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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000321/1997009]]
| number = ML20199B822
| issue date = 11/03/1997
| title = Insp Repts 50-321/97-09 & 50-366/97-09 on 970817-1004. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations, Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support
| author name =
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000321, 05000366
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-321-97-09, 50-321-97-9, 50-366-97-09, 50-366-97-9, NUDOCS 9711190107
| package number = ML20199B804
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 38
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000321/1997009]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:.    . . . . . . .            .
                                                                                                                                              ..        .
                                                                                                                      .    ..        ..          . .
      .
  .
.
                                        U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                                                                                              REGION II
                                                                                                                                                                            ,
                            Docket Nos:                                                                                50 321. 50-36t
                            License Nos:                                                                              DPR-57 and NPF-5
                            Report No:                                                                                50-321/97-09, 53-366/97-09
                            Licensee:                                                                                  Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
                            Facility:                                                                                  E. I. Hatch Units 1 & 2
                            Location:                                                                                  P. O. Box 439
                                                                                                                        Baxley, Georgia 31513
                            Dates-                                                                                    Augue.t 17 - October 4. 1997
                              Inspectors:                                                                                B. Holbrook. Senior Resident Inspector
                                                                                                                        J. Canady, Resident Inspector
                              Accompanying Inspector:                                                                            T. Fredette
                              Approved by:                                                                              P. Skinner Chief. Projects Branch 2
                                                                                                                        Division of Reactor Projects
                                                                                                                                                              Enclosure 2
      9711190107 971103
      PDR
      0                ADOCK 05000321
                                  PDR
                                        _ _ _ _ _ . .__ __-____ - ____ _ ______-____ ______________ _____-___________                                                    _-
 
      .      - _ _ _ _                  _          . - _
                                                                      _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
        -
                                                                                                                                  !
          :,  +                                                                                                                  t
..,                                --
          -                                  -
          f                              -
                                                                    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.                                          ;
I                                                      -Plant Hatch. Units 1 and 2-
                                            -
                                                                                                          .
                                                                                                            . -
s                              -NRC-Inspection Report 50 321/97-09 50-366/97-09                                                ;
                        This integrated inspection includeo aspects-of licensee ' operations
                        engineering, maintenance, and-plant-support. The report covers a 7-week-
    ,
                      _ period _of resident inspection activities.
                        Ooerations
                      Le      During Unit 2 startup activities on September 18,_' operator                                      4
                              procedure usage, communications, control of activities, and
                              supervisory oversight during these activities were excellent.
>
                              Equipment problems such as control rods that were difficult to                                    I
                              withdraw - turbine vibration problems during turbine roll, and main
                              generator automatic voltage regulator problems challenged                                          4
                              operators-(Section 01.1).
                        e-    Equipment al'gnment, component _o)erability, and material
"
                              conditions observed-during a wal(down of the Unit 1 Standby Gas                                    !
                              Treatment System were good in all areas inspected. Housekeeping
                            L conditions in the filter train room adjacent to Unit 1 Heating
                              Ventilation and Air Conditioning room were excellent
                              (Section 02.1).
                        e    Unit I systems responded properly following a trip of the
                              1A Reactor Feed Pump Turbine (RFPT) and subsequent Reactor                                        '
                              Recirculation Runback on September 6. Operator response to the
                              plant transient was good (Section 04.1).
.                      o    Operations supervision failed to                              llow applicable procedures to
:                            correctly generate a-Maintenance Work Order (MWO) package for a
                              Reactor Manual Control system relay replacement. Operations
                              supervision authorized work and maintenance personnel performed
,
                              work using the incorrectly completed work package. This was
                              identified as an example of Violation (VIO) 50-321, 366/97-09-01,
~
                              Fai',ure to Follow Procedure - Multiple Examples -(Section 04.2).
                        e    The inspectors concluded that the operating crew's performance
                              resulted in additional- challenges during a normal reactor manual
                              scram. Operations management prompt actions to correct an
                              operating crew's weaknesses following a routine manual scram on
,
                            -Unit 2 was good (Section 04.3).
                        o    Operations demonstrated poor oversight and coordination of the
                              battery charger transfer activity. A plant equipment operator
                              failed to properly follow arocedures governing continuous
                              activities- that affected tie operability of Emergency Diesel
:
i                                                                                                              Enclosure 2      '
,
!
                          .-          ._~      --      - - - - - -            --                                -      -- -
 
                                        . . . . _      _
                                                            _    .__ ._        . _ - _ _ . . . . _ . _ __          _ _. . _ _
          x      ..
                                  .
  ..
        T
                                                                            2
                                        -Generator 2A and 2C 125-volt direct current subsystems. This
                                            failure to follow procedures was' identified-as an example of-                                    >
                                          VIO 50-321. 366/97-09-01, Failure to Follow Procedure - Multiple
                                          Examples (Section_08.2).
                      tialptenance
                      o                  Routine maintenance activities were generally completed in a
                                          thorough and professional manner. No deficiencies were identified
                                          by the inspectors for the maintenance activities observed
                                            (Section M1.1).                                                                                  ,
                      o                  Maintenance department response to the Rod Position Indicating ..                                  '
              .
                                          System (RPIS) problem on Unit I was timely 'and engineering support-
                                          of the maintenance ac.tivity was excellent. Operator actions for
                                          the failed RPIS were appropriate (Section M1.2).
                      *                  Maintenance and engineering support following the 1A Emergency
                                          Diesel Generator failure to start on September 4 was excellent.
                                        - The review of past performance and repair history for the failed
>
                                          fuel oil check valves that resulted in additional check valve
                                          replacements. demonstrated conservative decision making by the
                                          licensee (Section M1.3;
                      e-                  Management's oversight and pre-job planning for the forced outage
                                          on the Unit 1 main steam isolation valve limit switch adjustment
                                          was good. Craft personnel performed the work activity in a
                                          professional and timely manner. Health Physics personnel
                                          demonstrated a pro-active attitude by identifying the Low Pressure
                                          Coolant Injection check valve leak and notifying maintenance
                                          (Section M1.4).
                      e                    Maintenance personnel's attention-to-detail during a walkdown
                                          which discovered broken 31eces of the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant
u
                                          Injection (HPCI) flange Jushing was superior. Engineering support
                                          of maintenance was excellent. Foreign Material Exclusion control
                                          measures were satisfactory (Section M2.1).
                      e-                  Maintenance and engineering oversight of the intake structure
                                          dredging activities was excellent. Foreign material exclusion and'
                                          security control measures were appropriate. Communications and
                                          departmental-coordination was good (Section M2.2).
                      e                    For the surveillances observed all-data met the recuired
                                          acceptance criteria-and the equipment performed sat";factorily,
i                                        The-performance of the personnel conducting the surveillances was
                                          generally professional and-competent (Section M3.1).
l
      '
lt
'
                                                                                                            Enclosure 2
                                                                                                                                              .
            --      swe  -- -- , . , ,            m.,-  --  -.w        e  ,,      -        4  y w~_<m      y            9 y ,-, , - -
 
    .
  .
.
                                        3
      e    The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI
            code requirements for visual inspections were met for the strap
            welding on the Unit 2 Safety Relief Valves. A procedurally
            required VT-1 inspection was not com)leted following work on the B
            fecdwater check valve hinge pin for Jnit 2. This was identified
            as an example of VIO 50-321, 366/97-09-01. Failure to Follow
            Procedure - Multiple Examples (Section M3.2).
      e    The licensee had taken appropriate actions to correct the TIP
            System ASME code. Class 2 issues. The GE Code requirements of the
            TIP equipment installed were equivalent to those of the ASME Code.
            The proposed UFSAR revision was appropriate (Section M3.3).
      e    The inspectors concluded that Safety Audit and Engineering Review
            (SAER) audit 97-SA-3. Technical Specification Administrative
            Control Implementation, was conducted by trained and qualified
            personnel. The audit was thorough and detailed. The corrective
            actions and proposed completion dates were appropriate for the
            findings (Section M7.1).
      Enaineerina
      e    The inspectors concluded that the licensee was making progress in
            resolving the divisional cable separation issues for both units
            (Section E1.1).
      e    The inspectors concluded that new fuel receipt. inspection, and
            storage were completed with appropriate oversight and control, and
            in accordance with applicable plant procedures. Engineering.
            Health Physics. and security personnel support for the activity
            was satisfactory (Section E4.1).
      Plant Supoort
      e    The inspectors concluded that a contract Health Physics
            technician who left the plant site after receiving an alarm on the
            exit portal monitor presented minimal safety significance to the
            individual or to the public. The actions taken by the licensee
            were a)propriate and no further NRC actions are planned.  Based
            upon t1e fact that the individual is no longer employed at the
            site and site access was immediately terminated (Section R1.2).
      e    Management personnel had placed special emphasis for improved
            Health Physics and general radiation worker activities. The stop
            work meetino, plant tours for new contractors, and radiation
            worker ex]ectations list were identified as a strength
            (Section R1.3).
                                                                    Enclosure 2
 
  .
.
                                  4
    e Overall performance during the annual emergency preparedness
      exercise was good. Event classifications during the exercise were
      correct. Operator performance in the simulator and overall
      performance in the operations support center was excellent
      (Section P4.1).
    e The areas of security inspected met the applicable requirements
      (Section S2).
                                                              Enclosure 2
 
  .                                                                                  ,
        .
      .
.
                                              5
                                      ReDort Details
          Summary of Plant Status
          Unit 1 began the report period at 100% Rated Thermal Power (RTP). End-
          of-cycle coast down began on September 2, On September 6. the 1A
          reactor feedwater pump turbine tripped during a weekly turbine test and
          resulted in a power reduction to 66% RTP. The unit was returned to
          98% RTP. the maximum achievable povci , the same day.    Power was reduced
          on September 15 to remove the 1A feedwater pump from service due to a
          oil cooler leak. The unit was increased to the maximum achievable coast
          down power on September 17. Later on September 17, power was reduced
          slightly to verify turbine control valve functions. Power was returned
          to maximum rated the same day.    The unit remained in coast down for the
          remainder of the report period except for routine testing activities.
          Unit 2 began the report period at 100% RTP. On September 15. power w s
          reduced to approximately 75% RTP for main steam isolation valve (MSIV)
          testing and was subsequently brounht to Hot Shutdown due to MSIV limit
          switch problems. Unit startup began on September 18. and reached 100%
          RTP on September 22.    The unit operated at this power level for the
          remainder of the report period, except for routine testing activities.
                                        I. ODerations
          01    Conduct of Operations
          01.1 General Comments (71707)
                The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant
                operations. In general, the conduct of operations was
                professional and safety-conscious: specific events and
                observations are detailed in the section below. In particular, the
                inspectors observed that during the Unit 2 startup activities on
                September 18. equipment problems such as control rods that were
                difficult to withdraw, turbine vibration problems during turbine
                roll, and main generator automatic voltage regulator problems
                challenged operators. Operator procedure usage, communications,
                control of activities, and supervisory oversight during these
                activities was excellent.
                                                                          Enclosure 2
    .
 
                          .- -      -                          _
                                                                  -        -                - - . - -        .  - -            . .      . . . - .
                . ,
                            .                                                                                                                          -i
    ,
                                                                                                                                                        i
                                                                                                                                                      4
                                                                                                  6
                                02-          (Operational Status of Facility _and Equipment-                                                          !
                                02.1- Enaineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown                                                                  -
                                                                                                                                                        ,
                                a.                Insoection Scoce (71707)
                                                  Thel ins)ectors-performed an inspection of the accessible portions
                                                                                                                                                        '
                                                  of the Jnit I standby gas treatment (SBGT) system. This-included-
                                                  verification of valve alignment, instrumentation, condition of -
                                                -components in service, and general housekeeping for both trains of
                                                  the system,
                                b.              Observations and Findinos
                                                -The inspectors reviewed applicable Piping and Instrumentation
                                                  Diagrams (P& ids) and filter train operability verification
                                                  procedures in use for the Unit 1 SBGT system. System control
                                                  switches, valves and dampers were verified to be in the correct
                                                  positions. Proper operation of control room flow recorders and
                                                  indications were confirmed following routine atmospheric venting
                                                  of the primary containment using the "A" SBGT filter train,
                                c.              Conclusions
                                                  Equipment alignment, component opertbility, and material condition
'
                                                  were good in all-areas inspected. _ Housekeeping conditions in the
                                                  filter train room adjacent to Unit 1 Heating Ventilation and Air
                                                  Conditioning room were excellent.
                                04.0 Operator Knowledge and Performance
                                            -
                                04.1            1A Reactor Feedoumo Turbine (RFPT) Trio Durina Routine Turbine
                                                  Testina
                                a.                Inspection 5 ooe (71707) (92901)
                                              - The insSectors reviewed procedure 34IT-N21-003-1S, "RFPT Weekly
                                                  Test". Revision (Rev.) 4. and operator performance and plant-
                                                  response following a 1A RFPT trip on September 6.
                                b.              Observations and Findinos
'
                                                  Licensee management-had deferred routine RFPT_ testing during hot
                                                                -
                                              - weather conditions and times of peak load demand. 0n' September 6.
                                                  the 1A RFPT trip. test was scheduled. This was one of the first
                                                weekly turbine tests performed following resumption of the-RFPT
                                                  testing. While performing section 7.3. "RFPT 011 Trip Test " the
.
                                                                                                                            Enclosure 2
.
  __----a a -*_  _m ---#_    , .      .s.e--    s.w-  W,-3----      g+.-r--  4+-+ ,--sa. p y      r -m-g-g r w  -
                                                                                                                        tr-  *--1-      -r-  p    D-
 
    .
  .
.
                                      7
        operator stated that when he released the Overs)eed Trip Test
        Lockout Switch, the RFPT immediately tripped. Other than the RFPT
                -
                                                                            The
        trip. there were  no indications of abnormal system  resp
        RFPf trip caused a Reactor Recirculation Systa runbac .  (onse.
        The inspectors reviewed plant data and discussed the RFPT trip
        with operations and management personnel.      The inspectors observed
        that all systems responded correctly. The Reactor water level
        decreased to about 15 inches and a Reactor Recirculation System
        Runback occurred as expected. Reactor power stabilized at about
        66% Rated Thermal Power (RTP). The region of potential
        instability of the power to flow map was never entered.
        Operations personnel discussed the pump trip and later
        successfully completed the turbine testing on the 1A and 1B RFPT.
        During subsequent testing. the operators did not release the
        Overspeed Trip Test Lockout Switch until a few seconds had passed
        after receiving the green reset permissive light. Operations
        personnel told the inspectors that they believe that holding the
        Overspeed Trip Test Lockout Switch depressed for a few seconds
        longer may have prevented the initial trip.      Reactor power was
        increased to maximum rated within about 1.5 hours following the
        RFPT trip and subsequent testing.
        The licensee initiated a review of the procedure and system
        response to determine if possible procedure problems existed or if
        improvements could be made to ensure that no future RFPi trips
        occurred. A temporary change to clarify some procedure steps for
        both units was completed. The licensee concluded that the root
        cause of the RFPT trip was mechanical linkage not being in the
        proper position when the overspeed lockout switch was released.
        The procedure revision addressed this problem.
        The inspectors observed that the testing procedure had been used
        numerous times in the past and no known previous problem or RFPT
        trips had been identified. The inspectors reviewed the procedure
        in detail and walked through the procedure at the local panels to
        ensure switch nomenclature and procedure wording were clear.      No
        procedure deficiencies were observea.
      c. Conclusions
        Unit 1 systems responded properly following the tri) of the
        1A RFPT and subsequent Reactor Recirculation Runbacc on
        September 6. Operator response to the trip and runback'was good.
                                                                    Enclosure 2
 
  .
      -
    .
                                          8
        04.2 Unit 1 Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS) Relay ReDlacement
        a.    Insoection Scoce (71707) (62707)
              On August 15. Operations supervision prepared a maintenance work
              order (MWO) for the re)lacement of a failed relay associated with
              the RMCS on Unit 1.    T1e MWO was provided to maintenance personnel
              as guidance for component replacement. The inspectors reviewed
              applicable procedures and otler documentation associated with the
              work activity,
        b.    Observationsandfindinas
              On August 15, while performing surveillance procedure
              34SV-C11-003-IS. " Control Rod Weekly Exercise." Rev. 10. Edition
              (ED) 1. the control rods in row 34 could be selected but would not
              actuate the RMCS for manual insertion. Troubleshooting activities
              by maintenance personnel revealed that relay 1C11-K033 had failed
              and required replacement.
              Operations supervision on shift 3repared MWO 1-97-1979 and grantec
              approval for the maintenance tec1nician to replace the relay. Tht
              MWO prepared and approved was not properly completed.    The MWO dic
              not'have any work instructions or procedural references, and other
              items of importance were not indicated. The inspectors reviewed
              the MWO that was used by the maintenance technician and observed
              that the technician documented the work performed on the MWO. The
              technician documented that the K033 relay was defective, had been
              replaced with a new one, and the RMCS operated satisfactorily.
              A later review by maintenance personnel identified several
              discrepancies with the MWO and initiated a deficiency card. The
              inspectors reviewed the deficiency card that identified the
              discrepancies on the MWO used by the technician to re) lace the
              failed relay. Also, reviewed was a second MWO with t1e same
              control number that was prepared after the relay replacement. This
              MWO corrected the discrepancies identified for the earlier MWO.
              The inspectors reviewed MWO 1-97-1979 to determine if the
              requirements of Administrative Control procedure 50AC-MNT-001-05.
              " Maintenance Program." Rev. 25, were met for the maintenance work
              activities.    The following discrepancies were identified:
              .      Step 4.2.5 of the procedure required. in part that plant
                    maintenance be performed and controlled within the
                    boundaries of " work instructions" of MW0s and/or procedures.
                    Work instructions were not provided to replace a failed RMCS
                    relay.
                                                                        Enclosure 2
l
l
 
    .              -  ._              _ _. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _
                                                                                                                _ ;
              2-    #                                                                                                s
  .                                                                                                                  .
          b                                                                                                          t
                                                                              9-
                                                  Section 8.2.2 and sub-step _8,2.1.2 required, in part, that
                                '
.
                                ..                                                                                  ..
                                                  block:23 of the MW0' state a specific sco)e of work using          l
                                                  referenced material as ap)licabler The iWO failed to enter        ,
                                                  the specific scope of. wort and references in block 23 of the
                                                                                                                      '
  ,
                                                  MW0.
                                    *            -Step 8.5.-1 requires. in' part, that prior to the start of
                                                . plant maintenance, the responsible personnel will perform a
                                                -cursory review of the MWO package-to ensure the contents are'-
      _.                  _
                                                  adequate. Responsible operations and maintenance personnel-          ,
                                                .did not ensure that the contents of the MWO package were        -
                                                                                                                      ;
                                                                                                                      '
                                                  adequate.                              -
                      -c-        Conclusions                                                                      a
                                  The inspectors concluded that. operations supervision' failed to
                              : follow applicable procedures to correctly generate a MWO package'                    <
                                    for a-RMCS relay replacement. - Additionally, operations                          4
                                  supervision authorized work and maintenance personnel performed
                                  work'using the MW0. Operations'and maintenance personnel failed
                              -to ensure that the MWO package contents were adequate. This was
                                    identified as an example of Violation (VIO) 50-321. 366/97-09-01,
'-
                                  Failure to-Follow Procedure - Multiple Examples.
                                                                                                                      '
                                                                                                                      #
                          04.3 Doerator Performance Durina Normal Plant Shutdown
                          a.        Insoection Scoce (71707)
*
                                  The inspectors reviewed an operating crew's performance and
                                  management's corrective actions following deficiencies identified                  ,
                                  during a forced outage of Unit 2-on September 15.
                          b.      Observations and Findinas                                                          ,
                              -Unit 2 was being shut down to conduct a drywell entry to~ adjust
                                  inboard main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switches.
                                  Maintenance activities associated with the limit switch
                                  adjustments are discussed'in Section M1.4 of this Inspection
                                  Report (IR), Following a manual scram from about 20% aower.
,
                                  reactor water level increased to about 88 inches, at w1ich time
      -
                -
                                  operators closed the HSIVs. About 36 inches is the normal reactor _        ~
                                  water level. Maintaining an approximately normal reactor water
,
                                -level is generally not a problem during a manual scram condition                      ,
                                  from low )ower, and the MISVs are not normally closed during
                                  routine slutdowns._ Closing the MSIVs isolated the RFPT (normal-
                                  water control system) steam supply and the main condenser for
                                  normal pressure control. These actions can complicate a routine                    -
                                  manual scram and present additional challenges to the operating
                              " crew. The. operators stated that they. closed the MSIVs to prevent
                              -exceeding the reactor: vessel cooldown rate. The potential for
                                                                                                    Enclosure 2
            ,_    ..              - . _ _
 
      .                          .            .  . ._.                        -  .
  .
        .
    .
.
                                            10-
                exceeding the vessel cooldown rate was due to abnormally high
                water level. Following the MSIV closure at 4:42 p.m. the Reactor-
                Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) was manually placed in
                service for reactor pressure control. The MSIVs were reopened at
                6:40 p.m. and norml pressure control was established.
                The inspectors-discussed the operating crews performance with
                operations management. The inspectors were informed that the
                perforinance of the operating crew did not meet managements
                expectations. Operations management stated that the operators'
                response to chcnging reactor water level was slow. Management
                personnel also stated that operations )ersonnel were slow to reset
                the reactor scram and this also contri)uted to the high reactor
                water level.
                Operations management and the operating crew conducted a critique
                of the crew performance and unit response using unit chart
                recorders and the safety parameter display system tape
                information. Management stated the crew acknowledged that their
                performance could be inproved. As part of the corrective actions,
                simulator training was provided to the crew to practice similar
                m&nual scram con itions. Additionally, low power reactor
                shutdowns will be evaluated for inclusion into the regularly
                scheduled operator license requalification training.
          c.    Conclusions
                The inspectors concluded that the operating crew's performance
                resulted in additional challenges durin9 a normal reactor manual
                scram. Operations management prompt actions to correct an
                operating crew's weaknesses following a routine manual scre a on
                Unit 2 was good.
          04.4 Review of Unit 2 Emeraency Diesel Generator (EDG) Battery Charaer
                Transfer
          a.    Insoection Scooe (71707) (92901) (62707)
                The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with an
                activity on September 11, when a plant equipment operator (PE0)
                improperly transferred battery chargers for the 2A and 2C
                Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 125-Volt Direct Current (VDC)
                subsystems, rendering both subsystems inoperable. The inspectors
                reviewed the ap)licable procedures, control room logs. TSs. rfi0s,
                and discussed t11s problem with licensee management.
                                                                        Enclosure 2
 
                                                                _  .
                s
    .
  .
.
                                    11
      b. Observations and Findinas
        The control .roon -logs indicated that the unit shift supervisor had
        authorized a maintenance electrician to conduct preventive
        maintenance (PM) on battery charger feeder breakers in accordance
        with MWO 29701339. In order to facilitate taking the battery
        chargers out of service to perform the PM. the electrician
        requested the assistance of the outside roving PE0 to transfer
        battery chargers. The PE0 performed the transfer without using
          )rocedure 34S0-R42-001-25. "125/250 VDC Station Service Charger
          Rotation & Breaker Racking." and failed to connect the in-service
        battery chargers to their respective 125 VDC cabinets. As a
        result, both EDG 125-VDC subsystems were left misaligned with
        control power being provided by the EDG batteries.
        Control room operators subsequently received an annunciator for
        " Battery Volts Low or Fuse Trouble" for both the 2A and 2C EDGs.
        An operator was dispatched to investigate the problem. Normal
        battery charger alignment was restored: however, the misaligned
        battery chargers had rendered the 125-VDC subsystems inoperable
        for a total of 36 minutes. Engineering conducted an analysis and
        determined that a loss of function of the 2A and 2C 125-VDC
        systems did not occur due to the fact that the total energy loss
        from the batteries was only 2 amp-hours, compared to load profiles
        of 66 amp-hours and 37 amp hours for the 2A and 2C DC subsystems,
        respectively.
        The inspectors reviewed procedure 34S0-R42-001-2S. Rev. 4, which
        is classified as a " continuous use" procedure in accordance with
        10AC-MGR-019 0S. " Procedure Use and Adherence." Rev. O.
        Specifically MGR-01900S stated, in part, that a " continuous use"
        procedure is required at work activities that affect safety-
        related system operability, and that procedure steps will be
        reviewed, read, and initialed during the activity. The inspectors
        verified that the )rocedure was adequate to perform the DC system
        transfers for the EDGs.
        The inspector's review indicated that at the pre-job briefing, the
        Unit 2 shift supervisor had designated a performance team PE0 to
        perform the battery charger transfers. This PE0 was never in
        attendance at the pre-job briefing, nor was the PE0 who
        subsequently performed the improper transfer.
        In addition, a review of the operations logs revealed that the
        shift supervisor documented the maintenance being performed under
        MWO 29701339 as " Battery Charger Clean and Inspect." when the
        actual maintenance was to clean and inspection of the battery
        charger feeder breakers. The inspectors determined that
        operations * oversight and coordination of the battery charger
        transfer evolution was poor.
                                                                  Enclosure 2
 
      .
    .
  .
                                            12
        c.    Conclusions
              Operations demonstrated poor oversight and coordination of the
              battery charger transfer activity. A PE0 failed to pro >erly
              follow procedures governing continuous use activities tlat affect
              the operability of EDG 2A and 2C 125-VDC subsystems.      This failure
              to follow procedures was identified as an example of Violation
              (VIO) 50-321. 366/97-09-01. Failure to Follow Procedure - Multiple
              Examples.
        08    Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901) (82301)
        08.1  (Closed) IFI 50-321. 366/96-13-04: Inability to Correctly
              Classify Events. This IFI was initiated following
              misclassification of events during simulator scenarios observed
              during a licensed operator requalification program assessment. The
              licensee revised procedure 73EP-EIP-001-05. " Emergency
              Classification and Initial Actions." to improve usability and
              increase training emphasis on event classifications. Based upon
              the inspectors' review of licensee actions and demonstrated
              improvements in simulated event classifications this item is
              closed.
        08.2 (Closed) LER 50-366/97-09:        Removal of DG Battery Chargers From
              Service Results in Inoperability of Both the 2A and 2C DG DC
              Electrical Power Subsystems. This LER is discussed in
              Section 04.4 of this IR. Based upon the inspectors review of
              licensee actions, this item is closed.
                                        II. Maintenance
        M1    Conduct of Mcintenance
        M1.1 General Coments
        a.    Jnsoection Scoce (62707)
              The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the
              following work activities:
              .      MWO 1-97-2223:    realace RPIS 28 volt power supply
              .      MWO 1-96-2099:    re) lock 1B EDG generater winding at next
                                        outage
              .      MWO 1-96-3225:    inspect 1B EDG engine per applicable
                                        6-year PM procedures
              .      MWO 1-97-1998:    perform inspection of 18 EDG jacket
,                                      coolant pump in accordance with procedure
l                                      52PM-R43-017-0S
l            .      MWO 1-96-4145:    Jerform 18-month grease inspection on
                                        iPCI CST suction valve 1E41-F004
                                                                        Enclosure 2
 
                                                                    ..-e
    .
        .
      .
  .
                                            13
          -b.  Observations and Findinas
                The inspectors found that the work was performed with the work
                packages present and being actively used.
          c.  Conclusions
                Maintenance activities were generally completed in a thorough and
                professional manner. No deficiencies were identified by the
                inspectors for the maintenance activities observed.
          M1.2  Rod Position Indicatina System (RPIS) and Drywell-to-Torus Vacuun
                3reaker Problems on Unit 1
          a.    Insoection Scope (62707) (37551) (71707)
                The inspectors observed portions of the work activities associated
                with the re)lacement of the 28-volt RPIS power sup)ly and
                discussed tie activity with the system engineer. )iscussions were
                also conducted with operations' management concerning the opening
                of a drywell-to-torus vacuum breaker during drywell venting
                activities. Additionally the inspectors reviewed the Technical
                Specifications (TSs). Technical Requirenent Manual (TRM). abnormal
                operating procedure. MWO 1-97-2223. and applicable work packages
                associated with the problems.
          b.  Qbservations and Findinas
                Unit 1 entered TRM Action Statement. Section T3.3.3. on
                September 16. due to an inoperable RPIS. The TRM Action Statement
                required that the unit be in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) within 12
                hours. The RPIS became inoperable due to a failed 28-volt power
                supply. The operators lost a portion of the full core display
                panel. Operators were able to determine control rod positions
                using the process computer. The manual and automatic shutdown
                functions of the control rods were still operable.
                Similar RPIS and drywell-to-torus vacuum breaker (DW/ torus)
                3roblems occurred on June 30 and July 20. The 5-volt power supply
                lad failed for the RPIS system and the 1T48-F323F DW/ torus vacuum
                breaker had failed to close due to mechanical binding. Details of
                these problems are documented in section 01.3 of Inspection Report
                (IR) 50-321, 366/97-07.
i
'
                The inspectors observed a portion of the RPIS power supply
                replacement activity and its return to service. The system
                indicating lights operated properly and the RPIS functioned
                properly.
                                                                        Enclosure 2
1
,
 
    -                                  -    -      ...              .
  .
      .
        ~
J
                                        14
            Engineering personnel informed the inspectors thai; the current      i
            5 volt and 28-volt RPIS power supplies are obsolete and a design
            change to realace the existing power sup) lies ds being prepared.
            The design clange will be installed in tie future.
            On Seatember 15 during drywell (DW) venting activities, the
            IT48 323A DW to torus vacuum breaker openec and would not close.
            Operations >'ersonnel entered the correct TS Required Action
            Statement ( RS) 3.6.1.8. Suparession Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum      i
            Breakers. This TS requires tlat the vacuum breaker ce closed
            within two hours. The operating crew aligned the SBGT system to
            take suction from the torus as allowed by procedure and the vacuum
            breaker closed within the required two hours. The TS RAS for the
            opened vacuum breaker was terminated.
            Operations management informed the inspectors that the operating
            crew allowed the DW-to-torus differential pressure (DP) to become
            lower than desired during DW venting activities. The F323A vacuum
            breaker has a history of opening sooner than the other vacuum
            breakers, and it o]ened at the higher DP. Operations management
            further informed t1e inspectors that a night order was written for
            the operators to use during drywell venting activities. The night
            order instructed the operators to keep the DW-to-torus DP greater
            than 0.2 pounds per square inch differential (psid). The TS
            opening setpoint is less than or equal to 0.5 psid. The
            inspectors reviewed the night order and system operating procedure
            3450-T48-002-15. " Containment Atmospheric Control and Dilution,"
            Rev.1.6. and no deficiencies were identified.
            The inspectors also reviewed Section T3.3.3 of the TRM and
            abnormal operating procedure 34AB-C11-002-1S. "RPIS Failure."
            Rev.1. Edition (ED) 1. to verify that the appropriate actions
            were taken by the o)erating crew. The inspectors reviewed
            MWO 1-97-2223 whic1 provided instruction for the replacement of
            the 28-volt RPIS power supply. No deficiencies were identified.
          c. Conclusions
            Maintenance's response to the RPIS problem was timely; engineering
            support of the maintenance activity was excellent: and operations
            personnel took the appropriate actions for the RPIS failure.
                                                                      Enclosure 2
 
        _
    .
          .
      .
                                                                                                                  '
  ,.
                                                                                                                  :
                                                        15
              M1.3 LA Emeraency Diesel Generator Failure To Start Durina Surveillance
                    M                                                                                              ,
            xa.  -Insoection Scone (61726) (92902)
                                                                                                                  .
                    The inspectors reviewed applicable maintenance procedures,
                    associated MW0s,_and work packa9es associated with the repair of                              >
                    the 1A EDG following a: failure to start on September 4, 1997-.- The
                    inspectors discussed the EDG failure with operations, maintenance.                          ,
                    and engineering personnel.
              b,  l Observations and Findinas'
                                                                                                                  ,
                    % ring the performance of surveillance test 34SV-R43-001-1S.
                    " Diesel Generator 1A Monthly Test." Rev. 17. ED1. the-1A EDG
                    failed to start. Operations personnel contacted maintenance for'                              ,
                    their assistance in troubleshooting activities. Operations
                    declared the EDG inoperable and initiated the correct TS RAS. The
                    maintenance investigation revealed that the fuel oil check valve
                    had stuck in the open position. This check valve is on the down-
                    stream: side of the injectors and allowed the fuel oil to drain
                    from the fuel oil header back into the clean fuel oil drain tank.
                    As a result an inadequate supply of fuel oil existed for the EDG                              ,
-
                  -start.
'
                    Maintenance replaced the-check valve and the EDG surveillance was
                    successfully completed. Hintenance and engineering personnel
o                  conducted a review of pa~ nerformance and repair history for the
                    check valves and issued at e Mneering evaluation to document the
                    results of the review. The mspectors reviewed the engineering
                    evaluation and other licensee documentation and observed the
                    following:
                    .      .In 1987, all check valves (one for each of the five EDGs)
                            were replaced due to suspected problems.
,                  e      From the total of five valves, two valves had 10 years or
                            more of service life with no problems. Check valves for
~
                            EDGs 2A and 2C were replaced in 1987 and in March 1997.
                          -respectively, with no problems observed.
                    .      One valve had five years of service life with no problems.
                            The check valve for-EDG 1B was replaced in October 1992 and                          .
<
                            August 1997-, with.no problems observed.
                  L.      One valve had less than five years of service life with one
                            failure.
                    .    - The check-valve for EDG 1A was replaced in April 1993 and -
                            had failed in September 1997.
                                                                                        Enclosure 2
  <
                %            -        +e  . . - . . -    ---,e % .v -' ;m,- n.-m..y ,        r,-. , - - - , - -
 
                ..
.
    .
  .
                                        16
          Maintenance personnel inspected the check valve installed in the
            1C EDG and discovered that it was also open. The check valve was
          replaced, and post maintenance testing was successfully performed.
          The check valve had been replaced in March 1993.
          The engineering evaluation recommended that the check valves be
          replaced every five years, however, maintenance management was
          evaluating whether or not the frequency snould be every 18 me hs.
          The inspectors were informed that the check valve was suspected of
          causing sluggish EDG start times in 1987. The inspectors were not
          aware of any recent operability concerns or sluggish EDG start
          proi>lems .
      c.  Conclusions
          Maintenance and engineering support following the 1A Emergency
          Diesel Generator failure to start on September 4 was excellent.
          The review of past performance and repair history for the failed
            fuel oil check valves that resulted in additional check valve
            replacements demonstrated conservative decision making.
      M1.4 Unit 2 Forced Outaae
      a.    Insoection Scooe (6270171
          The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures and MW0s associated
          with the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) limit switches on
          Unit 2. Limit switch adjustments were discussed with maintenance,
          engineering, and operations personnel. Additionally, the
            inspectors reviewed procederes applicable to the repairs performed
          on the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) check valve during
          the forced outage and discussed the re pairs with maintenance
          management and engineering personnel
      b.  Observations and Findinas
          On September 14. While performing quarterly MSIV surveillance
            )rocedure 345V-B21-001-25. "MSIV Exercise and Closure Instrument
            r unctional Test." Rev. 5. ED 1: the 2C71-K3G and 2C71-K3H relays
          failed to re-energize when the 'O' inboard MSIV was returned to
          its fully opened position. Because a s-imilar relay associated
          with the 'B' MSIV was already de-energized due to a similar
          failure during the previous surveillance a half scram resulted
          which the operators were unable to reset. The failure of the
          relay associated with the 'B' inboard MSIV is documented in
          Section M1.3 of IR 50-321. 366/97-07.
          The licensee decided to bring the unit to Hot Shutdown for entry
          into the drywell to ins)ect and/or adjust the limit switches that
          provide the signal to t1e relays that failed to re-energize.
                                                                    Enclostre 2
                                                                                .
 
    .  ..      ~    -      -      . . - - -      - -        . .      -.                . .. .      - - ~ . - . . -  .
  n                                                                                                                              +
          -
      .                                                                                                                          i
.
                                                                                                                                  -
                                                            li                                                                    .
                        Maintenance work was completed for limit switch adjustments and-
                                                                    -
                        unit startup was commenced on September 18. The unit achieved
                        100% RTP on September 22.
                        Due to the failure of the relays to reset on September 14 and on
                        June 22,1the licensee initiated a root- cause investigation of the                                      ,
                        MSIV limit switch problems. The licensee root cause investigation:                                      !
                        concluded that the limit switch setup methodology was a-possible-                                        ,
                        contributor to the problem.-.The-limit switch reset positions                                            '
i                        criteria was not specified by procedure and was left to the                                              *
                        judgement of the electrician performing the work. A new type of                                          i
-
                        limit switch was installed during the-last unit refueling outage
                        and craft judgement-was again used to set the limit switch reset
                        positions. However, small changes in valve stroke length (due to
                        unknown causes) when steam flowed through the MSIV may have
                        prevented the' limit switches from resetting'when the MSIV-was very
                        close to the valve full-open position. Maintenance personnel also
                        determined that the new limit switch reset position was not                                              :
                        consistent and predictable like the previous limit switches. The                                      4
4                        root cause investigation report-recomnended that the maintenance
                        department revise applicable procedures to include specific
                        instructions on limit switch reset positions.
                        The inspectors reviewed surveillance procedure 52SV-B21-001-0S.
                        "MSIV Limit Switch Inspection," P.ev. 4. The revision of the
-
                        procedure included an addition which required a confirmation that
.                        the MSIV limit switch resets when the MSIV is taken back to the
                        fully opened )osition. Other procedure steps were either deleted
                        or added to t1e preventive maintenance procedure.
                        Health Physics personnel identified a leak on the Low Pressure
                        Coolant Injection (LPCI) check valve 2E11-F050B upon initial entry
-
                        into the drywell for the MSIV limit switch adjustment work
                        activity.        The valve was leaking steam from the hinge pin area.
                        Maintenance attempted to stop the leak by torquing the hinge pin.
                        The valve was_ repacked after the torquing failed to stop the leak.
                  c.  . Conclusions
l:
                        Management's oversight and pre-job plconing for forced outage
                        act'vities on the MSIV limit switch adjustment was good. Craft
<
                        personnel performed the work activity in a professional and timely
                        manner. Health Physics personnel demonstrated a aro-active-
                        attitude by identifying the LPCI check valve leac and notifying
                        maintenance.
,
L                                                                                                Enclosure 2
L
1-
'
          _. .                              _        _ , _    . , _      - . _ _ , , , _              .          . _ ,  - - _ - ,
 
  .
      .
    .
p
                                        18
        M2  Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
        M2.1 Inocerable Unit 2 Hiah Pressure Coolant In.iection (HPCI) Pumo
        a.  Inspection Scone (62707)
            On August 18 the Unit 2 HPCI pump was declared inoperable due to
            a broken flange bushing that was discovered by maintenance
            personnel. The inspectors reviewed a)plicable drawings.
              3rocedures. TS. MW0s. Licensee Event Re] orts (LER), and the
              Jpdated Final Safety Analysis Report (U SAR) associated with
            repairs of the pump. The inspectors also held discussions with        .
            involved maintenance, engineering, and vendor personnel,
        b.  Observations and Findinas
            On August 18. during a routine housekeeping wal!:down of the HPCI
            system. maintenance personnel discovered pieces of metal in the
            shaft drain casing of the HPCI main pump. The metal pieces were
            from the pump shaft flange bushing (six pieces) and one of the
            shaft's split rings. The flangt bushing is designed to limit the
            water flow from the shaft of the pump in the event of a
            catastrophic failure of the mechanical seal. The split ring is
            one of two semicircular rings that assists in maintaining the
            shaft sleeve in proper alignment.
            Operations personnel declared the HPCI system inoperable after
            being informed of the damage. The RAS of TS 3.5.1. Condition C,
            was entered. The required 10 CFR 50.72 notification was made to
            the NRC.
                                                                      housing and
            The  inspectors
            removal  of pum) observed  the disassembly
                              shaft components            of the bearir.g/ repair
                                                during the inspection
            activities. T1e inspectors observed that the lubricant piping
            removed was not immediately sealed for foreign material exclusion
            (FME) control. The inspectors observed that sawing activitias of
            metal components were in progress in the immediate area and had
            the potential of FME contamination. Maintenance personnel
            eventually taped the lubricant piping for FME protection. The
            inspectors were later informed that the piping and components were
            flushed and cleaned prior to installation.
            The inspectors observed the recovered pieces of the bushing
            flange. It was noted by the inspectors that all pieces necessary
            to reconstruct the flange bushing were not present. The
            inspectors were informed by maintenance personnel that six pieces
            of the flange bushing were recovered and the remaining missing
            part or parts were not found. A search of the immediate area was
            conducted but did not locate the missing parts.
                                                                      Enclosure 2
 
  . .              .    _    _      _ . _      _          ..      _      --    _ _ . . ~ _ - _ _ . . _ _
                      -
      .
d
                                                                                                                    1
                                                                                                                  -t
                                                                                                                    _
                                                                19-
                            The licensee contacted the aump vendor to assist with the failure L                      '
                            mechanism determination. Tle inspectors discussed the possible
                                                                    -
                            cause of the flang,e bushing failure with-the vendor
                    ~
                            representative. nie vendor representative informed the inspectors
                            that he suspected that shaft movement caused by the bearing-
                            failure cn the-shaft between the main pump and the booster pump -
                            allowed the shaft to rub against'the flange bushing, thus causing                        ,
                            a: failure of the flange bushing.
                            The licensee suspected that the bearing failed due to a small
                            amount of particles that contaminated the main pump journal                              1
                            2 earing housing. This caused damage to the bearing babbitt-                          .!
                            material which led to increased pump vibration sufficient in                            '
                            magnitude to cause the shaft-to impact, crack, and. break the-
                            flange bushing and displace the spl:t ring retainer. The licensee                      ;
                            indicated that the damage to the seal likely occurred during the
                            performance of the HPCI operability surveillance performed on
                            August 11, but was unable to determine the source and type of
                          .contamiration that caused the bearing damage.
                            The inspectors reviewed the data package for the most recently:
                          -performed o)erability surveillance procedure: 34SV-E41-002-2S,                            +
                            "HPCI Pump Operability." Rev. 26, and noted that the main pump
                            inboard horizontal vibration (point H03) was in the alert range.
                            This required the operability test to be performed at double the                        ,
                            normal frequency.
                            A review of MWO 2 96-0024 by the inspectors indicated that a small
i
                            water leak at the mechanical seals had been identified earlier.
                            Since the leak did not affect pump operability the work for the
                            mechanical seal repair / replacement was initially deferred until
>
                            the next Unit 2 refueling outage. The MWO was revised to include
                            the work scope for the replacement of the damaged bearing.' the
                            flange bushing and the split ring. All work was performed and the
                            HPCI-system was returned to an operable status-en August 24.
                            The inspectors reviewed LER 50 366/97-08, Main Pump Journal
>                          Bearing Damage Renders HPCI System Inoperable. As part of the
                            corrective actions, the licensee inspected and replaced the
i                          inboard and outboard main pump bearings and rebuilt the pump shaft
                            bearing. The damaged outboard main pump mechanical seal was
                            replaced and the bearing lubrication oil system was drained,
                            flushed, and cleaned. : The lubricating' oil system filters were
                            also replaced. Following-system repairs. maintenance engineering
                            personnel confirmed that vibration levels and alignment of the
l                          turbine and main' pump were within acceptable tolerances.
  l                                                                                        Enclosure 2-
l
      . - - _ - -              .-        - .  - - . . - ..            _- ,    , -                    _    . -.
 
      .      . . , - -          --.        -.    - - ~ - - - - - - - -                          _ . . - _        --
    ,
          ,-      ..-                                                                                                  _;
-
                                                                                                                          1
                                                                    .20-
                                                                                                                          ;
                            The inspectors-reviewed vendor. drawings S-25084. "HPCI Pump he                              l
                            Sectional-GE VPF #3076-13." and the associated drawing for t
                            mechanical seals. Additior, ally. Unit 2 UFSAR Section 7.3.1.2.1.                            1
                                                                                                                          '
                            High Pressure Coolant Injection System Instrumentation and
                            Centrol, was reviewed. No discrepancies were identified.
                                                                                                                          I
                        c.  Conclusions--
                            Maintenance personnel's attention-to-detail during the walkdown
                            which discovered the broken pieces of the HFCI flange bushing was                            i
                                                                                                  FME-
                            superior. Engineering support of maintenance was excellent.
                            control measures were satisfactory.
                        M2.2 Intake Structure Dredaina Activities
                                                                                                                          .
                        a.    InsoectionScone(62727.1
                              The inspectors observed activities associated with the dredging
                              and cleaning of the intake structure water pit. The inspectors
                              also reviewed MWO 1-97-1453 and the data package of )rocedure
                              52PM-MME-006-05 " Intake Structure Pit Inspection." Rev. 6.
v                              Discussions were conducted with maintenance supervision and
                              engineering. A representative sampling of clearance tags was
                                verified,
                        b.    Qbservations and Findinas
                                On September 26. the inspectors observed activities associated
                                with the preparation-to dredge and clean the intake structure pit.
                                The inspectors observed that a FME area boundary had been
                                established inside the intake structure on the ground level and
                                FME was properly controlled.
'
                                The inspectors verified that a representative sampling of the-
                                clearance tags associated with the work activity was properly-
                                  placed.
                                  The inspectors discussed communication aspects of this activity.
                              -with engineering and maintenance supervision. The inspectors
>                                observed that communications had been established with the divers.
                                  the divers' attendant. the control room, and with a member of the
                                  diving ~ team that--was located on the dredge platform.
                                  The dredge platform was afloat-on the river with a suction hose.-
                                    that ran through an opening in the travelling screens. The
                                    opening was made by removing necessary sections of the traveling
e                                    screen. The opening in the travelling screen was large enough to
                                    insert an 8-inch diameter suction line into the pump suction pit
L
;                                    area.: Security personnel appropriately monitored the area.
                                                                                              Enclosure 2
!-
  L
      . _                  , _ . -            ,          .                  -    .      .,.    -            - _ ~ -
 
  -
.
                                    21
        A review of MWO 1-97-1453 and the data package for procedure
        52PM-MME-006-0S revealed that the intake pit dredging and cleaning
        activity was completed by the divers on October 2. The divers had
        cleaned the pit to an acceptable level per the requirements of
        procedure 52PM-MME-006-0S.
    c.  Conclusions
        The ins)ectors concluded that maintenance and engineering
        oversialt of the activities was excellent. FME and security
        control measures were appropriate. Communications and
        departmental coordination was good.
    H3  Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
    M3.1 Surveillance Observations
    a.    Inspection Scoce (61726)
        The inspectors observed various surveillance activities. The
        procedJres to accomplish the activities provided instructions for
        demonstrating that the referenced safety-related equipment
          functioned as required by TSs and the Inservice Testing procram,
    b.  Qbiervations and Fin.fdn_qi
        The inspectors observed all or pcrtions of the following Unit 1
        and Unit 2 surveillance activities:
          .      345V-E11-001-1S:  Residual Heat Removal Pump Operability.
                                    Rev. 20. ED 1
          .      345V-E41-002-1S: HPCI Pump Operability. Rev. 21
          .      345V-R43-003-2S: Diesel Generator 2C Monthly Test. Rev. 18
          .      34SV-SUV-018-1S: ECCS Status Checks. Rev, 6
          .      57SV-N62-001-2S: Off Gas Hydrogen Analyzer FT&C. Rev. 10
          The inspectors attended the pre-evolution briefing for all of the
          surveillance activities. During the Unit 1 HPCI o)erability
          briefing, appropriate precautions were emphasized )y the Unit 1
          Shift Supervisor regarding torus temperature. Communications
          between maintenance, engineering operations, and HP personnel
          were excellent. The inspectors observed that, during the test.
          operations personnel were very cognizant of monitoring suppression
          pool temperature. Coordination between the test lead operator and
          the shift operator when placing the RHR system in the suppression
          pool cooling mode was good.
          The inspectors observed that during the Unit 1 RHR operability
          pre-evolution briefing, the lead operator appeared unfamiliar with
          specific aspects of the test as they related to items on the
                                                                  Enclosure 2
 
  .
.
                                      22
        pre-evolution checklist. Specifically, the operator was unsure of
        what permission was required to initiate this surveillance,
        whether FME would be a concern, and whether or not a post-
        evolution briefing would be conducted to discuss results of the
        test. The inspectors discussed this observation with operations
        management.
        During the Unit 1 RHR pump operability test, the inspectors
        observed that operations personnel collected in Service Testing
          (IST) vibration readings at two )oints on the motor mounting
          flange in the radial direction. )ut took no axial vibration
          readings. Discussions with the licensee's IST engineer and a
          review of the RHR pum) IST plan revealed that these pumps were not
        equipped with thrust 3 earings, therefore axial vibration readings
        were not required.
        The inspectors examined the IST test data for the 1A RHR pump and
        verified that reference parameters were correctly extracted from
        the Unit 1 IST data book. No deficiencies were identified,
    c.  Conclusions
        For the surveillance activities observed, all data met the
          required acceptance criteria and equipment performed
          satisfactorily. The surveillance tests were conducted in
        accordance with procedures and with cversight from supervisors and
          system engineers. With minor excepticns, all involved personnel
        were knowledgeable of the tests and system performance
          requirements. Overall, performance was professional and
        competent.
    M3.2 Review of The American Society of Mechanical Enaineers (ASME) Code
          Visual Examinations for Unit 2
    a.    Insoection Scoce (62707) (929021
        The inspectors reviewed the work packages for maintenance
        activities performed during the Unit 2 Spring Outage of 1997.
        This review was to ascertain whether applicable visual
        examinations, as required by Section XI of the ASME code, were
        met. The inspectors conducted discussions with Quality Control
          (OC) supervision and engineering. Additionally, the inspectors
          reviesed the following plant procedures:
          .      Engineering Service Procedure 42EN-ENG-014-05. "ASME
                Section XI Repair / Replacement." Rev. 9.
          *      Quality Control Procedure 450C-0CX-009-0S. " Quality Control
                Document Review and Inspection Point Assignment." Rev. 5.
                                                                  Enclosure 2
                                                                              1
 
      ;.
            ,  ,
  c
              _
                                                    23
    -
                      *-    Administrative C6ntrol: Procedure-40AC-0CX-001-05.J" Quality
                            Control -Inspection Program." Rev 7.
                  b. .0bsersations and Findinas
                    IThe ins)ectors were informed by quality control (0C) supervision
                      that-a QC review of work packages for the recent Unit 2 outage
                      (Spring 1997) revealed that-some required Section XI ASME code~
                      visual inspections were not performed. The work packages in-
                      question were 2-96-0834. 2 96-0836, and 2-97-0686. The work
                      packages were identified on deficiency card (DC) C09703695.
                      The inspectors discussed the work packages with engineering
              ~
                      personnel assigned to perform the root cause determination for the
                      deficiencies. Engineering informed the inspectors that the ASME
                      Section XI Code-required visual inspections (VT-1 and VT-3) were
                      performed but some were not performed per.the guidance provided 'in
                      procedure 42EN-ENG-014-05.
                      The inspectors reviewed the three work packages listed on
                      DC-C09703695, the Root Cause Analysis Summary for the DC, and the
                      engineering evaluation for the vendor-performed VT-1 for the
                      feedwater check valve hinge pin installation. This review
                      indicated the following:
,
                      .      Work packages 2-96-0834 and 2-96-00836 provided wark
                            instructions for outage re) air / replacement activities on
                            safety relief valves.2B21 :013E and 2B21-F013G.
                            respectively. The work activity in question was for the
                            welding of a strap onto the safety relief valve to support a
                            pilot sensing tube. The licensee treated the work activity
                            as an ASME Section XI repair / replacement activity, thus
                            requiring a VT-3 examination. However, the VT-3 post
                            maintenance requirement was not listed on the Section XI
,                            Examination Plan, attachment 4. of procedure
'
                            42EN-ENG-014-05, and the VT ' was not com)leted. However.
l                          ' credit was taken after the tag because t1e OC inspector
c                            assigned to the work cctivities was VT-3 qualified and had
'
                            performed other visual examinations-on the valves. A review
-
                            of the ASME Section XI code revealed that this work was not
                            required to be treated as ASME Section XI.
                                          -
                      *-    Work package 2-97-0686 provided work instructions-for outage
                            repair / replacement activities performed cn feedwater inboard
                            check: valve-2821-F0108. The work activity in question was
                            for the installation of a new u) graded hinge-pin assembly.
                            The Quality Control Ins)ection )oint Assignment Sheet of
                            procedure 450C-0CX-0094S (generic hold point sheet)
                            required a VT-1 based upon the repair / replacement program.
                            This generic hold sheet was in the work package. A      ,      t
                                                                                Enclosure 2  4
o
i:
L
                                                                                              >
        .=
 
  '
        -
    , .-
                                          24
                    documentation review revealed that an initial baseline VT-1
                                                                                    -
                    (prior to valve hinge pin work) was performed by site OC
                    Sersonnel in accordance with the repair / replacement program,
                      Jut was not performed on the replacement bolting after the
                    new hinge pin was returned to service. An engineering
                    evaluation of the VT-1 performed by the vendor was conducted
                    by the licensee. The evaluation concluded that the visual
                    examinations performed by the vendor met all the
                    requirements to fulfill the ASME Section XI pre-service
                    examinations of a VT-1.
                                                                                    '
              Procedural enhancertents were recently implemented for the
              Section XI Examination Plan of procedure 42EN ENG-014-0S and the
              Quality Control Ins)ection Point Assignment Sheet of procedure
              450C-0CX-009-0S. T1ese enhancements provide more clarity as to
              when post repair / replacement inspections are required.
              The inspectors reviewea administrative control procedure
              40AC-0CX-001-05. Step 8.6.5 of the procedure required, in part,
              that th? qualified OC inspector perform inspections in accordance
              with an a> proved Quality Control Inspect.on Point Assignment Sheet
              (generic lold point sheet). Site OC personnel did not perform a
              VT-1 inspection for replacement work activities on feedwater check
              valve F010B during the Unit 2 spring outage of 1997 per plant
              procedures. Credit was taken, after an engineering evaluation,
              for a vendor-performed VT-1.
              The inspectors reviewed licensee performance for the past two
              years with respect to Section XI ASME code VT inspections. A
              violation was identified in Ins)ection Report 50-321. 366/96-11
              for a failure to perform an ASME Code-required VT-3 inspection on
              HPCI Valve 1E41-F006. The inspectors concluded that the
              circumstances surrounding the missed VT-3 on the HPCI valve were
              different and the corrective actions for that violation would not
              have reasonably prevented the VT-1 problem with the feedwater
              check valve hinge pin replacement.
          c.  Conclusions
              ASME Section XI code requirements for visual inspections were met
              for the strap welding on the SRVs and the hinge pin replacement on
              the feedwater inboard check valve. The acceptance of credit for
            -the VT-1 performed by the vendor for the feedwater check valve was
              reasonable.    The inspectors concluded that site OC personnel
              failed to follow the requirements of plant procedures for the VT-1
              listed on the generic hold inspection sheet for replacement work
              on the feedwater check valve hinge pin. This was identified as an
              example of VIO 50-321, 366/97-09-01, Failure to Follow Procedure -
              Multiple Examples.
                                                                        Enclosure 2
l
 
    --
                                                                                                                ,
                                                                                                                .
  .
      .
          ,
                                                  25
                      Review of Traversina Incore Probe (TIP) Flance Reolacement On
                                                                                                                -
              M3.3
                      Jnit 2
              a.'  -Insoection Scoce (62707)                                                                  .
                      The inspectors reviewad procedure 42EN-ENG 014-0S. "ASME
                      Se: tion XI Repair / Replacement." Rev 9.-and documentation
                      associated with ASME Code.Section III. Class 2. requirements for                          4
                                                                                                                i
                      the Unit 2 primary containment' TIP penetration flanges,
'
              b..    Observations and Findinas
                      The inspectors were informed by Nuclear Safety and Compliance
                      (NSAC). personnel that they were conducting a review of whether or                      -
                      not the Unit-2 primary containment TIP penetration flanges meet                          :
                      ASME Code Section III. Class 2. requirements. Table 3.2-1 of the
                    ' Unit 2 UFSAR lists the TIP piping as ASME Code Section III.
                      Class 2. This included the flange. TIP tubing, and tubing valves.
                      This review was initiated following a review of maintenance work
                      activities conducted during the last Unit 2 refueling outage.
~
                      The inspectors reviewed E.I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Safety
                      Assessment for Primary Containment TIP Penetrations, dated
                      September 10, 1997, and Hatch Project Support - Engineering
                      Operability-Evaluation - Unit 2 TIP Penetrations, dated                                  .
                      September 16. 1997. The inspectors also reviewed Table 3.2-1 of
                      the Unit 2 UFSAR.
                      GE h'd verbally informed the licensee that, even though the TIP
                      systen flanges were not what the code s)ecified in the UFSAR,
                      there was no operability concern with t1e TIP system. The
                      licensee stated that GE informed it that other sites had
                      identified similar problems with respect to the TIP system and
                      that the components supplied by GE were equivalent to those
                      required by ASME. By letter dated October 21. 1997. entitled-
                      Hatch Tip System ASME Code Compliance Evaluation. GE concluded
                      that the portion of the TIP system that is considered part of the
                      primary containment supplied for Hatch Units 1 and 2 during
                      construction and as replacement parts meet the intent of ASME
                      Section III. Class 2. The licensee also informed the inspectors
                      that a proposed UFSAR change for table 3.2-1 was being reviewed
                    =for the next scheduled UFSAR submittal.
                      The inspectors reviewed applicable documentation and observed that
                      all applicable-inspection requirements of the ASME code were met
                      following the flange installations on Unit 2.
                                                                                                  Enclosure 2
        .  _
                                __      _    _      ._ _ _ _._ .      _  _ _ . _.__ _ _ _ _ _            _
 
                              . - -- . . , .                - ~-              .  -            -      . - -          -- - -
              .
                      *
                                                                                                                                -;
                                                                                                                                  9
                                                                                                                                  *
                                                                            26
  1
                                    c.      -Conclusions-                                                                    a
                                                                                                                                  r
                                                                  -                                            -
                                              The licensee had taken appropriate actions-to correct the TIP                .
                                                                                                                              _.
                                                                                                                                  '
                                            .-System ASME code, Class 2-issues. ,The GE Code requirements of the                '
    -"
                                              TIP equipment installed were equivalent to those of the ASME Code.
                                              The proposed UFSAR revision was appropriate.
                                  :M7_        Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities                                        ,
                                    M7.1      Review of Safety Audit end Enaineerina Review (SAER) Audit
                                              ReDort 97-SA-3 (62707)
                                              The-inspectors reviewed audit report 97-SA-3. Ventilation Filter
                                              Train Testing, dated July 24, 1997. The audit included a review
                                              of procedures, methodology, and employee performance of testing
                                              activities for plant-ventilation systems described in the
'
                                              Technical Specifications (TSs) and UFSARs for both units to ensure
                                              that the ventilation filter testing program was being correctly
                                              implemented. The audit included a detailed review of the TS and
                                              UFSAR requirements and the testing requirements and methodology
                                              outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.52 and ASME/ ANSI N510.
                                              The inspectors concluded that the audit was conducted by trained                      '
                                              and qualified personnel. The audit was thorough and detailed. The
                                              inspectors observed that the audit findings identified were
                                              submitted to appropriate management and department personnel.
                                              Corrective actions were-identified and tracked in accordance with                  *
                                              applicable plant procedures. The corrective actions and proposed
                                              completion-dates were appropriate for the findings.
                                    M8-      Miscellaneous Maintenance-Issues (92700) (92902)
                                    M8.1      (Closed) LER 50-366/97-08: Main Pump Journal Bearing Damage
                                              Renders HPCI System inoperable. This item is discussed in
                                              Section M2.1 of this re)crt. Based u
;-
                                              licensee actions,- this _ER is closed.pon the inspectors' review of
                                                                                                                                    ,
                                    M8,2_ (Closed) IFT 50-321. 366/96-14-02:              Potential Single Failure
                                              Vulnerability in the Freeze Protection System. This item was
                                              opened'to review whether or not a loss of power from Unit 1 to the
                                              freeze protection for the service water cooling plaing to the
                                              IB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) could impact t1e EDG's
                                              operability support to Unit 2.      Corportte engineering reviewed the
                                              issue and determined that a potential Ligle failure vulnerability
                                              in the freeze protection heat tracing system does not exist.
                                              Based upon the ins
                                              -dated February 10.pectors*        review
                                                                    1997, this item          of the engineering evaluation.
                                                                                          is closed.
                -
r
n                                                                                                                  Enclosure 2
                                                                                                                                  '
      , ,_ .
                  , , - . . -                = . - . - - - . - - .                - - - ,            - ,.    - - . -
 
    .
  .
                                                                                ,
                                        27
      M8.3 (Closed) IFl 50-321/96-15 04: Switchyard Maintencnce and Material
            Condition. Ihis item was initiated following an inspection to
            evaluate electrical maintenance in the switchyard as it relates to
            the Maintenance Rule. The following completed or long term
            planned corrective actions associated with the IFl were described
            in documentation provided by central scheduling personnel during a
            discussion:
            *      An independent review team performed a thorough housekeeping
                  inspection of the switchyard on January 19.1997.    The
                  inspection identified the items listed in the IFl and a
                  determination was made that che housekeeping and material
                  conditions did not meet the expectations and standards of
                  plaat Hatch, but no items were identified that were
:                  detrimental to the proper operation of switchyard equipment.
            .      An evaluation of overdue PMs indicated that they were not
                  applicable to Plant Hatch. PMs (performed every eight
                  years), which are applicable to Hatch, were current.
            .      The following long-term process was developed to avoid
                  future concerns:
                  Southern Transmission Maintenance Center (STMC) will ensure
                  that adequate housekeeping standards are maintained in the
                  switchyard.
,
                  Dispatchers in central scheduling will function as the
                  primary contact for planning and performing switchyard
                  maintenance.
                  STMC and central scheduling agreed that the policy and
                  practice will be that there will be no overdue PMs. Those
                  chat are currently overdue will be completed by the end of
                  the year.
                  STMC will arepare a yearly schcdule of planned PMs for
                  central scleduling to review and approve.
            The inspectors performed a tour of t5e switchyards and the
            switchyard cont N1 house on October 2. The inspectors questioned
            central scheduling personnel about untaped s)are electrical leads
            observed in the switchyard control house. Tlese electrical leads
            were identified in the IFl. The inspectors were informed by
            central scheduling and STMC personnel that it was a common
            practice of the switchyard maintenance crew state wide, to leave
            the ends of the electrical leads pointing straight up and un-
            taped.  Housekeeping and material conditions were good.
                                                                    Enclosure 2
 
    _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _          _ _ _ _ _                . _ . . _ . . , _ . _ . . _ . - . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _
                    .                                                                                                                                                  ,
                                                                                                                                                                        i
                                                                                                                                                                        I
  4
                                                                                                                                                                        i
                                                                                    28                                                                                  j
                                -Basea upon the inspectors * review of licensee actions, this item                                                                      I
                                  is closed.                                                                                                                          j
                                                                                                                                                                        .
                          M8,4 (Closed) IFI 50-321. 366/97-0 D J:                                              Review of Licensee's                                    i
                                  Assessment of the ALARA Process for the Unit 2 Reactor Coolant                                                                        !
~
                                  Leak Repair on the RWCll Heat Exchanger,                                                    This item was identified                  :
                                  due to a significant difference between the ALARA staff's
                                  estimated dose of (15 person rem) and the actual dose
,                                (28.33 person rem) received during the leak repair activities,                                                                        '
                                  The licensee conducted a review of the activities and identified                                                                      i
                                  that the type of welding process and the amount of welding-                                                                          !
                                  contributed to the dose received,                                          Ins)ection report
                                  50 321, 366/97-07- identified other worc coordination and
                                  exmunication deficiencies that also contributed to the increased                                                                      i
                                  dose. The licensee's review did not identify any significant new                                                                      l
                                  information. The inspectors concluded that the initial ALARA                                                                          !
                                  assessment, the followup ALARA review, and the ALARA review                                                                            .
                                  methodology were satisfactory. Based upon the inspectors' review
3
                                  of licensee actions, this item is closed.
                                                              III. Enaineerina
                          El    Conduct of Engineering (37551)
                                  On site engineering activities were reviewed to determine their
                                  effectiveness in preventing, identifying, and resolving safety                                                                        ;
                                  issues, events, ma problems,                                                                                                          ,
                                                                                                                                                                        1
,
                          El.1 Review of Units 1 and ? Inadeauate Cable Seoaration Issues (37551)                                                                      i
                                  (92903)
                                  The inspectors continued to monitor the licensee's progress and                                                                        ;
                                  work activities associated with the cable separation issue. This                                                                      i
                                  issue was originally documented as IFl 50-321, 366/97-03 05 and                                                                        !
                                  was discussed in Inspection Report 50 321, 366/97-07. The
                                  inspectors have concluded that-the licensee is making progress in
                                  resolving the issue.
                          E4      Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance
                          E4,1  Pre Outaae Fuel Insoection and Preoaration
                        .a.      Insoection Ccooe (60705l
                                  The inspectors reviewed procedure 42FH ERP-012-05, "New Fuel and                                                                      ;
-
                                  New Channel Handling." Rev, 7. and observed licenree activities                                                                      i
                                  for new fuel receipt, inspection, and-storage.                                                                                        >
                                                                                                                                                                        ;
                                                                                                                                                                        h
                                                                                                                                                                        !
                                                                                                                                                Enclosure 2
                                                                                                                                                                        t
                        - ---            ._,-,.-....A-.                  .-.,-_m.--._.,r._.                            -
                                                                                                                              .,.__._._,,..,m__            _ - . - - -
 
    . _                                              - -      -
                                                                                    .
                                                                                      -
            .                                                                                                                                                          p
                                                                                                                                                                    ..
                                                                                                                                                                        :
                                                                                    29                                                                                i
                                                                                                                                                                        !
                        - b.              Observations and Findinas                                                                                                  j
i                                                                                                                                                                      i
                                          -The inspectors observed that new fuel received on site was                                                                  i
                                                                                                                                                                        '
                                            temporarily stored at a location near the intake structure.                                        The
                                            area was properl                                                                                                            ;
                                          materials area. yThe    identified
                                                                        inspectors      andobserved
                                                                                              controlled  theasshi>    a radioactive
                                                                                                                            ping crate
4                                          unloading, crate disassembly, and HP survey of tie new fuel.                                                                ;
                                            Reactor engineering personnel were present and provided oversight
                                            and direction of the activity. Inventory sheets-for                                                                        .
                                            accountability and tracking of the new fuel were completed.                                                                !
                                            Security personnel provided satisfactory security oversight.                                                                ,
                                            The inspectors observed new fuel inspection and channeling                                                                  .
                                            activities from the Unit I refueling floor. New fuel channels                                                              !
'
                                          were Installed and the fuel was moved to the spent fuel pool for                                                            !
                                            storage.                                                                                                                  1
                        - c.                Conclusions
                                            The inspectors concluded that new fuel receipt. inspection, and                                                              ;
                                                                                                                                                                        ^
>                                          storage were completed with appropriate oversight and control, and
                                            in accordance with applicable plant 3rocedures. Engineering. HP.                                                            :
                                            and security personnel support for t1e activity was satisfactory.
I                          E8          , Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)                                                                                    $
                            E8.1            (Closed) IFI 50 321/96-14-05:                  Restoration of IB EDG Motor Control                                          ,
                                            Center (MCC).        This item was initiated following the
                                            implementation of temporary modification (TM) 1-96-41, This TM                                                              i
                                          was implemented because the Unit 1 supply breaker in the IB EDG                                                              i
                                                                                                                                                                        '
                                            MCC 1R24-S026 did not coordinate properly with its downstream load
                                            breakers. This was an operability concern for the MCC and the
                                            IB EDG during events re
1
                                          A fault at any of the r:on-safety  quiring alignment
                                                                                              related loads      ofsupplied
                                                                                                                          the 1B EDGfrom to Unit 1.                      ;
                                          MCC 1B had the potential to cause the breaker to trip, thus
-
                                            leaving the safety related loads su) plied by MCC IB inoperable.
                                          The TM resolved the immediate opera)ility concern t./ moving the-                                                              .
                                            non-safety related loads to another bus.
                                          As a permanent resolution, the licensee implemented design change
                                        .
                                            request (DCR) 1 96-055. The.DCR modified safety-related EDG                                                                  -
                                            building 600/208-volt MCC 1B 1R24-S024 to eliminate possible
>
                                            non coordination-between safety-related supply breakers and
                                            downstream non safety related loads for certain postulated faults.                                                          '
                                            Based upon the inspectors' review of DCR 1-96-055. licensee's-                                                              !
                                            actions, and discussions with the system engineer, this item is
                                            closed.                                                                                                                    ,
                                                                                                                                                                        !
                                                                                                                                  Enclosure 2
                                                                                                                                                                        l
                      . .                  .                                            .
                                                                                                                                                                          .
,
  4    a.,-e-- ev-e v    -
                            r.---4 - - -    ,...<m,- - - - ,c -            m..w,.,
                                                                                , -        r    -
                                                                                                    w-wm-=  W-v+.-e*----ww    u+r- "ma? ' r e-e mr* .=-+-m4ww 'nW'"
 
  --                                  .          --.
        *
                          -
                                                                                                                                      !
            ..                                                                                                                      t
                                                                                                                                      I
                                                                                                                                      :
                                                                                                                                      :
                                                                              "30                                                    l
                                                                        IV P1 ant Suooort-                                            }
                                                                                                                                      ;
                                    R1            Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls                                      t
                                                                                                                                      i
                                    R1.1 Observation of Routine Radioloaical Controls
                                    a.            insoection Scone (71750)                                                          )
                                                                                                                                      :
                                                  General Health Physics (HP) activities were observed during the-                  {
                                                  report period. This included locked high radiation area doors.                      ,
                                                  proper radiological posting. and personnel frisking upon exiting                  j
                                                  the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA). The inspectors made
-                                                  frequent tours of the RCA and discussed radiological controls with                >
                                                  HP technicians and HP management. - Minor deficiencies were                        t
                      -
                                                  discussed with HP technicians and HP management personnel.
                                    RI.2          person Exits Plant Site A'ter Receivina Alarm on the Exit Portal
                                                    ionitor Wearina Potentially Contaminated Clothina                                  !
                                    a.            Insoection Scoce (71750)(92904)                                                    i
                                                                                                                                      t
                                                  On September 29, 1997, a contract HP technician left the plant                      !
                                                  site after receiving an alarm on the exit portal' monitor. This                    i
                                                  was contrary to HP practices and plant procedures. The inspectors
                                                        -
                                                                                                                                      ,
                                                  reviewed documentation provided by HP personnel and plant                          ;
                                                                                                                                      ;
                                                  procedures. and discussed the issue with licensee management.
                                                                                                                                      i
                                    b.            Observations and Findinas
                                                  On September 29, the ins)ectors were informed by HP supervision
                                                  that a contractor HP tec1nician exited the Plant Entry Security
                                                  Building (PESB) on September 26 after receiving an alarm on the
                                                    )ortal monitor. This portal monitor is located at the exit of the                  ,
                                                    )ESB and is the final monitoring point for contamination prior to
                                                  leaving the protective area.
                                                                                                                                      l
                                                  The licensee informed the inspectors that upon initial exit
'
                                                                                                                                      :
                                                  through the portal monitor the individual received an alarm.
                                                  Since.there was a HP technician monitoring personnel leaving the
                                                  area, to assure that the people used the exit portal monitor
                                                  properly, the individual was monitored using a PM 6 radiation
                                                  detector. This monitor also alarmed, The individual was
                                                    instructed to report-to the HP office for assistance in
                                                  determining why the contamination alarms were sounding. After
                                                  about 10 minutes. he returned to the PESB and attemated to exit
                                                  again. This time he again-received an alarm from tie monitor and
                                                  was told by the HP technician that he could not leave the site.
                                                  The individual ignored alarm and the instructions of the HP
                                                -technician, exited the PESB.'and left the site.                                      ,
                                                                                                                                      !
                                                                                                                  Enclosure 2        ;
                                                                                                                                        ,
  - -          - .            ~                    +                                        _                      :_              _
      -  -        ,s _.~ _.- _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _                          .._ _ _ . _ _        _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ , , ,
 
---                      -.                                                                            - _ -                    -
    , .                                                                                                                                !
                                                                                                                                        i
                                                                                                                                        i
                                                  31-                                                                                  !
                                                                                                                                        i
                      The inspectors reviewed a written statement provided by the HP                                                  l
                      foreman who spoke with the individual u)on his return to the HP                                                  k
                                                                                                                                        -
                      office. The statement indicated that tle HP foreman did not
                      recall many of the details of the conversation he had with the
                      individual but did recall that the individual ap> eared unhappy
                                                                                                                                        '
                      about not being allowed to exit.from the PESB. Tie individual did                                                :
                                                                                                                                        '
                      not agree with the reasons provided by the HP assigned at the exit                                              '
                      point in the PESB for not allowing him to leave. The HP foreman
                      also indicated in the written statement that he is certain that he                                              ,
                      would not have given the individual authorization to ignore an                                                  .
                      alarming portal monitor.-
                                                                                                                                      j
                                                                                                                                        ,
                      in followup actions by the licensee. HP supervision called site                                                  -
                      security and requested that access to the protective area be
                      denied to the individual upon his return. The individual returned                                                i
                      to the site the following morning (September 27) and was met at                                                  :
                      the entrance to the PESB by his contract su>ervisor and two HP                                                  i
                      -foremen. The individual was instructed by MP supervision to take
                      the weekend off and report back to work on Monday morning for a                                                  .
                      discussion of the issue with HP supervision. The individual
                      objected to returning the following Honday morning for a
                      discussion and indicated that he resigned.
                      The individual was then escorted to dosimetry by his contract                                                    i
                      supervisor for a whole body count. The results of the whole body                                                I
                      count were normal and the individual was escorted to the exit of
                      the PESB.                                                                                                        ,
                      The HP survey taken when the individual initially attempted to
                      exit the site indicated a reading of approximately 8500                                                            .
                      disintegrations per minute (dpm) on one of the individual's knees.                                              '
                      The portal monitor was set to alarm at 5000 dpm.
                      The inspectors were informed by HP personnel that four different
                      scenarios were run using computer modeling to determine a
                      hypothetical dose which the individual would have received. Each
                      scenario was based upon conservative assumptions and assumed a
                      point. source of radiation and a 4-hour exposure to the radiation.
                      Two of the scenarios constituted a set that assumed that the                                                    ;
                      contamination was due to the decay of noble gases-such as krypton.
                                                                                                                                        '
                      xenon. and iodine. One of these scenarios assumed that the 8500
                      dpm obtained from the HP survey was contamination on the pant leg
                      with an air gap to the skin. The dose resulting from this.
                      scenario was 6 milli-rem (mrem) to the skin. The other scenario
                      in this set assumed that the contamination was on the skin.
                      resulting in a dose of 79 mrem to the skin.
                                                                                                                                        ;
                                                                                                Enclosure 2
                . _    _ - _ _ _                                                              -
                                                                                                                                      -;
--    - - .- - -,_.                  ,,...-.m--  , _ _ _ - . . , _ _ . . - - - - . _ , - , ,      , . _ _ . - . . - _ , -
                                                                                                                            . ~ , , -
 
  .    -.        -- -. -        - -          --  .-    _    - -          - _ _  _ - - .
.
      .
    .
                                          32
                The remaining scenarios assumed that the 8500 dpm contamination
                was from a hot particle that resulted from activated corrosion              :
                products. A 1 mrem dose was received when it was assumed that the            '
                contamination was on the pant leg with an air gap and 28 mrem
                resulted when it was assumed that the contamination was on the
                skin.
                The results of the above computer modeling was provioM by Plant
                Hatch's HP personnel to the company's corporate office. The
                corporate office provided the information to the states of Georgia
                and Alabama, Based upon the results of the computer modeling, the
                states decided not to pursue the issue.
                The inspectors were informed by Nuclear Safety and Compliance
                management that the company will continue to pursue the matter              '
                because the contaminated clothing was not recovered for frisking.
                The insores were later informed that telephone contact was
                later m&:e M that the individual was reluctant to discuss the
                issue. Tre &tn',ee also indicated that there is a high
                probability t u the contamination was due to short-lived decay
                products, but that there was a concern that it may be due to a hot
                particle.
                The inspectors reviewed Administrative Control Procedure
                60AC-HPX-012-05. " Overview of Radiological Work Practices and
                Radiation Protection ACPS." Revision 4. and observed that all
                procedure requirements were not met. The cause of the
                contamination alarm should have been determined and a)propriate
                corrective actions taken before the individual left t1e site.
          c.  Conclusions
                The inspectors concluded that the contract HP technician who left
                the plant site after receiving an alarm on the exit portal monitor
                presented minimal safety significance to the individual or public.
                The actions taken by the licensee were appropriate and no further
                NRC actions are planned based upon the fact that the individual is
                no longer employed at the site and site access was immediately
                terminated.
          R1.3 Pre-Outaae Radiolooical Protection Activities
          a.  Insoection Scone (60705) (71750)
                The inspectors observed licensee HP activities in preparation for
                the upcoming Unit I refueling outage.
                                                                        Enclosure 2
                                            _    _
                                                                                            ]
 
  .
                                  33
    b. Observations and Findinas
      The inspectors observed that HP management initiated several
      actions to strengthen the HP area. Meetings were held with all
      Hatch personnel to communicate management's expectations for HP
      activities. The meetings included discussions on procedural
      requirements, required actions for unexpected conditions, and
      recent changes for radiological work permit (RWP) requirements.
      Health Physics department management issued " Rad Bulletins" to
      remind all plant personnel of the renewed emphasis for HP
        improvements. The Bulletins communicated new RWP requirements a
      special emphasis to eliminate personnel contaminations, and to
        improve contamination controls and overall radiation worker
      practices. The Bulletins were made available to all site
      personnel. A new listing of radworker expectations was developed
      ana conspicuously posted in various areas of the plant. HP
      management developed a checklist for good rad practices. The
      checklist was used as a quick reference and feedback tool by
      various managers. supervisors, and coworkers during plant tours
      and peer checks.
      The General Manager conducted a period of stop work and assembled
      all available aersonnel in order to communicate his expectations
      for improved H) practices. A resident inspector attended the
      meeting and observed that several key items were discussed. A
      video tape was made available for site personnel who were not able
      to attend the stop work meeting.
      During the last refueling outage, and for the upc'aing Unit I
      refueling outage the HP department conducted tours of the cite
      for new contractor personnel. The inspectors observed one site
      tour for new contractors. The tour included discussions for
      site-specific frisking techniques, egress points, and routine
      posting and boundaries. The licensee completed approximately 25
      tours for about 150 personnel and additional tours were planned.
      The inspectors attended several HP shift briefings and observed
      some improvements in communications. specific job assignments, and
      overall HP staff work practices. The inspectors observed
      pre-staging activities for Unit I refueling activities and
      observed that radiological and contamination control boundaries
      were correctly established. The inspectors oLserved that HP
      personnel routinely toured the site to assist other workers. The
      inspectors observed some minor deficiencies that were attributed
      to individual worker poor work practices. This included some
      anti-contamination clothing that was not properly placed in the
l      disposal containers. Other items were laying across the
;      contamination control boundary markers, These deficiencies were
l
      brought to the attention to HP personnel for resolution.
I
                                                              Enclosure 2
l
 
              - . . - ---.- _~ ~ - _ - _ _                                                                                                                                  - - - - .                                - _ . . -
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ,
        '
                  .          #                                                                                                                                                                                                j
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ;
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                )
                                                                                                                                      34
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                i
                                                    c.          Conclusions                                                                                                                                                    l
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                t
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                i
                                                                  The inspectors concluded that management personnel had placed
                                                                  special emphasis for improved HP and general rad worker
                                                                  activities. The stop work meeting, plant tours for- new
                                                                contractors, and radworker expectations list were identified as a
                                                                  strength.
                                                    P4          Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP
                                                    P4.1 Annual Emeraency Preoaredness (EP) Exercise
                                                    - a.          Insoection Scoce (82301)
                                                                The inspectors reviewed procedures 73EP-EIP 063 05. " Technical
                                                                Support Center Activation," Rev. 6, 73EP-EIP-001 05. " Emergency
                                                                Classification and Initial Actions," Rev.12. and the Hatch
                                                                Emergency Plan for Unit I and Unit 2. and observed licensee
                                                                actions during the annual exercise. Federal, state and county
                                                                officials participated in the annual exercise.
                                                    b.          Observations and Findinas
                                                                On August 20, 1997, the inspectors participated in the licensee's
    <
                                                                annual EP exercise. One inspector observed overall activities and
                                                                monitored licensee performance._ The inspectors observed operator
                                                                performance in the plant simulator technical support center
                                                                  (TSC), operations support center (OSC) and emergency operation
                                                                facility (EOF). The inspectors concluded that operator
                                                                performance in the simulator was excellent. Operators correctly
                                                                classified the events in accordance with procedure
                                                                73EP EIP-001-0S. The inspectors observed that event
                                                                classification problems identified in past exercises had been
                                                                corrected. This was demonstrated by actual event classification
                                                                and observed in training and during this and previous exercises.
'
                                                                The inspectors noted that the TSC was activated in accordance with
                                                                procedure 73EP-EIP-063-05. The inspectors verified that minimum
"                                                              manning,hed.
                                                                establis                          Thecommunication  inspectors observed            links, and        that      TSC  analysishabitability          were
                                                                                                                                                                                                              of plant
                                                                conditions and corrective actions were correct and appropriate.
                                                              - Interactions with offsite agencies were appropriate and timely.
                                                            - The.-inspectors noted that several people assigned to key TSC
                                                                positions were alternates. The inspectors confirmed that the
                                                                alternate personnel were qualified-to perform their assigned
  .
                                                            -
                                                                positions.
  .
'
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Enclosure 2
l
          -                                                                                  -
  '*o  e    4    -M-gie-    @ Pe + - r b gp wa r-      (- .-.g4-    g -
                                                                          -'gw--4-gyam+gufe--  -u.agy-gy-p ma..pg#-      c m; 4 3g grg.ip ,p p g -    4 7.s g 9 gg.99_.,-.-pys  *'a-sr---g%  y,%s Me-m-y-;-
 
      _ .. _ _ _                                  -    _.._e                _ _ _. ____._                                    _ . _ . . _ _
                                                                                                                                                                        ,
  .
          '
                                                                                                                                                                      l  ;
                                                                                                                                                                          i
                                                                                                35
                                        .The inspectors verified that the areas identified for improvement                                                              !
                                        during previous exercises were addressed and had improved in all                                                                ;
'
                                        areas.                The inspectors did not identify an                                                                      l
                                        deficiencies with performance in the TSC. y significant                                                                        i
                                        The inspectors observed that control of the activities in the OSC                                                              l
>                                        had improved over the last several exercises. Control, noise                                                                  !'
                                        level, and individual attention were areas on which the licensee
                                        had placed increased emphasis during this and otner recent-                                                                    ,
                                        exercises. OSC performance during this exercise was excellent.                                                                  :
                                        The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique and observed                                                                i
                                        that the licensee was very self-critical. Ope,n and frank
                                        discussions were held with respect to ir.di,idual and overall' site
                                        exercise performance. Areas for improvement were identified as
                                      . well as aspects of the exercise that were considered strengths.
                                        The ins)ectors identified the post exercise critique process as a
                                        strengt1.
                                                                                                                                                                        '
                                        Following a detailed review and assessment of overall performance.
                                        the licensee determined that all exercise objectives were met.
                                        The inspectors did not identify any significant deficiencies,
                          c,.            Conclusions
                                        Overall performance during the annual exercise conducted on                                                                    >
,
                                        August 20, 1997, was good. Event classifications during the
                                        exercise were correct. Operator performance in the simulator and
                                        overall performance in the operations support center were                                                                      '
                                        excellent.                                                                                                                    .
                          S2            Status of Security Facilities and Equipment (71750)
                                        The inspectors toured the protected area and observed that the                                                                  :
                                        perimeter fence was intact and not compromised by erosion nor                                                                  !
                                        disrepair. The fence fabric was secured and barbed wire was
                                        angled as required by the licensee's Plant Security Program (PSP).
                                        Isolation zones were maintained on both sides of the barrier and
                                        were free of objects which could shield or conceal an individual.
                                        The inspectors observed that personnel and packages entering the
                                        protected area were searched either by special purpose detectors
                                        or by a physical patdown for-firearms. explosives, and contraband.
                                        Bad e issuance was observed, as was the processing and escorting
                                        of isitors. Vehicles were searched, escorted, and secured as
                                        described in applicable procedures.
                                        The inspectors observed on the morning of August 21 that the
                                        elevated lights at the front of the PESB were not lit. This
                                        resulted in reduced visibility in the area leading to the entry to
                                                                                                                                Enclosure 2
                                                                                                                                                                        .
    *            - , - -    ....w,.- v  -.,m.wr.-.  . . - - . -    vy.-+-. e  ,-  -e e v-%=,w  ---re -e--o w** me wr r +c *      =      ' ' . - - 3.--n- -1-e -x
 
  '
    .    .
                                                  36-
                  -the protected area. -The inspectors observed upon entry into the
                    protected area that a com)ensatory post was established to provide
                    a visual observation of tie area-leading to the entrance of the
                    PESB.
                    The inspectors concluded th'at the areas of security inspected met
                    the applicable requirements.
                                      V. Manaoement Meetings
              'X.2  Review of UFSAR Commitments
                    A recent discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a
                    manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
                    (UFSAR)' description highlighted the need for a special focused
                    review that compares plant aractices, procedures and/or parameters-
                    to the UFSAR description. While performing the ins)ections
                    discussed in this re> ort the inspectors reviewed tie applicable
                    portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The
                    inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the
                    observed plant )ractices, procedures, and/or parameters, except as
                    noted above in )aragraph M3.3. Table 3.2-1 of the Unit 2 UFSAR
                    lists the TIP piping as ASME Code Section Ill. Class 2. This
                    included the flange. TIP tubing and tubing valves.    All TIP
                    flanges, TIP tubing and tubing valves do not meet the ASME Code
                    Section 111. Class 2-requirement. The licensee is evaluating a
                    change to table 3.2-1 of the UFSAR for submittal.
              X3  Exit Meeting Summary
                    The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the
                    licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October
                    16. 1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The
                    inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined
                    during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No
                    proprietary information was identified,
                                  PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
                    Licensee
                    Anderson, J., Unit Superintendent
                    Betsill'. J., Assistant General Manager - Operations
                    Breitenbach.-C.. Engineering Support tanager - Acting
                    Curtis. S.. Unit Superintendent
                    Davis. D. Plant Administration Manager
                    Fornel. P, Performance Team Manager
                    Fraser. 0.. Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor
                    Hammonds'. J., Operations Support Superintendent
                    Kirkley,LW.,- Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
                                                                              Enclosure-2
1-    ..  _ _ .1 _      _i            _ ._.i        _.  . _ ,
                                                                                          I
 
.                                                                              l
    .
  .
                                                                                I
                                    37
      Lewis, J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager                  '
      Madison. 0.. Operations Manager
      Moore. C.. Assistant General Manager - Plant Support                    '
      Reddick. R., Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
      Roberts. P.. Outages and Planning Manager
      Thompson. J., Nuclear Security Manager
      Tipps. S.. Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
      Wells. P. General Manager - Nuclear Plant
                      INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
      IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
      IP 60705: Preparations for R.efueling
      IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
      IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
      IP 71707: Plant Operations
      IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
      IP 82301: Evaluation Of Exercises for Power Reactors
      IP 92700: Onsite follow up of Written Reports of Nonroutine
                    Events at Power Reactor Facilities
      IP 92901: Followup - Operations
      IP 92902:    Followup - Maintenance / Surveillance
      IP 92903: Followup - Followup Engineering
      IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support
                ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
      Opened
      50 321, 366/97-09-01        V10        Failure to Follow Procedures -
                                            Multiple Examples (Sections
                                            04.2. 08.2 and M3.2).
      Closed
      50-321, 366/96-13-04        IFI        Inability to Correctly
                                            Classify Events
                                            (Section 08.1).
      50-366/97-08                LER        Main Pump Journal Bearing
                                            Damage Renders HPCI Systen
                                            Inoperable (Section M8.1).
      50-321, 366/96 14-02        IFl        Potential Single Failure
                                            Vulnerability in the Freeze
                                            Protection System
                                            (Section M8.2).
                                                                Enclosure 2
                                                                            .
 
                                                                                  . . .
                                    .-
            .
  ..                                                                                        .
                                                                                            L
                                              38
                50-321, 366/97-07-01    IFl    Review of Licensee's
                                                Assessment of the A&LARA
                                                Process for the Unit 2 Reactor
                                                Coolant Leak Repair on the
                                                RWCU Heat Exchanger
                                                (Section M8.4).
                50 321/96 14-05          IFI    Restoration of IB EDG Motor
                                                Control Center (MCC)
                                                (Section E8.1).
                50-321/96-15-04          IFI    Switchyard Maintenance and
                                                Material Condition
                                                (Section M8.3).
                50-366/97-09            LER    Removal of DG Battery Chargers
                                                From Service Results in
                                                Inoperability of Both the 2A
                                                and 2C DG DC Electrical Power
                                                Subsystems (Section 08.2).
                Discussed
                50 321, 366/97-03-05    IFI    Review of 4160-VAC Wiring
                                                Separation Deficiencies
                                                (Section E1.1).
                                                                '
                                                                                            ,
!
;
p
l
                                                                    Enclosure 2
L
,
  y-- - ~ ,  ,  --      - ~ . , ,    y  m            ,_                      y      -,-
}}

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