ML20199C803

Transcript of 960918 Interview of J Atkinson in Crystal River,Florida Re OI Rept 2-96-033.Pp 1-21.W/Certificate of Svc.Birth Date & Social Security Number Deleted

ML20199C803
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	09/18/1996
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
To:
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ML20199C716	List: IA-97-313, Transcript of 951130 Interview of P Hinman in Crystal River, Florida Re OI Rept 2-94-036.Pp 1-146.W/Certificate of Svc. Title Page Encl.Birth Date & Social Security Number Deleted ML20199C710 ML20199C735 ML20199C747 ML20199C779 ML20199C803 ML20199C818 ML20199C827 ML20199C852 ML20199C889 ML20199C912 ML20199C929 ML20199C942 ML20199C961 ML20199C966 ML20199C981 ML20199C989 ML20248J609
References
FOIA-97-313 2-96-033, 2-96-33, NUDOCS 9711200145
Download: ML20199C803 (21)

Text

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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2

NUCLEAR REGUIATORY CONNISSION 3

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OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS 5

INTERVIEW t

6 --------------------~~------------x 7

IN THE MATTER oft 8

IllTERVIEW OF i

Docket No.

9 JAMES THOMAS ATKINSON t

2-96-033 10 11

---

x 12 13 Wednesday, September 18, 1996 14 15 Conference Room - Second Floor 16 Crystal River Plant 17 15760 West Powerline Street 18 Crystal River, Florida 19 20 The above-entitled interview was conducted at 21 1 05 p.m.

22 EXHIBIT-V 23 BEFORE:

24 JIM VORSE-D Senior Investigator CASENO.

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APPEARANCES 2

on Behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3

JAt!ES VORSE, Senior Investigator 4

Region II NRC Office of Investigations 5

401 Marietta Street i

6 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 7

on Behalf-of the Interviewee, James Thomas Atkinson 8

ROBERT ALEXANDER GLENN, ESQUIRE 9

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10 Post Office Box 140A2 11 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 g

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HR. VORSE:

Fortherecord,today'Idateis 3

18 September 1996, the time is 1:05 p.m.

My name is James 4

Vor'se.

I'm the Special Agent with the Office of 5

Investigations and I will be conducting this interview.

6 During this proceeding, which is being recorded 7

for transcription, the NRC Office of Investigations will 8

conduct an interview of James Thomas Atkinson, Chief 9

Nuclear Operator.

This interview pertains to 01 10 investigation numbet 2-96-033.

The location of this interview is the Administration Building, Florida Power 11 12 Corporation's Crystal River plant located in Crystal River, 13 Florida.

14 And others in attendance at this interview are --

15 would you please identify yourself, Mr. Glenn?

16 MR. GLENN:

Alex Glenn, G-L-E-N-N.

Corporate 17 Counsel, Florida Power Corporation.

18 MR. VORSE:

And, Mr. Atkinson, would you say 19 your name and your title.

20 MR. ATKINSON:

James Thomas Atkinson, Chief 21 Nuclear Operator.

22 HR. VORSE:

Mrs. Hay, would you administer the 23 oath, please.

24 Whereupon, 25 JAMES THOMAS ATKINSON,

O 4

(

1 being first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined 2

and testified as follows:

3 EXAMINATION 4

MR. VORSE:

Mr. Atkinson, would you give your 5

date of birth and Social Security number, please.

6 THE WITNESS:

Social 7

Security is 8

MR. VORSE:

Earlier I showed you a copy of Title 9

18, 2001 --

ss 10 THE WITNESS:

Correct.

11 HR. VORSE:

-- which talks about truthfulness 12 and false statements.

Do you understand what you read?

13 THE WITNESS!

Yes, sir.

14 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

Do you know that Mr. Glenn 15 here represents both Florida Power corporation and 16 yourself?

17 THE WITNESS:

Yes, I do know that.

18 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

Would you, for the record, 19 tell me what your educational background is?

20 THE WITNESS:

High school graduate; a teacher at 21 vocational school for welding and auto mechanics; hot 22 license class for Crystal River Unit III, and I got my license in December of 1993; and just ongoing vocational 23 24 training, evenings mostly.

25 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

Would you describe your

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5 1

duties as a chief nuclear operator?

1 2

THE WITNESS:

Just to maintain safety on

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3 efficient operation of Crystal River Unit III and maintain i

4 reactor safety.

5 MR. VORSE:

On the 26th of March 1996 there was 6

a refueling outage.

7 THE WITNESS:

Right.

8 MR. VORSE Would you describe where you were 9

and what you were doing at that -- before the two fuel 10 assemblies came together.

11

-THE WITNESS:

I was --

My duties were tag board 12 operator, which is back behind the main control board, and 13 my duties were to approve moves off of move sheets, which 14 could be from the spent fuel pool to the reactor or from 15 moves internal to the reactor.

16 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

What --

On the 26th what 17 kind of move sheets were you working from?

18 THE WITNESS:

I was working from handwritten 19 moves sheets from the reactor engineer.

20 MR. VORSE:

Can you describe how that works?

21 THE WITNESS:

As far as --

22 MR. VORSE Well, when you get this handwritten 23 move sheet what do you do with it?

24 THE WITNESS:

We look at the fuel assembly 25 number and if it has a control component in it so we'll 4

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1 know what weights to expect on the load cell.

And this particularfuelassembly,whicheveroneitm2ybe,is 2

3 designated to go into a certain spot in the reactor core.

4 The person who is operating FHCR-3,.which is the 5

spent fuel bridge, commuricates with me and says, I'm going 1

6 to pick up this assembly at this location; and I'll approve 7

it to pick -- to go to that location and pick it up.

And 8

once it's picked up into the mest in FHCR-3, then we've got 9

what's called a 22 tape which measures the height of the i

10 fuel assembly inside the mast, and he'll give me that i

11 reading.

I'll write the reading down and I'll say, okay, i

12 that's a good number, because we have a band to work with.

I 13 If it's within this band, it's good; if it's outside the I

14 band, then it's not good.

15 If I say it's good he'll continue to over one of I

16 the carriages, Z or Y carriage, and once he gets in 17 position he'll give me his location over this upender or 18 the other upender.

And I'll say, go ahead and lower it.

19 And he'll lower the fuel assembly down into the carriage.

20 Once it gets all the way down and he gets his underload and 21 then I'll go ahead and, you know, he'll give me his 22 tape 22 reading, which that too has to be in a band.

I'll write 23 that down; I'll say, you know, if it's a good number-I'll 24 say that's a good number,-go ahead and release it.

Then 25 he'll release it and then, you know, come up with a mast, t

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and once he gets all the way to the top he'll give me his 2

final ZZ tape reading, which is an expected value.

3 Then the upender operator lowers the upender and 4

lets it stay down for like ten seconds, just to make sure 5

it's all the way down.

And then he'll transfer it to the 54 os h reactor side, the reactor =p!!i;,g side.

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7 And once it gets to that side then the other 8

upender operator in the reactor building will what's called 9

framing it up, which is just brings it straight up 10 vertical.

And once it's framed up the operator that's on 11 FHCR-1, which is the reactor building fuel handling bridge, li will go to that location and pick that fuel assembly up.

13 First he'll take the mast all the way down and he'll get 14 his underload, telling me that the mast is actually sitting 15 on top of the fuel assembly.

And he'll give me his ZZ tape 16 reading and if it's a good number I'll say go ahead and 17 grab it, or grapple it.

Okay?

18 He'll grab that and he'll pull it up into the 19 mast.

And once it's all the way up he'll get his load-up 20 light and he'll say, okay, I've got my uplight and my ZZ 21 tape reading is this.

And if it's a good number I'll say, 22 okay, go ahead and proceed.

That's a good number, that's 23 what I'll tell him.

And then he'll say, okay, I'm going to 24 this location in the core.

And I'll look-at the move sheet L

25 and I'll say, okay, that's good, that's a good location.

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1 And then they'll take that fuel assembly and 2

index over the core and he'll say, okay, 1*m indexed over 3

these coordinates.

Okay.

And I'll say -- I'll look at the 4

move sheet, I'll say, okay, that's where he's supposed to 5

be, go ahead and lower the fuel assembly.

And he'll get it 6

all the way down into the core and he'll give me his 22 7

tape reading before he lets go of it.

And I'll tell him 8

whether that's a good number or not.

If it's a good number 9

I'll say, okay, go ahead and release it.

And then he'll 10 disengage and then pull it up and he'll be watching his 12 load cell to make sure that the fuel assembly stays in the 12 core.

Because if anything's showing other than 13 approximately 300 pounds on the load cell, then he's still 14 got something on the mast.

And until he gets all the way 15 up, and then he'll give me his final 22 tape reading, and 16 that's the completion of one move.

t 17 MR. VORSEt What does the ZZ stand for?

18 THE WITNESS:

I don't know.

It's just -- that's 19 what they've always called it.

20 MR. VORSEt You did a -- you must have talked 21 slow, I understood everything you said.

22 ok,4y.

On this night we had a miscommuni -- not a 23 miscommunication, a misunderstanding of the R versus O ten.

24 Would you go ahead and go through that with me.

25 THE WITNESS:

Well, first off it was very late v

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1 in the day shift.

It was just minutes before we were 2

expected to turn over to the next night shift.

And things 3

were going along rather smoothly up until that point.

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The previous moves weretreactor, a certain

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location in the reactor to another location in the reactor.

6 And they were moving fuel assemblies around to form what's 7

known as a box.

That's why we caji it boxing it in, where 8

you make -- where you just make a box.

And then you take 9

an old fuel assembly and put it down in to make sure it 10 goes in straight, see.

11 And like I say, there were several moves in the FHcR 12 reactor itself.

And Christine Smith was on JEkeK-1, which 9"

13 is the reactor building side fuel handling bridge, and she 14 went to pick up one from reactor zero eight and it was 15 supposed to go to Oscar ten.

But when I looked at it I 16 seen R zero eight to R zero ten.

Okay.

17 Well, that R zero was supposed to be reactor 18 Oscar ten.

And when she said she was indexed over it I 19 looked, I says, okay, that's good, which I should have 20 looked at it twice, or three times.

But she went ahead and 21 lowered it down and she says, well, I've got an underload, 22 which means that 600 pounds of pressure has been applied to 23 the top of the fuel assembly and the bottom of the fuel 24 assembly that's in the mast, which cuts out lowering 25 movement all together.

That's what the interlock's for, to

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1 prevent fuel damage or any kind of fuel assembly damage.

Andshesays,maybeI'mjusthungdponanother 2

3 one; because to clarify this it looked like there was a 4

space for that fuel assembly, because the fuel assembly 5

that was in there was previously burnt, okay.

You could 6

tell the new fuel assembliest The old ones that had been 7

burnt, they're like black.

And unless you've got a light 8

shining direct on it you cannot see that fuel assembly.

9 And it appeared to be a space for that fuel assembly.

10 And I says, well, is there a space there?

And 11 she says, it looks like it.

And I says, vell, lift it up 12 and try it one more time.

And as she was lifting 't up I 13 looked ouer at the move sheet again and I said, wait a 14 minute, wait a minute, I1says, this -- that's not the right 15 location.

And she says, what do you mean.

And I says, 16 it's supposted to bc Oscar ten.

And she looked at the move 17 sheet again, the one -- her copy inside on the bridge, and 18 she,sdys, oh, it is supposed to be Oscar ten.

So then she 19 pulled it all the way back up into the mast, moved to Oscar 20 ten and inserted the fuel assembly there.

21 And at that point I looked at John Weaver and --

22 KR. VORSE:

~What's John Weaver --

23 THE WITNESS John Weaver is the reactor 24 engineer that was beside me on the tag board, and he keeps 25 the reactor engineer's log of fuel movement.

And he just

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looked at me like it wasn't any kind of a big deal.

And 1 2

was thinking, well, should we tell somebody.

Well, 3

naturally I thought I would tell the reactor engineer, of 4

anybody who would know more about reactor safety and fuel 5

assembly damage or possible damage than I did, and he just 6

kind of just didn't say anything.

7 MR. VORSE:

Did he make any kind of a log entry 8

or anything?

9 THE WITNESS No.

That's what surprised me.

I 10 just looked and : says, well, do we need to note this or 11 anything?

He says, no, it's not a big deal.

So I said 12 okay, we'll continue on.

And at that point : think we 13 might have made one more move before turnover and then that 14 was it for the end of my day.

15 But another thing you kind of have to understand 16 is I don't know if it was the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> days, but the 17 continuous rotation of people.

I would rotate from the tag 18 board to FHCR-1, to FHCR-3, back to the tag board, back-to 19 FHCR-1.

And it was a continuous rotation with very limited 20 break time.

21 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

Is Mr. Weaver kind of a 22 backup to you, for you, to interpret correctly what the 23 move sheets are trying to say?

24 THE WITNESS:

I would think.so, because he was 25 on the headsets with me and I think he looked at the move t

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sheets the same time I did.

And he didn't say anything.

2 And I, you know, the way I read it, that's the way it read 3

to me, R zero ten.

4 MR. VORSE:

Is Mr. Weaver your supervisor?

5 THE WITNESS:

No.

6 MR. VORSE:

Who is your supervisor on that 7

shift?

8 THE WITNESS:

At that time it was Dave Jones.

9 He was the refueling supervisor in the reactor building.

10 MR. VORSE:

So even though you're in the control 11 room you're still under his supervision?

12 THE WITNESS:

Correct.

13 MR. VORSE:

Do you know who wrote the anonymous 14 precursor?

15 THE WITNESS:

No, sir, I sure don't.

16 HR. VORSE:

Why do you think someone would do 17 that?

18 THE WITNESS:

I don't know.

I write precursors 19 and my name's on every one of them.

20 MR. VORSE:

Did --

Well, you were a little bit 21 concerned about this.

2 THE WITNESS:

Yes.

2 23 MR. VORSE:

I guess, you know, underloads are 24 routine or=can be rou -- considered routine but this was a 25 little bit unique in that one --

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1 THE WITNESS:

One's right directly on top of the 2

other.

3 MR. VORSE And it appears that that, the method 4

of -- I mean handwritten move sheets which -- were they all 5

the same or did some of them have like R T something and 6

sero one zero, I mean, or was it just this move sheet th&t 7

had the R sero one zero, but there was another one that had 8

R T something?

9 THE W:THESS There's --

They vary.

Most of 10 the moves are -- they're on a computer printout and they're 11 very easy to distinguish, very easy to read.

12 MR. VORSE:

.IX) the computer printouts have like 13 an 0, a slash through the 07

1. 4 THE WITNESS:

Right.

15 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

But the handwritten ones 16 didn't?

17 THE WITNESS:

Correct That's one of my rec --

18 that was one of my recommendations on how to fix any 19 possible future errors like this.

You know, the zeros 20 should have a slash, the O's would be just no diash.

21 MR. VORSE:

The military way?

22 THE WITNESS:

Correct.

4 23 Now, let me back up and talk about the O's and 24 -the zeros-again.

Certain --'Certain move -- Certain-1 25 printouts have O's as being perfectly round, where the 4

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1 zeros are elongated, you know, top to bottom.

And that is 2

easily distinguished also.

So I just -- that's another way 3

of, you know, fixing the problem.

4 MR. VORSE:

Did you -- even though Mr. Weaver 5

didn't seem too concerned about this did you go to anyone 6

else and tell them that you were concerned about this?

7 THE WITNESS:

I don't -- I don't really 8

remember.

I think I talked about it with Dave Jones, and 9

he says -- to the best of my knowledge, he says, well, I've 10 been thinking about it.

And that's basically as far as it 11 went.

And he was my supervisor.

And knowing Dave, he is 12

-- he is the epitome of conservativeness.

He is like right 13 on top of everything.

And if anything would have possibly 14 been reportable or anything like that Dave would have been 15 right on top of it I would have thought.

Because that's 16 the way Dave is; I've known him for a long time.

He is 17 really conservative.

He makes those kinds of decisions.

18 MR. VORSE:

Did you --

Did you tell Dave that 19 you were concerned about --

20 THE WITNESS:

Well, I asked him, I se.id, what 21 did you think about that.

And he says, well, he says, 22 that's what the underloads are for, he says, that's to 23 prevent any kind of fuel damage or anything.

And I had to 24 agree with that because I know that's what they're for 25 otherwise they wouldn't even put them on there.

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MR. VORSE Is there anything you want to

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2 clarify for the record, Mr. Glenn?

3 MR. GLENN:

Yeah.

Did you have any opinion as 4

to whether or not you thought the fuel assembly would have 5

been damaged if an underload had gone off?

6 THE WITNESS:

No.

7 MR. GLENN:

Why is that?

8 THE WITNESS:

Well, because -- let me -- let me 9

just demonstrate on this fuel assembly orce here.

10 MR. GLENN:

Is the microphone going to pick him 11 up.

i 12 COURT REPORTER:

If he speaks up.

13 THE WITNESS:

Okay.

This fuel assenbly that I'm 14 pointing to here that's in the room, the bottom of the fu,el 15 assembly has what's known as a grid and if it should happen 16 to hit directly on top of this control componont, which 17 there was a control component in the one that was in the 18 core. it would apply no more than 600 pounds pressure 19 before the cutoffs quit moving the mast downward, which 20 would be preventing more damage, if any damage.

21 What that does is it presses down on here,.which 22 compresses these springs to a point where they may be 23 almost flat.

And that's what these springs are actually 24 made for is to absorb shock, for control component trips, 25 rod insertions into the fuel assembly, and it's also, as I

16 1

pull this out, you can see that there's -- thic is a solid 1

2 cylindrical piece of stainless steel that would apply 3

pressure directly to those springs and not onto the fuel j

4 pins themselves.

5 And at 600 pounds, which is what the engineers 6

calculate could be the maximum as far as design limit --

7 not a design limit but an administrative limit, that's what 8

they set the interlocks to, to prevent any type of damage, 9

possible damage to the fuel.

10 And as far as the pins in the bottom of the fuel 11 assembly being lowered, that was protected by what I said 12 was a grid.

And those are solid stainless steel grids, 13 squares, in the bottom of the fuel assembly, with holes 14 just large enough for water to go through to remove the 15 heat of the fuel.

16 HR. GLENN:

Do you specifically recall talking 17 to Mr. Jones at that time or at a later date or when?

18 THE WITNESS:

It was later.

As a matter of fact 19 it might have even been the next day, because we were all 20 ready to turn over and go home.

And then he approached me 21 and says, you know, you need to write down everything that 22 happened and how you think it might have happened.

23 KR. VORSE When did he do that?

24 THE WITNESS:

I think it was --

I'm not 25 positive, but I think it was like the next day or possibly

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1 even the day after.

And I says, why?

And he says, well, 2

we just need to document this.

And I sayr s okay.

So I sat 3

down and I wrote everything I knew out on paper.

And then 4

I gave it to Dave.

And he says, this will be good.

And 5

that's as far as I heard of anything un+,11 just recently.

6 MR. VORSEt Have you got anything you want to 7

add, anything I should have asked you that -- let me ask 8

you this:

Has this ever happened before?

9 THE WITNESS:

Not to my knowledge, but I have s.,

10 heard of operators, you know, there are probably shift 11 supervisors and above now that say, well, this has happened 12 before.

And I can't prove it.

I don't know of it 13 happening.

But they say it has.

14 HR. VORSE:

Are you talking about 15 misinterpretation of the move sheets or are yott talking 16 about lowering one fuel assembly on another?

17 THE WITNESS:

Lowering a fuel assembly onto 18 ancther.

Which may have been the same circumstance.

I 19 don't know.

Like I say, all I can tell you is hearsay.

20 MR. GLENN:

How often do you get underloads 21 during a refueling?

22 THE WITNESS:

Well, you can get them quite often 23 because the fuel assamblies when the burn they can get 24 longer, they can bend like bananas, they can twist like 25 licorice.

They can be formed in any ways.

And when you

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lower them into the core the spacer grids may hang, which 2

will give you an underload, you know, it could get onto the 3

bottom plate of another fuel assembly, which will give you j

4 an underload.

And it's all -- all those underloads are 5

designed to protect the surrounding fuel and the fuel 6

assembly that's in the fuel handling bridge itself.

7 But we-get them.

We get underloads, we get 8

overloads.

Now, the distinction between and underload and 9

a overload is as you're pulling fuel out of the core or out 10 of the spent fuel pool and it weighs too much or it's 11 hanging up inside of the racks, then it will go out on 12 overloads, which means it's too heavy for the mast to pull 13 up.

14 Now, an underload is you've already got all that 15 weight in the mast.

As you're going down and it's not at 16 the correct ZZ tape reading it'll hit whatever, any 17 surrounding component, a grid, or something, and it will 18 quit going down because of the interlock.

And that's known 19 as an underload.

20 So even when you get all the way into the core 21 and the fuel assembly is inserted all the way into the core 22 as it should be you'll still get an underload.

But the EZ 23 tape reading is what determines whether that fuel assembly 24 -is inserted at the right height or not.

Then you can 25 disengage.

19 1

MR. VORSE:

Now what happens with the overload?

2 You're taking the fuel assembly out --

3 THE WITNESS:

Correct.

4 MR. VORSE

-- and it's too heavy for the crane 5

to handle?

6 THE WITNESS:

Right.

7 MR. VORSE:

So what do you do then, put it tack?

8 THE WITNESS:

You put it,back and what we 9

normally do is we try to pull it out again, and if we get 10 the same overload we'll put it back into the core, we'll do Il an inspection to see if -- see if the fuel assembly is 12 actually twisted or bowed or comething to that effect to 13 where it could hang up on the fuel assembly next to it or 14 possibly hang up at the bottom on the grid.

And if that's 15 the case we may have to rotate the mast on the bridge to 16 get the fuel assembly not to hang up.

And if that happens, 17 then once we get the fuel assembly out we'll rotate the 18 bridge back to its original position to make sure -- unless 19 every fuel assembly hangs, then we'll rotate the mast just 20 enough to see if every fuel assembly will come out at that 21 point.

If they do, then we leave it there.

22 MR. VORSE:

Do you have anything you want to 23 add?

24 THE WITNESS:

As I said, operating then, during 25 the refueling outage, even though I was involved with

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another circumstance it still wasn't apparent.to me that I i

2 should go ahead and write a precursor card on this, because l

3 that wasn't -- that wasn't the environment, I guess.

4 Today, everything gets written down.- Everything is on 5

precursor cards, everything's logged, there can be no 6

mistake 7 now.

i' 7

MR. VORSE:

Okay.

Well, we'll go ahead and i

8 conclude this interview.

The time is 1:33 p.m.,

still the 9

18th of September,

'96.

4 10 (Whereupon, the proceedings.were concluded at 11 1:33 o' clock p m.)

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1 C E R T I-F I C A T E

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2 Th.d u is to certify that the attached proceedings 3

beforetheUnitedStatesNuclearRegulatorybommissionin 4

the ratter of:

5 Name of Proceedings Interview of James Atkinson 6

Docket Number (s):

2-96-033 7

Place of Proceeding:

Crystal River Nuclear Plant 8

Crystal River, Florida 9

10 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original t

11 transcript thereof for the file of the United States 12 Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter 13 reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the 14 court reporting cornpany, and that the transcript is a true s

15 and accurate record.of the foregoing proceedings.

16 17 18

% Vli L A ~ f eW f/

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19 7 eggy S. Hay 20 Official Reporter 21 Neal R. Gross and Co., Inc.

22 23 24 25 l.

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