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{{#Wiki_filter:May 12, 2021
{{#Wiki_filter:May 12, 2021  
Mr. Rod L. Penfield
Site Vice President
Mr. Rod L. Penfield  
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.
Site Vice President  
Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.  
10 Center Road
Perry Nuclear Power Plant  
Perry, OH 44081
10 Center Road  
SUBJECT:       PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
Perry, OH 44081  
                05000440/2021001
Dear Mr. Penfield:
SUBJECT:  
On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT  
at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. On April 28, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of
05000440/2021001  
this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are
documented in the enclosed report.
Dear Mr. Penfield:  
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding
involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation
On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection  
(NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. On April 28, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of  
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this
this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are  
inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection
documented in the enclosed report.  
report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding  
Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector
involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation  
at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
(NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.  
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this  
disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,
inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection  
Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the
report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
NRC Resident Inspector at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional  
Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector  
at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.  
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a  
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your  
disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,  
Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the  
NRC Resident Inspector at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.  


R. Penfield                                       2
R. Penfield  
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
2  
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection  
Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document  
                                              Sincerely,
Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public  
                                              /RA/
Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.  
                                              Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief
                                              Branch 2
Sincerely,  
                                              Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 05000440
/RA/  
License No. NPF-58
Enclosure:
As stated
Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief  
cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV
Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects  
Docket No. 05000440  
License No. NPF-58  
Enclosure:  
As stated
cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV  




  ML21132A095
  ML21132A095  
        SUNSI Review
                                    Non-Sensitive               Publicly Available
SUNSI Review  
                                    Sensitive                  Non-Publicly Available
  OFFICE RIII                 RIII
Non-Sensitive  
  NAME     RRiuz:ve via email BDickson via email
Sensitive
  DATE     5/11/2021         5/12/2021
                                     
Publicly Available  
                          U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Non-Publicly Available  
                                        Inspection Report
   
Docket Number:        05000440
OFFICE RIII  
License Number:        NPF-58
RIII  
Report Number:        05000440/2021001
   
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0045
Licensee:              Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.
Facility:              Perry Nuclear Power Plant
NAME  
Location:              Perry, Ohio
RRiuz:ve via email  
Inspection Dates:      January 01, 2021 to March 31, 2021
BDickson via email  
Inspectors:            S. Bell, Health Physicist
   
                      V. Myers, Senior Health Physicist
                      J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector
                      T. Ospino, Resident Inspector
DATE  
                      J. Steffes, Senior Resident Inspector
5/11/2021  
                      T. Taylor, Fermi Resident Inspector
5/12/2021  
Approved By:          Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief
                      Branch 2
                      Division of Reactor Projects
                                                              Enclosure


                                              SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
Enclosure
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, in
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
Inspection Report
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
                                    List of Findings and Violations
  Human Performance Error Resulted in Unplanned RCIC Unavailability
Docket Number:
  Cornerstone              Significance                              Cross-Cutting      Report
05000440
                                                                    Aspect              Section
  Mitigating              Green                                    [H.12] - Avoid      71111.22
  Systems                  NCV 05000440/2021001-01                  Complacency
License Number: 
                          Open/Closed
NPF-58
  A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of
  TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," was self-revealed on January 19, 2021, when an unexpected isolation
  of the RCIC steam supply occurred. Specifically, during performance of SVI-E31-T5395A,
Report Number: 
  "RCIC Steam Line Flow High Channel Functional for E31-N684A," Revision 8, the licensee
05000440/2021001  
  failed to lift the lead from terminal B4 for relay 1E51-K24, resulting in the closure of the RCIC
  steam supply outboard valve and an unplanned limiting condition for operation (LCO) entry
  and unavailability of the RCIC system.
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0045
                                      Additional Tracking Items
None.
                                                    2
Licensee:
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.  
Facility:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Location:
Perry, Ohio
Inspection Dates:
January 01, 2021 to March 31, 2021
Inspectors:
S. Bell, Health Physicist
V. Myers, Senior Health Physicist
J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector
T. Ospino, Resident Inspector 
J. Steffes, Senior Resident Inspector 
T. Taylor, Fermi Resident Inspector 
Approved By:
Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief
Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects


PLANT STATUS
Perry Nuclear Power Plant began the inspection period at 97 percent of rated thermal power in
2
coastdown operations before a refueling outage. On January 10, 2021, the 1B feedwater heater
isolated. The isolation resulted in a power perturbation. In response to the power perturbation
SUMMARY
and feedwater heater isolation, the operators lowered reactor power to 79 percent to maintain
margin to thermal limits per abnormal operating procedures. High water level conditions caused
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
the heater isolation. The high-water level condition resulted from a failed circuit card in the level
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, in
transmitter for the alternate level controller. Operators restored level using the normal level
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process.  The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs
controller. The operators returned the unit to maximum attainable power and continued
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.  Refer to
coastdown operations on January 11, 2021. On March 6, 2021, operators shutdown the
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
reactor to commence refueling outage 1R18. The reactor remained shut down in the refueling
outage for the remainder of the inspection period.
List of Findings and Violations
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
Human Performance Error Resulted in Unplanned RCIC Unavailability
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-Cutting
Aspect
Report
Section
Mitigating
Systems
Green
NCV 05000440/2021001-01 
Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid
Complacency
71111.22
A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of 
TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," was self-revealed on January 19, 2021, when an unexpected isolation
of the RCIC steam supply occurred.  Specifically, during performance of SVI-E31-T5395A,
"RCIC Steam Line Flow High Channel Functional for E31-N684A," Revision 8, the licensee
failed to lift the lead from terminal B4 for relay 1E51-K24, resulting in the closure of the RCIC
steam supply outboard valve and an unplanned limiting condition for operation (LCO) entry
and unavailability of the RCIC system.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
 
3
PLANT STATUS  
Perry Nuclear Power Plant began the inspection period at 97 percent of rated thermal power in  
coastdown operations before a refueling outage. On January 10, 2021, the 1B feedwater heater  
isolated. The isolation resulted in a power perturbation. In response to the power perturbation  
and feedwater heater isolation, the operators lowered reactor power to 79 percent to maintain  
margin to thermal limits per abnormal operating procedures. High water level conditions caused  
the heater isolation. The high-water level condition resulted from a failed circuit card in the level  
transmitter for the alternate level controller. Operators restored level using the normal level  
controller. The operators returned the unit to maximum attainable power and continued  
coastdown operations on January 11, 2021. On March 6, 2021, operators shutdown the  
reactor to commence refueling outage 1R18. The reactor remained shut down in the refueling  
outage for the remainder of the inspection period.  
INSPECTION SCOPES  
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in  
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with  
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared  
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met  
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection  
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,  
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance  
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.  
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President
of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President  
(COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access
of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019
licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors
(COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access  
performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in
licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors  
IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site
performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in
portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to
IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site  
determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be
portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to  
performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per
determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be  
the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The
performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per  
inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The  
                                                  3
inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.  


REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
4
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
    The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
REACTOR SAFETY  
    systems/trains:
    (1)     High pressure core spray (HPCS) system on February 9, 2021
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment  
    (2)     Division 2 diesel generator while division 1 vital bus was removed from service for
            modification on March 13, 2021
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)  
    (3)     Residual heat removal (RHR) B partial alignment due to outage configuration on
            March 14, 2021
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following  
    (4)     Electrical bus and load alignment due to outage configuration on March 15, 2021
systems/trains:  
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)  
    The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a
High pressure core spray (HPCS) system on February 9, 2021
    walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,
(2)  
    material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
Division 2 diesel generator while division 1 vital bus was removed from service for  
    (1)     Quarterly fire protection alarm test on January 14, 2021
modification on March 13, 2021  
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(3)  
    (1)     Fire protection drill on January 27, 2021
Residual heat removal (RHR) B partial alignment due to outage configuration on  
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)
March 14, 2021  
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding
(4)  
Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
Electrical bus and load alignment due to outage configuration on March 15, 2021  
    (1)     The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel
            internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary were
71111.05 - Fire Protection  
            appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were
            appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the documentation of
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)  
            the following activities from March 8, 2021 to March 18, 2021:
            03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a  
                1. Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Main Steam System 26 Inch Elbow to Pipe
walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,  
                    Weld, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Category R-A,
material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:  
                    Component 1B21-0006
                2. UT of Reactor Vessel Top Head Meridional Weld, ASME Category B-A,
(1)  
                    Component 1B13-DM
Quarterly fire protection alarm test on January 14, 2021  
                3. UT of Reactor Vessel Feedwater Nozzle Weld, ASME Category R-A,
                    Component 1B13-N4E-KB
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)  
                                                    4
(1)  
Fire protection drill on January 27, 2021  
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)  
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding  
Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)  
(1)  
The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel  
internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary were  
appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were  
appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the documentation of  
the following activities from March 8, 2021 to March 18, 2021:  
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.  
 
1. Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Main Steam System 26 Inch Elbow to Pipe  
Weld, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Category R-A,  
Component 1B21-0006  
2. UT of Reactor Vessel Top Head Meridional Weld, ASME Category B-A,  
Component 1B13-DM  
3. UT of Reactor Vessel Feedwater Nozzle Weld, ASME Category R-A,  
Component 1B13-N4E-KB  


              4. Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) of Control Rod Drive System Piping
                  Support Welded Attachment, ASME Category C-C, Component
5
                  1C11-H0040-WA
              5. Magnetic Particle Examination (MT) of Reactor Vessel Top Head to Top Head
4. Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) of Control Rod Drive System Piping  
                  Flange Meridional Weld, ASME Category B-A, Component 1B13-AG
Support Welded Attachment, ASME Category C-C, Component
              6. MT of Main Steam System Flued Head Fitting to Process Pipe Attachment
1C11-H0040-WA  
                  Weld, ASME Category B-K, Component 1B21-P124-WA
5. Magnetic Particle Examination (MT) of Reactor Vessel Top Head to Top Head  
              7. Visual Examination (VT-3) of High-Pressure Core Spray System Pipe
Flange Meridional Weld, ASME Category B-A, Component 1B13-AG  
                  Restraint, ASME Category F-A, Component 1E22-H0034
6. MT of Main Steam System Flued Head Fitting to Process Pipe Attachment  
              8. Visual Examinations of Chilled Water System: VT-3 of Pipe Anchor, ASME
Weld, ASME Category B-K, Component 1B21-P124-WA  
                  Category F-A, Component 1P47-H0219 and VT-1 of Pipe Anchor Integral
7. Visual Examination (VT-3) of High-Pressure Core Spray System Pipe  
                  Attachment Weld, ASME Category D-A, Component 1P47-H0219-WA
Restraint, ASME Category F-A, Component 1E22-H0034  
              9. AVR-R17-01, ASME Section XI Flaw Evaluation, Weld ID 1B13-AE
8. Visual Examinations of Chilled Water System: VT-3 of Pipe Anchor, ASME  
              10. Pipe Replacement of Essential Service Water System B Piping between
Category F-A, Component 1P47-H0219 and VT-1 of Pipe Anchor Integral  
                  Valve 1P45F0541B and Heat Exchanger 1P42B0001B and between
Attachment Weld, ASME Category D-A, Component 1P47-H0219-WA  
                  Valve 1P45F0541B and Second Downstream Elbow; Weld Numbers
9. AVR-R17-01, ASME Section XI Flaw Evaluation, Weld ID 1B13-AE  
                  200726587-01, -02, -03, -04, -05, -06 and -07 (WO 200726587)
10. Pipe Replacement of Essential Service Water System B Piping between  
              11. Pipe Replacement of Reactor Water Clean Up System; Spool Piece between
Valve 1P45F0541B and Heat Exchanger 1P42B0001B and between
                  Heat Exchangers 1G33B0001C and 1G33B0002A; Weld Numbers
Valve 1P45F0541B and Second Downstream Elbow; Weld Numbers
                  200724734-01, -02, -03, -04, -05, -06, and -07 (WO 200724734)
200726587-01, -02, -03, -04, -05, -06 and -07 (WO 200726587)  
          The above volumetric (UT) and surface (PT and MT) examination records were
11. Pipe Replacement of Reactor Water Clean Up System; Spool Piece between  
          selected from the previous outage in 2019 (1R17), since there were no ISI exams or
Heat Exchangers 1G33B0001C and 1G33B0002A; Weld Numbers  
          aging management related exams performed during this outage (1R18).
200724734-01, -02, -03, -04, -05, -06, and -07 (WO 200724734)  
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
The above volumetric (UT) and surface (PT and MT) examination records were  
(1 Sample)
selected from the previous outage in 2019 (1R17), since there were no ISI exams or  
    (1)   The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the
aging management related exams performed during this outage (1R18).  
          Control Room during plant shutdown and cooldown activities for the 1R18 refueling
          outage on March 6 to 7, 2021.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance  
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
    The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following
(1 Sample)  
    structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended
    function:
(1)  
    (1)   Combustible gas mixing system A failure on December 22, 2020
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the
    (2)   Containment radiation monitor outboard isolation loss of indication on
Control Room during plant shutdown and cooldown activities for the 1R18 refueling  
          January 15, 2021
outage on March 6 to 7, 2021.  
    (3)   Inclined fuel transfer system failure on March 16, 2021
    (4)   Division 1 emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) integrated test failures and
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness  
          resolution on March 22 to 24, 2021
                                                  5
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)  
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following  
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended  
function:  
(1)  
Combustible gas mixing system A failure on December 22, 2020  
(2)  
Containment radiation monitor outboard isolation loss of indication on
January 15, 2021  
(3)  
Inclined fuel transfer system failure on March 16, 2021  
(4)  
Division 1 emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) integrated test failures and  
resolution on March 22 to 24, 2021  


71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
6
    The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the
    following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control  
    appropriate work controls were addressed:
    (1)   Plant risk assessment related to D1A electrical bus emergent work started on
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)  
          November 30, 2020
    (2)   Emergent work for annunciator system ground alarms on January 7, 2021
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the  
    (3)   Emergent work related to electro-hydraulic pump A leak and spill on
following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and  
          January 25, 2021
appropriate work controls were addressed:  
    (4)   Reactor feed pump turbine "B" emergent work on February 22 to 24, 2021
    (5)   Plant risk assessment during the Division 1 ECCS integrated test between
(1)  
          March 22 to 24, 2021
Plant risk assessment related to D1A electrical bus emergent work started on  
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
November 30, 2020  
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
(2)  
    The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the
Emergent work for annunciator system ground alarms on January 7, 2021  
    following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(3)  
    (1)   Combustible gas mixing system A (CR 2020-09635) failure and common cause
Emergent work related to electro-hydraulic pump A leak and spill on
          review on December 22, 2020
January 25, 2021  
    (2)   Operability review based on CR 2020-09501 related to the Technical Support Center
(4)  
          radiation monitor on January 4, 2021
Reactor feed pump turbine "B" emergent work on February 22 to 24, 2021  
    (3)   Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system operability verification based on
(5)  
          CR 2021-00338 on January 19, 2021
Plant risk assessment during the Division 1 ECCS integrated test between
    (4)   Operability review for SCRAM insertion times after shutdown on March 6, 2021
March 22 to 24, 2021  
    (5)   Operability review for safety relief valves (SRV) after set pressure testing on
          March 29, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments  
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)  
(3 Samples)
    The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the  
    (1)   Dedicated open phase control room annunciator modification on December 17, 2020
following operability determinations and functionality assessments:  
    (2)   Installation of temporary jumpers to bypass the rod block as part of outage emergent
          activities on March 17, 2021
(1)  
    (3)   Breaker EH1114 relay modification associated with Engineering Change 11-0559-002
Combustible gas mixing system A (CR 2020-09635) failure and common cause  
          on March 16, 2021
review on December 22, 2020  
                                                  6
(2)  
Operability review based on CR 2020-09501 related to the Technical Support Center  
radiation monitor on January 4, 2021  
(3)  
Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system operability verification based on
CR 2021-00338 on January 19, 2021  
(4)  
Operability review for SCRAM insertion times after shutdown on March 6, 2021  
(5)  
Operability review for safety relief valves (SRV) after set pressure testing on
March 29, 2021  
71111.18 - Plant Modifications  
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)
(3 Samples)  
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:  
(1)  
Dedicated open phase control room annunciator modification on December 17, 2020  
(2)  
Installation of temporary jumpers to bypass the rod block as part of outage emergent  
activities on March 17, 2021  
(3)  
Breaker EH1114 relay modification associated with Engineering Change 11-0559-002  
on March 16, 2021  


71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
7
    The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system
    operability and functionality:
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing  
    (1)   Technical support center testing following radiation monitor repair work on
          December 16, 2020, to January 4, 2021
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)  
    (2)   Division 3 emergency service water testing following packing adjustment on
          January 5, 2021
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system  
    (3)   Testing of the containment radiation monitor outboard isolation valve following blown
operability and functionality:  
          fuse replacement on January 15, 2021
    (4)   Testing following average power range monitor A and B power supply replacement
(1)  
          on January 19, 2021
Technical support center testing following radiation monitor repair work on
    (5)   "B" reactor protection system trip channel Potter-Brumfield relay replacement for
December 16, 2020, to January 4, 2021  
          1C71A-K012B, work order 200391663
(2)  
    (6)   Testing following replacement of control rod drive mechanisms on March 17, 2021
Division 3 emergency service water testing following packing adjustment on
    (7)   Testing following replacement of "A" RHR relays on March 22 to 24, 2021
January 5, 2021  
    (8)   SRV test following replacement on March 29, 2021
(3)  
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Testing of the containment radiation monitor outboard isolation valve following blown  
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
fuse replacement on January 15, 2021  
    (1)   (Partial)
(4)  
          The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 1R18 activities from March 6 to
Testing following average power range monitor A and B power supply replacement  
          March 31, 2021. Activities evaluated by the inspectors included, but were not limited
on January 19, 2021  
          to, shutdown and cooldown operations, reduced inventory control, containment
(5)  
          walkdown, reactor vessel disassembly for heavy load controls, refueling operations,
"B" reactor protection system trip channel Potter-Brumfield relay replacement for  
          reactor coolant system instrumentation, outage plan and shutdown risk.
1C71A-K012B, work order 200391663  
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
(6)  
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Testing following replacement of control rod drive mechanisms on March 17, 2021  
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
(7)  
    (1)   SRV pressure actuation channel A test on January 20, 2021
Testing following replacement of "A" RHR relays on March 22 to 24, 2021  
    (2)   HPCS pump test on February 1, 2021
(8)  
    (3)   Fuel pool cooling and cleanup system surveillance on February 3, 2021
SRV test following replacement on March 29, 2021  
    (4)   Control rod maximum scram-based insertion time on March 6, 2021
    (5)   Division 1 standby diesel generator load rejection test on March 8, 2021
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities  
    (6)   Division 1 ECCS integrated test between March 22 to 24, 2021
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)  
    (1)   "C" RHR system pump and valve operability test, work order 200792521.
                                                7
(1)  
(Partial)  
The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 1R18 activities from March 6 to
March 31, 2021. Activities evaluated by the inspectors included, but were not limited  
to, shutdown and cooldown operations, reduced inventory control, containment  
walkdown, reactor vessel disassembly for heavy load controls, refueling operations,  
reactor coolant system instrumentation, outage plan and shutdown risk.  
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing  
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:  
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)  
(1)  
SRV pressure actuation channel A test on January 20, 2021  
(2)  
HPCS pump test on February 1, 2021  
(3)  
Fuel pool cooling and cleanup system surveillance on February 3, 2021  
(4)  
Control rod maximum scram-based insertion time on March 6, 2021  
(5)  
Division 1 standby diesel generator load rejection test on March 8, 2021  
(6)  
Division 1 ECCS integrated test between March 22 to 24, 2021  
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)  
(1)  
"C" RHR system pump and valve operability test, work order 200792521.  


Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
    (1)   Leak rate test for the shutdown cooling A to the feedwater shutdown isolation valve
8
          1E12-F050A on March 22, 2021
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)  
    (1)   Calibration check of FLEX fuel pool level transmitter on January 27, 2021
RADIATION SAFETY
(1)  
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Leak rate test for the shutdown cooling A to the feedwater shutdown isolation valve  
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
1E12-F050A on March 22, 2021  
    (1)   The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of
          radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)  
          how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1)  
    The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to
Calibration check of FLEX fuel pool level transmitter on January 27, 2021  
    access high radiation areas.
    (1)   The inspectors evaluated radiological protection related instructions to plant workers
RADIATION SAFETY  
          for emergent diving activities on the inclined fuel transfer system.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls  
    The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination
    and radioactive material.
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)  
    (1)   The inspectors observed workers exiting the radiologically controlled area (RCA).
    (2)   The inspectors observed licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material
(1)  
          leaving the radiologically controlled area.
The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of  
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)
radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and  
    The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and
how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.  
    observation of the following radiological work activities.
    (1)   Inclined fuel transfer system diving activities under RWP 210910
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)  
    (2)   Flow accelerated corrosion exams in the reactor water cleanup heat exchanger and
          pump room under RWP 210602
The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to  
    (3)   Control rod drive mechanism exchange under RWP 210518
access high radiation areas.  
                                                  8
(1)  
The inspectors evaluated radiological protection related instructions to plant workers  
for emergent diving activities on the inclined fuel transfer system.  
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)  
The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination  
and radioactive material.
(1)  
The inspectors observed workers exiting the radiologically controlled area (RCA).  
(2)  
The inspectors observed licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material  
leaving the radiologically controlled area.  
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)  
The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and  
observation of the following radiological work activities.  
(1)  
Inclined fuel transfer system diving activities under RWP 210910  
(2)  
Flow accelerated corrosion exams in the reactor water cleanup heat exchanger and  
pump room under RWP 210602  
(3)  
Control rod drive mechanism exchange under RWP 210518  


High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
    The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very
9
    High Radiation Areas:
    (1)   Locked high radiation area for reactor water clean-up pump repair in the auxiliary
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)  
          building 599'
    (2)   Locked high radiation area for the fuel pool cooling pump room in the intermediate
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very  
          building 574'
High Radiation Areas:  
    (3)   Locked high radiation area established for fuel moves in containment 620'
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency
(1)  
(IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
Locked high radiation area for reactor water clean-up pump repair in the auxiliary  
    (1)   The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician
building 599'  
          performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
(2)  
71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
Locked high radiation area for the fuel pool cooling pump room in the intermediate  
Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
building 574'  
    The inspectors reviewed as low as reasonably achievable practices and radiological work
(3)  
    controls for the following work activities.
Locked high radiation area established for fuel moves in containment 620'  
    (1)   Inclined fuel transfer system diving activities under RWP 210910
    (2)   Flow accelerated corrosion exams in the reactor water cleanup heat exchanger and
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency
          pump room under RWP 210602
(IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)  
    (3)   Control rod drive mechanism exchange under RWP 210518
Radiation Worker Performance (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
(1)  
    The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician  
    during:
performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.  
    (1)   Inclined fuel transfer system diving activities under RWP 210910
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls  
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
    The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant
Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)  
    walkdowns:
    (1)   Radiation monitors (portal monitor, personnel contamination monitor and small article
The inspectors reviewed as low as reasonably achievable practices and radiological work  
          monitor) located at the RCA exit.
controls for the following work activities.  
    (2)   Portable radiation survey instrumentation located at the RCA exit and the
          Instrumentation Calibration Facility (Geiger Mueller contamination monitoring
(1)  
          instruments and dose rate survey instruments including ion chambers, pressurized
Inclined fuel transfer system diving activities under RWP 210910  
          ion chambers and Telepoles).
(2)  
    (3)   Gamma spectroscopy systems and liquid scintillation instrumentation located within
Flow accelerated corrosion exams in the reactor water cleanup heat exchanger and  
          the Chemistry Counting Room.
pump room under RWP 210602  
                                                9
(3)  
Control rod drive mechanism exchange under RWP 210518  
Radiation Worker Performance (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)  
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance  
during:  
(1)  
Inclined fuel transfer system diving activities under RWP 210910  
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation  
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)  
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant  
walkdowns:  
(1)  
Radiation monitors (portal monitor, personnel contamination monitor and small article  
monitor) located at the RCA exit.  
(2)  
Portable radiation survey instrumentation located at the RCA exit and the  
Instrumentation Calibration Facility (Geiger Mueller contamination monitoring  
instruments and dose rate survey instruments including ion chambers, pressurized  
ion chambers and Telepoles).  
(3)  
Gamma spectroscopy systems and liquid scintillation instrumentation located within  
the Chemistry Counting Room.  


    (4)   JL Shepherd Model 89 instrumentation calibrator.
    (5)   Area Radiation Monitors and Continuous Air Monitors in the Fuel Handling Building
10
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
    The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection
(4)  
    instruments:
JL Shepherd Model 89 instrumentation calibrator.  
    (1)   Canberra Argos Personal Contamination Monitor, SN L70L004V
(5)  
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
Area Radiation Monitors and Continuous Air Monitors in the Fuel Handling Building  
& Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)  
    The inspectors evaluated the licensee's performance in controlling, labelling and securing
    radioactive materials in the following locations.
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection  
    (1)   Outside radioactive material storage locations
instruments:  
    (2)   Radiation protection radioactive source storage locations (calibration facility and RCA
          exit)
(1)  
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02 (1 Sample)
Canberra Argos Personal Contamination Monitor, SN L70L004V  
    (1)   Inspectors walked down accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems
          located in the radioactive waste handling building and evaluated system configuration
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
          and functionality.
& Transportation  
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
    (1)   The inspectors evaluated the licensees characterization and classification of
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)  
          shipment 19-1030 consisting of reactor water cleanup resin radioactive waste
    (2)   The inspectors evaluated the licensees characterization and classification of
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's performance in controlling, labelling and securing  
          shipment 20-1026 consisting of spent resin radioactive waste
radioactive materials in the following locations.  
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
    (1)   The inspectors observed shipment number 21-008, containing radioactive
(1)  
          contaminated laundry.
Outside radioactive material storage locations  
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
(2)  
    The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through
Radiation protection radioactive source storage locations (calibration facility and RCA  
    a record review:
exit)  
    (1)   Radioactive waste shipment 19-1030 consisting of reactor water cleanup resin
          transported in a Type B package
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02 (1 Sample)  
    (2)   Radioactive waste shipment 20-1026 consisting of dewatered resin transported in
          a general design package
(1)  
    (3)   Radioactive waste shipment 19-1025 consisting of reactor water cleanup resin
Inspectors walked down accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems  
          transported in a Type B package
located in the radioactive waste handling building and evaluated system configuration  
                                                  10
and functionality.  
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)  
(1)  
The inspectors evaluated the licensees characterization and classification of  
shipment 19-1030 consisting of reactor water cleanup resin radioactive waste  
(2)  
The inspectors evaluated the licensees characterization and classification of  
shipment 20-1026 consisting of spent resin radioactive waste  
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)  
(1)  
The inspectors observed shipment number 21-008, containing radioactive  
contaminated laundry.  
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)  
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through  
a record review:  
(1)  
Radioactive waste shipment 19-1030 consisting of reactor water cleanup resin  
transported in a Type B package  
(2)  
Radioactive waste shipment 20-1026 consisting of dewatered resin transported in  
a general design package  
(3)  
Radioactive waste shipment 19-1025 consisting of reactor water cleanup resin  
transported in a Type B package  


    (4)   Radioactive material shipment 19-3033 consisting of control rod drive mechanisms
            transported in a Type A package
11
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
(4)  
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
Radioactive material shipment 19-3033 consisting of control rod drive mechanisms  
    The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
transported in a Type A package  
    (1)   LER 2020-002-00, Standby Liquid Control System Rendered Inoperable due to Valve
            Misposition (ADAMS Accession No. ML20293A204). The inspection conclusions
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE  
            associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results
            Section 71153.
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion  
INSPECTION RESULTS
  Human Performance Error Resulted in Unplanned RCIC Unavailability
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)  
  Cornerstone           Significance                               Cross-Cutting     Report
                                                                  Aspect            Section
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):  
  Mitigating           Green                                     [H.12] - Avoid    71111.22
  Systems              NCV 05000440/2021001-01                   Complacency
(1)  
                        Open/Closed
LER 2020-002-00, Standby Liquid Control System Rendered Inoperable due to Valve  
  A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of
Misposition (ADAMS Accession No. ML20293A204). The inspection conclusions  
  TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," was self-revealed on January 19, 2021, when an unexpected
associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results  
  isolation of the RCIC steam supply occurred. Specifically, during performance of
Section 71153.  
  SVI-E31-T5395A, "RCIC Steam Line Flow High Channel Functional for E31-N684A,"
  Revision 8, the licensee failed to lift the lead from terminal B4 for relay 1E51-K24, resulting in
INSPECTION RESULTS  
  the closure of the RCIC steam supply outboard valve and an unplanned limiting condition for
  operation (LCO) entry and unavailability of the RCIC system.
Human Performance Error Resulted in Unplanned RCIC Unavailability  
  Description:
Cornerstone  
  On January 19, 2021, during the performance of SVI-E31-T5395A, RCIC Steam Line Flow
Significance  
  High Channel Functional for E31-N684A, Revision 8, the licensee received several control
Cross-Cutting  
  room alarms and identified that the RCIC steam supply outboard valve was closed. The
Aspect
  licensee determined that an inadvertent isolation of the RCIC system and an unplanned
Report  
  inoperability had occurred. The inspectors determined that procedural steps were not
Section  
  implemented during the surveillance test, as written. Specifically, the licensee failed to
Mitigating  
  perform Section 5.1 appropriately, steps 72a and 72b, and complete the independent
Systems
  verification to ensure the correct lead was lifted from terminal B4 associated with relay
  1E51-K24. This failure resulted in the closure of the RCIC steam supply outboard valve and
Green  
  the RCIC system unavailability.
NCV 05000440/2021001-01
   Corrective Actions: Immediate corrective actions included securing from the surveillance,
Open/Closed  
  restoration of the RCIC steam supply flow path and RCIC system operability.
   Corrective Action References: CR 2021-00338, Wrong Lead lifted during Surveillance
[H.12] - Avoid
  Performance 1/19/2021.
Complacency
                                                  11
71111.22
A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of
TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," was self-revealed on January 19, 2021, when an unexpected  
isolation of the RCIC steam supply occurred. Specifically, during performance of
SVI-E31-T5395A, "RCIC Steam Line Flow High Channel Functional for E31-N684A,"  
Revision 8, the licensee failed to lift the lead from terminal B4 for relay 1E51-K24, resulting in  
the closure of the RCIC steam supply outboard valve and an unplanned limiting condition for  
operation (LCO) entry and unavailability of the RCIC system.  
Description:  
On January 19, 2021, during the performance of SVI-E31-T5395A, RCIC Steam Line Flow  
High Channel Functional for E31-N684A, Revision 8, the licensee received several control  
room alarms and identified that the RCIC steam supply outboard valve was closed. The  
licensee determined that an inadvertent isolation of the RCIC system and an unplanned  
inoperability had occurred. The inspectors determined that procedural steps were not  
implemented during the surveillance test, as written. Specifically, the licensee failed to  
perform Section 5.1 appropriately, steps 72a and 72b, and complete the independent  
verification to ensure the correct lead was lifted from terminal B4 associated with relay
1E51-K24. This failure resulted in the closure of the RCIC steam supply outboard valve and  
the RCIC system unavailability.  
    
Corrective Actions: Immediate corrective actions included securing from the surveillance,  
restoration of the RCIC steam supply flow path and RCIC system operability.  
    
Corrective Action References: CR 2021-00338, Wrong Lead lifted during Surveillance  
Performance 1/19/2021.  


Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The resident inspectors determined that the licensees failure to
12
implement Section 5.1, Steps 72a and 72b of SVI-E31-T5395A, RCIC steam line flow high
channel functional for E31-N684A, Revision 8, was a performance deficiency. Specifically,
Performance Assessment:  
the failure to ensure the correct lead was lifted from terminal B4 of the relay 1E51-K24 in
 
accordance with the procedure directly led to the inoperability and unavailability of the RCIC
Performance Deficiency: The resident inspectors determined that the licensees failure to  
system.
implement Section 5.1, Steps 72a and 72b of SVI-E31-T5395A, RCIC steam line flow high  
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
channel functional for E31-N684A, Revision 8, was a performance deficiency. Specifically,  
because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems
the failure to ensure the correct lead was lifted from terminal B4 of the relay 1E51-K24 in  
cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,
accordance with the procedure directly led to the inoperability and unavailability of the RCIC  
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
system.  
consequences. The resident inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more
 
than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor  
Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the
because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems  
availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent
cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,  
undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to lift the correct lead from
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable  
terminal B4 of relay 1E51-K24, which directly led to the closure of the RCIC steam supply
consequences. The resident inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more  
outboard valve and steam flow path isolation, thus negatively impacting the availability of the
than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating  
RCIC system.
Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the  
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The
availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent  
Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened
undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to lift the correct lead from  
the finding against the Mitigating Systems screening questions in Exhibit 2 and answered
terminal B4 of relay 1E51-K24, which directly led to the closure of the RCIC steam supply  
"NO" to all screening questions. Therefore, the finding screened to very low safety
outboard valve and steam flow path isolation, thus negatively impacting the availability of the  
significance (Green).
RCIC system.  
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the
 
possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The  
outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the licensee
Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened  
failed to implement error reduction tools from Section 4.2.5.3 of NOBP-LP-2601, "Human
the finding against the Mitigating Systems screening questions in Exhibit 2 and answered  
Performance Program," Revision 13, independent verification which resulted in the failure to
"NO" to all screening questions. Therefore, the finding screened to very low safety  
implement the procedure as written.
significance (Green).  
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1, "Procedures," requires, in part, that written
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the  
procedures/instructions be established, implemented, and maintained covering the following
possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful  
activities: the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33,
outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the licensee  
Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A,
failed to implement error reduction tools from Section 4.2.5.3 of NOBP-LP-2601, "Human  
Section 8b(2)(r), states, in part, that for the reactor core isolation system "Specific procedures
Performance Program," Revision 13, independent verification which resulted in the failure to  
for surveillance tests, inspections, and calibrations should be written (implementing
implement the procedure as written.  
procedures are required for each surveillance test, inspection, or calibration listed in the
Enforcement:  
technical specifications."
 
Contrary to the above, on January 19, 2020, while performing an activity affecting quality, the
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1, "Procedures," requires, in part, that written  
licensee did not accomplish a surveillance test in accordance with the procedure and
procedures/instructions be established, implemented, and maintained covering the following  
incorrectly performed a step in surveillance procedure SVI-E31-T5395A, and failed to lift the
activities: the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33,
proper lead. Specifically, the licensee failed to lift the lead from terminal B4 from relay
Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A,
1E51A-K24 resulting in an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.5.3, Condition A,
Section 8b(2)(r), states, in part, that for the reactor core isolation system "Specific procedures  
and adversely affected the availability of the RCIC system.
for surveillance tests, inspections, and calibrations should be written (implementing  
                                                  12
procedures are required for each surveillance test, inspection, or calibration listed in the  
technical specifications."  
Contrary to the above, on January 19, 2020, while performing an activity affecting quality, the  
licensee did not accomplish a surveillance test in accordance with the procedure and  
incorrectly performed a step in surveillance procedure SVI-E31-T5395A, and failed to lift the  
proper lead. Specifically, the licensee failed to lift the lead from terminal B4 from relay  
1E51A-K24 resulting in an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.5.3, Condition A,  
and adversely affected the availability of the RCIC system.  


Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
13
Minor Violation                                                                       71153
Minor Violation: Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000440/2020-002 documented a condition
where the standby liquid control (SLC) system was rendered inoperable due to a valve
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with  
alignment issue. The event occurred on August 21, 2020, from 0953 to 1307 hours
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.  
(approximately 3 hours). The licensee submitted the LER to the NRC according to
10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(A) and 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented
Minor Violation  
the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and mitigate
71153  
the consequences of an accident.
Minor Violation: Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000440/2020-002 documented a condition  
The LER stated that on August 20, 2020, Periodic Test Instruction, PTI-C41-P0001, Standby
where the standby liquid control (SLC) system was rendered inoperable due to a valve  
Liquid Control Transfer System Pump, and Valve Operability Test, was being performed on
alignment issue. The event occurred on August 21, 2020, from 0953 to 1307 hours  
the SLC system. During the test on August 20, 2020, at 1248 hours, a valve misposition
(approximately 3 hours). The licensee submitted the LER to the NRC according to
resulted in the inadvertent addition of 226 gallons of water to the SLC storage tank, causing
10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(A) and 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented  
an unintended dilution of the boron solution. On August 21, 2020, at 0953 hours, the SLC
the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and mitigate  
system was declared inoperable when the sample results for the SLC storage tank confirmed
the consequences of an accident.
the boron solution concentration did not meet Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.7 criteria. The
 
licensee restored operability on August 21, 2020, at 1307 hours.
The LER stated that on August 20, 2020, Periodic Test Instruction, PTI-C41-P0001, Standby  
While reviewing LER 05000440/2020-002, the inspectors identified that the diluted boron
Liquid Control Transfer System Pump, and Valve Operability Test, was being performed on  
solution concentration existed for a time longer than permitted by TS 3.1.7. Following the
the SLC system. During the test on August 20, 2020, at 1248 hours, a valve misposition  
guidance in NUREG-1022 Revision 3 "Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, the
resulted in the inadvertent addition of 226 gallons of water to the SLC storage tank, causing  
inspectors determined that the licensee should have reported the diluted boron solution
an unintended dilution of the boron solution. On August 21, 2020, at 0953 hours, the SLC  
concentration to the NRC as a condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical
system was declared inoperable when the sample results for the SLC storage tank confirmed  
Specifications, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B). Specifically, the diluted boron solution
the boron solution concentration did not meet Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.7 criteria. The  
concentration existed for longer (approximately 24 hours) than the total 20 hours allowed for
licensee restored operability on August 21, 2020, at 1307 hours.
restoration and shutdown outage time per Technical Specifications. The licensee plans on
submitting a revised LER in response to the minor violation.
While reviewing LER 05000440/2020-002, the inspectors identified that the diluted boron  
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. Specifically,
solution concentration existed for a time longer than permitted by TS 3.1.7. Following the  
the failure to identify 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) on a Licensee Event Report did not impact the
guidance in NUREG-1022 Revision 3 "Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, the  
completeness or accuracy of performance indicator data or other information provided to the
inspectors determined that the licensee should have reported the diluted boron solution  
agency, as is provided in Enforcement Policy Example 6.9(d)(10).
concentration to the NRC as a condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical  
Enforcement: This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) constitutes a minor
Specifications, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B). Specifically, the diluted boron solution  
violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement
concentration existed for longer (approximately 24 hours) than the total 20 hours allowed for  
Policy.
restoration and shutdown outage time per Technical Specifications. The licensee plans on  
                                                13
submitting a revised LER in response to the minor violation.  
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. Specifically,  
the failure to identify 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) on a Licensee Event Report did not impact the  
completeness or accuracy of performance indicator data or other information provided to the  
agency, as is provided in Enforcement Policy Example 6.9(d)(10).  
Enforcement: This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) constitutes a minor  
violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement  
Policy.  


EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
14
  *   On April 28, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to
      Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS  
  *   On February 5, 2021, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline
      inspection results to Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.  
      licensee staff.
  *   On March 18, 2021, the inspectors presented the Inservice Inspection results to
*  
      Mr. C. Elliott, Plant General Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
On April 28, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to  
  *   On March 25, 2021, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline
Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.  
      inspection results to Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the
*  
      licensee staff.
On February 5, 2021, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline  
  *   On April 28, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results inspection
inspection results to Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the  
      results to Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
licensee staff.  
                                                14
*  
On March 18, 2021, the inspectors presented the Inservice Inspection results to
Mr. C. Elliott, Plant General Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.  
*  
On March 25, 2021, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline  
inspection results to Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the  
licensee staff.  
*  
On April 28, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results inspection  
results to Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.  


DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
  Inspection Type             Designation   Description or Title                                         Revision or
15
Procedure                                                                                              Date
71111.04   Drawings         302-0351-00000 Standby Diesel Generator Starting Air                       GG
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED  
                            302-0352-00000 Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System                     LL
   
                            302-0353-00000 Standby Diesel Generator Lube Oil                           T
Inspection  
            Procedures       ELI-R22       15KV and 5KV Metal Clad Switchgear                           3/15/2021
Procedure
                            VLI-E12       Residual Heat Removal System                                 3/14/2021
Type  
                            VLI-E22A       High Pressure Core Spray                                     10
Designation  
                            VLI-R44       Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Starting Air System       6
Description or Title  
                            VLI-R45       Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System (Unit 1)   5
Revision or  
                            VLI-R47       Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Lube Oil                   7
Date  
71111.05   Procedures       FPI-A-B02     Fire Brigade Drills                                         01/27/2021
71111.04  
            Work Orders     200750956     Quarterly Fire Alarm                                         01/14/2021
Drawings
71111.08G Corrective Action CR-2019-02185 Foreign Material Head Tensioner Lock Washer Dropped in       03/19/2019
302-0351-00000  
            Documents                      Cavity
Standby Diesel Generator Starting Air  
                            CR-2019-02328 Relevant Indication Identified During Containment Surface   03/14/2019
GG  
                                            Exams
302-0352-00000  
                            CR-2019-02523 1C22D0012B Found with Internal Parts Missing - Potential     03/19/2019
Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System  
                                            Foreign Material
LL  
                            CR-2019-02677 During IVVI Piece of Foreign Material Identified Between Jet 03/22/2019
302-0353-00000  
                                            Pumps 16 and 17
Standby Diesel Generator Lube Oil  
                            CR-2019-02704 During IVVI Piece of Foreign Material Identified at Jet Pump 03/23/2019
T  
                                            17
Procedures
                            CR-2019-02893 Foreign Material Found Inside Reactor Vessel During Core     03/28/2019
ELI-R22  
                                            Verification
15KV and 5KV Metal Clad Switchgear
                            CR-2019-02956 Legacy Foreign Material Discovered in Inner Bellows         03/29/2019
3/15/2021  
                            CR-2019-02990 Foreign Material - Piece of Rope Found in Inner Bellows     03/30/2019
VLI-E12
                                            After Draindown
Residual Heat Removal System
                            CR-2019-03147 Leakage Identified During Reactor Pressure Vessel Test       04/03/2019
3/14/2021  
                            CR-2019-03157 Documentation of Identified Mechanical Joint Leakage         04/04/2019
VLI-E22A
                                            Identified During Reactor Pressure Vessel Leak Test (1R17)
High Pressure Core Spray
                            CR-2019-03358 Roll-Up Condition Report Following 1R17 Refuel - Foreign     04/09/2019
10  
                                            Material Focused Observations
VLI-R44  
                            CR-2019-04170 Additional Pitting Discovered in Piping Downstream of       05/07/2019
Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Starting Air System  
                                                      15
6  
VLI-R45  
Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System (Unit 1)  
5  
VLI-R47  
Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Lube Oil  
7  
71111.05  
Procedures
FPI-A-B02  
Fire Brigade Drills
01/27/2021  
Work Orders
200750956  
Quarterly Fire Alarm
01/14/2021  
71111.08G Corrective Action  
Documents 
CR-2019-02185  
Foreign Material Head Tensioner Lock Washer Dropped in  
Cavity
03/19/2019  
CR-2019-02328  
Relevant Indication Identified During Containment Surface  
Exams 
03/14/2019  
CR-2019-02523  
1C22D0012B Found with Internal Parts Missing - Potential  
Foreign Material
03/19/2019  
CR-2019-02677  
During IVVI Piece of Foreign Material Identified Between Jet  
Pumps 16 and 17
03/22/2019  
CR-2019-02704  
During IVVI Piece of Foreign Material Identified at Jet Pump  
17
03/23/2019  
CR-2019-02893  
Foreign Material Found Inside Reactor Vessel During Core  
Verification
03/28/2019  
CR-2019-02956  
Legacy Foreign Material Discovered in Inner Bellows  
03/29/2019  
CR-2019-02990  
Foreign Material - Piece of Rope Found in Inner Bellows  
After Draindown
03/30/2019  
CR-2019-03147  
Leakage Identified During Reactor Pressure Vessel Test  
04/03/2019  
CR-2019-03157  
Documentation of Identified Mechanical Joint Leakage  
Identified During Reactor Pressure Vessel Leak Test (1R17)  
04/04/2019
CR-2019-03358  
Roll-Up Condition Report Following 1R17 Refuel - Foreign  
Material Focused Observations
04/09/2019  
CR-2019-04170  
Additional Pitting Discovered in Piping Downstream of  
05/07/2019  


Inspection Type             Designation   Description or Title                                       Revision or
Procedure                                                                                            Date
16
                                          Emergency Service Water
                            CR-2020-02539 Mechanical Leakage Identified During ISI-P2-T2200-3       03/23/2020
Inspection  
                            CR-2020-06809 1R16 Snubber As-Built Discrepancy                         08/31/2020
Procedure
          Corrective Action ATA-2021-4926 Remove "Snubbers" from Definition of VT-3 in NQI-1042,     03/12/2021
Type  
          Documents                      Paragraph 3.15 to Align with Language Contained in ASME
Designation  
          Resulting from                  Section XI (2013 Edition), IWA-2213
Description or Title  
          Inspection
Revision or  
          Drawings         304-672-105   Piping Isometric, Reactor Water Clean-Up System, Reactor   D
Date  
                                          Building
Emergency Service Water  
                            305-002-113   ISI Piping Isometric, System P47 Chilled Water System Loop A
CR-2020-02539  
                                          B
Mechanical Leakage Identified During ISI-P2-T2200-3  
                            305-006-103   Reactor Vessel Closure Head, Circumferential and           A
03/23/2020  
                                          Meridional Weld Arrangement
CR-2020-06809  
                            305-006-108   ISI, System 1B13, Reactor Vessel Feedwater Nozzle Weld     D
1R16 Snubber As-Built Discrepancy  
                                          Arrangement
08/31/2020  
                            305-605-103   ISI Piping Isometric, System B21, Main Steam Loop C       C
Corrective Action  
                            305-605-107   ISI Piping Isometric, System B21, Main Steam Loop A,     D
Documents
                                          Steam Tunnel Elevation 620-6
Resulting from
                            305-701-102   ISI Piping Isometric, High Pressure Core Spray             D
Inspection 
                            305-871-104   System C11, Control Rod Drive, Loop B, Reactor Building   C
ATA-2021-4926  
                                          Elevation 620-6
Remove "Snubbers" from Definition of VT-3 in NQI-1042,  
                            92-701-0034   Pipe Support Mark Number 1E22-H0034                       A
Paragraph 3.15 to Align with Language Contained in ASME  
                            92-871-0040   Pipe Support Mark 1C11-H0040                               2
Section XI (2013 Edition), IWA-2213  
                            B-312-641     Containment Penetration Detail, Type K                     F
03/12/2021
          Miscellaneous     RRP 200724734 Repair Replacement Plan: Remove and Replace Reactor       0
Drawings
                                          Water Clean Up Heat Exchanger 4 Spool Piece Between
304-672-105  
                                          Heat Exchangers 1G33B0001C and 1G33B0002A
Piping Isometric, Reactor Water Clean-Up System, Reactor  
                            RRP 200726587 Repair Replacement Plan: Remove 3" Bypass                 0
Building  
                                          Piping/Components and Replace 14" Spool Piece Between
D
                                          Valve 1 P45F0541 B and Heat Exchanger 1 P4280001 B.
305-002-113  
                                          Also Replace Portion of Spool Piece Between Valve
ISI Piping Isometric, System P47 Chilled Water System Loop  
                                          1 P45F0541 B and Second Elbow Downstream of the Valve.
B  
                                          Reference ECP 18-0162-002
A
                            WPS 1.1.2-001 Welding Procedure Specification: P1 Gr. 1 & 2 to P1 Gr,   13
305-006-103  
                                                    16
Reactor Vessel Closure Head, Circumferential and  
Meridional Weld Arrangement  
A
305-006-108  
ISI, System 1B13, Reactor Vessel Feedwater Nozzle Weld  
Arrangement  
D
305-605-103  
ISI Piping Isometric, System B21, Main Steam Loop C  
C  
305-605-107  
ISI Piping Isometric, System B21, Main Steam Loop A,  
Steam Tunnel Elevation 620-6  
D
305-701-102  
ISI Piping Isometric, High Pressure Core Spray  
D  
305-871-104  
System C11, Control Rod Drive, Loop B, Reactor Building  
Elevation 620-6  
C
92-701-0034  
Pipe Support Mark Number 1E22-H0034  
A  
92-871-0040  
Pipe Support Mark 1C11-H0040  
2  
B-312-641  
Containment Penetration Detail, Type K  
F  
Miscellaneous
RRP 200724734  
Repair Replacement Plan: Remove and Replace Reactor  
Water Clean Up Heat Exchanger 4 Spool Piece Between  
Heat Exchangers 1G33B0001C and 1G33B0002A  
0
RRP 200726587  
Repair Replacement Plan: Remove 3" Bypass  
Piping/Components and Replace 14" Spool Piece Between  
Valve 1 P45F0541 B and Heat Exchanger 1 P4280001 B.
Also Replace Portion of Spool Piece Between Valve
1 P45F0541 B and Second Elbow Downstream of the Valve.
Reference ECP 18-0162-002  
0
WPS 1.1.2-001  
Welding Procedure Specification: P1 Gr. 1 & 2 to P1 Gr,
13  


Inspection Type       Designation Description or Title                                       Revision or
Procedure                                                                                      Date
17
                                    1&2
          NDE Reports 0941-19A-003 Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT): Piping Support Welded   03/13/2019
Inspection  
                                    Attachment: Component 1C11-H0040-WA
Procedure
                      0942-19A-008 Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): Top Head to Top Head   03/21/2019
Type  
                                    Flange: Component 1B13-AG
Designation  
                      0942-19A-010 Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): P124 Flued Head         03/25/2019
Description or Title  
                                    Fitting to Process Pipe Attachment Weld: Component
Revision or  
                                    1B21-P124-WA
Date  
                      0942-19B-009 Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 14 Pipe to 14 Elbow   03/13/2019
1 & 2  
                      0942-19B-014 Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): Flange to Pipe         03/13/2019
NDE Reports
                      0942-19B-015 Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): Pipe to Elbow Butt     03/13/2019
0941-19A-003  
                                    Welds
Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT): Piping Support Welded  
                      0942-19B-016 Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): (2) Half Coupling to   03/13/2019
Attachment: Component 1C11-H0040-WA  
                                    Pipe and Flange to Pipe Welds
03/13/2019
                      0942-19B-017 Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 14 Flange to 14 Elbow 03/13/2019
0942-19A-008  
                                    Butt Weld (Repair)
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): Top Head to Top Head  
                      0942-19B-025 Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 14 Pipe to 14 Elbow   03/25/2019
Flange: Component 1B13-AG  
                                    FW-07
03/21/2019
                      0942-19B-031 Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 4 Spool Piping         03/07/2019
0942-19A-010  
                      1042-19B-018 Visual Examination System Leakage (VT-2): Order             03/27/2019
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): P124 Flued Head  
                                    200726587 Piping Replacement
Fitting to Process Pipe Attachment Weld: Component
                      1042-21-023 Visual Examination of Pipe Hanger, Support, or Restraint   03/04/2021
1B21-P124-WA  
                                    (VT-3): Chilled Water System, Pipe Anchor, Component
03/25/2019
                                    1P47-H0219 Located on ISI Drawing 305-002-113
0942-19B-009  
                      1042-21-024 Visual Examination of Welds (VT-1): Chilled Water System   03/08/2021
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 14 Pipe to 14 Elbow  
                                    Pipe Anchor Integral Attachment, Component
03/13/2019  
                                    1P47-H0219-WA Located on ISI Drawing 305-002-113
0942-19B-014  
                      1042-21-029 Visual Examination of Pipe Hanger, Support, or Restraint   03/04/2021
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): Flange to Pipe  
                                    (VT-3): Mechanical Snubber, Drawing 305-701-102,
03/13/2019  
                                    Component 1E22-H0034
0942-19B-015  
                      APR-R17-02   Ultrasonic Examination Summary Sheet, System 1B13, Weld     03/282019
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): Pipe to Elbow Butt  
                                    Number 1B13-N4E-KB, Safe-End to Nozzle
Welds
                      MVR-004     UT Report with Calibration Records C-007 and C-008:         03/23/2019
03/13/2019  
                                    Component 1B13-DM
0942-19B-016  
                                              17
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): (2) Half Coupling to  
Pipe and Flange to Pipe Welds  
03/13/2019
0942-19B-017  
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 14 Flange to 14 Elbow  
Butt Weld (Repair)  
03/13/2019
0942-19B-025  
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 14 Pipe to 14 Elbow  
FW-07
03/25/2019  
0942-19B-031  
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 4 Spool Piping  
03/07/2019  
1042-19B-018  
Visual Examination System Leakage (VT-2): Order  
200726587 Piping Replacement
03/27/2019  
1042-21-023  
Visual Examination of Pipe Hanger, Support, or Restraint
(VT-3): Chilled Water System, Pipe Anchor, Component  
1P47-H0219 Located on ISI Drawing 305-002-113  
03/04/2021
1042-21-024  
Visual Examination of Welds (VT-1): Chilled Water System  
Pipe Anchor Integral Attachment, Component
1P47-H0219-WA Located on ISI Drawing 305-002-113  
03/08/2021
1042-21-029  
Visual Examination of Pipe Hanger, Support, or Restraint
(VT-3): Mechanical Snubber, Drawing 305-701-102,  
Component 1E22-H0034  
03/04/2021
APR-R17-02  
Ultrasonic Examination Summary Sheet, System 1B13, Weld  
Number 1B13-N4E-KB, Safe-End to Nozzle  
03/282019
MVR-004  
UT Report with Calibration Records C-007 and C-008:  
Component 1B13-DM  
03/23/2019


Inspection Type             Designation       Description or Title                                     Revision or
Procedure                                                                                                Date
18
                            UT-19-E006         UT Calibration/Examination Report: Component 1B21-006   03/15/2019
          Procedures       GEH-UT-247         Procedure for Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of     4
Inspection  
                                                Dissimilar Metal Welds
Procedure
                            GEH-UT-300         Procedure for Manual Examination of Reactor Vessel       12
Type  
                                                Assembly Welds in Accordance with PDI
Designation  
                            NOP-CC-5762       Appendix VIII Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of   3
Description or Title  
                                                Ferritic Welds
Revision or  
                            NQI-0941           Liquid Penetrant Examination                             22
Date  
                            NQI-0942           Magnetic Particle Examination                           22
UT-19-E006  
                            NQI-1042           Visual Examination                                       20
UT Calibration/Examination Report: Component 1B21-006  
          Work Orders       200718215         Reactor Vessel Top Head Meridional Weld Examination     03/21/2019
03/15/2019  
                            200718218         Piping Weld Exams on Main Steam Lines                   04/17/2019
Procedures
                            200724734         Replace 4 Piping - RWCU Piping Between Heat             04/11/2019
GEH-UT-247  
                                                Exchangers 1G33B0001C and 1G33B0002A
Procedure for Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of  
                            200726587          Replace 14 Piping - ESW B Piping Between 1P45F0541B   04/09/2019
Dissimilar Metal Welds  
                                                and Heat Exchanger 1P42B0001B and Between Valve
4
                                                1P45F0541B and Second Elbow Downstream of Valve
GEH-UT-300  
                            200728323         1B13 Reactor and Internals Non-Destructive Examination   04/18/2019
Procedure for Manual Examination of Reactor Vessel  
                            200794288         System P47 Exams: Pre-1R18                               03/12/2021
Assembly Welds in Accordance with PDI  
                            200794289         ISI of Piping, Supports, and Components of P42, P47, and 03/12/2021
12
                                                E22 Systems
NOP-CC-5762  
71111.11Q Miscellaneous     Evolution Specific Perry Nuclear Power Plant End of Cycle 18 Shutdown       0
Appendix VIII Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of  
                            Reactivity Plan
Ferritic Welds  
          Procedures        IOI-3             Power Changes                                           81
3
                            IOI-4             Shutdown                                                 26
NQI-0941  
71111.12   Corrective Action 2021-00266         Loss of Indication for Containment Radiation Monitor     01/15/2021
Liquid Penetrant Examination  
          Documents                            Outboard Isolation
22  
                            2021-01834         IFT Cable Damaged During Transfer                       03/14/2021
NQI-0942  
          Miscellaneous     NOP-ER-3004-03     Maintenance Rule Failure Review Form                     04
Magnetic Particle Examination  
                            NOP-SS-3001-02     Procedure Approval Form                                 12
22  
71111.13   Corrective Action 2021-00128         Multiple Alarms Received Coincident with Annunciator     01/7/2021
NQI-1042  
          Documents                            System Ground
Visual Examination  
                            2021-00455         EHC Pump A Leak                                       01/25/2021
20  
                                                          18
Work Orders
200718215  
Reactor Vessel Top Head Meridional Weld Examination  
03/21/2019  
200718218  
Piping Weld Exams on Main Steam Lines  
04/17/2019  
200724734  
Replace 4 Piping - RWCU Piping Between Heat  
Exchangers 1G33B0001C and 1G33B0002A
04/11/2019  
200726587
Replace 14 Piping - ESW B Piping Between 1P45F0541B  
and Heat Exchanger 1P42B0001B and Between Valve  
1P45F0541B and Second Elbow Downstream of Valve  
04/09/2019
200728323  
1B13 Reactor and Internals Non-Destructive Examination  
04/18/2019  
200794288  
System P47 Exams: Pre-1R18  
03/12/2021  
200794289  
ISI of Piping, Supports, and Components of P42, P47, and  
E22 Systems
03/12/2021  
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
Evolution Specific  
Reactivity Plan
Perry Nuclear Power Plant End of Cycle 18 Shutdown  
0  
Procedures 
IOI-3  
Power Changes  
81  
IOI-4  
Shutdown  
26  
71111.12  
Corrective Action  
Documents 
2021-00266
Loss of Indication for Containment Radiation Monitor  
Outboard Isolation 
01/15/2021  
2021-01834
IFT Cable Damaged During Transfer
03/14/2021  
Miscellaneous
NOP-ER-3004-03  
Maintenance Rule Failure Review Form  
04  
NOP-SS-3001-02  
Procedure Approval Form  
12  
71111.13  
Corrective Action  
Documents 
2021-00128
Multiple Alarms Received Coincident with Annunciator  
System Ground 
01/7/2021  
2021-00455
EHC Pump A Leak
01/25/2021  


Inspection Type             Designation     Description or Title                                         Revision or
Procedure                                                                                                Date
19
                            2021-01200     Planned Work Not Able to be Released as Scheduled Due to     02/23/2021
                                            Leakby Aux Condenser B Air Removal Suction Valve
Inspection  
                            2021-02121     Unplanned Division 1 DG Start During Integrated             03/23/2021
Procedure
                                            LOOP/LOCA Test
Type  
          Work Orders       200840213       Determine and Correct the Cause Ground on Electrical Bus     11/30/2020
Designation  
                                            D1A CR 2020-09061
Description or Title  
71111.15   Corrective Action 2020-09501     Ventilation Radiation Monitor Gas Channel Reading Erratic   12/16/2020
Revision or  
          Documents        2021-00338     Wrong Lead Lifted During Surveillance Performance           01/20/2021
Date  
                            2021-01707     Rod SCRAM Time Recorder Did Not Perform as Expected         03/10/2021
2021-01200  
                            2021-09635     Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor Suction Valve Would       12/22/2020
Planned Work Not Able to be Released as Scheduled Due to  
                                            Not Re-Open Following Compressor Start
Leakby Aux Condenser B Air Removal Suction Valve
          Work Orders       200798943       Safety Relief Valve Removes, Replaces and Offsite Testing   03/23/2021
02/23/2021
71111.18   Engineering       11-0559-002     Spring Charging Motor Margin Improvement - EH 1114           0
2021-02121
          Changes          ECP 15-0057     Installation of U1/U2 Startup Transformer                   02/26/2018
Unplanned Division 1 DG Start During Integrated  
          Engineering       ECP 19-0203-002 Dedicated Open Phase Control Room Annunciators - Unit 2     07/10/2020
LOOP/LOCA Test
          Evaluations
03/23/2021  
          Work Orders       200846449       Jumper Request to Remove Rod Block                           03/17/2021
Work Orders
71111.19   Corrective Action 2021-00266     Loss of Indication for Containment Radiation Monitor         01/15/2021
200840213  
          Documents                        Outboard Isolation
Determine and Correct the Cause Ground on Electrical Bus  
          Procedures        SVI-B21-T2100   Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Set Pressure Testing               7
D1A CR 2020-09061
                            SVI-D17-T2001   Plant Radiation Monitoring Isolation Valves Operability Test 8
11/30/2020
          Work Orders       100841399       Technical Support Center Ventilation Radiation Monitor Gas   01/4/2021
71111.15  
                                            Channel Reading Erratic Replacement
Corrective Action  
                            200391663      Replace Relay 1C17A-K0112B Reactor Protection System         0
Documents 
                                            Trip Channel B
2020-09501
                            200536387       Replace Relays 1E12-K18A/19A                                 03/22/2021
Ventilation Radiation Monitor Gas Channel Reading Erratic
                            200594427       Replace Power Supply PS22                                   01/12/2021
12/16/2020  
                            200727023       Install ECP-11-0559-002 74 Power Monitoring Relay in         03/14/2021
2021-00338
                                            Breaker EH1114
Wrong Lead Lifted During Surveillance Performance
                            200762809      Inspect/Tighten Packing-ESW PMP Div III                     01/5/2021
01/20/2021  
                            200795982       Control Unit Hydraulic                                       03/17/2021
2021-01707  
71111.20   Corrective Action 2021-01545     Condensate Booster Pump C Tripped Following Reactor         03/6/2021
Rod SCRAM Time Recorder Did Not Perform as Expected
          Documents                        Recirculation Pump Downshift
03/10/2021  
                                                        19
2021-09635  
Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor Suction Valve Would  
Not Re-Open Following Compressor Start
12/22/2020
Work Orders
200798943  
Safety Relief Valve Removes, Replaces and Offsite Testing
03/23/2021  
71111.18  
Engineering  
Changes 
11-0559-002
Spring Charging Motor Margin Improvement - EH 1114
0  
ECP 15-0057  
Installation of U1/U2 Startup Transformer
02/26/2018  
Engineering  
Evaluations 
ECP 19-0203-002 Dedicated Open Phase Control Room Annunciators - Unit 2
07/10/2020  
Work Orders
200846449  
Jumper Request to Remove Rod Block
03/17/2021  
71111.19  
Corrective Action  
Documents 
2021-00266  
Loss of Indication for Containment Radiation Monitor  
Outboard Isolation
01/15/2021  
Procedures 
SVI-B21-T2100  
Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Set Pressure Testing  
7  
SVI-D17-T2001
Plant Radiation Monitoring Isolation Valves Operability Test
8  
Work Orders
100841399  
Technical Support Center Ventilation Radiation Monitor Gas  
Channel Reading Erratic Replacement
01/4/2021  
200391663
Replace Relay 1C17A-K0112B Reactor Protection System  
Trip Channel B  
0
200536387  
Replace Relays 1E12-K18A/19A
03/22/2021  
200594427  
Replace Power Supply PS22
01/12/2021  
200727023  
Install ECP-11-0559-002 74 Power Monitoring Relay in  
Breaker EH1114
03/14/2021  
200762809
Inspect/Tighten Packing-ESW PMP Div III  
01/5/2021  
200795982  
Control Unit Hydraulic  
03/17/2021  
71111.20  
Corrective Action  
Documents 
2021-01545  
Condensate Booster Pump C Tripped Following Reactor  
Recirculation Pump Downshift
03/6/2021  


Inspection Type         Designation     Description or Title                                     Revision or
Procedure                                                                                        Date
20
                        2021-01557     Feedwater Heater 3A Isolated on High Level Following     03/6/2021
                                        Recirculating Pump Downshift to Slow Speed
Inspection  
                        2021-01564     Control Rod 02-27 Did Not Settle at 00                   03/7/2021
Procedure
                        2021-01604     Scaffold Level Inadvertently Dropped in the Suppression 03/8/2021
Type  
                                        Pool During Scaffold Erection
Designation  
                        2021-01829     Leak in High Pressure Core Spray Room                   03/14/2021
Description or Title  
                        2021-01857     As Found Blockage of 3-Inch Fire Protection System to   03/15/2021
Revision or  
                                        Emergency Service Water Pipe Connection
Date  
                        2021-01939     Fuel Assembly 18P568 Identified as Cycle 18 Fuel Defect 03/17/2021
2021-01557  
                        2021-02011     Design Discrepancies Contained Within the Engineering   03/19/2021
Feedwater Heater 3A Isolated on High Level Following  
                                        Change Package for the 1B33-F060B Side Drain Appendage
Recirculating Pump Downshift to Slow Speed  
                        2021-02117     Ground Detected on DC Bus                               03/22/2021
03/6/2021
                        2021-02159     Loose Bushing Terminal Lead Connectors Found in Unit 1   03/24/2021
2021-01564  
                                        Start-Up Transformer
Control Rod 02-27 Did Not Settle at 00  
                        2021-02237     Issues Noted on Post Maintenance Tests for Scram         03/25/2021
03/7/2021  
                                        Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves
2021-01604  
                        2021-02312     Control Rod Drive Mechanism Temperature for Rod 34-43   03/27/2021
Scaffold Level Inadvertently Dropped in the Suppression  
                                        Indicates Failed
Pool During Scaffold Erection
                        2021-02428     Hard Ground Indicated on DC Bus D-1-B                   03/31/2021
03/8/2021  
          Miscellaneous                 1R18 Shutdown Defense-In-Depth Report                   1
2021-01829  
          Procedures   SVI-B21-T1176   Reactor Coolant System Heat Up and Cooldown             03/7/2021
Leak in High Pressure Core Spray Room  
                                        Surveillance
03/14/2021  
71111.22   Procedures   GMI-0067       Under-Vessel Maintenance Activities                     19
2021-01857  
                        IMI-E2-47       Installation of Reactor Refuel Level Instrumentation for 03/9/2021
As Found Blockage of 3-Inch Fire Protection System to  
                                        IOI-9
Emergency Service Water Pipe Connection  
                        SVI-B21-T2100   Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Set Pressure Testing           7
03/15/2021
                        SVI-E12-T2210   Leak Rate Test for RHR to FWD Injection Valves           03/24/2021
2021-01939  
                                        1E12-F050A and 1E12-F053A
Fuel Assembly 18P568 Identified as Cycle 18 Fuel Defect  
                        SVI-G41-T2002   Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Operability Test   02/3/2021
03/17/2021  
                        SVI-R43-T7000-A Division 1 ECCS Integrated Test                         12
2021-02011  
                        TXI-0460       Division 1 Standby Diesel Generator Load Rejection Test  03/8/2021
Design Discrepancies Contained Within the Engineering  
          Work Orders   200751888       SRV Pressure Actuation Channel a Functional for         01/20/2021
Change Package for the 1B33-F060B Side Drain Appendage  
                                        1B21-N668A
03/19/2021
                        200778903      Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrument 1X13N0003 Calibration   01/27/2021
2021-02117  
                                                    20
Ground Detected on DC Bus  
03/22/2021  
2021-02159  
Loose Bushing Terminal Lead Connectors Found in Unit 1  
Start-Up Transformer
03/24/2021  
2021-02237  
Issues Noted on Post Maintenance Tests for Scram  
Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves  
03/25/2021
2021-02312  
Control Rod Drive Mechanism Temperature for Rod 34-43  
Indicates Failed
03/27/2021  
2021-02428  
Hard Ground Indicated on DC Bus D-1-B  
03/31/2021  
Miscellaneous
1R18 Shutdown Defense-In-Depth Report  
1  
Procedures
SVI-B21-T1176  
Reactor Coolant System Heat Up and Cooldown  
Surveillance
03/7/2021  
71111.22  
Procedures
GMI-0067  
Under-Vessel Maintenance Activities  
19  
IMI-E2-47  
Installation of Reactor Refuel Level Instrumentation for
IOI-9
03/9/2021  
SVI-B21-T2100  
Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Set Pressure Testing  
7  
SVI-E12-T2210
Leak Rate Test for RHR to FWD Injection Valves
1E12-F050A and 1E12-F053A  
03/24/2021
SVI-G41-T2002  
Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Operability Test
02/3/2021  
SVI-R43-T7000-A Division 1 ECCS Integrated Test
12  
TXI-0460
Division 1 Standby Diesel Generator Load Rejection Test   
03/8/2021  
Work Orders
200751888  
SRV Pressure Actuation Channel a Functional for
1B21-N668A 
01/20/2021  
200778903
Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrument 1X13N0003 Calibration  
01/27/2021  


Inspection Type             Designation   Description or Title                                       Revision or
Procedure                                                                                              Date
21
                                            Check
                            200778904     Level Sensor Calibration                                   02/3/2021
Inspection  
                            200778926     Standby Oil Pump Testing 1N27C0006A                         12/30/2020
Procedure
                            200783921     Control Rod Maximum SCRAM Insertion Time                   03/6/2021
Type  
                            200792417     High Pressure Core Spray Pump and Valve Operability Test   02/1/2021
Designation  
71124.01   Corrective Action CR-2021-01739 Two Unbriefed Dose Rate Alarms Received in Containment     03/11/2021
Description or Title  
          Documents                       Annulus 690' Elevation
Revision or  
          Corrective Action CR-2021-01952 NRC Comment During Radiological Hazards/ALARA               03/16/2021
Date  
          Documents                        Inspection for Loss of Telemetry
Check  
          Resulting from
200778904  
          Inspection
Level Sensor Calibration
          Radiation        N/A           Radiological Surveys for Lower Inclined Fuel Transfer       03/15/2021
02/3/2021  
          Surveys                          System
200778926  
                            PY-M-20210310- Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room Post Pump         03/09/2021
Standby Oil Pump Testing 1N27C0006A
                            7              Failure Verification Survey for Flow Accelerated Corrosion
12/30/2020  
                                            Exam Work
200783921  
                            PY-M-20210312- Scaffold Extension for Flow Accelerated Corrosion Exam     03/12/2021
Control Rod Maximum SCRAM Insertion Time
                            37
03/6/2021  
          Radiation Work   210518         Undervessel Activities                                     0
200792417  
          Permits (RWPs)    210602         Flow Accelerated Corrosion Exams in the Reactor Water       0
High Pressure Core Spray Pump and Valve Operability Test
                                            Clean-Up Heat Exchanger and Pump Room
02/1/2021  
                            210910         Inclined Fuel Transfer System Diving Activities and Support 0
71124.01  
                                            Work
Corrective Action  
71124.02   ALARA Plans       ALARA Plan     Undervessel Activities                                     0
Documents 
                            210518
CR-2021-01739  
                            ALARA Plan     Flow Accelerated Corrosion Exams in the Reactor Water       0
Two Unbriefed Dose Rate Alarms Received in Containment  
                            210602        Clean-Up Heat Exchanger Room
Annulus 690' Elevation
                            ALARA Plan     ALARA Plan for Inclined Fuel Transfer System Diving and     0
03/11/2021  
                            210910        Support Activities
Corrective Action
71124.05   Calibration                     Canberra Argos Personal Contamination Monitor;             02/17/2021
Documents  
          Records                          SN L70L004V
Resulting from
71124.08   Corrective Action 2019-03353     Radwaste Processing Inventory Issues                       04/09/2019
Inspection 
          Documents        2019-06245     Radwaste Tanks Require Multiple Iterations of Processing in 07/24/2019
CR-2021-01952  
                                            Order to Become Transfer Quality
NRC Comment During Radiological Hazards/ALARA  
                                                      21
Inspection for Loss of Telemetry  
03/16/2021
Radiation
Surveys 
N/A  
Radiological Surveys for Lower Inclined Fuel Transfer  
System
03/15/2021  
PY-M-20210310-
7
Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room Post Pump  
Failure Verification Survey for Flow Accelerated Corrosion  
Exam Work  
03/09/2021
PY-M-20210312-
37
Scaffold Extension for Flow Accelerated Corrosion Exam  
03/12/2021  
Radiation Work  
Permits (RWPs) 
210518  
Undervessel Activities  
0  
210602  
Flow Accelerated Corrosion Exams in the Reactor Water  
Clean-Up Heat Exchanger and Pump Room  
0
210910  
Inclined Fuel Transfer System Diving Activities and Support  
Work  
0
71124.02  
ALARA Plans
ALARA Plan  
210518
Undervessel Activities  
0  
ALARA Plan  
210602
Flow Accelerated Corrosion Exams in the Reactor Water  
Clean-Up Heat Exchanger Room  
0
ALARA Plan  
210910
ALARA Plan for Inclined Fuel Transfer System Diving and  
Support Activities  
0
71124.05  
Calibration  
Records 
Canberra Argos Personal Contamination Monitor;
SN L70L004V
02/17/2021  
71124.08  
Corrective Action  
Documents 
2019-03353  
Radwaste Processing Inventory Issues  
04/09/2019  
2019-06245  
Radwaste Tanks Require Multiple Iterations of Processing in  
Order to Become Transfer Quality  
07/24/2019


Inspection Type             Designation   Description or Title                                       Revision or
Procedure                                                                                            Date
22
                            2020-07918     Pre NRC-Assessment ATA 2020-10589 Identified               10/13/2020
                                          Deficiencies in Closure Packages for SVI-E31-T5190
Inspection  
          Miscellaneous   20118         Radioactive Material Transportation Training Record       07/09/2020
Procedure
                            451802001     10 CFR 61 Laboratory Analysis of Reactor Water Clean-Up   05/25/2018
Type  
                                          Resin
Designation  
                            510237001      10 CFR 61 Laboratory Analysis of Spent Resin               02/25/2020
Description or Title  
          Procedures       NOP-OP-4502   Control of Radioactive Material                           7
Revision or  
                            NOP-OP-5201   Shipment of Radioactive Material-Waste                     10
Date  
                            PCP-0000       Process Control Program                                   15
2020-07918  
                            RPI-1301       Movement of Radioactive Material/Waste Outside of         13
Pre NRC-Assessment ATA 2020-10589 Identified  
                                          Radiologically Controlled Areas and Onsite Interim Storage
Deficiencies in Closure Packages for SVI-E31-T5190  
          Self-Assessments ATA-2020-10589 Pre NRC-Inspection - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing   11/13/2020
10/13/2020
                                          and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and
Miscellaneous
                                          Transportation
20118  
          Shipping Records 19-1025       Radioactive Waste Shipment of Reactor Water Cleanup       06/05/2019
Radioactive Material Transportation Training Record  
                                          Resin
07/09/2020  
                            19-1030       Radioactive Waste Shipment of Reactor Water Cleanup       07/23/2019
451802001
                                          Resin
10 CFR 61 Laboratory Analysis of Reactor Water Clean-Up  
                            19-3033       Radioactive Material Shipment of Control Rod Drive         07/18/2019
Resin
                                          Mechanisms
05/25/2018  
                            20-1026       Radioactive Waste Shipment of Dewatered Resin             11/30/2020
510237001
                            21-2008       Radioactive Material Shipment Containing Radiologically   03/18/2021
10 CFR 61 Laboratory Analysis of Spent Resin  
                                          Contaminated Laundry
02/25/2020  
          Work Orders     200752735     Radioactive Source Inventory/Leak Test Record             09/03/2020
Procedures
                                                    22
NOP-OP-4502  
Control of Radioactive Material  
7  
NOP-OP-5201  
Shipment of Radioactive Material-Waste  
10  
PCP-0000  
Process Control Program  
15  
RPI-1301  
Movement of Radioactive Material/Waste Outside of  
Radiologically Controlled Areas and Onsite Interim Storage  
13
Self-Assessments ATA-2020-10589  
Pre NRC-Inspection - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing  
and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and  
Transportation  
11/13/2020
Shipping Records 19-1025  
Radioactive Waste Shipment of Reactor Water Cleanup  
Resin
06/05/2019  
19-1030  
Radioactive Waste Shipment of Reactor Water Cleanup  
Resin 
07/23/2019  
19-3033  
Radioactive Material Shipment of Control Rod Drive  
Mechanisms
07/18/2019  
20-1026  
Radioactive Waste Shipment of Dewatered Resin
11/30/2020  
21-2008  
Radioactive Material Shipment Containing Radiologically  
Contaminated Laundry
03/18/2021  
Work Orders
200752735  
Radioactive Source Inventory/Leak Test Record  
09/03/2020
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 09:01, 29 November 2024

Integrated Inspection Report 05000440/2021001
ML21132A095
Person / Time
Site: Perry FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/12/2021
From: Billy Dickson
NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2
To: Penfield R
Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp
References
IR 2021001
Download: ML21132A095 (25)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000440/2021001

Text

May 12, 2021

Mr. Rod L. Penfield

Site Vice President

Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

10 Center Road

Perry, OH 44081

SUBJECT:

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT

05000440/2021001

Dear Mr. Penfield:

On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection

at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. On April 28, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of

this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are

documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding

involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation

(NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this

inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection

report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional

Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector

at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a

response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your

disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,

Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the

NRC Resident Inspector at Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

R. Penfield

2

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection

and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document

Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public

Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief

Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000440

License No. NPF-58

Enclosure:

As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

ML21132A095

SUNSI Review

Non-Sensitive

Sensitive

Publicly Available

Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE RIII

RIII

NAME

RRiuz:ve via email

BDickson via email

DATE

5/11/2021

5/12/2021

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000440

License Number:

NPF-58

Report Number:

05000440/2021001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0045

Licensee:

Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp.

Facility:

Perry Nuclear Power Plant

Location:

Perry, Ohio

Inspection Dates:

January 01, 2021 to March 31, 2021

Inspectors:

S. Bell, Health Physicist

V. Myers, Senior Health Physicist

J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector

T. Ospino, Resident Inspector

J. Steffes, Senior Resident Inspector

T. Taylor, Fermi Resident Inspector

Approved By:

Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief

Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

2

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees

performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, in

accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs

program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to

https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Human Performance Error Resulted in Unplanned RCIC Unavailability

Cornerstone

Significance

Cross-Cutting

Aspect

Report

Section

Mitigating

Systems

Green

NCV 05000440/2021001-01

Open/Closed

[H.12] - Avoid

Complacency

71111.22

A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of

TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," was self-revealed on January 19, 2021, when an unexpected isolation

of the RCIC steam supply occurred. Specifically, during performance of SVI-E31-T5395A,

"RCIC Steam Line Flow High Channel Functional for E31-N684A," Revision 8, the licensee

failed to lift the lead from terminal B4 for relay 1E51-K24, resulting in the closure of the RCIC

steam supply outboard valve and an unplanned limiting condition for operation (LCO) entry

and unavailability of the RCIC system.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

3

PLANT STATUS

Perry Nuclear Power Plant began the inspection period at 97 percent of rated thermal power in

coastdown operations before a refueling outage. On January 10, 2021, the 1B feedwater heater

isolated. The isolation resulted in a power perturbation. In response to the power perturbation

and feedwater heater isolation, the operators lowered reactor power to 79 percent to maintain

margin to thermal limits per abnormal operating procedures. High water level conditions caused

the heater isolation. The high-water level condition resulted from a failed circuit card in the level

transmitter for the alternate level controller. Operators restored level using the normal level

controller. The operators returned the unit to maximum attainable power and continued

coastdown operations on January 11, 2021. On March 6, 2021, operators shutdown the

reactor to commence refueling outage 1R18. The reactor remained shut down in the refueling

outage for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with

their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met

consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection

Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,

observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance

with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President

of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019

(COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access

licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors

performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in

IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site

portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to

determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be

performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per

the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The

inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

4

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following

systems/trains:

(1)

High pressure core spray (HPCS) system on February 9, 2021

(2)

Division 2 diesel generator while division 1 vital bus was removed from service for

modification on March 13, 2021

(3)

Residual heat removal (RHR) B partial alignment due to outage configuration on

March 14, 2021

(4)

Electrical bus and load alignment due to outage configuration on March 15, 2021

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a

walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,

material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1)

Quarterly fire protection alarm test on January 14, 2021

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

Fire protection drill on January 27, 2021

71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)

BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding

Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel

internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary were

appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were

appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the documentation of

the following activities from March 8, 2021 to March 18, 2021:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.

1. Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Main Steam System 26 Inch Elbow to Pipe

Weld, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Category R-A,

Component 1B21-0006

2. UT of Reactor Vessel Top Head Meridional Weld, ASME Category B-A,

Component 1B13-DM

3. UT of Reactor Vessel Feedwater Nozzle Weld, ASME Category R-A,

Component 1B13-N4E-KB

5

4. Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) of Control Rod Drive System Piping

Support Welded Attachment, ASME Category C-C, Component

1C11-H0040-WA

5. Magnetic Particle Examination (MT) of Reactor Vessel Top Head to Top Head

Flange Meridional Weld, ASME Category B-A, Component 1B13-AG

6. MT of Main Steam System Flued Head Fitting to Process Pipe Attachment

Weld, ASME Category B-K, Component 1B21-P124-WA

7. Visual Examination (VT-3) of High-Pressure Core Spray System Pipe

Restraint, ASME Category F-A, Component 1E22-H0034

8. Visual Examinations of Chilled Water System: VT-3 of Pipe Anchor, ASME

Category F-A, Component 1P47-H0219 and VT-1 of Pipe Anchor Integral

Attachment Weld, ASME Category D-A, Component 1P47-H0219-WA

9. AVR-R17-01, ASME Section XI Flaw Evaluation, Weld ID 1B13-AE

10. Pipe Replacement of Essential Service Water System B Piping between

Valve 1P45F0541B and Heat Exchanger 1P42B0001B and between

Valve 1P45F0541B and Second Downstream Elbow; Weld Numbers

200726587-01, -02, -03, -04, -05, -06 and -07 (WO 200726587)

11. Pipe Replacement of Reactor Water Clean Up System; Spool Piece between

Heat Exchangers 1G33B0001C and 1G33B0002A; Weld Numbers

200724734-01, -02, -03, -04, -05, -06, and -07 (WO 200724734)

The above volumetric (UT) and surface (PT and MT) examination records were

selected from the previous outage in 2019 (1R17), since there were no ISI exams or

aging management related exams performed during this outage (1R18).

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the

Control Room during plant shutdown and cooldown activities for the 1R18 refueling

outage on March 6 to 7, 2021.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following

structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended

function:

(1)

Combustible gas mixing system A failure on December 22, 2020

(2)

Containment radiation monitor outboard isolation loss of indication on

January 15, 2021

(3)

Inclined fuel transfer system failure on March 16, 2021

(4)

Division 1 emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) integrated test failures and

resolution on March 22 to 24, 2021

6

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the

following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and

appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1)

Plant risk assessment related to D1A electrical bus emergent work started on

November 30, 2020

(2)

Emergent work for annunciator system ground alarms on January 7, 2021

(3)

Emergent work related to electro-hydraulic pump A leak and spill on

January 25, 2021

(4)

Reactor feed pump turbine "B" emergent work on February 22 to 24, 2021

(5)

Plant risk assessment during the Division 1 ECCS integrated test between

March 22 to 24, 2021

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the

following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1)

Combustible gas mixing system A (CR 2020-09635) failure and common cause

review on December 22, 2020

(2)

Operability review based on CR 2020-09501 related to the Technical Support Center

radiation monitor on January 4, 2021

(3)

Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system operability verification based on

CR 2021-00338 on January 19, 2021

(4)

Operability review for SCRAM insertion times after shutdown on March 6, 2021

(5)

Operability review for safety relief valves (SRV) after set pressure testing on

March 29, 2021

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

(3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1)

Dedicated open phase control room annunciator modification on December 17, 2020

(2)

Installation of temporary jumpers to bypass the rod block as part of outage emergent

activities on March 17, 2021

(3)

Breaker EH1114 relay modification associated with Engineering Change 11-0559-002

on March 16, 2021

7

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system

operability and functionality:

(1)

Technical support center testing following radiation monitor repair work on

December 16, 2020, to January 4, 2021

(2)

Division 3 emergency service water testing following packing adjustment on

January 5, 2021

(3)

Testing of the containment radiation monitor outboard isolation valve following blown

fuse replacement on January 15, 2021

(4)

Testing following average power range monitor A and B power supply replacement

on January 19, 2021

(5)

"B" reactor protection system trip channel Potter-Brumfield relay replacement for

1C71A-K012B, work order 200391663

(6)

Testing following replacement of control rod drive mechanisms on March 17, 2021

(7)

Testing following replacement of "A" RHR relays on March 22 to 24, 2021

(8)

SRV test following replacement on March 29, 2021

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)

(1)

(Partial)

The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 1R18 activities from March 6 to

March 31, 2021. Activities evaluated by the inspectors included, but were not limited

to, shutdown and cooldown operations, reduced inventory control, containment

walkdown, reactor vessel disassembly for heavy load controls, refueling operations,

reactor coolant system instrumentation, outage plan and shutdown risk.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

(1)

SRV pressure actuation channel A test on January 20, 2021

(2)

HPCS pump test on February 1, 2021

(3)

Fuel pool cooling and cleanup system surveillance on February 3, 2021

(4)

Control rod maximum scram-based insertion time on March 6, 2021

(5)

Division 1 standby diesel generator load rejection test on March 8, 2021

(6)

Division 1 ECCS integrated test between March 22 to 24, 2021

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

"C" RHR system pump and valve operability test, work order 200792521.

8

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

Leak rate test for the shutdown cooling A to the feedwater shutdown isolation valve

1E12-F050A on March 22, 2021

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

Calibration check of FLEX fuel pool level transmitter on January 27, 2021

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of

radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and

how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to

access high radiation areas.

(1)

The inspectors evaluated radiological protection related instructions to plant workers

for emergent diving activities on the inclined fuel transfer system.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination

and radioactive material.

(1)

The inspectors observed workers exiting the radiologically controlled area (RCA).

(2)

The inspectors observed licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material

leaving the radiologically controlled area.

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and

observation of the following radiological work activities.

(1)

Inclined fuel transfer system diving activities under RWP 210910

(2)

Flow accelerated corrosion exams in the reactor water cleanup heat exchanger and

pump room under RWP 210602

(3)

Control rod drive mechanism exchange under RWP 210518

9

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very

High Radiation Areas:

(1)

Locked high radiation area for reactor water clean-up pump repair in the auxiliary

building 599'

(2)

Locked high radiation area for the fuel pool cooling pump room in the intermediate

building 574'

(3)

Locked high radiation area established for fuel moves in containment 620'

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency

(IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician

performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed as low as reasonably achievable practices and radiological work

controls for the following work activities.

(1)

Inclined fuel transfer system diving activities under RWP 210910

(2)

Flow accelerated corrosion exams in the reactor water cleanup heat exchanger and

pump room under RWP 210602

(3)

Control rod drive mechanism exchange under RWP 210518

Radiation Worker Performance (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance

during:

(1)

Inclined fuel transfer system diving activities under RWP 210910

71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant

walkdowns:

(1)

Radiation monitors (portal monitor, personnel contamination monitor and small article

monitor) located at the RCA exit.

(2)

Portable radiation survey instrumentation located at the RCA exit and the

Instrumentation Calibration Facility (Geiger Mueller contamination monitoring

instruments and dose rate survey instruments including ion chambers, pressurized

ion chambers and Telepoles).

(3)

Gamma spectroscopy systems and liquid scintillation instrumentation located within

the Chemistry Counting Room.

10

(4)

JL Shepherd Model 89 instrumentation calibrator.

(5)

Area Radiation Monitors and Continuous Air Monitors in the Fuel Handling Building

Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection

instruments:

(1)

Canberra Argos Personal Contamination Monitor, SN L70L004V

71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,

& Transportation

Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's performance in controlling, labelling and securing

radioactive materials in the following locations.

(1)

Outside radioactive material storage locations

(2)

Radiation protection radioactive source storage locations (calibration facility and RCA

exit)

Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02 (1 Sample)

(1)

Inspectors walked down accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems

located in the radioactive waste handling building and evaluated system configuration

and functionality.

Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees characterization and classification of

shipment 19-1030 consisting of reactor water cleanup resin radioactive waste

(2)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees characterization and classification of

shipment 20-1026 consisting of spent resin radioactive waste

Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors observed shipment number 21-008, containing radioactive

contaminated laundry.

Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through

a record review:

(1)

Radioactive waste shipment 19-1030 consisting of reactor water cleanup resin

transported in a Type B package

(2)

Radioactive waste shipment 20-1026 consisting of dewatered resin transported in

a general design package

(3)

Radioactive waste shipment 19-1025 consisting of reactor water cleanup resin

transported in a Type B package

11

(4)

Radioactive material shipment 19-3033 consisting of control rod drive mechanisms

transported in a Type A package

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1)

LER 2020-002-00, Standby Liquid Control System Rendered Inoperable due to Valve

Misposition (ADAMS Accession No. ML20293A204). The inspection conclusions

associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results

Section 71153.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Human Performance Error Resulted in Unplanned RCIC Unavailability

Cornerstone

Significance

Cross-Cutting

Aspect

Report

Section

Mitigating

Systems

Green

NCV 05000440/2021001-01

Open/Closed

[H.12] - Avoid

Complacency

71111.22

A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of

TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," was self-revealed on January 19, 2021, when an unexpected

isolation of the RCIC steam supply occurred. Specifically, during performance of

SVI-E31-T5395A, "RCIC Steam Line Flow High Channel Functional for E31-N684A,"

Revision 8, the licensee failed to lift the lead from terminal B4 for relay 1E51-K24, resulting in

the closure of the RCIC steam supply outboard valve and an unplanned limiting condition for

operation (LCO) entry and unavailability of the RCIC system.

Description:

On January 19, 2021, during the performance of SVI-E31-T5395A, RCIC Steam Line Flow

High Channel Functional for E31-N684A, Revision 8, the licensee received several control

room alarms and identified that the RCIC steam supply outboard valve was closed. The

licensee determined that an inadvertent isolation of the RCIC system and an unplanned

inoperability had occurred. The inspectors determined that procedural steps were not

implemented during the surveillance test, as written. Specifically, the licensee failed to

perform Section 5.1 appropriately, steps 72a and 72b, and complete the independent

verification to ensure the correct lead was lifted from terminal B4 associated with relay

1E51-K24. This failure resulted in the closure of the RCIC steam supply outboard valve and

the RCIC system unavailability.

Corrective Actions: Immediate corrective actions included securing from the surveillance,

restoration of the RCIC steam supply flow path and RCIC system operability.

Corrective Action References: CR 2021-00338, Wrong Lead lifted during Surveillance

Performance 1/19/2021.

12

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The resident inspectors determined that the licensees failure to

implement Section 5.1, Steps 72a and 72b of SVI-E31-T5395A, RCIC steam line flow high

channel functional for E31-N684A, Revision 8, was a performance deficiency. Specifically,

the failure to ensure the correct lead was lifted from terminal B4 of the relay 1E51-K24 in

accordance with the procedure directly led to the inoperability and unavailability of the RCIC

system.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,

reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences. The resident inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more

than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating

Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the

availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to lift the correct lead from

terminal B4 of relay 1E51-K24, which directly led to the closure of the RCIC steam supply

outboard valve and steam flow path isolation, thus negatively impacting the availability of the

RCIC system.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The

Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened

the finding against the Mitigating Systems screening questions in Exhibit 2 and answered

"NO" to all screening questions. Therefore, the finding screened to very low safety

significance (Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the

possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful

outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the licensee

failed to implement error reduction tools from Section 4.2.5.3 of NOBP-LP-2601, "Human

Performance Program," Revision 13, independent verification which resulted in the failure to

implement the procedure as written.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1, "Procedures," requires, in part, that written

procedures/instructions be established, implemented, and maintained covering the following

activities: the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33,

Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A,

Section 8b(2)(r), states, in part, that for the reactor core isolation system "Specific procedures

for surveillance tests, inspections, and calibrations should be written (implementing

procedures are required for each surveillance test, inspection, or calibration listed in the

technical specifications."

Contrary to the above, on January 19, 2020, while performing an activity affecting quality, the

licensee did not accomplish a surveillance test in accordance with the procedure and

incorrectly performed a step in surveillance procedure SVI-E31-T5395A, and failed to lift the

proper lead. Specifically, the licensee failed to lift the lead from terminal B4 from relay

1E51A-K24 resulting in an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.5.3, Condition A,

and adversely affected the availability of the RCIC system.

13

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with

Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Minor Violation

71153

Minor Violation: Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000440/2020-002 documented a condition

where the standby liquid control (SLC) system was rendered inoperable due to a valve

alignment issue. The event occurred on August 21, 2020, from 0953 to 1307 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.973135e-4 months <br />

(approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />). The licensee submitted the LER to the NRC according to

10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(A) and 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented

the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to shut down the reactor and mitigate

the consequences of an accident.

The LER stated that on August 20, 2020, Periodic Test Instruction, PTI-C41-P0001, Standby

Liquid Control Transfer System Pump, and Valve Operability Test, was being performed on

the SLC system. During the test on August 20, 2020, at 1248 hours0.0144 days <br />0.347 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.74864e-4 months <br />, a valve misposition

resulted in the inadvertent addition of 226 gallons of water to the SLC storage tank, causing

an unintended dilution of the boron solution. On August 21, 2020, at 0953 hours0.011 days <br />0.265 hours <br />0.00158 weeks <br />3.626165e-4 months <br />, the SLC

system was declared inoperable when the sample results for the SLC storage tank confirmed

the boron solution concentration did not meet Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.7 criteria. The

licensee restored operability on August 21, 2020, at 1307 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.973135e-4 months <br />.

While reviewing LER 05000440/2020-002, the inspectors identified that the diluted boron

solution concentration existed for a time longer than permitted by TS 3.1.7. Following the

guidance in NUREG-1022 Revision 3 "Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, the

inspectors determined that the licensee should have reported the diluted boron solution

concentration to the NRC as a condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical

Specifications, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B). Specifically, the diluted boron solution

concentration existed for longer (approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) than the total 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> allowed for

restoration and shutdown outage time per Technical Specifications. The licensee plans on

submitting a revised LER in response to the minor violation.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. Specifically,

the failure to identify 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) on a Licensee Event Report did not impact the

completeness or accuracy of performance indicator data or other information provided to the

agency, as is provided in Enforcement Policy Example 6.9(d)(10).

Enforcement: This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) constitutes a minor

violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement

Policy.

14

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On April 28, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to

Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On February 5, 2021, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline

inspection results to Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the

licensee staff.

On March 18, 2021, the inspectors presented the Inservice Inspection results to

Mr. C. Elliott, Plant General Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.

On March 25, 2021, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline

inspection results to Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the

licensee staff.

On April 28, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results inspection

results to Mr. R. Penfield, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

15

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.04

Drawings

302-0351-00000

Standby Diesel Generator Starting Air

GG

302-0352-00000

Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System

LL

302-0353-00000

Standby Diesel Generator Lube Oil

T

Procedures

ELI-R22

15KV and 5KV Metal Clad Switchgear

3/15/2021

VLI-E12

Residual Heat Removal System

3/14/2021

VLI-E22A

High Pressure Core Spray

10

VLI-R44

Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Starting Air System

6

VLI-R45

Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System (Unit 1)

5

VLI-R47

Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Lube Oil

7

71111.05

Procedures

FPI-A-B02

Fire Brigade Drills

01/27/2021

Work Orders

200750956

Quarterly Fire Alarm

01/14/2021

71111.08G Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2019-02185

Foreign Material Head Tensioner Lock Washer Dropped in

Cavity

03/19/2019

CR-2019-02328

Relevant Indication Identified During Containment Surface

Exams

03/14/2019

CR-2019-02523

1C22D0012B Found with Internal Parts Missing - Potential

Foreign Material

03/19/2019

CR-2019-02677

During IVVI Piece of Foreign Material Identified Between Jet

Pumps 16 and 17

03/22/2019

CR-2019-02704

During IVVI Piece of Foreign Material Identified at Jet Pump

17

03/23/2019

CR-2019-02893

Foreign Material Found Inside Reactor Vessel During Core

Verification

03/28/2019

CR-2019-02956

Legacy Foreign Material Discovered in Inner Bellows

03/29/2019

CR-2019-02990

Foreign Material - Piece of Rope Found in Inner Bellows

After Draindown

03/30/2019

CR-2019-03147

Leakage Identified During Reactor Pressure Vessel Test

04/03/2019

CR-2019-03157

Documentation of Identified Mechanical Joint Leakage

Identified During Reactor Pressure Vessel Leak Test (1R17)

04/04/2019

CR-2019-03358

Roll-Up Condition Report Following 1R17 Refuel - Foreign

Material Focused Observations

04/09/2019

CR-2019-04170

Additional Pitting Discovered in Piping Downstream of

05/07/2019

16

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Emergency Service Water

CR-2020-02539

Mechanical Leakage Identified During ISI-P2-T2200-3

03/23/2020

CR-2020-06809

1R16 Snubber As-Built Discrepancy

08/31/2020

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

ATA-2021-4926

Remove "Snubbers" from Definition of VT-3 in NQI-1042,

Paragraph 3.15 to Align with Language Contained in ASME

Section XI (2013 Edition), IWA-2213

03/12/2021

Drawings

304-672-105

Piping Isometric, Reactor Water Clean-Up System, Reactor

Building

D

305-002-113

ISI Piping Isometric, System P47 Chilled Water System Loop

B

A

305-006-103

Reactor Vessel Closure Head, Circumferential and

Meridional Weld Arrangement

A

305-006-108

ISI, System 1B13, Reactor Vessel Feedwater Nozzle Weld

Arrangement

D

305-605-103

ISI Piping Isometric, System B21, Main Steam Loop C

C

305-605-107

ISI Piping Isometric, System B21, Main Steam Loop A,

Steam Tunnel Elevation 620-6

D

305-701-102

ISI Piping Isometric, High Pressure Core Spray

D

305-871-104

System C11, Control Rod Drive, Loop B, Reactor Building

Elevation 620-6

C

92-701-0034

Pipe Support Mark Number 1E22-H0034

A

92-871-0040

Pipe Support Mark 1C11-H0040

2

B-312-641

Containment Penetration Detail, Type K

F

Miscellaneous

RRP 200724734

Repair Replacement Plan: Remove and Replace Reactor

Water Clean Up Heat Exchanger 4 Spool Piece Between

Heat Exchangers 1G33B0001C and 1G33B0002A

0

RRP 200726587

Repair Replacement Plan: Remove 3" Bypass

Piping/Components and Replace 14" Spool Piece Between

Valve 1 P45F0541 B and Heat Exchanger 1 P4280001 B.

Also Replace Portion of Spool Piece Between Valve

1 P45F0541 B and Second Elbow Downstream of the Valve.

Reference ECP 18-0162-002

0

WPS 1.1.2-001

Welding Procedure Specification: P1 Gr. 1 & 2 to P1 Gr,

13

17

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

1 & 2

NDE Reports

0941-19A-003

Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT): Piping Support Welded

Attachment: Component 1C11-H0040-WA

03/13/2019

0942-19A-008

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): Top Head to Top Head

Flange: Component 1B13-AG

03/21/2019

0942-19A-010

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): P124 Flued Head

Fitting to Process Pipe Attachment Weld: Component

1B21-P124-WA

03/25/2019

0942-19B-009

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 14 Pipe to 14 Elbow

03/13/2019

0942-19B-014

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): Flange to Pipe

03/13/2019

0942-19B-015

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): Pipe to Elbow Butt

Welds

03/13/2019

0942-19B-016

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): (2) Half Coupling to

Pipe and Flange to Pipe Welds

03/13/2019

0942-19B-017

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 14 Flange to 14 Elbow

Butt Weld (Repair)

03/13/2019

0942-19B-025

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 14 Pipe to 14 Elbow

FW-07

03/25/2019

0942-19B-031

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT): 4 Spool Piping

03/07/2019

1042-19B-018

Visual Examination System Leakage (VT-2): Order

200726587 Piping Replacement

03/27/2019

1042-21-023

Visual Examination of Pipe Hanger, Support, or Restraint

(VT-3): Chilled Water System, Pipe Anchor, Component

1P47-H0219 Located on ISI Drawing 305-002-113

03/04/2021

1042-21-024

Visual Examination of Welds (VT-1): Chilled Water System

Pipe Anchor Integral Attachment, Component

1P47-H0219-WA Located on ISI Drawing 305-002-113

03/08/2021

1042-21-029

Visual Examination of Pipe Hanger, Support, or Restraint

(VT-3): Mechanical Snubber, Drawing 305-701-102,

Component 1E22-H0034

03/04/2021

APR-R17-02

Ultrasonic Examination Summary Sheet, System 1B13, Weld

Number 1B13-N4E-KB, Safe-End to Nozzle

03/282019

MVR-004

UT Report with Calibration Records C-007 and C-008:

Component 1B13-DM

03/23/2019

18

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

UT-19-E006

UT Calibration/Examination Report: Component 1B21-006

03/15/2019

Procedures

GEH-UT-247

Procedure for Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of

Dissimilar Metal Welds

4

GEH-UT-300

Procedure for Manual Examination of Reactor Vessel

Assembly Welds in Accordance with PDI

12

NOP-CC-5762

Appendix VIII Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of

Ferritic Welds

3

NQI-0941

Liquid Penetrant Examination

22

NQI-0942

Magnetic Particle Examination

22

NQI-1042

Visual Examination

20

Work Orders

200718215

Reactor Vessel Top Head Meridional Weld Examination

03/21/2019

200718218

Piping Weld Exams on Main Steam Lines

04/17/2019

200724734

Replace 4 Piping - RWCU Piping Between Heat

Exchangers 1G33B0001C and 1G33B0002A

04/11/2019

200726587

Replace 14 Piping - ESW B Piping Between 1P45F0541B

and Heat Exchanger 1P42B0001B and Between Valve

1P45F0541B and Second Elbow Downstream of Valve

04/09/2019

200728323

1B13 Reactor and Internals Non-Destructive Examination

04/18/2019

200794288

System P47 Exams: Pre-1R18

03/12/2021

200794289

ISI of Piping, Supports, and Components of P42, P47, and

E22 Systems

03/12/2021

71111.11Q Miscellaneous

Evolution Specific

Reactivity Plan

Perry Nuclear Power Plant End of Cycle 18 Shutdown

0

Procedures

IOI-3

Power Changes

81

IOI-4

Shutdown

26

71111.12

Corrective Action

Documents

2021-00266

Loss of Indication for Containment Radiation Monitor

Outboard Isolation

01/15/2021

2021-01834

IFT Cable Damaged During Transfer

03/14/2021

Miscellaneous

NOP-ER-3004-03

Maintenance Rule Failure Review Form

04

NOP-SS-3001-02

Procedure Approval Form

12

71111.13

Corrective Action

Documents

2021-00128

Multiple Alarms Received Coincident with Annunciator

System Ground

01/7/2021

2021-00455

EHC Pump A Leak

01/25/2021

19

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

2021-01200

Planned Work Not Able to be Released as Scheduled Due to

Leakby Aux Condenser B Air Removal Suction Valve

02/23/2021

2021-02121

Unplanned Division 1 DG Start During Integrated

LOOP/LOCA Test

03/23/2021

Work Orders

200840213

Determine and Correct the Cause Ground on Electrical Bus

D1A CR 2020-09061

11/30/2020

71111.15

Corrective Action

Documents

2020-09501

Ventilation Radiation Monitor Gas Channel Reading Erratic

12/16/2020

2021-00338

Wrong Lead Lifted During Surveillance Performance

01/20/2021

2021-01707

Rod SCRAM Time Recorder Did Not Perform as Expected

03/10/2021

2021-09635

Combustible Gas Mixing Compressor Suction Valve Would

Not Re-Open Following Compressor Start

12/22/2020

Work Orders

200798943

Safety Relief Valve Removes, Replaces and Offsite Testing

03/23/2021

71111.18

Engineering

Changes

11-0559-002

Spring Charging Motor Margin Improvement - EH 1114

0

ECP 15-0057

Installation of U1/U2 Startup Transformer

02/26/2018

Engineering

Evaluations

ECP 19-0203-002 Dedicated Open Phase Control Room Annunciators - Unit 2

07/10/2020

Work Orders

200846449

Jumper Request to Remove Rod Block

03/17/2021

71111.19

Corrective Action

Documents

2021-00266

Loss of Indication for Containment Radiation Monitor

Outboard Isolation

01/15/2021

Procedures

SVI-B21-T2100

Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Set Pressure Testing

7

SVI-D17-T2001

Plant Radiation Monitoring Isolation Valves Operability Test

8

Work Orders

100841399

Technical Support Center Ventilation Radiation Monitor Gas

Channel Reading Erratic Replacement

01/4/2021

200391663

Replace Relay 1C17A-K0112B Reactor Protection System

Trip Channel B

0

200536387

Replace Relays 1E12-K18A/19A

03/22/2021

200594427

Replace Power Supply PS22

01/12/2021

200727023

Install ECP-11-0559-002 74 Power Monitoring Relay in

Breaker EH1114

03/14/2021

200762809

Inspect/Tighten Packing-ESW PMP Div III

01/5/2021

200795982

Control Unit Hydraulic

03/17/2021

71111.20

Corrective Action

Documents

2021-01545

Condensate Booster Pump C Tripped Following Reactor

Recirculation Pump Downshift

03/6/2021

20

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

2021-01557

Feedwater Heater 3A Isolated on High Level Following

Recirculating Pump Downshift to Slow Speed

03/6/2021

2021-01564

Control Rod 02-27 Did Not Settle at 00

03/7/2021

2021-01604

Scaffold Level Inadvertently Dropped in the Suppression

Pool During Scaffold Erection

03/8/2021

2021-01829

Leak in High Pressure Core Spray Room

03/14/2021

2021-01857

As Found Blockage of 3-Inch Fire Protection System to

Emergency Service Water Pipe Connection

03/15/2021

2021-01939

Fuel Assembly 18P568 Identified as Cycle 18 Fuel Defect

03/17/2021

2021-02011

Design Discrepancies Contained Within the Engineering

Change Package for the 1B33-F060B Side Drain Appendage

03/19/2021

2021-02117

Ground Detected on DC Bus

03/22/2021

2021-02159

Loose Bushing Terminal Lead Connectors Found in Unit 1

Start-Up Transformer

03/24/2021

2021-02237

Issues Noted on Post Maintenance Tests for Scram

Discharge Volume Vent and Drain Valves

03/25/2021

2021-02312

Control Rod Drive Mechanism Temperature for Rod 34-43

Indicates Failed

03/27/2021

2021-02428

Hard Ground Indicated on DC Bus D-1-B

03/31/2021

Miscellaneous

1R18 Shutdown Defense-In-Depth Report

1

Procedures

SVI-B21-T1176

Reactor Coolant System Heat Up and Cooldown

Surveillance

03/7/2021

71111.22

Procedures

GMI-0067

Under-Vessel Maintenance Activities

19

IMI-E2-47

Installation of Reactor Refuel Level Instrumentation for

IOI-9

03/9/2021

SVI-B21-T2100

Safety Relief Valve (SRV) Set Pressure Testing

7

SVI-E12-T2210

Leak Rate Test for RHR to FWD Injection Valves

1E12-F050A and 1E12-F053A

03/24/2021

SVI-G41-T2002

Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Operability Test

02/3/2021

SVI-R43-T7000-A Division 1 ECCS Integrated Test

12

TXI-0460

Division 1 Standby Diesel Generator Load Rejection Test

03/8/2021

Work Orders

200751888

SRV Pressure Actuation Channel a Functional for

1B21-N668A

01/20/2021

200778903

Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrument 1X13N0003 Calibration

01/27/2021

21

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Check

200778904

Level Sensor Calibration

02/3/2021

200778926

Standby Oil Pump Testing 1N27C0006A

12/30/2020

200783921

Control Rod Maximum SCRAM Insertion Time

03/6/2021

200792417

High Pressure Core Spray Pump and Valve Operability Test

02/1/2021

71124.01

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-2021-01739

Two Unbriefed Dose Rate Alarms Received in Containment

Annulus 690' Elevation

03/11/2021

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-2021-01952

NRC Comment During Radiological Hazards/ALARA

Inspection for Loss of Telemetry

03/16/2021

Radiation

Surveys

N/A

Radiological Surveys for Lower Inclined Fuel Transfer

System

03/15/2021

PY-M-20210310-

7

Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room Post Pump

Failure Verification Survey for Flow Accelerated Corrosion

Exam Work

03/09/2021

PY-M-20210312-

37

Scaffold Extension for Flow Accelerated Corrosion Exam

03/12/2021

Radiation Work

Permits (RWPs)

210518

Undervessel Activities

0

210602

Flow Accelerated Corrosion Exams in the Reactor Water

Clean-Up Heat Exchanger and Pump Room

0

210910

Inclined Fuel Transfer System Diving Activities and Support

Work

0

71124.02

ALARA Plans

ALARA Plan

210518

Undervessel Activities

0

ALARA Plan

210602

Flow Accelerated Corrosion Exams in the Reactor Water

Clean-Up Heat Exchanger Room

0

ALARA Plan

210910

ALARA Plan for Inclined Fuel Transfer System Diving and

Support Activities

0

71124.05

Calibration

Records

Canberra Argos Personal Contamination Monitor;

SN L70L004V

02/17/2021

71124.08

Corrective Action

Documents

2019-03353

Radwaste Processing Inventory Issues

04/09/2019

2019-06245

Radwaste Tanks Require Multiple Iterations of Processing in

Order to Become Transfer Quality

07/24/2019

22

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

2020-07918

Pre NRC-Assessment ATA 2020-10589 Identified

Deficiencies in Closure Packages for SVI-E31-T5190

10/13/2020

Miscellaneous

20118

Radioactive Material Transportation Training Record

07/09/2020

451802001

10 CFR 61 Laboratory Analysis of Reactor Water Clean-Up

Resin

05/25/2018

510237001

10 CFR 61 Laboratory Analysis of Spent Resin

02/25/2020

Procedures

NOP-OP-4502

Control of Radioactive Material

7

NOP-OP-5201

Shipment of Radioactive Material-Waste

10

PCP-0000

Process Control Program

15

RPI-1301

Movement of Radioactive Material/Waste Outside of

Radiologically Controlled Areas and Onsite Interim Storage

13

Self-Assessments ATA-2020-10589

Pre NRC-Inspection - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing

and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and

Transportation

11/13/2020

Shipping Records 19-1025

Radioactive Waste Shipment of Reactor Water Cleanup

Resin

06/05/2019

19-1030

Radioactive Waste Shipment of Reactor Water Cleanup

Resin

07/23/2019

19-3033

Radioactive Material Shipment of Control Rod Drive

Mechanisms

07/18/2019

20-1026

Radioactive Waste Shipment of Dewatered Resin

11/30/2020

21-2008

Radioactive Material Shipment Containing Radiologically

Contaminated Laundry

03/18/2021

Work Orders

200752735

Radioactive Source Inventory/Leak Test Record

09/03/2020

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