simulator training observed ap-
.
peared to be effective.
Instructor preparation
was good and the lesson plan content was com-
plete.
During cbservations of classroom training
for PDC 88-07 involving the degraded voltage
modification, the Team noted that the depth of
knowledge being presented was adeqaste and stu-
dant participation was encouraged. After obser-
ving the conduct of the annual simulator opera-
t.ng exam, the Team noted improved coraunications
_-


  _ _ _ _ _ _   ._ _     _ _ _ _     __   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                         _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ .
_ _ _ _ _ _
.             .
._
                                84
_
      s
_ _ _ _
                    between meners d the operating crew.                                                                         In addi-
__
                    tion, the Hm noted the simulator examination
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                    was also bei. , observed by licensee upper manage-
_ _ _ _ - _
                    ment.       Discussions with training and operations
_ _ _ .
                    personnel confirmed that strong upper tranagement
.
                    attention and support for all aspects of the
.
                    Itcensed training programs is evident.                                                                           Inter-
84
                    views with licensed operators indicated that
s
                    overall they a re very satisfied thi t training
between meners d the operating crew.
                    programs are well-suited to their needs, and that
In addi-
                    the programs are responsive to their feedback.
tion, the Hm noted the simulator examination
                  Operators indicated that the training program has
was also bei. , observed by licensee upper manage-
                    greatly improved over the past year with the
ment.
                    incorporation of simulator training into the
Discussions with training and operations
                    requalification program.
personnel confirmed that strong upper tranagement
                  Discussions with Operations Training staff 4.a-
attention and support for all aspects of the
                  cated sufficient staffing to conduct training
Itcensed training programs is evident.
                  programs.           Thirteen instructors are                                                                 currently
Inter-
                    receiving Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) certif t-
views with licensed operators indicated that
                  cation training and are expected to be fully cer-
overall they a re very satisfied thi t training
                    tified by the end of 1988                                                                         The use of experi-
programs are well-suited to their needs, and that
                  enced PNPS instructors instead of contractors for
the programs are responsive to their feedback.
                    the operations training programs should enhance
Operators indicated that the training program has
                    the quality of the licensee's programs as well as
greatly improved over the past year with the
                  contribute to the depth of in-house operational
incorporation of simulator training
                  expertise.
into the
                  Recent additions to the licensed requalification
requalification program.
                  program include the incorporation of Emergency
Discussions with Operations Training staff 4.a-
                  Operating Procedure (EOP) proficiency training.
cated sufficient staffing to conduct training
                  This includes at least 4 hours devoted to E0P
programs.
                  review ir, the classroom and/or simulator during
Thirteen instructors are
                  each 32-hour segment of the program. (Each oper-
currently
                  ator normally receives one segment of requalifi-
receiving Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) certif t-
                  cation training every five weeks. )                                                                           Also, the
cation training and are expected to be fully cer-
                  exam structure at the end of each session has
tified by the end of 1988
                  been nodified to include written and simulator
The use of experi-
                  operating exams, which will aid the training
enced PNPS instructors instead of contractors for
                  staff in determining the effectiveness of the
the operations training programs should enhance
                  programs on a more frequent basis.                                                                         In addition,
the quality of the licensee's programs as well as
                  the training staf f appears to carefully track
contribute to the depth of in-house operational
                  attendance in req;alification training to assure
expertise.
                  that everyone required to attend is trained in
Recent additions to the licensed requalification
                  each module           of                           the                                     requalification   program.
program include the incorporation of Emergency
Operating Procedure (EOP) proficiency training.
This includes at least 4 hours devoted to E0P
review ir, the classroom and/or simulator during
each 32-hour segment of the program. (Each oper-
ator normally receives one segment of requalifi-
cation training every five weeks. )
Also, the
exam structure at the end of each session has
been nodified to include written and simulator
operating exams, which will aid the training
staff in determining the effectiveness of the
programs on a more frequent basis.
In addition,
the training staf f appears to carefully track
attendance in req;alification training to assure
that everyone required to attend is trained in
each module
of
the
requalification
program.


  ,.                                                     - _ - _ _ _ _ _     _.
,.
      , e
- _ - _ _ _ _ _
                      85
_.
                                                                                    l
,
e
85
4
4
            The operation's training staff appears to have a
The operation's training staff appears to have a
            very effective working relationship with the
very effective working relationship with the
            operations department.     They meet to discuss
operations department.
            training needs on a frequent caris.         Through
They meet to discuss
            these meetings, the training department anpears
training needs on a frequent caris.
            able to sufficiently track and schedule the
Through
            licensed training either required or requested to
these meetings, the training department anpears
            be completed prior to restart.     In addition, the
able to sufficiently track and schedule the
            operation's department often provided support                         l
licensed training either required or requested to
            during simulator examinations.                                         '
be completed prior to restart.
            The Team reviewed the licensee's special training                     ,
In addition, the
            program for the sixteen licensed operators (14
operation's department often provided support
            RO's and 2 SRO's) who currently hold NRC licenses
l
            which are limited pending on-watch training dur-
during simulator examinations.
            ing the Power Ascension Program. The Team dis-
'
            cussed various aspects of the program with mem-                         ,
The Team reviewed the licensee's special training
'
,
            bees of the licensee's training and rperations
program for the sixteen licensed operators (14
            staff. The Team noted that the licensee has
RO's and 2 SRO's) who currently hold NRC licenses
            established a structured and supervised program
which are limited pending on-watch training dur-
            to assure completion of NRC requirements to allow
ing the Power Ascension Program. The Team dis-
          . removal of the individuals' license limitations.
cussed various aspects of the program with mem-
            Following a discussion with the Team regarding
,
            plans for ensuring that each operator performs a
bees of the licensee's training and rperations
            sufficient number of reactivity manipulations,
'
            the licensee representative stated that en at-
staff.
            tachment to the special program would be added to
The Team noted that the licensee has
            further clarify what constitutes an acceptable
established a structured and supervised program
            manipulation.
to assure completion of NRC requirements to allow
            The Team observed     the   operations department
removal of the individuals' license limitations.
'          staff on four days of consecutive shift rotation.
.
            These observations verified the overall effec-
Following a discussion with the Team regarding
            tiveness of training.       For example, on-shift                     .
plans for ensuring that each operator performs a
            communications, an area of emphasis in simulator                     '
sufficient number of reactivity manipulations,
            training, was formal and effective.         However,
the licensee representative stated that en at-
            during a walk-through with an equipment operator
tachment to the special program would be added to
            (non-licensed) of E0P Satellite Procedure 5.3.26,                     t
further clarify what constitutes an acceptable
            the Team noted several discrepancies in the pro-                     ,
manipulation.
            cedurt.   It also noted that the E0 and an SRO                       -
The Team observed
            misunderstood a step in the procedure.                       Upon   l
the
            investigation of these problems, the licensee
operations department
            determined that a decision to train only the E0's
:
            and not the licensed operators on the field por-
staff on four days of consecutive shift rotation.
            tion of the ratellite procedures contributed to
These observations verified the overall effec-
            the misunderstanding. These issues are discussed                     ;
'
            in detail in Section 3.2.4
tiveness
                                                                                  !
of training.
                                                                                  !
For example, on-shift
                                                                                  !
.
                                                                                  t
'
communications, an area of emphasis in simulator
training, was formal and effective.
However,
during a walk-through with an equipment operator
(non-licensed) of E0P Satellite Procedure 5.3.26,
t
the Team noted several discrepancies in the pro-
,
cedurt.
It also noted that the E0 and an SRO
-
misunderstood a step in the procedure.
Upon
l
investigation of these problems, the licensee
determined that a decision to train only the E0's
and not the licensed operators on the field por-
tion of the ratellite procedures contributed to
the misunderstanding. These issues are discussed
;
in detail in Section 3.2.4
!
!
!
t
,
,
                                                                                  !
!
                                                                                  I
I
.
.
--
-


                          -
-
                            i
i
                      w .
w
                t
.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                1
t
                                                                                                                                                                                                86                                               :
1
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ,
86
                                                                                                                                                                                      Additional Team followup of the problems found
:
                                                                                                                                                                                      during the above-mentioned procedure walk-through
,
                                                                                                                                                                                      identified a weakness in the licensee's method of
Additional Team followup of the problems found
                                                                                                                                                                                      determining the need far additional training on
during the above-mentioned procedure walk-through
                                                                                                                                                                                      new procedures and procedure changes. The licen-
identified a weakness in the licensee's method of
                                                                                                                                                                                      see's current method incorporates review of ORC
determining the need far additional training on
                                                                                                                                                                                      meeting minutes to determine newly approved pro-         *
new procedures and procedure changes. The licen-
                                                                                                                                                                                      cedures or procedure changes requiring training.           :
see's current method incorporates review of ORC
                                                                                                                                                                                      However, a delay of 30 to 45 days is not unusual
meeting minutes to determine newly approved pro-
                                                                                                                                                                                      between the meeting and the distribution of for-         [
*
                                                                                                                                                                                      mal minutu. Tor example, Procedure 5.3.26 had
cedures or procedure changes requiring training.
                                                                                                                                                                                      been revised since equipment operator training
:
                                                                                                                                                                                      was conducted in March and April 1988. The ORC
However, a delay of 30 to 45 days is not unusual
                                                                                                                                                                                      meeting minutes which addressed this procedure
between the meeting and the distribution of for-
                                                                                                                                                                                      change had not been received by the training
[
                                                                                                                                                                                      department as of August M. 1938, 42 days af ter
mal minutu.
                                                                                                                                                                                      the ORC meeting on July 6,1988.
Tor example, Procedure 5.3.26 had
                                                                                                                                                                                      The Team discussed the issue with a licensee             :
been revised since equipment operator training
                                                                                                                                                                                      training department representative who stated
was conducted in March and April 1988. The ORC
                                                                                                                                                                                      that the department recognized this concern and
meeting minutes which addressed this procedure
                                                                                                                                                                                      was preparing to implement, in October 1988, a
change had not been received by the training
                                                                                                                                                                                      more timely method for cetermining the needed
department as of August M. 1938, 42 days af ter
                                                                                                                                                                                      training.
the ORC meeting on July 6,1988.
                                                                                                                                                                                      During the inspection, the licensee committed to
The Team discussed the issue with a licensee
                                                                                                                                                                                      accelerate implementation cf certain features of         ;
:
                                                                                                                                                                                      the improved program, such that the training             ,
training department representative who stated
                                                                                                                                                                                      department will become aware of procedure changes       l
that the department recognized this concern and
                                                                                                                                                                                      within soproximately one day following the ORC           l
was preparing to implement, in October 1988, a
                                                                                                                                                                                      meeting.   This will allow the training staff the
more timely method for cetermining the needed
                                                                                                                                                                                      opportunity to review the precedure changes end
training.
                                                                                                                                                                                      determine the need for training prior to issuance
During the inspection, the licensee committed to
                                                                                                                                                                                      of the approved procedure.       If the training       i
accelerate implementation cf certain features of
]                                                                                                                                                                                     department determines that training is required         ;
;
                                                                                                                                                                                      prior to issuance of the procedure, the depart-           i
the improved program, such that the training
                                                                                                                                                                                      ment will have the ability to delay the proced-         i
,
                                                                                                                                                                                      ure issuance. The licensee representative stated
department will become aware of procedure changes
                                                                                                                                                                                      that .o inta.ed as k iri.tiwtion detailing this         ,
l
                                                                                                                                                                                      process was being written and would be approved         '
within soproximately one day following the ORC
                                                                                                                                                                                      by ORC within about a week.       In additica, the       l
l
                                                                                                                                                                                      training staff will revis, their backlog of ORC         i
meeting.
                                                                                                                                                                                      recting minutes to determ ne which procedure             ,
This will allow the training staff the
                                                                                                                                                                                      changes have not been addressed and will take           j
opportunity to review the precedure changes end
                                                                                                                                                                                      appropriate action. These actions planned by the       '
determine the need for training prior to issuance
                                                                                                                                                                                      licensee appeared very responsive to the Team's         ;
of the approved procedure.
                                                                                                                                                                                      concerns.
If the
.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             I
training
l                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ,
i
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              l
]
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              ;
department determines that training is required
;                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           i
;
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              .
prior to issuance of the procedure, the depart-
  _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _        __ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _                                        _        . . _ _
i
ment will have the ability to delay the proced-
i
ure issuance. The licensee representative stated
that .o inta.ed as k iri.tiwtion detailing this
,
process was being written and would be approved
'
by ORC within about a week.
In additica, the
l
training staff will revis, their backlog of ORC
i
recting minutes to determ ne which procedure
,
changes have not been addressed and will take
j
appropriate action. These actions planned by the
'
licensee appeared very responsive to the Team's
;
concerns.
I
.
l
,
l
;
;
i
.
.
.
. .
.
. .
. .
.
.
. -
.
.
.
. .


  1, .
.
                                87
1,
              3.7.2.2 Technical and General Training
87
                      Nuclear Training Manual, T-001, Parts 4 and 5,
3.7.2.2
                      outline the licensee's technical and general
Technical and General Training
                      training programs. Included are training 3ro-
Nuclear Training Manual, T-001, Parts 4 and 5,
                      grams in maintenance, health physics, chemistry,
outline the licensee's technical and general
                      fire brigade, emergency plan, supervision, and
training programs.
                      technical training for staf f and managers,     ihe
Included are training 3ro-
                      Team reviewed these programs and discussed var-
grams in maintenance, health physics, chemistry,
                      ious aspects of them with members of the licen-
fire brigade, emergency plan, supervision, and
                      see's training, technical, and supervisory staff.
technical training for staf f and managers,
                      To evaluate the ef fectiveness of the training       1
ihe
                      programs, the Team observed classroom instruc-
Team reviewed these programs and discussed var-
                      tion;   interviewed radiological controls and
ious aspects of them with members of the licen-
                      radiological chemistry (radchem) technicians, QA
see's training, technical, and supervisory staff.
                      engineers and first-line supervision; reviewed
To evaluate the ef fectiveness of the training
                      classroom training evaluation and feedback forms;
1
                      and observed ongoing work ir. the plant.
programs, the Team observed classroom instruc-
                      Overall, the licensee's training programs were
tion;
                      found to be adequate.       Classroom training ob-
interviewed
                      served appeared to be effective and student
radiological
                      participation was strongly encouraged.     In-house
controls
                      staffing for those training programs appeared
and
                      more than sufficient. The following relatively
radiological chemistry (radchem) technicians, QA
                      new training programs are indicative of licensee
engineers and first-line supervision; reviewed
!                   initiatives to develop employee skills:
classroom training evaluation and feedback forms;
                      --
and observed ongoing work ir. the plant.
                            apprentice programs for maintenance, health
Overall, the licensee's training programs were
                            physics, and rad chem technicians; and,
found to be adequate.
                      --
Classroom training ob-
                            technical training       for newly   assigned
served appeared to be effective and student
                            supervisors.
participation was strongly encouraged.
                      Additional training programs currently being
In-house
                      developed in industrial safety and safety aware-
staffing for those training programs appeared
                      ness, along with the licensee's CPR program, show
more than sufficient.
                      the licensee's positive attitude in those areas.
The following relatively
    .
new training programs are indicative of licensee
                      The Team's observations of work in the plant dur-
!
                      ing this inspection verified the averall training
initiatives to develop employee skills:
                      effectiveness. However, inadequacies in mainten-
apprentice programs for maintenance, health
                      ance post-work testing appeared to be the result
--
                      of lack of training for the maintenance planning
physics,
                      group and first-line supervisors on the post-work
and rad chem technicians;
                      testing portion of the new maintenance program
and,
                      (See Section 3.3.2.6).
technical
training
for
newly
assigned
--
supervisors.
Additional
training
programs
currently being
developed in industrial safety and safety aware-
ness, along with the licensee's CPR program, show
the licensee's positive attitude in those areas.
The Team's observations of work in the plant dur-
.
ing this inspection verified the averall training
effectiveness. However, inadequacies in mainten-
ance post-work testing appeared to be the result
of lack of training for the maintenance planning
group and first-line supervisors on the post-work
testing portion of the new maintenance program
(See Section 3.3.2.6).
i
i
        . , _
. , _
s e


  _
_
.   .
.
                              83
.
      3.7.3 Conclusions
83
            The 11:ensee's training programs appear to be very good.
3.7.3
            Team findings in all functional areas indicated overall     '
Conclusions
            effectiveness of the training implemented. Examples of
The 11:ensee's training programs appear to be very good.
            areas where training may have needed to be conducted sooner
Team findings in all functional areas indicated overall
            include E0P satellite procedures and the post-work testing
'
            program.   A weakness was identified in the licensee's
effectiveness of the training implemented.
            method of determining training needed for new procedures
Examples of
            and procedure changes.
areas where training may have needed to be conducted sooner
            The licensee appears to have made a strong commitment in
include E0P satellite procedures and the post-work testing
            the area of licensed operator training, as exemplified by
program.
            increased staffing, simulator use in requalification train-
A weakness was identified in the licensee's
            ing, strong interface between training and operations man-
method of determining training needed for new procedures
            agement, and increased attention and support from upper
and procedure changes.
            management. In addition, the creation of new programs for
The licensee appears to have made a strong commitment in
            supervisors and apprentices reflects an effort by the
the area of licensed operator training, as exemplified by
            licensee to effectively promote employee development.
increased staffing, simulator use in requalification train-
ing, strong interface between training and operations man-
agement, and increased attention and support from upper
management.
In addition, the creation of new programs for
supervisors and apprentices reflects an effort by the
licensee
to effectively
promote
employee development.


    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
  .                               .
.
                                                                                  89
.
                                                3.8 Fire Protection
89
                                                    3.8.1     Scope of Review
3.8 Fire Protection
                                                              The Team's evaluation of the fire protection program
3.8.1
                                                              focused on the maintenance of fire protection equipment,
Scope of Review
                                                              the reliance on compensatory measures for degraded equip-
The Team's evaluation of the fire protection program
                                                              ment, and the performance of personnel on the fire brigade
focused on the maintenance of fire protection equipment,
                                                              and standing fire watches.
the reliance on compensatory measures for degraded equip-
                                                    3.8.2   Observations and Findings
ment, and the performance of personnel on the fire brigade
                                                                                                                            .
and standing fire watches.
                                                              Licensee senior management established a station goal of
3.8.2
                                                              reducing the number of open fire protection corrective
Observations and Findings
                                                              maintenance requests (MR's) to 40 from a high of 300. This   ,.
.
                                                              goal was reached in June 1988. This reduction is indica-     :
Licensee senior management established a station goal of
                                                              tive of the overall improvement of the material condition
reducing the number of open fire protection corrective
                                                              of fire protection equipment and systems. The number of
maintenance requests (MR's) to 40 from a high of 300. This
                                                              MR's began climbing two weeks before the IAT inspection,
,.
                                                              and reached 63 during the second week of this inspection.
goal was reached in June 1988.
                                                              The increase was mainly for low priority MR's.
This reduction is indica-
                                                                                                                            l
:
                                                              Fire protection MR's are tracked as a stction performance     r
tive of the overall improvement of the material condition
                                                              indicator and this increasing trend received prompt senior   i
of fire protection equipment and systems.
                                                              management attention.     Tha licensee is currently contract-
The number of
                                                              ing to bring in additional fire protection maintenance sup-
MR's began climbing two weeks before the IAT inspection,
                                                              port by the end of August 1933. The fire protectinn man-
and reached 63 during the second week of this inspection.
                                                              ager meets daily with operations, maintenance and planning   ,
The increase was mainly for low priority MR's.
                                                              sections to schedule MR's and develop the station's work     ,
l
                                                              plan. The Team concluded that the licensee is giving
Fire protection MR's are tracked as a stction performance
                                                              proper management Attention to itre protection MR's.         l
r
                                                              There are over 5,000 fire barrier penetration seals at
indicator and this increasing trend received prompt senior
                                                              PNPS.   The licensee's tagging system has been effective in :
i
                                                              identifying these penetrations, with no untagged penetra-     i
management attention.
                                                              tions or degraded penetration seals observed by the Team.
Tha licensee is currently contract-
                                                              The number of fire watch postings has been reduced from 145
ing to bring in additional fire protection maintenance sup-
                                                              a year ago to 45 prior to this inspection.         Fifteen of
port by the end of August 1933.
                                                              these remaining postings will be eliminated by changes to
The fire protectinn man-
                                                              the fire protection program which are currently being
ager meets daily with operations, maintenance and planning
i                                                             reviewed by NRC.   Another twelve will be eliminated when
,
sections to schedule MR's and develop the station's work
,
plan.
The Team concluded that the licensee is giving
proper management Attention to itre protection MR's.
l
There are over 5,000 fire barrier penetration seals at
PNPS.
The licensee's tagging system has been effective in
:
identifying these penetrations, with no untagged penetra-
i
tions or degraded penetration seals observed by the Team.
The number of fire watch postings has been reduced from 145
a year ago to 45 prior to this inspection.
Fifteen of
these remaining postings will be eliminated by changes to
the fire protection program which are currently being
i
reviewed by NRC.
Another twelve will be eliminated when
the licensee completes Engineering Services Request (ESR)
'
'
                                                              the licensee completes Engineering Services Request (ESR)
88-339, "Alarm delays on non-vital CAS alarms."
                                                              88-339, "Alarm delays on non-vital CAS alarms." This ESR
This ESR
will provide a means to electronically monitor fire doors
;
,
,
                                                              will provide a means to electronically monitor fire doors    ;
without undue distractian of security personnel from their
'
'
                                                              without undue distractian of security personnel from their    '
'
                                                              primary function. The remaining 18 fire watch postings are
primary function. The remaining 18 fire watch postings are
                                                              due to degraded (quipment for which repairs are currently     l
due to degraded (quipment for which repairs are currently
!                                                             being planned.
l
                                                                                                                            I
!
                                                                                                                            l
being planned.
                                                                                                                            l
I
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l


                                                                    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
    . .
__
  t.
_
                                    90
.
              Because TS's allow one individual to rove and cover more
.
              than one fire watch posting, the number of people on shif t
t.
              committed to fire watch activities is substantially lower
90
              than 45. Two personnel per shift are assigned to cover
Because TS's allow one individual to rove and cover more
              these fire watchos. In discussions with the Team, the fire
than one fire watch posting, the number of people on shif t
              watches appeared knowledgeable about their duties. The
committed to fire watch activities is substantially lower
              Team reviewed several fire watch postings in the plant and
than 45.
              identified no concerns. All fire watch rounds were com-
Two personnel per shift are assigned to cover
              pleted on schedule.
these fire watchos. In discussions with the Team, the fire
              The Team observed the on-shif t fire brigade respond to an
watches appeared knowledgeable about their duties.
              unannounced fire drill. The drill scenario was a simulated
The
              main transformer fire with a concurrent failure of the
Team reviewed several fire watch postings in the plant and
              deluge system.     The brigade leader developed a successful
identified no concerns.
              fire fighting strategy.       The brigade members responded
All fire watch rounds were com-
              promptly in full fire fighting gear.         Communications be-                   ,
pleted on schedule.
              tween the brigade and the control room appeared to be ade-
The Team observed the on-shif t fire brigade respond to an
              q t.a t e . The fire brigade's first-line supervisors observed
unannounced fire drill. The drill scenario was a simulated
              the deill on their own initiative. The fire protection
main transformer fire with a concurrent failure of the
              training instructor was also found to be knowledgeable and
deluge system.
              ent.husiastic about the training program.                                         ;
The brigade leader developed a successful
                                                                                                  "
fire fighting strategy.
        3.8.3 Conclusions
The brigade members responded
              Effective management by the fire protection manager and
promptly in full fire fighting gear.
              support by senior management are shown by the attention
Communications be-
              given to the material condition of fire protection equip-                           ;
,
              ment and reduced reliance on compensatory measures for
tween the brigade and the control room appeared to be ade-
              degraded equipment. Completion of licensing actions and an
q t.a t e . The fire brigade's first-line supervisors observed
              ESR will further reduce the number of fire watch postings.
the deill on their own initiative.
              There is good identification and control of fire barriers.
The fire protection
              Personnel assigned fire watch and fire brigade duties are
training instructor was also found to be knowledgeable and
              knowledgeable about their duties and perform them properly.
ent.husiastic about the training program.
              The   f' re protection division is well       staffed to meet
;
              program needs.
"
                                                                                                  ,
3.8.3
                                                                                                  i
Conclusions
                                                                                                  i
Effective management by the fire protection manager and
support by senior management are shown by the attention
given to the material condition of fire protection equip-
;
ment and reduced reliance on compensatory measures for
degraded equipment. Completion of licensing actions and an
ESR will further reduce the number of fire watch postings.
There is good identification and control of fire barriers.
Personnel assigned fire watch and fire brigade duties are
knowledgeable about their duties and perform them properly.
The
f' re protection division is well
staffed to meet
program needs.
,
i
i
)
)
-


                                                _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  r
r
    ,     .
,
                                                91
.
            3.9 Engineering Support
91
                  3.9.1   Scope of Review
3.9 Engineering Support
                          NRC found licensee engineering support to be strong in the
3.9.1
                          past two SALP reports. Because of this history of good
Scope of Review
i                         performance, engineering support was not selected as a
NRC found licensee engineering support to be strong in the
                          specific area of focus for this inspection.                       Instead,
past two SALP reports.
                          observations relative to engineering support were made by
Because of this history of good
                          the Team while it inspected the other functional areas.
i
                  3.9.2   Observations and Findings
performance, engineering support was not selected as a
                          The Team found that engineering support to the facility is
specific area of focus for this inspection.
                          generally very effective.               In particular,   the     Systems
Instead,
                          Engineering Division functions well to meet plant needs.
observations relative to engineering support were made by
                          Also, engineering support to maintenance has improved and
the Team while it inspected the other functional areas.
                          is eahanced by the improved maintenance work process and
3.9.2
                          the effective performance of the maintenance engineers.
Observations and Findings
                          The Team noted that a number of technical issues, including
The Team found that engineering support to the facility is
                            some NRC open items, as well as licensee-identified items,
generally very effective.
                          require NED resolution before plant restart. They are
In particular,
                          being tracked and pursued for resolution by NED.
the
                          During tours of the control room, the Team noted the mini-
Systems
                          mal use of certain human engineering features, such as
Engineering Division functions well to meet plant needs.
                          color-codes, meter "banding" (e.g., marking of normal,
Also, engineering support to maintenance has improved and
                          alert, and fail positions on meter and gauge faces), and
is eahanced by the improved maintenance work process and
                            system lineup memory aids. Based on discussions with NED
the effective performance of the maintenance engineers.
                          personnel, the Team determined that the licensee performed
The Team noted that a number of technical issues, including
                          a detailed control room design review (DCRDR) and received
some NRC open items, as well as licensee-identified items,
                          comments on it from the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor
require NED resolution before plant restart.
                          Regulation.     A   supplemental           licensee D0RDR   report     is
They are
                            required four months af ter the end of the current outage.
being tracked and pursued for resolution by NED.
                          Currently, the licensee's DCRDR project has identified
During tours of the control room, the Team noted the mini-
                          about 140 proposed human engineering improvements which are
mal use of certain human engineering features, such as
                          being evaluated and prioritized.               A few were incorporated
color-codes, meter "banding"
      ,                    into design changes this outage.             The Team noted that some
(e.g.,
                          of the remaining improvements were relatively simple, from
marking of normal,
                            an engineering perspective, but could significantly enhance
alert, and fail positions on meter and gauge faces), and
                          control room human factors. The Team asked whether'imple-
system lineup memory aids.
                          mentation of some of these items could be accelerated rela-
Based on discussions with NED
                            tive to the other, more complex items which may require
personnel, the Team determined that the licensee performed
                          more detailed engineering and a plant outage to install.
a detailed control room design review (DCRDR) and received
                    .
comments on it from the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor
  l     -
Regulation.
                                            -                   .
A
                                                                                        ___           _-- a
supplemental
licensee D0RDR
report
is
required four months af ter the end of the current outage.
Currently, the licensee's DCRDR project has identified
about 140 proposed human engineering improvements which are
being evaluated and prioritized.
A few were incorporated
into design changes this outage.
The Team noted that some
,
of the remaining improvements were relatively simple, from
an engineering perspective, but could significantly enhance
control room human factors.
The Team asked whether'imple-
mentation of some of these items could be accelerated rela-
tive to the other, more complex items which may require
more detailed engineering and a plant outage to install.
.
l
-
-
.
___
_--
a


    . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _
  .                                 o
.
                                                                      92
o
                                            The     licensee fndicated that these simple improvements,
92
                                            categorized by the licensee as "Paint-Label-Tape," are
The
                                            included in the current 1989 budget. The licensee also
licensee fndicated that these simple improvements,
                                            committed to evaluate control room human factors during the
categorized by the licensee as "Paint-Label-Tape," are
                                            Power Ascension Program and to include an update regarding
included in the current 1989 budget.
                                            the schedule and scope of these "Paint-Label-Tape" items in
The licensee also
                                            their report to NRC at the completion of the Power Ascen-
committed to evaluate control room human factors during the
                                            sfon Program. The licensee was very responsive on this
Power Ascension Program and to include an update regarding
                                            issue. The Team noted that (1) licensee personnel have
the schedule and scope of these "Paint-Label-Tape" items in
                                            performed well in the simulator under NRC observation, and
their report to NRC at the completion of the Power Ascen-
                                            (2) there has not been any pattern of performance problems
sfon Program.
                                            traceable to control room human factors. Thus, the T:am
The licensee was very responsive on this
                                            cancluded that the licensee's approach to this issue is
issue.
                                            acceptable.
The Team noted that (1) licensee personnel have
                                            The Team reviewed the licensee's program for the control of
performed well in the simulator under NRC observation, and
                                            transient materials.         This review included the licensee's
(2) there has not been any pattern of performance problems
                                            methods for identifying, tracking and removing non perman-
traceable to control room human factors.
                                            ent equipment such as tools, gas bottles, and scaffolding
Thus, the T:am
                                            located in plant treas where safety-related equipment is
cancluded that the licensee's approach to this issue is
                                            housed. The licensee currently assigns responsibility in
acceptable.
                                            this area to the Systems Engineering Group (SEG). Station
The Team reviewed the licensee's program for the control of
                                            Instruction SI-SG.1010 "Systems Group Systems Walkdown and
transient materials.
                                            Area Inspection Guidelines," details the licensee's program
This review included the licensee's
                                            for controlling transient materials. Materials so identi-
methods for identifying, tracking and removing non perman-
                                            fied during weekly walkdowns by system engineers are docu-
ent equipment such as tools, gas bottles, and scaffolding
                                            mented and are either removed or their presence justified
located in plant treas where safety-related equipment is
                                            in writing.     If the material is allowed to remain in the
housed. The licensee currently assigns responsibility in
                                            process building, a seismic missile hazard analysis is per-
this area to the Systems Engineering Group (SEG). Station
                                            formed under Station Instruction SI-SG.1015 "Dotential
Instruction SI-SG.1010 "Systems Group Systems Walkdown and
                                            Seismic Missile Hazard," and appropriate measures are
Area Inspection Guidelines," details the licensee's program
                                            implemented to ensure that the materials are properly
for controlling transient materials. Materials so identi-
                                            secured. The licensee is compiling a data base which
fied during weekly walkdowns by system engineers are docu-
                                            identifies transient eaterials which must be removed prior
mented and are either removed or their presence justified
                                            to startup.     The program appears to be comprehensive and
in writing.
If the material is allowed to remain in the
process building, a seismic missile hazard analysis is per-
formed under Station Instruction SI-SG.1015
"Dotential
Seismic Missile Hazard," and appropriate measures are
implemented to ensure that the materials are properly
secured.
The licensee is compiling a data base which
identifies transient eaterials which must be removed prior
to startup.
The program appears to be comprehensive and
,
,
                                            adequate.
adequate.
l
l
                                            During plant tours, the Team questioned the licensee con-
During plant tours, the Team questioned the licensee con-
                                            cerning the installation of splash shields and personnel
cerning the installation of splash shields and personnel
  .
barriers in the areas of safety-related instrumentation.
                                            barriers in the areas of safety-related instrumentation.
.
                                            Specifically, the Team questioned the seismic response nf
Specifically, the Team questioned the seismic response nf
                                            ti,e structures and the effect they may have on safety-
ti,e structures and the effect they may have on safety-
                                            related structures.
related structures.
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I
                                    _. -..     - --         --__,, -           - _
_.
-..
- --
--__,, -
-


              _ _-_     - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _-_
  .               .
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                                                                                                      93
.
                                                                                                                The fire water spray shield was installed during the cur-
.
                                                                                                                rent outage. This plant design change           was processed under
93
                                                                                                                current             licensee procedures which require a seismic
The fire water spray shield was installed during the cur-
                                                                                                                response analysis prior to modification approval. P9rson-
rent outage.
                                                                                                                nel barriers installed during the mid-1970's recently had
This plant design change was processed under
                                                                                                                seismic analyses performed on their current configurations.
current
                                                                                                                These analyses found them satisfactory.
licensee
                                                                                                                Based on this information and on a review of licensee docu-
procedures
                                                                                                                reentation, the Team had no further questions.
which
                                                                            3.9.3                             Conclusions
require
                                                                                                                'the Team concluded that engineering support continues to be
a
                                                                                                                effective and identified no weaknesses. The Itcensee has
seismic
                                                                                                                committed to evaluate potential near-term improverrents in
response analysis prior to modification approval.
                                                                                                                control room human engineering during power ascension
P9rson-
                                                                                                                testing.
nel barriers installed during the mid-1970's recently had
l
seismic analyses performed on their current configurations.
These analyses found them satisfactory.
Based on this information and on a review of licensee docu-
reentation, the Team had no further questions.
3.9.3
Conclusions
'the Team concluded that engineering support continues to be
effective and identified no weaknesses.
The Itcensee has
committed to evaluate potential near-term improverrents in
control
room human engineering during power ascension
testing.
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h
4
4
    - - , --         -
- - , --
                                                          , . , , - _ , - , - . , , _ , . _ _ , , _ , _ _ . , _ . - _ - . , , _ ,,..,,._,------_,-,,_n     e- .,           , -- , y g. :,g
-
, . , , - _ , - , - . , , _ , . _ _ , , _ , _ _ . , _ . - _ - . , , _
,,..,,._,------_,-,,_n
e-
.,
, -- ,
y
g. :,g


, _ _ _ - - - - - - - _ - - _ - -       _             --   . - - - - - - - - -             -- _ ---- ------- --- -- - - . _ -               - - - _ - - _ --   - - - ---- --- ------
, _ _ _ - - - - - - - _ - - _ - -
    o             .
_
                                                                                      94
--
                                  3.10 Safety AssessmentfQuality Verj,fication
. - - - - - - - - -
                                      3.10.1     Scope of Review
-- _ ---- ------- --- -- - - . _ -
                                                The objective of this irspection was to evaluate the ef fec-                                                                         i
- - - _ - - _ --
                                                tivenass of the licensee's t                                                   assessment programs.           The
- - - ---- --- ------
                                                  inspection focused on determining whether these programs
o
                                                contribute to the prevention of problems by stonitoring and
.
                                                evaluating plant performance, providing assessments and
94
                                                findings, and communicating and following up en corrective
3.10 Safety AssessmentfQuality Verj,fication
                                                action recommendations.                                       The inspection consisted of a
3.10.1
                                                documentation review, personnel interviews, and observa-
Scope of Review
                                                tions of meeting and work.
The objective of this irspection was to evaluate the ef fec-
                                      3.10.2   Nuclear Salety Review and Audit Committee
i
                                                The Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee (NSRAC) is an
tivenass of the licensee's t
                                                independent body responsible for performing senior-manage-
assessment programs.
                                                ment-directed reviews of activities affecting nuclear
The
                                                safety. The NSRAC reports to the Senior Vfce President                                                         -
inspection focused on determining whether these programs
                                                Nu: lear (SVP-N). Membership on the committee is composed
contribute to the prevention of problems by stonitoring and
                                                of senior                       licensee management personnel augmented by
evaluating plant performance, providing assessments and
                                                consultants.
findings, and communicating and following up en corrective
                                                The Team reviewed the NSRAC procedures manual, Technical
action recommendations.
                                                Specification 6.5.B                       meeting minutes, audit reports, and
The inspection consisted of a
                                                associated NSRAC reports and correspondence. The Team also
documentation review, personnel interviews, and observa-
                                                attended a full NSRAC trueting at the station on
tions of meeting and work.
                                                August 2, 1988.
3.10.2
                                                A review of the committee meeting minutes for the period
Nuclear Salety Review and Audit Committee
                                                between January 1987 and June 1988 verified that Technical
The Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee (NSRAC) is an
                                                Specification requirements have been met with respect to
independent body responsible for performing senior-manage-
                                                the composition, duties, meeting frequencies, and responsi-
ment-directed
                                                bilities of the committee. The composition and charter of
reviews
                                                the committee was significantly revised in February 1938.
of activities
                                                The selection process for members was designed to assure a
affecting
                                                broad-based, independent review of facility activities and
nuclear
                                                to minimize the potential for cost and schedule pressures
safety. The NSRAC reports to the Senior Vfce President
                                                to influence the committee's reviews and findings. The
-
                                                current committee is made up of ten eenbers appointed by
Nu: lear (SVP-N).
                                                the SVP-N                       Of the ten members, five are consultants, in-
Membership on the committee is composed
                                                cluding the Committee Chairman.                                                 Only two members of the
of senior
                                                committee hold line responsibility for operation of the
licensee management
                                                plant. Only one member, also a consultant, belonged a year
personnel
                                                ago. To enhance the perspective of the new members, the
augmented by
                                                licensee implemented an annual training program. The Team
consultants.
                                                was provided with a t strix indicating the ev.cerience of
The Team reviewed the NSRAC procedures manual, Technical
Specification 6.5.B
meeting minutes, audit reports, and
associated NSRAC reports and correspondence. The Team also
attended
a
full
NSRAC
trueting
at
the
station
on
August 2, 1988.
A review of the committee meeting minutes for the period
between January 1987 and June 1988 verified that Technical
Specification requirements have been met with respect to
the composition, duties, meeting frequencies, and responsi-
bilities of the committee.
The composition and charter of
the committee was significantly revised in February 1938.
The selection process for members was designed to assure a
broad-based, independent review of facility activities and
to minimize the potential for cost and schedule pressures
to influence the committee's reviews and findings.
The
current committee is made up of ten eenbers appointed by
the SVP-N
Of the ten members, five are consultants, in-
cluding the Committee Chairman.
Only two members of the
committee hold line responsibility for operation of the
plant. Only one member, also a consultant, belonged a year
ago. To enhance the perspective of the new members, the
licensee implemented an annual training program. The Team
was provided with a t strix indicating the ev.cerience of


                                                      _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _     _ _ _ _ .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  O'     0
_ _ _ _ .
    ,
O'
      ,
0
                                95
,
,
95
i
i
            current committce members relative to Technical Specifica-
current committce members relative to Technical Specifica-
            tion requirements and verified the committee collectively
tion requirements and verified the committee collectively
            possesses a broad based level of experience and competence.
possesses a broad based level of experience and competence.
            The committee charter, as detailed in NSRAC Procedure
The committee charter, as detailed in NSRAC Procedure
            101-1, also does not. allow the use of alternate members,
101-1, also does not. allow the use of alternate members,
            although these are allowed by the Technical Specifications.
although these are allowed by the Technical Specifications.
            Af ter a review of recent membership changes, and discuss-
Af ter a review of recent membership changes, and discuss-
            ions with the NSRAC Ceordinator, the Team r ified that the
ions with the NSRAC Ceordinator, the Team r ified that the
            collective competence of the committee monborship has been
collective competence of the committee monborship has been
            maintained as changes were made.
maintained as changes were made.
  ~
NSRAC currently conducts meetings approximately once a
            NSRAC currently conducts meetings approximately once a
~
            month.   Since the beginning of 1988, seven meetings have
month.
            been conducted, six of which were held at the site.                       This
Since the beginning of 1988, seven meetings have
            is significantly more than the once per-six-months minimum
been conducted, six of which were held at the site.
            required by the Technical Specifications. Three additional
This
          meetings are scheduled for 1988.     In addition, individual
is significantly more than the once per-six-months minimum
            subcommittees may hold additional meetings at the site.
required by the Technical Specifications. Three additional
          NSRAC also intends to meet at the site in September with
meetings are scheduled for 1988.
            several key members of station management to review restart
In addition, individual
          preparations and plans to provide its own independent
subcommittees may hold additional meetings at the site.
            recommendations for restart readiness.
NSRAC also intends to meet at the site in September with
          NSRAC uses subcommittees ef fectively to review specific
several key members of station management to review restart
          areas of interest. Currently, six subcommittees are estab-
preparations and plans to provide its own independent
            lished: (1) safety evaluations; (2) operations /mainten-
recommendations for restart readiness.
          ance; (3) training / security / fire protection; (4) radiation
NSRAC uses subcommittees ef fectively to review specific
          control / chemistry / emergency preparedness; (5) quality over-
areas of interest. Currently, six subcommittees are estab-
          view; and, (6) engineering / technical. Each subcommittee is
lished:
          chaired by a NSRAC member, and is composed of additional
(1) safety evaluations;
          personnel appointed by the committee.         The subcommittees
(2) operations /mainten-
          provide reports to the full committee during their ;ched-
ance; (3) training / security / fire protection; (4) radiation
          uled meetings. The subcommittees are especially usef ul in
control / chemistry / emergency preparedness; (5) quality over-
          performing documentation review to allow more time for open
view; and, (6) engineering / technical. Each subcommittee is
          discussions at the meetings.
chaired by a NSRAC member, and is composed of additional
          A stronger NSRAC involvement in station accivities is evi-
personnel appointed by the committee.
          dent not only in the recent site meetings and effective use
The subcommittees
          of subcommittees, but also in scheduled site tours and
provide reports to the full committee during their ;ched-
          audit participation.     The NSRAC has established a schedule
uled meetings.
          for individual committee members to perform station tours
The subcommittees are especially usef ul in
          and report the results to the full committee. NSRAC has
performing documentation review to allow more time for open
          also designated individual members to participate in
discussions at the meetings.
          selected QA audits throughout the year.
A stronger NSRAC involvement in station accivities is evi-
          The Team reviewed selected audits conducted under the
dent not only in the recent site meetings and effective use
          cognizance of NSRAC, which are required by Technical
of subcommittees, but also in scheduled site tours and
          Specifications. The audits reviemed were thorough, timely,
audit participation.
          and the noted deficiencies have been corrected or are being
The NSRAC has established a schedule
          tracked. The audit reports reviewed included a third party
for individual committee members to perform station tours
          assessment of the adequacy of the QA program, and QA audits
and report the results to the full committee.
NSRAC has
also designated
individual
members
to participate in
selected QA audits throughout the year.
The Team reviewed selected audits conducted under the
cognizance of NSRAC, which are required by Technical
Specifications. The audits reviemed were thorough, timely,
and the noted deficiencies have been corrected or are being
tracked. The audit reports reviewed included a third party
assessment of the adequacy of the QA program, and QA audits


                                                                    .
.
  o o
o
                                                                      i
o
                          96
i
      of Technical Specifications, administrative controls,
96
      operations, chemistry, radiation protection, and inservice
of
      testing. In addition, special audits were recently con-
Technical
      ducted concerning shutdown from outside the control room,
Specifications,
        the salt service water system, and NSRAC activities.
administrative
      The current committee has an effective formal tracking
controls,
      system for all "concerns" forwarded to management and com-     '
operations, chemistry, radiation protection, and inservice
      mittee followup items.       The   "concerns" reviewed were
testing.
      clearly transmitted to the SVP-N.         However, review of   ,
In addition, special audits were recently con-
      recent meeting minutes by NRC revealed that a number of
ducted concerning shutdown from outside the control room,
      "recommendations" had been forwarded to the SVP-N, but a
the salt service water system, and NSRAC activities.
      formal response had not been received. The committee also
The current committee has an effective formal tracking
      di.d not formally track resolution of these recommendations.
system for all "concerns" forwarded to management and com-
      Further investigation by the NSRAC Coordinator determined
'
      that although the items had not been tracked, the specific
mittee
      recommendations had been implemented, or were incorporated
followup
      into another corrective action process.                       ,
items.
      Ouring NSRAC Meeting 88-04, conducted on May 24, 1983, the
The
      Operations and Maintenance Subcommittee presented a report
"concerns"
      on the conduct of the Operations Review Committee (ORC).       ,
reviewed were
      NSRAC raised concerns over whether the ORC was fully meet-      '
clearly transmitted to the SVP-N.
      ing the intent of its duties required in the Technical
However, review of
      Specifications. The report identified four specific find-
,
      ings of deficiency. They included:
recent meeting minutes by NRC revealed that a number of
'    -
"recommendations" had been forwarded to the SVP-N, but a
            Inadequate method of reviewing changes to safety-        '
formal response had not been received.
            related procedures;                                      i
The committee also
      -
di.d not formally track resolution of these recommendations.
            Lack of ORC prepared reports resulting from ORC inves-  ;
Further investigation by the NSRAC Coordinator determined
            tigation of a Technical Specifications violations;
that although the items had not been tracked, the specific
recommendations had been implemented, or were incorporated
into another corrective action process.
,
Ouring NSRAC Meeting 88-04, conducted on May 24, 1983, the
Operations and Maintenance Subcommittee presented a report
on the conduct of the Operations Review Committee (ORC).
,
,
      -
NSRAC raised concerns over whether the ORC was fully meet-
            Lack of specific review and reports of facility oper-   I
'
            ations by ORC; and,                                     !
ing the intent of its duties required in the Technical
      -
Specifications. The report identified four specific find-
            Lack of formality in the conduct of ORC meetings.
ings of deficiency. They included:
      Af ter the discussion, NSRAC concurred that the ORC perform-
'
  ,  ance issues should be formally raised as a concern to the
Inadequate method of reviewing changes to safety-
      SVP-N. Tha NSRAC concern (88-04-01) was transmitted to the
'
-
related procedures;
i
Lack of ORC prepared reports resulting from ORC inves-
;
-
tigation of a Technical Specifications violations;
,
Lack of specific review and reports of facility oper-
I
-
ations by ORC; and,
!
Lack of formality in the conduct of ORC meetings.
-
Af ter the discussion, NSRAC concurred that the ORC perform-
ance issues should be formally raised as a concern to the
,
SVP-N. Tha NSRAC concern (88-04-01) was transmitted to the
SVP-N on May 27,1938.
The concern stated that NSRAC's
'
.
.
      SVP-N on May 27,1938. The concern stated that NSRAC's          '
overall assessment was that ORC's conduct and administra-
      overall assessment was that ORC's conduct and administra-
tion needed substantial improvement.
      tion needed substantial improvement.         Specifically, the !
Specifically, the
      concern stated that the established process did not appear     j
!
;     to foster adequate depth and discipline for substantive         *
concern stated that the established process did not appear
      indepandent reviews. In addition, NSRAC noted that of the       [
j
      40 meetings cenducted in 1933 prior to the review, neither     l
;
      the Station Director nor the Plant Manager had attended,       ;
to foster adequate depth and discipline for substantive
l     based on its review of the meeting minutes.                     '
*
                                                                      I
indepandent reviews. In addition, NSRAC noted that of the
                                                                      !
[
                                                                      I
40 meetings cenducted in 1933 prior to the review, neither
                                                                      !
l
                                                                      (
the Station Director nor the Plant Manager had attended,
;
l
based on its review of the meeting minutes.
'
I
!
I
!
(
- -
- -


                                                                          _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
, *
,
                                97
*
            The NSRAC concern was responded to on June 22, 1988.                         In                   ;
97
            response, the Station Director initiated revisions to the
The NSRAC concern was responded to on June 22, 1988.
          ORC Charter and Procedure 1.3.4, "Procedures," to accur-
In
            ately describe the specific methods by which ORC met the
;
            procedure and operations review requirements. In addition,
response, the Station Director initiated revisions to the
            the   Station Director attended an ORC meeting on
ORC Charter and Procedure 1.3.4, "Procedures," to accur-
          June 22, 1988, and is considering additional initiatives to
ately describe the specific methods by which ORC met the
            improve the conduct and administration of ORC activities.
procedure and operations review requirements.
          N5RAC closed the concern at the August 2, 1988 meeting, but
In addition,
            initiated a followup item to continue to monitor ORC per-
the
            formance.   In addition, NSRAC members were encouraged to
Station
          attend ORC meetings as observers. NRC's review of ORC per-
Director
            formance 'Jentified similar deficiencies and concluded that
attended
          additior.1 actions to strengthen some ORC functions were
an
          warranted (See Section 3.10.3).
ORC
          Based on meeting attendance and review of recent meeting
meeting
          minutes, the Team noted that the NSRAC reviews have been
on
          thorough and focused on improving performance in areas
June 22, 1988, and is considering additional initiatives to
            important to safety. During the August 2, 1988 NSRAC meet-
improve the conduct and administration of ORC activities.
          ing, the Team noted that the discussions were frank and
N5RAC closed the concern at the August 2, 1988 meeting, but
          open, with the reviews concentrated on recurring and emerg-
initiated a followup item to continue to monitor ORC per-
          ing issues.     The areas of emphasis have included 50.59
formance.
          reviews, ORC performance, corrective action programs, pro-
In addition, NSRAC members were encouraged to
          cedure adequacy, and management depth.
attend ORC meetings as observers. NRC's review of ORC per-
          Due to the limited number of "concerns" issued by NSRAC
formance 'Jentified similar deficiencies and concluded that
          since revision of the committee in February 1988, the Team
additior.1 actions to strengthen some ORC functions were
          could not reach a conclusion on the responsiveness of the
warranted (See Section 3.10.3).
          station organization to NSRAC. It appears at least in one
Based on meeting attendance and review of recent meeting
          case pertaining to ORC performance, that the response was
minutes, the Team noted that the NSRAC reviews have been
          not comprehensive. However, all other "concerns" reviewed
thorough and focused on improving performance in areas
          were responded to adequately.
important to safety. During the August 2, 1988 NSRAC meet-
    3.10.3 Operations Review Committee
ing, the Team noted that the discussions were frank and
          The function, composition, and responsibilities of the                                             i
open, with the reviews concentrated on recurring and emerg-
          Operations Review Committee (ORC) are described in PNPS                                           L
ing issues.
          Technical Specification 6.5.A.       In addition, PNPS Procedure                                 ;
The areas of emphasis have included 50.59
          1.2.1, "Operations Review Committee," describes in greater
reviews, ORC performance, corrective action programs, pro-
          detail the authority and responsibility of the ORC at the
cedure adequacy, and management depth.
          Pilgrim Station.       For this inspection, the Team reviewed
Due to the limited number of "concerns" issued by NSRAC
          the   minutes   of   ORC   meetir,g s   88-40   through 88-63
since revision of the committee in February 1988, the Team
          (April 1,1988 through July 5,1988) and observed the con-
could not reach a conclusion on the responsiveness of the
          duct of three regularly scheduled and two special ORC meet-
station organization to NSRAC.
          ings (ORC Meetings 80-80, 81, 82, 83 and 86). In addi+1on,
It appears at least in one
          the Team interviewed various ORC members and alternates.
case pertaining to ORC performance, that the response was
not comprehensive.
However, all other "concerns" reviewed
were responded to adequately.
3.10.3
Operations Review Committee
The function, composition, and responsibilities of the
i
Operations Review Committee (ORC) are described in PNPS
L
Technical Specification 6.5.A.
In addition, PNPS Procedure
;
1.2.1, "Operations Review Committee," describes in greater
detail the authority and responsibility of the ORC at the
Pilgrim Station.
For this inspection, the Team reviewed
the
minutes
of
ORC
meetir,g s
88-40
through
88-63
(April 1,1988 through July 5,1988) and observed the con-
duct of three regularly scheduled and two special ORC meet-
ings (ORC Meetings 80-80, 81, 82, 83 and 86). In addi+1on,
the Team interviewed various ORC members and alternates.


  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  a
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _
a
.
.
                                                                93
93
                                            The inspection focused on whether ORC operations satisfied
The inspection focused on whether ORC operations satisfied
                                            current Technical Specification requirenents; whether the
current Technical Specification requirenents; whether the
                                            ORC was meeting its responsibilities identified in PNPS
ORC was meeting its responsibilities identified in PNPS
                                            Procedure 1.2.1, and whether the CRC was responsive to
Procedure
                                            recommendations for improvements icentified during NSRAC
1.2.1,
                                            and QA audits of its operations.
and whether the CRC was responsive to
                                            3.10.3.1 Compliance with Technical Specifications and
recommendations for improvements icentified during NSRAC
                                                      Procedures                                         '
and QA audits of its operations.
                                                      By reviewing existing documentation, and through
3.10.3.1 Compliance with Technical Specifications and
                                                      direct observation of ORC meetings, the Team has
Procedures
                                                      determined that the       Technical   Specification
'
                                                      requirements for the ORC composition, quorum,
By reviewing existing documentation, and through
                                                      meeting frequency, authority, and records are
direct observation of ORC meetings, the Team has
                                                      being satisfied. During the period reviewed, the
determined
                                                      Team noted that the ORC reviewed plant proced-
that
                                                      ure changes, plant design changes (PDCs), Field
the
                                                      Revision Notices (FRNs), and Licensea Event
Technical
                                                      Reports (LERs), as well as proposed revisions to
Specification
                                                      the security plan, to the inservice inspection
requirements for the ORC composition, quorum,
                                                      program, to the emergency plan and to fire pro-
meeting frequency, authority, and records are
                                                      tection program implementing procedures. The ORC
being satisfied. During the period reviewed, the
                                                      members and alternates are appointed by memur-
Team noted that the ORC reviewed plant proced-
                                                      andum from the Station Director and cannot serve
ure changes, plant design changes (PDCs), Field
                                                      on the committee until they have successfully
Revision Notices
                                                      completed the station ORC training course. There
(FRNs),
                                                      is also a required reading review program used by
and
                                                      the Training Department as a retraining program
Licensea
                                                      for ORC members and alternates. The Team re-
Event
                                                      viewed the training course material and deter-
Reports (LERs), as well as proposed revisions to
                                                      mined that it bad an appropriate emphasis on
the security plan, to the inservice inspection
                                                      assuring safe operation as well as on regulatory
program, to the emergency plan and to fire pro-
                                                      requirements.
tection program implementing procedures. The ORC
                                                      The ORC at Pilgrim Station has been reeting
members and alternates are appointed by memur-
                                                      regularly every Wednesday and has a scheduled
andum from the Station Director and cannot serve
                                                      "special" meeting every Friday on an as-needed
on the committee until they have successfully
                                                      basis. The ORC met an average of about twice a
completed the station ORC training course.
,                                                      week, which is well above Technical Specification
There
                                                      requirements.
is also a required reading review program used by
                                                      While there was evidence in the minutes of dis-     :
the Training Department as a retraining program
                                                      cussions about LERs, PDCs or FRNs, the prepond-     '
for ORC members and alternates.
                                                      erence of the ninutes described changes to pro-
The Team re-
                                                      cedures.     The Team saw no reference of ORC
viewed the training course material and deter-
                                                      reviews of Failure and Malfunction Reports. The
mined that it bad an appropriate emphasis on
                                                      ORC has a system for following issues identified
assuring safe operation as well as on regulatory
                                                      during discussions which requires a formal
requirements.
                                                      response to the ORC and a review of the response
The ORC at Pilgrim Station has been reeting
                                                      by ihe ORC to assure that the response resolved     '
regularly every Wednesday and has a scheduled
                                                      the initial concerns.
"special" meeting every Friday on an as-needed
basis.
The ORC met an average of about twice a
week, which is well above Technical Specification
,
requirements.
While there was evidence in the minutes of dis-
:
cussions about LERs, PDCs or FRNs, the prepond-
'
erence of the ninutes described changes to pro-
cedures.
The Team saw no reference of ORC
reviews of Failure and Malfunction Reports.
The
ORC has a system for following issues identified
during
discussions
which
requires
a
formal
response to the ORC and a review of the response
by ihe ORC to assure that the response resolved
'
the initial concerns.


  -_.
-_.
O   *
O
                      99
*
          The Team reviewed the closeout process for ORC
99
          followup items and determined that, in one case,
The Team reviewed the closeout process for ORC
          an item (88-58-01) may have been clo'.ed prema-
followup items and determined that, in one case,
          turely. During a discussien among the Team, the
an item (88-58-01) may have been clo'.ed prema-
        ORC Chairman, the Design Section Manager, and the
turely. During a discussien among the Team, the
        Construction Division Manager, the ORC Chairman
ORC Chairman, the Design Section Manager, and the
        agreed that the item should be reopened for addi-
Construction Division Manager, the ORC Chairman
        tional review. During ORC Meeting 88-82, the
agreed that the item should be reopened for addi-
          item was reopened.
tional review.
        By observing the ORC, the Team concluded that the
During ORC Meeting 88-82, the
        committee members and alternates are concerned
item was reopened.
        with assuring the safe operation of the facility.
By observing the ORC, the Team concluded that the
        Discussions focused on the impact of items on
committee members and alternates are concerned
        safety systems, as well as whether the items
with assuring the safe operation of the facility.
        being discussed met regulatory requirements or
Discussions focused on the impact of items on
        constituted unreviewed safety questions.       The
safety systems, as well as whether the items
        Station Director also attended one of the regu-
being discussed met regulatory requirements or
        larly scheduled ORC meetings during the inspec-
constituted unreviewed safety questions.
        tion period.
The
      . During its review, the Team identified two weak-
Station Director also attended one of the regu-
        nesses in the operation of the ORC. They are the
larly scheduled ORC meetings during the inspec-
        Technical Specification (TS) review of plant
tion period.
        operations (T.S. 6.5 A.6.e) and the TS require-
During its review, the Team identified two weak-
        ment to investigate violations and prepare i
.
        report covering the evaluation and recommenda-
nesses in the operation of the ORC. They are the
        tions to prevent a recurrence (T.S. 6.5.A.6.1).
Technical Specification (TS) review of plant
        TS 6.5. A.6 e states that the ORC ds responsible
operations (T.S. 6.5 A.6.e) and the TS require-
        for the review of facility operations to detect
ment to investigate violations and prepare i
        po te;.',i a l safety hazards while TS 6.5.A.6.1
report covering the evaluation and recommenda-
        states that the ORC is responsible for investiga-
tions to prevent a recurrence (T.S. 6.5.A.6.1).
        ting all TS violations and for preparing a report
TS 6.5. A.6 e states that the ORC ds responsible
        covering the evaluation and recommendations to
for the review of facility operations to detect
        prevent a recurrence.
po te;.',i a l
        The Team noted that ORC routinely uses the review
safety hazards while
        of LERs and Failure and Malfunction Reports
TS
        (F&MRs) to satisfy the TS required review of
6.5.A.6.1
        plant operations and TS violations.       The Team
states that the ORC is responsible for investiga-
        also noted that the ORC has appointed the Compli-
ting all TS violations and for preparing a report
        ance Division as a subcommittee to the ORC and
covering the evaluation and recommendations to
        assigned it the responsibility et presenting
prevent a recurrence.
        selected Failure and Malfunction Reports as weil
The Team noted that ORC routinely uses the review
        as the preparation of all LERs, including any
of LERs and Failure and Malfunction Reports
(F&MRs) to satisfy the TS required review of
plant operations and TS violations.
The Team
also noted that the ORC has appointed the Compli-
ance Division as a subcommittee to the ORC and
assigned it the responsibility et presenting
selected Failure and Malfunction Reports as weil
as the preparation of all LERs, including any


, _ _ _ _ _
, _ _ _ _ _
    O           O
O
                                                                                                          l
O
                                                                100
l
                                                      involving TS violations. Copies of all LERs are
100
                                                      provided to the ORC as a means of satisfying
involving TS violations. Copies of all LERs are
                                                      the TS requirements. Further, PNPS Procedure
provided to the ORC as a means of satisfying
                                                      1.2.1 permits the ORC Chairman to set the time-
the TS requirements.
                                                      liness of subcommittee reports to the full ORC.
Further, PNPS Procedure
                                                      While the use of subcommittees te support ORC       !
1.2.1 permits the ORC Chairman to set the time-
                                                      activities is acceptable, the Team believes that
liness of subcommittee reports to the full ORC.
                                                      the method used by ORC in fulfilling its respon-
While the use of subcommittees te support ORC
                                                      sib 111 ties as defined by TS 6.5.A.6.e and i needs
!
                                                      improvement.     In   particular,   the   Compliance -
activities is acceptable, the Team believes that
                                                      Division has been issuing all LERs, including
the method used by ORC in fulfilling its respon-
                                                      those discussing TS violations, prior to any ORC
sib 111 ties as defined by TS 6.5.A.6.e and i needs
                                                      review of the product prepared. A review of 10
improvement.
                                                      LERs disclosed that ORC review of the LER occurs
In
                                                    usually a week to two weeks after the LER was
particular,
                                                      formally sent to the NRC. While this may satisfy     '
the
                                                    the timeliness requirements of PNPS Procedure         i
Compliance
                                                      1. 2.1, i t does not appear that the corrective     l
-
                                                    actions proposed to prevent recurrence receives
Division has been issuing all LERs, including
                                                    the full benefit of a timely multi-disciplinary
those discussing TS violations, prior to any ORC
                                                    review, as is intended by the composition and
review of the product prepared. A review of 10
                                                    responsibilities of the ORC.       The formal release !
LERs disclosed that ORC review of the LER occurs
                                                    of the LER involving a TS violation by the ORC       '
usually a week to two weeks after the LER was
                                                      subcommittee without a formal review by the com-     '
formally sent to the NRC. While this may satisfy
                                                    plete ORC is a weakness in meeting the require-       !
'
                                                    ments of TS 6.5.A.6.1.                               j
the timeliness requirements of PNPS Procedure
                                                                                                          '
i
                                                    During a review of F&MRs, which had not yet been
1. 2.1, i t does not appear that the corrective
                                                    reviewed by ORC, the Team noted that F&MR 86-266,     '
l
                                                    which discussed a TS violation, had not yet been
actions proposed to prevent recurrence receives
                                                    reviewed by ORC.
the full benefit of a timely multi-disciplinary
                                                                                                          f
review, as is intended by the composition and
                                                    In this case, the violation was against an admin-     *
responsibilities of the ORC.
                                                    istrative requirement in TS Section 6.8, and was     I
The formal release
                                                    not reportable as an LER. Therefore, the F&MR
!
                                                    did not result in an LER or a special report.         I
of the LER involving a TS violation by the ORC
                                                    The event occurred in September 1986, and no
'
                                                    reports have yet been submitted to ORC as
subcommittee without a formal review by the com-
                                                    required by the TS. The licensee stated that the
'
                                                    F&MR was still open punding completion of the
plete ORC is a weakness in meeting the require-
                                                    remaining corrective action, and that then a
!
                                                    report would be issued.
ments of TS 6.5.A.6.1.
                                                    Both of these findings indicate that the ORC is
j
                                                    not actively participating in the timely review
'
                                                    of plant orerations and does not appear to pro-
During a review of F&MRs, which had not yet been
                                                    vide reaningful input into the process.
reviewed by ORC, the Team noted that F&MR 86-266,
            ____   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
'
which discussed a TS violation, had not yet been
reviewed by ORC.
f
In this case, the violation was against an admin-
*
istrative requirement in TS Section 6.8, and was
I
not reportable as an LER.
Therefore, the F&MR
did not result in an LER or a special report.
I
The event occurred in September 1986, and no
reports have yet been
submitted
to ORC as
required by the TS. The licensee stated that the
F&MR was still open punding completion of the
remaining corrective action, and that then a
report would be issued.
Both of these findings indicate that the ORC is
not actively participating in the timely review
of plant orerations and does not appear to pro-
vide reaningful input into the process.
____
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


                                                    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -     .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
O O
.
                      101
O
    3.10.3.2 Responsiveness to /udit Recommendations
O
              The Team reviewed both quality assurance (QA)
101
              audit findings and HSRAC recommendations to
3.10.3.2 Responsiveness to /udit Recommendations
              determine ORC responsiveness to recommendations
The Team reviewed both quality assurance (QA)
              for improvements to its operations. In QA Audit
audit
              Report 87-37, QA listed two recommendations
findings
              accepted by the ORC. PNPS Procedure 1.2.1 was
and HSRAC
              reviewed and the Team determined that PNPS Pro-
recommendations
              cedure 1.2.1, Revision 21, contained the QA
to
              recommendations. The ORC was also audited by QA
determine ORC responsiveness to recommendations
              i rem May 22 through June 22, 1988.                       The audit
for improvements to its operations.
              generated   one   recommendation concerning                         the
In QA Audit
              cross-referencing of ORC meetings with document
Report
              references. Based upon discussions between the
87-37,
              QA auditor and the Team, ORC has also accepted
QA
              this recommendation.
listed
              In May 1988, the ORC received a list of four
two
              concerns from NSRAC based upon an audit review of
recommendations
              the ORC.   While the nature of the specific con-
accepted by the ORC.
              cerns are discussed in detail in Section 3.10.3
PNPS Procedure 1.2.1 was
              above, they are summarized here. Specifically,
reviewed and the Team determined that PNPS Pro-
              the NSRAC expressed concerns about the following
cedure
              areas: (1) the ORC review of changes to safety-
1.2.1,
              related procedures, (2) ORC investigation of TS
Revision 21, contained the QA
              violations, (3) ORC review of facility opera-
recommendations.
              tfons, and (4) conduct of ORC meetings.
The ORC was also audited by QA
              The concerns related to the ORC's investigation
i rem May 22 through June 22, 1988.
              of TS violations and its review of plant opera-
The audit
              tions are paralleled by the Team's findings dis-
generated
              cussed in Section 3.10.3.1 above.
one
              The NSRAC concern with ORC procedure reviews is
recommendation
              being evaluated for long-term improvements but no
concerning
              definitive action is currently planned by the
the
              licensee. As for NSRAC concern #4, the meetings
cross-referencing of ORC meetings with document
              observed by the Team, were conducted in a manner
references.
              permitting formal and informal discussions of
Based upon discussions between the
              specific issues.     A meeting agenda for regular
QA auditor and the Team, ORC has also accepted
              ORC meetings was prepared and followed. The Team
this recommendation.
              concluded that the meetings were conducted
In May 1988, the ORC received a list of four
              acceptably.
concerns from NSRAC based upon an audit review of
              Based on the above, the Team has determined that,
the ORC.
              in general, the ORC has been receptive to recom-
While the nature of the specific con-
              nendations for improvement.     However, the fact
cerns are discussed in detail in Section 3.10.3
              that the NSRAC concerns remain unresolved sug-
above, they are summarized here.
              gests that the ORC may have difficulty addressing
Specifically,
              more complex recomendations.
the NSRAC expressed concerns about the following
areas:
(1) the ORC review of changes to safety-
related procedures, (2) ORC investigation of TS
violations, (3) ORC review of facility opera-
tfons, and (4) conduct of ORC meetings.
The concerns related to the ORC's investigation
of TS violations and its review of plant opera-
tions are paralleled by the Team's findings dis-
cussed in Section 3.10.3.1 above.
The NSRAC concern with ORC procedure reviews is
being evaluated for long-term improvements but no
definitive action is currently planned by the
licensee. As for NSRAC concern #4, the meetings
observed by the Team, were conducted in a manner
permitting formal and informal discussions of
specific issues.
A meeting agenda for regular
ORC meetings was prepared and followed. The Team
concluded
that
the
meetings
were
conducted
acceptably.
Based on the above, the Team has determined that,
in general, the ORC has been receptive to recom-
nendations for improvement.
However, the fact
that the NSRAC concerns remain unresolved sug-
gests that the ORC may have difficulty addressing
more complex recomendations.


    _ __
_ __
  O     O
O
                                                                                                                  ,
O
                                          102                                                                     ;
,
>
102
                                  The Team also observed that the quality of the                                 '
The Team also observed that the quality of the
                                  meeting minutes could be improved by providing
'
                                  more discussion of the issues by the various ORC
>
                                  members as opposed to providing abstracts of the
meeting minutes could be improved by providing
                                  documents discussed.
more discussion of the issues by the various ORC
                                  Based upon a review of the ORC activities, the                                 ,
members as opposed to providing abstracts of the
                                  Team determined that there are weaknesses in the
documents discussed.
                                  implementation of responsibilities assigned to
Based upon a review of the ORC activities, the
                                  the DRC. In particular, the Team determined that
,
                                  weaknesses exist in the review of plant opera-
Team determined that there are weaknesses in the
                                  tions and tne investigation of TS violations.
implementation of responsibilities assigned to
                                  The Team has concluded that improvements in these
the DRC. In particular, the Team determined that
                                  two specific areas would result in a more effec-
weaknesses exist in the review of plant opera-
                                  tive ORC. In response to the Team's concerns,
tions and tne investigation of TS violations.
                                  the licensee agreed to take certain actions prior
The Team has concluded that improvements in these
                                  to restart to strengthen the operational focus of
two specific areas would result in a more effec-
                                  ORC.   These actions are: (1) to review plant                                   ,
tive ORC.
                                  incident critiques; (2) to review LER's prior to                              [
In response to the Team's concerns,
                                  their submittal to NRC; (3) to review F&MR's on a                            -
the licensee agreed to take certain actions prior
                                  regular basis; and, (4) to provide for a monthly                              l
to restart to strengthen the operational focus of
                                  presentation and discussion of plant operations                                '
ORC.
                                  as a specific agenda item. The Team found these
These actions are:
(1) to review plant
,
,
                                  licensee commitments responsive to its concerns.
incident critiques; (2) to review LER's prior to
                                                                                                                I
[
            3.10.4 Quality Assurance Audit and Surveillance Programs                                           !
their submittal to NRC; (3) to review F&MR's on a
-
regular basis; and, (4) to provide for a monthly
l
presentation and discussion of plant operations
'
as a specific agenda item. The Team found these
licensee commitments responsive to its concerns.
,
I
3.10.4
Quality Assurance Audit and Surveillance Programs
!
1
1
                  The Team reviewed selected QA audit and surveillance                                         i
The Team reviewed selected QA audit and surveillance
                  reports, selecting specific findings, discrepancies, and                                     i
i
                  observations for followup of the licensee's corrective                                       t
reports, selecting specific findings, discrepancies, and
                  action process. QA personnel, including the QA Department                                   !
i
                  (QAD) manager, and other station nanagers and engineers,                                   '
observations for followup of the licensee's corrective
                  were interviewed regarding the audit and surveillance pro-                                 !
t
                  gram objectives and overall conclusions which can be drawn                                 li
action process. QA personnel, including the QA Department
                  f rom the audit and surveillance findings.                                   The Team also
!
                  reviewed the quarterly QA0 Trend Analysis report, and at-
(QAD) manager, and other station nanagers and engineers,
                  tended several QA interface meetings. Portions of the
'
                  Boston Edison Company Quality Assurance Manual (BEQAM) and
were interviewed regarding the audit and surveillance pro-
                  applicable station procedures were also reviewed.
!
  ,                                                                                                            4-
gram objectives and overall conclusions which can be drawn
                  The technical content and quality of the issues raised in                                   '
l
                  the selected audit reports were excellent.                                   The conduct of .
f rom the audit and surveillance findings.
                  a performance-based radiological controls audit by outside                                   i
The Team also
                  consultants was noteworthy.                                     Specificolly, the Team re-       -
i
                  viewed audits required under the cognizance of NSRAC, i r.                                   ;
reviewed the quarterly QA0 Trend Analysis report, and at-
                  accordance with the TS, and found that they are being per-
tended several QA interface meetings.
                  formed as required. The Team determined that all defici-                                     i
Portions of the
                  encies identified in the audits were either closed or ade-
Boston Edison Company Quality Assurance Manual (BEQAM) and
                  quately tracked by a for al system,                                                         j.
applicable station procedures were also reviewed.
                                                                                                                t
4-
                                                                                                                I
,
                  n,-.-. . - - -         . - - - - _ - _ . - - - - - - - , . - -         ---- - .- . _ .
The technical content and quality of the issues raised in
'
the selected audit reports were excellent.
The conduct of
.
a performance-based radiological controls audit by outside
i
consultants was noteworthy.
Specificolly, the Team re-
-
viewed audits required under the cognizance of NSRAC, i r.
;
accordance with the TS, and found that they are being per-
formed as required.
The Team determined that all defici-
i
encies identified in the audits were either closed or ade-
quately tracked by a for al system,
j
t
I
n,-.-.
. - - -
. - - - - _ - _ . - - - - - - - , . - -
----
-
.- . _ .


  ,                                               .-
,
o   *
.-
                                                                              l
o
                                                                              l
*
                                                                              !
l
                          103
l
      During the conduct of audits and surveillances, deficiency             '
!
      reports (OR) are issued by QA for conditions contrary to
103
      management policies and procedures, regJlatory require-
During the conduct of audits and surveillances, deficiency
      ments, or licensee commitments.       A DR which reports a           ,
'
      deficiency identified during a QA audi+, is issued at the             ,
reports (OR) are issued by QA for conditions contrary to
      time of the audit exit interview.       The licensee has an
management policies and procedures, regJlatory require-
      effective system of re, quiring a written response to the OR           t
ments, or licensee commitments.
      within a specified period, dependent on its significance,
A DR which reports a
      and for subsequent followup of corrective action. A system
,
      also edists for granting extensions through an escalation
deficiency identified during a QA audi+, is issued at the
      process to upper management.
,
      QA prepares a monthly status report, including OR status,
time of the audit exit interview.
      which is forwarded to senior management for appropriate               ,
The licensee has an
      actions. Review of the most recent QA trend report indi-
t
      cated a decline in the OR backlog, an increase in the num-             .
effective system of re, quiring a written response to the OR
      ber of OR's completed on time, and few extensions needed               L
within a specified period, dependent on its significance,
      for OR closeout. The number of deficiencies reported by QA             !
and for subsequent followup of corrective action. A system
      remained fairly constant.     These are all indicators that           ,
also edists for granting extensions through an escalation
      licensee management attention to the corrective action               l
process to upper management.
      process has had a positive impact.                                     '
QA prepares a monthly status report, including OR status,
      The licensee also effectively trends Immediate Corrective               '
which is forwarded to senior management for appropriate
      Actiens (ICA), which are identified in audit and surveil-               ,
,
      lance reports. These report conditions which could lead to
actions.
      a DR, but which are corrected prior to the end of the audit             ,
Review of the most recent QA trend report indi-
      or surveillance.     They also are tracked along with the               ,
cated a decline in the OR backlog, an increase in the num-
      OR's.     The Team also found the tracking of recommendations           .
ber of OR's completed on time, and few extensions needed
      from the audits and surveillances to be effective.                     l
.
      Approximately 45 QA surveillance reports concerning obser-             i
L
      vations of surveillance testing were reviewed. The reports             I
for OR closeout. The number of deficiencies reported by QA
      were well planned, well documented, and thorough. Again,               ,
!
      the tracking and followup of identified deficiencies were
remained fairly constant.
                                                                            l
These are all indicators that
      adequate. A minor concern of the Team involved QA followup
,
      to identified procedural inadequacies during surveillances,             i
licensee management attention to the corrective action
      In ten of the surveillance activites reviewed by NRC,                 !
l
      technical piocedure deficiencies were identified by QA, but           I
process has had a positive impact.
      since the technicians being observed halted the test and               (
'
      pursued a procedure change, no deficiency reports were                 l
The licensee also effectively trends Immediate Corrective
      issued. Furt.her review ' snd that the majority of the pro-           !
'
      cedure deficiencies were identified prior to implementation           ,
Actiens (ICA), which are identified in audit and surveil-
      of new procedure validation program, and that QAD has an               i
,
      open DR on the procedure validation process. QA0 is con-
lance reports. These report conditions which could lead to
      tinuing to monitor the process. The Team had no further               l
a DR, but which are corrected prior to the end of the audit
      cor.ce rn s .
,
                                                                            l
or surveillance.
                                                                            ;
They also are tracked along with the
                                                                            !
,
                                                                            I
OR's.
                                                                            ,
The Team also found the tracking of recommendations
                                                                            b
.
                                                                              ,
from the audits and surveillances to be effective.
                                                                    - r .- -
l
Approximately 45 QA surveillance reports concerning obser-
i
vations of surveillance testing were reviewed. The reports
I
were well planned, well documented, and thorough.
Again,
,
the tracking and followup of identified deficiencies were
l
adequate. A minor concern of the Team involved QA followup
to identified procedural inadequacies during surveillances,
i
In ten of the surveillance activites reviewed by NRC,
!
technical piocedure deficiencies were identified by QA, but
I
since the technicians being observed halted the test and
(
pursued a procedure change, no deficiency reports were
l
issued. Furt.her review ' snd that the majority of the pro-
!
cedure deficiencies were identified prior to implementation
,
of new procedure validation program, and that QAD has an
i
open DR on the procedure validation process.
QA0 is con-
l
tinuing to monitor the process.
The Team had no further
cor.ce rn s .
l
;
!
I
,
b
,
-
r .- -


      _ _ _ _ _ _                           -                                           __ _____ _
_ _ _ _ _ _
, ,, ,
-
                                                104
__
                          Two QA Interface meetings were attended during the inspec-
_____ _
                          tion. The mee*.ing attendees include representatives from
, ,,
                          QA, plant staff, and engineering. They meet weekly to
,
                          review the status of various corrective action items,
104
                          including OR's, Management Corrective Action Requests
Two QA Interface meetings were attended during the inspec-
                          (MCARs) and Potenti:1 Conditions Adverse to Quality Reprts
tion. The mee*.ing attendees include representatives from
                          (PCAQ's).   The meetings have improved communications among
QA, plant staff, and engineering.
                          the organizations and have contributed to the more timely
They meet weekly to
                          resolution of corrective action items.
review the status of various corrective action items,
                  3.10.5 Corrective Action Process and Programa
including OR's,
                          The Team reviewed the licensee's programs curr6ntly in
Management Corrective Action
                          place to identify, follow, and correct safety-related prob-
Requests
                          lems. A newly formulated Corrective Action Program "Clear-
(MCARs) and Potenti:1 Conditions Adverse to Quality Reprts
                          inghouse," and proposed revisions to corrective action pro-
(PCAQ's).
                          cess procedures were also evaluated with respect to the
The meetings have improved communications among
                          current objectives and planned initiatives to improve cor-
the organizations and have contributed to the more timely
                          rective action program effectiveness. Samples were chosen
resolution of corrective action items.
                          from each of the programmatic areas where problem identift-
3.10.5
                          cation is routine and implementation of corrective measures
Corrective Action Process and Programa
                          is required.   Each of these programs is discussed below.
The Team reviewed the licensee's programs curr6ntly in
                          The Tean interviewed licensee personnel responsible for
place to identify, follow, and correct safety-related prob-
                          individual program management and implementation, as well
lems. A newly formulated Corrective Action Program "Clear-
                          as the technical personnel accountable for problem dis-
inghouse," and proposed revisions to corrective action pro-
                          position and corrective action adequacy.
cess procedures were also evaluated with respect to the
                          For all of the areas evaluated, the Team sought to deter-
current objectives and planned initiatives to improve cor-
                          mine the effectiveness of the licensee's process for root
rective action program effectiveness.
                          cause analysis of problems, investigation of problems and
Samples were chosen
                          causes for their generic applicability, and trending of
from each of the programmatic areas where problem identift-
                          findings to prevent their recurrence. Selectad issues were
cation is routine and implementation of corrective measures
                          analyzed % understand the technical problems, check how
is required.
                          they were programmatically hsndled,       and to determine
Each of these programs is discussed below.
                          whether the corrective measures were appropriate to the
The Tean interviewed licensee personnel responsible for
                          specific cases.       The examples are cited in the following
individual program management and implementation, as well
                          subparagraphs not only to illustrate the scope of licensee
as the technical personnel accountable for problem dis-
                          activities inspected, but also to support the conclusions
position and corrective action adequacy.
                          reached     regarding     the corrective   action     program
For all of the areas evaluated, the Team sought to deter-
                          effectiveness.
mine the effectiveness of the licensee's process for root
                          3.10.5.1   Failure and Malfunction Reports
cause analysis of problems, investigation of problems and
                                    The Failure and Malfunction Report (F&MR) is a
causes for their generic applicability, and trending of
                                    process by which failures, malfunctions, and
findings to prevent their recurrence. Selectad issues were
                                    abnormal operating events are reported, evaluated
analyzed % understand the technical problems, check how
                                    and corrected to preclude repetition.     The pro-
they were
                                    cess is described in:       Nuclear Organization
programmatically hsndled,
                                                                                -
and
to determine
whether the corrective measures were appropriate to the
specific cases.
The examples are cited in the following
subparagraphs not only to illustrate the scope of licensee
activities inspected, but also to support the conclusions
reached
regarding
the
corrective
action
program
effectiveness.
3.10.5.1
Failure and Malfunction Reports
The Failure and Malfunction Report (F&MR) is a
process by which failures, malfunctions, and
abnormal operating events are reported, evaluated
and corrected to preclude repetition.
The pro-
cess
is
described
in:
Nuclear
Organization
-


      _. ___ __ __ ______
_. ___ __ __ ______
    .                     .
.
                                      105
.
                              Procedure (NOP) 8305, the "Failure and Malfunc-
105
                              tion Report Process;" PNPS Procedure Number
Procedure (NOP) 8305, the "Failure and Malfunc-
i                             1.3.24, "Failure and Malfunction Reports;" and
tion
                              PNPS Work Instruction NS-3.2.12 "F&MR Trend
Report Process;"
                            Analytis."
PNPS Procedure Number
                              Team review of licensee precedures verified that
i
                              responsibilities are established for the F&MR
1.3.24, "Failure and Malfunction Reports;" and
                            process; reports are prioritized by safety sig-
PNPS Work Instruction NS-3.2.12
                            nificance; underlyin   root causes are evaluated;   ;
"F&MR Trend
                              reports are tracked for completion of corrective   ,
Analytis."
                            action; and, trending for repctitive proble.ns is
Team review of licensee precedures verified that
                            performed.   A report may be initiated by any
responsibilities are established for the F&MR
                              licensee staff member for failures, malfunctions,
process; reports are prioritized by safety sig-
                            and abnormal operating events identified during
nificance; underlyin
                            station operation.     The Nuclear Watch Engineer
root causes are evaluated;
                            ensures that adequate compensatoi,, measures are
;
                            implemented and the required notifications are     !
reports are tracked for completion of corrective
  >
,
                            performed.   The Compliance Division Manager then
action; and, trending for repctitive proble.ns is
'
performed.
                            recomnends a lead group to perform the investiga-   '
A report may be initiated by any
                            tion and performs a reportability review.       The
licensee staff member for failures, malfunctions,
                            appropriate department manager is responsible to
and abnormal operating events identified during
                            ensure that the identified deviations are prc-
station operation.
                            perly resolved and that corrective actions are
The Nuclear Watch Engineer
                            planned and effectively iniplemented in a timely
ensures that adequate compensatoi,, measures are
                            manner. The department manager is a'.so responsi-   '
implemented and the required notifications are
                            ble for the revi- and approval of the reporta-
!
a                          bility, root caase analysis, corrective action     !
performed.
                            plans, disposition, and final closeout. A root
The Compliance Division Manager then
                            cause analysis is performed for those F&MR's       i
>
                            determined to be significant. The term "signifi-   '
recomnends a lead group to perform the investiga-
                            cant" applies to a condition adverse to quality
'
                            which merits further evaluation for cause and       >
'
!                            requires management attention to preclude recur-   I
tion and performs a reportability review.
                            rence. The nonsignificant deviations are evalu-     l
The
                            ated in a periodic trend analysis.                 l
appropriate department manager is responsible to
                                                                                [
ensure that the identified deviations are prc-
,
perly resolved and that corrective actions are
                            The Team identified several discrepancies in the   }
planned and effectively iniplemented in a timely
manner. The department manager is a'.so responsi-
'
ble for the revi- and approval of the reporta-
bility, root caase analysis, corrective action
!
a
plans, disposition, and final closeout.
A root
cause analysis is performed for those F&MR's
i
determined to be significant. The term "signifi-
'
cant" applies to a condition adverse to quality
which merits further evaluation for cause and
>
requires management attention to preclude recur-
I
!
rence.
The nonsignificant deviations are evalu-
l
ated in a periodic trend analysis.
l
[
The Team identified several discrepancies in the
}
,
3
3
                            ddministration of the F&MR process.     Procedure ,
ddministration of the F&MR process.
'
Procedure
    .                        1.3.24 states that the       Complianc   Division
,
!                          Manager is responsi51e to present F&MR's that are
1.3.24
states
that
the
Complianc
Division
'
.
Manager is responsi51e to present F&MR's that are
!
designated significant or important to ORC. As
'
'
.
.
discussed in Section 3.10.2, the Team noted that
'
'
                            designated significant or important to ORC. As
the ORC meeting minutes for the previous six
                            discussed in Section 3.10.2, the Team noted that
months did not record the review of any F&MR's.
                            the ORC meeting minutes for the previous six
.
                            months did not record the review of any F&MR's.     .
Further Team review found that a backlog of over
                            Further Team review found that a backlog of over   j
j
'
'
                                                                                ,
,
t                                                                               ,
t
                                                                                i:
,
                                                                                l
i:
                                                                                l
l
l
- - - - - - - - -


1
1
    a ,
a
                  106
,
        eristed, and that no F&MRs had been submitted to
106
        ORC since February 3, 1988, except for those
eristed, and that no F&MRs had been submitted to
        associated with an LER. Some of the F&MR's
ORC since February 3, 1988, except for those
        involved events which occurred in 1986. The         ,
associated with an LER.
                                                            '
Some of the F&MR's
        licensee stated this was caused by personnel
involved events which occurred in 1986.
        resource constraints.     The Team also found two   i
The
        closed F&MR's which appeared to meet the criteria
,
        established in Proendure 1.3.24 for being submit-
licensee stated this was caused by personnel
        ted to ORC, but which had not been submitted
'
        prior to closure.     F&MR's 88-127 and 88-76 were !
resource constraints.
        cot reviewed by ORC, but invefived recurring con-   ;
The Team also found two
        ditions, which is a criterion for ORC review.       ;
i
        Ir. addition, many of the closed safety-related     !
closed F&MR's which appeared to meet the criteria
        F&MRs were denoted not safety-related by the       ,
established in Proendure 1.3.24 for being submit-
        Watch Engineer during the initial review process.   '
ted to ORC, but which had not been submitted
        This .nts-clat *fication; however, did not affect   ,
prior to closure.
        the processing and evaluation of the associated
F&MR's 88-127 and 88-76 were
        events for those F&MR's inspected.
!
        The Team reviewed a listing of open and closed
cot reviewed by ORC, but invefived recurring con-
        F&MR's and evaluated a sampling of closed reports
;
        to determine the completeness and effectiveness     r
ditions, which is a criterion for ORC review.
        of the corrective actions. The total number of
;
        F&MR's initiated has been increasing over the
Ir. addition, many of the closed safety-related
!       last few years. The licensee has attributed this
!
        increase to a heightened sensitivity of personnel
F&MRs were denoted not safety-related by the
i       to critical self-assessment and to the identif f-
,
l       cation of potentially reportable or significant
Watch Engineer during the initial review process.
        events to management. The total number of open
'
        F&MR's has significantly decreased over the last   ;
This .nts-clat *fication; however, did not affect
        year.
,
the processing and evaluation of the associated
events for those F&MR's inspected.
The Team reviewed a listing of open and closed
F&MR's and evaluated a sampling of closed reports
to determine the completeness and effectiveness
r
of the corrective actions.
The total number of
F&MR's initiated has been increasing over the
!
last few years. The licensee has attributed this
increase to a heightened sensitivity of personnel
i
to critical self-assessment and to the identif f-
l
cation of potentially reportable or significant
events to management.
The total number of open
F&MR's has significantly decreased over the last
;
year.
l
l
The root cause analyses performed for the F&MR's
i
'
'
        The root cause analyses performed for the F&MR's    i
reviewed were found to be of excellent quality.
        reviewed were found to be of excellent quality.     l
l
                                                            !
!
        Each analysis included an event description,
Each analysis included an event description,
        probable cause, actions completed, recommended
probable cause, actions completed, recommended
        actions, and safety significance.     The Systems   !
actions, and safety significance.
        Engineering Group's impact on this important
The Systems
        process has been positive.                         1
!
  I .
Engineering Group's impact on this important
        The Team revf ewed the latest F&MR Trend Analysis   e
process has been positive.
        Report, which covered the period July through
1
        December 1987, anti the applicable procedures.     ;
I
        The Team noted that the station's Technical Sec-   l
.
        tions did not specifically assign responsibility
The Team revf ewed the latest F&MR Trend Analysis
        for the report's proposed recommendations.     Fur- i
e
        ther review found that this program deficiency     i
Report, which covered the period July through
        had been previously identified by the licensee     !
December 1987, anti the applicable procedures.
        and the NRC and that the licensee had initiated     j
;
        corrective action. Specifically, a review of all
The Team noted that the station's Technical Sec-
        previous trend report rec w endations was per-
l
        forced by the licensee to determine their status.
tions did not specifically assign responsibility
                                                              l
for the report's proposed recommendations.
                                                              >
Fur-
i
ther review found that this program deficiency
i
had been previously identified by the licensee
!
and the NRC and that the licensee had initiated
j
corrective action. Specifically, a review of all
previous trend report rec w endations was per-
forced by the licensee to determine their status.
l
>


      _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _       __ _         _     _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                   __________           - __ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
    .                     o
__ _
                                                                                        107
_
                                                                            The review was completed in July 1983, and 74% of
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                              the recommendations were corrected. The remain-
__________
                                                                              ing items are currently being dispositioned by
- __
                                                                            the licensee to ensure effective long-term cor-
_
                                                                            rective action. In addition, the licensee has
_
                                                                            revised the F&MR procedures to include use of the
.
                                                                            Management Corrective Action Report (MCAR) as a
o
                                                                            vehicle for the Technical Section to report and
107
                                                                            correct negative trends identified in the re-
The review was completed in July 1983, and 74% of
                                                                            ports. The most recent trend report resulted in
the recommendations were corrected.
                                                                            the issuance of two MCAR's, which the Team
The remain-
                                                                            reviewed.
ing items are currently being dispositioned by
                                                                            The Team also noted that the trend report focused
the licensee to ensure effective long-term cor-
                                                                            its discussions primarily on individual problems
rective action.
                                                                            rather than trend patterns and recurring fail-
In addition, the licensee has
                                                                            ures. The Team observed that the Technical Sec-
revised the F&MR procedures to include use of the
                                                                            tion would be more effective if it thoroughly
Management Corrective Action Report (MCAR) as a
                                                                            evaluated trends and patterns, since the indi-
vehicle for the Technical Section to report and
                                                                            vidual F&MR itself is adequate to evaluate iso-
correct negative trends identified in the re-
                                                                            lated problems.                                         In addition, the report did not
ports. The most recent trend report resulted in
                                                                            provide any detailed discussion of personnel
the issuance of two MCAR's, which the Team
                                                                            errors or procedural failures, although there
reviewed.
                                                                            were a large number in the report.
The Team also noted that the trend report focused
                                                                3.10.5.2 Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality
its discussions primarily on individual problems
                                                                            As described by PNPS Nuclear Organization Proced-
rather than trend patterns and recurring fail-
                                                                            ure (NOP) 83A9, "Management Corrective Action
ures. The Team observed that the Technical Sec-
tion would be more effective if it thoroughly
evaluated trends and patterns, since the indi-
vidual F&MR itself is adequate to evaluate iso-
lated problems.
In addition, the report did not
provide any detailed discussion of personnel
errors or procedural failures, although there
were a large number in the report.
3.10.5.2 Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality
As described by PNPS Nuclear Organization Proced-
ure (NOP) 83A9, "Management Corrective Action
Process," the potential conditions adverse to
-
-
                                                                            Process," the potential conditions adverse to
quality (PCAQ) report can be used by any licensee
                                                                            quality (PCAQ) report can be used by any licensee
member tc document and report any actual or sus-
                                                                            member tc document and report any actual or sus-
pected conditions adverse to quality not reported
                                                                            pected conditions adverse to quality not reported
by other report forms such as NCRs, ors, and
                                                                            by other report forms such as NCRs, ors, and
F&MRs.
                                                                            F&MRs.     In short, it is a process for anyone to
In short, it is a process for anyone to
                                                                            elevate a concern to management to assure that
elevate a concern to management to assure that
                                                                            the concern will be evaluated and                                                     resolved.
the concern will be evaluated and
                                                                            As   implemented. PCAQs are written from one
resolved.
  '
As
                                                                            department to another or from one section to
implemented.
                                                                            another within a department.                                         For example, Oper-
PCAQs
                                                                            ations (N00) could send a FCAQ to Engineering
are written
                                                                            (NED) asking for an evaluation of a specific
from one
                                                                            plant condition.                                         In each case, the originating
'
                                                                            department is responsible for tracking each item
department to another or from one section to
                                                                            to resolution. According to NOP 83A9, a PCAQ is
another within a department.
                                                                            not formally closed until the originating depart-
For example, Oper-
                                                                            eent is satisfied with the proposed corrective
ations (N00) could send a FCAQ to Engineering
                                                                            action and the corrective action has been
(NED) asking for an evaluation of a specific
                                                                            implemented.                                                                                             <
plant condition.
In each case, the originating
department is responsible for tracking each item
to resolution. According to NOP 83A9, a PCAQ is
not formally closed until the originating depart-
eent is satisfied with the proposed corrective
action
and
the
corrective
action
has
been
implemented.
<


  O *
*
                103
O
        The Team reviewed a listing of open and closed
103
        PCAQ's and also reviewed a sampling of individual
The Team reviewed a listing of open and closed
        PCAQ's to determine the completeness and effec-
PCAQ's and also reviewed a sampling of individual
        tiveness     of   corrective     actions.     As   of
PCAQ's to determine the completeness and effec-
      August 19, 1988,     there were about       250 PCAQs
tiveness
        awaiting resolution.   There is currently no cen-
of
        tral tracking system for all PCAQs, although
corrective
        licensee management has begun initiatives in that
actions.
        area. In June 1988, the licensee began an effort
As
        to reduce the number of open PCAQ's and to estab-
of
        lish a central tracking system for PCAQ's with
August 19, 1988,
        the QAO. As part of this effort, each department
there were about
        is reviewing unresolved PCAQ's to evaluate each
250 PCAQs
      one's significance and its potential impact on
awaiting resolution.
        restart.   Based on discussions with respons!ble
There is currently no cen-
      managers, the Team learned that QA0 has completed
tral tracking system for all PCAQs, although
        its review and concluded that r.one of the unre-
licensee management has begun initiatives in that
      solved   PCAQ's   concern   equipment   operability
area. In June 1988, the licensee began an effort
      issues or are of a significance level that re-
to reduce the number of open PCAQ's and to estab-
      quires action before restart. N00 has not com-
lish a central tracking system for PCAQ's with
      pleted its evaluation but expects to be finished
the QAO. As part of this effort, each department
      within two weeks. NED has been implementing a
is reviewing unresolved PCAQ's to evaluate each
      routine review of each unresolved PCAQ and has
one's significance and its potential impact on
      been maintaining a list of PCAQ's needed to be
restart.
      resolved prior to restart.       The review of out-
Based on discussions with respons!ble
      standing PCAQ's is an iten on the restart check-
managers, the Team learned that QA0 has completed
      list maintained by the plai t. Subsequent check-
its review and concluded that r.one of the unre-
      list review by ORC also provides a decision point
solved
      in the process to assure that all necessary
PCAQ's
      evaluations have been completed.
concern
      Based on the above, the Team has concluded that
equipment
      the licensee is assuring that each PCAQ is being
operability
      evaluated for its nuclear safety and equipment
issues or are of a significance level that re-
      operability     impact relative to the planned
quires action before restart.
      restart of the plant and that all PCAQ'; noeded
N00 has not com-
      for resolution before restart will be identified.
pleted its evaluation but expects to be finished
      The ORC review of the PCAQ's on the restart
within two weeks.
      checklist will provide another check to assure
NED has been implementing a
)     that resolution n' PCAQ's needed for restart has
routine review of each unresolved PCAQ and has
I     occurred.
been maintaining a list of PCAQ's needed to be
resolved prior to restart.
The review of out-
standing PCAQ's is an iten on the restart check-
list maintained by the plai t.
Subsequent check-
list review by ORC also provides a decision point
in the process to assure that all necessary
evaluations have been completed.
Based on the above, the Team has concluded that
the licensee is assuring that each PCAQ is being
evaluated for its nuclear safety and equipment
operability
impact
relative
to
the
planned
restart of the plant and that all PCAQ'; noeded
for resolution before restart will be identified.
The ORC review of the PCAQ's on the restart
checklist will provide another check to assure
)
that resolution n' PCAQ's needed for restart has
I
occurred.


      _ _ - - _ _ - _
_ _ - - _ _ - _
    .                 .
.
                                              109
.
i
109
                                    The Team selected several closed PCAQ's to deter-
i
                                    mine whether the proposed corrective action had
The Team selected several closed PCAQ's to deter-
                                    satisfied the originating department's concerns
mine whether the proposed corrective action had
                                    and whether the corrective action was completed
satisfied the originating department's concerns
                                    as required by station procedures.     In general,
and whether the corrective action was completed
:                                 all identified corrective actions described on
as required by station procedures.
                                    the PCAQ's were completed; however, the docume -
In general,
                                    tation of the completed activity was, in many
:
                                    cases, limited and specific references were not
all identified corrective actions described on
                                    provided. The Team stated that additional guid-
the PCAQ's were completed; however, the docume -
                                    ance on the level of documentation to be provided
tation of the completed activity was, in many
                                    on the closecut portion of the PCAQ form could
cases, limited and specific references were not
                                    enhance clarity and auditability of the closure
provided.
                                    process. The Team also noted that the PCAQ sys-
The Team stated that additional guid-
J                                   tem can allow ambiguity of PCAQ status in cases
ance on the level of documentation to be provided
on the closecut portion of the PCAQ form could
enhance clarity and auditability of the closure
process. The Team also noted that the PCAQ sys-
J
tem can allow ambiguity of PCAQ status in cases
where a proposed action has been rejected by the
-
-
                                  where a proposed action has been rejected by the
originating office.
'
For example, NED rejected
                                  originating office.       For example, NED rejected
'
)                                   the response prepared by N00 to PCAQ NED-SS-087.
)
                                  A review of the N00 log showed the issue resolved
the response prepared by N00 to PCAQ NED-SS-087.
                                  (July 22, 1933), but further investigation with
A review of the N00 log showed the issue resolved
                                  parsens af fected indicated that the response was
(July 22, 1933), but further investigation with
                                  being rewritten and further corrective action was
parsens af fected indicated that the response was
                                  to be performed. The fornal closecut process and
being rewritten and further corrective action was
  I                                 status tracking for the PCAQ's needs improvement,
to be performed. The fornal closecut process and
i                                 This finding parallels a similar finding of the
I
  !
status tracking for the PCAQ's needs improvement,
                                  QA Department contained in QA0 88-609, dated
i
This finding parallels a similar finding of the
!
QA Department contained in QA0 88-609, dated
May 23, 1988.
;
;
                                  May 23, 1988.
                        3.10.5.3 Managenent Corrective Action Request
l
l
                                  The GEQAM and NOP 83A9, "Management Corrective
3.10.5.3 Managenent Corrective Action Request
                                  Action Process," describe the purpose of the
The GEQAM and NOP 83A9, "Management Corrective
                                  Management Corrective Action Request (MCAR).   The
Action Process," describe the purpose of the
                                  MCAR is a two part corrective action document
Management Corrective Action Request (MCAR).
]'                                used to: (1) perform a root cause analysis of
The
                                  significant conditions adverse to quality and
MCAR is a two part corrective action document
                                  develop preventive action plans; and (2) request
]
                                  management to implement selected action plans to
used to:
,                                  prevent recurrence of a problem.       In lieu of a
(1) perform a root cause analysis of
  ,.                              Deficiency Report, an MCAR may be used to report
significant conditions adverse to quality and
i                                  and resolve deficiencies involving process or
'
develop preventive action plans; and (2) request
management to implement selected action plans to
prevent recurrence of a problem.
In lieu of a
,
Deficiency Report, an MCAR may be used to report
,.
and resolve deficiencies involving process or
i
1
1
policy issues which af fect more than one depart-
'
'
                                  policy issues which af fect more than one depart-
ment and for which management attention and
                                  ment and for which management attention and
direction is required. An MCAR eay also be used
:
:
                                  direction is required. An MCAR eay also be used
for tracking long-term corrective actions related
i                                  for tracking long-term corrective actions related
i
to nonconformance reports (NCRs) and PCAQ's nr
;
;
                                  to nonconformance reports (NCRs) and PCAQ's nr
for identification of adverse trends identified
'
'
                                  for identification of adverse trends identified
i
i                                  threugh trend analysis programs.
threugh trend analysis programs.
i
i
!
!
!
!


    _.   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_.
; .   .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                              110
.
.
;
110
l
l
                                                      QA0 is assigned adiinistrative control for the
QA0 is assigned adiinistrative control for the
                                                      MCAR process. QAD logs the status, distributes
MCAR process.
                                                      copies, reports on delinquent MCAR's, and per-
QAD logs the status, distributes
                                                      forms the closecut. QAD also reviews each MCAR
copies, reports on delinquent MCAR's, and per-
                                                    where the responsible department is different
forms the closecut. QAD also reviews each MCAR
j                                                     from the issu.ing department to verify that the
where the responsible department is different
                                                      assignment of     the   responsible department   is
j
from the issu.ing department to verify that the
assignment of
the
responsible department
is
-
-
                                                      appropriate.
appropriate.
                                                      The Team reviewed the current status of open
The Team reviewed the current status of open
l                                                   MCAR's and the administrative controls in place
l
                                                      to track and promptly resolve MCAR's. The latest
MCAR's and the administrative controls in place
                                                    monthly status report, issued to the SVP-N on
to track and promptly resolve MCAR's. The latest
monthly status report, issued to the SVP-N on
August 1,1988, from the QA0 Manager listed 30
l
l
                                                    August 1,1988, from the QA0 Manager listed 30
'
'
                                                    open MCAR's. This list included two 1985 MCAR's
open MCAR's. This list included two 1985 MCAR's
                                                    and eight 1936 MCAR's. Approximately 40% of the
and eight 1936 MCAR's. Approximately 40% of the
                                                    MCAR's initiated since 1984 remain open,
MCAR's initiated since 1984 remain open,
i                                                   The licensee has previously observed that in-
i
l                                                   creased management attention is required to close
The licensee has previously observed that in-
!                                                   cut MCAR's in a timely manner. For example, the
l
I                                                   most recent QAD trend analysis report, issued on
creased management attention is required to close
                                                    May 23, 1988, recommended that the SVP-N initi-
!
                                                    ate action to closecut MCAR's QA0 85-2 and QA0
cut MCAR's in a timely manner.
                                                    87-2, which address the large number of quality
For example, the
                                                    problem reports issued for "f ailure to follow
I
                                                    procedures" and "inadequate procedures."
most recent QAD trend analysis report, issued on
                                                    Team attendance at several QA Interface meetings
May 23, 1988, recommended that the SVP-N initi-
                                                    also noted that there is clearly increased
ate action to closecut MCAR's QA0 85-2 and QA0
                                                    management attention being directed to c'ostout
87-2, which address the large number of quality
                                                    the longstanding MCAR's.
problem reports issued for "f ailure to follow
                                                    The Team reviewed two open M;AR's to evaluate the
procedures" and "inadequate procedures."
                                                    effectiveness of the process. MCAR 86-06, issued
Team attendance at several QA Interface meetings
                                                    in November 1936, involved recurring failures of
also noted
                                                    the salt service water (SSW) pumps. The MCAR was
that
                                                    issued as a result of an F&MR trend repert find-
there
.                                                    ing.   The MCAR resulted in a detailed root cause
is
l                                                    analysis by a consultant and the development of a
clearly
                                                    long-term corrective action plan, which is not
increased
                                                    yet complete. MCAR 8S-02, issued in June 1938,
management attention being directed to c'ostout
                                                    concerned programmatic inefficiencies in the PCAQ
the longstanding MCAR's.
                                                    process. The licensee is actively working on
The Team reviewed two open M;AR's to evaluate the
                                                    developing an integrated list of the approxi-
effectiveness of the process. MCAR 86-06, issued
                                                    mately 250 open PCAQ's with a curre it status (see
in November 1936, involved recurring failures of
                                                    Section 3.10.4.2).     This list is to be utilized
the salt service water (SSW) pumps. The MCAR was
                                                    to increase emphasis on closecuts.       Review of
issued as a result of an F&MR trend repert find-
                                                    these M;AR's did not identify any discrepancies
ing.
                                                    in the process.
The MCAR resulted in a detailed root cause
.
analysis by a consultant and the development of a
l
long-term corrective action plan, which is not
yet complete.
MCAR 8S-02, issued in June 1938,
concerned programmatic inefficiencies in the PCAQ
process.
The licensee is actively working on
developing an integrated list of the approxi-
mately 250 open PCAQ's with a curre it status (see
Section 3.10.4.2).
This list is to be utilized
to increase emphasis on closecuts.
Review of
these M;AR's did not identify any discrepancies
in the process.


      _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . __   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _         -       _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .           _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -                   __
_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . __
    D                                   *
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
,
-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        '
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .
                                                                                                                      111
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        :
__
  ,
D
                                                                                  3.10.5.4 Clearinghouse Process                                                                                                      I
*
                                                                                              The current procedure describing the corrective                                                                          i
                                                                                              action process is NOP 83A9, "Management Correc-                                                                          [
                                                                                              tive Action Process." This prccedure discusses                                                                          l
                                                                                              the responsibilities of the station depart-cents                                                                        t
                                                                                              in resolving identified deficiencies and report-                                                                        t
                                                                                              ing the trends observed                                                                    The procedure also          !
                                                                                            describes the various types of reports or docu*                                                                         t
                                                                                            ments available to station personnel and specifi-                                                                        ;
                                                                                            cally defines their use.                                                                                                  ;
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      r
                                                                                            As a result of the self-assessment evaluations
                                                                                            and performance improvement plans, the licensee                                                                          ;
                                                                                            determined that the existing corrective action                                                                          t
                                                                                            processes were very compliccted and that a                                                                              i
,                                                                                            streamlined process was needed that would provide                                                                        I
,
,
  '
'
                                                                                            an easy means of raising any concerns to manage-
111
                                                                                            ment for resolution. A need was also identified
:
!                                                                                           for a specific entity which could monitor the
,
,                                                                                            performance of the station organization in imple-
3.10.5.4 Clearinghouse Process
                                                                                            menting self-improvement recommendations, as well                                                                       *
I
!
The current procedure describing the corrective
                                                                                            as provide the focal point for identified issues
i
                                                                                            to be placed into the appropriate plant correc-                                                                         ,
action process is NOP 83A9, "Management Correc-
.                                                                                            tive actin 6 process,                                                                                                   j
[
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      P
tive Action Process."
This prccedure discusses
l
the responsibilities of the station depart-cents
t
t
in resolving identified deficiencies and report-
ing the trends observed
The procedure also
describes the various types of reports or docu*
t
ments available to station personnel and specifi-
;
cally defines their use.
;
r
As a result of the self-assessment evaluations
and performance improvement plans, the licensee
;
determined that the existing corrective action
t
processes were
very compliccted and
that a
i
streamlined process was needed that would provide
I
,
an easy means of raising any concerns to manage-
,
'
ment for resolution. A need was also identified
!
for a specific entity which could monitor the
performance of the station organization in imple-
,
menting self-improvement recommendations, as well
*
!
as provide the focal point for identified issues
to be placed into the appropriate plant correc-
,
tive actin 6 process,
j
.
P
In June 1933, the "Clearinghouse" was established
l
3
3
                                                                                            In June 1933, the "Clearinghouse" was established                                                                        l
to serve a number of needs.
It was developed to
l
'
'
                                                                                            to serve a number of needs. It was developed to                                                                          l
assure that the licensee's restart assessment
                                                                                            assure that the licensee's restart assessment                                                                           (
(
,
team observations had been entered into the
                                                                                            team observations had been entered into the                                                                             !
!
;                                                                                           regular corrective                                     action process and, when                                         j
,
;
regular corrective
action
process
and,
when
j
necessary, that all necessary .Nperwork. was pre-
-
;
;
                                                                                            necessary, that all necessary .Nperwork. was pre-                                                                        -
pared for the resolution of any outstanding
                                                                                            pared for the resolution of any outstanding                                                                             [
[
                                                                                            ttems.                   As of this inspection, 69 assessment
ttems.
                                                                                            items remain unresolved but have schedules iden-                                                                         e
As of this inspection, 69 assessment
                                                                                            tified                   for their completion. Responses for                                                           !
items remain unresolved but have schedules iden-
                                                                                            approximately 69 additional items have not been                                                                         !
e
                                                                                            received                   from the station organization.                                                 The         :
tified
                                                                                            balance of the original 449 items have been                                                                             f
for
    .                                                                                      listed as closed. The Team cid not evaluate the                                                                         l
their completion.
Responses
for
!
approximately 69 additional items have not been
!
received
from the station organization.
The
:
balance of the original 449 items have been
f
listed as closed. The Team cid not evaluate the
l
.
closecut process for any completed or closed
j
,
,
                                                                                            closecut process for any completed or closed                                                                            j
items.
j                                                                                            items.                                                                                                                  j
j
,                                                                                            A second responsibility of the Clearinghouse was                                                                         !
j
                                                                                            to streamline the corrective action process. As                                                                         {
A second responsibility of the Clearinghouse was
                                                                                            of this inspection period, revisions to the sta-                                                                         i
!
i                                                                                           tion procedures for improvements in corrective                                                                           !
,
!                                                                                           action processes have not been made. The current                                                                         ,
to streamline the corrective action process. As
i                                                                                           estirate for cenpletion of the necessary proced-                                                                         l
{
l                                                                                           ure revist" s was the end of Augus..                                                                                     j
of this inspection period, revisions to the sta-
i
i
tion procedures for improvements in corrective
!
!
action processes have not been made. The current
,
i
estirate for cenpletion of the necessary proced-
l
l
ure revist" s was the end of Augus..
j
i
.
.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      i
,
,                                                                                                                                                                                                                    i
i
!
4
4
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      !
_.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                ._.__
-
.
.


                                      _ _ _ _ _                               _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                         . _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
  O 4
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                                                                                                        i
. _ _ _ _ _
                112
O
        While subject to revision during the required
4
        station procedure review process, the following                                                                                                 i
i
        is a discussion of the current licensee philos-
112
        ophy concerning potential modification of the                                                                                                   I
While subject to revision during the required
        corrective action processes. The Team did not
station procedure review process, the following
        evaluate the effectiveness of these proposed
i
        changes   in   the overall                corrective action                                                                                    ,
is a discussion of the current licensee philos-
        programs.
ophy concerning potential modification of the
                                                                                                                                                      !
I
        The Clea ringhoui,e is currently revising three                                                                                                i
corrective action processes.
        existing NOPs, creating a new NOP, and revisirg                                                                                                l
The Team did not
        the BEQAM. The new NOP would define the role and
evaluate the effectiveness of these proposed
        responsibilities of the Clearinghouse, establish
changes
        a new form for identifying real or potential                                                                                                    '
in
      plant problems, as well as for reporting
the
      employee-identified concerns or self-assessment                                                                                                !
overall
      recommendations for plant improvements. The new                                                                                                ,
corrective
        form would provide a uimple method for raising
action
,
,
'
programs.
        issues, concerns, or recommendations to station                                                                                               ,
!
      management.     Upon receipt of this form, the                                                                                                 '
The Clea ringhoui,e is currently revising three
t    Clearinghouse would review the issue described                                                                                                 i
i
      and integrate the issue into the regular plant                                                                                                 j
existing NOPs, creating a new NOP, and revisirg
      corrective     action proc 2sses                                     for                                   resolution.                         l
l
      Another proposed change is a categorization of                                                                                                 l
the BEQAM. The new NOP would define the role and
responsibilities of the Clearinghouse, establish
a new form for identifying real or potential
'
plant
problems,
as
well
as
for
reporting
employee-identified concerns or self-assessment
!
recommendations for plant improvements. The new
,
form would provide a uimple method for raising
issues, concerns, or recommendations to station
,
,
'
management.
Upon receipt of this form,
the
'
Clearinghouse would review the issue described
i
t
and integrate the issue into the regular plant
j
corrective
action
proc 2sses
for
resolution.
l
Another proposed change is a categorization of
l
all
the existing corrective action processes
'
.
.
      all    the existing corrective action processes                                                                                                '
identified in NOP B3A9 into three groups.
      identified in NOP B3A9 into three groups. One                                                                                                   i
One
      group, identified as corrective action processes.                                                                                               l
i
group, identified as corrective action processes.
l
would include deficiency reports (OR), non-con-
,
,
      would include deficiency reports (OR), non-con-                                                                                                ,
,
      formance reports (NCR), management corrective                                                                                                   }
formance reports (NCR), management corrective
      action requests (MCAR), failure and malfunction                                                                                                 !
}
      reports (F&MR), radiological eccurrence reports                                                                                                 ,
action requests (MCAR), failure and malfunction
      (ROR), security deficiency reports (50R), and                                                                                                   l
!
      supplier finder reports (SFR).                                         These processes                                                         i
reports (F&MR), radiological eccurrence reports
'
,
      are used to identify and document plant deficia
(ROR), security deficiency reports (50R), and
      encies and to provide a neans of tracking the                                                                                                   e
l
      resolution of identified problems.                                                                                                             (
supplier finder reports (SFR).
                                                                                                                                                      t
These processes
j     A second group of controls would be categorized
i
      as normal work control processes.                                                                           This group
are used to identify and document plant deficia
      would potentially include maintenance requests                                                                                                 !
'
      (MR), housekeeping services assistance (H5A),                                                                                                   !
encies and to provide a neans of tracking the
      procedure change notices (PC), and engineering                                                                                                 i
e
I     services requests (ESR).                                                                                                                       t
resolution of identified problems.
(
t
j
A second group of controls would be categorized
as normal work control processes.
This group
would potentially include maintenance requests
!
(MR),
housekeeping services assistance (H5A),
!
procedure change notices (PC), and engineering
i
I
services requests (ESR).
t
i
i
,
,
Line 6,000: Line 9,024:
j
j
;
;
                                                                                                                                                      ;
;
                                                _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -                                                   _ _ _ _ - -
i
                                                                                                                                                      i
-
- -


  _ _ _ - _ _ _
_ _ _ - _ _ _
.               o
.
                                                                                                        ,
o
                                                                                                        f
,
                                              113
f
                              The last group currently being proposed includes
113
                              all recommendations or findings from the existing
The last group currently being proposed includes
                          ,    self-assessment programs. The information to be                           '
all recommendations or findings from the existing
                              tracked in this group are recommendations for
self-assessment programs.
                              improving performance and would not be used to                           ;
The information to be
                              identify programatic deficiencies. Any identi-                           1
'
                              fication of deficiencies would be tracked using                           '
,
                              one of the processes described in the first group                         I
tracked in this group are recommendations for
                              above.         Examples of the types of recommendations               1
improving performance and would not be used to
                              to be tracked would be quality assurance audit
;
                              findings and peer evaluator reports,                                     j
identify programatic deficiencies.
                              Changes would also be required for NOP 84E1,                             !
Any identi-
                              "Engineering Service Request (ESR) Proe-ss," and                         :
1
                              NOP 84A7, "Drawing Control," as well as the                               '
fication of deficiencies would be tracked using
                              quality assurance manual,                           in order to fully
'
                              implement the revised program,                                           j
I
                              The         licensee anticipates                   that all necessary   I
one of the processes described in the first group
                              changes to station procedures would be completed                         l
above.
                              by the end of August, with formal implementation                         ;
Examples of the types of recommendations
                              of the program changes within an additional 30                           :
1
                              days.                                                                     t
to be tracked would be quality assurance audit
                  3.10.5.5 Management 0.ersight and Assessment Team (MO&AT)
findings and peer evaluator reports,
                              In addition to the plant operations oversight                           i
j
                              provided by the ORC, the MC&AT also provides an                         !
Changes would also be required for NOP 84E1,
                              oversight review of plant operations by the
!
                              nature of its responsibilities for overview of
"Engineering Service Request (ESR) Proe-ss," and
                              restart activities.           The MO&AT is corrposed of
:
                            eight sentor managers, which includes the Station
NOP 84A7, "Drawing Control," as well as the
                            Director. Director of Special Projects and Vice                           i
'
                            President Nuclear Engineering. The SVP-N acts as                         ;
quality assurance manual,
                            the Chairman of the team. Further, three M01AT                           ,
in order to fully
                            merbers had been licensee managers prior to the                         I
implement the revised program,
                            arrival of the SVP-N, while the remaining ran-                           (
j
                            agers joined the licensee subsequent to February                         l
The
                              1987.                                                                 l
licensee anticipates
                            The M01AT maintains its oversight of restart-
that all
                                                                                                      '
necessary
                            related activities and associated plant opera-
I
                            tio'is through several self-assessment programs.                         I
changes to station procedures would be completed
                            These programs include but are not limited to the                         ,
l
                            peer evaluator and management ronttoring pro-                             l
by the end of August, with formal implementation
                            grams.         The Team noted that these programs were                   ;
;
                            ef'ective in evaluating plant activities.                                 l
of the program changes within an additional 30
                                                                                                      l
:
                                                                                                      (
days.
                                                                                                      i
t
                                                                                                      !
3.10.5.5 Management 0.ersight and Assessment Team (MO&AT)
                                                                                                      !
In addition to the plant operations oversight
                                                                                                      ,
i
                                                                                                      I
provided by the ORC, the MC&AT also provides an
                                                                                                      !
!
                                                                                                      ,
oversight review of plant operations by the
                            - --- _ . - - -               - - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ . - _ . - -
nature of its responsibilities for overview of
restart activities.
The MO&AT is corrposed of
eight sentor managers, which includes the Station
Director. Director of Special Projects and Vice
i
President Nuclear Engineering. The SVP-N acts as
;
the Chairman of the team.
Further, three M01AT
,
merbers had been licensee managers prior to the
I
arrival of the SVP-N, while the remaining ran-
(
agers joined the licensee subsequent to February
l
1987.
l
The M01AT maintains its oversight of restart-
related activities and associated plant opera-
'
I
tio'is through several self-assessment programs.
These programs include but are not limited to the
,
peer evaluator and management ronttoring pro-
l
grams.
The Team noted that these programs were
;
ef'ective in evaluating plant activities.
l
l
(
i
!
!
,
I
!
,
- ---
. - - -
- - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ . - _ . - -


                                                - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
    '
'
  O
O
                          114
114
                The Team determined that, in some ways, the
The Team determined that, in some ways, the
                responsibilities of the MO&AT parallels some of
responsibilities of the MO&AT parallels some of
                the responsibilities to review plant operations
the responsibilities to review plant operations
                assigned to the ORC. In addition, the Team
assigned to the ORC.
                determined that the curreret role of the MO&AT is
In addition,
                not credited by the ORC as a means of fulfilling
the Team
                its responsibilities to review plant operations,
determined that the curreret role of the MO&AT is
                but it does provide a second, independent look
not credited by the ORC as a means of fulfilling
                at plant operations.
its responsibilities to review plant operations,
      3.10.5.6 Engineering Service Requests (ESR's)
but it does provide a second, independent look
                ESRs are tracking forms used by any licensee
at plant operations.
                department to request engireering assistance from
3.10.5.6 Engineering Service Requests (ESR's)
                the Nuclear Engineering Department (NED). Stand-
ESRs are tracking forms used by any licensee
                ard practice within NEO is to attach an ESR to
department to request engireering assistance from
                all requests for assistance which may be already
the Nuclear Engineering Department (NED). Stand-
                tracked under another corrective action tracking
ard practice within NEO is to attach an ESR to
                system, such as DR's, PCAQ's, etc. This is done
all requests for assistance which may be already
                to provide a means for the NED to track and
tracked under another corrective action tracking
                monitor the progress of its work. When ai ESR is
system, such as DR's, PCAQ's, etc. This is done
                opened or received. NED is to review the concern,
to provide a means for the NED to track and
                determir.e a plan for resolution of the item,
monitor the progress of its work. When ai ESR is
                which wculd include an evaluation relative to
opened or received. NED is to review the concern,
                plans for plant restart. Unless the issue can be
determir.e a plan for resolution of the item,
                resolved within 30 days, a response to the origi-
which wculd include an evaluation relative to
                nating department is to be provided within 30
plans for plant restart. Unless the issue can be
resolved within 30 days, a response to the origi-
nating department is to be provided within 30
days which describes the above.
In discussions
'
'
                days which describes the above.                                                    In discussions
l
l              with the Team, a management representative of NED
with the Team, a management representative of NED
l               indicated that this practice has not always
l
                worked as planned and that additional emphasis is
indicated that this practice has not always
                being placed on assuring that the 30-day re-
worked as planned and that additional emphasis is
                sponses are being sent in a timely fashion.
being placed on assuring that the 30-day re-
                NED tracks all existing E5R's, determines what
sponses are being sent in a timely fashion.
                actions are required prior to restart, and rou-
NED tracks all existing E5R's, determines what
                tinely evaluates the potential impacts of out-
actions are required prior to restart, and rou-
                standing ESR's on the plansed restart of the
tinely evaluates the potential impacts of out-
                plant.   In each case where NED determines that
standing ESR's on the plansed restart of the
                resolution of an ESR is not required to support
plant.
                restart. NED prepares docu entation to support
In each case where NED determines that
                that   position.               This                                     documentation   undergoes
resolution of an ESR is not required to support
                several levels of review, including the Section
restart. NED prepares docu entation to support
                Manager, Department Manager and the Vice Presi-
that
                dent - Nuclear Engineering. Any open ESR asso-
position.
                ciated with unresolved pCAQ's or MCAR's is also
This
                revie=ed by the CRC as part of its assigned
documentation
                restart checklist revie.'.
undergoes
                              ____-_ __-____-_
several levels of review, including the Section
Manager, Department Manager and the Vice Presi-
dent - Nuclear Engineering.
Any open ESR asso-
ciated with unresolved pCAQ's or MCAR's is also
revie=ed by the CRC as part of its assigned
restart checklist revie.'.
____-_ __-____-_


  . *
*
.
,
,
!                                                                             i
!
                                                                              l
i
l
'
i
115
!
i
Based upon discussions with NED personnel, the
I
Team concluded that ESR's are adequa0ely tracked
j
and that upper management is routinely informed
!
of potential problems in a timely fashion.
}
i
3.10.5.7 Human Performance Evaluation System
'
The Team inquired as to the licensee's intentions
!
in participating in the Institute for Nuclear
Power Operations (!NPO) Human Performance Evalua-
;
tion Systvm (HPES) program.
The program
is
r
intended to assist licensees in the reduction of
[
human error by encouraging pe*sonnel to report
!
actual or potential situations which keep a per-
t
son from outstanding performance.
The licensee
I
has designated an HPES coordinator, who is in the
!
Training Department.
The coordinator has been
i
I
trained by INPO and is currently preparing to
implement
the
program.
The
coordinator
has
!
'
'
                                                                              i
already become involved in the Incident Investi-
                                  115                                        !
l
                                                                              i
gation and Critique process, and has reviewed the
                        Based upon discussions with NED personnel, the       I
i
                        Team concluded that ESR's are adequa0ely tracked      j
recent findings frc:n the licensee's ESF Actuation
                        and that upper management is routinely informed      !
:
                        of potential problems in a timely fashion.           }
.
                                                                              i '
!
            3.10.5.7 Human Performance Evaluation System
Task Fo
                        The Team inquired as to the licensee's intentions    !
i report,
                        in participating in the Institute for Nuclear
This p rog ra.. . ence fully
                        Power Operations (!NPO) Human Performance Evalua-    ;
implete'.' o l,
                        tion Systvm (HPES) program. The program is            r
should provide additional valuable
                        intended to assist licensees in the reduction of      [
input int- the corrective action process.
                        human error by encouraging pe*sonnel to report        !
f
                        actual or potential situations which keep a per-      t
3.10.6
                        son from outstanding performance. The licensee        I
Conclusions
                        has designated an HPES coordinator, who is in the     !
Overall, the Team determined the licensee's programs for
                        Training Department. The coordinator has been        i
!
I                      trained by INPO and is currently preparing to
safety assessment / quality verification to be adequate and
I
improving.
Based upon the areas inspected and examples
'
'
                        implement the program.        The coordinator  has  !
L
                        already become involved in the Incident Investi-
raised, the Team concluded that'
                                                                              l
t
                        gation and Critique process, and has reviewed the    i
1.
                      . recent findings frc:n the licensee's ESF Actuation    :
The Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee is
                        Task Fo i report, This p rog ra.. . ence fully        !
actively involved in ;.he oversight of facility opera-
                        implete'.' o l, should provide additional valuable
'
                        input int- the corrective action process.
tions.
      3.10.6 Conclusions                                                      f
The con:11ttee is composed of experienced man-
            Overall, the Team determined the licensee's programs for        !
agers with diverse experience and provides clear and
            safety assessment / quality verification to be adequate and      I
valid input to the SVP-N on safety-related activities.
            improving. Based upon the areas inspected and examples          '
2.
            raised, the Team concluded that'                                 L
Plant problems and deficiencies are being ident'f ted
                                                                              t
f
            1.   The Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee is
and entered into the appropriate corrective action
                  actively involved in ;.he oversight of facility opera-     '
system,
                  tions. The con:11ttee is composed of experienced man-
t
                  agers with diverse experience and provides clear and
-- - ---
                  valid input to the SVP-N on safety-related activities.
o
            2.   Plant problems and deficiencies are being ident'f ted       f
                  and entered into the appropriate corrective action
                  system,
                                                                              t
                                                                            o


.
.
      . .
.
                            116
.
            3. There are effective, meaningful communications between
116
              the QA and plant operations departments, as well as
3.
              good systems engineering involvement in evaluation and
There are effective, meaningful communications between
              resolution of problems.
the QA and plant operations departments, as well as
            4. The weekly QA interface meeting has enhanced communt-
good systems engineering involvement in evaluation and
              cations at the station and improved the process of
resolution of problems.
              resolving open issues.
4.
            5. The Operations Review Committee (ORC) has not been
The weekly QA interface meeting has enhanced communt-
              reviewing plant operat'.ons ef fectively so that mean-
cations at the station and improved the process of
              ingful input to Itcensee manag cent is being consist-
resolving open issues.
              ently provided,     Recently, heavy emphasis has been
5.
              placed on administrative reviews of procedure changes
The Operations Review Committee (ORC) has not been
              and modifications, rather than reviewing plant opera-
reviewing plant operat'.ons ef fectively so that mean-
              tions. Also, ORC review of plant failure and malfunc-
ingful input to Itcensee manag cent is being consist-
              cion reports has neither been timely nor included all
ently provided,
              appropriate reports.
Recently, heavy emphasis has been
            6. Multiple corrective action processes and multiple
placed on administrative reviews of procedure changes
              tracking systems detract from efficient functioning of
and modifications, rather than reviewing plant opera-
              the system. This has been identified by the licensee
tions. Also, ORC review of plant failure and malfunc-
              and programs ar     being established to correct the
cion reports has neither been timely nor included all
              known deficiencie;.
appropriate reports.
            7. The tracking and ;1osecut of PCAQ's and MCAR's have
6.
              not been effective in the pest.     Also, a relatively
Multiple corrective action processes and multiple
              large number of open PCAQ's exists. The licensee is
tracking systems detract from efficient functioning of
              taking action to resolve these problem.
the system. This has been identified by the licensee
  . . _ .
and programs ar
being established to correct the
known deficiencie;.
7.
The tracking and ;1osecut of PCAQ's and MCAR's have
not been effective in the pest.
Also, a relatively
large number of open PCAQ's exists.
The licensee is
taking action to resolve these problem.
. . _ .


    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  ,                 *
*
,
'
'
                                                            117
117
                      4.0 UNRESOLVED ITEMS
4.0 UNRESOLVED ITEMS
                            An unresolved item is an item for which additional information is required
An unresolved item is an item for which additional information is required
                            in order to determine whether the item is acceptable, a violation, or a
in order to determine whether the item is acceptable, a violation, or a
                            deviation.   An unresolved item is discussed in section 3.4.2.2 of this
deviation.
                            report.
An unresolved item is discussed in section 3.4.2.2 of this
report.


      *
I
    o                                                                                     I
o
                                                                                          i
*
                                                  118
i
                                                                                          !
118
        5.0 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS
!
                                                                                            l
5.0 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS
              At periodic intervals during the inspection period, the Team Leader held     [
l
              meetings with senior facility management tu discuss the inspection scope
At periodic intervals during the inspection period, the Team Leader held
              and preliminary findings. A final exit interview vas conducted on           l
[
              August 24, 1938. Attendees are listed in Appendix 8. At the exit meet-     i
meetings with senior facility management tu discuss the inspection scope
              ing, the Team Leader described the preliminary insoection findings,         !
and preliminary findings.
              including both the preliminary overall conclusions and the preliminary     :
A final exit interview vas conducted on
              findings and observations in each functional area.     The Team Leader also !
l
              confirmed licensee comm.itments at the exit meeting, Then the Team Manager I-
August 24, 1938.
              discussed how the Team findings will be used in NRC Restart Assessment
Attendees are listed in Appendix 8.
              Panel activities. Also, the Regional Administrator outlined the remaining     .
At the exit meet-
              step in the NRC staff process of evaluating Pilgrim restart readiness and   [
i
              developing staff recommendation.                                             l
ing, the Team Leader described the preliminary insoection findings,
                                                                                          l
!
                                                                                          l
including both the preliminary overall conclusions and the preliminary
                                                                                          [
:
                                                                                          ;
findings and observations in each functional area.
                                                                                            t
The Team Leader also
                                                                                          ;
!
                                                                                          I
confirmed licensee comm.itments at the exit meeting, Then the Team Manager
                                                                                          '
I-
                                                                                          i
discussed how the Team findings will be used in NRC Restart Assessment
                                                                                          L
Panel activities. Also, the Regional Administrator outlined the remaining
                                                                                          i
.
                                                                                          ;
step in the NRC staff process of evaluating Pilgrim restart readiness and
                                                                                          i
[
                                                                                          !
developing staff recommendation.
  .                                                                                       I
l
                                                                                          i
l
                                                                                          !
l
                                                                                          !
[
                                                                                          I
;
                                                                                          I
t
                                                                                          .
;
                                                                                          I
I
                                                                                          !
'
i
L
i
;
i
!
.
I
i
!
!
I
I
.
I
!
--
--


                                                                        _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . -
_ _ _ _ _ _
  , *
_ - _ _ . -
l
,
*
APPEN0!X A
Entrance Interview Attende_es
August 8, 1988
Boston Edison Company
J. Alexander, Plant Operations $ection Hanager
R. Anderson, Plant Manager
H. Balfour, Iraining Section Manager
R. Bird, 5entor Vice President - Nuclear
F. Famulari, Quality Assurance Department Manager
0. Gillispie, Nuclear Training Department Manager
R. Grazio, Regulatory Section Manager
P. Hamilton, Compitance Division Manager
K. Highfill, Station Director
J. Jens, Radiological Section Manager
E. Kraft, Plant Support Department Manager
R, ledgett, Otrector Special Projects
0. Long, Security Section Manager
A. Morist, Planning tad Outage Department Manager
E. Robinson, Corporate Comunication Information Division Head
L. Schmeling, Program V.anager
J. Seery. Technical Section Manager
R. Sherry, Plant Maintehance Section Manager
R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager
E. Wagner, Asr*stant to Senior Vice President - Nuclear
F. Wozniak, Fire Protection Olvision Manager
l
United States Nuclear Regulatory _Comission
l
l
                                      APPEN0!X A
F. Alstulewicz, Senter Technical Assistant, Policy Development and
                              Entrance Interview Attende_es
!
                                    August 8, 1988
Technical Support Branch, Office of Nuclear React,or Regulation (NRR)
      Boston Edison Company
      J. Alexander, Plant Operations $ection Hanager
      R. Anderson, Plant Manager
      H. Balfour, Iraining Section Manager
      R. Bird, 5entor Vice President - Nuclear
      F. Famulari, Quality Assurance Department Manager
      0. Gillispie, Nuclear Training Department Manager
      R. Grazio, Regulatory Section Manager
      P. Hamilton, Compitance Division Manager
      K. Highfill, Station Director
      J. Jens, Radiological Section Manager
      E. Kraft, Plant Support Department Manager
      R, ledgett, Otrector Special Projects
      0. Long, Security Section Manager
      A. Morist, Planning tad Outage Department Manager
      E. Robinson, Corporate Comunication Information Division Head
      L. Schmeling, Program V.anager
      J. Seery. Technical Section Manager
      R. Sherry, Plant Maintehance Section Manager
      R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager
      E. Wagner, Asr*stant to Senior Vice President - Nuclear
      F. Wozniak, Fire Protection Olvision Manager
l      United States Nuclear Regulatory _Comission
l      F. Alstulewicz, Senter Technical Assistant, Policy Development and
!         Technical Support Branch, Office of Nuclear React,or Regulation (NRR)
,
,
      R. Blough, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3B, Otvision of Reactor
R. Blough, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3B, Otvision of Reactor
l
l
          Projects (DRP), Region 1 (RI)
Projects (DRP), Region 1 (RI)
      S. Collins Deputy Director, ORP, RI
S. Collins Deputy Director, ORP, RI
      L. Doerflein, Project Engineer, ORP, R!
L. Doerflein, Project Engineer, ORP, R!
      T. Cragoun, Senior Radiation Specialist, Division of Radiation $afety
T. Cragoun, Senior Radiation Specialist, Division of Radiation $afety
          and Safeguards (CRSS)
and Safeguards (CRSS)
      M. Evans, Operations Engineer, Olvision of React,or Safety (ORS), R!
M. Evans, Operations Engineer, Olvision of React,or Safety (ORS), R!
      J. tyash, Resident Inspector, Ptigrim Nuclear Power Statten, ORP, R1
J. tyash, Resident Inspector, Ptigrim Nuclear Power Statten, ORP, R1
      0. Mcdonald, Project Manager, Project Directorate 1 3, NRR
0. Mcdonald, Project Manager, Project Directorate 1 3, NRR
      L. Pitsco, 5tntor Operations Engineer, Otvision of License Performance
L. Pitsco, 5tntor Operations Engineer, Otvision of License Performance
          and Quality Evaluatien, NRR
and Quality Evaluatien, NRR
      W. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Mi11 store Point, ORP, RI
W. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Mi11 store Point, ORP, RI
      L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector, Indian Point Unit 2, CRP, RI
L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector, Indian Point Unit 2, CRP, RI
      G. $sith, Safeguards $recia115t, OR55. RI
G. $sith, Safeguards $recia115t, OR55. RI
      C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector, Pilgrim huclear Fe.er Station, ORP, RI
C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector, Pilgrim huclear Fe.er Station, ORP, RI
%
%


                                                _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _                     _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                                                            _ _
- _ _ _ _ _ _
    . *
_ _
                                                                                                                    I
_ _
                                                                                                                    I
.
        Appendix A - Entrance Interview         A-2
*
                                                                                                                    '
I
        Attendees                                                                                                 ;
I
                                                                                                                    r
Appendix A - Entrance Interview
A-2
'
Attendees
;
r
!
Com.monwealth of_ Massachusetts
*
*
                                                                                                                    !
l
            Com.monwealth of_ Massachusetts                                                                        l
i
                                                                                                                    i
'
  i
P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Department of Public Safety
  '
            P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Department of Public Safety
            P. Chan, Observer
            S. Sho11y (MHS Technical Associates, Inc.), observer                                                  i
                                                                                                                  t
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                                                                                                                    !
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                                                                                                                    t
                                                                                                                  !
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                                                                                                                  !
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                                                                                                                  l
                                                                                                                  l'
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                                                                                                                  .
P. Chan, Observer
S. Sho11y (MHS Technical Associates, Inc.), observer
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- ~ ~ ~ ~ - - * - ' ' ^ - ~ '


                                                      _ _____________ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _____________ _ ___ _ _
                                                                                            ,
_ _ _ _ _
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                                      APPENDIX B                                           i
'
                              Exit Interview Attenden
APPENDIX B
                                    August _24.193,]                                       [
i
Exit Interview Attenden
August _24.193,]
[
j
j
      Boston Edtson Company
Boston Edtson Company
                                                                                            >
>
                                                                                            !
!
      J. Alexander, Plant Operations Section Manager                                         *
J. Alexander, Plant Operations Section Manager
      R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear
*
      F. Famulari Quality Assurance Department Manager                                       ,
R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear
l     0. G1111spie, Nuclear Training Department Manager                                     i
F. Famulari Quality Assurance Department Manager
,
l
0. G1111spie, Nuclear Training Department Manager
i
-
-
      R. Gramont, Deputy Maintenance Section Manager                                         ;
R. Gramont, Deputy Maintenance Section Manager
      R. Grazio, Regulatory Section Manager                                                 i
;
      P. Hamtiton, Compliance Divtston Manager                                               l
R. Grazio, Regulatory Section Manager
      K, Highfill, $tation Ofrector
i
l     J. Jens, Radiological Section Manager                                                 !
P. Hamtiton, Compliance Divtston Manager
      E. Kraft, Plant support Department Manager                                             :
l
      R. Ledjett, Director $pecial Projects                                                 ;
K, Highfill, $tation Ofrector
l     0. Long, Security Section Manager                                                     !
l
l     E Robinson, Corporate Comunication Irformation Disiston Head
J. Jens, Radiological Section Manager
      L. Schmeling, Program Manager                                                         ;
!
      J. Seery, Technical Secsion Manager                                                   i
E. Kraft, Plant support Department Manager
      R. Sherry, Plant Maintenance Section Manager                                           j
:
      R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager                                     ;
R. Ledjett, Director $pecial Projects
      5. Sweeney, Chief Executivc Officer ard Chairman ef the e n d                         i
;
l
0. Long, Security Section Manager
!
l
E Robinson, Corporate Comunication Irformation Disiston Head
L. Schmeling, Program Manager
;
J. Seery, Technical Secsion Manager
i
R. Sherry, Plant Maintenance Section Manager
j
R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager
;
5. Sweeney, Chief Executivc Officer ard Chairman ef the e n d
i
E. Wagner, Assistant to Senior Vice President - Nuclear
,
,
      E. Wagner, Assistant to Senior Vice President - Nuclear                                ,
,
l     F. Wozniak, Fire Protection Otvisten Manager                                           ,
l
      United States Nuclear Regulatory Cemmisslo)                                           f
F. Wozniak, Fire Protection Otvisten Manager
                                                                                            f
,
      F. Akstulewicz, Senior Technical Assistant, Policy Development and                     :
United States Nuclear Regulatory Cemmisslo)
        T*,:hnical support Branch, Off.ce of Nuclear Raactor Regulation (NRR)               -
f
      R. Blough, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3B, Olvision of Reactor                 !
f
        Projects (ORP), Region I (RI)                                                       t
F. Akstulewicz, Senior Technical Assistant, Policy Development and
      B. Boger, Assistant Director for Region ! Reactors, NRR                               l
:
      5. Collins, Deputy Otrector, ORP, R!                                                   l
T*,:hnical support Branch, Off.ce of Nuclear Raactor Regulation (NRR)
      L. Doerfietn, Project Engineer, DRP. RI                                               j
-
      W. Little Office of Special Projects, R!!                                               i
R. Blough, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3B, Olvision of Reactor
      J. Lyash, Resident Inspector, Pileetm Nuclear Power Station, CRP, R!                   !
!
      0. Mcdonald, Project Manager, Prc et Directort te (PD) !-3, 'lRR                       l
Projects (ORP), Region I (RI)
      W. Naymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Pills +.ane Point, ORP, RI                     :
t
      L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector, Indian Point Unit 2. ORP, R!
B. Boger, Assistant Director for Region ! Reactors, NRR
      V. Russell, Regional Maintstrator, R!
l
      C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector, Ptigrim Nucicar Power Station. ORF, RI
5. Collins, Deputy Otrector, ORP, R!
      R. Vesssan, Director, PO I-3, NRR
l
                                                                                            i
L. Doerfietn, Project Engineer, DRP. RI
                                                                                              ,
j
                                                                                          -
W. Little Office of Special Projects, R!!
i
J. Lyash, Resident Inspector, Pileetm Nuclear Power Station, CRP, R!
!
0. Mcdonald, Project Manager, Prc et Directort te (PD) !-3, 'lRR
l
W. Naymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Pills +.ane Point, ORP, RI
:
L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector, Indian Point Unit 2. ORP, R!
V. Russell, Regional Maintstrator, R!
C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector, Ptigrim Nucicar Power Station. ORF, RI
R. Vesssan, Director, PO I-3, NRR
i
,
-


    ,
,
  .
.
      Appendix B - Exit Interview             B-2
Appendix B - Exit Interview
        Attendees
B-2
            Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Attendees
            P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Department of Public Safety
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
            P. Chan, Observer
P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Department of Public Safety
          G. Minor (MHB Technical Associates, Inc.), Observer
P. Chan, Observer
G. Minor (MHB Technical Associates, Inc.), Observer
!
!
I
I
i
i


-     __ _
-
    '
__
_
'
.0
.0
                                        APPENDIX C
APPENDIX C
                                      Persons Contacted
Persons Contacted
        R. Anderson, Plant Manager
R. Anderson, Plant Manager
        R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear
R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear
        F. Famulari, Quality Assurance Department Manager
F. Famulari, Quality Assurance Department Manager
        K. Pi-hfill, Station Director
K. Pi-hfill, Station Director
        E. ! ,tard, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering
E. ! ,tard, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering
        E. Kraft, Plant Support Services Manager
E. Kraft, Plant Support Services Manager
        A. Morisi, Planning and Outage Manager
A. Morisi, Planning and Outage Manager
        R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager
R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager
        S. Sweeney, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
S. Sweeney, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
        In addition, the Team interviewed a large number of managers (including
In addition, the Team interviewed a large number of managers (including
        virtually all section and division managers), engineers, supervisors, and
virtually all section and division managers), engineers, supervisors, and
        craft personnel in each inspection area.
craft personnel in each inspection area.
  .
.
            9
9


O O
O
                                      APPENDIX 0
O
                                  Documents Reviewed
APPENDIX 0
    * PNPS, Nuclear Training Manual, T-001, Parts 3, 4 and 5
Documents Reviewed
    * PNPS,   Special Post-Startup Training Program, Approved August 9, 1988
PNPS, Nuclear Training Manual, T-001, Parts 3, 4 and 5
    * PNPS Technical Specifications
*
    *
PNPS,
      Boston Edison Company Nuclear Mission, Organization and Policy Manual
Special
    * Nuclear Organization Procedures
Post-Startup Training Program, Approved August 9, 1988
    * Material Condition Improvement Action Plan
*
    * Boston Edison Quality Assurance Manual
PNPS Technical Specifications
    *
*
      Audit Reports -- Sampling review it.cluding the following:       87-40, 88-02,
Boston Edison Company Nuclear Mission, Organization and Policy Manual
      87-63, 88-10, 88-20, 87-37, 87-49, 8b-04, and 88-11
*
    *
Nuclear Organization Procedures
      Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) Reports -- Sampling review
*
      including N00 87-88, NED 86-71, GE0 87-255, S0 88-57, SO 88-58, 50 88-48,
Material Condition Improvement Action Plan
      N00 87-02, N00 87-28, NED 88-087, 50 88-59, SO 88-12, N00 88-120,
*
      NED 88-90, 50 88-55, and S0 88-22
Boston Edison Quality Assurance Manual
    a
*
      Management Corrective Action Requests (MCAR's) -- Sampling review includ-
Audit Reports -- Sampling review it.cluding the following:
      ing QA0 85-2, QA0 87-2, 86-06, and 88-02
87-40, 88-02,
    *  Licensee Event Reports (LER's) -- Sampling review including 87-21, 88-008
*
      thru 88-014, 88-016, and 88-017
87-63, 88-10, 88-20, 87-37, 87-49, 8b-04, and 88-11
    *
Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) Reports -- Sampling review
      Maintenance Requests (MR's) -- Sarrpling review including 88-11-6, 88-110,
*
      88-10-179, 88-46-300, 88-14-16, 88-45-183, 88-45-181, 88-46-194, 88-10-26,
including N00 87-88, NED 86-71, GE0 87-255, S0 88-57, SO 88-58, 50 88-48,
      88-10-105,   88-10-69,   88-10-71,   88-1C-80,   88-10-141,   87-10-282, and
N00 87-02, N00 87-28, NED 88-087,
      87-10-283
50 88-59,
    *
SO 88-12, N00 88-120,
      Maintenance Activities / Packages   --
NED 88-90, 50 88-55, and S0 88-22
                                                Sampl i r.g review including 88-3-26,
Management Corrective Action Requests (MCAR's) -- Sampling review includ-
      63-19-109, 88-46-213, 88-10-86, 87-46-173, 88-13-20, 88-46-438, 88-2-12,
a
      86-20-47, 88-45-157, 88-45-176, 88-3-62, 88-63-276, 88-45-190, 88-1-31,
ing QA0 85-2, QA0 87-2, 86-06, and 88-02
      88-14-16, 88-46-194, and 88-10-114
Licensee Event Reports (LER's) -- Sampling review including 87-21, 88-008
    *
*
      Meeting Minutes for ORC Meetings 88-40 through 88-63
thru 88-014, 88-016, and 88-017
    * Failure and Malfunction Report 86-266
Maintenance Requests (MR's) -- Sarrpling review including 88-11-6, 88-110,
    * NEO Procedure 16.03, "Corrective Action Program"
*
88-10-179, 88-46-300, 88-14-16, 88-45-183, 88-45-181, 88-46-194, 88-10-26,
88-10-105,
88-10-69,
88-10-71,
88-1C-80,
88-10-141,
87-10-282,
and
87-10-283
Maintenance Activities / Packages
Sampl i r.g review including 88-3-26,
*
--
63-19-109, 88-46-213, 88-10-86, 87-46-173, 88-13-20, 88-46-438, 88-2-12,
86-20-47, 88-45-157, 88-45-176, 88-3-62, 88-63-276, 88-45-190, 88-1-31,
88-14-16, 88-46-194, and 88-10-114
Meeting Minutes for ORC Meetings 88-40 through 88-63
*
Failure and Malfunction Report 86-266
*
NEO Procedure 16.03, "Corrective Action Program"
*


              _.
_.
    .
.
  .
.
      Appendix 0 - Documents Revir.wed         0-2
Appendix 0 - Documents Revir.wed
        *  QAD Trend Analysis Report for the First Quarter of 1988 - QAD 88-609
0-2
        * PNPS Work Instruction NS-3.2.12, F&MR Trend Analysis
QAD Trend Analysis Report for the First Quarter of 1988 - QAD 88-609
        * Memo from J. Seery to R. Grazio, Appointment of Compliince Division as ORC
*
          Subcommittee, June 23, 1988
PNPS Work Instruction NS-3.2.12, F&MR Trend Analysis
        *  Memo from R. G. Bird to K. L. Highfill, NSRAC Concern from May 24, 1988
*
          NSRAC Meeting - May 27, 1988
Memo from J. Seery to R. Grazio, Appointment of Compliince Division as ORC
      *  Memo from K. L. Highfill to R. G. Bird, Response to NSRAC Action Item
*
          88-04-01 - June 22, 1988
Subcommittee, June 23, 1988
      *  Memo from J. A. Seery to     R. Flannery, OkC Mee*.ing Minutes Distrioution
Memo from R. G. Bird to K. L. Highfill, NSRAC Concern from May 24, 1988
          List     dated May 6, 1988
*
      *  Procedure 1.2.1, Operation Review Committee
NSRAC Meeting - May 27, 1988
      *   Procedure 1.3.24, Failure and Malfunction Reports
Memo from
      *   Procedure 1.3.2.6, Response to Deficiency Reports
K. L. Highfill to R. G. Bird, Response to NSRAC Action Item
      *   Procedure 1.3.4, Procedures
*
      *   Procedure 1.3.33, Operating Experience Review
88-04-01 - June 22, 1988
      *   Procedure 1.3.37, Post Trip Reviews
Memo from J. A. Seery to
      *   Procedure 1.3.33, Plant Performance Monitoring Program
R. Flannery, OkC Mee*.ing Minutes Distrioution
      *   Procedure 1.3.63, Conduct of Critique 5 and Incident Investigations
*
      *   Procedure NOP 83A9, Management Corre   ive Action Process
List
      *   Procedure NOP 83A13, Deficiency Repo.t Process
dated May 6, 1988
      *   Procedure NOP 83A14, Nonconformance Report Process
Procedure 1.2.1, Operation Review Committee
I    *   Procedure NOP 84A1, Surveillance Monitoring Program
*
      *   Procedure NOP 84A11, Annual Independent Review of BECo's Quality Assurance
Procedure 1.3.24, Failure and Malfunction Reports
          Program
*
      *    Procedure N0P 85A1, Nuclear Organization Performance Monitoring and
Procedure 1.3.2.6, Response to Deficiency Reports
          Management Information Program
*
      .    Procedure NOP 88A1, Performance Standards and Evaluation Guidelines for
Procedure 1.3.4, Procedures
          Pilgrim Station
*
Procedure 1.3.33, Operating Experience Review
*
Procedure 1.3.37, Post Trip Reviews
*
Procedure 1.3.33, Plant Performance Monitoring Program
*
Procedure 1.3.63, Conduct of Critique 5 and Incident Investigations
*
Procedure NOP 83A9, Management Corre
ive Action Process
*
Procedure NOP 83A13, Deficiency Repo.t Process
*
Procedure NOP 83A14, Nonconformance Report Process
*
Procedure NOP 84A1, Surveillance Monitoring Program
I
*
Procedure NOP 84A11, Annual Independent Review of BECo's Quality Assurance
*
Program
Procedure N0P 85A1, Nuclear Organization Performance Monitoring and
*
Management Information Program
Procedure NOP 88A1, Performance Standards and Evaluation Guidelines for
.
Pilgrim Station
i
i


    a
a
  .
.
        Appendix 0 - Docurents Reviewed         0-3
Appendix 0 - Docurents Reviewed
        *    Procedure NOP 8305, The Failure and Malfunction Report Process
0-3
        *   Procedure NOP 8401, Operating Experience Review Program
Procedure NOP 8305, The Failure and Malfunction Report Process
        *   Procedure 1.4.5, PNPS Tagging
*
        *   Procedure 1.5.3, Maintenance Requests
Procedure NOP 8401, Operating Experience Review Program
        *   Procedure 1.5,3.1, Maintenance Work Plan
*
        *   Procedure 1.5.7, Energency Maintenance
Procedure 1.4.5, PNPS Tagging
      *   Procedure 3.M.1-30, Post-Work Testing Guidance
*
      *   Procedure SI-MT.1000, Maintenance Section Manual
Procedure 1.5.3, Maintenance Requests
      *   Procedure SI-MT.0501, Post-Work Test Matrices and Guidelines
*
      *   Procedura 3.M.1-11.1, E0 Maintenance Process:   Repair / Replacement
Procedure 1.5,3.1, Maintenance Work Plan
      *   Procedure 3.M.3-1, A5/A6 Buses 4KV Protective Relay Calibration / Functional
*
            Test and Annunciator Verification
Procedure 1.5.7, Energency Maintenance
      *
*
            Procedure 3.M.3-8, Inspection / Troubleshooting Electrical Circuits
Procedure 3.M.1-30, Post-Work Testing Guidance
      *   Procedure TP 88-40, 480 VAC Contactor Testing
*
      *     Procedure TP 88-22, Pre-Operational Test of the New Degraded Voltage
Procedure SI-MT.1000, Maintenance Section Manual
            Relays and Motilfied Load Shedding Logic
*
      *    Procedure PW TMI-1, Post Work Test Matrix and Guidelines, Revision A
Procedure SI-MT.0501, Post-Work Test Matrices and Guidelines
*
Procedura 3.M.1-11.1, E0 Maintenance Process:
Repair / Replacement
*
Procedure 3.M.3-1, A5/A6 Buses 4KV Protective Relay Calibration / Functional
*
Test and Annunciator Verification
Procedure 3.M.3-8, Inspection / Troubleshooting Electrical Circuits
*
Procedure TP 88-40, 480 VAC Contactor Testing
*
Procedure TP 88-22, Pre-Operational Test of the New Degraded Voltage
*
Relays and Motilfied Load Shedding Logic
Procedure PW TMI-1, Post Work Test Matrix and Guidelines, Revision A
*
Procedure
3.M.4-14,
Rotating Equipment inspection, Asambly and Dis-
*
j
j
      *    Procedure  3.M.4-14,  Rotating Equipment inspection, Asambly and Dis-
assembly, Revision 6, dated April 4, 1988
i          assembly, Revision 6, dated April 4, 1988
i
l
l
      *    Procedure 8.Q.3.4, 125/250V DC Motor Control Center Testing and Mainten-
Procedure 8.Q.3.4, 125/250V DC Motor Control Center Testing and Mainten-
            ance
*
      *    Procedure 2.2.85, Fuel Pool Cooling System
ance
      .
Procedure 2.2.85, Fuel Pool Cooling System
            Procedure 3.M.1-15, Vibration Monitoring for Preventive Maintenance and
*
            Balancing, Revision 5, dated June 12, 1938
Procedure 3.M.1-15, Vibration Monitoring for Preventive Maintenance and
.
Balancing, Revision 5, dated June 12, 1938
Procedure 2.2.8, standby AC Power System (Diesel Generators), Revision 20,
*
,
,
      *    Procedure 2.2.8, standby AC Power System (Diesel Generators), Revision 20,
l
l
            dated January 13, 1988
dated January 13, 1988
      *    Procedure ARP, Panel C39, Fuel Pool Cooling System, Revision 0, dated
Procedure ARP, Panel C39, Fuel Pool Cooling System, Revision 0, dated
l         January 30, 1988
*
l
January 30, 1988
l
l
!
!
      *    Procedure 2.2.83, Reactor Cleanup System, Revision 22, dated June 20, 1988
Procedure 2.2.83, Reactor Cleanup System, Revision 22, dated June 20, 1988
*
l
l
l
l


-                             -
-
                .             *
-
                                  Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed         D-4
*
                                  *
.
                                      Fire Watch Computer Listing, dated August 4, 1988
Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed
                                  *
D-4
                                      Fire Protection Maintenance Request Computer Listing, dated August 9, 1988
Fire Watch Computer Listing, dated August 4, 1988
                                  *   Pilgrim   Station   Performance   Indicators,   dated August 10, 1988   and
*
                                      August 17, 1988
Fire Protection Maintenance Request Computer Listing, dated August 9, 1988
                                  *  Procedure 8.8.29, "Inspection of Fire Barriers," Revision 1
*
                                  *   Temporary Modification Log
Pilgrim
                                  *
Station
                                      Temporary Modification Status Report to R. Anderson f rom P. Mastrangelo,
Performance
                                      dated August 4, 1988
Indicators,
                                  *  Procedure 1.5.9, "Temporary Modifications," Revi' ion 12
dated
                                  *   Procedure 1.5.9.1, "Lif ted Leads and Jumpers," Revision 0
August 10, 1988
                                  *   Procedure 1.3.34, "Conduct of Operations"
and
                                *
*
                                      Procedure 2.1.16, "Nuclear Power Plant Operator Tour," Revision 54
August 17, 1988
                                *   Overtime Book
Procedure 8.8.29, "Inspection of Fire Barriers," Revision 1
                                *   Procedure 1.3.67, "Use and Control of Overtime at PNPS"
*
                                *
Temporary Modification Log
                                      Advance Overtime Requests for Week Ending August 6,1988
*
                                *
Temporary Modification Status Report to R. Anderson f rom P. Mastrangelo,
                                      PNPS 1-ERHS-VIII.8-4-0, Turbine Building Shield Wall Design
*
                                *   Confidential Memo #13, to J. P. Jens from K. L. Highfill,               dated
dated August 4, 1988
                                      July 19, 1938, "Training Program for Radiation Protection Manager"
Procedure 1.5.9, "Temporary Modifications," Revi' ion 12
                                *    Procedure 6.1-209, "Radiological Occurrence Reports"
*
                                *   Radiological Work Plan for A and B Recirculation Pump Seal Welds
Procedure 1.5.9.1, "Lif ted Leads and Jumpers," Revision 0
                                *   Procedure 6.1-012, "Access Control to High Radiation Areas"
*
                                *   Selected RP Techrician Training and Qualification Folders, lesson Plan,
Procedure 1.3.34, "Conduct of Operations"
                                      Quizzes and Training Guides
*
                                *    Selected Radiation Work Pernits from March 1988 to August 19S8
Procedure 2.1.16, "Nuclear Power Plant Operator Tour," Revision 54
                                *   Maintendnce Request 87-20-84
*
  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Overtime Book
*
Procedure 1.3.67, "Use and Control of Overtime at PNPS"
*
Advance Overtime Requests for Week Ending August 6,1988
*
PNPS 1-ERHS-VIII.8-4-0, Turbine Building Shield Wall Design
*
Confidential
Memo
#13,
to
J. P. Jens
from
K. L. Highfill,
dated
*
July 19, 1938, "Training Program for Radiation Protection Manager"
Procedure 6.1-209, "Radiological Occurrence Reports"
*
Radiological Work Plan for A and B Recirculation Pump Seal Welds
*
Procedure 6.1-012, "Access Control to High Radiation Areas"
*
Selected RP Techrician Training and Qualification Folders, lesson Plan,
*
Quizzes and Training Guides
Selected Radiation Work Pernits from March 1988 to August 19S8
*
Maintendnce Request 87-20-84
*
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


  _
_
.
.
    Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed           0-5
Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed
      *  Procedure 8.M.2-1.5.3.4, "Primary Containment Isolation Logic Channel Test
0-5
          - Channel 82," Revision 8, dated September 24, 1987
Procedure 8.M.2-1.5.3.4, "Primary Containment Isolation Logic Channel Test
    *    Procedure 8.M.2-1.5.7, "Group I Primary Containment Isolation Valve Test-
*
          ing," Revision 5, dated November 7, 1987
- Channel 82," Revision 8, dated September 24, 1987
    *    Procedure 8.M.2-8.2, "Calibration of ATS Transmitters Rack C2206," Revis-
Procedure 8.M.2-1.5.7, "Group I Primary Containment Isolation Valve Test-
          ion 2, dated June 30, 1988
*
    *    Procedure 8.M.1-32.4, "Analog Trip System - frip Unit Calibration - Cabi-
ing," Revision 5, dated November 7, 1987
          net C2229-82," Revision 5, dated April 4, 1938
Procedure 8.M.2-8.2, "Calibration of ATS Transmitters Rack C2206," Revis-
    *    Procedure 8.M.2-2.10.8.5, "Diesel Generator 'A' Initiation   By Loss of Off-
*
        Site Power Logic," Revision 8, dated November 6, 1987
ion 2, dated June 30, 1988
    *  Procedure 8 M.2-2.10.8. 3,   "Diesel Generator 'A' Initiation By Core Spray
Procedure 8.M.1-32.4, "Analog Trip System - frip Unit Calibration - Cabi-
        logic," Revision 12, dated April 9, 1988
*
    *  Procedure   3.M.3-1,   "AUA6 Buses 4KV Protective     Relay Calibration /
net C2229-82," Revision 5, dated April 4, 1938
        Functional Test     and   Annunciator   Verification," Revision 23,   dated
Procedure 8.M.2-2.10.8.5, "Diesel Generator 'A'
        August 13, 1988
Initiation By Loss of Off-
    *    Procedure 8.M.2-2.6.7, "RCIC Simulated Automatic Actuation," Revision 6,
*
        dated February 5, 1988
Site Power Logic," Revision 8, dated November 6, 1987
    *    Procedure 8.5.5.1, "RCIC Pump Operability and Flow Rate Test at 1000
Procedure 8 M.2-2.10.8. 3,
        psig," Revision 24, dated June 4, 1988
"Diesel Generator 'A'
    *    Procedure 8.M.2-2.10.7, "RCIC Automatic Isolation System Logic," Revi s-
Initiation By Core Spray
        ion 11, dated November 7, 1987
*
    *    Procedure 8.M.2-2.6.1,     "RCIC Steam Line Hi Flow," Revision 13, dated
logic," Revision 12, dated April 9, 1988
        June 9, 1988
Procedure
    *    Procedure   8.M.2-2.6.3,   "RCIC Steam Line Hi Temperature," Revision 12,
3.M.3-1,
        dated July 17, 1987
"AUA6
    *    Procedure 8.M.2-2.64, "RCIC Steam Line Low Pressure," Revision 16 dated
Buses 4KV Protective
        June 20, 1988
Relay Calibration /
    *    Procedure 8.M.1-32.5, "Analog Trip System - Trip Unit Calibration Cabinet
*
        C2233A, Section A," Revision 2, dated December 7, 1987
Functional
    *    Procedure 8.E.11. "Standby Liquid Control System Instrument Calibration,"
Test
        Revision 9, dated September 2, 1987
and
    *    Procedure 8.E.13, "RCIC System Instrument Calibration," Revision 14, dated
Annunciator
        June 26, 1988
Verification,"
Revision 23,
dated
August 13, 1988
Procedure 8.M.2-2.6.7, "RCIC Simulated Automatic Actuation," Revision 6,
*
dated February 5, 1988
Procedure 8.5.5.1,
"RCIC Pump Operability and Flow Rate Test at 1000
*
psig," Revision 24, dated June 4, 1988
Procedure 8.M.2-2.10.7, "RCIC Automatic Isolation System Logic," Revi s-
*
ion 11, dated November 7, 1987
Procedure
8.M.2-2.6.1,
"RCIC Steam Line Hi Flow," Revision 13, dated
*
June 9, 1988
Procedure
8.M.2-2.6.3,
"RCIC Steam Line Hi Temperature," Revision 12,
*
dated July 17, 1987
Procedure 8.M.2-2.64, "RCIC Steam Line Low Pressure," Revision 16 dated
*
June 20, 1988
Procedure 8.M.1-32.5, "Analog Trip System - Trip Unit Calibration Cabinet
*
C2233A, Section A," Revision 2, dated December 7, 1987
Procedure 8.E.11. "Standby Liquid Control System Instrument Calibration,"
*
Revision 9, dated September 2, 1987
Procedure 8.E.13, "RCIC System Instrument Calibration," Revision 14, dated
*
June 26, 1988


                    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  .
.
    Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed                                                     0-6
Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed
0-6
l
l
    *    Procedure 8.4.1, "Standby Liquid Control Pump Operability and Flow Rate
Procedure 8.4.1,
        Test," Revision 19, dated April 9, 1988
"Standby Liquid Control Pump Operability and Flow Rate
    *    Procedure 1.8, "Master Surveillance Tracking Program," Revision 9, dated
*
        August 15, 1988
Test," Revision 19, dated April 9, 1988
    *    Procedure 1.3.36, "Measurement and Test Equipment," Revision 4,                                           dated
Procedure 1.8, "Master Surveillance Tracking Program," Revision 9, dated
        March S', 1988
*
    *    Procedure 8.I.1,                 "Administration of Inservice Pump and Valve Testing,"
August 15, 1988
        Revision 4, dated August 15, 1986
Procedure
    *    Procedure   8.I.3,                 "Inservice Test Analysis and Documentatics Methods,"
1.3.36, "Measurement and Test Equipment," Revision
        Revision 6, dated May 11, 1988
4,
    Orawings
dated
    *    PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 34-9 (Revision E1):                                         Primary Containment
*
        Isolation System
March S',
    *    PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 28-12 (Revision E14):                                         Primary Containment
1988
        Isolation System
Procedure 8.I.1,
"Administration of Inservice Pump and Valve Testing,"
*
Revision 4, dated August 15, 1986
Procedure
8.I.3,
"Inservice Test Analysis and Documentatics Methods,"
*
Revision 6, dated May 11, 1988
Orawings
PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 34-9 (Revision E1):
Primary Containment
*
Isolation System
PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 28-12 (Revision E14):
Primary Containment
*
Isolation System
,NPS Elementary Diagram MIN 36-7 (Sh. 10, Revision E7): Primary Contain-
t
t
    *   ,NPS Elementary Diagram MIN 36-7 (Sh. 10, Revision E7): Primary Contain-
*
        ment Isolation System
ment Isolation System
    *    PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 36-7 (Sh.11, Revision ES): Primary Contain-
PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 36-7 (Sh.11, Revision ES): Primary Contain-
        ment Isolation System
*
    *    PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 41-10 (Revision E2):                                         Primary Containment
ment Isolation System
        Isolation System
PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 41-10 (Revision E2):
    *    PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 38-11 (Revision E2):                                         P rima ry Containment
Primary Containment
        Isolation Sy', tem
*
    *    PNPS Elementary Otagram MIN 35-7 (Revision E4):                                         Primary Containment
Isolation System
        Isolation System
PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 38-11 (Revision E2):
    *    PNPS Elementary Diagram mig 11-11 (Revision Ell):                                     RCIC System
P rima ry Containment
    *   PNPS Elementary Diagram MIG 12-12 (Revision ES):                                     RCIC System
*
    *   PNPS Elementary Diagram mig 14-9 (Revision ES):                                     RCIC System
Isolation Sy', tem
    *   PNPS Elementary Diagram MIG 15-9 (Revision E8):                                     RCIC System
PNPS Elementary Otagram MIN 35-7 (Revision E4):
    *   PNPS Elementary Diagram MIG 16-7 (Revision ES):                                     RCIC System
Primary Containment
    *   PNPS Elementary Diagram MIK 4-11 (Revision E10):                                     Core Spray
*
                                          - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Isolation System
                                                                                                                        __ j
PNPS Elementary Diagram mig 11-11 (Revision Ell):
RCIC System
*
PNPS Elementary Diagram MIG 12-12 (Revision ES):
RCIC System
*
PNPS Elementary Diagram mig 14-9 (Revision ES):
RCIC System
*
PNPS Elementary Diagram MIG 15-9 (Revision E8):
RCIC System
*
PNPS Elementary Diagram MIG 16-7 (Revision ES):
RCIC System
*
PNPS Elementary Diagram MIK 4-11 (Revision E10):
Core Spray
*
- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
__ j


.
.
  Appendix 0 - Dncuments Reviewed       D-7
Appendix 0 - Dncuments Reviewed
  *
D-7
      PNPS Schematic Diagram E-548 (Revision E0): Containment Atmosphere Isola-
PNPS Schematic Diagram E-548 (Revision E0): Containment Atmosphere Isola-
      tion Control
*
  *
tion Control
      PNPS Schematic Diagram E-38 (Revision E6):   4160V System Breakers 152-504
PNPS Schematic Diagram E-38 (Revision E6):
      and 152-604
4160V System Breakers 152-504
  *  PNPS Schematic Diagram E-35 (Revision E3):     4160V Auxiliary Relays and
*
      Miscellaneous Schemes
and 152-604
  *  PNPS Schematic Diagram E-27 (Revision E7): Diesel Generator
PNPS Schematic Diagram E-35 (Revision E3):
  *   PNPS Schematic Diagram E-17 (Revision E7):     Schematic Meter and Relay
4160V Auxiliary Relays and
      Diagram 4160 Volt System
*
  *  PNPS Schematic Diagram M6-22-14 (Sh. 1, Revision Ell):   Diesc1 Generator
Miscellaneous Schemes
      "A" X107A Engine Control
PNPS Schematic Diagram E-27 (Revision E7):
  *
Diesel Generator
      PNPS Relay Setting Drawing E5-200 (Sh. 1, Revision E3): 4160 Volt Switch-
*
      gear Relay Settings
PNPS Schematic Diagram E-17 (Revision E7):
  *  PNPS Relay Setting Drawing E5-200 (Sh. 3, Revision E2): 4160 Volt Switch-
Schematic Meter and Relay
      gear Relay Settings
*
  *
Diagram 4160 Volt System
      PNPS P&ID M245 (Revision E13): RCIC System, Sh. 1
PNPS Schematic Diagram M6-22-14 (Sh. 1, Revision Ell):
  *
Diesc1 Generator
      PNPS P&ID M246 (Revision E10): RCIC System, Sh. 2
*
  *                                 Standby Liquid Control System
"A" X107A Engine Control
      PNPS P&ID M249 (Revision E12):
PNPS Relay Setting Drawing E5-200 (Sh. 1, Revision E3): 4160 Volt Switch-
        .
*
gear Relay Settings
PNPS Relay Setting Drawing E5-200 (Sh. 3, Revision E2): 4160 Volt Switch-
*
gear Relay Settings
PNPS P&ID M245 (Revision E13):
RCIC System, Sh. 1
*
PNPS P&ID M246 (Revision E10):
RCIC System, Sh. 2
*
PNPS P&ID M249 (Revision E12):
Standby Liquid Control System
*
.


  O *
*
                                                                                              r
O
                                                                APPENDIX E
r
                          IATI Composition and Structure
APPENDIX E
      Team Manager                                               Samuel J. Collins
IATI Composition and Structure
      Team Leader                                                 A. Randy Blough
Team Manager
l     Technical Assistant                                         Clay C. Warren
Samuel J. Collins
      Administrative Assistant                                   Mary Jo DiDonato
Team Leader
      Jperations                                                 Lawrence W. Rossbach (Lead)
A. Randy Blough
            Shift Inspectors                                     Lawrence W. Rossbach
l
                                                                  William J. Raymond
Technical Assistant
                                                                  Loren R. Plisco
Clay C. Warren
                                                                  Lawrence T. Doerflein
Administrative Assistant
                                                                  F,ancis M. Akstulewicz
Mary Jo DiDonato
I     Radiological Controls                                       Thomas F. Dragoun
Jperations
      Maintenance                                                 Jeffrey J. Lyash
Lawrence W. Rossbach (Lead)
                                                                  William J. Raymond         e
Shift Inspectors
      Surveillance                                               Lawrence T. Doerflein
Lawrence W. Rossbach
      Security                                                   Gregory C. Smith
William J. Raymond
      Fire Protection                                             Lawrence W. Roseh..n
Loren R. Plisco
      Assurance of Quality                                       Loren R. P11sco
Lawrence T. Doerflein
                                                                  Francis M. Akstulewicz
F,ancis M. Akstulewicz
      Training and Management                                     Daniel G. Mcdonald
I
        Effectiveness                                             Michele G. Evans
Radiological Controls
      Report Coordinator                                         Tae K. Kim
Thomas F. Dragoun
      Commonwealth of                                             Steven C. Sholly
Maintenance
        Massachusetts (Observers)                                 Pamela M. Chan
Jeffrey J. Lyash
                              - - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
William J. Raymond
e
Surveillance
Lawrence T. Doerflein
Security
Gregory C. Smith
Fire Protection
Lawrence W. Roseh..n
Assurance of Quality
Loren R. P11sco
Francis M. Akstulewicz
Training and Management
Daniel G. Mcdonald
Effectiveness
Michele G. Evans
Report Coordinator
Tae K. Kim
Commonwealth of
Steven C. Sholly
Massachusetts (Observers)
Pamela M. Chan
- - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _


                                                                          _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
. *
*
                                  APPENDIX F
.
              NRC Integraced Assessment Team Inspection (IATI)
APPENDIX F
                                Members Resumes
NRC Integraced Assessment Team Inspection (IATI)
    This appendix shows IATI summary resumes of the team members and Common-
Members Resumes
    wealth of Massachusetts observers.       The resumes outline the nuclear
This appendix shows IATI summary resumes of the team members and Common-
    experience of team members.
wealth of Massachusetts observers.
      .
The resumes outline the nuclear
                                            9
experience of team members.
.
9


                                                                                .
.
  .
.
    Appendix F                           F-2
Appendix F
    NAME:         FPANCIS M. AKSTULEWICZ
F-2
    ORGANIZATION:   United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NAME:
                    Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
FPANCIS M. AKSTULEWICZ
                    Policy Development and Technical Support Branch
ORGANIZATION:
    TITLE:         Senior Technical Assistant
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    EDUCATION:     B.S., Nuclear Engineering
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
    EXPERIENCE:     Fourteen Years of Nuclear Experience as Follows:
Policy Development and Technical Support Branch
                    Two and Goe-Half Years - Shielding Engineer - Bechtel Power
TITLE:
                    Corporation
Senior Technical Assistant
                    One Year - Technical Analyst - Office of Material Safety
EDUCATION:
                    and Safeguards (f.'RC)
B.S., Nuclear Engineering
                    Eight Years - Nuclear Engineer - Office of Nuclear Reactor
EXPERIENCE:
                    Regulation (NRC)
Fourteen Years of Nuclear Experience as Follows:
                    Two Years - Project Manager - Haddam Neck Plant, Office of
Two and Goe-Half Years - Shielding Engineer - Bechtel Power
                    Nuclear Reactor Reg Jlation (NRC)
Corporation
                    One-Half Year - Present Position
One Year - Technical Analyst - Office of Material Safety
    SPECIAL
and Safeguards (f.'RC)
    QUALIFICATIONS: Completion of NRC Fundamental and Advanced BWR Systems
Eight Years - Nuclear Engineer - Office of Nuclear Reactor
                    Training Course and BWR Simulator Course
Regulation (NRC)
    SPECIAL
Two Years - Project Manager - Haddam Neck Plant, Office of
    ASSIGNMENTS:   Member of Fire Protection, Health Physics and Diagnostic
Nuclear Reactor Reg Jlation (NRC)
                    Team Inspection at Haddam Neck
One-Half Year - Present Position
SPECIAL
QUALIFICATIONS:
Completion of NRC Fundamental and Advanced BWR Systems
Training Course and BWR Simulator Course
SPECIAL
ASSIGNMENTS:
Member of Fire Protection, Health Physics and Diagnostic
Team Inspection at Haddam Neck
;
;
I
I
Line 6,793: Line 10,238:
L
L


. o
o
    Appendix F                             F-3
.
    NAME:           A. RANDOLPH BLOUGH
Appendix F
    ORGANIZATION:   United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
F-3
                    Division of Reactor Projects
NAME:
    TITLE:         Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3B
A. RANDOLPH BLOUGH
    EDUCATION:     B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, 1973 (Graduated with Honors)
ORGANIZATION:
                    Navy Nuclear Engineer Officer Course, 1977
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
                    NRC I,3pector Technical Training Program, 1980
Division of Reactor Projects
                    Various technical and management courses in USN and USNRC,
TITLE:
                    such as QA, Reactor Engineering, Reactor Safety, Supervis-
Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3B
                    ing Human Resources, EEO, Management Workshops
EDUCATION:
    EXPERIENCE:     Fifteen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
B.S.,
    1985-Present   United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) --
U.S.
                    Reactor Projects Section Chief.     Manage s <fety inspection
Naval Academy, 1973 (Graduated with Honors)
                    programs for three commercial reactor fac)'ities.       Super-
Navy Nuclear Engineer Officer Course, 1977
                    vise nine nuclear engineers. Provide formal assessments of
NRC I,3pector Technical Training Program, 1980
                    utility management effectiveness and safety performance.
Various technical and management courses in USN and USNRC,
    1982-1985       USNRC -- Senior Resident Inspector at operations phase and
such as QA, Reactor Engineering, Reactor Safety, Supervis-
                    preoperational phase nuclear power plants. Planned, super-
ing Human Resources, EEO, Management Workshops
                    vised, and performed inspections of management controls and
EXPERIENCE:
                    activities     important to nuclear safety.       Coordinated
Fifteen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
                    specialist inspector efforts. Formally reported findings
1985-Present
                    and recommended appropriate enforcement.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
    1972-1982       USNRC -- Resident Inspector. Planned, performed, and docu-
--
                    mented inspections of all functional areas at a dual-unit
Reactor Projects Section Chief.
                    operating reactor site.
Manage s <fety inspection
    1973-1979       U.   S. Navy Nuclear Power Program.   Duties included super-
programs for three commercial reactor fac)'ities.
                    visory positions in nuclear plant operations, maintenance
Super-
                    and training. Performed audits and coordinated plant self-
vise nine nuclear engineers. Provide formal assessments of
                    assessment.     Was   responsible for a   complex,   in-plant
utility management effectiveness and safety performance.
                    nuclear training program for up to 300 students. Shipboard
1982-1985
                    duties included Main Propulsion Assistant: responsible for
USNRC -- Senior Resident Inspector at operations phase and
                    all reactor and main propulsion systems, all radiological
preoperational phase nuclear power plants. Planned, super-
                    controls and plant chemistry.     Collateral duties included
vised, and performed inspections of management controls and
                    9A Of ficer, and Nuclear Weapons Safety / Security Officer.
activities
    SPECIAL
important
    QUALIFICATIONS: Qualified BWR Inspector, NRC Region I,1980
to
                    Qualified Nuclear Engineer Officer, Naval Reactors, 1977
nuclear
    SPECIAL
safety.
    ASSIGNMENTS:   Team Lesder, NRC Integrated Performance Assessnment Team
Coordinated
                    Inspection, Oyster Creek, 1987
specialist inspector efforts.
                    Team Leader, NRC Team Inspection of Oyster Creek Contain-
Formally reported findings
                    ment Vacuum Breakers Event, 1987
and recommended appropriate enforcement.
                    Participated in various other plant readiness inspections,
1972-1982
                    1984-1985
USNRC -- Resident Inspector. Planned, performed, and docu-
                                    . - _                     -_
mented inspections of all functional areas at a dual-unit
operating reactor site.
1973-1979
U.
S. Navy Nuclear Power Program.
Duties included super-
visory positions in nuclear plant operations, maintenance
and training. Performed audits and coordinated plant self-
assessment.
Was
responsible
for a
complex,
in-plant
nuclear training program for up to 300 students. Shipboard
duties included Main Propulsion Assistant: responsible for
all reactor and main propulsion systems, all radiological
controls and plant chemistry.
Collateral duties included
9A Of ficer, and Nuclear Weapons Safety / Security Officer.
SPECIAL
QUALIFICATIONS:
Qualified BWR Inspector, NRC Region I,1980
Qualified Nuclear Engineer Officer, Naval Reactors, 1977
SPECIAL
ASSIGNMENTS:
Team Lesder, NRC Integrated Performance Assessnment Team
Inspection, Oyster Creek, 1987
Team Leader, NRC Team Inspection of Oyster Creek Contain-
ment Vacuum Breakers Event, 1987
Participated in various other plant readiness inspections,
1984-1985
. - _
-_


  *
{
*
.
.
                                                                                  {
Appendix F
                                                                                  l
F-4
                                                                                  !
NAME:
                                                                                  l
PAMELA M. CHAN
    Appendix F                           F-4                                     l
ORGANIZATION:
                                                                                  1
Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting Council (Since 12/87)
    NAME:           PAMELA M. CHAN
TITLE:
    ORGANIZATION:   Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting Council (Since 12/87)
Engineer / Utility Analyst
    TITLE:         Engineer / Utility Analyst
EDUCATION:
    EDUCATION:     B.S. M.E. Pennsylvania State University
B.S. M.E. Pennsylvania State University
    EXPERIENCE:     Five Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
EXPERIENCE:
    1987           United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III,
Five Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
                    Reactor Inspector
1987
    1985-1987       Nuclear Power Services - Construction
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III,
    1984-1985       Combustion Engineering     -
Reactor Inspector
                                                Nuclear Systems Services; Field
1985-1987
                    Service Engineer
Nuclear Power Services - Construction
    1982-1984       Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation - Power Division
1984-1985
                    System Engineer - Turbine Plant Systems
Combustion Engineering
    SPECIAL
Nuclear Systems Services; Field
    QUALIFICATIONS: Background in Maintenance and Quality Assurance
-
    SPECIAL
Service Engineer
    ASSIGNMENTS:   Participated in several team inspections while at NRC
1982-1984
                    Region III
Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation - Power Division
                                                                                l
System Engineer - Turbine Plant Systems
SPECIAL
QUALIFICATIONS:
Background in Maintenance and Quality Assurance
SPECIAL
ASSIGNMENTS:
Participated in several team inspections while at NRC
Region III
l


  .                                                                            1
1
.
.
    Appendix F                           F-5
.
    NAME:           SAMUEL J. COLLINS
Appendix F
    ORGANIZATION:   United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I
F-5
                    bivision of Reactor Projects
NAME:
    TITLE:         Deputy Director
SAMUEL J. COLLINS
    EDUCATION:     Bachelor of Science, Maine Maritime Academy
ORGANIZATION:
                  Business Program, Southern Vermont College
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I
    EXPERIENCE:   Seventeen Years Nuclear Experience in Design, Construction,
bivision of Reactor Projects
                  Operations, Inspection and Management as Follows:
TITLE:
    1987 - Present Deputy Director:   Division of Reactor Projects, USNRC,
Deputy Director
                  Region I
EDUCATION:
    1986 - 1987   Deputy Director (Detail):     Division of Reactor Projects,
Bachelor of Science, Maine Maritime Academy
                  USNRC, Region I
Business Program, Southern Vermont College
                  As a member of the Senior Executive Service, responsible
EXPERIENCE:
                  for division management; the conduct of inspections and
Seventeen Years Nuclear Experience in Design, Construction,
                  evaluations of assigned NRC programs for all power and
Operations, Inspection and Management as Follows:
                  non power reactors within Region I.
1987 - Present
    1985 - 1986   Branch Chief:   Ret.ctor Projects Branch No. 2. USNRC,
Deputy Director:
                  Region I
Division of Reactor Projects, USNRC,
                  Responsible for project management, staffing and budget
Region I
                  considerations, including irspectionr, implementation of
1986 - 1987
                  SAlp, resident inspection and enforcement for eleven
Deputy Director (Detail):
                  assigned power reactor sites in operation and under
Division of Reactor Projects,
                  construction.
USNRC, Region I
    1984 - 1985   Section Chief:   Reactor Projects Section No. 2C, USNRC,
As a member of the Senior Executive Service, responsible
                  Region I
for division management; the conduct of inspections and
                  Responsible for implementation of the routine and reactive
evaluations of assigned NRC programs for all power and
                  inspection program at six assigned power reactors during
non power reactors within Region I.
                  new cunstruction, testing and cperation.
1985 - 1986
    1983 - 1934   Senior Resident Inspector: Operations, Yankee Nuclear
Branch Chief:
                  Power Station, ORP, USNRC, Region I
Ret.ctor Projects Branch No. 2. USNRC,
                  Supervised; inspection and event response program at opera-
Region I
                  ting Wastinghouse PWR power reactor facility.
Responsible for project management, staffing and budget
    1930 -1933     Pesident Reactor Inspector: Operations, Vereont Yankee
considerations, including irspectionr, implementation of
                  Nuclear Power Station, DRP, USNRC, Region :.     Field
SAlp, resident inspection and enforcement for eleven
                  inspector at oper. ting Geners' Electric BWR power reactor
assigned power reactor sites in operation and under
            ,
construction.
                  facility.
1984 - 1985
Section Chief:
Reactor Projects Section No. 2C, USNRC,
Region I
Responsible for implementation of the routine and reactive
inspection program at six assigned power reactors during
new cunstruction, testing and cperation.
1983 - 1934
Senior Resident Inspector: Operations, Yankee Nuclear
Power Station, ORP, USNRC, Region I
Supervised; inspection and event response program at opera-
ting Wastinghouse PWR power reactor facility.
1930 -1933
Pesident Reactor Inspector: Operations, Vereont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station, DRP, USNRC, Region :.
Field
inspector at oper. ting Geners' Electric BWR power reactor
,
facility.


. *
*
    Appendix F - Samuel J. Collins           F-6               ,
.
    Private Industry:
Appendix F - Samuel J. Collins
    1971 - 1980       Tenneco Corporation, Newport News Shipbuilding.   Various
F-6
                        positions as contractor to U.S. Navy Nuclear Program
,
                        including:
Private Industry:
                        Project Manager - S5W Steam Generator Chemical Cleaning
1971 - 1980
                        Project
Tenneco Corporation, Newport News Shipbuilding.
                      Chief Test Engineer - Chairman and NNS representative to
Various
                      Joint Test Group for 55W overhaul and construction
positions as contractor to U.S. Navy Nuclear Program
                      Shif t Test Engineer - Shif t supervisor for reactor overhaul
including:
                      and refueling
Project Manager - S5W Steam Generator Chemical Cleaning
                      Shift Test Engineer - Shift supervisor for reactor new
Project
                      construction
Chief Test Engineer - Chairman and NNS representative to
                      Mechanica   Test Engineer - Shift mechanical test for reac-
Joint Test Group for 55W overhaul and construction
                      tor new construction
Shif t Test Engineer - Shif t supervisor for reactor overhaul
                      Reactor Design Engineer - Design support for reactor new
and refueling
                      construction
Shift Test Engineer - Shift supervisor for reactor new
    SPECIAL
construction
    QUALIFICATIONS:   Senior Executive Service Candidate Development Program,
Mechanica
                      USNRC, 1986 - 1987
Test Engineer - Shift mechanical test for reac-
                      Qualified SWR Resident Inspector
tor new construction
                      Qualified PWR Resident Inspector
Reactor Design Engineer - Design support for reactor new
                      Qualified 55W Shif t Test tingineer
construction
                      Third Engineer License, USCG
SPECIAL
    SPECIAL
QUALIFICATIONS:
    ASSIGNMENTS:       1988 - Team Manager, Pilgrim Integrated Assessment Restart
Senior Executive Service Candidate Development Program,
                      Team Inspection
USNRC, 1986 - 1987
                      1987 - 1988 - Chairman, Pilgrim Restart Assessment Panel
Qualified SWR Resident Inspector
                      1987 - 1988 - Region I Representative, NRC Training Ad-
Qualified PWR Resident Inspector
                      visory Group
Qualified 55W Shif t Test tingineer
                      1937 - Chairman, Differing Professional Opinion Peer Review
Third Engineer License, USCG
                      Group
SPECIAL
                      1987 - Chairman, Comanche Peak Task Force Review Group
ASSIGNMENTS:
                      1986 - Team Leader, Nine Mile Point 1 and 2 Diagnostic Team
1988 - Team Manager, Pilgrim Integrated Assessment Restart
                      Inspection
Team Inspection
                      1985 - Team Leader, Pes:h Bottom 2 and ? 11 agnostic Team
1987 - 1988 - Chairman, Pilgrim Restart Assessment Panel
                      Inspection
1987 - 1988 - Region I Representative, NRC Training Ad-
visory Group
1937 - Chairman, Differing Professional Opinion Peer Review
Group
1987 - Chairman, Comanche Peak Task Force Review Group
1986 - Team Leader, Nine Mile Point 1 and 2 Diagnostic Team
Inspection
1985 - Team Leader, Pes:h Bottom 2 and ? 11 agnostic Team
Inspection


    - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
  e                         *
*
                              Appendix F                                 F-7
e
                              NAME:               LAWRENCE T. DOERFLEIN
Appendix F
                              ORGANIZATION:       United !tates Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
F-7
                                                  Division of Reactor Projects
NAME:
                              TITLE:               Project Engineer
LAWRENCE T. DOERFLEIN
                              EDUCATION:           BS Electrical Engineering
ORGANIZATION:
                                                  US Naval Academy, 1973
United !tates Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
                              EXPERIENCE:         Fifteen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
Division of Reactor Projects
                              Aug. 1985-Present   Project Engineer
TITLE:
                              Oct. 1993-July 1935 Senior Resident Inspector, FitzPatrick huclear Power Plant
Project Engineer
                              Nov. 1980-0ct. 1980 Resident Inspector, FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
EDUCATION:
                              June 1973-Oct. 1980 US Navy
BS Electrical Engineering
                              SPECIAL
US Naval Academy, 1973
                              QUALIFICATIONS:     Certified NRC SWR Inspector
EXPERIENCE:
                                                  Qualified Chief Naval Nuclear Engineer
Fifteen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
                              SPECIAL
Aug. 1985-Present
                              ASSIGNMENTS:         Limerick Readiness Assessment Team
Project Engineer
                                                  Pilgrim Augmented Inspection Team
Oct. 1993-July 1935 Senior Resident Inspector, FitzPatrick huclear Power Plant
Nov. 1980-0ct. 1980 Resident Inspector, FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
June 1973-Oct. 1980 US Navy
SPECIAL
QUALIFICATIONS:
Certified NRC SWR Inspector
Qualified Chief Naval Nuclear Engineer
SPECIAL
ASSIGNMENTS:
Limerick Readiness Assessment Team
Pilgrim Augmented Inspection Team
:
:
                                                                                                                                  I
I
                                                                                                                                  t
t
                                                                                                                                  -
-
  .
.
                                                                                                                                  l
l
                                                                                                                                  l
l
                                                                                                                                  I
I
                                                                                                                                  I
I
                                                                  __ .           . _ __
__ .
                                                                                          _ _
. _ __
                                                                                              - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
                                                                                                                ._ _____ _ __ . ..
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
._ _____ _ __ .
..
_


  . *
*
      Appendix F                           F-8
.
      NAME:         THOMAS F. DRAGOUN
Appendix F
      ORGANIZATION: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
F-8
                    Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
NAME:
      TITLE:         Senior Radiation Specialist
THOMAS F. DRAGOUN
      EDUCATION:     Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Union College
ORGANIZATION:
                    000 Staf f College, Battle Creek, Michigan
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
      EXPERIENCE:   Twenty-Three Years of Nuclear Experience as Follows:
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
      1983-Present NRC - Senior Radiation Specialist
TITLE:
      1983-1969     General Electric Company, which included the following:
Senior Radiation Specialist
                    -
EDUCATION:
                          Qualified as Operations Engineer and E00W at Navy
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Union College
                          Prototype (3 Years)
000 Staf f College, Battle Creek, Michigan
                    -
EXPERIENCE:
                          Senior Engineer on Trident Prototype Construction
Twenty-Three Years of Nuclear Experience as Follows:
                          Project (0 Years)
1983-Present
                    -
NRC - Senior Radiation Specialist
                          Health Physicist responsible for service work, both
1983-1969
                          domestic and foreign by Large Steam Turbine Division
General Electric Company, which included the following:
                          (6 Years)
Qualified as Operations Engineer and E00W at Navy
      1955-1969     Cornell University - Taught Radiation Protection Subjects
-
Prototype (3 Years)
Senior Engineer on Trident Prototype Construction
-
Project (0 Years)
Health Physicist responsible for service work, both
-
domestic and foreign by Large Steam Turbine Division
(6 Years)
1955-1969
Cornell University - Taught Radiation Protection Subjects
:
:
i
i
4
4


                                                                                    _ _.
_ _.
  . o
o
      Appendix F                               F-9
.
      NAME:               MICHELE G. EVANS
Appendix F
      ORGANIZAfl0'd:     United Sta#ies H<i.itar Regulatory Commission, Region I
F-9
                          Division of Reactor Safety
NAME:
      TITLE:             Operations Enciseor
MICHELE G. EVANS
      EDUCATION:         B.S., Cr/mi as Eno'lecring, University Jf Pennsylvania
ORGANIZAfl0'd:
      EXPERIENCE:         Four Years of Nuslear ;perieace as r ollows:
United Sta#ies H<i.itar Regulatory Commission, Region I
      Aug 1987-Present   Operations Enginter, Eoiling Water Rasctor Section - Con-
Division of Reactor Safety
                        duct review and inspection o# Power Ascension Programs at
TITLE:
                        Pilgrim and Nine Mile Point 2. Currently in training tn
Operations Enciseor
                        qualify as BWR Operator Licensing Examiner
EDUCATION:
      July 1934-Aug 1937 Reactor Engineer, Test Programs Section - Conducted review
B.S., Cr/mi as Eno'lecring, University Jf Pennsylvania
                        and ii:spection of preoperational test programs at Hope
EXPERIENCE:
                        Cre2k ar.d Nine Mile Point 2, and Startup Testing Programs
Four Years of Nuslear ;perieace as
                        at Limerick 1, Shoreham, Pope Creek and Nine Mile Point 2.
r llows:
      SPECIAL
o
      QUALIFICATICNS:   USNRC Certified BWR Inspector
Aug 1987-Present
                        Engineer in Training (State of Pennsylvania)
Operations Enginter, Eoiling Water Rasctor Section - Con-
      SPECIAL
duct review and inspection o# Power Ascension Programs at
      ASSIGNMENTS:       Currently participating in the Women's Executive Leadership
Pilgrim and Nine Mile Point 2.
                        Program for Management Development
Currently in training tn
qualify as BWR Operator Licensing Examiner
July 1934-Aug 1937 Reactor Engineer, Test Programs Section - Conducted review
and ii:spection of preoperational test programs at Hope
Cre2k ar.d Nine Mile Point 2, and Startup Testing Programs
at Limerick 1, Shoreham, Pope Creek and Nine Mile Point 2.
SPECIAL
QUALIFICATICNS:
USNRC Certified BWR Inspector
Engineer in Training (State of Pennsylvania)
SPECIAL
ASSIGNMENTS:
Currently participating in the Women's Executive Leadership
Program for Management Development
,
,


                                                                            . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _
. *
*
    Appendix F                           F-10
.
    NAME:           JEFFREY J. LYASH
Appendix F
    ORGANIZATION:   United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
F-10
                    Division of Reactor Projects
NAME:
    TITLE:         Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
JEFFREY J. LYASH
    EDUCATION:     B.S. , Mechanical Engineering, Orexel University
ORGANIZATION:
    EXPERIENCE:     Six Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
                    Two and One-Half Years - NRC Resident Inspector - Pilgrim
Division of Reactor Projects
                    Nuclear Power Station
TITLE:
                    One Year - NRC Resident Inspector - Hope Creek Generating
Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
                    Station
EDUCATION:
                    One Year - NRC Reactor Engineer - Region I
B.S. , Mechanical Engineering, Orexel University
                    One and One-Half Years - Pennsylvania Power and Light
EXPERIENCE:
                    Company - Test Engineer - Susquehanna Steam Electric
Six Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
                    Station
Two and One-Half Years - NRC Resident Inspector - Pilgrim
    SPECIAL
Nuclear Power Station
    QUALIFICATIONS: Meritorious Service Award as NRC Resident Inspector of the
One Year - NRC Resident Inspector - Hope Creek Generating
                    Year 1987-1988
Station
One Year - NRC Reactor Engineer - Region I
One and One-Half Years - Pennsylvania Power and Light
Company - Test Engineer - Susquehanna Steam Electric
Station
SPECIAL
QUALIFICATIONS:
Meritorious Service Award as NRC Resident Inspector of the
Year 1987-1988


.
.
  , *
*
      Appendix F                             F-11
,
      NAME:           DANIEL G. M 00NALD, JR.
Appendix F
      ORGANIZATION:   United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
F-11
                      Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NAME:
      TITLE:           Senior Project Manager
DANIEL G. M 00NALD, JR.
      EDUCATION:       B.S., Management, Shenandoah College
ORGANIZATION:
                      A.A., Engineering, Solano College
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
      EXPERIENCE:     Thirty-One Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
      1982-Present     Senior Project Manager - Manage and coordinite all NRC
TITLE:
                      licensing functions on assigned operating reactor facil-
Senior Project Manager
                      ities which have difficulties or complexities with manage-
EDUCATION:
                      ment and operation.     (NRC)
B.S., Management, Shenandoah College
      1982 (3 Months) Reactor Engineer (Instrumentation) - Technical evaluations
A.A., Engineering, Solano College
                      of instrumentation and control systems or licensee appli-
EXPERIENCE:
                      cations and operating reactor modifications. Assist in
Thirty-One Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
                      developing regulatory requirements and establishing staff
1982-Present
                      policy. (NRC)
Senior Project Manager - Manage and coordinite all NRC
      1980-1932       Staff Member - Conduct, direct and coordinate assessments
licensing functions on assigned operating reactor facil-
                      of critical technologies in the context of national secur-
ities which have difficulties or complexities with manage-
                      ity.   Provide technical support to the Nuclear Regulatory
ment and operation.
                      Commission.     (Los Alamos National Laboratory)
(NRC)
      1979-1980       Reactor Inspector (Electrical) - Inspects reactors under
1982 (3 Months)
                      construction and in operation.     (NRC)
Reactor Engineer (Instrumentation) - Technical evaluations
      1978-1979       Senior Electrical Engineer - Technical evaluations of
of instrumentation and control systems or licensee appli-
                      electrical, instrumentation and control systems. Assist in
cations and operating reactor modifications. Assist in
                      developing staff policy. (NRC)
developing regulatory requirements and establishing staff
      1973-1978       Reactor Engineer (Instrumentation) - Technical evaluation
policy.
                      for license applications and operating reactors. (NRC)
(NRC)
      1966-1973       Senior Technical Associate - Field engineer in nuclear
1980-1932
                      weapons test programs.     (Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
Staff Member - Conduct, direct and coordinate assessments
                      (LLL))                                                     >
of critical technologies in the context of national secur-
      1964-1966       Senior Electronic Engineering Coordinator - Design of con-
ity.
                      trol, interlock and instrumentation systems for critical
Provide technical support to the Nuclear Regulatory
                      assembly machines, test reactors and containment vaults.
Commission.
                      (LLL)
(Los Alamos National Laboratory)
      1960-1964       Electronics Designer - Design of cormunication, personnel
1979-1980
                      warning, closed circu t TV and radiation monitoring
Reactor Inspector (Electrical) - Inspects reactors under
                                              i
construction and in operation.
                      systems.   (LLL)
(NRC)
1978-1979
Senior Electrical Engineer - Technical evaluations of
electrical, instrumentation and control systems. Assist in
developing staff policy.
(NRC)
1973-1978
Reactor Engineer (Instrumentation) - Technical evaluation
for license applications and operating reactors.
(NRC)
1966-1973
Senior Technical Associate - Field engineer in nuclear
weapons test programs.
(Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
(LLL))
>
1964-1966
Senior Electronic Engineering Coordinator - Design of con-
trol, interlock and instrumentation systems for critical
assembly machines, test reactors and containment vaults.
(LLL)
1960-1964
Electronics Designer - Design of cormunication, personnel
warning, closed circu t TV and radiation monitoring
i
systems.
(LLL)


  , .
.
      Appendix F - Daniel G. McDona'.d Jr.     F-12
,
      1957-1960           Senior Electronic Technician - Fabricated and assisted in
Appendix F - Daniel G. McDona'.d Jr.
                          the design and development of prototype electrical and
F-12
                          electronics equipment. (LLL)
1957-1960
      1953-1957           Electrical Specialist - Four year apprenticeship with
Senior Electronic Technician - Fabricated and assisted in
                          Department of Navy.   (Mare Island Shipyard)
the design and development of prototype electrical and
electronics equipment.
(LLL)
1953-1957
Electrical Specialist - Four year apprenticeship with
Department of Navy.
(Mare Island Shipyard)
1
1
l
l
1
1
                                                                              . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. .
.
.


        _ ______         _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .                     _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ ______
    .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
      s
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                Appendix F                                                                                                                                 F 13
s
                NAME:                                                                           LOREN R. PLISCO
.
                ORGANIZATION:                                                                   United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Appendix F
                                                                                                Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
F 13
                                                                                                Division of Licensee Performance and Quality Evaluation
NAME:
                TITLE:                                                                         Senior Operations Engineer
LOREN R. PLISCO
                EDUCATION:                                                                     B.S., Systems Engineering, U.S. Naval Academy
ORGANIZATION:
                EXPERIENCE:                                                                     Eleven Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                1937-1988                                                                       Senior Operations Engineer, NRC:NRR
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
                1936-1987                                                                       Senior Resident Inspector - Susq;ehanna Steam Electric
Division of Licensee Performance and Quality Evaluation
                                                                                                Station                                                                                   -
TITLE:
                1983-1986                                                                     Resident Inspector - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station
Senior Operations Engineer
                1932-1983                                                                     Reactor Engineer, Region I
EDUCATION:
                197/-1982                                                                     '.'S Navy Nuclear Power Program
B.S., Systems Engineering, U.S. Naval Academy
              SPECIAL
EXPERIENCE:
              QUALIFICATIONS:                                                                   Certified NRC BWR Inspector                                                                 '
Eleven Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
                                                                                                Qualified Naval Nuclear Engineer Officer
1937-1988
              SPECIAL
Senior Operations Engineer, NRC:NRR
            ASSIGNMENTS:                                                                       Susquehanna 2 - Operational Readiness Assessment Team
1936-1987
                                                                                                Inspection
Senior Resident Inspector - Susq;ehanna Steam Electric
                                                                                                Limerick 1 - Operational Readiness Asssessment Team Inspec-
Station
                                                                                                tion
-
                                                                                                                                                                                            i
1983-1986
                                                                                                Hope Creek - Operational Readiness Assessment Team Inspec-
Resident Inspector - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station
                                                                                                tion                                                                                       i
1932-1983
                                                                                                                                                                                            1
Reactor Engineer, Region I
                                                                                                Salt.m - ATWS Inspection
197/-1982
                                                                                                THI-1 - Management Integrity Inspection
'.'S Navy Nuclear Power Program
                                                                                                                                                                                            i
SPECIAL
I                                                                                                                                                                                          {
QUALIFICATIONS:
                                                                                                                                                                                            I
Certified NRC BWR Inspector
  ,
'
1                                                                                                                                                                                          i
Qualified Naval Nuclear Engineer Officer
  l                                                                                                                                                                                        l
SPECIAL
ASSIGNMENTS:
Susquehanna 2 - Operational Readiness Assessment Team
Inspection
Limerick 1 - Operational Readiness Asssessment Team Inspec-
tion
i
Hope Creek - Operational Readiness Assessment Team Inspec-
tion
i
1
1
i                                                                                                                                                                                          i
Salt.m - ATWS Inspection
                                                                                                                                                                                            !
THI-1 - Management Integrity Inspection
                                                                                                                                                                                            (
i
!                                                                                                                                                                                          l
I
{
I
,
,
4
1
i
l
l
1
i
i
!
(
!
l
,
4
. . .
- .


r -
r -
  , *
*
        Appendix F                           F-14
,
        NAME:         WILLIAM J. RAYMOND
Appendix F
      ORGANIZATION:   United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
F-14
                      Division of Reactor Projects
NAME:
        TITLE:         Senior Resident Inspector - Millstone Nuclear Power Station
WILLIAM J. RAYMOND
        EDUCATION:     B.S. Physics
ORGANIZATION:
                      M.S. Nuclear Science and Engineering
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
      EXPERIENCE:     Eighteen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
Division of Reactor Projects
        1975-1988     NRC Reactor Operations Inspector
TITLE:
                      -
Senior Resident Inspector - Millstone Nuclear Power Station
                              SU&T, Core Physics, Refueling, Pre & SU&T for BV, CC1,
EDUCATION:
                              IP3, MP2
B.S. Physics
                      -
M.S. Nuclear Science and Engineering
                            Project Inspector - Beaver Valley, Ginna and Susque-
EXPERIENCE:
                            hanna
Eighteen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
                      -
1975-1988
                            TMI Recovery Team - Accident Response and Containment
NRC Reactor Operations Inspector
                            Entry
SU&T, Core Physics, Refueling, Pre & SU&T for BV, CC1,
                      -
-
                            Senior Resident Inspector - Vermont Yankee and Mill-
IP3, MP2
                              stone
Project Inspector - Beaver Valley, Ginna and Susque-
      1972-1975       Startup Engineer, Babcock & Wilcox, Oconee 1 and 2 and
-
                      Three Mile Island, Unit 1
hanna
      1970-1972       Reactor Operator, VP1 Research Reactor
TMI Recovery Team - Accident Response and Containment
      SPECIAL
-
      QUALIFICATIONS: VPI Reactor Operator License
Entry
                      Certified NRC Licensed Operator Examiner - 1986
Senior Resident Inspector - Vermont Yankee and Mill-
      SPECIAL
-
      ASSIGNMENTS:   IAEA Assist Visit to Brazil CNEN - 1981
stone
                      Team Leadar Salem ATWS Event - NRC Fact Finding - 1983
1972-1975
                      Salem ATWS Generic Issue Review Team - 1983
Startup Engineer, Babcock & Wilcox, Oconee 1 and 2 and
                      NRC Response to Crystal River Event - 1981
Three Mile Island, Unit 1
                      Assist Visit to Region V - WNP2 Startup Readiness - 1982
1970-1972
                      Tean Inspections - Shoreham 1932 and Pilgrim 1986
Reactor Operator, VP1 Research Reactor
                      Operator Briefings of TMI Event - 1979
SPECIAL
QUALIFICATIONS:
VPI Reactor Operator License
Certified NRC Licensed Operator Examiner - 1986
SPECIAL
ASSIGNMENTS:
IAEA Assist Visit to Brazil CNEN - 1981
Team Leadar Salem ATWS Event - NRC Fact Finding - 1983
Salem ATWS Generic Issue Review Team - 1983
NRC Response to Crystal River Event - 1981
Assist Visit to Region V - WNP2 Startup Readiness - 1982
Tean Inspections - Shoreham 1932 and Pilgrim 1986
Operator Briefings of TMI Event - 1979


  -                                                                           _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
,   o
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
              t
o
      Appendix F                         F-15
,
      NAME:         LAWRENCE ROSSBACH
t
      ORGANIZATION: United States Nuclear Reguletory Commission, Region I
Appendix F
                    Division of Reactor Projects
F-15
      TITLE:       Senior Resident Inspector - Indian Point Unit 2
NAME:
      EDUCATION:   8.S., Nuclear Engineering
LAWRENCE ROSSBACH
      EXPERIENCE:   Sixteen Years of Nuclear Experience as Follows:
ORGANIZATION:
                    Six 7 ears, NRC Resident Inspector and Senior Resident
United States Nuclear Reguletory Commission, Region I
                    Inspector
Division of Reactor Projects
                    Two and One-Half Years, Program Manager for NRC's prepara-
TITLE:
                    tion to review a high level waste repository li:ense
Senior Resident Inspector - Indian Point Unit 2
                    application
EDUCATION:
                    Two and One-Half Years, NRC Project Manager and Reviewer
8.S., Nuclear Engineering
                    for Uranium Mills
EXPERIENCE:
                    Five Years, Systems Design Engineer at Architectural
Sixteen Years of Nuclear Experience as Follows:
                    Engineering (AE) Company
Six 7 ears, NRC Resident Inspector and Senior Resident
                                                                                                        l
Inspector
                                                                                                        :
Two and One-Half Years, Program Manager for NRC's prepara-
                                                                                                        I
tion to review a high level waste repository li:ense
                                                                                                        I
application
                                                                                                        i
Two and One-Half Years, NRC Project Manager and Reviewer
                                                                                                        l
for Uranium Mills
                                                                                                        l
Five Years, Systems Design Engineer at Architectural
                                                                                                        l
Engineering (AE) Company
                                                                                                        l
l
                                                                                                        !
:
                                                                                                          .
I
                                                                                                        j
I
i
l
l
l
l
!
.
j


. *
*
    App;ndix F                         F-16
.
    NAME:         STEVEN C. SHOLLY
App;ndix F
    ORGANIZATION: MHB Technical Associates (Observer for the Commonwealth of
F-16
                  Massachusetts
NAME:
    TITLE:       Associate Consultant
STEVEN C. SHOLLY
    EDUCATION:   B.S. in Education (1975) Graduate Course Work in Geo-
ORGANIZATION:
                  environmental Studies (1976-1977)
MHB Technical Associates (Observer for the Commonwealth of
    EXPERIENCE:   Seven and One-Half Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
Massachusetts
    1985-Present MHB Technical Associates, San Jose, CA - Work in Risk
TITLE:
                  Assessment, Quality Assurance, Optrating Events Analysis,
Associate Consultant
                  and Design and Construction Assessment
EDUCATION:
    1981-1935     Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, D.C. - Work in
B.S. in Education (1975) Graduate Course Work in Geo-
                  generic safety issues, risk assessment and emergency
environmental Studies (1976-1977)
                  planning
EXPERIENCE:
    SPECIAL
Seven and One-Half Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
    ASSIGNMENTS: -
1985-Present
                      Member of NRC Peer Review Group, NUREG-1050 (1984)
MHB Technical Associates, San Jose, CA - Work in Risk
                  -
Assessment, Quality Assurance, Optrating Events Analysis,
                      Participated in NRC Containment Performance Design
and Design and Construction Assessment
                      Objective Workshop (1986)
1981-1935
                  -
Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, D.C. - Work in
                      Participated in NRC/LLNL Workthop on Safety Goals
generic safety issues, risk assessment and emergency
                        Implementation, Presentation on Seismic Risk
planning
                      Assessment (1987)
SPECIAL
                                                                                l
ASSIGNMENTS:
                                                                            __
Member of NRC Peer Review Group, NUREG-1050 (1984)
-
Participated in NRC Containment Performance Design
-
Objective Workshop (1986)
Participated in NRC/LLNL Workthop on Safety Goals
-
Implementation, Presentation on Seismic Risk
Assessment (1987)
l
.


  r -
r -
    , *
*
        Appendix F                         F-17                                           ,
,
        NAME:         GREGORY C. SMITH
Appendix F
        ORGANIZATION: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
F-17
                      Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
,
                                                                                            l
NAME:
        TITLE:       Safeguards Specialist
GREGORY C. SMITH
                                                                                            '
ORGANIZATION:
        EDUCATION:   B.S. Education, California State College
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
                      -
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
                              Various additional courses including: Technical
l
                            Writing, Quality Assurance Auditing, Statistics,
TITLE:
                              Reactor Design and Layout, Radiological Accident
Safeguards Specialist
                                                                                            '
'
                            Assessment, Rrdiological Emergency Response, BWR
EDUCATION:
                              Technology, Transportation of Radioactive Materials,
B.S. Education, California State College
                            Advanced Neutron Nuclear Materials Assay, Safeguards
Various additional courses including:
                            Chemical Analysis of Nuclear Materials, Nondestructive         *
Technical
                            Assay of Nuclear Materials, Nondestructive Assay of
-
                              Fissionable Material, Accident / Incident Investigation
Writing, Quality Assurance Auditing, Statistics,
                            and Intrusion Detection Systems
'
        EXPERIENCE:   Twenty-Two Years Nuclear Incestry Experience as Follows:
Reactor Design and Layout, Radiological Accident
        1977-Present Safeguards Specialist, Physical Protection Inspector and
Assessment, Rrdiological Emergency Response, BWR
                      Safeguards Auditor (USNRC)
Technology, Transportation of Radioactive Materials,
        1966-1977     Westinghouse Electric Corperation, Bettis Atomic Power
Advanced Neutron Nuclear Materials Assay, Safeguards
                      Laboratory - Production Engineer, Nuclear !'aterials Aud-           .
Chemical Analysis of Nuclear Materials, Nondestructive
                      itor, Nuclear Materials Analyst, Reactor Development                 l
*
                      Technician
Assay of Nuclear Materials, Nondestructive Assay of
Fissionable Material, Accident / Incident Investigation
and Intrusion Detection Systems
EXPERIENCE:
Twenty-Two Years Nuclear Incestry Experience as Follows:
1977-Present
Safeguards Specialist, Physical Protection Inspector and
Safeguards Auditor (USNRC)
1966-1977
Westinghouse Electric Corperation, Bettis Atomic Power
Laboratory - Production Engineer, Nuclear !'aterials Aud-
.
itor, Nuclear Materials Analyst, Reactor Development
l
Technician
!
!
                                                                                            f
f
1
1
1
                                                                                            1
!
                                                                                            !
                                                                                            ;
                                                                                            !
                                                                                            !
                                                                                            ,
                                                                                            ;
                                                                                            !
                                                                                            !
;
;
                                                                                            t
!
!
,
,
                                                                                      - - -
;
!
!
;
t
,
.
- - -


~
~
  , o                                                                                     .
,
        Appendix F                               F-18
o
                                                                                            1
.
                                                                                            4
Appendix F
        NAME:             CLAY C. WARREN
F-18
        ORGANIZATION:     United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
4
                          Division of Reactor Projects
NAME:
        TITLE:             Senior Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
CLAY C. WARREN
        EDUCATION:         B.S., Natural Sciences, Louisianna State University
ORGANIZATION:
          Industrial:     1986 - USNRC Inspector Qualification Program
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I
                          1985 - Training Program on the General Electric BWR-6 oro-       .
Division of Reactor Projects
                          duct ifne and received NRC Senior Reactor Operator License       I
TITLE:
                          1982 - GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Senior Reactor Oper-
Senior Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
                          stor Certification training at the General Electric BWR         l
EDUCATION:
                          . raining Center
B.S., Natural Sciences, Louisianna State University
                          1980 - Shif+ Test ! 'neer training program at General
Industrial:
                          Dynamics Corporation, Electric Boat Division. Successfully
1986 - USNRC Inspector Qualification Program
                          completeo the Naval Engineering Officer exam administered
1985 - Training Program on the General Electric BWR-6 oro-
                          by Naval Reactors.
.
          Military:       Navy Nuclear Prototype Training
duct ifne and received NRC Senior Reactor Operator License
                          Navy Nuclear Power School
1982 - GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Senior Reactor Oper-
                          Electronics Technicians School
stor Certification training at the General Electric BWR
      EXPERIENCE:         Fif teen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
l
      Jan 1987-Present   United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Senior
. raining Center
                          Resident Inspector
1980 - Shif+ Test !
      Jan 1986-Jan 1987 Resident Inspector
'neer training program at General
      June 1934-Jan 1936 Shift Supervisor, Gulf States Utilities Company, River Bend
Dynamics Corporation, Electric Boat Division.
                          Nuclear Station
Successfully
      Jan 1931-June 1934 Control Operating Foreman, Gulf States Utilities Company,
completeo the Naval Engineering Officer exam administered
                          River Bend Nuclear Station
by Naval Reactors.
      June 1979-Dec l'J30 Shift Test Engineer, General Dynamics Corporation, Electric
Military:
  .                      Boat Olvisien
Navy Nuclear Prototype Training
      Jan 1971-June 1979 Electronics Technician - Reactor Operate., United States
Navy Nuclear Power School
                          Navy
Electronics Technicians School
      SPECIAL
EXPERIENCE:
      QUALIFICATIONS:   USNRC Senior Reactor Operators License
Fif teen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:
                .
Jan 1987-Present
                                                                                      _- _
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Senior
Resident Inspector
Jan 1986-Jan 1987
Resident Inspector
June 1934-Jan 1936 Shift Supervisor, Gulf States Utilities Company, River Bend
Nuclear Station
Jan 1931-June 1934 Control Operating Foreman, Gulf States Utilities Company,
River Bend Nuclear Station
June 1979-Dec l'J30 Shift Test Engineer, General Dynamics Corporation, Electric
Boat Olvisien
.
Jan 1971-June 1979 Electronics Technician - Reactor Operate., United States
Navy
SPECIAL
QUALIFICATIONS:
USNRC Senior Reactor Operators License
.
-
_


  f *
f
      Appendix F - Clay C. Warren                           F-19
*
      SPECIAL
Appendix F - Clay C. Warren
      ASSIGNMDO S;           Nine Mile Point 2 Operational Readiness Assessment Team
F-19
                              Inspection
SPECIAL
                              Peach Bottom - Special Team Inspection March 1986
ASSIGNMDO S;
Nine Mile Point 2 Operational Readiness Assessment Team
Inspection
Peach Bottom - Special Team Inspection March 1986
1
1
                        - - -
- - -
                                    -.         . - - - - _           _ _ _ _ _ , __
-.
. - - - - _
_ _ _ _ _ ,
__


                                                                            . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                                                                _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
_____
  e     *
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
            * "%                                     UNITED STATES
e
      f
*
                  k                    NUCLEAR REGULATCRY COMMi^^15N
* "%
      ,
UNITED STATES
                  .
k
                                                          REGION 1
f
      I                                            475 ALLINoALE ROAD
NUCLEAR REGULATCRY COMMi^^15N
        *
I
                                            KING oF PRUe41 A. PENNSYLVANIA 19406
.
          .....                                       01 SEF 1988
REGION 1
            The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
,
            Executive Office of Public Safety
475 ALLINoALE ROAD
          ATTN: Mr. Charles V. Barry
*
          One Ashburton Place
KING oF PRUe41 A. PENNSYLVANIA 19406
          Boston, Massachusetts 02108
.....
          Dear Mr. Barry:
01 SEF 1988
          This refers to our letter of July 13, 1988, regarding the Commonwealth of
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
          Massachusetts' participation in the Integrated Assessment Team Inspection
Executive Office of Public Safety
          (IATI) conducted at the Pilgrim Huclear Power Station.
ATTN: Mr. Charles V. Barry
          As the NRC Senior Manager responsible for the inspection, I would like to ac-
One Ashburton Place
          knowledge the conduct of the designated state representatives Ms. Pamela J. Chen
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
          and Mr. Steven C. Sho11y as being professional and contributing to the perfor-
Dear Mr. Barry:
          mance of the inspection.
This refers to our letter of July 13, 1988, regarding the Commonwealth of
          The established protocol (enclosed) provided to you on June 1,1988, clarified
Massachusetts' participation in the Integrated Assessment Team Inspection
          by our letter of July 13, 1988, and discussed directly by myself with
(IATI) conducted at the Pilgrim Huclear Power Station.
          Mr. Peter Agnes of your staff on August 9,1988, provides for collection and
As the NRC Senior Manager responsible for the inspection, I would like to ac-
          coordination of the concerns from the various interests within the Commonwealth.
knowledge the conduct of the designated state representatives Ms. Pamela J. Chen
          As stated in our July 13, 1988 letter, the NRC placed the burden on the Common-
and Mr. Steven C. Sho11y as being professional and contributing to the perfor-
          wealth's representative to present the many views, be they from the local
mance of the inspection.
          governments or from the State's Attorney General's office, to the NRC for
The established protocol (enclosed) provided to you on June 1,1988, clarified
          consideration during development of tne inspection scope. In this regard, we
by our letter of July 13, 1988, and discussed directly by myself with
          understand that Mr. Agnes conducted a public meeting on August 4, 19:3, with a
Mr. Peter Agnes of your staff on August 9,1988, provides for collection and
          designated state representative to the IATI present.
coordination of the concerns from the various interests within the Commonwealth.
          On August 9, 1988, having received no issues from the Commonwealth as an
As stated in our July 13, 1988 letter, the NRC placed the burden on the Common-
          additional input to the existing inspection plan, I contacted the Assistant
wealth's representative to present the many views, be they from the local
          Secretary of Public Safety directly and was assured that: no formal input to
governments or from the State's Attorney General's office, to the NRC for
          the IATI inspection plan would be submitted by the Commonwealth, the
consideration during development of tne inspection scope.
          Commonwealth would work through the designated representatives for any issues
In this regard, we
          and that issues brought to the Commonwealth's attention were no different than
understand that Mr. Agnes conducted a public meeting on August 4, 19:3, with a
          those previously noted. Also, the team leader has not.ified me that at no time
designated state representative to the IATI present.
          during the inspection did he receive immediate notification of any different
On August 9, 1988, having received no issues from the Commonwealth as an
          state observation or conclusion as would be called for under Protocol
additional input to the existing inspection plan, I contacted the Assistant
          Guideline 3 if any such dif ferences were identified during the inspection.
Secretary of Public Safety directly and was assured that: no formal input to
          Since the IATI exit meeting conducted on August 24, 1988 which was attended by
the IATI inspection plan would be submitted by the Commonwealth, the
          Mr. Agnes and Ms. Chen, the Commonwealth has expressed on several occasions
Commonwealth would work through the designated representatives for any issues
          both to the tredia and #t public meetings that technical issues and management
and that issues brought to the Commonwealth's attention were no different than
          concerns continue to exist. These statements appear inconsistent with the
those previously noted. Also, the team leader has not.ified me that at no time
          Commonwealth's response to repeated NRC requests for IATI inspection scope
during the inspection did he receive immediate notification of any different
          input and moreover inconsistent with the Comonwealth views expressed at the
state observation or conclusion as would be called for under Protocol
          IATI exit meeting.
Guideline 3 if any such dif ferences were identified during the inspection.
          In order to better understand and address the areas of concern, the NRC
Since the IATI exit meeting conducted on August 24, 1988 which was attended by
          requests that in accordance with the protocol agreement accepted by the
Mr. Agnes and Ms. Chen, the Commonwealth has expressed on several occasions
          Comrinwealth, as provided f( ? by Guideline 3, that the Commonwealth make
both to the tredia and #t public meetings that technical issues and management
,          available in writing those conclusions or observations that are substantially
concerns continue to exist. These statements appear inconsistent with the
          different fro'n those of the NRC inspectors in order that the NRC can take the
Commonwealth's response to repeated NRC requests for IATI inspection scope
          necessary actions to meet its regulatory responsibilities.
input and moreover inconsistent with the Comonwealth views expressed at the
    ? 0 T O ? ?!C-5           .?g
IATI exit meeting.
In order to better understand and address the areas of concern, the NRC
requests that in accordance with the protocol agreement accepted by the
Comrinwealth, as provided f( ? by Guideline 3, that the Commonwealth make
available in writing those conclusions or observations that are substantially
,
different fro'n those of the NRC inspectors in order that the NRC can take the
necessary actions to meet its regulatory responsibilities.
? 0 T O ? ?!C-5
.?g
l_
l_


                                                                                                    - - - - - - - _ - - .                             _-
- - - - - - - _ - - .
  .   .
_-
                            -
.
                                                                                                                                          G-2                              ;
.
                Mr. Charles V. Barry                                                 2
G-2
                                                                                            01 SF.F 1988
-
                It is necessary that the Commonwealth's response be provided to the NRC Region
;
                I by September 6, 1988, to be considered in conjunction with the documentation
Mr. Charles V. Barry
                of the results of the recently completed IATI. This request was discussed
2
                with Mr. P. Agnes of your staff on August 26 and August 31, 1988.
01 SF.F 1988
                If you have any questions regarding the above matters, please contact me at
It is necessary that the Commonwealth's response be provided to the NRC Region
                (215) 337-5126 or the State Liaison Officer for Region I, Ms. Marie Miller at
I by September 6, 1988, to be considered in conjunction with the documentation
                (215) 337-5246.
of the results of the recently completed IATI.
                                                                                      Sincerely,
This request was discussed
                                                                                        we   .  o         ns, leputy Director                                           ;
with Mr. P. Agnes of your staff on August 26 and August 31, 1988.
                                                                                      Division of Reactor Projects
If you have any questions regarding the above matters, please contact me at
                Enclosure: As Stated
(215) 337-5126 or the State Liaison Officer for Region I, Ms. Marie Miller at
(215) 337-5246.
Sincerely,
we
o
ns, leputy Director
;
.
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure: As Stated
cc w/ enc 1:
'
'
                cc w/ enc 1:
R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear
                R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear
K. Highfill, Station Director
'
'
                K. Highfill, Station Director
R. Anderson, Plant Manager
                R. Anderson, Plant Manager
J. Keyes, Licensing Division Manager
              J. Keyes, Licensing Division Manager
E. Robinson,. Nuclear Information Manager
                E. Robinson,. Nuclear Information Manager
R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager
                R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager
The Honorable Edward J. Markey
                The Honorable Edward J. Markey
i
i               The Honorable Edward P. Kirby
The Honorable Edward P. Kirby
:             The Honorable Peter V. Forman
:
!               B. McIntyre, Chairman, Department of Public Utilities
The Honorable Peter V. Forman
1               Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen
!
I
B. McIntyre, Chairman, Department of Public Utilities
                Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen
1
;             Plymouth Civil Defense Director
Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen
                P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Public Safety, Commonwealth of
I
                        Massachusetts                                                                                                                                     ;
Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen
,              S. Pollard,**sssachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources
;
                R. Shieshak, ,s'.SSPIRG                                                                                                                                   !
Plymouth Civil Defense Director
                Public Documet Room (POR)                                                                                                                                 :
P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Public Safety, Commonwealth of
                Local Public Document Room (LPOR)
Massachusetts
                Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
;
                NRC Resident Inspector
S. Pollard,**sssachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources
                CommonwealthofMassachusetts(2)
,
R. Shieshak, ,s'.SSPIRG
!
Public Documet Room (POR)
:
Local Public Document Room (LPOR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
CommonwealthofMassachusetts(2)
,
,
            bec w/ enc 1:
bec w/ enc 1:
!           Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)                                                                                                                     l
!
i
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
            S. Co11tns, DRP                                                                                                                                             f
l
                                                                                                                                                                          '
S. Co11tns, DRP
            J. Wiggins, ORP
f
            R. Blough, DRP
i
            L. Doerflein, DRP
'
            R. Bores, DR35
J. Wiggins, ORP
            D. Mcdonald, FM, NRR
R. Blough, DRP
L. Doerflein, DRP
R. Bores, DR35
D. Mcdonald, FM, NRR
!
!
!
!
                                                                                                                                                                          f
f
                                                                                                                                                                          I
I
$
$
    ------.,n------.-m         - - - , - - . -- - - - . - , - - ..-n,,,,--.- - - - _                                     .   - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - .
------.,n------.-m
- - - , - - . --
- - - . - , - -
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.
- - - - - - -
. - - - - - - - - - - - - .


  _ _ _ _ _   . _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                       _ __   _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
            e                               b
. _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                                                                                    G-3
_
                                                                                                        EN,C_LOSURE
__
                                                                Guidelines for Accompaniment on the Integrated Assessment Team Inspection
_ _ _ _ _ _
                                                              The following are guidelines for accempaniment during NRC's Pilgrim Integrated
e
                                                              Assessment Team Inspection.
b
                                                              1.   The observer is to make arrangements with the licensee for site access
G-3
                                                                  training and badging.
EN,C_LOSURE
                                                              2.   The observer shall be available throughout the inspection and will accom-
Guidelines for Accompaniment on the Integrated Assessment Team Inspection
                                                                  pany NRC inspectors. Communication with the licensee will be through the
The following are guidelines for accempaniment during NRC's Pilgrim Integrated
                                                                  appropriate NRC team member, preferably the team leader.
Assessment Team Inspection.
                                                              3.   When   the conclusions or observations made by the Comonwealth of
1.
                                                                  Massachusetts observer are substantially different from those of the NRC
The observer is to make arrangements with the licensee for site access
                                                                  inspectors, Comonwealth of Massachusetts will make its observations         -
training and badging.
                                                                  imediately known to the inspection team leader and available in writing
2.
                                                                  to the NRC and the licensee, in order that NRC can take the necessary
The observer shall be available throughout the inspection and will accom-
                                                                  actions to meet its regulatory responsibilities.       These communications
pany NRC inspectors. Communication with the licensee will be through the
                                                                  will be publicly available, similar to NRC inspection reports.
appropriate NRC team member, preferably the team leader.
                                                              4.   NRC inspectors are authorized to refuse to permit continued accompaniment
3.
,                                                                  by the Comonwealth of Massachusetts observer if his conduct interferes
When
l                                                                 with a fair and orderly inspection.
the conclusions
                                                              S.   The Comonwealth of Massachusetts observer in accompanying NRC inspectors
or observations made by the Comonwealth of
                                                                  will not normally be provided access to proprietary information.         No
Massachusetts observer are substantially different from those of the NRC
                                                                  license material may be removed from the site or licensee possession
inspectors, Comonwealth of Massachusetts will make its observations
                                                                  without NRC approval.
-
imediately known to the inspection team leader and available in writing
to the NRC and the licensee, in order that NRC can take the necessary
actions to meet its regulatory responsibilities.
These communications
will be publicly available, similar to NRC inspection reports.
4.
NRC inspectors are authorized to refuse to permit continued accompaniment
by the Comonwealth of Massachusetts observer if his conduct interferes
,
l
with a fair and orderly inspection.
S.
The Comonwealth of Massachusetts observer in accompanying NRC inspectors
will not normally be provided access to proprietary information.
No
license material may be removed from the site or licensee possession
without NRC approval.
6.
The Comonwealth of Massachusetts observer in accompanying the NRC
,
inspectors pursuant to these guidelines does so at his (.vn risk. The NRC
i
l
will accept no responsibility for injuries and exposures to harmful
,
,
                                                              6.  The Comonwealth of Massachusetts observer in accompanying the NRC
substances which may occur to the accompanying individual during the
i                                                                  inspectors pursuant to these guidelines does so at his (.vn risk. The NRC
l
l                                                                  will accept no responsibility for injuries and exposures to harmful        ,
inspection and will assume no liability for any incidents associated with
                                                                  substances which may occur to the accompanying individual during the       l
'
                                                                  inspection and will assume no liability for any incidents associated with   '
the accompaniment.
                                                                  the accompaniment.                                                         L
L
                                                                                                                                              t
t
                                                                                                                                              I
I
                                                                        _
_
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 01:30, 11 December 2024

Integrated Assessment Team Insp Rept 50-293/88-21 on 880808- -24.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Degree of Readiness of Licensee Mgt Controls,Programs & Personnel to Support Safe Restart & Plant Operation
ML20154C279
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 09/07/1988
From: Blough A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20154C278 List:
References
50-293-88-21, NUDOCS 8809140304
Download: ML20154C279 (161)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000293/1988021

Text

.

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No.:

50-293

Report No.:

50-293/88-21

Licensee:

Boston Edison Company

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

RF0 #1, Rocky Hill Road

Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

Facility:

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

Location:

Plymouth, Massachusetts

Dates of Inspection:

August 8-24, 1988

Inspectors:

(See Attachment E)

_ _ ' 7/89

i whc e T.

Approved By:

'

nn

Dw

-

A. Rt.ndy Blough, Ch'ief

~f

Dath

Reactor Projects Section No. 3B

Division of Reactor Projects

Inspection Summary:

Areas Inspected:

Integrated Assessment Team In:,pection to assess the degree

of readiness of licensee management controls, programs, and personnel to sup-

port safe restart and operation of the plant.

The scope of the inspection is

further detailed in Section 2.2.

Results:

The team concluded that licensee management controls, programs, and personnel

are generally ready and performing at a level to support safe startup and

operation of the facility.

Results are further summarized in Sections 1.0

(Executive Summary) and 2.3 (Summary of Findings).

.

l

O

'

O

l

t

.

l

.

e

l

4

1

)

l

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACR0NYMS.......................................................

iv

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.........................................

1

2.0

INTRODUCTION..............................................

2

2.1

Background...........................................

2

2.2 Scope of Inspection..................................

3

2.3 S u mm a ry o f I AT I R e s u l t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

2.3.1

Overall

Summary............................

A

2.3.2

Summary of Results by Functional Areas.....

5

2.4 Licensee Commitments.................................

9

2.4.1

Procedure Validation and Training..........

9

2.4.2

Identifying Procedure Changes Requiring

Training.................................

9

2.4.3

Temporary Modifications....................

9

2.4.4

Operations Review Committee................

10

2.4.5

Maintenin

10

e.

.........................

2.4.6

Survei,ionce..

10

.

.....................

2.4.7

Formalizing Personnel Qualification

Reviews..................................

11

2.4.8

Mission, Organization and Policy Manual....

11

2.4.9

Familiarizing Workers with t'xpected

Radiological

Conditions..................

11

2.4.10

Control Room Human

Factors.................

11

3.0 DE TAI LS O F I N S P EC T ION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

3.1 Management 0versight.................................

12

3.1.1

Scope of Review............................

42

3.1.2

Organization...............................

12

3.1.3

Staffing...................................

15

3.1.4

Qualifications..... . .....................

16

3.1.5

Administrative Policy and Procedures.......

18

3.1.6

Communications and Observations............

19

3.1.7

Conclusions.......................

.

20

......

i

. _______

.

e

Table of Contents (Continued)

Page

3.2

Operations...........................................

21

3.2.1

Scope of Review............................

21

3.2.2

Conduct of Operations......................

21

3.2.3

Shift Staffing and Overtime Controls.......

23

3.2.4

Procedure Va11dation.......................

24

3.2 5

Temporary Modification Controls............

25

3.2.6

Required Reading Books.....................

28

3.2.7

Logs.......................................

29

3.2.8

Timely Update of Lif ted Lead / Jumper Log. . . .

29

3.2.9

Tagouts and Operator Aids..................

31

3.2.10

Plant Tours and System Walkdowns...........

31

3.2.11

Conclusions................................

34

3.3

Maintenance..........................................

36

3.3.1

Scope of Review............................

36

3.3.2

Observations and Findings..................

36

3.3.3

Conclusions................................

50

'

3.4 Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control.........

52

3.4.1

Scope of

Review.........................

52

..

3.4.2

Observations and Findings..................

52

3.4.3

Conclusions................................

61

3.5 Radiation

Protection.................................

63

3.5.1

Scope of Review............................

63

3.5.2

Observations and Findings..................

63

3.5.3

Conclusions................................

73

3.6 Security and Safeguards...... .......................

75

3.6.1

Scope of Review............................

/%

3.6.2

Observations and Findings..................

75

3.6.3

Conclusions................................

82

11

_

O.

6

Table of Contents (Continued)

Page

3.7

Training.............................................

83

3.7.1

Scope of Review............................

8'.

3.7.2

Observations and Findings..................

83

3.7.3

Conclusions................................

88

3.8 Fire Protection......................................

89

3.8.1

Scope of Review............................

89

3.8.2

Observations and

Findings..................

89

3.8.3

Conclusions................................

90

3.9 Engineering Support..................................

91

3.9.1

Scope of Review............................

91

3.9.2

Observations and Findings..................

91

3.9.3

Conclusions................................

93

3.10 Safety Assessment / Quality Verification...............

94

3.10.1

Scope of Review............................

94

3.10.2

Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee..

94

3.10.3

Operations Review Committee................

97

3.10.4

Quality Assurance Audit and Surveillance

Programs.................................

102

3.10.5

Corrective Action Process and Programs.....

104

3.10.6

Conclusions................................

115

4.0 UNRESOLVED ITEMS..........................................

117

5.0 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS.......................................

118

Appendix A - Entrance Interview Attendees......................

A-1

Appendix B - Exit Interview

Attendees..........................

B-1

Appendix C - Persons Contacted.................................

C-1

Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed................................

D-1

Appendix E - IATI Composition and Structure................

E-1

...

.

Appendix F - Resumes...........................................

F-1

Appendix G - September 1, 1988 Letter from NRC to Commonwealth

of Massachusetts................................

G-1

Appendix H - September 6, 1988 Letter from Commonwealth of

Massachusetts to NRC...........................

.

H-1

111

. _ _ _ _

.

.

ACRONYMS

ALARA

As Low As Reasonably Achievable

-

ANSI

American National Standards Institute

-

ASME

American Society for Mechanical Engineers

-

BECo

Boston Edison Company

-

BEQAM

Boston Edison Quality Assurance Manual

-

CAS

Central Alarm Station

-

CQI

Commercial Quality Item

-

Core Spray (System)

CS

-

CST

Condensate Storage Tank

-

DC

Direct Current

-

i.

Detaiied Control Room Design Review

DCRDR

-

DG

Diesel Generator

-

DR

Deficiency Reports

-

E0P

Emergency Operating Procedures

-

E0

Equipment Operator

-

EPRI

Electric Power Research Institute

-

EQ

Environmental Qualification

-

ESF

Engineered Safety Feature

-

r

Engineering Service Roquest

-

'

Failure and Malfunction Reports

F6MR

-

For Your Information

FYI

-

General Employee Training

GET

-

iv

Y'

.

.

Acronyms

HP

Health Physics

-

HPES

Human Performance Evaluation System

-

HSA

Housekeeping Service Assistance

-

IATI

Integrated Assessment Team Inspection

-

I&C

Instrumentation and Control

-

ICA

Immediate Corrective Actions

-

INPO

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

-

IST

In-Service Testing

-

LCO

Limiting Condition for Operations

-

LL/J

Lifted Lead / Jumper

-

LSFT

Logic System Functional Test

-

M&TE

Measuring and Test Equipment

-

MCAR

Management Cnrrective Action Requests

-

MCIAP

Material Condition Improvement Action Plan

-

MO&AT

Management Oversight and Assessment Team

-

MOP

Mission, Organization and Policy Manual

-

MPC

Maximum Permitted Concentration

-

MR

Maintenance Request

-

MSC

Maintenance Summary and Control

-

MSTP

Master Surveillance Tracking Program

-

MWP

Maintenance Work Plan

-

NCR

Nonconformance Report

-

NED

Nuclear Engineering Department

-

h0P

Nuclear Organization Procedures

-

y

.

.

Acronyms

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-

NRR

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

-

NSRAC

Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee

-

NWE

Nuclear Watch Engineer

-

OMG

Outage Management Group

-

ORC

Operations Review Committee

-

P&ID

Piping and Instrument Diagram

-

PCAQ

Potential Condition Adverse to quality

-

PDC

Plant Design Change

-

PI

Pressere Indicator

-

PM

Preventive Maintenance

-

PNPS

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

-

PCIS

Primary Containment Isolation System

-

Quality Assurance Department

QAD

-

RCIC

-

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

RETS

Radiological Environmental Technical Specifications

-

RHR

Residual Heat Removal (System)

-

RO

Reactor Operator

-

ROR

Radiological Occurrence Report

-

RP

Radiation Protection

-

'

RWP

Radiation Work Permits

-

SAA

Simulated Automatic Actuation

-

SAS

Secondary Alarm Station

-

vi

.

.

Acronyms

SBLC

Standby Liquid Control (System)

-

SDR

Security Deficiency Reports

-

SE

Safety Evaluations

-

SEG

Systems Engineering Group

-

SES

Senior Executive Service

-

SFR

Supplier Finder Reports

-

SGI

Safeguards Information

-

SI

Station Instruction

-

SRO

Senior Reactor Operator

-

STA

Shift Technical Advisor

-

SVP-N

Senior Vice President - Nuclear

-

TM

Temporary Modification

-

TS

Technical Specifications

-

VP-NE

Vice president - Nuclear Engineering

-

WIP

Workforce Information Program

-

WPRT

Work Prioritization Review Team

-

vii

.

.

.

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In response to NRC concerns ever longstanding issues regarding the manage-

ment effectiveness of the Boston Edison Company (BECo) in the operation of

the Pilgrim facility, the licensee agreed to maintain the plant in a

shutdown

condition

following

operational

events which occurred on

April 11-12, 1986.

The NRC conf trmed the licensee's agreement in Con-

firmatory Action Letter (CAL) 86 10.

The CAL, as supplemented in an

August 27, 1986 letter, also confirmed that the licensee would develop a

comprehensive plan to address those concerns and perfonn an in-depth self-

assessment of the effectiveness of that Plan.

On June 25, 1988, the

licensee reported it had completed these activities to the extent that an

NRC review was appropriate. In order to assess the status and results of

BECo's corrective actions, the NRC performed an independent review of the

effectiveness of the licensee's management controls, programs and person-

nel during an Integrated Assessment Team Inspection (IATI) conducted

August 8-24, 1988.

The Team consisted of an SES-level manager, a Team leader, and members of

the NRC Region I

and Headquarters staff.

The inspection team also

included two obseners representing and appointed by the Commonwealth of

i;assachusetts.

These observers had access and input to all aspects of the

inspection as provided by the established protocol.

The areas reviewed

during the

inspection included operations, maintenance, surveillance,

radiation protection, security, training, fire protection and assurance of

quality.

The Team reported directly to the Regional Administrator of

Region I.

Overall, the Team concluded with high confidence that BECo management

controls, programs, and personnel were generally ready and performing at a

level to support safe startup and operation of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power

Station.

Further,

although the Team identified certain items which

require licensee actions or evaluations, there were no fundamental flaws

found in the licensee's management structure, management performance,

programs, or program lmplementation that would inhibit its ability to

assure reactor or public safety during plant operation.

__

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

o ,

2

.

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This report details the findings, conclusions and observations of NRC's

Integrated Assessment Team Inspection conducted at the Pilgrim Nuclear

Power Station (PNPS) on August 8-24, 1988. The results of this inspection

are to be considered during NRC staff's deliberations as it reaches its

decisior. regarding a restart recommendation to the NRC Commissioners.

2.1 Background

The NRC's 1985 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)

found programmatic weaknesses in several functional areas at the

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and noted that, historically, the

licensee could not sustain performance improvements once achieved. A

'

special NRC Region I diagnostic team inspection was subsequently per-

formed in February and March 1986 to evaluate facility performance.

This inspection, which included monitoring plant activities on a

24-hour basis, confirmed the 1985 SALP and concluded that poor

management control and incomplete staffing contributed to the poor

performance.

Following several operational events, Boston Edison Company (BECo)

shutdown PNPS on April 11-12, 1986.

The NRC subsequently issued a

Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) on April 12, 1986, and a supplement

on August 27, 1986, maintaining the ple.nt shutdown and requiring that

the licensee obtain NRC approval prior to restert.

The central

issues in the CAL, as supplemented, involved the effectiveness of

licensee management of the facility and technical concerns.

SALP evaluations continued during the shutdown, and improvements were

noted during the 1986 SALP period, although the rate of change was

slow.

Several factors inhibited progress, including continued man-

agement changes and prolonged staf fing vacancies.

Good performance

was noted in four areas:

emergency planning, outage management,

corporate engineering support and licensed operator training.

The

success in these areas reflected a high level of corporate management

attention and substantial resource commitments.

The licensee also

had made signi'icant plant hardware improvements, including Mark I

Containment performance enhancements.

,

!

Consistent with the CAL and its supplement, BECo has addressed the

specific technical

issues, developed and submitted the Pilgrim

Nuclear Power Station Restart Plan and performed a detailed self-

assessment of readiness for restart.

The NRC staff reviews of these

items are complete.

The licensee has also submitted a Power Ascen-

sion Test Program, for which the staff review is ongoing.

.

- -

- _

_

. _ _

___- - -

. _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

__ ___

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

O

3

NRC subsequently completed a SALP evaluation for Pilgrim covering the

period February 1,1987 to May 15,1988.

It concluded that licensee

managenient initiatives are generally successful in correcting staff-

ing, organization, and material deficiencies. Programmatic perform-

ance improvements were evident in areas previously identified as

having significant weakness and in areas that the licensee's self-

assessment process

identified

as

warranting

further management

attention.

The NRC Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) of April 1986 required the

NRC to perform a review to assess BECo's corrective actions. In con-

junction with an augmented inspection program and as part of a con-

tinuing effort to monitor BECo's program improvements, the NRC

planned this IATI to independently measure the effectiveness and

readinass of the licensee's management controls, programs and per-

sonnel to support safe restart of the facility. A Restart Readiness

Assessment Report that includes staff assessment results will be

prepared by the NRC in conjunction with development of an NRC staff

recommendation regarding plant restart.

2.2 Scope of Inspection

The IAT inspection was performed to provide an indepenuent, in-depth

assessment of the degree of readiness of licensee management con-

trols, programs, and personnel to support safe restart and operation

of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS).

The inspection covered

a variety of functional areas, including operations, maintenance,

surveillance, radiation protection, security, training, fire protec-

tion, and assurance of quality.

Particular emphasis was placed on

management ef fectiveness and on the status of the licensee's recent

program improvements in maintenance.

The inspection consisted of

interviews with licensee personnel, plant tours, observations of

plart activities, and selective examinations of procedures, records,

and documents.

The Team also directly observed ongoing

plant

activities on ali shifts from August 10-13, 1988.

The 15-member Team consisted of a senior manager, inspection team

leader, five shift inspectors, and several specialist inspectors from

both NRC Region I and the NRC Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

(NRR).

Two representatives from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

were also on the Team as observers throughout the inspection.

The

team roster and member resumes are attached as Appendices E and F to

this report.

Onsite IATI preparation, which included site familiarization and

plant tours, was conducted during the week of July 18, 1988. The Team

was onsite full-time from August 8 through 19, 1938. Some IATI mem-

bers were on site during the documentation period of August 20-24,

1988.

Attendees at the entrance and exit interviess are listed in

Appendices A and 8, respectively. Senior licensee managers contacted

during the course of the inspection are listed in Appendix C.

Many

other persons at all levels of the organization were also contacted

or interviewed.

.

.

4

The licensee was not p/esented with any written material by the NRC

during this inspection. The licensee indicated that no proprietary

material was presented for review during this inspection.

2.3 Summary of IATI Results

2.3.1

Overall Summary

The T2am concluded, with high confidence, that licensee

management controls, programs, and personnel are generally

ready and performing at a level to support safe startup and

operation of the facility. Technical items requiring reso-

lution or completion prior to restart are being addressed

and tracked by the licensee.

The Team identified a rela-

tively small number of additional items for which licensee

actions or evaluations appear appropriate; during the

inspection, the licensee made acceptable commitments in

these areas.

There are currently no fundamental flaws in

the licensee's management structure, management perform-

ance, programs,

or program

implementation

that would

inhibit its ability to assure reactor or public safety dur-

ing plant operation.

The inspection generally confirmed the results of the SALP

report for February 1,1987 through May 15, 1988, as well

as validating the general SALP conclusion that performance

was improving at the end of the SALP period.

Further,

licensee performance appeared to be consistent or improving

in all functional areas examined during the IATI, with the

current level of achievement for overall safety performance

equal to or better than that described in the SALP.

For

maintenance and radiation protection, the performance is

noticeably improved.

The inspection generally confirmed the effectiveness of

various licensee self-improvement programs and of the

licensee's self-assessment process.

The Team identified

relatively few issues that had not been previously identi-

fied by the licensee.

In the interest of continually

improving its self-assessment process, the licensee should

evaluate those cases where NRC either identified new issues

or assigned a higher sense of prior;ty than identified by

the licensee.

The inspection confirmed that important organization and

attitudinal changes had occurred since 1986. Of particular

concern to NRC during the diagnostic inspection in 1986

were several f actors inhibiting progress.

These included:

_

O

5

1)

Incomplete staffing, especially of operators and key

mid-level supervisory personnel;

2)

The prevailing licensee view that improvements to date

had corrected the problems identified;

3)

Reluctance by Itcensee management to acknowledge some

problems identified by NRC; and

4)

Dependence on third parties to identify problems

rather than implementing an offective licensee program

to identify weaknesses.

The Team found these inhibitors to be substantially re-

moved, and noted that a significantly improved nuclear

safety ethic exists at management levels and is developing

successfully at the worker level.

Based on a review of the management structure, staffing,

goals, policies and administrative controls, the Team con-

cluded that the licensee has an acceptable organization and

administrative process, with adequate management and tech-

nical resources to assure that the plant can be operated in

a safe and reliable manner during normal and abnormal con-

ditions.

Further, this performance-based inspection pro-

vided an integrated look at overall management effective-

ness in ensuring high

' andards of nuclear safety.

The

overall conclusions o#

is inspection confirm facility

management effectivene

especially its ability to perform

self-assessment functh

to improve performance, and to

3,

raise nuclear safety awareness and attitudes throughout the

organization.

2.3.2

Summary of Results by Functional Area

Within each functional

area,

conclusions were reached

including the identification of various strengths and weak-

nesses. Those are summarized below.

The basis for these

items, as well as the many significant observations made by

the Team, are explained in Section 3 of this report.

2.3.2.1

Operations

Strengths

Experienced and knowledgeable senior licen-

--

sed operators

,

O

e

6

Effective shift turnover

--

Excellent plant housekeeping

--

Weakness

Lauk of thoroughness and attention to detail

--

in validation and training of Emergency

Operating satellite procedures

2.3.2.2

Fire Protection

Strengths

Effective program staffing and supervision

--

Effective

prioritization,

control,

and

--

tracking

of

fire

protection

equipment

maintenance

Weaknesses

None

2.3.2.3

Maintenance

Strengths

Good organization and structure

--

Thorough program procedures

--

Clear maintenance section internal communi-

--

cations and interactions

Good control and support of field activities

--

Weaknesses

Examples of poor implementation of planning

--

.

for post-work testing

Poorly controlled storage of Q-listed items

--

at

two

locations

outside

the warehouse

_ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

7

2.3.2.4

Radiological Controls

Strengths

Effective

use

of

a

maintenance

health

--

physics (HP) advisor

A well-organized training program

--

Weaknesses

Examples of a lack of continuity and pro-

--

ficiency in certain highly specialized jobs

because

of

frequent

technician

rotation

Indications of weak vertical communications

--

within the HP group

2.3.2.5

Surveillance

Strength

_

Management commitment to improve an already

--

satisfactory program

Weakness

Incomplete resolution of proper frequency

--

and scheduling of once per-refueling outage

tests 2.3.2.6

Security

Strength

Overall management attention

--

Weaknesses

None

.

2.3.2.7

Training

.

Strengths

Excellent management support for operator

--

training programs

-

,-

.

.

8

Strong relations between the plant opera-

--

tions and training departments

Weakness

Lack of a defined process to assure timely

--

identification and implementation of train-

ing needs resulting from newly approved or

revised procedures

2.3.2.8

Engineering Support

Not directly reviewed. No specific strengths

--

or weaknesses identified

2.3.2.9

Safety Assessment / Quality Verification

Strengths

Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee

--

(NSRAC) composition,

plant tour program,

frequency and location of meetings, open

forum, and focus of reviews

Attitude and performance toward identifying

--

problems

Effective, meaningful communications between

--

the Quality Assurance and plant Operations

departments

Weaknesses

Operations Review Committee does not perform

--

an effective independent group review of

operations

and

Technical

Specification

violations

Multiplicity of corrective action programs

--

without centralized tracking

Poor tracking of Potential Condition Adverse

--

to Quality (pCAQ) reports

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,

.

9

2.3.2.10 Management Oversight

Strengths

Well-defined

organization,

incorporating

--

appropriate span-of-control

and including

highly qualifted, experienced managers in

key positions

Well-defined and well-conceived corporate

--

goals

Weaknesses

None

2.4 Licensee Commitments

During the IAT inspection, the licensee made certain commitments to

the inspection feam. These commitments relate to licensee corrective

or enhancer.ent actions planned in response to Team findtegs or con-

cerns.

These commitments, summarized below, are discussed in more

detail in subsequent sections of this report, shown in parentheses.

Commitments were confirmed during the exit interview. The status of

these issues will be reviewed by the NRC prior to any restart of the

plant (83-21-01).

2.4.1

Procedure Validation and Training (Section 3.2.4)

isy restart, the licensee will confirm effective implementa-

tion of all of f-normal and E0P satellite procedures that

have been substantively revised during this outage.

2.4.2

Identifying Procedure Changes Requiring Training (Section

3.7.2.1)

Before restart, the licensee will implement a process to

l

allow more timely identification of new procedures and

l

procedure changes which require training.

.

2.4.3

Temporary Modifications (Section 3.2.5)

By restart, the licensee will either prepare a justifica-

tion for operation for each active temporary modification

or apply the temporary modification extension request

process to all temporary modifications, including those

with outstanding engineering seevice requests.

O

8

10

2.4.4

Operations Review Committee (ORC) (Section 3.10.3)

Prior to restart, in order to strengthen its operational

focus, the ORC will begin to:

(1) review plant incident

critiquas; (2) review licensee event reports before their

issuance to NRC; (3) review failure and malfunction reports

on a regular basis; and, (4) provide for a monthly presen-

tation and discussion of plant operations as a specific

agenda item.

2.4.5

Maintenance

Before restart, the licensee will re-evaluate all

--

priority 3 maintenance requests to ensure that they

have

been

properly

scheduled.

(Section

3.3.2.4)

The licensee will complete training addressing the

--

revised post-work testing program by September 9, 1988.

'

(Section 3.3.2.6)

The licensee will resolve the inability to align

--

valves in the Torus Water Makeup Line in accordance

with current operating procedures and drawings prior

to restart.

(Section 3.3.2.4)

The licensee will issue a procedure to provide appro-

--

priate controls for the

"Q"

oil storage facility by

September 7, 1988, and perform an evaluation of the

possible addition of "non-Q" oil to

"Q" equipment and

its potential effect.

(Section 3.3.2.3)

The licensee will complete, before restart, the dis-

--

position of a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality

(PCAQ) identifying the need for a review of Commercial

Quality Item procurement documents for consistency

with approved engineering specific 3tions.

(Section

3.3.2.3)

2.4.6

Surveillance

.

Before restart, the licensee will review and evaluate

--

the once per-refueling-outage surveillance tests to

determine if they should be repeated to enhance the

assurance of system operability and document the basis

for its decision.

(Section 3.4.2.1)

Before restart, the licensee will provide the tech-

--

nical basis for the current test frequency of the

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System logic

System Functional Test (LSFT) on the initiation logic.

(Section 3.4.2.2)

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

e

0

11

2.4.7

Formalizing Personnel Qualification Reviews

The licensee will verify before restart the qualifications

of all personnel within the organization required to meet

ANSI 18.1-1971; and, prior to completion of the power

,

ascension program, will have a formalized process in place

to ensure future auditability.

(Section 3.1.4)

2.4.8

Mission, Organization and Policy (MOP) Manual

The licensee will issue MOP policy instructions prior to

restart and the organizational position descriptiens prior

to completion of power ascension.

(Section 3.1.5)

,

2.4.9

Familiarizing Workers with Expected Radiological Conditions

Before restart, the licensee will provide training and

briefings to the appropriate plant staff regarding expected

radiological conditions resulting from plant operation and

hydrogen addition.

(Section 3.5.2.14)

2.4.10

Control Room Human Factors

The licensee will evaluate control room human factors dur-

ing the power ascension program and include an update

regarding the schedule and scope of "Paint, Label and Tape"

items in their report to the NRC at the completion of the

l

Power Ascension Program.

(Section 3.9.2)

1

i

i

,

1

!

.

-.-

_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

. _ _ _ _

.

.

12

-

3.0 DETAIL 3 0F INSPECTION

The following sections contain the scope of inspection, the detailed

i

findings, and the conclusions for each functional area the Team assessed.

3.1 Management Oversight

3.1.1

Scope of Review

The IATI assessed the organizational structure currently in

place at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS).

The

assessment also included the administrative processes in

place to control and coordinate the activities and actions

'

affecting safe and reliable operation of the PNPS. Other

areas inspected included the adequacy of staffing, qualifi-

cations of personnel, and mechanisms to enhance and promote

stability in the organization's technical and managerial

staff.

Several management meettags were observed by Team members

to assess the interactions of managers and the effective-

ness of the policies and procedures being implemented.

Continual observations were made and shared by Team members

to augment findings and conclusions in the effectiveness of

.

the organization, management controls, and communications

I

throughout the functional areas.

The Team members inter-

'

viewed a cross-section of personnel at all levels of the

'

organization to determine if the overall attitude towerd

performance of safety-related activities has

improved.

These obrervations and interviews also provided the Team

with insight into the worker perception of management

policies,

involvement, effectiveness and its resulting

impact on safety,

j

i

3.1.2

Organization

The NRC staff noted in the most recent SALP report No.

,

50-293/87-99

for February 1, 1987 through May 15, 1983,

'

that an organizational transition had taken place.

The

report also noted tnat several temporary changes, including

i

.

numerous changes in personnel, had been made to strengthen

planning, control and performance at PNpS. Many of these

'

temporary changes were incorporated into a permanent reor-

ganization in February 1988. The licensee continued to re-

fine the new organziation and control

process through

!

t

,

, , _ _ - , . . - - - - _ . _ - - - . ,

- .

- . - - ,

n-

, - - , ,

.

_ _ ____________ -.

_ _ _ _ _ _

,

.

,

,

13

.

July 1988, notified NRC of the reorganization, and subse-

quently requested an amendment in August 1988 to the admin-

istrative section of its Technical Specifications (TS) to

reflect the new organization. The notification and request

were

in accordance with the PNPS TS, Section 6.2.C.

"Changes to the Organization," which allows organizational

a

changes to be implemented without prior NRC approval, pro-

"

vided notification is made and a subsequent license amend-

ment request is submitted for NRC review and approval.

I

he organization assessed during this inspection is the

j

subject

of

the

licensee's

amendment

request

dated

August 1, 1988, and approved by the Senior Vice President -

s

Nuclear (SVP-N) on August 4, 1988.

The discussion that

follows does not describe in complete detail the entire

,

i

organization, focusing instead on that portion that affects

j

the functional areas being evaluated during this inspection

(See Figure 1).

The results of this inspection will be

,

considered in NRC's review of the licensee's amendment

'

request.

4

I

The Team noted that the licensee has incorporated a balance

]

between the number of management levels from the first-line

supervisors to the SVP-N and the span of control for each

,

i

functional unit. The SVP-N has the Station Director, Vice

l

President

Nuclear Engineering (VP-NE), Emergency Pre-

-

paredness Department manager and Quality Assurance Depart-

t

}

mert manager reporting directly to him. The two department

managers report directly to the SVP-N to assure that inde-

pendence and appropriate management attention are provided

based on their functional requirements and responsibilities.

The committee charged with offsite satety, the Nuclear

i

Safety Review and Audit Committee (NSRAC), reports directly

}

to the SVP-N. The committee for onsite safety review, the

!

Operations Review Committee (ORC), reports directly to the

Station Director.

The reporting of the of fsite committee

!

to the SVP-N and the onsite committee to the Station

Director are appropriate based on their responsibilities.

'

Details on these standirg committees, their functional

requirements, responsibilities and accountabilities, are

contained in Section 3.10 of this report.

,

!

!.

The VP-NE has two department-level managers reporting

Jirectly to him.

These departments are the Nuclear Engi-

i

neering Department av the Manatement Services Department

i

both of which are located offsite.

The Station Director

1

has four department-level managers reporting directly to

l

him:

the Plant Support Department, Plant Manager (Opera-

tions), Planning and Outage Department, and the Nuclear

1

!

Training Department.

1

.,

,.

- , _ . - - , - -

r

_ - _ . . _ _

_.

__

_

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _

.-

_.

.

q

.

.

I

<

-l

Chairsdn, Board of Directcr5

and CEO

Senior Vice President -

Nuclear

1

Director - Spec 141 Projects

14uclear Safety Review and Audit Coasnittee

I

i

W

4

l

Wice President -

Quality Assurance

Erergency Planning

Station Direc ar

rauclear Engineering

Department flanager

Departinent m nager

i

I

1

,

l

Nuclear Engineering

14uclear Management

Operations fteview

Plant Department

Plannirs &

Department stanager

Services Department

Consmittee

(Plant N nager)

Outage

Department

,

'

Manager

.

tianager

I

,

l

'

Plant Support

Wuclear Training

,

i

J Department

-l

Departs,aent

-

"*"*9'#

.

9"

Manager

Plant Operations

l

'

1

Sc tion Manager

Figure 1.

BOST0i1 E0150ri C0ftPAf4Y - PILGRIF. ORGAf41ZAT104

'

l-

- - _ ~ , . - -

.

.-.

,.

-

.-

-

.- -

_

, -

_.

,

n

15

The senior manager of the functional areas is at the

department level, which is then subdivided into section

levels and division levels. The first-line supervisors, in

some cases senior supervisors, report to the division

managers.

The station organization, now under a Station Director who

has no direct corporate (i.e., off-site) responsibilities,

represents a substantial change frcm previous organiza-

tions.

The current structure was instituted to strengthen

management attention to plant activities. The narrowing of

the span of direct control and responsibility of the Plant

Manager allows a more focused management and control of

operational activities, which should result in the enhance-

ment of safe and reliable operation.

The

martments

reportir.g to the VP-NE have been restructured r ., 1 more

even distribution of responsibilities.

The Team concluded that the current organizational struc-

ture provides for an appropriate distribution (span) of

responsibilities and accountabilities for the activities

being performed by the functional units within it.

The

depth (number) of managers in the functional areas should

contribute

to

improved performance and organizational

stability by providing managers with increased opportun-

ities to participate in professio.tal technical and manage-

ment development programs and by increasing the framework

for career growth.

The Team also concluded that the redistribution of func-

tional responsibilities and increased depth in management

provides the framework necessary to enhance stability and

support safe and reliable operation at PNPS.

The evidence

for these changes thus far has been management's effective-

ness in creating a much-improved nuclear safety ethic and

in improving the functional areas described in the subse-

quent sections of this report.

3.1.3

Staffing

The most recent SALP Report (No. 50-293/87-99) indicated

that the allocated staffing levels were significantly

higher than in the past.

The Nuclear Organization is cur-

,'

rently authorized a staffing level of 985. Approximately

90'. of the autho-ized positions are filled, of which 86*4

are licensee personnel; the remaining 4*4 cc.mprise contract

,

personnel. Licensee personnel fill all Key positions from

'

Section Managers and above, with less than

15*. of the

remaining managers and first-line supervisor positions

filled by contractors or licensee personnel in acting

,

capacities.

I

_ - -__ - - -- -_.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

______ _

,

16

Increased staffing in all levels of the Radiologica', and

Maintenance Sections are examples of how the licensee has

provided the necessary management attention and resources

to areas that need them.

The increased staffing, specif-

ically at the craf t and technician level, appears f.uffic-

ient to allow for a planned and controlled preventiv, main-

tenance program that should result in overall saf2ty en-

hancement.

The increased staffing levels also allow for

training on a routine schedule.

The Team concluded that the authorized staffing has been

filled to a level acceptable for the licensee to perform

all the necessary functions for all

plant canditions,

including operations.

This finding is reinforced by the

evidence of improvements in the functional areas, described

in the subsequent portions of this report.

3.1.4

Qualifications

The PNPS TS, Sectirn 6.4, "Facility Staff Qualifications,"

requires that PNPS personnel meet tSe requirements of the

American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N18.1-1971,

"Selection and Training of Personiel for Nuclear Power

Plants."

The TS also requires that the Radiation Protec-

tion Manager shall meet or exceed the qualifications of

Regulatory Guide 1.8,

"Quali fica tion and Training for

Personnel at Nuclear Power P1'.nts," September 1975.

The Team audited resumes and position descriptions of key

managers and other selec.ed pe c.onnel throughout the organ-

ization. Their educational ana experience backgrounds were

compared with the requiremerts delineated in ANSI N18.1-

1971Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI N18.1-</br></br>1971" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., with special attention on t.he management experience

of key personnel. No deficiencief, were identified relating

to the qualification requirements of the ANSI standard.

More significantly, the Team noted the staffing of key

management positions with persornel having extensive and

successful management experience.

During its review, the Team fouid that some resumes needed

updating, and that no formal, detailed instructions or

guidance in establishing qualifications were available. The

Team reviewed a Quality Assurance Department (QAD) audit

report of the organization's administrative controls which

was conducted June 22 througn July 22, 1988 and which

resulted in similar findings.

The report, Audit Report

8S-25, "Administrative Controls," dated August 18, 1938,

,

e

.

17

indicated that personnel qualifications were audited by the

QA0 to determine compliance with the ANSI N18.1 require-

ments for the organizational positions held.

No defici-

encies were identified as the result of the QA0 audit.

The

report did, howeser, provide a recommendation consistent

with the NRC inspector's finding. Specifically, Reccmmen-

dation No. 88-25-03, notes the need to update resumes,

develop guidelines and procedures for documenting qualifi-

.

cation status, and maintain retrievable files.

The licensee has committed to the Team to reverify the

qualifications of all personnel within the. organization to

.

confirm they comply with ANSI N18.1-1971 prior to restart

and to have a process in place prior to completion of the

Power Ascension Program to ensure future auditability of

personnel qualifications.

Within the scope of the NRC review, the Team deter-

mined that the licensee's personnel are generally well

qualified for the positions hsid within the organization.

The licansee's commitment to reverification of all per-

tonnel qualifications prio: to restart will provide addi-

tional assurance of full compliance relating to personnel

qualifications.

The results of the IATI effort in assessing the adequacy of

the staffing and qualifications of the PNPS organization is

consistent with the overall facility evaluation in the most

recent SALP report (No. 50-293/87-99).

It noted the addi"

tion of management personnel who lack extensive commercial

nuclear power plant operating experience.

However, as

acted above, recent changes have resulted in the addition

of personnel in key management positions with extensive and

successful management experience, much of which is in

nuclear areas.

Also, many mid-level management positions

are held by individuals who have extensive Pilgrim NPS (or

other boiling water reactor) experience.

The Team con-

cluded that the combination of commercial nuclear power

plant operating experience in the organization with the

increased management capebility provides the qualifications

necessary to support safe and reliable operation at PNPS.

In the event of a restart authorization, licensee safety

performance will be closely monitored by the NRC during the

Power Ascension Program.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - __ _ _ _ _

. _ _ _ _

,

,

18

3.1.5

Administrative Policy and Procedures

The licensee has a variety of procedures to provide policy,

control and coordination of organization activities. Cor-

porate policy is provided in the form of company Bulletins

maintained

in

a

Boston

Edison

Company Organizational

Manual. The manual includes information about the corpor-

ate organization, its policy statements, corporate instruc-

tions, and committees which affect the entire company,

including the Nuclear Organization.

The corporate level

policy specifically affecting the Nuclear Organization is

contained in a Mission, Organization and Policy (MOP)

manual.

The Nuclear Organization Procedures (NOPs) provide guidance

for the control and coordination of the Nuclear Organiza-

tion. They include administrative pro edures affecting the

entire organization, as well as proceduret affecting func-

tional portions of the organization.

Each department also

has procedures in place specifier 11y for its functional

areas.

The Team reviewed several :0Ps to assure that the

guidance provided was current, reflected the organization

in place, and addressed coordinating activities within the

organization.

The Team also reviewed department-level

procedures to assure they included the current organiza-

tion, toals, department function, position descriptions,

qualti, cations required, responsibilities, and accounta-

bilities.

The Team concluded that the proceoures are, for the most

part, current.

They adequately identify corporate policy,

organization,

coordination,

functional

requirements,

i

responsibilities,

accountabilities,

and

qualifications

nacessary for the control and coordination of actions

within the organization.

The Mission, Organization and Policy Manual (MOP) is not

fully up to date; however, and is currently being revised

to accurately reflect current policy and to include all the

-

position descriptions within the organization.

The licen-

see has identified additional refin1ments in the organi a-

t

tional position descriptions to assure consistancy and to

provide accurate definitions of responsibilitias necessary

to assure accountability.

The licensee was previously

aware of this and has been working to finalize the updates.

The licensee committed to issue the revised MOP which

L

v

a

e

h

F

19

includes updated policy prior to restart and to complete

the organizational position description refinements before

,

the end of the Power Ascension Program. This commitment is

acceptable, based on the status of the other procedures

previously discussed which assure adequate administrative

controls.

3.1.6

Communications and Observations

Corporate policy for the Nuclear Organization 1.4 the MOP

manual includes, among its goals, the nced to strive to

raise standards of performance, for dedication to protec-

ting the environment and public, and for rigorous adherence

to procedures.

The Team, through its observations and

interviews, noted a positive change in the attitude toward

nuclear safety throughout PNPS.

This change is evident in

improved performance of safety-related activities.

These

improvements are indicated in the most recent SALP Report

(No. 50-293/87-99), and progress in the other functional

areas is addressed in this inspection report.

The Team

also noted during interviews that the corporate goal of

adherence to procedures has been conveyed to all levels of

the organization.

These c'sservations attest to manage-

ment's ef fectiveness in communicating corporate goals and

management's oversight in assuring that the goals are being

pursued.

The Team noted that the licensee established several mech-

anisms to assure adequate communications within the organ-

ization.

Meetings at all levels of the organization are

held on a routine basis.

Plant meetings are held every

morning to discuss plant status and to coordinate daily

,

activities. Several of tiase meetings were observed by the

4

Team to assess the interaction of the managers and the

resulting effectiveness. The Team concluded that the meet-

ings were effective and that safety-related activities are

being planned, scheduled, and prioritized in accordance

'

with their safety significance and plant status. These and

other observations by the Team indicate that teamwork at

the site is evident.

There are programs in place, such as

the Workforce Information Program (WIP), For Your Informa-

tion (FYI), and Management Oversight and Assessment Team

(MO&AT) to enhance management involvement, overall communi-

cations, and management visibility in the plant.

!

l

t

f

I

___ _ _ _ _ _

_

__

_ _ _ _ _ _

0

20

The licensee has also established a set of performance

indicators to track performance issues, restart issues,

plant condition reports, and activity status.

These per-

formance indicators are used as a management tool

to

measure

the

effectiveness

and

results

of established

programs.

The Team concluded, based on its evaluation of programs

in place, that communications throughout the organization

have improved, that teamwork is evident, and that corporate

goals are being conveyed to all levels of the organization.

3.1.7

Conclusions

The Team concluded that the licensee has an acceptable or-

ganization and administrative process in place with ade-

quate management and technical resources to assure that

pNPS can operate in a safo and reliable manner during

normal and abnormal conditions.

This conclusion is based

on the details discussed above,

th'e performance-based

inspection in the functional areas covered by the IATI, the

overall consistency in the findings of this inspection with

the most recent SALP (No. 50-293/87-99), and the plan for a

structured and controlled power ascension program prior to

operation.

This performance-bc

-d inspection of a wide range of func-

tional areas provic.c an integrated look at overall manage-

.

ment effectiveness in ensuring high standards of nuclear

safety. The overall conclusions of this inspection confirm

f acility management ef fectiveness, especially with respect

to management's ability to perform self-assessment func-

tions,

to make performance improvements, and to raise

nuclear

safety

awareness

and

attitudes

within

the

organization.

- _ _ _ __

.. .

_ _ _ _ _ _

__

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.____________

__

.

.

21

3.2 Operations

3.2.1

Scope of Reviev

i

The Team evaluated operations by observing how supervisors,

operators and staff performed in the control room and

throughout the plant.

The Team observed plant operations

during backshifts from August 10 through August 13, 1988,

and reviewed staffing levels to determine if they were

sufficient to support restart with minimal reliance on

overtime.

The ability to implement recently written E0P

satellite procedures and the quality of thesce procedures

were evaluated through a field walkdown of a procedure.

The implementation of administrative controls for opera-

tions was evaluated through inspections of overtime con-

trols, temporary modification controls, operator-required

reading, logkeeping, tagouts, and operator aids. The line-

up of two safety systems was independently verified by the

.

!

inspectors.

Housekeeping was observed during frequent

plant tours.

{

3.2.2

Conduct of Operations

The Team observed control reor,. operations en all shifts.

They were conducted in a formal manner, with effective

l

,

communications between

the operators

and

supervisors,

including repeat backs for certain functions. There was no

'

unnecessary traffic in the control

room.

Supervisors

briefed shift personnel on significant functions before

they occurred.

prior to energizing the recirculating pump

heaters, which could have produced smoke in the drywell,

'

the watch engineer thoroughly briefed to the reactor oper-

,

ator, equipment operator, and fire brigade leader,

t

The watch engineers, shif t supervisors, and reactor opera-

tors were knowledgeable about plant conditions and ongoing

work in the plant.

Shif t turnover briefings were thorough

i

and were followed by control room panel walkdowns. Attend-

i

ance at these briefings was inconsistent in that not all

wa:ch enginaars include other shift personnel, och as

health phytics shift workers in the pre-shift briefing.

The Teata observed that the health physics shift workers

receive separate briefings.

.ae Team discussed this prac-

t

tice with plant management, which stated that it was their

[

intent to include non-operations shif t workers in the pre-

!

t

!

shift briefing and that they would review its implementa-

t i o r, .

l

J

t

l

I

'

,

<

- - _ . _ - - _ _ .

--,

- _ -

__ _

_

.-

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

22

Control room operators received good support from the shift

technical advisors (STA), administrative assistants, and

other departments. The STA's were used in developing fail-

ure and malfunction reports (F&MR), and in the initial

followup of an EOD satellite procedure issue.

The admin-

istrative assistants do much of the administrative paper-

work and help to lessen traffic in the control room. There

was very good support of operations from other departments

in understanding and deciding che proper course of action

in response to F&MR events.

The Team accompanied several non-licensed equipment oper-

ators (E0's) on their tours.

The E0's performed their

plant tours in accordance with Procedure 2.1.16, "Nuclear

Power Operator Tour." Readings were taken and recorded, as

required. The operators also checked for abnormal condi-

tions,

such as vibrations, noise, leakage, odors, and

inadequate ventilation.

The E0's commented that they now

have more time to check general piant conditions on their

rounds beer.use the rounds are assigned to two E0's per

shift.

Previously, only one E0 made the plant tour.

The

E0's showed good regard for radiological protection and

ALARA practices. The operators were very familiar with the

plant, systems, and components, and were knowledgeable

about their duties and responsibilities.

The performance

by these operators demonstrated the effectiveness of the

non-licensed training program.

Watch engineers or operating supervisors accompany E0's on

plant tours at least once per week. Operations management,

including the chief ope atug engincar and operations

manager, were observed totring the control room frequently

and discussing plant status and evolutions with the watch

engineer.

i

The Team discussed the licentee's use of NRC's NUREG-1275,

"Operati.ig Ex9erience Feedback Report-New Plants" and ver-

iftad that licensee managemett had reviewed NUREG-1275

recommendations for applicabili'y,

BECo had independently

Initiated a number of improvemeats related to NUREG-1275

.

recommendations before they reviewed the ruort.

This

action was considered by the Team as a positiva example of

the quality of BEco self-improvement ef forts.

Some self-

identified improvement items include operator communica-

tions training, seminars to improve attention to detail,

splitting tours and revising tour sheets to improve equip-

ment operator performarce, and doing dry run training on

.

_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _

._.

._ __ __ _

. - _________.-____ _-_______-____

. _ _ _

O

O

23

the pcwer ascension and alternate safe shutdown evolutions.

Some improvement items resulting from the NUREG review

include seeking a more positive method of performing on-

shift instructions, repeating all logic system functional

tests, and performing a comprehensive review of inadvertent

emergency safety feature (ESF) actuations.

The ESF actua-

tion review has resulted in several corrective actions.

In summary, the licensee conducted operations in a profess-

ional manner.

Operators are knowledgeable about

their

duties and plant conditions and management keeps an active

and effective oversight of operations.

3.2.3

Shift Staffing and Overtime Controls

The licensee's Ser.ior Reactor Operators (SRO) are ver/

experienced and strengthen the operations organization.

To take advantage of this experience, an extra SRO will be

t

assigned to each shift during the Power Ascension Test

Program. Only 8 Reactor Operators (RO) have unrestricted

licenses because the 14 newly licensed RO's are limited

pending on-watch training and reactivity manipulations dur-

'

ing the Power Ascension Program.

Therefore, the licensee

will initially staff a four-shift rotation during plant

restart. At an appropriate point after restart, the licen-

see will go to a six-shif t rotation of two SRO's and two

RO'S per shift.

There are also sufficient non-licensed

equipment operators to staff six shifts. STA's will work a

five-shift rotation for at least the not year.

These

staffing levels are considered adequate.

It should not be necessary to work ope ators in excess of

the overtime guidelines of NRC Generic Letter 82-12. Senior

i

plant management has been active in restricting overtime.

Procedure 1.3.6.7, "Use and Control of Overtime at PNPS,"

adopts NRC guidelines, provides procedural controls for

overtime hours, and requires advance approval of overtime.

The

inspector reviewed Operations Department overtime

records for the period of July 6,1988 to August 16, 1988.

l

During this period, there were only three occasions when

!

.

staff worked greater than 56 hours6.481481e-4 days <br />0.0156 hours <br />9.259259e-5 weeks <br />2.1308e-5 months <br /> in a 7-day period. Dur-

ing this period, there was one instance of overtime in

,

excess of NRC guidelines.

This occurred August 1 and 2

when a radwaste worker worked 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> in a 48-hour period.

This worker had approval to work up to 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> that week

but did not have approval to exceed the 48-hour guideline.

This worker is not a licensed operator and was not doing

'

safety-related work. The licensee identitied this incident

and counseled the individual on overtime requirements.

_ _ _ _ _

o

24

l

3.2.4

Procedure Validation

The Team walked down Procedure 5.3.26, "Reactor Pressure

Vessel Injection During Emergencies," with a non-licensed

equipment operator who had been trained in the procedure,

i

The procedure involved connecting a fire water crosstie to

the residual heat ro;noval (RHR) system.

Minor procedure

(

errors were found. A drain valve labeled 1-DR-122 in the

l

field is referred to as 1-DR-121 and the fire water storage

'

tank low level alarm is referred to as annunciator B-7,

whereas it is actually 0-3.

Also, the procedure instructs

the operator to "connect the locel flow meter" without

specifying

the

instrument

number.

The

procedure was

actually referring to a st ra t r.e r differential pressure

indicator, instrument number 33-PID-4610. The operator did

not simulate connecting this instrument and when questioned

by the Team, he stated that the step referred to flow n)eter

FI 4609 which was already connected. Of more significance

was confusion caused by step IV.B.2.b, which instructs the

operator to install jumpers to defeat LPCI initiation and

PCIS isolation signals and operate LPCI injection valves 28

and 29. The equipment operator requested the assistance of

the watch engineer and the STA.

These watchstanders

initially felt the jumper was not needed,

iha jumper is

not directly ' elated to LPCI valves 28 and 29, but is

needed to provide a flow path for a fire pump and to pre-

pare for contingencies in the E0Ps.

Procedure 5.3.26 was one of eight new procedures written by

contractors and validated by contractors.

All eight of

these procedures are therefore suspect and will be revali-

dated by licensee operations staff before restart.

All

other E0P satellite procedures and other abnormal operating

procedures substantially changed daring this outage will

also be revalidated before restart.

The licensee did not perform any QA audits or surveillances

on the writing of procedures by contractors. However, the

licensee has performed surveillances of the procedure

validation process used on procedures other than the E0P

satellite procedures.

Surve111ances #87-9.3-9 and #88-1.

1-56 found that half of the procedures being revised and

implemented in April and May 1988 were not being validated.

As a result of this finding, procedure 1.3.4-4, "Procedure

Validation," was issued August 15, 1983.

- _ _____

__

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. _ _ . _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

___ _______ _ __.

.

.

25

There were also somt, training aspects to this procedure

issue.

The equipment operator was trained on Rev. O of

5.3.26 which did not include the instruction to connect the

local flow meter, whereas the inspector used Rev. 1. Licen-

,

sed operators were trained on the control room portion of

the E0P satellite procedures and equipment operators were

trained in the procedural steps outside the control room.

The problem with the jumpers occurred at the interface

between these operators.

Following the procedures revali-

dation discussed above, the licensee will provide addt-

tional training as needed.

During a NSRAC meeting conducted ' on August 2,1988, the

committee discussed an open concern on the validation and

upgrade of plant procedures.

NSRAC concluded that they

were concerned that all of tne routine operating procedures

had not been validated by one o' the validation processes.

Following the meeting, the committee forwarded a concern to

the SVP-N concerning the operating procedures necessary for

long-term operation of the plant.

The plant staff is

scheduled to respond to NSRAC on September 14, 1988.

The

NRC will review this response during a subsequent inspec-

tion.

3.2.5

Temporary Modification Controls

The Team observed that current logs show that about 15 tem-

porary modifications (TMs) are in effect, some of which

date back to 1983. Fif teen is not an unusual or unmanage-

able number of TM's, and represents a significant reduction

from previous conditions.

The Team reviewed nine TM's initiated 1987 and prior years

and noted (1) only three of the nine modifications affected

safety-related systems; (2) licensee safety evaluations

(SE) were filed in the TM package, which demonstrated the

interio

configurations

created

were

acceptable;

and,

(3) licensee actions to address the TM's by conversion to

permanent modifications were apparently based on engineer-

ing service requests and plant design changes referenced in

.

the TM packages.

Team review of the SE's on a sampling

basis did not identify any inadequacies. Further, the Team

noted that reduction of the TM backlog has been a licensee

priority.

I

t

!

L

~

.

_ _ _

_

_ __

_

26

Plant Procedure 1.5.9,

"Temporary Modi fications," allows

temporary modifications to be open for six months and pro-

vides a mechanism for active TM's to be extended. However,

this mechanism is typically not used. Procedure 1.5.9 does

not require a review of the TM for extension of the expira-

tion date if an engineering service request (ESR) for a

permanent design change is in effect for the TM. Of seven

TM's reviewed, six had ESR's and therefore did not have a

current approved extension date.

The inspector indicated

that good engineering practice would dictate continuance of

the periodic reviews for all TM's, and licensee management

agreed. The licensee committed to either prepare a justi-

fication for operation for every TM that is still open

prior to startup or to revise the procedure to apply the TM

extension request process to all TM's, including those with

outstanding ESR's.

TM 84-77 was selected for detailed followup review to

assess the technical adequacy of the change on a temporary

basis and to evaluate the extent and timeliness of licensee

followup actions to either remove the temporary modifica-

tion or convert it to a permanent change to the facility.

The modification involved the replacement of an FCR-type

relay in cubical 72-754 of the DC motor control center for

the RCIC 1301-22 valve.

The valve is in the suction path

from the condensate storage tank (CST), is normally open

for RCIC standby and initial operation, and will cycle

closed on low level in the CST.

After failure of the

existing TCR relay (an open circuit coil), an HFA-type

relay was installed on December 17, 1934 and made elec-

trically equivalent to the original circuit.

An HFA was

used because an FCR relay was not available onsite.

The

change did not affect the normal function of the valve.

Engineering

Service

Request

(ESR)85-368,

dated

July 22, 1985, requested engineering to convert the change

to a permanent modification, with a completion date of

November 22, 1985.

ESR response memorandum NED 86-1275,

dated December 31, 1986, rejected the ESR request to make

the change permanent because of two concerns involving the

need to keep the wiring in the 72-754 cubical consistent

with other DC motor control centers (MCC) and the assumed

differences in the inrush and coil holding currents between

the two types of relays.

In rejecting the request, engi-

neering found that the change was acceptable on a temporJry

basis, but recom. mended restoration of the original design.

.

.

27

A Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) Report (No.

NED 86-110) was issued to assess the deviations.

Further

l

engineering evaluation was requested by ESR 88-080, dated

January 27, 1988, with action requested by May 1, 1988.

Further engineering review determined that the change would

be acceptable as a permanent modification, which was made

by FRN 87-80-52 to PDC 87-80 dated June 14, 1988.

The plant design change (PDC) modified the drawing to per-

manently document the change and addressed the scismic ade-

quacy of the HFA relay installation. The HFA relay was not

certified to be environmentally qualified since the 1301-22

valve is not nn the EQ master list and environmental qual-

ification (EQ) is not required. The PDC also addressed the

adequacy of the inrush and holding current characteristics

of the HFA reley.

The second engineering review found the

HFA current characteristics to be better than those of the

FCR relay.

The Team discussed the bases for the original and final

engineering determinations via telephone on August 17, 1988

with engineering (NED)

The Team noted that engineering

.

initially rejected the proposed design change based on

l

!

information indicating larger power consumption by the HFA

relays, and based on a concern that, if replacement of the

FCRs with HFAs became a general practice, a problem could

result in the increase in DC loads.

Those concerns were

.

not realized since the FCR failure was a random one, and

l

the operating current characteristics of the HFAs are

l

better than initially assumed.

Based on the above, the Team identified no technical con-

cerns with the licensee's dispositioning of the adequacy of

>

the modification.

The Team noted that licensee action on the original 1985

ESR was not timely in either the preparation of the

original ESR or the followup actions by NED in response to

the site request. However, the actions to respond to ESR

88-80 and disposition the issue in 1988 were greatly

improved.

The Team audited the six tag outs for TM 84-22 and found

that MCC R25 was missing two TM tags. Since this is a non

safety-related modification which is about to be withdrawn,

this was not considered by the Team to be of safety signif-

icance.

It does indicate; however, the need to period-

ically recheck TM tagouts.

._ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

28

An additional concern is that in the following example the

licensee performed a TM without implementing the formal

review and approval process. During a tour of the reactor

building on August 8,1988, the Team noted that reactor

'

pressure boundary leak detection system monitors C-19A and

C-19B had their doors propped open, and each monitor had a

large fan tied to the opening.

Investigation identified

that no temporary modification had been processed to

evaluate and authorize this alteration.

The

licensee

stated that elevated temperatures in the cabinets result in

failure of the monitor electronics and have been a long-

standing

problem.

Engineering response to Engineering

Service Request (ESR)85-462 implemented a reduction in

system heat-tracing temperature.

This alteration did not

resolve the problem, and on August 6,1988, the licensee

initiated ESR 88-558 requesting further engineering review,

Monitors C-19A and C-19B are required to be operable by

Technical Specifications during power operations so that

some short-term action and long-term resolution are needed.

Since the monitors are not currently required to be oper-

able, the licensee has de-energized them and removed the

fans pending evaluation.

In sumary, even though the licensee has been aggressive in

4

reducing the number of TM's, there have been some lapses in

their control of temporary modifications. This indicates a

need for continued licensee management attention to this

area,

3.2.6

Required Reading Books

The Team reviewed the "Required Reading" books in the con-

trol room.

The books consist of three large binders that

contain procedure changes.

They provide a method for

promptly updating operators on plant and procedure changes.

Each piece of information in the book had a sign-off sheet

to ensure that all operations personnel read the material.

The Team noted that information in the books dated back to

April 1983 and many of the procedure changes had not been

signed of f as read by all personnel. This appears to indi-

cate that the program is not being monitored routinely by

operations management. Material remaining in the book for

long periods defeats the purpose of providing timely infor-

mation on changes to the operators.

Conversely, if the

changes are not important to operations personnel, it may

not be necessary to put them in the books.

The Team discussed these observations with the Plant Opera-

tions Section Manager.

Some improvement was noted later

during the IAT inspection, as a result,

,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

29

3.2.7

Logs

The Team reviewed the implementation of the Technical Spec-

ification Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO) log, the

Otsabled Annunciator Alarm Log, and the operations super-

visor

log

procedures.

The

LCO

log was

implemented

August 18, 1988,

by

Procedure

SI-OP.0008,

"Limiting

Conditions for Operations Log," dated July 25,1988, and

was

being

used

on

a

trial

basis

from August 8

to

August 18, 1988.

The only LCO entered after the log was

implemented, LC0 A-88-002, was properly entered, tracked,

and cleared.

Procedure SI-OP.008 is being revised to

incorporate lessons learned in its initial implementation.

The Disabled Annunciators Alarm Log is controlled by Pro-

cedure 2.3.1, General Action Alarm Procedures, Item VII.

The inspector observed eight disabled annunciator tags on

control room annunciators. All eight were properly logged.

However, only two of the eight annunciators had a mainten-

ance request (MR) issued.

The shift supervisor informed

the Team that disabled annunciators without MRs occurred

due to plant conditions and will be returned to service

before startup.

The licensee aud'ts disabled annunciators

monthly under preventive maintenance (FM) Procedure S. A.24

"Audit of Control Room Annunciators and Instruments," which

should assure that these annunciators are returned to ser-

vice before startup.

There was little activity in the control room during this

inspection, but the Team did observe the following items

properly logged in the operations supervisor's log: LCO's,

Failure and Malfunction Reports, a fire drill, and spent

fuel pool temperatures while the fuel pool pumps were

out of service for maintenance.

However, as discussed in

Section 3.I .8 below, changes in jumpers or lif ted leads

were not logp i in the operations supervisor's log.

The Team concluded that log keeping practices are generally

adequate.

3.2.8

Timely Update of Lif ted Lead / Jumper Log

During a review of the Lif ted Lead / Jumper (LL/J) procedure

and program implementation on August 16, 1988, the Team

identified that the log was not being n;aintained comoletely

up-to-date. Eight entries in the LL/J log involved lif ted

leads or jumpers installed on July 14, 1988, to perform

main station battery werk anc testing per Maintenance Work

Plan (MdP) S7-46-173.

All eight requests were associated

with the same M4P. All log entries showed the LL/J request

_ _ _ _ _ _ .

._.

_ _______ -_ ___ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ - _ _ _

.

.

30

was still active on August 16, 1988. The Team found that

,

the batteries had been returned to normal and LL/J request

was closed out on July 29,1988, and that Maintenance

Request 87-46-173 was completed on August 1,1988, inclu-

sive of the post-work testing.

Step 5.3.1.5 of Station

Procedure 1.5.9.1, "Lif ted Leads and Jumpers," states that

the person performing the LL/J request is to notify the

Watch Engineer when the system is returned to normal by

removing the jumpers or landing the lif ted leads.. The

Watch Engineer is responsible for updatino the LL/J log.

The findings were referred to operations personnel on

August 16, 1988 for followup.

Licensee followup review confirmed that the work had been

completed and the log should have been updated.

The log

was updated to show the correct status on August 16, 1988.

In response to the inspector's findings, the licensee co..-

ducted an audit of the log.

The licensee's audit identi-

fied (1) two instances where the log had not been updated,

and (2) that operations personnel were not making entries

in the Operation's Supervisor log when LL/J log entries

were made.

These matters were referred to the Operations

!

Section for followup and corrective action.

QA followup

and trending will be covered by QA Surveillance Report

,

88-94-61.

4

The licensee reported that the cause of the discrepancy was

the failure of m61ntenance personnel to inform operations

j

that the jumpers and lif ted leads were cleared when the

i

systems were returned tb normal. Inspector interviews with

j.

the Maintenance Supervisor responsible for MR 87-46-173

noted that he failed to discuss the closecut action on the

4

LL/J request as a result of a misunderstanding on the

status of the work package closeout during shift turnover

with another maintenance supervisor.

Team review concluded the inaccurate LL/J log had minimal

significance and no impact on safe plant eperations for

these cases.

There was no loss of control of the physical

plant configuration.

Plant operators would have reviewed

the LL/J log as a prerequisite to plant restoration and

startup.

This review would have identified the open log

entries and

the completed closecut actions.

Further,

licensee followup to the discrepancies identified by the

Teara were prompt and appropriate.

Based on the above, and

in recognition that the jumper and lifted lead log is a new

tracking system, no further NRC action is warranted at this

time.

This

area will

receive

further

review during

subsequent routine NRC inspections.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -

.

.

31

3.2.9

Tagouts and Operator Aids

The Team reviewed the licensee's administrative controls

for use of protective tagging at PNPS.

The Team reviewed

Procedure No.1.4.5, "PNPS Tagging Procedure," Revision 23,

which is to be implemented September 1,1938, and noted

that this procedure was revised to address concerns with

tag controls identified during the licensee's self-assess-

L

ment.

Specifically, the procedure limits the use of Nu-

clear Watch Engineer (NWE) tags; prohibits the use of dan-

ger (red) tags for identification purposes on lifted leads;

and requires documented monthly reviews, including field

verification, of NWE, Caution and Master Danger tags and

tagout sheets.

The Team reviewed the NWE and caution tag

logs and independently verified that several NWE, caution,

danger, and master danger tags were properly filled out,

properly hung, and positioned as required on the compon-

ents.

No discrepancies were identified.

Based on this

review, the Team concluded that the licensce's control of

protective tagging was adequate and properly implemented.

The Team also reviewed the licensee's control of operator

1

aids as established by Procedure No. 1.3.34, "Conduct of

Operations." An operator aid is information in the form of

sketches, notes, graphs, instructions, or drawings used by

personnel authorized to operate plant equipment. The Team

reviewed the operations and chemistry operator aid log and

determined that it was maintained in accordance with the

i

procedure. The Team noted that periodic licensee reviews

1

and verification of the need for and placement of operator

aids were documented.

The Team independently verified

proper posting of selected operator aids, and no unauthor-

ized aids were identified during the Team's plant tours.

Based on this review, the Team concluded that the licen-

-

see's control of operator aids was adequate.

3.2.10

Plant Tours and System Walkdowns

3.2.10.1 Miscellaneous Tour Observations

!

The IATI Team made frequent plant tours.

The

overall material condition of rooms and equip.

I

ment was excellent.

Particularly notable was

cleanliness, fresh paint, and obvious decontam-

,

ination efforts to make major portions of plant

and equipment accessible. Comnonent labeling and

tagging was very good,

j

i

l

l

l

l

[

l

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

O

8

32

The Team observed activities in progress.

Per-

sons interviewed on tour (HP, security, opera-

tions

contractor)

had

experience

in

their

positions and were knowledgeable about their work

and duties.

HPs were cognizant of work activ-

ities in progress.

Housekeeping controls were

being maintained during work in progress.

The Team reviewed the status of indicators and

controls on selected local panels.

Controls and

indications were operable and no deficiencies

were noted. Operating procedures required to be

posted at the local panels were available and

adequate, based on Team review.

The Team observed loose cable tray covers includ-

ing one that was laying on top of an in place

cover.

The licensee reviewed this finding and

documented the review and corrective actions in

an engineering "white paper." This review deter-

mined that loose covers do not compromise the

design but that covers laying on top of in place

cable tray covers could be a seismic concern.

The misplaced cover found by the Team was deter-

mined to not be needed.

The licensee surveyed

cable trays throughout the process buildings and

found additional loose covers but no more that

were completely unfastened and laying on top of

other covers.

Corrective actions completed in-

clude refastening the loose covers, removing the

misplaced cover, revising procedure SI-SG.1010

"Systems Group System Walkdown Inspection Guide-

line," to use periodic walkdowns by the system

engineering division to identify seismic con-

cerns, such as misplaced tray covers, and prepar-

ing F&MR No.88-200, which will be used to deter-

mine how to keep future maintenance and modifica-

tion work

from creating

loose

or misplaced

covers.

The Team concluded that the licensee's

response to this issue was thorough and adequate.

The Team considers this issue resolved.

3.2.10.2 Diesel Generator Walkdown

A walkdown of the 'A' diesel generator (DG) was

completed on August 15, 1988, to verify opera-

bility and standby readiness of the emergency

power supply, and to observe the general condi-

tions in the 03 area.

The valve checkof f lists

of Procedure

2.2.8,

"Standby AC power System

(Diesel Generators) " were used as acceptable

criteria to establish the proper system valve

- _ _ _ _

.

s

33

positions.

The procedure checklists were also

reviewed for adequacy agatast Drawings M219 and

M224, and by comparison with the physical plant

during a walkdown of the diesel skid and room.

Proper valve lineup was verified for the DG fuel

oil and air start systems. This review confirmed

that the 'A' DG was operable in the standoy modo.

Cleanliness and the general condition of equip-

ment and components in the diesel rooms were

excellent.

Valve and component identification

(tags) and labeling were very good and showed

significant improvement in performance in com-

parison to past reviews. Several minor discrep-

ancies were noted, as follows:

(1)identifica-

tion tags were missing on valves 104C and 118,

and the tag was loose on valve 105C; (2) valve

118 was required to be locked in the closed

position and a chain and padlock were provided

for this purpose; however, the chain was suffic-

iently loose that the Team would have been able

to defeat the lock and thereby move the valve;

(3) the inner fire door granting access to the

'A'

DG skid had worn and damaged gaskets along

the closing surface and the door latching mech-

anisms (dogs) were misaligned with the position

indicators; (4) no permanent lighting was instal-

led in the ' A' and 'B'

diesel day tank rooms --

lighting, if installed, would aid operator re-

views during plant tours; and, (5) two isolation

valves for pressure switches 4555A and 4556A were

not labeled with an 10 tag in the plant and were

not identified on system drawings or procedures.

The valves were properly positioned.

Addition-

ally,

proper

valve

position

is demonstrated

indirectly during the monthly functional test of

the diesel air start system.

These discrepancies were noted by the Nuclear

Plant Operator accompanying the Team and were

discussed with the duty Watch Engineer. Actions

were taben to document and correct the discrep-

ancies, inclucing the issuance of Maintenance

Request 88-61-83 for the fire door.

Inspector

followup review on August 16, 1988 confirmed that

actions were in progress and had been completed

to correct the tag on valve 105C and to properly

lock valve 118.

Licensee response to the Team's

findings was appropriate and timely.

No other

inadequacies were noted.

__-______ __ ___

.

.

34

3.2.10.3 Standby liquid Control System Walkdown

'

The Team walked down the standby liquid control

(SBLC) system using the valve checklist in Pro-

cedure No. 2.2.?4, "Valve Lineup for Standby

Liquid Control System," and piping and instrument

diagram (P&ID) M-249. This review was performed

to verify the adequacy of the procedure checklist

and P&ID, evaluate the valve labeling, evaluate

the control of locked valves, verify the opera-

bility of instrument and support systems, and

assess the overall material Condition of the sys-

tem and general cleanliness of the area.

The

Team noted that the checklist control of vent and

drain capped connections differed from other

safety system procedures, such as those for the

residual heat removal (RHR) and core spray (CS)

systems. For example, an outboard vent valve on

the CS checklist would be "locked, closed and

espped." The SBLC procedure only checks "locked,

closed." No deficiencies with capped connections

were noted, however.

The Team also noted that

the vent valve for pressure indicator (PI) 1159

was not on the valve checklist.

The licensee

agreed to review these observations to determine

if the procedure needed to be revised.

No other

deficiencies or concerns were noted.

Overall, the Team found the valve labeling, mate-

rial condition, and general cleanliness to be

excellent.

3.2.11

Conclusions

The operations staff conducted their activities in a pro-

fessional manner. Operators were knowledgeable about their

duties and about plant status. The depth of experience and

knowledge of senior licensed operators is a strength and

will be a major asset du ri r.3 restart.

Shift turnover

.

briefings by individual operators and for the shift are

thorough; however, non-operations shift workers do not

routinely attend these briefings. Site management involve-

ment in operations was evident by their frequent presence

in the control room.

Shift staffing levels are adequate

and plant housekeeping was excellent

O

O

35

1

!

.

A weakness was noted in the validation and/or training of

E0P satellite procedures.

The licensee's commitment to

confirm effective implementation of E0P satellite and off-

normal procedures before restart is responsive to NRC con-

cerns.

Administrative controls and log-keeping practices

,

i

l

are generally adequate, although required reading materials

'

!

are not being reviewed by all personnel on a timely basis.

l

There are lapses in the licensee's control of temporary

4

modifications, particularly the absence of periodic reviews

and scheduled completion dates for temporary modifications

covered by an engineering services request,

i

!

l

l

l

I

I

i

r

l

L __

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - _________ ____-__ _

..

__

_ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

36

3.3 Maintenance

3.3.1

Scope of Review

The licensee's maintenance program has undergone signifi-

cant change during the past several months. Weaknesses had

been identified during the SALP period ending May 15, 1988,

,

,

and by Special NRC Maintenance Team Inspection 50-293/

~

88-17.

During the present inspection, the licensee's main-

'

tenance policies and program procedures were reviewed.

Maintenance activities were evaluated during the planning,

implementation, post work testing and closecut

stages.

Emphasis was placed on direct observation of ongoing werk

in the field.

Interviews were conducted with personnel at

each level within the maintenance department to determine

their depth of understanding of program goals.

The Team

'

,

also assessed the size and significance of the licensee's

l

maintenan'.e backlog, and reviewed established licensee

performance indicators.

1

3.3.2

Observations and Findings

3.3.2.1

Management Policies and Goals

'

The Team reviewed the licensee's Mission Organ -

tration and Policy Manual, Nuclear Operations

Procedures

Manual,

and

Maintenance

Section

Manual.

These documents describe the licensee's

'

policy and performance goals for the maintenance

l

l

program. The licensee has also established the

,

Material

Condition

Improvement

Action

Plan

!

,

(MCIAP).

The MCIAP, which is described in the

,

i

licensee's Restart Plan, is designed to achieve

!

long-term improvement in the maintenance program.

>

In addition, maintenance performance indicators

r

are being used by the licensee to evaluate the

success of recent program changes and the allo-

cated maintenance staff has been increased sig-

'

'

nificantly.

Interviews with maintenance person-

nel at various levels within the department indi-

, .

cate

that

the

organization

and

management

,

policies are generally well understood.

,

1

,

i

$

l

i

I

!

,

(

l

,

<

6

,

'

.

,

.

,

37

i

3.3.2.2

Organization and Staffing

The maintenance organization and staffing levels

were reviewed.

Interviews were conducted with

division

supervisors

and

staff personnel

to

determine whether organizational

relationships

were well

understood.

The

current

staffing

status was evaluated, particularly in the super-

visor, maintenance engineer, and planning post-

tions, to determine whether staffing levels were

adequate, responsibilities clearly defined, and

resources effectively used.

The maintenance section consists of three pro-

duction divisions (electrical,

instrumentation

and control and mechanical), plus a planning

,

division and an engineering group. All division

manager positions and all first-line supervisor

i

positions in the production divisions are filled

,

with licensee employees, except for two positions

in the equipment tool room, which are presently

filled by contractors.

Increased stiffing at the

craft level in the production divisions has been

i

authorized.

Instrumentation and Control (I&C)

will increase from 22 to 30 positions; Electrical

'

Maintenance will increase from 14 to 18 post-

tions; and Mechanical Maintenance will increase

from 27 to 33 positions.

Staffing of the plan-

ning division has not baen completed.

Twelve

contractor personnel are presently being used to

perform the planning function, with assistance

from the licensee's outage management group.

This arrangement is performing acceptably, as

described in Section 3.3.2.4

Team

interviews

with

supervisors

and

craft

'

empicyees showed that personnel clearly under-

stand the new program and their area of respon-

sibility. The interviews covered personnel with

a wide range of experience in their positions,

including those newly assigned.

The Team noted;

however, that the recently revised job descrip-

)

tions for the section have not been disseminated

to the staff.

The Maintenance Manager stated

that they would be issued in the near future.

!

!

!

. _ _ - - . __

e

O

38

Two positions in the new maintenance section

organization, the Deputy Manager and the Radio-

logical Advisor, are effectively being used. The

Radiological Advisor is a permanent staff post-

tion and provides a focus for interface with the

Radiological Protection Group. Team observations

indicated that the Deputy Manager was effective

in scheduling and coordinating activities through

his interface with other sections,

j

The Team's review indicated that licensee staff-

ing is ample to meet targeted production goals

without reliance on the use of excessive over-

time. While some variations occur, the percent

of overtime worked has been at or slightly above

the operatirg goal of 20*4, which equals a 48-hour

work week.

Work schedules for craf t and super-

.

visory personnel provide I day off in a 7-day

!

period.

The maintenance staff is working pri-

marily on the day shif t, with night shif t cover-

age provided for certain critical jobs in pro-

gress.

The licensee plans to provide around-

the-clock 8-hour shifts that will match the

Operations

Section

rotating

shift

schedule,

beginning with plant startup. Maintenance shift

coverage will continue through the power escala-

tion sequence and on a redaced scale afterwards.

Licensee staffing is sufficient to staff the

shift schedule without reliance on excessive

overtime.

New personnel assigned to the division manager

and production supervisor positions have adequate

prior experience in related assignments.

The

Team's observations of the first- and second-line

supervisors in conducting their daily activities

showed that the supervisory, oversight, and con-

trol functions were effectively performed. Based

on these observations, the Team concluded that

the newly hired supervisory staff does not have a

negttive impact on the quality of control over

maintenance activities.

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,

.

39

In summary, identified strengths in the present

maintenance section organization include the use

of the Deputy Manager and

the

Radiological

Advisor.

The increase in supervisory positions

in the production divisions has been effective in

increasing oversight and control of work activ-

j

ities. While temporary staffing of the planning

division with contractors is sufficient and pro-

vides for an effective planning function (as

measured by the quantity and quality of mainten-

ance packages produced), plans to staff these

'

positions with permanent licensee employees by

October 1988 should remain a management priority

to assure timely integration of the planning and

i

scheduling functions. Management has controlled

overtime for the craf t and supervisory positions.

Plans to provide for maintenance staffing during

and after restart on an 8-hour rotating shift

basis should provide continued ef fective over-

time control.

3.3.2,3

Communications and Interfaces

Communication between the maintenance department

l

and other portions of the organization, particu-

[

larly operations and radiation protection, had

previously been a weakness.

The licensee has

,

taken successful steps towards improving communt-

cation, both internal to the maintenance depart-

,

ment and with other station groups.

The

Team attended a

variety of maintenance

department status and turnover meetings.

Based

,

on observation of the:S meetings and interviews

with maintenance personnel at each level of the

i

organization, the Team concluded that communica-

tions internal to the maintenance staff are ef-

[

fective.

Maintenance department managers vare

cognizant of the status of activities and of

f

emerging problems.

J

l

The

licensee

has

initiated

several

programs

directly

addressing

the

past

weaknesses

in

j

.

interdepartment communications.

In an effort to

,

l

improve the interface with radiation protection

!

and to raise worker sensitivity to health physics

,

issues, the licensee created and staffed the

!

l

nsintenance Radiological Advisor position. Inter-

l

views with a spectrum of individuals indicated

l

'

that this &ffort has had a positive impact on

f

.

h

.

.

.

. . .

.

.

. - __ _ _--

! .

.

,

6

!

l

40

day-to-day working relationships and performance.

The licensee also formed the Vork Prioritization

Review Team (WPRT), composed of representatives

,

l

of various station departments.

The WPRT pro-

I

vides a forum for discussion of the relative

I

importance of each maintenance item as it arises.

The WPRT has been effective in improving opera-

tion's departtent involvement with the mainten-

ance process. The maintenance department is also

involved in daily and weekly meetings intended to

l

ensure coordination between station groups. !!eet-

ings

attended

by

the

Team were

generally

effective.

l

The need for continued efforts to improve commur +

!

Ications and interfaces were noted in some arers.

The licensee's Stores Department practices .re

not alway: < >lly supportive of specific mainten-

ance department needs.

For example, lubricating

,

l

oil can only be withdrawn in bulk quantities,

l

such as a 55 gailon drum.

Typical maintenance

I

activities require use of only a fraction of this

amount.

Similar restrictions apply to materials

routinely used by the 1&C, electrical, and mech-

anical maintenance divisicns. This policy places

the burden for control and storage of unused

material on the individual requesting the with-

l

drawal. The Team noted that maintenance person-

'

nel were routinely using a cabinet in the main-

tenance shop to store uoused "Q" materials. No

prccedure existed to specify the appropriate con-

trols for the storage area.

The need for estab-

lishment of the storage cabinet had been dis-

cust.ed previously between the Quality Assurance

Department (QAD) and matntenar.ce.

QA0 believed

that the cabinet was nc,t currently in use, while

maintenance personnel believed that Q).O had con-

curred in its creation, demonstrating a lapse in

interdepartment

communications.

The

licensee

subsequently per ormed an inventory of the mate-

,

rials in the cal:1nct, and removed all non-Q ar.d

suspect materials.

Procedure 3.M 1-32, "Contrcl

of

  • Q*

Hold A. ea ," wa s subsequently issued to

provide appropriate controls and surveillance of

the cabinet.

_____

_ _ _ _ .

____

- _ _ _

.

.

41

The Team also noted that partially used drums of

both Q and non-Q lubricatinq oil and grease were

being kept in a storage shed outside the process

building.

Several of the drums were not properly

sealed.

No procedure addressing this storage

arca existed.

Discussions with operations per-

sonnel indicated that the difference between Q

'

and non-Q drums of material was not clearly

understood. Routine withdrawals and their equip-

Mnt application were not A ecorded. In response,

a ..e

licensee removed all non-Q reaterials and

comitted to issue e procedu.*e to establish

aopropriate controls by Septecer 7,1988, in-

cluding provisions to ensure that, the lubricants

<

are traceable to their application in the field.

In addition, the liceasee committed to evaluate

the possible addition of non-Q oil to Q equipment

and its potential significance.

During followup to this issue, the Team reviewed

Engineering Specification M-547, which decuments

the procurement and receipt inspection re?vire-

ments for the purchase of lubricants as a Commer-

cial Quality Item (CQI).

The Team 70tsd that

l

M-547 requires sampling and testing of each b4tch

of material purcFased as a CQI.

At the Yeam%

request, the licensee reviewed records and iden-

I

tified two cases in which a CQI procurement order

had been issued which did not invoke thia samp-

!

ling

require. tent.

The

licensee

subsequently

issued a Potential Condition Adverse to Quality

(PCAQ) to initi.te a review of CQIs issuod for

i

consistency wit.h approved engireering specifica-

l

tions.

The licenste committed to disposition

!

this PCAQ prior to restart.

,

L

Overall ce:nunications between the maintenance

i

department and other groups within the organira-

l

tion are effective. However, the interface prob-

!

lems dis. usseo &bove, among the Stores Ospart-

'

,

men ,1AC, and the Maintenance Department. $ndi-

r

.

catt . hat continued at'.ention is needed.

T

,

i

l

i

P

i

i

f

-

-

'

'

.

.-

42

,

3.3.2.4

Maintunence Planning and Prioritization

' ensee has established a Mainte,a ce Plan-

r. . .

Ji . stor within the Maintenance Department.

The

!-

af the Planning Division is clearly

deline

in approved maintenance procedures and

the

.see's Maintensnce Section Manual .

The

. Planning

Division Manager position

has been

filled and the licensee is actively pursuing

candidates for the eight allccated staff post-

tions.

When staffing efforts are corolete, the

division will corsist of a work package planning

group and a scheduling group.

In the interim,

the licensee is utilizing twelve contractor per-

sonnel to perform the package planning function.

The licensee's Outage Management Group (OMG) is

currently providing scheduling guidance.

The

licensee expects to complete the staffing effort

by October 1988,

Team reviews indicate that the

present staff of contractors, in conjunction with

OMG assistance. is functioning well.

-

Implementation of the revised maintenance work

'.

process, particularly the need to generate de-

tailed job-specific maintenance work plans (K4P)

for each maintenance request (MR), has resulted

in a heavy emphasis on the planning function.

The Team reviewed a large sample of completed

KdP's, and KdP's in the field.

Interviews with

craf t personnel and first-line supervisors indi-

1

'

cated that these individuals were knowled;eable

about the new maintenance process requirements

and considered KdP's issued by Planning to be of

generally good quality.

One weakness was noted

i

in the area of post-work testing specification,

'

as discussed in Section 3.3.2.6.

The lum not"d that the completion of job plan-

ning,

ano approval of the F#P are typically

restraints to commencement of the activity.

This

results in the need to expedite the review pro-

cess, making scheduling difficult.

It appears

1

that this is primarily attributable to the new-

ness of both the program and the Planning staff.

Other factors also contribute.

For example, the

licensee's procedures currently do not provide a

simplified process for non-intert changes to the

M

e

-

m

o

-

43

MWP after issuance. MWP's require a complete re-

review to incorporate minor changes.

The licen-

see rtated that a revision to the program to

include provisions for non-intent changes

is

planned for the future. The licensee's engineer-

ing department is presently reviewing each MR/fiWP

and approving the use of any replacement mate-

rials.

This practice provides positive control

of all materials, but delays issuance of ;.he MWP

and

is

a

significant

drain

on

engineering

resources. While these factors inhibit efficient

planning, no instance of inadequate planning was

identified.

The licensee has created a WPRT to assist in the

assignment of the proper priority to each MR.

The WPRT meets daily and is composed of represen-

tatives of various station groups,

including

maintenance, operations, outage management, con-

struction management, and fire protection.

It

performs a multi-disciplined review of new main-

tenance items to identify potential plant impact.

The IATI Team attended a WPRT meetir.g and ob-

served that discussions were properly focused and

priorities weie assigned appro,-iately.

The Team also independertly reviewed outstanding

maintenance requests for the RHR system and the

electrical

distribution

system.

This

review

focused on MR's not designated for completion

before restart. The Team noted that MR 88-10-105

documented electrical ground and potential cable

insulation damage in the circuit for pressure

switch PS-1001-93A.

This switch is environmen-

tally qualified (EQ) and provides a

safety-

related interlock function for the automatic

depressurization system.

The MR had been sched-

uled for work af ter restart, leaving the switch

,

EQ in an indeterminate state. In response t

the

l

Team's question, the licensee rescheduled tne MR

for completion r~ior to restart.

!

l

,

i

l

_

.

-

~ -.

-

y

.-

-,

,

.

4

8

44

,

Tne -Team also noted that MR 88-10-26 documents

i

'

that valve A0-8901 is currently open and cannot

be closed using the ~ hand switch.

A0-8001 is

-

installed in series with a check. valve in the

tor'us fill line. The check valve satisfies the

,

primary containment isolation function for the

line. While A0-8001 is not rewired for contain-

ment isolation operability, h does serve as a

redundant isolation valve immediately adjacent to

the check valve. A0-8001 was originally designed

.

,

to receive an automatic open signal on sensed low-

t

torus level.

Because normal torus level is now

maintained below the instrument low level. set-

point, the valve continuously receives an open

signal, thus preventing manual closure.

This

condition has existed for at least several years.

The licensee has relied on closure of a maqual

block valve located in the turbine building to

compensate for the problem.

The Team expressed

concern that. the distance between the containment

!

isolation check valve and the redundant isolation

U

valve have been unnecessarily extended outside

the reactor building. In addition, a lineup that

'

is inconsistent with the design drawings and

operating procedures resulted.

The WPRT had

designated this MR as post-restart.

In response

to the Team's concerns, the licensee initiated an

Engineerirg Service Request (ESR) to identify an

acceptablo repair.

The licensee committed to

'

resolve tTis item prior to restart.

l

These tw o examples of misscheduled MR's were

discussed by licensee management with the WPRT.

In addition, the licensee committed to re-evalu-

i

i

ate all priority 3 MR's before restart.

The

licenser's process for review and prior tization

'

!

of MR's is thorough, and with the exuption of

the twc instances described above, appears well

l

implemented. The vffectiveness of the licensee's

plannirg and prioritization program is demon-

'

strated by the overall decrease in the number of

outsta1 ding maintenance tasks, their average age,

i

and their significance.

l

3

L

i

i

I

4

i

<

- .

- . -

- . . - .

- -

- - - . -

- -

- _ . _ _ - . . . -

.

~

-

.

>

45

The licensee tracks several maintenance perform-

ance indicators which are indicative of backlog

status.

Those performance indicators generally

display a favorable trend. The Performance Indi-

cator Report for August 9,1988, shows a total

backlog of 2177 open MR's, of which 746 are in a

test / turnover status.

Of these, 220 cannot be

tested until the plant system becomes operable

during startup. Of the 1431 remaining open MR's,

the

licensee has identified 652 required for

restart.

The physical work had yet to be done

for 145 of these 652 MR's.

Based on tho above,

and an average closeout rate of about 25 packages

per week, elimination of the restart backlog

with)n 6 to 7 weeks appears to be manageable

effort.

The licensee's goal, i r,

addition to

addressing the restart MR's, is to reduce the

total number of open MR's from 1431 to less than

1000 Dy plant restart.

The Team noted that this

would constitute an acceptable open MR backlog

for an opersting plant, and that the licen>ee's

goal was reasonable.

3.3.2.5

Control and Performance of Maintenance

Inspection in this area was performed to deter-

mine whether maintenance activities are being

properly controlled through

-tablished proced-

ures, and the use of approve

2chnical manuals,

drawings and job-specific instructions. Mainten-

ance activities were observed to determine how

well

the new prog am was being implemented.

The new maintenance program is nrimarily defined

in Procedures 1.5.3, "Maintenance Requests," and

1.5.3.1,

"Maintenance Work Plan," which were

implemented

on June 20, 1988.

The procedures

were reviewed and found to provide strong con-

trols for identification, planning, performance,

and closecut of maintenance tasks.

Issuance and

control of materials used for replacement / repair

assure that requisite quality requirements are

' maintained.

Super /isory oversight of work in

progress and the final review of work packages

for completeness is a strength.

Based on its

review of the above procedures and observations

of work in progress, the Tear concluded that the

r,swly defined program provides excellent control

and docu entation of activities.

.

,w

. .

n.

. -

..

..

.

.e-

0

4

46

,

!

'

.The new program and proced',ies formalize controls-

i

.

that were previously in place, but inconsistently.

t

applied and not . recognized by ' procedures.

The

procedures now require better documentation of

the initial

problem description,

the rcpairs

made, and the post-work test requirements. They

'

require detailed work instructions, which should

provide for consistent high quality in mainten-

ance work packages. An. additional improvement in

the maintenance procedures is that the mainton-

[

ance work plan now provides for detailed documen-

I

tation of installation and removal of lifted

I

leads and jumpers (LL/J).

This documentation

i

assures proper performance of the . task and is

i

supplemented by the tracking;provided in the LL/J

!

l

Log initiated by the Operations Department per

Procedure 1.5.9.1.

'

I

To eliminate a previously identified weakness,

.

the

licensee

has

stopped

using

Procedure

3.M.1-11, "Routine Maintenance," which was found

+

,

to be too general to adequately control work

i

activities.

Instead, detailed work instructions

are provided by the work plans prepared in ac-

l

cordance with Procedure 1.5.3.1.

Further, the

licensee has stopped using the Maintenance Sum a

i

i'

mary and Control (MSC) form.

The documentation

provided by the form has been replaced by the

detailed

work

plans,

maintenance

logs,

and

'

'

special process control sheets now required by

'

'

procedure. 1.5.3 and 1.5.3.1.

1

The maintenance activities and packages listed in

[

'

Appendix 0 of this report were reviewed to verify

,

proper implementation of program requirements.

'

t

The Team found that detailed work packages were

prepared and in use in the field with adequate

,

'

job specific instructions to accomplish the as-

!

scope were observed.

Pre-job briefings were

'

signed tasks.

No ad-hoc changes of the work

.

conducted and were appropriate to outline the

activities planned.

Coordination and in-process

!

communications with operations personnel were

[

proper

and

assured

good

control

of

plant

i

equipment.

I

f

t

i

,

.

h

?

-.- - - - -.-. -

_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. .

. .

47

Maintenance

personnel,

including

contractors,

have been trained in and were knowledgeable about

the new program and procedure requirements. Al-

though the new controls were deemed cumbersome by

'

some, overall worker attitudes about the new

procedures were positive.

There is a general

acceptance of the present progra:n and a desire to

"do the work right."

Personnel performing the

work wrre qualified, as verified by the training

and qualification status board maintained in the

maf-*.enance shop.

The licensee has made progress in filling vacan-

cies in the. first-line supervisor positions.with

personnel having the requisite experience and

expertise in the associated disciplines.

The

present supervisory staffing is adequate to cover

work production schedules and provides adeouate

oversight.

In an addition 21 program improvement,

supervisor review of work packages is now re-

quired by procedure to assure management review

of packages for completeness.

First-line super-

visors were ruutinely observed in the field di-

recting work in progress.

Supervisory involve-

')

ment was effective to assure completion of work

correctly, to help resolve technical problems,

and to coordinate engineering support, as re-

quired. The oversight function has been enhanced

by the larger number of first-line supervisors

who have been relieved of the excessive adminis-

trative burden associated with planning and pack-

age prepar' tion.

The effectiver.ess of maintenance staff engineers

and system engineers in supporting field activ-

ities was particularly noted in the repairs for

the fuel pool cooling pump and the repair of RHR

discharge valve 288. The engineers are also used

in the root cause analysis of component failures.

The repair of valves 28A and B involved the

.

fabrication of new valvo yokes, which resulted in

a large and complicated work control process that

was appropriately broken down into several work

packages.

Oversight and control of these jobs,

which spanned several weeks, were notable. The

quality of the final product was evident, as was

the welding of the yoke subparts. Good inprocess

t

. _ .

-,

-

i

. , -

,

t

,

48

,

controls resulted in an acceptable root weld on

the first attempt for valve 288.

Although a

'

problem was encountered in the fabrication of the

yokes (short by 3/8 inches), . this item, consid-

ered minor, was properly dispositioned by the

licensee

through Nonconformance

Report (NCR)

88-99.

3.'3.2.6

Post-Maintenance Testing Program

The licensee's program for identification and

implementation of post-maintenance testing was

considered weak during

previous

inspections.

During the current period, the Team revieweo the

licensee's post-maintenance testing program pro-

cedures and other approved test technical guid-

ance. A sample of maintenance tasks was reviewed

to determine if planned testing adequately demon-

strated correction of the cited deficiency. Test-

ing was observed in the field, and completed test

documentation was

reviewed

for

thoroughness.

The licensee recently implemented a major revis-

ion to Procedure

3.M.1-30,

"Post-Work Testing

Guidance."

The current revision establishes a

conservative philosophy designed to ensure that

prescribed testing verifies correction of the

original deficiency, as well as potential prob-

lems which could have resulted from performance

of

the

task.

Organizational

and

individual

responsibilities are clearly defined.

Procedure

3.M.1-30

incorporates

by

reference

Station

Instruction SI-MT.0501, "~os t-Work Test Matrices

and Guidelines."

SI-MT 0301 serves to further

define the method by which post work testing is

to be specified and documented.

It includes an

individual matrix for each type of component

describing the possible maintenance tasks and the

corresponding post-work test requirement.

Each

matrix references an appropriate data sheet which

,

provides more dctailed testing guidance. Proced-

ure 3.M.1-30, in conjunction with SI-MT 0501, is

to be used by the Maintenance Planning Division,

with needed technical input from other mainten-

ance department and systems engineering depart-

ment personnel, to establish comprehensive test-

ing requirements for each maintenance request.

The testing program as described in these docu-

ments is well conceived and is considered a

strength,

i

i

I

,

,

a.

_

49

c

The. Team reviewed a sample of ongoing maintenance

tasks and evaluated the technical adequacy of

prescribed testing. In three of the examples re-

viewed, the planned testing was not adequate to

ensure proper performance of the task. and com-

plete correction of the problem:

(1) Testing identified for the replacement of

i

the fuel pool cooling pump _ and _ motor under

MR 86-109, included only motor current and

vibration monitoring.

No pump head / flow

test was specified.

(2) The package for replacement of a safety 4

related 4160-VAC bus leekout relay under

MR-88-110

initiall/

contained

only

the

general guidance which should have been used

for development of detailed testing. Subse-

quently, suggested testing verified only a

portion

of the lockout relay functions.

(3) Post-maintenance testing following repair of

a motor operated valve limit switch under MR

88-10-179 was also not adequate to ensure

that

the

prcblem

had

been

completely

corrected.

In response to the Team's f_indings, the licensee

Maintenance Section Manager audited task-ready MR

packages and identified one additional case of

inadequately specified testing.

In each of the

above instances, the licensee subsequently de-

veloped and performed adequate post-work tests.

Discussion with the personnel involved and main-

tenance department management revealed that no

training on the newly developed post-work testing

procedures and guidance had been corducted. The

licensee immediately briefed appropriate super-

visors and workers on the program, and committed

to complete formal training in this area by

September 9, 1988.

A second potential contrib-

utor to the problem in planning post-work tests

is the press of business, particularly in the

planning area, in that the planners are currently

just able to keep pace with the schedule for

field activities.

Liensee management appeared

to be sensitive to this issue. The Team reviewed

an additional sample of in process and completed

MR's and did not identify any further problems.

_

__

_ _ _ _

' "

n

'-

50

Overall, the Team concluded that the licensee has

established a . thorough post-work testing program

demonstrating a sound safety perspective.

Al-

though sne program is generally well implen;ented,

some problems were noted.

The newness of the

program, the current press of business, and some

weakncss in personnel training appear to be af-

t

fecting its implementation. Therefore, this area

requires continued licensee attention.

3.3.3

Cor.clusions

1

The licensee has established a viable maintenance organiza-

tion.

Allocated staffing levels have been substantially

increased and are sufficient to support routine maintenance

,

activities. Of particular significance is the addition of

i

first-line supervisory positions, and the creation of an

'

expanded maintenance planning and scheduling division. The

licensee has been largely successful in filling previously

,

vacant positicas.

One exception is the staffing of the

l

maintenance planning division. While none of the permanent

staff in this area is in place, the licensee is effectively

i

utilizing contractors to perform tae function. Full staff-

,

ing and training of the planning division is important to

improving its overall ef fectiveness. Aggregate management

and supervisory qualifications were also found to be

,

adequate.

!

'

Newly revised maintenance and post - ek testing program

procedures provide significantly impre..d control and dccu-

mentation of field activities.

They also result in an

increased emphasis on detailed job planning. Observations

by the Team indicate that implementation of the program is

j

generally effective.

Some

implementation problems are

.

evident; however, the problems affect production and not

i

the ov.'ity of completed work.

Additional attention to

post-w rk test program applicrtion by the licensee

is

needed.

'

t

The licenseo appears to have identified and properly pri-

oritized outstandino maintenance tasks, with only minor

,

F

'

exceptions noted.

A process to ensure continued proper

[

prioritization has been established.

Both licensee senior

r

L

management and maintenance section management are using a

set of indicators to monitor performance.

i

!

,

!

L

t

!

..

.

51

In summary, the licensee's current maintenance staff and

program are adequate to suppo-t plant operations.

Con-

tinued close licensee management monitoring of the newly

implemented program will be required until

additional

experience is gained. The long-term supaort programs, such

as preventive maintenance, will requir : licensee enhance-

ment to further strengthen performance.

l

l

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l

)-

1

.

o

a

52

3.4 Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control

3.4.1

Scope of Review

The Team reviewed the licensee's administrative controls

and implementation of the surveillance testing and cali-

bration control program to assess its adequacy. As part of

this review, the Team examined the licensee's corrective

action to address past problems which included:

ef fec tive-

ness of test scheduling; the technical adequacy of proced-

ures; and lack of centralized control of the program.

The

inspection consisted of a review of various procedures,

drawings, and records; observations of testing in progress;

and personnel interviews.

3.4.2

Observations and Findings

3.4.2.1

Master Surveillar

Tracking Program

i

The Team reviewed the licensee's program for the

control and evaluation of surveillance testing

and calibration required by the Technical Specif-

ications (TS), inservice testing (IST) of pumps

and valves required by 10 CFR 50.55.a(g), ans

calibration of other safety related instrumenta-

tion not specified in TS.

The program is pre-

scribed by Procedure No.

1.8,

"Master Surveil-

lance Tracking Program." The Systems Engineering

Division Manager has overall adminsitrative re-

sponsibility for the Master Surveillance Tracking

Program (MSTP). A plant Surveillance Coordinator

has been assigned within the Systems Engineering

Division to implement the program, which includes

reviewing and approving the various lists, sched-

ules, and reports generated by the MSTP, and

maintaining the MSTP data base.

Each division

has appointed a Division Surveillance Coordinator

to interface with the plant Surveillarice Coor-

dinator.

The

plant

Surveillance

Coordinator

meets weekly with the Plar t Manager to review the

.

status of the surveillance program.

The purpose of the MSTP is to ensure the timely

perfnrmance of all surveillance testing.

The

MSTP data base contains information such as:

commitment reference (TS, preventive maintenance,

regulatory commitment,

etc.);

the

applicable

procedure number and title; scheduler interval

and basis; the group responsible for performing

_

-

,-

,

53

the test / calibration; and the date last performed,

the next due date, and the last date by which the

surveillance test must be completed (plus 25%

date). Completed tests are rescheduled to ensure

the combined grace period for any three consecu-

tive tests does not exceed 3.25 times the spec-

ified surveillance interval'

The accuracy of the

data base was verified by a contractor during the

current outage. Procedure No. 1.8 contains spec-

ific controls on changing any of the data fields

in the MSTP data base to maintain its accuracy.

,

In addition, a second contractor verification of

the MSTP data base is scheduled to be performed

in the near future.

The Team selected several

TS-required surveillance tests to ensure that

they are in the MSTP data base, that' approved

procedures existed, and that the test frequency

was proper.

No discrepancies were identified

with the data base during the Team's review; how-

ever, the Team was concerned with a potential

problem involving the schedulir;g of once per-

operating-cycle versus once per-refueling-outage

tests, as discussed below.

As part of its review, the Team examined the pro-

cess established by Procedure No. 1.8 to deter-

mine its adequacy in ensuring that surveillance

tests were properly scheduled and performed with-

in the required time period.

A "Division List"

is issued to each division and to the Control

Room Annex each Friday which provides a schedule

of tests due for performance the following week.

A "Monthly Forecast" is also issued weekly to

assist the Section Managers in planning and

scheduling resources. When a surveillance test

is satisfactorily completed, the Control Room

Annex copy of the Division List is signed off.

Daily,

the

Planning and Scheduling Division

transcribes the completion dates and updates the

MSTP data base. A "Surveillance Day File Report"

is issued daily to identify all changes made to

the MSTP data base since the last time the report

was issued. This report is reviewed by the Plant

Surveillance Coordinator and used to verify pro-

per transcription and data entry.

"Variance

Reports" are issued weekly to Section Managers to

_

E.

.

x

a

54

identify those

surveillance

tests

that' were-

scheduled, but not performed. A written explana-

tion as to why the tests were not performed with-

~

in the required time and why it's act.eptable not

to perform the test is sent to the surveillance

coordinator within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of receipt of the

Variance Report.

A "Priority Notice" is issued

for any surveillance test that has reached its

deadline date (plus 25% date) and that has not

been performed by that date to assist in the pre-

vention of TS violations.

Failure to perform a

TS-required surveillance test on the deadline

date requires submission of a Failure and Mal-

function Report.. The Team reviewed samples of

each of the above reports, and their responses,

and concluded that the program was adequate and

contained sufficient checks to ensure that sur-

veillance

tests

were

completed

within

the

required time.

Although the Team found the administrative con-

trol and implementation of the MSTP to be ade-

quate, it noted a commitment by licensee manage-

ment to improve the program.

These improvements

include:

replacing the Division Lists with task

cards to reduce the potential for transcription

errors; adding an alert notice when a scheduled

test is not performed; improving the scheduling

of conditional surveillances; planning for the

addition of a full-time surveillance engineer;

and instituting an equipment history computer

program capable of trending surveillance /calibra-

tion results on individual components.

The Team identified one concern during its review

related to the scheduling of once per-operating-

cycle versus once per-refueling-outage surveil-

lance tests.

The Pilgrim Technical Specifica-

tinns define an operating cycle as the interval

between the end of one refueling outage and the

,

end of the next subsequent refueling outage.

A

refueling outage is the period of time between

the shutdown of the unit prior to refueling and

the startup of the plant after that refueling.

The TS contains some surveillance requirements

that are specified to be performed once per oper-

ating cycle, while there are others, such as

testing the drywell-to-suppression-chamber vacuum

breakers, which are to be performed during each

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

,

.o

r

'55

refueling outage.

Also, all the safety-related

instruments not specified in the TS are cali-

brated once per refueling outage. As part of a

previously identified issue, the licensee has

defined once per-operating-cycle to be 18 months;

i

however, no clarification has been provided for

once per-refueling-outage.

As a result, there

are

several

once per-refueling-outage

tests /

l

calibrations which were performed in 1986 and

1987 which are currently scheduled on the MSTP

for

the

"next

refueling

outage," which

is.

projected for some time in 1991.

i

Therefore, by strictly interpreting the defini-

tions, the interval for some of the once per-

t

refueling outage surveillance tests could be as

long as four or five-years. The Team pointed out

that this appears to be beyond the intent of the

TS.

The Team also noted that a licensee task

force established to determine system operability

prior to restart had also identified this issue

and recommended that evaluations be performed on

the once per-refueling-outage surveillance tests

to determine if and when they should be reper-

formed.

The * 'censee committed to evaluate the

status

of

the

once-per-refueling-surveillance

tests and provide justification for those tests

not rescheduled, prior to restart.

3.4.2.2

Logic System Functional Test and Simulated

Automatic Actuation Procedures

The

Team reviewed

the

procedures

listed in

Appendix 0 of this report to determine the ade-

quacy of the licensee's performance of logic

system functional

tests (LSFT) and simulated

,

automatic actuations (SAA). The review consisted

of the indicated channel / train of the primary

containment

isolation

system (PCIS)

and

the

reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system LSFT

and SAA, and the diesel generator (DG) initiation

LSFT.

The procedures were reviewed against the

'

system drawings to ensure that they were tech-

!

nically adequate, that all relays and contacts

were tested, that the procedures were properly

,

approved, and that the tests were performed at

,

the required frequency.

The licensee uses a

series of overlapping tests to satisfy the LSFT

.

, -

c.

c

s

G

56

1

?

and SAA. The Team noted that the licensee had a

"

,

contractor review the adequacy of the LSFT and

SAA tests during this outage.

The contractor

identified several deficiencies, which were cor-

i

rected.

The Team found that each procedure re-

viewed was technically adequate and that the

testing sequence satisfied the Technical Specifi--

cation LSFT and SAA frequency and scope require-

ments.

The Team also noted that the format of

the procedures was adequate and included:

en-

vironmental' qualification quality control (QC)

witness

points

on

transmitter

calibrations;

i

<

double verification on lifting and landing leads;

!

fuse holder fit checks; and I&C management review

upon test completion prior to the NWE review.

i

Ouring the review of the RCIC isolation subsystem

LSFT, the Team questioned why there was no LSFT

on initiation logic. The Team acknowledged that

it was not required by TS Table 4.2.B

nor was

credit taken for it in the FSAR.

However, TS 3.5.0.1 re.Jires RCIC be operable (with reactor

pressure greater than 150 psig and coolant tem-

perature greater than 365 degrees F) and the TS

definition of system operability requires that

all subsystems also be operable.

This would

include the RCIC initiation logic.

Also, the~

guidance provided by the Standard Technical Spec-

ifications indicates that an LSFT on the RCIC

initiation logic should be performed every six

l

months. The Team noted that Procedure No. 8.M.2-

2.6.7,

"RCIC

Simulated Automatic

Actuation,"

actually performs an initiation logic LFST; how-

ever, it is scheduled at a once per-18-month fre-

!

quency, while TS-required LSFT's have a frequency

l

of once per 6 months.

This item is unresolved

,

i

pending a licensee evaluation of the adequacy of

i

the RCIC initiation logic LSFT frequency (88-21-

i

02).

The licensee committed to pcovide, before

i

restart, the technical basis for the surveillance

[

frequency.

3.4.2.3

Calibration Procedures

7

!

The Team noted that the licensee established a

!

series of procedures, known as the 6.E series, to

calibrate the safety-related instrumentation not

p

,

specified in the Technical Specifications.

This

,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

__ .

.

.

57

instrumentation is normally used to record data

necessary to complete TS required surveillance

i

tests or inservice testing of pumps and valves.

The 8.E procedures are scheduled on a once per-

refueling-outage interval.

The Team performed a detailed review of Proced-

ures No. 8.E.11, "Standby Liquid Control System

Instrument Calibration," and 8.E.13, "RCIC System

Instrument Calibration." Overall, the Tecm found

i

the technical content and format to be adequate;

'

however, two discrapancies were identified.

Pro-

cedure No. 8.E.11 does not calibrate pressure

indicator (PI) 1159.

This PI was installed dur-

.'

ing the current outage and is used in the per-

formance of Procedure No. 8.4.1, "Stendby Liquid

'

Control Pump Operability and Flow Rate Test."

The Team also noted that Procedure No. 8.E.13

does not calibrate PI 1340-2. This PI is used in

the performance' of Procedure No. 8.5.5.1, "RCIC

,

Pump Operability Flow Rate and Valve Test 9 1,000

psig."

PI 1340-2 was installed and last cali-

brated during the 1984 outage when pressure

i

transmitter 1360-19 was replaced with a Rosemount

Transmitter.

The licensee indicated that the

i

procedures .sould be

revised to correct the

l

deficiencies.

1

3.4.2.4

Survefilance Test Observations

'

,

.

On August 16, 1988, the Team observed a portion

'

of the performance of Procedure No. 8.M.2-2.10.

1-5,

"Core Spray System

'B'

Logic Functional

!

!

Test," Revision 13.

The test was performed as

!

j

part of the restoration of the

"B" Core Spray

l

j

System and as post work testing of relay 14A-

K208.

The test was observed to ensure it was

'

performed in accordance with a properly approved

'

and adequate procedure.

During the test, the

i

Team noted that the technicians' performance was

t

,

.

adequate. They conducted the test in a slow and

deliberate manner and stopped when questions

,

arose concerning mislabelled nameplates and the

'

identification of some relay coil leads.

In both

i

cases, the questions were resolved before they

proceeded.

The Team noted that the I&C first-

line supervisor monitored portions of the test.

.

The test was also monitored by QA personnel as

part of the surveillance monitoring program. QA

i

personnel indicated that they observe approxi-

j

mately one surveillance test a week.

~

'

.

.\\

l

t

l

1

. - - _ , - _ - - , - , -

. . , , , , , , . _ - , . - . _ , - _ , , , , . - . - , _ _ . , , , _ . - . , , _ , . ,_,

- . , _ ,

, . . , ,

. - - ,

--

..,,,e

. --

.

.

_

_

_

~4 f:

9

~

,

-58

i

The test was stopped at Step 25 when the test

results did not agree with the expected results

delineated in the procedure.

The step was sup-

posed to verify the instantaneous pickup of the

-

core spray pump start relay 14A-K128. Subsequent

,

licensee investigation revealed that the instan-

taneous pickup was removed as part c,f the de-

graded grid voltage modification (Plant Design

Change (PDC) 88-07).

The Team noted that PDC

.

88-07 had not yet been closed; however, an impact

!

review performed prior to installing the modifi-

cation failed to identify Procedure 8.M.2-2.10.

1-5 as being affected by the PDC.

The Team noted that one of the licensee's self-

assessment action items was to review the impact

of PDC's

(installed

since October

1987) on

"

L5FT's.

The

licensee's

review

began

on

October 1987 because this was the completion date

,

of the contractor review noted above which ver-

ified the adequacy of LSFT/SAA tests.

The Team

3'

noted that the contractor review produced an

i

LSFT/SAA data base which cross references the

'

safety-related components tested to the appli-

cable LSFT/SAA test.

This data was being used

during the licensee's review.

Four of the five

PDC's involved in the licensee's review of impact

on LSFT's have been completed. The remaining PDC

(88-07) was under review when the problem with

the core spray LSFT was noted.

Twenty-one pro-

i

cedures have been identified as possibly being

'

affected by the PDC and are currently under

review.

The CS functional te3t appears to be the

only affected test run prior to completion of the

!

PDC procedure review,

t

The licensee indicated that a possible future

'

improvement will be to use the LSFT/SAA data base

e

l

to determine the impact of a PDC on procedures

before implementing the modification.

j

.

3.4.2.5

Measuring and Test Equipment

The Tea;n reviewed records, interviewed personnel,

and toured storage areas to determine the ade-

quacy of the licensee's program for control of

measuring and test equipment (M&TE). Administra-

'

tive control of the program is established by

,

l

Procedure No.

1.3.36,

"Measurement

and Test

'

Equipment."

i

. - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _-.

- _ - _ _ _

,

-.

59

,

!

,

The licensee has implemented a computerized sys-

.

tem to issue and track M&lE.

This system will

only allow issuance equipment to authorized per-

-

sonnel, will limit the checkout period to only 24

!

hours, and will not issue M&TE if the sticker

r

calibration date does not match the calibration

date in the computer. The system also issues a

PATE traveler form to the user to identify usage

on each plant device tested and each M&TE range

used.

This data is later entered into.the com-

-

puter to assist in evaluations if and when a

l

piece of M&TE is found to be out of calibration.

The Team reviewed two cases where M&TE was out of

calibratinn and noted that the evaluations per-

formed were documented in accordance with proced-

ures

and appeared thorough.

Thus far, only

electrical I&C and electrical PATE are on the new

computerized system; however, similar controls

are being manually implemented for mechanical

equipment until it is incorporated into the new

system.

,

The licensee currently has two storage areas for

l

M&TE:

ene for electrical /I&C and one for mech-

,

anical equipment.

The Team toured each area and

a

noted that the equipment was identified by a

unique number and indicated calibration status.

,

The Team found that the equipment was properly

stored and that P4TE out-of-calibration, on hold

i

for repairs, or new equipment not yet in the sys-

tem, were properly identified and segregated.

i

The licensee indicated plans to go to only one

storage arer and to increase the number of staff

!

issuing and controlling the P4TE.

'

i

!

The Team also reviewed the system for recalling

)

equipment for calibration.

The recall tracking

!

is performed in accordance with Procedure No,

t

1.8.2, "PM Tracking Program." The Team reviewed

l

,

severa' equipment calibration stickers during its

,

tour of the storage areas and during observations

I

of ongoing surveillance and maintenance activ-

t

ities.

No equipment past its calibration due

date was identified.

'

1

The Team found the licensee's control of measur-

ing and test equipment to be adequate.

L

{

r

!

l

L

!

I

1

.

.

.

. -

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

__

_ _ _ _ .

_____ ___

,

a

60

3.4.2.6

Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves

The Team reviewed the status of the licensee's

program for inservice testing of pumps and valves

in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure

Vessel Code,Section XI.

The licensee submitted Revision 1A to the inser-

vice test (IST) program on October 24, 1985.

A

meeting was held between BECo and the NRC on

January 14, 1988, to discuss the licensee's pro-

posed Revision 2 to the IST program. To minimize

impact on the NRC review cycle, the licensee sub-

niitted an interim IST program, Revision 18, on

March 14, 1988, to address concerns identified by

the NRC during review of Revision 1A. The licen-

see plans to subm!t Revision 2 af ter the Safety

Eva'.uation Report on Revision IB is issued. Pe-

vision 2 is to maintain the upgrades made to the

program in Revision 18 and increase the program

scope by adding more components

(e.g.,

relief

valves).

Control of the IST Program is established by Pro-

cedure No.

8.I.1,

"Administration of Inservice

Pump and Valve Testing."

The Team reviewed the

procedure and noted that while it defines the

,

methodology for compliance to the IST program for

pumps and valves, including analysis of test

data, direction on corrective action, and estab-

l

lishment of reference values (additional guidance

is contained in Procedure No. 8. I .3, "Inservice

Test Analysis and Documentation Methods"), the

organizational

responsibilities and referenced

IST program revision need to be updated.

For

example, the pump and valve testing is now sched-

uled through the MSTP instead

f.,f

the compliance

group, and a Senior ASME Test Engineer has been

hired to implement the program.

The licensee

acknowledged the Team's comments and showed it a

.

draf t revision to Procedure 8.I, which is sched-

uled to be implemented when Revision 2 is submit-

ted.

The Team reviewed the draf t procedure and

noted that

it provided additicnal detail on:

_ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .. _ __-

,

.

61

responsibilities, definitions, test requirements,

compliance requirements, evaluation, disposition,

post-maintenance testing, and administration and

records maintenance.

The draft procedure also

provides a listing of the pumps and valves cur-

rently within the testing program and includes a

cross-reference for individual test requirements

to the approved PNPS procedure.

The Team noted that other improvements (planned

or in progress) to the IST program include revis-

ing all the implementing procedures to upgrade

them to Revision 2 and creating a position for a

second ASME test engineer.

The Team reviewed several pump and valve test

results for the standby liguid control, core

spray, salt service water and low pressure cool-

ant injection systems to verify that the accept-

ance criteria were met, that the results were

properly evaluated and trended, and that the fre-

quency of testing was increased when required.

The Team noted that Procedure No. 8.I contains

controls to change the MSTP data base test fre-

quency when the deviations fall within the alert

range. The Team reviewed changes to various pump

reference values to ensure that they were justi-

fied and documented.

The Team also checked the

reactor buildirg closed cooling water, salt ser-

vice water, and standby liquid control system

pumps to ensure that the IST vibration data point

was properly marud.

No deficiencies were iden-

tified during this review.

3.4.3

Conclusions

Based on observations, personnel intervieus, and the review

of procedures and records noted above, the Team concluded

that:

,

1.

The licensee has established and is implementing an

adequate and effective program to control all surveil-

lance activities at PNPS.

2.

Responsibility for implementing the MSTP has been

p! aced

in

a

centralized,

strong,

forward-looking

division.

_-

q

O

O

62

3.

The licensee was adequately implementing the IST pro-

gram for pumps and valves.

The Team noted that there

are several

planned

improvements

to

the

program

involving administrative and implementing procedures

and staffing to upgrade the IST program.

4.

Licensee management is committed to improve the sur-

veillance program,

as

evidenced by

the upgrades

planned or in progress in each area examined.

These

include:

contractor data base reviews; increasing the

scope of the IST program, increasing staffing; im-

proved control over issuing and tracking M&TE; estab-

lishing an equipment history computer program; replac-

ing the MSTP division lists with task i:ards; and

improving conditional test scheduling.

S.

With the exception of the few deficiencies noted

above,

the

procedures were

technically

adequate.

6.

The one concern identified was the licensee's need to

resolve

the

once per-refueling-outage

scheduling

deficiency.

i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

D

O

63

3.5 Radiation Protection (RP)

3.5.1

Scope of Review

The Team reviewed various aspects of the radiation protec-

tion program during the inspection, with emphasis on the

licensee's ability to safely support plant startup.

Per-

formance was determined from:

observation of work in

progress; periodic tours of plant areas; interviews with

managers,

supervisors,

and technicians; and review of

selected documents.

The areas reviewed are as follows:

1) Organization and staffing;

2) Training, qualification and continuing education of RP

technicians;

3) General employee training;

4) ALARA programs;

5) Control and oversight of work in radiological areas;

6) Control of locked high radiation areas;

7) Acequacy of laboratory (count room) equipment;

8) Availability and

adequacy of portable

RP survey

equipment;

9) Adequacy of gaseous and liquid release monitoring

systems;

'

10) Clarity and consistency of RP policies and procedures;

11) Audits.

3.5.2

Observations and Findings

'

3.5.2.1

Organization and Staffing

i

.

The organization of the radiation protection (RP)

department has remained stable since the signifi-

cant changes which were made early in 1983. The

i

staffing level has remained constant and is ade-

quate to support plant operations.

The RP soc-

tion

marager

described

various

enhancements

_ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ .

p

a

64

planned for the supervisory staff.

An outline

for qualification as Radiation Protection Man-

ager, per Regulatory Guide 1.8,

has been ap-

proved. One or two division managers within the

RP section will be expected to qualify as Radia-

tion Protection Manager to provide depth in the

organization.

Incentives have been approved for

achieving this qualification.

In addition, the

three division managers will rotate assignments

for cross-training purposes, and all will be

encouraged to pursue advanced scholastic degrees.

These efforts are expected to begin in the near

future.

The Team observed some indications of isolated

morale problems at the technician and first-line

supervisor level which were attributed to several

causes.

Contributors include personnel and as-

signment changes within the organization result-

ing from rotation of radiation protection shif t

supervisors, an influx of new technicians, im-

pending implementation of a new rotating work

.

schedule, and a perceived lack of management

presence in the field.

In addition, weaknesses

may exist in communications within the RP organ-

ization as evidenced by technician perceptions of

a lack of technician input or review during the

development or revision nf RP policies and pro-

cedures.

In summary, and in spite of these dif-

.

ficulties, the Team observed that the technicians

and supervisors were generally enthusiastic and

competent.

Another potential weakness results from the prac-

tice of rotating technicians through job assign-

ments each three to six months.

Although this

practice may have merit for familiarization and

job exposure purposes it may prevent or signifi-

cantly delay the development of a high profici-

ency

level

in certain

specialized

technical

areas, a concern particularly evident in the

instrument repair and calibration facility. Here

the RP technician is assigned to repair and cali-

brate a wide range of instrumentation, including

gas flow detector cells, sophisticated computer-

controlled automatic friskers, air pumps, and all

alpha, beta, gamma and neutron survey meters.

The area supervisor stated that he was attempting

to resolve this problem by requesting an exten-

sion of the rotation cycle.

1

i

--

, , _ _

__

__._._.--,_.c

.-_

- _ _ - _ _

__

i

d

.

65

~.

The RP section has 42 technicians, of whom 36 are

ANSI 18.1 qualified.

Only 21 have commercial

experience. The section manager provided a shift

staffing schedule for power ascension testing

that will ensure that the experience will be

adequately distributed among the individual shift

Crews.

3.5.2.2

RP Technician Training

The RP technician training and qualification pro-

gram is certified by the Institute of Nuclear

Plant Operations (INPO), uses INPO guidelines for

development of instructional material, and uses

the INPO exam question bank.

The training is

conducted in three phases over a period of two

years or less, depending on experience.

Upon

completion of Phase 2,

the technician .is con-

sidered to be ANSI qualified and can issue radia-

tion work permits.

The third phase includes

specialty tasks such as operation of the whole

body counter and respirator fit testing.

Classroom training is provided at the offsite

facility. The training facilities were adequate,

well lighted, comfortable and equipped with prac-

tice equipment.

The Team observed that most of

the basic survey instruments were available, but

laboratory-type gamma spectroscopy equipment, as

well as ALARA mock-ups, were not available. This

is typical of a single unit station.

Most pre-

sentations appeared to rely on lectures with

minimal use of audio-visual equipment. A review

of selected lesson plans showed adequate tech-

nical content.

Classroom training is followed by an in plant

phase where the technician receives on-the-job

training and demonstrates proficiency at various

tasks.

This is documented in a qualification

.

folder.

Qualified technicians will be provided

with ongoing training on a six-week schedule.

This will be contingent on implementation of a

new six-section rotating work schedule.

The

,

,

66

training department has begun drafting lesson

plans which will cover a broad range of topics,

including interpersonal

skills training.

The

instructors must also complete formal qualifica-

tions.

They were recently required to begin

spending a certain number of hours in plant be-

tween training cycles.

This keeps them abreast

of changes occurring in the plant.

The Team concluded that this program is well-

controlled and documented and is aided by a dy-

namic first-line supervisor.

The implementation

and effectiveness of cycle training will be eval-

uated in the future.

The licensee's current ef-

forts are directed at completing initial qual-

ification for the entire staff.

3.5.2.3

General Employee Training (GET)

All general employee training and in processing

is conducted at the on-site training center over

a three-day period.

Classrooms were spacious,

comfortable, and well equipped.

Ample training

aids, as well as audio-visual equipment, were in

evidence.

A comprehensive student manual

is

given to each trainee along with copies of appro-

priate regulations and regulatory guides.

Basic

training involves 20 contact hours, while radia-

tion workers receive an additional 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

Res-

pirator fit testing is also provided.

The two instructors associated with GET had com-

pleted the formal

Staff Development

program.

Both have extensive experience and are well qual-

ified. Although their teaching techniques could

not be observed since no classes were in session

during the week of this review, the Team con-

cluded that the training content provided ade-

quate direction to attendees.

Both instructors

spend time in the plant weekly to assess staff

training needs.

The GET training is INPO certified. In addition,

the training center offers five courses to all

new supervisors. A new industrial safety train-

ing program is under development. An instructor

has been hired and will begin providing training

in occupational safcty during the first quarter

of 1989.

- - .

.

.

67

The Team concluded that management support of GET

training was good, that the training was effec-

tively conducted, and that it made a positive

contribution to safety.

3.5.2.4

ALARA Programs

ALARA performance at this station had been a

persistent weakness over several past SALP report

periods.

The Team noted recent apparent improvement in

upper management support for ALARA programs.

Examples of this support are reflected in the

re-evaluatien of the 1988 ALARA goal from 600 to

390 manrem and formulation of 'iveral plans to

reduce exposures. Also, the licensee is assign-

ing an experienced manager to survey INPO, Elec-

tric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and several

other nuclear stations to make a list of cost-

effective exposure source term reduction tech-

niques.

The Station Director will then formulate

a long-term program based on the findings of this

survey.

Another plan is to begin removal of

abandoned in place systems in 1989 which should

remove unnecessary sources of exposure. A th'rd

project is underway to identify hot spotr in

plant piping and determine which of these could

[

be reduced by flushing.

The ALARA staff also has plans to attend a train-

ing course and visit other stations to observe

effective techniques.

This staff

i s in

the

process of filling its final vacancy.

,

'

,

ALARA performance at the working level remains

mixed. Licensing personnel developed a technique

for conducting remote inspections of fire barrier

penetrations using a flashlight mounted on a

telescope.

This concept may ta appiled in num-

,'

erous situations and has the potential for sig-

nificant dose savings.

On the other hand, in-

stances of f ailure to effectively use low-dose

waiting areas were observed during work.

The

ALARA divisicn manager is working to increase the

.

sensitivity of all workers and technicians to

l

ALARA practices.

(

!

!

l

,

l

..g

- _ _ - , - - -

gm

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

._ __

,

.

63

The Team concluded that licensee attention to

ALARA programs has significantly improved in

recent months.

The effectiveness and implemen-

tation of AL\\RA plans will be assessed in future

NRC inspections.

3.5.2.5

Control of Work

During closure of a Confirmatory Order in the

fall of D87, NRC noted some improvement in the

r91ations between the RP section and the other

sections performing work. However, poor planning

and lack of work control continued to be ob-

served.

During this assessment, further improve-

ment in resolving these weaknesses was observed.

One indicator of poor planning is the number of

radiation work permits (RWP) issued but not used.

A review found that only a small fraction of

RWP's issued are now unusad.

In addition, the

use of "A" priority maintenance work requests by

the Operations Department to expedite work has

decreased significantly.

The use of a Radiation Protection Advisor as-

signed to the Maintenance department continues to

be effective. This position was recently assumed

by an experienced RP technician.

He has intro-

duced innovations, including frequent work group

training sessions and installation of permanently

situated boxes in the plant for ccntaminated

tools.

The Planning Division is developing improved pro-

cedures for planning work.

This section is re-

sponsible for coordinating with the RP and ALARA

groups during the early phases of work planning.

This allows adequats time for RWP preparation and

ALARA

re*

isponsible

section managers

stated tt

'N

arly maintenance-HP contact

,

will be pr.u

s' ted ir. September 1988.

The Team observed that on-the-job cooperation

between workers and RP technicians was good.

A

minor problem ,vas noted in that RP technicians in

the controlled area appeared unprepared to deal

with a minor first-aid injury.

Technicians were

___

.-_

_ _ _ _ _ _ - . .

.

>

69

uncertain in dealing with a worker with abrasions

to his nose that caused bleeding.

This was at-

tributed by the Team to a lack of training snd

clear policies.

On the other hand, technicians

appeared well prepared to handle more serious

emergencies,

i

3.5.2.6

Control of Locked High Radia_ ion Areas

The

licensee has previously incurred several

violations for failure to properly control locked

high

radiation

areas.

This

issue has

been

tracked as a NRC outstanding item (87-57-01).

The licensee organized a task force to determine

which lasting corrective actions would prevent a

i

recurrence of these problems. Based on the find-

ings of th- task force, the control procedures

were revised to placa basic responsibility on the

RP technician who signs out the door key.

Fur-

i

ther controls are provided by shift tours of all

locked areas and by upgrading locking devices.

Gased on these actions, the Team concluded the

licensee had appropriately addressed concerns ir.

this area.

3.5.2.7

Laboratory Equipment

The adequacy and availability of RP laboratory

-

equipment to support plant startup was reviewed.

The

licensee

has

available

two multichannel

analyzers

(Nuclear Data

6700),

several

beta

counters (BC4), and several alpha counters (SAC

<

t

4).

The radiochemistry laboratory has redundant

,

equipment for backup. This equipment is required

to perform isotopic analysis of air samples for

maximum permitted concentration (MPC) calcula-

'

tions, detection of degraded fuel conditions, and

to support radwaste analysis. Procedures for the

use of the

equipment are available

in

the

laboratory.

The Team noted that, at the time of the inspec-

tion, several pieces of laboratory equipment wert

awaiting repair or calibration.

Only ;ne BC-4

i

and one SAC-4 were operational in the lab.

Both

nultichannel

analyzers

were

awaiting

repair

parts.

The supe tisor in charge attributed this

to the lack of proficiency of the technicians due

to the rotating work assignment policy.

This

issue was discussed in Section 3.5.2.1.

-

.

.

70

3.5.2.8

Survey Equipment

The svailability of properly calibrated survey

equipment was reviewed. Survey equipment is used

by RP techniciant, to measure dose rates, and sur-

face and airborne contamination levels.

Included

in the review were the automatic personnel con-

tamination detectors.

All equipment is calibrated and repaired in a

facility on site, eFCept for neutron survey

meters.

RP technicians are trained to perform

all

functions in the facility.

The facility

appeared to be adequately equipped to perforhi its

task,

s

Stocks of equipment ready for issuance appeared

ample and the calibration / repair backlog was

minimal.

This readiness may have been aided

somewhat by reduced outage activity.

The Team

noted an improvement in that the new manager of

the g"oup has recently implemented a computer

program that shows the status of each piece of

equi pme ri t , the data base for which is updated

each time an instrument is issued.

Information

that is captured includes users of the meter,

calibration due date, and failure mode if placed

out of service.

The Team concluded that an adequate supply of

calibrated instruments is on hand te <;pport

routine

operation.:

and

abnormal

c cm. '.i o n s .

3.5.2.9

Monitoring Environmental Releases

The operability of the environmental

release

monitors was verified.

The two paths for a gas-

eous release are the main stack and the reactor

butiding vent.

The monitors were fouiid to be

operational

and

properly

calibrated,

with

approvea procedures available. The eculpment is

ile the cal-

maintained by the Chemistry Group

'

culations of offsite doses require

oy the re-

<ised Radio

ical Environmental Technical Spec-

ifications

StTS)

are

performed

by

the

RP

seation.

- .

-

-

_

x,

e

O

71

The s'ngle liquid release path monitor was oper-

ational.

Due to elevated background radiation

levels at the sodium iodida e.anitor, a new system

has been installed parallel to the old system.

The new system will offer increased sensitivity

and will be tnught on line in the near future.

3.5.2.10 Policies and Procedures-

-

A sampling of RP procedures indicates that they

ara generally clear.

The number of procedures

controlling

the RP department

activities

is

extensive. However, the format varies from step-

by-step instructions to a more general format.

The RWP procedure is currently being revised to

make the process less cumbersome and more useful.

In general, the RP technicians Md not feel ade-

quately consulted during the revi.ston of proced-

ures.

This

issue was discussed

in

Section

3.5.2.1.

The Team concluded that ;,he RP procedures were

adequate to support startup.

3.5.2.11 Audits

Previous inspections found the licensee's inter-

nal audits and asssessments of the RP program

-

were primarily compliance-oriented.

Currently,

these audits are completed in several ways. Sev-

eral peer evaluators were trained to make on the-

job observations.

A Radiological Assessor is

permanently assigned to the staff reporting to

the Senior Vice President.

The Management Over-

sight and Assessment Team (MO&AT) does monthly

plant tours.

Also, the QA Dr,artment recently

transferred in two expertene.

etP personnel.

In

addition to the above audits and reviews, the

Radiological Occurrence Report (ROR) system pro-

vides a method to capture input from workers and

RP technicians.

A review of these efforts shows that a moderate

level of success has been achieved in finding

program weaknesses.

However, the results i. ave

not been commensurate with the ef' ort involved.

The RP section manager stated that an ef fort is

. .

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,

72

,

underway to shift the emphasis of these audits to

performance rather than compliance.

The audit

performed by QA in November 1987 is being used

as a model.

Licensee efforts in this regard are

expected to be long term and are adaquate at this

time to support plant startup.

3.5.2.12 Control of Radiological Shielding

The Tear reviewed the licensee's program for the

,

installation, control, and removal uf radiation

'

shielding. This review concluded that the licen-

see's program for control of radiation shielding

is well documented and that implementation is

good.

The prograr.; guidelines are contained in PNPS Pro-

cedure 6.10-008, "Installation and Removal of

Shielding." Responsibility for implementation of

the procedural requirements fall under the aus-

pices

of

the

Radiological

Technical

Support

'

Division.

The procedural requirements for con-

'

trolling this process appear well defined and

comprehensive.

Licensee personnel

responsible

for implementation of the procedure were well

versed on procedural requirements and current

field installations.

l.icensee records of field

it.stallations were current, had been reviewed at

the required intervals, and were accurate.

3.5.2.13 Health Physics Training

The Team observed licensee personnel during a

i

contamination control

training exercise.

The

'

exercise simulated a spill of highly radioacLive

(3 Rem on contact) resin during transfer opera-

l

tions.

The scenerio document was well defined

-

and included detailed timelines and instructions

to the exercise controllers. The entire exercise

i

was videotaped and replayed during the debriefing

[

.

of participants.

The exercise was well control-

led and interviews with participants indicated

i

that the individuals involved considered it to be

'

an effective training device.

Lessons learned

and feedback frnm participants appeared to be

well disseminated.

,

,

4

i

t

._

-..

.

. . -

_ _ . _ - . _ , _

._

_

. _ .

_ _ _ _

,

.

73

l

3.5.2.14 Hydregen Water Chemistry System

The licensee has installed a system to inject

hydrogen gas into the fcedwater to reduce the

potential for corrosion of ieactor internal pip-

ing.

This process will result in increased radi-

ation levels onsite from increased radioactive

nitrogen isotope levels in the system. A review

of the impact analysis showed that a comprehen-

i

sive plan to control exposures has been developed.

A test run i.1935 resulted in the installation

of a 16-foot high 20-inch thick concrete shield

around the turbine.

Moreover, special controls

are programmed into the computer that controls

the hydrogen injection.

The cognizant engineer

stated that tFese controls are designed to pre-

vent increased exposure either onsite or of fsite.

Team review of these calculations showed that

J

doses may in fact be lowered.

The Training Department is developing a training

program for the RP technicians to review the

l

change in '.adiation levels that occur with opera-

tions. This program was developed to refresh the

RP technicians because of the extended shutdown

1

and the increased levels of radiation in the

shielded areas resulting from the addition of

'

hydrogen.

The RP section manager stated that a

condensed revision of these presentations will

also be given to all maintenance and operations

personnel prior to startup.

3.5.3

Conclusions

The Team determined that progress has been made, that ade-

quate staff and management oversight is in place to achieve

further progress, and that performance is adequate to sup'

port plant startup.

ticenset

strengthr. include a well-controlled and well-

,

organized training program for general employees and RP

technicians.

The use of an RP Advisor in the Maintenance

Section, which had been effective in improving working

relationships, has led to further initiatives in training

and control of :ontaminated tools.

The addition of this

ocsition has also resulted in improved nianning and control

of work.

-

-

-

-

.

.

_ , _ _

- - -

.

.

74

Notable progress was observed regarding upper management

support and emphasis on ALARA.

This attention is expected

to result in improving levels of performance over the next

few years.

Staff development programs for all levels of

personnel, from technicians through managers, should con-

siderably improve their level of performance.

Control of

technical problems, such as the radiological impact of

hydrogen water chemistry and calibration status of survey

meters, has improved.

A weakness was observed as a result of the rotational as-

signment of RP technicians that may affect eheir profic-

1ency in performing certain highly specialized jobs.

An

additional weakness concerns the perception of poor ver-

tical communications between management and RP technicians

and workers. Although this issue has led to some incom-

plete understanding of policies and some morale problems,

it has not significantly affected safety

performance.

Additionally, vertical communications within the RP organ-

ization appeared somewhat weak.

The Team detected a per-

ception on the part of technicians that they have not been

adequately involved in the changes being made in the RP

Department policies and procedures.

This perception ap-

parently has resulted f rom RP management not effectively

communicating the b.ses for these changes to the staf f.

There is also a perception that RP management is remote and

not easily accessible. However, the Team determined that,

despite this weakness, the attitude and safety approach of

the RP Departmeat staff has significantly improved and is

adequate to support plant operations.

The licensee advised that a training program is being

developed to refresh RP technicians concerning the change

in radiological conditions on plant startup and the unique

conditions to be created by the addition of hydrogen. A

condensed version of this training will be provided to

other radiation workers. Cempletion of this effort will be

reviewed in a future NRC inspection.

.

O

..

.

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,

.

75

3.6 Security and Sateguards

3.6.1

Scope of Review

Prior to the plant shutdown in Anril 1986, NRC had identi-

fled serious concerns regarding the implementation and

management support of the security program at Pilgrim.

The

licensee has been aggressively pursuing a comprehensive

course of action to ider.tify and correct the root causes of

the programmatic weaknesses in physical security. The most

recent SALP (50-293/87-99) covering the period February 1,

1987 to May 15, 1988, determined that the licensee has

demonstrated a commitment to implement an effective secur-

ity program. The licensee's security organization has been

expanded with the addition of experienced personnel in key

positions, significant capital resources have been expend.:1

to upgrade security hardware, and equipment and progr m

plans base been improved.

During the IAT inspection, all phases of the security pro-

gram, including management support, staffing, organization,

and hardware maintenance, have been reviewed to assess the

eff ectiveness of the program implementation.

The results

of the review are described below in general terms to

exclude any safeguards infor.sation.

3.6.2

Observations and Findings

3.6.2.1

Review of Security Program Upgrades

The Team reviewed the progress made to date on

the security program improvements committed to by

the licensee as a result of previous NRC enforce-

ment action.

The Itcensee was advised by the

Team that progress on these improvements will

continue

to be monitored during

future NRC

inspections.

Those commitments and their status

are as follows.

.'roject

Status

.

Protected Area

The upgrades of tne perimeter

Perimeter

barrier, intrusion detection

system,

and assessment aid

system are complete.

- _ .

_

-

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . .-. _

__. _ . _. _ _ .

_ _

___

_ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ . _ _ _ .

.

.

76

Project

Status

Protected Area and Installation of upgraded

Perimeter Lighting

lighting is approximately 95%

complete.

Four light stan-

chions remain to be instal-

led.

The lighting system as

i

installed

meets

regulatory

requirements.

Main and Alternate The

designs

for

the

new

i.

Access Control

(upgraded)

access

control

Points

points are complete and new

package search equipment is

on site. Installation of new

package and personnel search

equipment

and

full

length

turnstiles is scheduled for

completion on

September 28,

1988, in the site's main ac-

cess point.

Installation of

new package search equipment

in the site's alternate et e-

cess point is also scheduled

for September 28, 1988.

Vital Area

The vital area analysis,

Analysis

including walkdown

of

all

vital areas to verify barrier

integrity,

and issuance of

.

'

the

report,

is

complete.

New Security

The selection of the new

Computer

computer has been made and a

purchase order for the com-

puter has been issued.

The

'

licensee is currently working

with the vendor on software

,

options.

The delivery of the

!

new computer is scheduled for

the first quarter of 1989,

l

with installation to follow.

,

,

I

L

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

.

.

77

3.6.2.2

Followup on Previously Unresolved Item

(Closed)

Unresolved

Item

(50-293/87-44-01):

Neighborhood checks for licensee employees being

assigned to the site were not being consistently

conducted as part of the access control program.

The neighborhood checks were not a regulatory

-

requirement

and

it

is

a

licensee-identified

issue. During this inspection, the Team verified

that the licensee has conducted a review and

identified all site personnel who had not been

subjected to neighborhood checks.

For those

employees with less than three years of service

with the licensee, neighborhood checks were s';b-

sequently conducted.

For employees with more

than three years with the company, a review of

the personnel file was conducted and a memorandum

was put into the file to indicate that the review

was being made in lieu of the netchborhood check.

The acceptability of this alternative to the

neighborhood checks was reviewed by NRC prior to

its implementation and was found satisfactory.

3.6.2.3

Security Plan and Implementing Procedures

The Team met with licensee representatives and

discussed the NRC-approved Security Plan (the

Plan).

As a result of these discussions, and a

review of the Plan and its implementing proced-

ures, the Team found that the implementing pro-

cedures adequately addressed the Plan's commit-

ments.

In addition,

all

security personnel

interviewed demonstrated familiarity with the

L

Plan, implementing procedures, an- NRC's security

program performance objectives.

1

3.6.2.4

Management Effectiveness - Security Programs

'

An in-depth review of the licensees management

ef fectiveness was conducted by NRC in April and

May 1988 and documented in Inspection Report No.

1

50-293/88-18.

During that inspection, the Team

concluded that the licensee has continued with

its initiatives at' taken significant actions to

further improve the effectiveness

1 security

organization.

It was also cor.

that the

i

existing organization should provive the capa-

bility to monitor the program properly.

<

t

P

-

.

.

.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _.

._

.

o

78

During its inspection, the Team independently

concluded that there is a strong management team

in place based on the experience of the expanded

proprietary security organization, the effective

interaction both between members of the security

organization and with other departments, and the

effective oversight of the contract security

organization.

3.6.2.5

Seci~ity Organization

On

ugust 16,1988, at 10:00 p.m.,

the security

con ractor

for PNPS was

changed

from Globe

Security Systems to the Wackenhut Corporation.

The Team reviewed the licensee's and the contrac-

tor's transition plans, and interviewed numerous

management and union security personnel prior to

the transition. Also, the Team was onsite during

the

transition for direct observations.

The

transition was somewhat simplified by the fact

that all Globe employees that applied for posi-

tions were retcined by Wackenhut.

The

Team

determined that, because of comprehensive transi-

tion planning, the change in the contract secur-

ity force was accomplished without any compromise

of security and with minimal disruption to secur-

ity operations.

!

3.6.2.6

Security Program Audit

The Team reviewed the monthly corporate audit

reports. These c

it reports were of gotd qual-

ity and were generated as a result of corporate

oversight of the site security program.

The

i

findings in these reports were minor and not

indicative of any major programmatic problems.

The corrective actions were appropriate for the

findings.

3.6.2.7

Records and Reports

.

The Team reviewed various :ecurity records, logs,

,

and reports, including patrol logs, central alarm

l

station (CAS) logs, visitor control logs, and

testing and maintenance records.

All records,

legs, and reports reviewed were complete and

maintained as committed to in the Plan.

!

l

l

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

o

79

3.6.2.8

Testing and Maintenance

The Team reviewed the testing and maintenance

records and procedures.

The review disclosed

that the preventive maintenance procedures were

comprehensive and that the licensee now has in-

place a program that provides for prioritization

of security maintenance by the security depart-

ment.

The maintenance support to the security

department has improved as a result of the secur-

ity department assigning priority to the mainten-

ance work.

The use of compensatory measures for

inoperative equipment is minimal.

3.6.2.9

Locks, Xeys and Combinations

The Team reviewed the installation, storage, ro-

ta ' ion and related records for all locks, keys

ano combinations and determined that the licensee

was meeting the commitments in the Plan and its

implementing procedures.

3.6.2.10 Physical Barriers - Protected Areas

The Team physically inspected the protected area

l

barriers. It was determined by observations that

the barriers were installed and maintained as

described in the Plan. Progress on upgrading the

barriers is addressed in Section 3.6.2.1 of this

section.

3.6.2.11 Physical Barriers - Vital Areas

The Team physically inspected the vital area bar-

riers and determined that the barriers were

installed and maintained as described in the

Plan.

3.6.2.12 Security System Power Supply

The Team reviewed the security system power sup-

,

ply system and determined that it was in accord-

t

ance with Plan requirements. The Team noted that

as a result of the approval of a recant Plan

!

revision, improvements for protecting the secur-

ity power supply are wnderway, with wo-k expected

i

to be completed by September 28, 1933.

!

I

>

f

i

. _ _ _ _ _

- . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ -__

._ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

,

.

80

3.6.2.13 Lighting

The Team observed lighting within the protected

area. All areas were lighted in accordance with

commitments in the Plan.

Progress on upgrading

the lighting is addressed in Section

3.6.2.1.

3.6.2.14 Compensatory Measures

,

The Team reviewed the licensee's compensatory

measures and determined that their use to be con-

i

sistent with the commitments in the Plan. As a

result of the security program upgrades addressed

in Section

3.6.2.1,

the need for compensatory

measures for degraded security equipment has been

dramatically reduced.

Further reductions in the

7

use of coripeasato 'v measures will occur as pro-

ject upgrades are t spleted.

!

3.6.2.15 Aasessment Aids

The Team reviewed the licensee's use of assess-

l

t

ment aids and Jetermined by observation that the

I

assessment aids are installed, functioning and

i

maintained as committed to in the Plan.

Progress

on upgrading the assessment aids is addressed in

Section 3.6.2.1.

3.6.2.16 Access Control - Personnel and Packages

The Team reviewed the access control procedures

for personnel and packages and determinti that

they are corisistent with commitments in the Plan.

This determination was made by observing person-

,

nel

access

processing

during

shift

changes,

visitor access processing, and by interviewing

l

security personnel about package access proced-

!

ures.

The status of upgrades in the access con-

(

trol points is addressed in Section

3.6.2.1.

'

[

'

.

3.6.2.17 Access Control - Vehicles

Tna Team reviewed vehicle access control proced-

ures and observed vehicle searches at the Main

i

Vehicle Gate.

It was d;t.>rmined that vehicle

[

searches were being conducted consistent with

i

commitments in the Plan.

I

i

I

I

i

i

!

t

-

-

-

- -

- - -

-

-

.

-

-

.

- -

-

-

-

-

-

,

.

81

3.6.2.18 Detection Aids - Protected Area

The Team observed penetration tests of approxi-

mately 25% of the licensee's intrusion detection

system on August 17, 1983. The remaining 75% was

not tested during this inspection; however, pre-

vious test records were reviewed and the records

indicated that the system was operating as de-

scribed in the Plan and implementing procedures.

3.6.2.19 Detection Aids - Vital Area

The Team observed the testing of intrusion detec-

tion aids in selected vital areas and determined

that they wer? installed and functioning as

committed to in the Plan.

3.6.2.20 Alarm Stations

The Team observed the operation of both the Cen-

l

tral Alarm Station (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm

l

Station (SAS) and found them to be in accordance

c

i

with Plan

commitments.

During

the

previous

inspection (50-293/88-16), a concern was identi-

fied that the licensee was diverting an alarm

station monitor f rom security duty to respond to

t

i

fire protection system and health physics alarms.

'

During

the

IAT

inspection,

the Team noted

improvements in that there is a marked decrease

in the number of nuisance alarms, as a result of

the removal of the fire door and health physics

doors from the security alarm system.

L

3.6.2.21 Communications

I

The Team observed tests of all communication

capabilities in both the CAS and the SAS.

The

Team also reviewed testing records for the vari-

ous means of communications available to security

force members and found them to be as committed

,

to in the Plan.

I

3.6.2 ;2 Training and Qualification - General Requirements

The Team reviewed the licensee's Training and

Qualification Plan and teplementing procedures

and determined that they we re be'.ng implemented

i

as committed to in the Plan,

t

t

,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_.

.

o

82

3.6.2.23 Safeguards Contingency Plan Implementation Review

The Team reviewed the licensee's Contingency Plan

and implementing procedures and determined that

all exercises were being performed by the secur-

ity organization as committed to in the Plan.

3.6.2.24 Protection of Safeguards Information

The Team reviewed the protection and handling

procedures for Safeguards Information (SGI) and

determined that the licensee had completed an

inspection of each office onsite that handled and

stored SGI.

The inspection result, indicated

that the SGI assigned to each of fice was accoun-

ted for and was being stored in accordance with

established licensee procedures.

3.6.3

Conclusions

A comprehensive review of the licensee's security program

determined that the licensee has established and is imple-

menting a significantly improved seeJrity program over that

which existed when the station was shutdown in April 1986.

Upgrades to the security program include a greatly expanded

proprietary security organization, major installation of

state-of-the-art equipment, improved security maintenance

support, and upgrades to plans and procedures,

i

l

i

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

__

_ _ _ _

.

.

83

3.7 Training

3.7.1

Scope of Review

The Team assessed the scope, quality, and effectiveness of

the licensee's training programs.

Included in this review

were the licensed and non-licensed operator training pro-

grams and the programs for technical and general training

of the plant staff.

3.7.2

Observations and Findings

3.7.2.1

Operations Training

Operations Training Programs are outlined in PNPS

Nuclear Training Manual, T-001, Part 3, and have

received

INPO

accreditation.

The Operations

Training Programs include initial and requalifi-

cation training for licensed operators, initial

and continuing training for non-licensed opera-

tors, Shif t Technical Advisor (STA) training, and

SRO certification training.

The Team reviewed

these programs and discussed various aspects of

the programs with members of the licensee's

training and operation's staff.

The Team re-

viewed eight Operator and Senior Reactor Operator

training records to verify compliance with Sec-

tion 3.5.5 of the Training Manual.

To evaluate

l

the effectiveness of the training programs, the

l

Team observed classroom and simulator training;

interviewed licensed operators and senior opera-

tors, non-licensed operators and STAS; reviewed

several training evaluation and feedback forms

from classroom and simulator training conducted

during the current requalification cycle; and

observed ongoing operations in the plant.

Overall, the Team determined that the Operations

Training Programs are adequate and effective.

Classroom and simulator training observed ap-

.

peared to be effective.

Instructor preparation

was good and the lesson plan content was com-

plete.

During cbservations of classroom training

for PDC 88-07 involving the degraded voltage

modification, the Team noted that the depth of

knowledge being presented was adeqaste and stu-

dant participation was encouraged. After obser-

ving the conduct of the annual simulator opera-

t.ng exam, the Team noted improved coraunications

_-

_ _ _ _ _ _

._

_

_ _ _ _

__

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ - _

_ _ _ .

.

.

84

s

between meners d the operating crew.

In addi-

tion, the Hm noted the simulator examination

was also bei. , observed by licensee upper manage-

ment.

Discussions with training and operations

personnel confirmed that strong upper tranagement

attention and support for all aspects of the

Itcensed training programs is evident.

Inter-

views with licensed operators indicated that

overall they a re very satisfied thi t training

programs are well-suited to their needs, and that

the programs are responsive to their feedback.

Operators indicated that the training program has

greatly improved over the past year with the

incorporation of simulator training

into the

requalification program.

Discussions with Operations Training staff 4.a-

cated sufficient staffing to conduct training

programs.

Thirteen instructors are

currently

receiving Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) certif t-

cation training and are expected to be fully cer-

tified by the end of 1988

The use of experi-

enced PNPS instructors instead of contractors for

the operations training programs should enhance

the quality of the licensee's programs as well as

contribute to the depth of in-house operational

expertise.

Recent additions to the licensed requalification

program include the incorporation of Emergency

Operating Procedure (EOP) proficiency training.

This includes at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> devoted to E0P

review ir, the classroom and/or simulator during

each 32-hour segment of the program. (Each oper-

ator normally receives one segment of requalifi-

cation training every five weeks. )

Also, the

exam structure at the end of each session has

been nodified to include written and simulator

operating exams, which will aid the training

staff in determining the effectiveness of the

programs on a more frequent basis.

In addition,

the training staf f appears to carefully track

attendance in req;alification training to assure

that everyone required to attend is trained in

each module

of

the

requalification

program.

,.

- _ - _ _ _ _ _

_.

,

e

85

4

The operation's training staff appears to have a

very effective working relationship with the

operations department.

They meet to discuss

training needs on a frequent caris.

Through

these meetings, the training department anpears

able to sufficiently track and schedule the

licensed training either required or requested to

be completed prior to restart.

In addition, the

operation's department often provided support

l

during simulator examinations.

'

The Team reviewed the licensee's special training

,

program for the sixteen licensed operators (14

RO's and 2 SRO's) who currently hold NRC licenses

which are limited pending on-watch training dur-

ing the Power Ascension Program. The Team dis-

cussed various aspects of the program with mem-

,

bees of the licensee's training and rperations

'

staff.

The Team noted that the licensee has

established a structured and supervised program

to assure completion of NRC requirements to allow

removal of the individuals' license limitations.

.

Following a discussion with the Team regarding

plans for ensuring that each operator performs a

sufficient number of reactivity manipulations,

the licensee representative stated that en at-

tachment to the special program would be added to

further clarify what constitutes an acceptable

manipulation.

The Team observed

the

operations department

staff on four days of consecutive shift rotation.

These observations verified the overall effec-

'

tiveness

of training.

For example, on-shift

.

'

communications, an area of emphasis in simulator

training, was formal and effective.

However,

during a walk-through with an equipment operator

(non-licensed) of E0P Satellite Procedure 5.3.26,

t

the Team noted several discrepancies in the pro-

,

cedurt.

It also noted that the E0 and an SRO

-

misunderstood a step in the procedure.

Upon

l

investigation of these problems, the licensee

determined that a decision to train only the E0's

and not the licensed operators on the field por-

tion of the ratellite procedures contributed to

the misunderstanding. These issues are discussed

in detail in Section 3.2.4

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,

Additional Team followup of the problems found

during the above-mentioned procedure walk-through

identified a weakness in the licensee's method of

determining the need far additional training on

new procedures and procedure changes. The licen-

see's current method incorporates review of ORC

meeting minutes to determine newly approved pro-

cedures or procedure changes requiring training.

However, a delay of 30 to 45 days is not unusual

between the meeting and the distribution of for-

[

mal minutu.

Tor example, Procedure 5.3.26 had

been revised since equipment operator training

was conducted in March and April 1988. The ORC

meeting minutes which addressed this procedure

change had not been received by the training

department as of August M. 1938, 42 days af ter

the ORC meeting on July 6,1988.

The Team discussed the issue with a licensee

training department representative who stated

that the department recognized this concern and

was preparing to implement, in October 1988, a

more timely method for cetermining the needed

training.

During the inspection, the licensee committed to

accelerate implementation cf certain features of

the improved program, such that the training

,

department will become aware of procedure changes

l

within soproximately one day following the ORC

l

meeting.

This will allow the training staff the

opportunity to review the precedure changes end

determine the need for training prior to issuance

of the approved procedure.

If the

training

i

]

department determines that training is required

prior to issuance of the procedure, the depart-

i

ment will have the ability to delay the proced-

i

ure issuance. The licensee representative stated

that .o inta.ed as k iri.tiwtion detailing this

,

process was being written and would be approved

'

by ORC within about a week.

In additica, the

l

training staff will revis, their backlog of ORC

i

recting minutes to determ ne which procedure

,

changes have not been addressed and will take

j

appropriate action. These actions planned by the

'

licensee appeared very responsive to the Team's

concerns.

I

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3.7.2.2

Technical and General Training

Nuclear Training Manual, T-001, Parts 4 and 5,

outline the licensee's technical and general

training programs.

Included are training 3ro-

grams in maintenance, health physics, chemistry,

fire brigade, emergency plan, supervision, and

technical training for staf f and managers,

ihe

Team reviewed these programs and discussed var-

ious aspects of them with members of the licen-

see's training, technical, and supervisory staff.

To evaluate the ef fectiveness of the training

1

programs, the Team observed classroom instruc-

tion;

interviewed

radiological

controls

and

radiological chemistry (radchem) technicians, QA

engineers and first-line supervision; reviewed

classroom training evaluation and feedback forms;

and observed ongoing work ir. the plant.

Overall, the licensee's training programs were

found to be adequate.

Classroom training ob-

served appeared to be effective and student

participation was strongly encouraged.

In-house

staffing for those training programs appeared

more than sufficient.

The following relatively

new training programs are indicative of licensee

!

initiatives to develop employee skills:

apprentice programs for maintenance, health

--

physics,

and rad chem technicians;

and,

technical

training

for

newly

assigned

--

supervisors.

Additional

training

programs

currently being

developed in industrial safety and safety aware-

ness, along with the licensee's CPR program, show

the licensee's positive attitude in those areas.

The Team's observations of work in the plant dur-

.

ing this inspection verified the averall training

effectiveness. However, inadequacies in mainten-

ance post-work testing appeared to be the result

of lack of training for the maintenance planning

group and first-line supervisors on the post-work

testing portion of the new maintenance program

(See Section 3.3.2.6).

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83

3.7.3

Conclusions

The 11:ensee's training programs appear to be very good.

Team findings in all functional areas indicated overall

'

effectiveness of the training implemented.

Examples of

areas where training may have needed to be conducted sooner

include E0P satellite procedures and the post-work testing

program.

A weakness was identified in the licensee's

method of determining training needed for new procedures

and procedure changes.

The licensee appears to have made a strong commitment in

the area of licensed operator training, as exemplified by

increased staffing, simulator use in requalification train-

ing, strong interface between training and operations man-

agement, and increased attention and support from upper

management.

In addition, the creation of new programs for

supervisors and apprentices reflects an effort by the

licensee

to effectively

promote

employee development.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

.

.

89

3.8 Fire Protection

3.8.1

Scope of Review

The Team's evaluation of the fire protection program

focused on the maintenance of fire protection equipment,

the reliance on compensatory measures for degraded equip-

ment, and the performance of personnel on the fire brigade

and standing fire watches.

3.8.2

Observations and Findings

.

Licensee senior management established a station goal of

reducing the number of open fire protection corrective

maintenance requests (MR's) to 40 from a high of 300. This

,.

goal was reached in June 1988.

This reduction is indica-

tive of the overall improvement of the material condition

of fire protection equipment and systems.

The number of

MR's began climbing two weeks before the IAT inspection,

and reached 63 during the second week of this inspection.

The increase was mainly for low priority MR's.

l

Fire protection MR's are tracked as a stction performance

r

indicator and this increasing trend received prompt senior

i

management attention.

Tha licensee is currently contract-

ing to bring in additional fire protection maintenance sup-

port by the end of August 1933.

The fire protectinn man-

ager meets daily with operations, maintenance and planning

,

sections to schedule MR's and develop the station's work

,

plan.

The Team concluded that the licensee is giving

proper management Attention to itre protection MR's.

l

There are over 5,000 fire barrier penetration seals at

PNPS.

The licensee's tagging system has been effective in

identifying these penetrations, with no untagged penetra-

i

tions or degraded penetration seals observed by the Team.

The number of fire watch postings has been reduced from 145

a year ago to 45 prior to this inspection.

Fifteen of

these remaining postings will be eliminated by changes to

the fire protection program which are currently being

i

reviewed by NRC.

Another twelve will be eliminated when

the licensee completes Engineering Services Request (ESR)

'88-339, "Alarm delays on non-vital CAS alarms."

This ESR

will provide a means to electronically monitor fire doors

,

without undue distractian of security personnel from their

'

'

primary function. The remaining 18 fire watch postings are

due to degraded (quipment for which repairs are currently

l

!

being planned.

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Because TS's allow one individual to rove and cover more

than one fire watch posting, the number of people on shif t

committed to fire watch activities is substantially lower

than 45.

Two personnel per shift are assigned to cover

these fire watchos. In discussions with the Team, the fire

watches appeared knowledgeable about their duties.

The

Team reviewed several fire watch postings in the plant and

identified no concerns.

All fire watch rounds were com-

pleted on schedule.

The Team observed the on-shif t fire brigade respond to an

unannounced fire drill. The drill scenario was a simulated

main transformer fire with a concurrent failure of the

deluge system.

The brigade leader developed a successful

fire fighting strategy.

The brigade members responded

promptly in full fire fighting gear.

Communications be-

,

tween the brigade and the control room appeared to be ade-

q t.a t e . The fire brigade's first-line supervisors observed

the deill on their own initiative.

The fire protection

training instructor was also found to be knowledgeable and

ent.husiastic about the training program.

"

3.8.3

Conclusions

Effective management by the fire protection manager and

support by senior management are shown by the attention

given to the material condition of fire protection equip-

ment and reduced reliance on compensatory measures for

degraded equipment. Completion of licensing actions and an

ESR will further reduce the number of fire watch postings.

There is good identification and control of fire barriers.

Personnel assigned fire watch and fire brigade duties are

knowledgeable about their duties and perform them properly.

The

f' re protection division is well

staffed to meet

program needs.

,

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91

3.9 Engineering Support

3.9.1

Scope of Review

NRC found licensee engineering support to be strong in the

past two SALP reports.

Because of this history of good

i

performance, engineering support was not selected as a

specific area of focus for this inspection.

Instead,

observations relative to engineering support were made by

the Team while it inspected the other functional areas.

3.9.2

Observations and Findings

The Team found that engineering support to the facility is

generally very effective.

In particular,

the

Systems

Engineering Division functions well to meet plant needs.

Also, engineering support to maintenance has improved and

is eahanced by the improved maintenance work process and

the effective performance of the maintenance engineers.

The Team noted that a number of technical issues, including

some NRC open items, as well as licensee-identified items,

require NED resolution before plant restart.

They are

being tracked and pursued for resolution by NED.

During tours of the control room, the Team noted the mini-

mal use of certain human engineering features, such as

color-codes, meter "banding"

(e.g.,

marking of normal,

alert, and fail positions on meter and gauge faces), and

system lineup memory aids.

Based on discussions with NED

personnel, the Team determined that the licensee performed

a detailed control room design review (DCRDR) and received

comments on it from the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

A

supplemental

licensee D0RDR

report

is

required four months af ter the end of the current outage.

Currently, the licensee's DCRDR project has identified

about 140 proposed human engineering improvements which are

being evaluated and prioritized.

A few were incorporated

into design changes this outage.

The Team noted that some

,

of the remaining improvements were relatively simple, from

an engineering perspective, but could significantly enhance

control room human factors.

The Team asked whether'imple-

mentation of some of these items could be accelerated rela-

tive to the other, more complex items which may require

more detailed engineering and a plant outage to install.

.

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92

The

licensee fndicated that these simple improvements,

categorized by the licensee as "Paint-Label-Tape," are

included in the current 1989 budget.

The licensee also

committed to evaluate control room human factors during the

Power Ascension Program and to include an update regarding

the schedule and scope of these "Paint-Label-Tape" items in

their report to NRC at the completion of the Power Ascen-

sfon Program.

The licensee was very responsive on this

issue.

The Team noted that (1) licensee personnel have

performed well in the simulator under NRC observation, and

(2) there has not been any pattern of performance problems

traceable to control room human factors.

Thus, the T:am

cancluded that the licensee's approach to this issue is

acceptable.

The Team reviewed the licensee's program for the control of

transient materials.

This review included the licensee's

methods for identifying, tracking and removing non perman-

ent equipment such as tools, gas bottles, and scaffolding

located in plant treas where safety-related equipment is

housed. The licensee currently assigns responsibility in

this area to the Systems Engineering Group (SEG). Station

Instruction SI-SG.1010 "Systems Group Systems Walkdown and

Area Inspection Guidelines," details the licensee's program

for controlling transient materials. Materials so identi-

fied during weekly walkdowns by system engineers are docu-

mented and are either removed or their presence justified

in writing.

If the material is allowed to remain in the

process building, a seismic missile hazard analysis is per-

formed under Station Instruction SI-SG.1015

"Dotential

Seismic Missile Hazard," and appropriate measures are

implemented to ensure that the materials are properly

secured.

The licensee is compiling a data base which

identifies transient eaterials which must be removed prior

to startup.

The program appears to be comprehensive and

,

adequate.

l

During plant tours, the Team questioned the licensee con-

cerning the installation of splash shields and personnel

barriers in the areas of safety-related instrumentation.

.

Specifically, the Team questioned the seismic response nf

ti,e structures and the effect they may have on safety-

related structures.

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.

93

The fire water spray shield was installed during the cur-

rent outage.

This plant design change was processed under

current

licensee

procedures

which

require

a

seismic

response analysis prior to modification approval.

P9rson-

nel barriers installed during the mid-1970's recently had

seismic analyses performed on their current configurations.

These analyses found them satisfactory.

Based on this information and on a review of licensee docu-

reentation, the Team had no further questions.

3.9.3

Conclusions

'the Team concluded that engineering support continues to be

effective and identified no weaknesses.

The Itcensee has

committed to evaluate potential near-term improverrents in

control

room human engineering during power ascension

testing.

l

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4

- - , --

-

, . , , - _ , - , - . , , _ , . _ _ , , _ , _ _ . , _ . - _ - . , , _

,,..,,._,------_,-,,_n

e-

.,

, -- ,

y

g. :,g

, _ _ _ - - - - - - - _ - - _ - -

_

--

. - - - - - - - - -

-- _ ---- ------- --- -- - - . _ -

- - - _ - - _ --

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3.10 Safety AssessmentfQuality Verj,fication

3.10.1

Scope of Review

The objective of this irspection was to evaluate the ef fec-

i

tivenass of the licensee's t

assessment programs.

The

inspection focused on determining whether these programs

contribute to the prevention of problems by stonitoring and

evaluating plant performance, providing assessments and

findings, and communicating and following up en corrective

action recommendations.

The inspection consisted of a

documentation review, personnel interviews, and observa-

tions of meeting and work.

3.10.2

Nuclear Salety Review and Audit Committee

The Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee (NSRAC) is an

independent body responsible for performing senior-manage-

ment-directed

reviews

of activities

affecting

nuclear

safety. The NSRAC reports to the Senior Vfce President

-

Nu: lear (SVP-N).

Membership on the committee is composed

of senior

licensee management

personnel

augmented by

consultants.

The Team reviewed the NSRAC procedures manual, Technical Specification 6.5.B

meeting minutes, audit reports, and

associated NSRAC reports and correspondence. The Team also

attended

a

full

NSRAC

trueting

at

the

station

on

August 2, 1988.

A review of the committee meeting minutes for the period

between January 1987 and June 1988 verified that Technical

Specification requirements have been met with respect to

the composition, duties, meeting frequencies, and responsi-

bilities of the committee.

The composition and charter of

the committee was significantly revised in February 1938.

The selection process for members was designed to assure a

broad-based, independent review of facility activities and

to minimize the potential for cost and schedule pressures

to influence the committee's reviews and findings.

The

current committee is made up of ten eenbers appointed by

the SVP-N

Of the ten members, five are consultants, in-

cluding the Committee Chairman.

Only two members of the

committee hold line responsibility for operation of the

plant. Only one member, also a consultant, belonged a year

ago. To enhance the perspective of the new members, the

licensee implemented an annual training program. The Team

was provided with a t strix indicating the ev.cerience of

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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95

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current committce members relative to Technical Specifica-

tion requirements and verified the committee collectively

possesses a broad based level of experience and competence.

The committee charter, as detailed in NSRAC Procedure

101-1, also does not. allow the use of alternate members,

although these are allowed by the Technical Specifications.

Af ter a review of recent membership changes, and discuss-

ions with the NSRAC Ceordinator, the Team r ified that the

collective competence of the committee monborship has been

maintained as changes were made.

NSRAC currently conducts meetings approximately once a

~

month.

Since the beginning of 1988, seven meetings have

been conducted, six of which were held at the site.

This

is significantly more than the once per-six-months minimum

required by the Technical Specifications. Three additional

meetings are scheduled for 1988.

In addition, individual

subcommittees may hold additional meetings at the site.

NSRAC also intends to meet at the site in September with

several key members of station management to review restart

preparations and plans to provide its own independent

recommendations for restart readiness.

NSRAC uses subcommittees ef fectively to review specific

areas of interest. Currently, six subcommittees are estab-

lished:

(1) safety evaluations;

(2) operations /mainten-

ance; (3) training / security / fire protection; (4) radiation

control / chemistry / emergency preparedness; (5) quality over-

view; and, (6) engineering / technical. Each subcommittee is

chaired by a NSRAC member, and is composed of additional

personnel appointed by the committee.

The subcommittees

provide reports to the full committee during their ;ched-

uled meetings.

The subcommittees are especially usef ul in

performing documentation review to allow more time for open

discussions at the meetings.

A stronger NSRAC involvement in station accivities is evi-

dent not only in the recent site meetings and effective use

of subcommittees, but also in scheduled site tours and

audit participation.

The NSRAC has established a schedule

for individual committee members to perform station tours

and report the results to the full committee.

NSRAC has

also designated

individual

members

to participate in

selected QA audits throughout the year.

The Team reviewed selected audits conducted under the

cognizance of NSRAC, which are required by Technical

Specifications. The audits reviemed were thorough, timely,

and the noted deficiencies have been corrected or are being

tracked. The audit reports reviewed included a third party

assessment of the adequacy of the QA program, and QA audits

.

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of

Technical

Specifications,

administrative

controls,

operations, chemistry, radiation protection, and inservice

testing.

In addition, special audits were recently con-

ducted concerning shutdown from outside the control room,

the salt service water system, and NSRAC activities.

The current committee has an effective formal tracking

system for all "concerns" forwarded to management and com-

'

mittee

followup

items.

The

"concerns"

reviewed were

clearly transmitted to the SVP-N.

However, review of

,

recent meeting minutes by NRC revealed that a number of

"recommendations" had been forwarded to the SVP-N, but a

formal response had not been received.

The committee also

di.d not formally track resolution of these recommendations.

Further investigation by the NSRAC Coordinator determined

that although the items had not been tracked, the specific

recommendations had been implemented, or were incorporated

into another corrective action process.

,

Ouring NSRAC Meeting 88-04, conducted on May 24, 1983, the

Operations and Maintenance Subcommittee presented a report

on the conduct of the Operations Review Committee (ORC).

,

NSRAC raised concerns over whether the ORC was fully meet-

'

ing the intent of its duties required in the Technical

Specifications. The report identified four specific find-

ings of deficiency. They included:

'

Inadequate method of reviewing changes to safety-

'

-

related procedures;

i

Lack of ORC prepared reports resulting from ORC inves-

-

tigation of a Technical Specifications violations;

,

Lack of specific review and reports of facility oper-

I

-

ations by ORC; and,

!

Lack of formality in the conduct of ORC meetings.

-

Af ter the discussion, NSRAC concurred that the ORC perform-

ance issues should be formally raised as a concern to the

,

SVP-N. Tha NSRAC concern (88-04-01) was transmitted to the

SVP-N on May 27,1938.

The concern stated that NSRAC's

'

.

overall assessment was that ORC's conduct and administra-

tion needed substantial improvement.

Specifically, the

!

concern stated that the established process did not appear

j

to foster adequate depth and discipline for substantive

indepandent reviews. In addition, NSRAC noted that of the

[

40 meetings cenducted in 1933 prior to the review, neither

l

the Station Director nor the Plant Manager had attended,

l

based on its review of the meeting minutes.

'

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97

The NSRAC concern was responded to on June 22, 1988.

In

response, the Station Director initiated revisions to the

ORC Charter and Procedure 1.3.4, "Procedures," to accur-

ately describe the specific methods by which ORC met the

procedure and operations review requirements.

In addition,

the

Station

Director

attended

an

ORC

meeting

on

June 22, 1988, and is considering additional initiatives to

improve the conduct and administration of ORC activities.

N5RAC closed the concern at the August 2, 1988 meeting, but

initiated a followup item to continue to monitor ORC per-

formance.

In addition, NSRAC members were encouraged to

attend ORC meetings as observers. NRC's review of ORC per-

formance 'Jentified similar deficiencies and concluded that

additior.1 actions to strengthen some ORC functions were

warranted (See Section 3.10.3).

Based on meeting attendance and review of recent meeting

minutes, the Team noted that the NSRAC reviews have been

thorough and focused on improving performance in areas

important to safety. During the August 2, 1988 NSRAC meet-

ing, the Team noted that the discussions were frank and

open, with the reviews concentrated on recurring and emerg-

ing issues.

The areas of emphasis have included 50.59

reviews, ORC performance, corrective action programs, pro-

cedure adequacy, and management depth.

Due to the limited number of "concerns" issued by NSRAC

since revision of the committee in February 1988, the Team

could not reach a conclusion on the responsiveness of the

station organization to NSRAC.

It appears at least in one

case pertaining to ORC performance, that the response was

not comprehensive.

However, all other "concerns" reviewed

were responded to adequately.

3.10.3

Operations Review Committee

The function, composition, and responsibilities of the

i

Operations Review Committee (ORC) are described in PNPS

L

Technical Specification 6.5.A.

In addition, PNPS Procedure

1.2.1, "Operations Review Committee," describes in greater

detail the authority and responsibility of the ORC at the

Pilgrim Station.

For this inspection, the Team reviewed

the

minutes

of

ORC

meetir,g s

88-40

through

88-63

(April 1,1988 through July 5,1988) and observed the con-

duct of three regularly scheduled and two special ORC meet-

ings (ORC Meetings 80-80, 81, 82, 83 and 86). In addi+1on,

the Team interviewed various ORC members and alternates.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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.

93

The inspection focused on whether ORC operations satisfied

current Technical Specification requirenents; whether the

ORC was meeting its responsibilities identified in PNPS

Procedure

1.2.1,

and whether the CRC was responsive to

recommendations for improvements icentified during NSRAC

and QA audits of its operations.

3.10.3.1 Compliance with Technical Specifications and

Procedures

'

By reviewing existing documentation, and through

direct observation of ORC meetings, the Team has

determined

that

the

Technical

Specification

requirements for the ORC composition, quorum,

meeting frequency, authority, and records are

being satisfied. During the period reviewed, the

Team noted that the ORC reviewed plant proced-

ure changes, plant design changes (PDCs), Field

Revision Notices

(FRNs),

and

Licensea

Event

Reports (LERs), as well as proposed revisions to

the security plan, to the inservice inspection

program, to the emergency plan and to fire pro-

tection program implementing procedures. The ORC

members and alternates are appointed by memur-

andum from the Station Director and cannot serve

on the committee until they have successfully

completed the station ORC training course.

There

is also a required reading review program used by

the Training Department as a retraining program

for ORC members and alternates.

The Team re-

viewed the training course material and deter-

mined that it bad an appropriate emphasis on

assuring safe operation as well as on regulatory

requirements.

The ORC at Pilgrim Station has been reeting

regularly every Wednesday and has a scheduled

"special" meeting every Friday on an as-needed

basis.

The ORC met an average of about twice a

week, which is well above Technical Specification

,

requirements.

While there was evidence in the minutes of dis-

cussions about LERs, PDCs or FRNs, the prepond-

'

erence of the ninutes described changes to pro-

cedures.

The Team saw no reference of ORC

reviews of Failure and Malfunction Reports.

The

ORC has a system for following issues identified

during

discussions

which

requires

a

formal

response to the ORC and a review of the response

by ihe ORC to assure that the response resolved

'

the initial concerns.

-_.

O

99

The Team reviewed the closeout process for ORC

followup items and determined that, in one case,

an item (88-58-01) may have been clo'.ed prema-

turely. During a discussien among the Team, the

ORC Chairman, the Design Section Manager, and the

Construction Division Manager, the ORC Chairman

agreed that the item should be reopened for addi-

tional review.

During ORC Meeting 88-82, the

item was reopened.

By observing the ORC, the Team concluded that the

committee members and alternates are concerned

with assuring the safe operation of the facility.

Discussions focused on the impact of items on

safety systems, as well as whether the items

being discussed met regulatory requirements or

constituted unreviewed safety questions.

The

Station Director also attended one of the regu-

larly scheduled ORC meetings during the inspec-

tion period.

During its review, the Team identified two weak-

.

nesses in the operation of the ORC. They are the

Technical Specification (TS) review of plant

operations (T.S. 6.5 A.6.e) and the TS require-

ment to investigate violations and prepare i

report covering the evaluation and recommenda-

tions to prevent a recurrence (T.S. 6.5.A.6.1).

TS 6.5. A.6 e states that the ORC ds responsible

for the review of facility operations to detect

po te;.',i a l

safety hazards while

TS 6.5.A.6.1

states that the ORC is responsible for investiga-

ting all TS violations and for preparing a report

covering the evaluation and recommendations to

prevent a recurrence.

The Team noted that ORC routinely uses the review

of LERs and Failure and Malfunction Reports

(F&MRs) to satisfy the TS required review of

plant operations and TS violations.

The Team

also noted that the ORC has appointed the Compli-

ance Division as a subcommittee to the ORC and

assigned it the responsibility et presenting

selected Failure and Malfunction Reports as weil

as the preparation of all LERs, including any

, _ _ _ _ _

O

O

l

100

involving TS violations. Copies of all LERs are

provided to the ORC as a means of satisfying

the TS requirements.

Further, PNPS Procedure

1.2.1 permits the ORC Chairman to set the time-

liness of subcommittee reports to the full ORC.

While the use of subcommittees te support ORC

!

activities is acceptable, the Team believes that

the method used by ORC in fulfilling its respon-

sib 111 ties as defined by TS 6.5.A.6.e and i needs

improvement.

In

particular,

the

Compliance

-

Division has been issuing all LERs, including

those discussing TS violations, prior to any ORC

review of the product prepared. A review of 10

LERs disclosed that ORC review of the LER occurs

usually a week to two weeks after the LER was

formally sent to the NRC. While this may satisfy

'

the timeliness requirements of PNPS Procedure

i

1. 2.1, i t does not appear that the corrective

l

actions proposed to prevent recurrence receives

the full benefit of a timely multi-disciplinary

review, as is intended by the composition and

responsibilities of the ORC.

The formal release

!

of the LER involving a TS violation by the ORC

'

subcommittee without a formal review by the com-

'

plete ORC is a weakness in meeting the require-

!

ments of TS 6.5.A.6.1.

j

'

During a review of F&MRs, which had not yet been

reviewed by ORC, the Team noted that F&MR 86-266,

'

which discussed a TS violation, had not yet been

reviewed by ORC.

f

In this case, the violation was against an admin-

istrative requirement in TS Section 6.8, and was

I

not reportable as an LER.

Therefore, the F&MR

did not result in an LER or a special report.

I

The event occurred in September 1986, and no

reports have yet been

submitted

to ORC as

required by the TS. The licensee stated that the

F&MR was still open punding completion of the

remaining corrective action, and that then a

report would be issued.

Both of these findings indicate that the ORC is

not actively participating in the timely review

of plant orerations and does not appear to pro-

vide reaningful input into the process.

____

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

.

O

O

101

3.10.3.2 Responsiveness to /udit Recommendations

The Team reviewed both quality assurance (QA)

audit

findings

and HSRAC

recommendations

to

determine ORC responsiveness to recommendations

for improvements to its operations.

In QA Audit

Report

87-37,

QA

listed

two

recommendations

accepted by the ORC.

PNPS Procedure 1.2.1 was

reviewed and the Team determined that PNPS Pro-

cedure

1.2.1,

Revision 21, contained the QA

recommendations.

The ORC was also audited by QA

i rem May 22 through June 22, 1988.

The audit

generated

one

recommendation

concerning

the

cross-referencing of ORC meetings with document

references.

Based upon discussions between the

QA auditor and the Team, ORC has also accepted

this recommendation.

In May 1988, the ORC received a list of four

concerns from NSRAC based upon an audit review of

the ORC.

While the nature of the specific con-

cerns are discussed in detail in Section 3.10.3

above, they are summarized here.

Specifically,

the NSRAC expressed concerns about the following

areas:

(1) the ORC review of changes to safety-

related procedures, (2) ORC investigation of TS

violations, (3) ORC review of facility opera-

tfons, and (4) conduct of ORC meetings.

The concerns related to the ORC's investigation

of TS violations and its review of plant opera-

tions are paralleled by the Team's findings dis-

cussed in Section 3.10.3.1 above.

The NSRAC concern with ORC procedure reviews is

being evaluated for long-term improvements but no

definitive action is currently planned by the

licensee. As for NSRAC concern #4, the meetings

observed by the Team, were conducted in a manner

permitting formal and informal discussions of

specific issues.

A meeting agenda for regular

ORC meetings was prepared and followed. The Team

concluded

that

the

meetings

were

conducted

acceptably.

Based on the above, the Team has determined that,

in general, the ORC has been receptive to recom-

nendations for improvement.

However, the fact

that the NSRAC concerns remain unresolved sug-

gests that the ORC may have difficulty addressing

more complex recomendations.

_ __

O

O

,

102

The Team also observed that the quality of the

'

>

meeting minutes could be improved by providing

more discussion of the issues by the various ORC

members as opposed to providing abstracts of the

documents discussed.

Based upon a review of the ORC activities, the

,

Team determined that there are weaknesses in the

implementation of responsibilities assigned to

the DRC. In particular, the Team determined that

weaknesses exist in the review of plant opera-

tions and tne investigation of TS violations.

The Team has concluded that improvements in these

two specific areas would result in a more effec-

tive ORC.

In response to the Team's concerns,

the licensee agreed to take certain actions prior

to restart to strengthen the operational focus of

ORC.

These actions are:

(1) to review plant

,

incident critiques; (2) to review LER's prior to

[

their submittal to NRC; (3) to review F&MR's on a

-

regular basis; and, (4) to provide for a monthly

l

presentation and discussion of plant operations

'

as a specific agenda item. The Team found these

licensee commitments responsive to its concerns.

,

I

3.10.4

Quality Assurance Audit and Surveillance Programs

!

1

The Team reviewed selected QA audit and surveillance

i

reports, selecting specific findings, discrepancies, and

i

observations for followup of the licensee's corrective

t

action process. QA personnel, including the QA Department

!

(QAD) manager, and other station nanagers and engineers,

'

were interviewed regarding the audit and surveillance pro-

!

gram objectives and overall conclusions which can be drawn

l

f rom the audit and surveillance findings.

The Team also

i

reviewed the quarterly QA0 Trend Analysis report, and at-

tended several QA interface meetings.

Portions of the

Boston Edison Company Quality Assurance Manual (BEQAM) and

applicable station procedures were also reviewed.

4-

,

The technical content and quality of the issues raised in

'

the selected audit reports were excellent.

The conduct of

.

a performance-based radiological controls audit by outside

i

consultants was noteworthy.

Specificolly, the Team re-

-

viewed audits required under the cognizance of NSRAC, i r.

accordance with the TS, and found that they are being per-

formed as required.

The Team determined that all defici-

i

encies identified in the audits were either closed or ade-

quately tracked by a for al system,

j

t

I

n,-.-.

. - - -

. - - - - _ - _ . - - - - - - - , . - -

-

.- . _ .

,

.-

o

l

l

!

103

During the conduct of audits and surveillances, deficiency

'

reports (OR) are issued by QA for conditions contrary to

management policies and procedures, regJlatory require-

ments, or licensee commitments.

A DR which reports a

,

deficiency identified during a QA audi+, is issued at the

,

time of the audit exit interview.

The licensee has an

t

effective system of re, quiring a written response to the OR

within a specified period, dependent on its significance,

and for subsequent followup of corrective action. A system

also edists for granting extensions through an escalation

process to upper management.

QA prepares a monthly status report, including OR status,

which is forwarded to senior management for appropriate

,

actions.

Review of the most recent QA trend report indi-

cated a decline in the OR backlog, an increase in the num-

ber of OR's completed on time, and few extensions needed

.

L

for OR closeout. The number of deficiencies reported by QA

!

remained fairly constant.

These are all indicators that

,

licensee management attention to the corrective action

l

process has had a positive impact.

'

The licensee also effectively trends Immediate Corrective

'

Actiens (ICA), which are identified in audit and surveil-

,

lance reports. These report conditions which could lead to

a DR, but which are corrected prior to the end of the audit

,

or surveillance.

They also are tracked along with the

,

OR's.

The Team also found the tracking of recommendations

.

from the audits and surveillances to be effective.

l

Approximately 45 QA surveillance reports concerning obser-

i

vations of surveillance testing were reviewed. The reports

I

were well planned, well documented, and thorough.

Again,

,

the tracking and followup of identified deficiencies were

l

adequate. A minor concern of the Team involved QA followup

to identified procedural inadequacies during surveillances,

i

In ten of the surveillance activites reviewed by NRC,

!

technical piocedure deficiencies were identified by QA, but

I

since the technicians being observed halted the test and

(

pursued a procedure change, no deficiency reports were

l

issued. Furt.her review ' snd that the majority of the pro-

!

cedure deficiencies were identified prior to implementation

,

of new procedure validation program, and that QAD has an

i

open DR on the procedure validation process.

QA0 is con-

l

tinuing to monitor the process.

The Team had no further

cor.ce rn s .

l

!

I

,

b

,

-

r .- -

_ _ _ _ _ _

-

__

_____ _

, ,,

,

104

Two QA Interface meetings were attended during the inspec-

tion. The mee*.ing attendees include representatives from

QA, plant staff, and engineering.

They meet weekly to

review the status of various corrective action items,

including OR's,

Management Corrective Action

Requests

(MCARs) and Potenti:1 Conditions Adverse to Quality Reprts

(PCAQ's).

The meetings have improved communications among

the organizations and have contributed to the more timely

resolution of corrective action items.

3.10.5

Corrective Action Process and Programa

The Team reviewed the licensee's programs curr6ntly in

place to identify, follow, and correct safety-related prob-

lems. A newly formulated Corrective Action Program "Clear-

inghouse," and proposed revisions to corrective action pro-

cess procedures were also evaluated with respect to the

current objectives and planned initiatives to improve cor-

rective action program effectiveness.

Samples were chosen

from each of the programmatic areas where problem identift-

cation is routine and implementation of corrective measures

is required.

Each of these programs is discussed below.

The Tean interviewed licensee personnel responsible for

individual program management and implementation, as well

as the technical personnel accountable for problem dis-

position and corrective action adequacy.

For all of the areas evaluated, the Team sought to deter-

mine the effectiveness of the licensee's process for root

cause analysis of problems, investigation of problems and

causes for their generic applicability, and trending of

findings to prevent their recurrence. Selectad issues were

analyzed % understand the technical problems, check how

they were

programmatically hsndled,

and

to determine

whether the corrective measures were appropriate to the

specific cases.

The examples are cited in the following

subparagraphs not only to illustrate the scope of licensee

activities inspected, but also to support the conclusions

reached

regarding

the

corrective

action

program

effectiveness.

3.10.5.1

Failure and Malfunction Reports

The Failure and Malfunction Report (F&MR) is a

process by which failures, malfunctions, and

abnormal operating events are reported, evaluated

and corrected to preclude repetition.

The pro-

cess

is

described

in:

Nuclear

Organization

-

_. ___ __ __ ______

.

.

105

Procedure (NOP) 8305, the "Failure and Malfunc-

tion

Report Process;"

PNPS Procedure Number

i

1.3.24, "Failure and Malfunction Reports;" and

PNPS Work Instruction NS-3.2.12

"F&MR Trend

Analytis."

Team review of licensee precedures verified that

responsibilities are established for the F&MR

process; reports are prioritized by safety sig-

nificance; underlyin

root causes are evaluated;

reports are tracked for completion of corrective

,

action; and, trending for repctitive proble.ns is

performed.

A report may be initiated by any

licensee staff member for failures, malfunctions,

and abnormal operating events identified during

station operation.

The Nuclear Watch Engineer

ensures that adequate compensatoi,, measures are

implemented and the required notifications are

!

performed.

The Compliance Division Manager then

>

recomnends a lead group to perform the investiga-

'

'

tion and performs a reportability review.

The

appropriate department manager is responsible to

ensure that the identified deviations are prc-

perly resolved and that corrective actions are

planned and effectively iniplemented in a timely

manner. The department manager is a'.so responsi-

'

ble for the revi- and approval of the reporta-

bility, root caase analysis, corrective action

!

a

plans, disposition, and final closeout.

A root

cause analysis is performed for those F&MR's

i

determined to be significant. The term "signifi-

'

cant" applies to a condition adverse to quality

which merits further evaluation for cause and

>

requires management attention to preclude recur-

I

!

rence.

The nonsignificant deviations are evalu-

l

ated in a periodic trend analysis.

l

[

The Team identified several discrepancies in the

}

,

3

ddministration of the F&MR process.

Procedure

,

1.3.24

states

that

the

Complianc

Division

'

.

Manager is responsi51e to present F&MR's that are

!

designated significant or important to ORC. As

'

.

discussed in Section 3.10.2, the Team noted that

'

the ORC meeting minutes for the previous six

months did not record the review of any F&MR's.

.

Further Team review found that a backlog of over

j

'

,

t

,

i:

l

l

- - - - - - - - -

1

a

,

106

eristed, and that no F&MRs had been submitted to

ORC since February 3, 1988, except for those

associated with an LER.

Some of the F&MR's

involved events which occurred in 1986.

The

,

licensee stated this was caused by personnel

'

resource constraints.

The Team also found two

i

closed F&MR's which appeared to meet the criteria

established in Proendure 1.3.24 for being submit-

ted to ORC, but which had not been submitted

prior to closure.

F&MR's88-127 and 88-76 were

!

cot reviewed by ORC, but invefived recurring con-

ditions, which is a criterion for ORC review.

Ir. addition, many of the closed safety-related

!

F&MRs were denoted not safety-related by the

,

Watch Engineer during the initial review process.

'

This .nts-clat *fication; however, did not affect

,

the processing and evaluation of the associated

events for those F&MR's inspected.

The Team reviewed a listing of open and closed

F&MR's and evaluated a sampling of closed reports

to determine the completeness and effectiveness

r

of the corrective actions.

The total number of

F&MR's initiated has been increasing over the

!

last few years. The licensee has attributed this

increase to a heightened sensitivity of personnel

i

to critical self-assessment and to the identif f-

l

cation of potentially reportable or significant

events to management.

The total number of open

F&MR's has significantly decreased over the last

year.

l

The root cause analyses performed for the F&MR's

i

'

reviewed were found to be of excellent quality.

l

!

Each analysis included an event description,

probable cause, actions completed, recommended

actions, and safety significance.

The Systems

!

Engineering Group's impact on this important

process has been positive.

1

I

.

The Team revf ewed the latest F&MR Trend Analysis

e

Report, which covered the period July through

December 1987, anti the applicable procedures.

The Team noted that the station's Technical Sec-

l

tions did not specifically assign responsibility

for the report's proposed recommendations.

Fur-

i

ther review found that this program deficiency

i

had been previously identified by the licensee

!

and the NRC and that the licensee had initiated

j

corrective action. Specifically, a review of all

previous trend report rec w endations was per-

forced by the licensee to determine their status.

l

>

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

__ _

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

__________

- __

_

_

.

o

107

The review was completed in July 1983, and 74% of

the recommendations were corrected.

The remain-

ing items are currently being dispositioned by

the licensee to ensure effective long-term cor-

rective action.

In addition, the licensee has

revised the F&MR procedures to include use of the

Management Corrective Action Report (MCAR) as a

vehicle for the Technical Section to report and

correct negative trends identified in the re-

ports. The most recent trend report resulted in

the issuance of two MCAR's, which the Team

reviewed.

The Team also noted that the trend report focused

its discussions primarily on individual problems

rather than trend patterns and recurring fail-

ures. The Team observed that the Technical Sec-

tion would be more effective if it thoroughly

evaluated trends and patterns, since the indi-

vidual F&MR itself is adequate to evaluate iso-

lated problems.

In addition, the report did not

provide any detailed discussion of personnel

errors or procedural failures, although there

were a large number in the report.

3.10.5.2 Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality

As described by PNPS Nuclear Organization Proced-

ure (NOP) 83A9, "Management Corrective Action

Process," the potential conditions adverse to

-

quality (PCAQ) report can be used by any licensee

member tc document and report any actual or sus-

pected conditions adverse to quality not reported

by other report forms such as NCRs, ors, and

F&MRs.

In short, it is a process for anyone to

elevate a concern to management to assure that

the concern will be evaluated and

resolved.

As

implemented.

PCAQs

are written

from one

'

department to another or from one section to

another within a department.

For example, Oper-

ations (N00) could send a FCAQ to Engineering

(NED) asking for an evaluation of a specific

plant condition.

In each case, the originating

department is responsible for tracking each item

to resolution. According to NOP 83A9, a PCAQ is

not formally closed until the originating depart-

eent is satisfied with the proposed corrective

action

and

the

corrective

action

has

been

implemented.

<

O

103

The Team reviewed a listing of open and closed

PCAQ's and also reviewed a sampling of individual

PCAQ's to determine the completeness and effec-

tiveness

of

corrective

actions.

As

of

August 19, 1988,

there were about

250 PCAQs

awaiting resolution.

There is currently no cen-

tral tracking system for all PCAQs, although

licensee management has begun initiatives in that

area. In June 1988, the licensee began an effort

to reduce the number of open PCAQ's and to estab-

lish a central tracking system for PCAQ's with

the QAO. As part of this effort, each department

is reviewing unresolved PCAQ's to evaluate each

one's significance and its potential impact on

restart.

Based on discussions with respons!ble

managers, the Team learned that QA0 has completed

its review and concluded that r.one of the unre-

solved

PCAQ's

concern

equipment

operability

issues or are of a significance level that re-

quires action before restart.

N00 has not com-

pleted its evaluation but expects to be finished

within two weeks.

NED has been implementing a

routine review of each unresolved PCAQ and has

been maintaining a list of PCAQ's needed to be

resolved prior to restart.

The review of out-

standing PCAQ's is an iten on the restart check-

list maintained by the plai t.

Subsequent check-

list review by ORC also provides a decision point

in the process to assure that all necessary

evaluations have been completed.

Based on the above, the Team has concluded that

the licensee is assuring that each PCAQ is being

evaluated for its nuclear safety and equipment

operability

impact

relative

to

the

planned

restart of the plant and that all PCAQ'; noeded

for resolution before restart will be identified.

The ORC review of the PCAQ's on the restart

checklist will provide another check to assure

)

that resolution n' PCAQ's needed for restart has

I

occurred.

_ _ - - _ _ - _

.

.

109

i

The Team selected several closed PCAQ's to deter-

mine whether the proposed corrective action had

satisfied the originating department's concerns

and whether the corrective action was completed

as required by station procedures.

In general,

all identified corrective actions described on

the PCAQ's were completed; however, the docume -

tation of the completed activity was, in many

cases, limited and specific references were not

provided.

The Team stated that additional guid-

ance on the level of documentation to be provided

on the closecut portion of the PCAQ form could

enhance clarity and auditability of the closure

process. The Team also noted that the PCAQ sys-

J

tem can allow ambiguity of PCAQ status in cases

where a proposed action has been rejected by the

-

originating office.

For example, NED rejected

'

)

the response prepared by N00 to PCAQ NED-SS-087.

A review of the N00 log showed the issue resolved

(July 22, 1933), but further investigation with

parsens af fected indicated that the response was

being rewritten and further corrective action was

to be performed. The fornal closecut process and

I

status tracking for the PCAQ's needs improvement,

i

This finding parallels a similar finding of the

!

QA Department contained in QA0 88-609, dated

May 23, 1988.

l

3.10.5.3 Managenent Corrective Action Request

The GEQAM and NOP 83A9, "Management Corrective

Action Process," describe the purpose of the

Management Corrective Action Request (MCAR).

The

MCAR is a two part corrective action document

]

used to:

(1) perform a root cause analysis of

significant conditions adverse to quality and

'

develop preventive action plans; and (2) request

management to implement selected action plans to

prevent recurrence of a problem.

In lieu of a

,

Deficiency Report, an MCAR may be used to report

,.

and resolve deficiencies involving process or

i

1

policy issues which af fect more than one depart-

'

ment and for which management attention and

direction is required. An MCAR eay also be used

for tracking long-term corrective actions related

i

to nonconformance reports (NCRs) and PCAQ's nr

for identification of adverse trends identified

'

i

threugh trend analysis programs.

i

!

!

_.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

.

110

l

QA0 is assigned adiinistrative control for the

MCAR process.

QAD logs the status, distributes

copies, reports on delinquent MCAR's, and per-

forms the closecut. QAD also reviews each MCAR

where the responsible department is different

j

from the issu.ing department to verify that the

assignment of

the

responsible department

is

-

appropriate.

The Team reviewed the current status of open

l

MCAR's and the administrative controls in place

to track and promptly resolve MCAR's. The latest

monthly status report, issued to the SVP-N on

August 1,1988, from the QA0 Manager listed 30

l

'

open MCAR's. This list included two 1985 MCAR's

and eight 1936 MCAR's. Approximately 40% of the

MCAR's initiated since 1984 remain open,

i

The licensee has previously observed that in-

l

creased management attention is required to close

!

cut MCAR's in a timely manner.

For example, the

I

most recent QAD trend analysis report, issued on

May 23, 1988, recommended that the SVP-N initi-

ate action to closecut MCAR's QA0 85-2 and QA0

87-2, which address the large number of quality

problem reports issued for "f ailure to follow

procedures" and "inadequate procedures."

Team attendance at several QA Interface meetings

also noted

that

there

is

clearly

increased

management attention being directed to c'ostout

the longstanding MCAR's.

The Team reviewed two open M;AR's to evaluate the

effectiveness of the process. MCAR 86-06, issued

in November 1936, involved recurring failures of

the salt service water (SSW) pumps. The MCAR was

issued as a result of an F&MR trend repert find-

ing.

The MCAR resulted in a detailed root cause

.

analysis by a consultant and the development of a

l

long-term corrective action plan, which is not

yet complete.

MCAR 8S-02, issued in June 1938,

concerned programmatic inefficiencies in the PCAQ

process.

The licensee is actively working on

developing an integrated list of the approxi-

mately 250 open PCAQ's with a curre it status (see

Section 3.10.4.2).

This list is to be utilized

to increase emphasis on closecuts.

Review of

these M;AR's did not identify any discrepancies

in the process.

_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . __

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

-

_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

__

D

,

'

111

,

3.10.5.4 Clearinghouse Process

I

The current procedure describing the corrective

i

action process is NOP 83A9, "Management Correc-

[

tive Action Process."

This prccedure discusses

l

the responsibilities of the station depart-cents

t

t

in resolving identified deficiencies and report-

ing the trends observed

The procedure also

describes the various types of reports or docu*

t

ments available to station personnel and specifi-

cally defines their use.

r

As a result of the self-assessment evaluations

and performance improvement plans, the licensee

determined that the existing corrective action

t

processes were

very compliccted and

that a

i

streamlined process was needed that would provide

I

,

an easy means of raising any concerns to manage-

,

'

ment for resolution. A need was also identified

!

for a specific entity which could monitor the

performance of the station organization in imple-

,

menting self-improvement recommendations, as well

!

as provide the focal point for identified issues

to be placed into the appropriate plant correc-

,

tive actin 6 process,

j

.

P

In June 1933, the "Clearinghouse" was established

l

3

to serve a number of needs.

It was developed to

l

'

assure that the licensee's restart assessment

(

team observations had been entered into the

!

,

regular corrective

action

process

and,

when

j

necessary, that all necessary .Nperwork. was pre-

-

pared for the resolution of any outstanding

[

ttems.

As of this inspection, 69 assessment

items remain unresolved but have schedules iden-

e

tified

for

their completion.

Responses

for

!

approximately 69 additional items have not been

!

received

from the station organization.

The

balance of the original 449 items have been

f

listed as closed. The Team cid not evaluate the

l

.

closecut process for any completed or closed

j

,

items.

j

j

A second responsibility of the Clearinghouse was

!

,

to streamline the corrective action process. As

{

of this inspection period, revisions to the sta-

i

i

tion procedures for improvements in corrective

!

!

action processes have not been made. The current

,

i

estirate for cenpletion of the necessary proced-

l

l

ure revist" s was the end of Augus..

j

i

.

,

i

!

4

_.

-

.

.

_ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. _ _ _ _ _

O

4

i

112

While subject to revision during the required

station procedure review process, the following

i

is a discussion of the current licensee philos-

ophy concerning potential modification of the

I

corrective action processes.

The Team did not

evaluate the effectiveness of these proposed

changes

in

the

overall

corrective

action

,

programs.

!

The Clea ringhoui,e is currently revising three

i

existing NOPs, creating a new NOP, and revisirg

l

the BEQAM. The new NOP would define the role and

responsibilities of the Clearinghouse, establish

a new form for identifying real or potential

'

plant

problems,

as

well

as

for

reporting

employee-identified concerns or self-assessment

!

recommendations for plant improvements. The new

,

form would provide a uimple method for raising

issues, concerns, or recommendations to station

,

,

'

management.

Upon receipt of this form,

the

'

Clearinghouse would review the issue described

i

t

and integrate the issue into the regular plant

j

corrective

action

proc 2sses

for

resolution.

l

Another proposed change is a categorization of

l

all

the existing corrective action processes

'

.

identified in NOP B3A9 into three groups.

One

i

group, identified as corrective action processes.

l

would include deficiency reports (OR), non-con-

,

,

formance reports (NCR), management corrective

}

action requests (MCAR), failure and malfunction

!

reports (F&MR), radiological eccurrence reports

,

(ROR), security deficiency reports (50R), and

l

supplier finder reports (SFR).

These processes

i

are used to identify and document plant deficia

'

encies and to provide a neans of tracking the

e

resolution of identified problems.

(

t

j

A second group of controls would be categorized

as normal work control processes.

This group

would potentially include maintenance requests

!

(MR),

housekeeping services assistance (H5A),

!

procedure change notices (PC), and engineering

i

I

services requests (ESR).

t

i

,

!

I

1

i

j

i

-

- -

_ _ _ - _ _ _

.

o

,

f

113

The last group currently being proposed includes

all recommendations or findings from the existing

self-assessment programs.

The information to be

'

,

tracked in this group are recommendations for

improving performance and would not be used to

identify programatic deficiencies.

Any identi-

1

fication of deficiencies would be tracked using

'

I

one of the processes described in the first group

above.

Examples of the types of recommendations

1

to be tracked would be quality assurance audit

findings and peer evaluator reports,

j

Changes would also be required for NOP 84E1,

!

"Engineering Service Request (ESR) Proe-ss," and

NOP 84A7, "Drawing Control," as well as the

'

quality assurance manual,

in order to fully

implement the revised program,

j

The

licensee anticipates

that all

necessary

I

changes to station procedures would be completed

l

by the end of August, with formal implementation

of the program changes within an additional 30

days.

t

3.10.5.5 Management 0.ersight and Assessment Team (MO&AT)

In addition to the plant operations oversight

i

provided by the ORC, the MC&AT also provides an

!

oversight review of plant operations by the

nature of its responsibilities for overview of

restart activities.

The MO&AT is corrposed of

eight sentor managers, which includes the Station

Director. Director of Special Projects and Vice

i

President Nuclear Engineering. The SVP-N acts as

the Chairman of the team.

Further, three M01AT

,

merbers had been licensee managers prior to the

I

arrival of the SVP-N, while the remaining ran-

(

agers joined the licensee subsequent to February

l

1987.

l

The M01AT maintains its oversight of restart-

related activities and associated plant opera-

'

I

tio'is through several self-assessment programs.

These programs include but are not limited to the

,

peer evaluator and management ronttoring pro-

l

grams.

The Team noted that these programs were

ef'ective in evaluating plant activities.

l

l

(

i

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!

,

I

!

,

- ---

. - - -

- - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ . - _ . - -

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

'

O

114

The Team determined that, in some ways, the

responsibilities of the MO&AT parallels some of

the responsibilities to review plant operations

assigned to the ORC.

In addition,

the Team

determined that the curreret role of the MO&AT is

not credited by the ORC as a means of fulfilling

its responsibilities to review plant operations,

but it does provide a second, independent look

at plant operations.

3.10.5.6 Engineering Service Requests (ESR's)

ESRs are tracking forms used by any licensee

department to request engireering assistance from

the Nuclear Engineering Department (NED). Stand-

ard practice within NEO is to attach an ESR to

all requests for assistance which may be already

tracked under another corrective action tracking

system, such as DR's, PCAQ's, etc. This is done

to provide a means for the NED to track and

monitor the progress of its work. When ai ESR is

opened or received. NED is to review the concern,

determir.e a plan for resolution of the item,

which wculd include an evaluation relative to

plans for plant restart. Unless the issue can be

resolved within 30 days, a response to the origi-

nating department is to be provided within 30

days which describes the above.

In discussions

'

l

with the Team, a management representative of NED

l

indicated that this practice has not always

worked as planned and that additional emphasis is

being placed on assuring that the 30-day re-

sponses are being sent in a timely fashion.

NED tracks all existing E5R's, determines what

actions are required prior to restart, and rou-

tinely evaluates the potential impacts of out-

standing ESR's on the plansed restart of the

plant.

In each case where NED determines that

resolution of an ESR is not required to support

restart. NED prepares docu entation to support

that

position.

This

documentation

undergoes

several levels of review, including the Section

Manager, Department Manager and the Vice Presi-

dent - Nuclear Engineering.

Any open ESR asso-

ciated with unresolved pCAQ's or MCAR's is also

revie=ed by the CRC as part of its assigned

restart checklist revie.'.

____-_ __-____-_

.

,

!

i

l

'

i

115

!

i

Based upon discussions with NED personnel, the

I

Team concluded that ESR's are adequa0ely tracked

j

and that upper management is routinely informed

!

of potential problems in a timely fashion.

}

i

3.10.5.7 Human Performance Evaluation System

'

The Team inquired as to the licensee's intentions

!

in participating in the Institute for Nuclear

Power Operations (!NPO) Human Performance Evalua-

tion Systvm (HPES) program.

The program

is

r

intended to assist licensees in the reduction of

[

human error by encouraging pe*sonnel to report

!

actual or potential situations which keep a per-

t

son from outstanding performance.

The licensee

I

has designated an HPES coordinator, who is in the

!

Training Department.

The coordinator has been

i

I

trained by INPO and is currently preparing to

implement

the

program.

The

coordinator

has

!

'

already become involved in the Incident Investi-

l

gation and Critique process, and has reviewed the

i

recent findings frc:n the licensee's ESF Actuation

.

!

Task Fo

i report,

This p rog ra.. . ence fully

implete'.' o l,

should provide additional valuable

input int- the corrective action process.

f

3.10.6

Conclusions

Overall, the Team determined the licensee's programs for

!

safety assessment / quality verification to be adequate and

I

improving.

Based upon the areas inspected and examples

'

L

raised, the Team concluded that'

t

1.

The Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee is

actively involved in ;.he oversight of facility opera-

'

tions.

The con:11ttee is composed of experienced man-

agers with diverse experience and provides clear and

valid input to the SVP-N on safety-related activities.

2.

Plant problems and deficiencies are being ident'f ted

f

and entered into the appropriate corrective action

system,

t

-- - ---

o

.

.

.

116

3.

There are effective, meaningful communications between

the QA and plant operations departments, as well as

good systems engineering involvement in evaluation and

resolution of problems.

4.

The weekly QA interface meeting has enhanced communt-

cations at the station and improved the process of

resolving open issues.

5.

The Operations Review Committee (ORC) has not been

reviewing plant operat'.ons ef fectively so that mean-

ingful input to Itcensee manag cent is being consist-

ently provided,

Recently, heavy emphasis has been

placed on administrative reviews of procedure changes

and modifications, rather than reviewing plant opera-

tions. Also, ORC review of plant failure and malfunc-

cion reports has neither been timely nor included all

appropriate reports.

6.

Multiple corrective action processes and multiple

tracking systems detract from efficient functioning of

the system. This has been identified by the licensee

and programs ar

being established to correct the

known deficiencie;.

7.

The tracking and ;1osecut of PCAQ's and MCAR's have

not been effective in the pest.

Also, a relatively

large number of open PCAQ's exists.

The licensee is

taking action to resolve these problem.

. . _ .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,

'

117

4.0 UNRESOLVED ITEMS

An unresolved item is an item for which additional information is required

in order to determine whether the item is acceptable, a violation, or a

deviation.

An unresolved item is discussed in section 3.4.2.2 of this

report.

I

o

i

118

!

5.0 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS

l

At periodic intervals during the inspection period, the Team Leader held

[

meetings with senior facility management tu discuss the inspection scope

and preliminary findings.

A final exit interview vas conducted on

l

August 24, 1938.

Attendees are listed in Appendix 8.

At the exit meet-

i

ing, the Team Leader described the preliminary insoection findings,

!

including both the preliminary overall conclusions and the preliminary

findings and observations in each functional area.

The Team Leader also

!

confirmed licensee comm.itments at the exit meeting, Then the Team Manager

I-

discussed how the Team findings will be used in NRC Restart Assessment

Panel activities. Also, the Regional Administrator outlined the remaining

.

step in the NRC staff process of evaluating Pilgrim restart readiness and

[

developing staff recommendation.

l

l

l

[

t

I

'

i

L

i

i

!

.

I

i

!

!

I

I

.

I

!

--

_ _ _ _ _ _

_ - _ _ . -

l

,

APPEN0!X A

Entrance Interview Attende_es

August 8, 1988

Boston Edison Company

J. Alexander, Plant Operations $ection Hanager

R. Anderson, Plant Manager

H. Balfour, Iraining Section Manager

R. Bird, 5entor Vice President - Nuclear

F. Famulari, Quality Assurance Department Manager

0. Gillispie, Nuclear Training Department Manager

R. Grazio, Regulatory Section Manager

P. Hamilton, Compitance Division Manager

K. Highfill, Station Director

J. Jens, Radiological Section Manager

E. Kraft, Plant Support Department Manager

R, ledgett, Otrector Special Projects

0. Long, Security Section Manager

A. Morist, Planning tad Outage Department Manager

E. Robinson, Corporate Comunication Information Division Head

L. Schmeling, Program V.anager

J. Seery. Technical Section Manager

R. Sherry, Plant Maintehance Section Manager

R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager

E. Wagner, Asr*stant to Senior Vice President - Nuclear

F. Wozniak, Fire Protection Olvision Manager

l

United States Nuclear Regulatory _Comission

l

F. Alstulewicz, Senter Technical Assistant, Policy Development and

!

Technical Support Branch, Office of Nuclear React,or Regulation (NRR)

,

R. Blough, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3B, Otvision of Reactor

l

Projects (DRP), Region 1 (RI)

S. Collins Deputy Director, ORP, RI

L. Doerflein, Project Engineer, ORP, R!

T. Cragoun, Senior Radiation Specialist, Division of Radiation $afety

and Safeguards (CRSS)

M. Evans, Operations Engineer, Olvision of React,or Safety (ORS), R!

J. tyash, Resident Inspector, Ptigrim Nuclear Power Statten, ORP, R1

0. Mcdonald, Project Manager, Project Directorate 1 3, NRR

L. Pitsco, 5tntor Operations Engineer, Otvision of License Performance

and Quality Evaluatien, NRR

W. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Mi11 store Point, ORP, RI

L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector, Indian Point Unit 2, CRP, RI

G. $sith, Safeguards $recia115t, OR55. RI

C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector, Pilgrim huclear Fe.er Station, ORP, RI

%

_ _ _ _ _ _ _

- _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _

_ _

.

I

I

Appendix A - Entrance Interview

A-2

'

Attendees

r

!

Com.monwealth of_ Massachusetts

l

i

'

P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Department of Public Safety

i

P. Chan, Observer

S. Sho11y (MHS Technical Associates, Inc.), observer

i

t

i

I

t

\\

!

!

t

!

l

.

I

!

l

'

l'

i

.

1

4

a

'

1

I

.

s

i

!

,

.I

t

l

.

t

J

f

i

!

'

!

l

i

1

i

1

P

I

'

'

l

,

e

-

- - .

-

- --- --

- ~ ~ ~ ~ - - * - ' ' ^ - ~ '

_ _____________ _ ___ _ _

_ _ _ _ _

,

j

.

e

'

1

!

1

-

l

I

1

'

APPENDIX B

i

Exit Interview Attenden

August _24.193,]

[

j

Boston Edtson Company

>

!

J. Alexander, Plant Operations Section Manager

R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear

F. Famulari Quality Assurance Department Manager

,

l

0. G1111spie, Nuclear Training Department Manager

i

-

R. Gramont, Deputy Maintenance Section Manager

R. Grazio, Regulatory Section Manager

i

P. Hamtiton, Compliance Divtston Manager

l

K, Highfill, $tation Ofrector

l

J. Jens, Radiological Section Manager

!

E. Kraft, Plant support Department Manager

R. Ledjett, Director $pecial Projects

l

0. Long, Security Section Manager

!

l

E Robinson, Corporate Comunication Irformation Disiston Head

L. Schmeling, Program Manager

J. Seery, Technical Secsion Manager

i

R. Sherry, Plant Maintenance Section Manager

j

R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager

5. Sweeney, Chief Executivc Officer ard Chairman ef the e n d

i

E. Wagner, Assistant to Senior Vice President - Nuclear

,

,

l

F. Wozniak, Fire Protection Otvisten Manager

,

United States Nuclear Regulatory Cemmisslo)

f

f

F. Akstulewicz, Senior Technical Assistant, Policy Development and

T*,:hnical support Branch, Off.ce of Nuclear Raactor Regulation (NRR)

-

R. Blough, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3B, Olvision of Reactor

!

Projects (ORP), Region I (RI)

t

B. Boger, Assistant Director for Region ! Reactors, NRR

l

5. Collins, Deputy Otrector, ORP, R!

l

L. Doerfietn, Project Engineer, DRP. RI

j

W. Little Office of Special Projects, R!!

i

J. Lyash, Resident Inspector, Pileetm Nuclear Power Station, CRP, R!

!

0. Mcdonald, Project Manager, Prc et Directort te (PD) !-3, 'lRR

l

W. Naymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Pills +.ane Point, ORP, RI

L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector, Indian Point Unit 2. ORP, R!

V. Russell, Regional Maintstrator, R!

C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector, Ptigrim Nucicar Power Station. ORF, RI

R. Vesssan, Director, PO I-3, NRR

i

,

-

,

.

Appendix B - Exit Interview

B-2

Attendees

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Department of Public Safety

P. Chan, Observer

G. Minor (MHB Technical Associates, Inc.), Observer

!

I

i

-

__

_

'

.0

APPENDIX C

Persons Contacted

R. Anderson, Plant Manager

R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear

F. Famulari, Quality Assurance Department Manager

K. Pi-hfill, Station Director

E. ! ,tard, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering

E. Kraft, Plant Support Services Manager

A. Morisi, Planning and Outage Manager

R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager

S. Sweeney, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer

In addition, the Team interviewed a large number of managers (including

virtually all section and division managers), engineers, supervisors, and

craft personnel in each inspection area.

.

9

O

O

APPENDIX 0

Documents Reviewed

PNPS, Nuclear Training Manual, T-001, Parts 3, 4 and 5

PNPS,

Special

Post-Startup Training Program, Approved August 9, 1988

PNPS Technical Specifications

Boston Edison Company Nuclear Mission, Organization and Policy Manual

Nuclear Organization Procedures

Material Condition Improvement Action Plan

Boston Edison Quality Assurance Manual

Audit Reports -- Sampling review it.cluding the following:

87-40, 88-02,

87-63, 88-10, 88-20, 87-37, 87-49, 8b-04, and 88-11

Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) Reports -- Sampling review

including N00 87-88, NED 86-71, GE0 87-255, S0 88-57, SO 88-58, 50 88-48,

N00 87-02, N00 87-28, NED 88-087,

50 88-59,

SO 88-12, N00 88-120,

NED 88-90, 50 88-55, and S0 88-22

Management Corrective Action Requests (MCAR's) -- Sampling review includ-

a

ing QA0 85-2, QA0 87-2, 86-06, and 88-02

Licensee Event Reports (LER's) -- Sampling review including 87-21,88-008

thru 88-014,88-016, and 88-017

Maintenance Requests (MR's) -- Sarrpling review including 88-11-6,88-110,

88-10-179, 88-46-300, 88-14-16, 88-45-183, 88-45-181, 88-46-194, 88-10-26,

88-10-105,

88-10-69,

88-10-71,

88-1C-80,

88-10-141,

87-10-282,

and

87-10-283

Maintenance Activities / Packages

Sampl i r.g review including 88-3-26,

--

63-19-109, 88-46-213, 88-10-86, 87-46-173, 88-13-20, 88-46-438, 88-2-12,

86-20-47, 88-45-157, 88-45-176, 88-3-62, 88-63-276, 88-45-190, 88-1-31,

88-14-16, 88-46-194, and 88-10-114

Meeting Minutes for ORC Meetings 88-40 through 88-63

Failure and Malfunction Report 86-266

NEO Procedure 16.03, "Corrective Action Program"

_.

.

.

Appendix 0 - Documents Revir.wed

0-2

QAD Trend Analysis Report for the First Quarter of 1988 - QAD 88-609

PNPS Work Instruction NS-3.2.12, F&MR Trend Analysis

Memo from J. Seery to R. Grazio, Appointment of Compliince Division as ORC

Subcommittee, June 23, 1988

Memo from R. G. Bird to K. L. Highfill, NSRAC Concern from May 24, 1988

NSRAC Meeting - May 27, 1988

Memo from

K. L. Highfill to R. G. Bird, Response to NSRAC Action Item

88-04-01 - June 22, 1988

Memo from J. A. Seery to

R. Flannery, OkC Mee*.ing Minutes Distrioution

List

dated May 6, 1988

Procedure 1.2.1, Operation Review Committee

Procedure 1.3.24, Failure and Malfunction Reports

Procedure 1.3.2.6, Response to Deficiency Reports

Procedure 1.3.4, Procedures

Procedure 1.3.33, Operating Experience Review

Procedure 1.3.37, Post Trip Reviews

Procedure 1.3.33, Plant Performance Monitoring Program

Procedure 1.3.63, Conduct of Critique 5 and Incident Investigations

Procedure NOP 83A9, Management Corre

ive Action Process

Procedure NOP 83A13, Deficiency Repo.t Process

Procedure NOP 83A14, Nonconformance Report Process

Procedure NOP 84A1, Surveillance Monitoring Program

I

Procedure NOP 84A11, Annual Independent Review of BECo's Quality Assurance

Program

Procedure N0P 85A1, Nuclear Organization Performance Monitoring and

Management Information Program

Procedure NOP 88A1, Performance Standards and Evaluation Guidelines for

.

Pilgrim Station

i

a

.

Appendix 0 - Docurents Reviewed

0-3

Procedure NOP 8305, The Failure and Malfunction Report Process

Procedure NOP 8401, Operating Experience Review Program

Procedure 1.4.5, PNPS Tagging

Procedure 1.5.3, Maintenance Requests

Procedure 1.5,3.1, Maintenance Work Plan

Procedure 1.5.7, Energency Maintenance

Procedure 3.M.1-30, Post-Work Testing Guidance

Procedure SI-MT.1000, Maintenance Section Manual

Procedure SI-MT.0501, Post-Work Test Matrices and Guidelines

Procedura 3.M.1-11.1, E0 Maintenance Process:

Repair / Replacement

Procedure 3.M.3-1, A5/A6 Buses 4KV Protective Relay Calibration / Functional

Test and Annunciator Verification

Procedure 3.M.3-8, Inspection / Troubleshooting Electrical Circuits

Procedure TP 88-40, 480 VAC Contactor Testing

Procedure TP 88-22, Pre-Operational Test of the New Degraded Voltage

Relays and Motilfied Load Shedding Logic

Procedure PW TMI-1, Post Work Test Matrix and Guidelines, Revision A

Procedure

3.M.4-14,

Rotating Equipment inspection, Asambly and Dis-

j

assembly, Revision 6, dated April 4, 1988

i

l

Procedure 8.Q.3.4, 125/250V DC Motor Control Center Testing and Mainten-

ance

Procedure 2.2.85, Fuel Pool Cooling System

Procedure 3.M.1-15, Vibration Monitoring for Preventive Maintenance and

.

Balancing, Revision 5, dated June 12, 1938

Procedure 2.2.8, standby AC Power System (Diesel Generators), Revision 20,

,

l

dated January 13, 1988

Procedure ARP, Panel C39, Fuel Pool Cooling System, Revision 0, dated

l

January 30, 1988

l

!

Procedure 2.2.83, Reactor Cleanup System, Revision 22, dated June 20, 1988

l

l

-

-

.

Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed

D-4

Fire Watch Computer Listing, dated August 4, 1988

Fire Protection Maintenance Request Computer Listing, dated August 9, 1988

Pilgrim

Station

Performance

Indicators,

dated

August 10, 1988

and

August 17, 1988

Procedure 8.8.29, "Inspection of Fire Barriers," Revision 1

Temporary Modification Log

Temporary Modification Status Report to R. Anderson f rom P. Mastrangelo,

dated August 4, 1988

Procedure 1.5.9, "Temporary Modifications," Revi' ion 12

Procedure 1.5.9.1, "Lif ted Leads and Jumpers," Revision 0

Procedure 1.3.34, "Conduct of Operations"

Procedure 2.1.16, "Nuclear Power Plant Operator Tour," Revision 54

Overtime Book

Procedure 1.3.67, "Use and Control of Overtime at PNPS"

Advance Overtime Requests for Week Ending August 6,1988

PNPS 1-ERHS-VIII.8-4-0, Turbine Building Shield Wall Design

Confidential

Memo

  1. 13,

to

J. P. Jens

from

K. L. Highfill,

dated

July 19, 1938, "Training Program for Radiation Protection Manager"

Procedure 6.1-209, "Radiological Occurrence Reports"

Radiological Work Plan for A and B Recirculation Pump Seal Welds

Procedure 6.1-012, "Access Control to High Radiation Areas"

Selected RP Techrician Training and Qualification Folders, lesson Plan,

Quizzes and Training Guides

Selected Radiation Work Pernits from March 1988 to August 19S8

Maintendnce Request 87-20-84

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_

.

Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed

0-5

Procedure 8.M.2-1.5.3.4, "Primary Containment Isolation Logic Channel Test

- Channel 82," Revision 8, dated September 24, 1987

Procedure 8.M.2-1.5.7, "Group I Primary Containment Isolation Valve Test-

ing," Revision 5, dated November 7, 1987

Procedure 8.M.2-8.2, "Calibration of ATS Transmitters Rack C2206," Revis-

ion 2, dated June 30, 1988

Procedure 8.M.1-32.4, "Analog Trip System - frip Unit Calibration - Cabi-

net C2229-82," Revision 5, dated April 4, 1938

Procedure 8.M.2-2.10.8.5, "Diesel Generator 'A'

Initiation By Loss of Off-

Site Power Logic," Revision 8, dated November 6, 1987

Procedure 8 M.2-2.10.8. 3,

"Diesel Generator 'A'

Initiation By Core Spray

logic," Revision 12, dated April 9, 1988

Procedure

3.M.3-1,

"AUA6

Buses 4KV Protective

Relay Calibration /

Functional

Test

and

Annunciator

Verification,"

Revision 23,

dated

August 13, 1988

Procedure 8.M.2-2.6.7, "RCIC Simulated Automatic Actuation," Revision 6,

dated February 5, 1988

Procedure 8.5.5.1,

"RCIC Pump Operability and Flow Rate Test at 1000

psig," Revision 24, dated June 4, 1988

Procedure 8.M.2-2.10.7, "RCIC Automatic Isolation System Logic," Revi s-

ion 11, dated November 7, 1987

Procedure

8.M.2-2.6.1,

"RCIC Steam Line Hi Flow," Revision 13, dated

June 9, 1988

Procedure

8.M.2-2.6.3,

"RCIC Steam Line Hi Temperature," Revision 12,

dated July 17, 1987

Procedure 8.M.2-2.64, "RCIC Steam Line Low Pressure," Revision 16 dated

June 20, 1988

Procedure 8.M.1-32.5, "Analog Trip System - Trip Unit Calibration Cabinet

C2233A, Section A," Revision 2, dated December 7, 1987

Procedure 8.E.11. "Standby Liquid Control System Instrument Calibration,"

Revision 9, dated September 2, 1987

Procedure 8.E.13, "RCIC System Instrument Calibration," Revision 14, dated

June 26, 1988

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

Appendix 0 - Documents Reviewed

0-6

l

Procedure 8.4.1,

"Standby Liquid Control Pump Operability and Flow Rate

Test," Revision 19, dated April 9, 1988

Procedure 1.8, "Master Surveillance Tracking Program," Revision 9, dated

August 15, 1988

Procedure

1.3.36, "Measurement and Test Equipment," Revision

4,

dated

March S',

1988

Procedure 8.I.1,

"Administration of Inservice Pump and Valve Testing,"

Revision 4, dated August 15, 1986

Procedure

8.I.3,

"Inservice Test Analysis and Documentatics Methods,"

Revision 6, dated May 11, 1988

Orawings

PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 34-9 (Revision E1):

Primary Containment

Isolation System

PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 28-12 (Revision E14):

Primary Containment

Isolation System

,NPS Elementary Diagram MIN 36-7 (Sh. 10, Revision E7): Primary Contain-

t

ment Isolation System

PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 36-7 (Sh.11, Revision ES): Primary Contain-

ment Isolation System

PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 41-10 (Revision E2):

Primary Containment

Isolation System

PNPS Elementary Diagram MIN 38-11 (Revision E2):

P rima ry Containment

Isolation Sy', tem

PNPS Elementary Otagram MIN 35-7 (Revision E4):

Primary Containment

Isolation System

PNPS Elementary Diagram mig 11-11 (Revision Ell):

RCIC System

PNPS Elementary Diagram MIG 12-12 (Revision ES):

RCIC System

PNPS Elementary Diagram mig 14-9 (Revision ES):

RCIC System

PNPS Elementary Diagram MIG 15-9 (Revision E8):

RCIC System

PNPS Elementary Diagram MIG 16-7 (Revision ES):

RCIC System

PNPS Elementary Diagram MIK 4-11 (Revision E10):

Core Spray

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

__ j

.

Appendix 0 - Dncuments Reviewed

D-7

PNPS Schematic Diagram E-548 (Revision E0): Containment Atmosphere Isola-

tion Control

PNPS Schematic Diagram E-38 (Revision E6):

4160V System Breakers 152-504

and 152-604

PNPS Schematic Diagram E-35 (Revision E3):

4160V Auxiliary Relays and

Miscellaneous Schemes

PNPS Schematic Diagram E-27 (Revision E7):

Diesel Generator

PNPS Schematic Diagram E-17 (Revision E7):

Schematic Meter and Relay

Diagram 4160 Volt System

PNPS Schematic Diagram M6-22-14 (Sh. 1, Revision Ell):

Diesc1 Generator

"A" X107A Engine Control

PNPS Relay Setting Drawing E5-200 (Sh. 1, Revision E3): 4160 Volt Switch-

gear Relay Settings

PNPS Relay Setting Drawing E5-200 (Sh. 3, Revision E2): 4160 Volt Switch-

gear Relay Settings

PNPS P&ID M245 (Revision E13):

RCIC System, Sh. 1

PNPS P&ID M246 (Revision E10):

RCIC System, Sh. 2

PNPS P&ID M249 (Revision E12):

Standby Liquid Control System

.

O

r

APPENDIX E

IATI Composition and Structure

Team Manager

Samuel J. Collins

Team Leader

A. Randy Blough

l

Technical Assistant

Clay C. Warren

Administrative Assistant

Mary Jo DiDonato

Jperations

Lawrence W. Rossbach (Lead)

Shift Inspectors

Lawrence W. Rossbach

William J. Raymond

Loren R. Plisco

Lawrence T. Doerflein

F,ancis M. Akstulewicz

I

Radiological Controls

Thomas F. Dragoun

Maintenance

Jeffrey J. Lyash

William J. Raymond

e

Surveillance

Lawrence T. Doerflein

Security

Gregory C. Smith

Fire Protection

Lawrence W. Roseh..n

Assurance of Quality

Loren R. P11sco

Francis M. Akstulewicz

Training and Management

Daniel G. Mcdonald

Effectiveness

Michele G. Evans

Report Coordinator

Tae K. Kim

Commonwealth of

Steven C. Sholly

Massachusetts (Observers)

Pamela M. Chan

- - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

.

APPENDIX F

NRC Integraced Assessment Team Inspection (IATI)

Members Resumes

This appendix shows IATI summary resumes of the team members and Common-

wealth of Massachusetts observers.

The resumes outline the nuclear

experience of team members.

.

9

.

.

Appendix F

F-2

NAME:

FPANCIS M. AKSTULEWICZ

ORGANIZATION:

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Policy Development and Technical Support Branch

TITLE:

Senior Technical Assistant

EDUCATION:

B.S., Nuclear Engineering

EXPERIENCE:

Fourteen Years of Nuclear Experience as Follows:

Two and Goe-Half Years - Shielding Engineer - Bechtel Power

Corporation

One Year - Technical Analyst - Office of Material Safety

and Safeguards (f.'RC)

Eight Years - Nuclear Engineer - Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRC)

Two Years - Project Manager - Haddam Neck Plant, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Reg Jlation (NRC)

One-Half Year - Present Position

SPECIAL

QUALIFICATIONS:

Completion of NRC Fundamental and Advanced BWR Systems

Training Course and BWR Simulator Course

SPECIAL

ASSIGNMENTS:

Member of Fire Protection, Health Physics and Diagnostic

Team Inspection at Haddam Neck

I

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Appendix F

F-3

NAME:

A. RANDOLPH BLOUGH

ORGANIZATION:

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I

Division of Reactor Projects

TITLE:

Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3B

EDUCATION:

B.S.,

U.S.

Naval Academy, 1973 (Graduated with Honors)

Navy Nuclear Engineer Officer Course, 1977

NRC I,3pector Technical Training Program, 1980

Various technical and management courses in USN and USNRC,

such as QA, Reactor Engineering, Reactor Safety, Supervis-

ing Human Resources, EEO, Management Workshops

EXPERIENCE:

Fifteen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:

1985-Present

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)

--

Reactor Projects Section Chief.

Manage s <fety inspection

programs for three commercial reactor fac)'ities.

Super-

vise nine nuclear engineers. Provide formal assessments of

utility management effectiveness and safety performance.

1982-1985

USNRC -- Senior Resident Inspector at operations phase and

preoperational phase nuclear power plants. Planned, super-

vised, and performed inspections of management controls and

activities

important

to

nuclear

safety.

Coordinated

specialist inspector efforts.

Formally reported findings

and recommended appropriate enforcement.

1972-1982

USNRC -- Resident Inspector. Planned, performed, and docu-

mented inspections of all functional areas at a dual-unit

operating reactor site.

1973-1979

U.

S. Navy Nuclear Power Program.

Duties included super-

visory positions in nuclear plant operations, maintenance

and training. Performed audits and coordinated plant self-

assessment.

Was

responsible

for a

complex,

in-plant

nuclear training program for up to 300 students. Shipboard

duties included Main Propulsion Assistant: responsible for

all reactor and main propulsion systems, all radiological

controls and plant chemistry.

Collateral duties included

9A Of ficer, and Nuclear Weapons Safety / Security Officer.

SPECIAL

QUALIFICATIONS:

Qualified BWR Inspector, NRC Region I,1980

Qualified Nuclear Engineer Officer, Naval Reactors, 1977

SPECIAL

ASSIGNMENTS:

Team Lesder, NRC Integrated Performance Assessnment Team

Inspection, Oyster Creek, 1987

Team Leader, NRC Team Inspection of Oyster Creek Contain-

ment Vacuum Breakers Event, 1987

Participated in various other plant readiness inspections,

1984-1985

. - _

-_

{

.

Appendix F

F-4

NAME:

PAMELA M. CHAN

ORGANIZATION:

Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting Council (Since 12/87)

TITLE:

Engineer / Utility Analyst

EDUCATION:

B.S. M.E. Pennsylvania State University

EXPERIENCE:

Five Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:

1987

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III,

Reactor Inspector

1985-1987

Nuclear Power Services - Construction

1984-1985

Combustion Engineering

Nuclear Systems Services; Field

-

Service Engineer

1982-1984

Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation - Power Division

System Engineer - Turbine Plant Systems

SPECIAL

QUALIFICATIONS:

Background in Maintenance and Quality Assurance

SPECIAL

ASSIGNMENTS:

Participated in several team inspections while at NRC

Region III

l

1

.

.

Appendix F

F-5

NAME:

SAMUEL J. COLLINS

ORGANIZATION:

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I

bivision of Reactor Projects

TITLE:

Deputy Director

EDUCATION:

Bachelor of Science, Maine Maritime Academy

Business Program, Southern Vermont College

EXPERIENCE:

Seventeen Years Nuclear Experience in Design, Construction,

Operations, Inspection and Management as Follows:

1987 - Present

Deputy Director:

Division of Reactor Projects, USNRC,

Region I

1986 - 1987

Deputy Director (Detail):

Division of Reactor Projects,

USNRC, Region I

As a member of the Senior Executive Service, responsible

for division management; the conduct of inspections and

evaluations of assigned NRC programs for all power and

non power reactors within Region I.

1985 - 1986

Branch Chief:

Ret.ctor Projects Branch No. 2. USNRC,

Region I

Responsible for project management, staffing and budget

considerations, including irspectionr, implementation of

SAlp, resident inspection and enforcement for eleven

assigned power reactor sites in operation and under

construction.

1984 - 1985

Section Chief:

Reactor Projects Section No. 2C, USNRC,

Region I

Responsible for implementation of the routine and reactive

inspection program at six assigned power reactors during

new cunstruction, testing and cperation.

1983 - 1934

Senior Resident Inspector: Operations, Yankee Nuclear

Power Station, ORP, USNRC, Region I

Supervised; inspection and event response program at opera-

ting Wastinghouse PWR power reactor facility.

1930 -1933

Pesident Reactor Inspector: Operations, Vereont Yankee

Nuclear Power Station, DRP, USNRC, Region :.

Field

inspector at oper. ting Geners' Electric BWR power reactor

,

facility.

.

Appendix F - Samuel J. Collins

F-6

,

Private Industry:

1971 - 1980

Tenneco Corporation, Newport News Shipbuilding.

Various

positions as contractor to U.S. Navy Nuclear Program

including:

Project Manager - S5W Steam Generator Chemical Cleaning

Project

Chief Test Engineer - Chairman and NNS representative to

Joint Test Group for 55W overhaul and construction

Shif t Test Engineer - Shif t supervisor for reactor overhaul

and refueling

Shift Test Engineer - Shift supervisor for reactor new

construction

Mechanica

Test Engineer - Shift mechanical test for reac-

tor new construction

Reactor Design Engineer - Design support for reactor new

construction

SPECIAL

QUALIFICATIONS:

Senior Executive Service Candidate Development Program,

USNRC, 1986 - 1987

Qualified SWR Resident Inspector

Qualified PWR Resident Inspector

Qualified 55W Shif t Test tingineer

Third Engineer License, USCG

SPECIAL

ASSIGNMENTS:

1988 - Team Manager, Pilgrim Integrated Assessment Restart

Team Inspection

1987 - 1988 - Chairman, Pilgrim Restart Assessment Panel

1987 - 1988 - Region I Representative, NRC Training Ad-

visory Group

1937 - Chairman, Differing Professional Opinion Peer Review

Group

1987 - Chairman, Comanche Peak Task Force Review Group

1986 - Team Leader, Nine Mile Point 1 and 2 Diagnostic Team

Inspection

1985 - Team Leader, Pes:h Bottom 2 and ? 11 agnostic Team

Inspection

- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

e

Appendix F

F-7

NAME:

LAWRENCE T. DOERFLEIN

ORGANIZATION:

United !tates Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I

Division of Reactor Projects

TITLE:

Project Engineer

EDUCATION:

BS Electrical Engineering

US Naval Academy, 1973

EXPERIENCE:

Fifteen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:

Aug. 1985-Present

Project Engineer

Oct. 1993-July 1935 Senior Resident Inspector, FitzPatrick huclear Power Plant

Nov. 1980-0ct. 1980 Resident Inspector, FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

June 1973-Oct. 1980 US Navy

SPECIAL

QUALIFICATIONS:

Certified NRC SWR Inspector

Qualified Chief Naval Nuclear Engineer

SPECIAL

ASSIGNMENTS:

Limerick Readiness Assessment Team

Pilgrim Augmented Inspection Team

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. _ __

_

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_

._ _____ _ __ .

..

_

.

Appendix F

F-8

NAME:

THOMAS F. DRAGOUN

ORGANIZATION:

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

TITLE:

Senior Radiation Specialist

EDUCATION:

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Union College

000 Staf f College, Battle Creek, Michigan

EXPERIENCE:

Twenty-Three Years of Nuclear Experience as Follows:

1983-Present

NRC - Senior Radiation Specialist

1983-1969

General Electric Company, which included the following:

Qualified as Operations Engineer and E00W at Navy

-

Prototype (3 Years)

Senior Engineer on Trident Prototype Construction

-

Project (0 Years)

Health Physicist responsible for service work, both

-

domestic and foreign by Large Steam Turbine Division

(6 Years)

1955-1969

Cornell University - Taught Radiation Protection Subjects

i

4

_ _.

o

.

Appendix F

F-9

NAME:

MICHELE G. EVANS

ORGANIZAfl0'd:

United Sta#ies H<i.itar Regulatory Commission, Region I

Division of Reactor Safety

TITLE:

Operations Enciseor

EDUCATION:

B.S., Cr/mi as Eno'lecring, University Jf Pennsylvania

EXPERIENCE:

Four Years of Nuslear ;perieace as

r llows:

o

Aug 1987-Present

Operations Enginter, Eoiling Water Rasctor Section - Con-

duct review and inspection o# Power Ascension Programs at

Pilgrim and Nine Mile Point 2.

Currently in training tn

qualify as BWR Operator Licensing Examiner

July 1934-Aug 1937 Reactor Engineer, Test Programs Section - Conducted review

and ii:spection of preoperational test programs at Hope

Cre2k ar.d Nine Mile Point 2, and Startup Testing Programs

at Limerick 1, Shoreham, Pope Creek and Nine Mile Point 2.

SPECIAL

QUALIFICATICNS:

USNRC Certified BWR Inspector

Engineer in Training (State of Pennsylvania)

SPECIAL

ASSIGNMENTS:

Currently participating in the Women's Executive Leadership

Program for Management Development

,

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _

.

Appendix F

F-10

NAME:

JEFFREY J. LYASH

ORGANIZATION:

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I

Division of Reactor Projects

TITLE:

Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

EDUCATION:

B.S. , Mechanical Engineering, Orexel University

EXPERIENCE:

Six Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:

Two and One-Half Years - NRC Resident Inspector - Pilgrim

Nuclear Power Station

One Year - NRC Resident Inspector - Hope Creek Generating

Station

One Year - NRC Reactor Engineer - Region I

One and One-Half Years - Pennsylvania Power and Light

Company - Test Engineer - Susquehanna Steam Electric

Station

SPECIAL

QUALIFICATIONS:

Meritorious Service Award as NRC Resident Inspector of the

Year 1987-1988

.

,

Appendix F

F-11

NAME:

DANIEL G. M 00NALD, JR.

ORGANIZATION:

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

TITLE:

Senior Project Manager

EDUCATION:

B.S., Management, Shenandoah College

A.A., Engineering, Solano College

EXPERIENCE:

Thirty-One Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:

1982-Present

Senior Project Manager - Manage and coordinite all NRC

licensing functions on assigned operating reactor facil-

ities which have difficulties or complexities with manage-

ment and operation.

(NRC)

1982 (3 Months)

Reactor Engineer (Instrumentation) - Technical evaluations

of instrumentation and control systems or licensee appli-

cations and operating reactor modifications. Assist in

developing regulatory requirements and establishing staff

policy.

(NRC)

1980-1932

Staff Member - Conduct, direct and coordinate assessments

of critical technologies in the context of national secur-

ity.

Provide technical support to the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

(Los Alamos National Laboratory)

1979-1980

Reactor Inspector (Electrical) - Inspects reactors under

construction and in operation.

(NRC)

1978-1979

Senior Electrical Engineer - Technical evaluations of

electrical, instrumentation and control systems. Assist in

developing staff policy.

(NRC)

1973-1978

Reactor Engineer (Instrumentation) - Technical evaluation

for license applications and operating reactors.

(NRC)

1966-1973

Senior Technical Associate - Field engineer in nuclear

weapons test programs.

(Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

(LLL))

>

1964-1966

Senior Electronic Engineering Coordinator - Design of con-

trol, interlock and instrumentation systems for critical

assembly machines, test reactors and containment vaults.

(LLL)

1960-1964

Electronics Designer - Design of cormunication, personnel

warning, closed circu t TV and radiation monitoring

i

systems.

(LLL)

.

,

Appendix F - Daniel G. McDona'.d Jr.

F-12

1957-1960

Senior Electronic Technician - Fabricated and assisted in

the design and development of prototype electrical and

electronics equipment.

(LLL)

1953-1957

Electrical Specialist - Four year apprenticeship with

Department of Navy.

(Mare Island Shipyard)

1

l

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.

.

_ ______

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

s

.

Appendix F

F 13

NAME:

LOREN R. PLISCO

ORGANIZATION:

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Division of Licensee Performance and Quality Evaluation

TITLE:

Senior Operations Engineer

EDUCATION:

B.S., Systems Engineering, U.S. Naval Academy

EXPERIENCE:

Eleven Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:

1937-1988

Senior Operations Engineer, NRC:NRR

1936-1987

Senior Resident Inspector - Susq;ehanna Steam Electric

Station

-

1983-1986

Resident Inspector - Susquehanna Steam Electric Station

1932-1983

Reactor Engineer, Region I

197/-1982

'.'S Navy Nuclear Power Program

SPECIAL

QUALIFICATIONS:

Certified NRC BWR Inspector

'

Qualified Naval Nuclear Engineer Officer

SPECIAL

ASSIGNMENTS:

Susquehanna 2 - Operational Readiness Assessment Team

Inspection

Limerick 1 - Operational Readiness Asssessment Team Inspec-

tion

i

Hope Creek - Operational Readiness Assessment Team Inspec-

tion

i

1

Salt.m - ATWS Inspection

THI-1 - Management Integrity Inspection

i

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4

. . .

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Appendix F

F-14

NAME:

WILLIAM J. RAYMOND

ORGANIZATION:

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I

Division of Reactor Projects

TITLE:

Senior Resident Inspector - Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EDUCATION:

B.S. Physics

M.S. Nuclear Science and Engineering

EXPERIENCE:

Eighteen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:

1975-1988

NRC Reactor Operations Inspector

SU&T, Core Physics, Refueling, Pre & SU&T for BV, CC1,

-

IP3, MP2

Project Inspector - Beaver Valley, Ginna and Susque-

-

hanna

TMI Recovery Team - Accident Response and Containment

-

Entry

Senior Resident Inspector - Vermont Yankee and Mill-

-

stone

1972-1975

Startup Engineer, Babcock & Wilcox, Oconee 1 and 2 and

Three Mile Island, Unit 1

1970-1972

Reactor Operator, VP1 Research Reactor

SPECIAL

QUALIFICATIONS:

VPI Reactor Operator License

Certified NRC Licensed Operator Examiner - 1986

SPECIAL

ASSIGNMENTS:

IAEA Assist Visit to Brazil CNEN - 1981

Team Leadar Salem ATWS Event - NRC Fact Finding - 1983

Salem ATWS Generic Issue Review Team - 1983

NRC Response to Crystal River Event - 1981

Assist Visit to Region V - WNP2 Startup Readiness - 1982

Tean Inspections - Shoreham 1932 and Pilgrim 1986

Operator Briefings of TMI Event - 1979

-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

o

,

t

Appendix F

F-15

NAME:

LAWRENCE ROSSBACH

ORGANIZATION:

United States Nuclear Reguletory Commission, Region I

Division of Reactor Projects

TITLE:

Senior Resident Inspector - Indian Point Unit 2

EDUCATION:

8.S., Nuclear Engineering

EXPERIENCE:

Sixteen Years of Nuclear Experience as Follows:

Six 7 ears, NRC Resident Inspector and Senior Resident

Inspector

Two and One-Half Years, Program Manager for NRC's prepara-

tion to review a high level waste repository li:ense

application

Two and One-Half Years, NRC Project Manager and Reviewer

for Uranium Mills

Five Years, Systems Design Engineer at Architectural

Engineering (AE) Company

l

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.

App;ndix F

F-16

NAME:

STEVEN C. SHOLLY

ORGANIZATION:

MHB Technical Associates (Observer for the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts

TITLE:

Associate Consultant

EDUCATION:

B.S. in Education (1975) Graduate Course Work in Geo-

environmental Studies (1976-1977)

EXPERIENCE:

Seven and One-Half Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:

1985-Present

MHB Technical Associates, San Jose, CA - Work in Risk

Assessment, Quality Assurance, Optrating Events Analysis,

and Design and Construction Assessment

1981-1935

Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, D.C. - Work in

generic safety issues, risk assessment and emergency

planning

SPECIAL

ASSIGNMENTS:

Member of NRC Peer Review Group, NUREG-1050 (1984)

-

Participated in NRC Containment Performance Design

-

Objective Workshop (1986)

Participated in NRC/LLNL Workthop on Safety Goals

-

Implementation, Presentation on Seismic Risk

Assessment (1987)

l

.

r -

,

Appendix F

F-17

,

NAME:

GREGORY C. SMITH

ORGANIZATION:

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

l

TITLE:

Safeguards Specialist

'

EDUCATION:

B.S. Education, California State College

Various additional courses including:

Technical

-

Writing, Quality Assurance Auditing, Statistics,

'

Reactor Design and Layout, Radiological Accident

Assessment, Rrdiological Emergency Response, BWR

Technology, Transportation of Radioactive Materials,

Advanced Neutron Nuclear Materials Assay, Safeguards

Chemical Analysis of Nuclear Materials, Nondestructive

Assay of Nuclear Materials, Nondestructive Assay of

Fissionable Material, Accident / Incident Investigation

and Intrusion Detection Systems

EXPERIENCE:

Twenty-Two Years Nuclear Incestry Experience as Follows:

1977-Present

Safeguards Specialist, Physical Protection Inspector and

Safeguards Auditor (USNRC)

1966-1977

Westinghouse Electric Corperation, Bettis Atomic Power

Laboratory - Production Engineer, Nuclear !'aterials Aud-

.

itor, Nuclear Materials Analyst, Reactor Development

l

Technician

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Appendix F

F-18

4

NAME:

CLAY C. WARREN

ORGANIZATION:

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I

Division of Reactor Projects

TITLE:

Senior Resident Inspector - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

EDUCATION:

B.S., Natural Sciences, Louisianna State University

Industrial:

1986 - USNRC Inspector Qualification Program

1985 - Training Program on the General Electric BWR-6 oro-

.

duct ifne and received NRC Senior Reactor Operator License

1982 - GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Senior Reactor Oper-

stor Certification training at the General Electric BWR

l

. raining Center

1980 - Shif+ Test !

'neer training program at General

Dynamics Corporation, Electric Boat Division.

Successfully

completeo the Naval Engineering Officer exam administered

by Naval Reactors.

Military:

Navy Nuclear Prototype Training

Navy Nuclear Power School

Electronics Technicians School

EXPERIENCE:

Fif teen Years Nuclear Experience as Follows:

Jan 1987-Present

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Senior

Resident Inspector

Jan 1986-Jan 1987

Resident Inspector

June 1934-Jan 1936 Shift Supervisor, Gulf States Utilities Company, River Bend

Nuclear Station

Jan 1931-June 1934 Control Operating Foreman, Gulf States Utilities Company,

River Bend Nuclear Station

June 1979-Dec l'J30 Shift Test Engineer, General Dynamics Corporation, Electric

Boat Olvisien

.

Jan 1971-June 1979 Electronics Technician - Reactor Operate., United States

Navy

SPECIAL

QUALIFICATIONS:

USNRC Senior Reactor Operators License

.

-

_

f

Appendix F - Clay C. Warren

F-19

SPECIAL

ASSIGNMDO S;

Nine Mile Point 2 Operational Readiness Assessment Team

Inspection

Peach Bottom - Special Team Inspection March 1986

1

- - -

-.

. - - - - _

_ _ _ _ _ ,

__

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_____

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

e

  • "%

UNITED STATES

k

f

NUCLEAR REGULATCRY COMMi^^15N

I

.

REGION 1

,

475 ALLINoALE ROAD

KING oF PRUe41 A. PENNSYLVANIA 19406

.....

01 SEF 1988

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Executive Office of Public Safety

ATTN: Mr. Charles V. Barry

One Ashburton Place

Boston, Massachusetts 02108

Dear Mr. Barry:

This refers to our letter of July 13, 1988, regarding the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts' participation in the Integrated Assessment Team Inspection

(IATI) conducted at the Pilgrim Huclear Power Station.

As the NRC Senior Manager responsible for the inspection, I would like to ac-

knowledge the conduct of the designated state representatives Ms. Pamela J. Chen

and Mr. Steven C. Sho11y as being professional and contributing to the perfor-

mance of the inspection.

The established protocol (enclosed) provided to you on June 1,1988, clarified

by our letter of July 13, 1988, and discussed directly by myself with

Mr. Peter Agnes of your staff on August 9,1988, provides for collection and

coordination of the concerns from the various interests within the Commonwealth.

As stated in our July 13, 1988 letter, the NRC placed the burden on the Common-

wealth's representative to present the many views, be they from the local

governments or from the State's Attorney General's office, to the NRC for

consideration during development of tne inspection scope.

In this regard, we

understand that Mr. Agnes conducted a public meeting on August 4, 19:3, with a

designated state representative to the IATI present.

On August 9, 1988, having received no issues from the Commonwealth as an

additional input to the existing inspection plan, I contacted the Assistant

Secretary of Public Safety directly and was assured that: no formal input to

the IATI inspection plan would be submitted by the Commonwealth, the

Commonwealth would work through the designated representatives for any issues

and that issues brought to the Commonwealth's attention were no different than

those previously noted. Also, the team leader has not.ified me that at no time

during the inspection did he receive immediate notification of any different

state observation or conclusion as would be called for under Protocol

Guideline 3 if any such dif ferences were identified during the inspection.

Since the IATI exit meeting conducted on August 24, 1988 which was attended by

Mr. Agnes and Ms. Chen, the Commonwealth has expressed on several occasions

both to the tredia and #t public meetings that technical issues and management

concerns continue to exist. These statements appear inconsistent with the

Commonwealth's response to repeated NRC requests for IATI inspection scope

input and moreover inconsistent with the Comonwealth views expressed at the

IATI exit meeting.

In order to better understand and address the areas of concern, the NRC

requests that in accordance with the protocol agreement accepted by the

Comrinwealth, as provided f( ? by Guideline 3, that the Commonwealth make

available in writing those conclusions or observations that are substantially

,

different fro'n those of the NRC inspectors in order that the NRC can take the

necessary actions to meet its regulatory responsibilities.

? 0 T O ? ?!C-5

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Mr. Charles V. Barry

2

01 SF.F 1988

It is necessary that the Commonwealth's response be provided to the NRC Region

I by September 6, 1988, to be considered in conjunction with the documentation

of the results of the recently completed IATI.

This request was discussed

with Mr. P. Agnes of your staff on August 26 and August 31, 1988.

If you have any questions regarding the above matters, please contact me at

(215) 337-5126 or the State Liaison Officer for Region I, Ms. Marie Miller at

(215) 337-5246.

Sincerely,

we

o

ns, leputy Director

.

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure: As Stated

cc w/ enc 1:

'

R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear

K. Highfill, Station Director

'

R. Anderson, Plant Manager

J. Keyes, Licensing Division Manager

E. Robinson,. Nuclear Information Manager

R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager

The Honorable Edward J. Markey

i

The Honorable Edward P. Kirby

The Honorable Peter V. Forman

!

B. McIntyre, Chairman, Department of Public Utilities

1

Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen

I

Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen

Plymouth Civil Defense Director

P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Public Safety, Commonwealth of

Massachusetts

S. Pollard,**sssachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources

,

R. Shieshak, ,s'.SSPIRG

!

Public Documet Room (POR)

Local Public Document Room (LPOR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident Inspector

CommonwealthofMassachusetts(2)

,

bec w/ enc 1:

!

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

l

S. Co11tns, DRP

f

i

'

J. Wiggins, ORP

R. Blough, DRP

L. Doerflein, DRP

R. Bores, DR35

D. Mcdonald, FM, NRR

!

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EN,C_LOSURE

Guidelines for Accompaniment on the Integrated Assessment Team Inspection

The following are guidelines for accempaniment during NRC's Pilgrim Integrated

Assessment Team Inspection.

1.

The observer is to make arrangements with the licensee for site access

training and badging.

2.

The observer shall be available throughout the inspection and will accom-

pany NRC inspectors. Communication with the licensee will be through the

appropriate NRC team member, preferably the team leader.

3.

When

the conclusions

or observations made by the Comonwealth of

Massachusetts observer are substantially different from those of the NRC

inspectors, Comonwealth of Massachusetts will make its observations

-

imediately known to the inspection team leader and available in writing

to the NRC and the licensee, in order that NRC can take the necessary

actions to meet its regulatory responsibilities.

These communications

will be publicly available, similar to NRC inspection reports.

4.

NRC inspectors are authorized to refuse to permit continued accompaniment

by the Comonwealth of Massachusetts observer if his conduct interferes

,

l

with a fair and orderly inspection.

S.

The Comonwealth of Massachusetts observer in accompanying NRC inspectors

will not normally be provided access to proprietary information.

No

license material may be removed from the site or licensee possession

without NRC approval.

6.

The Comonwealth of Massachusetts observer in accompanying the NRC

,

inspectors pursuant to these guidelines does so at his (.vn risk. The NRC

i

l

will accept no responsibility for injuries and exposures to harmful

,

substances which may occur to the accompanying individual during the

l

inspection and will assume no liability for any incidents associated with

'

the accompaniment.

L

t

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