IR 05000285/1986031

Insp Rept 50-285/86-31 on 861117-21.Violations Noted: Inadequate Radiological Emergency Response Training

ML20212Q951
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	01/16/1987
From:	Terc N, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212Q939	List: IR 05000285/1986031 ML20212Q937 ML20212Q944
References
50-285-86-31, NUDOCS 8702020428
Download: ML20212Q951 (6)

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APPENulX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/86-31 License: DPR-40 Docket: 50-285 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station Inspection At: Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: November 17-21, 1986 Inspector: !

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N'.'M.~Terc, Emergency Preparedness Analyst Date l//b!O Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Programs Section Contractor: G. W. Bethke, Comex Approved:

L. A. Yandell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Date'

) //S!M and Safeguards Programs Section Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted November 17-21, 1986 (Report 50-285/86-31)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensees emergency preparedness program including: changes to the program, knowledge and performance of duties, audits, and public information progra Results: Within the four areas inspected, one violation was identified (inadequate training of personnel; paragraph 5).

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DETAILS OPPD Personnel Contacted W. Anderson, Shift Supervisor J. Biggs, Shift Chemistry Technician G. Chatfield, Shift Supervisor

• A. Christensen, Health Physicist M. Christensen, Instructor M. Core, Supervisor Maintenance J. Fluehr, Supervisor, Site Training

• F. Franco, Manager, Radiation Health and Emergency

• W. Gates, Plant Manager M. Gautier, Manager, Media Relations and Publications G. Hammond, Shift Chemistry Technician

• R. Jaworski, Manager, Technical Section

• L. Kusek, Supervisor, Operations K. Morris, Division Manager, Quality Assurance and Regulatory Affairs

• D. Munderloh, Senior Engineer D. Pettit, Manager, Public Information

• A. Richard, Manager, Quality Assurance

• G. Roach, Supervisor, Chemistry and Radiation Protection

• S. Sehers, Emergency Plan Coordinator H. Sterba, Division Manager, Corporate Communication

• Denotes those individuals who attended the exit intervie . License Actions On Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Deviation (285/8516-04): The NRC inspector determined that Procedure EPIP-OSC-2 was changed and that Attachment 1, " Nuclear Power Plant Incident Initial Report to Offsite Government Agencies," now constitutes the only notification form used during emergencies. This new form provides technical information in a manner that is useful to offsite authorities. The licensee's performance during the 1986 exercise and t'he walkthroughs conducted during this inspection demonstrated that the procedure reflected actual notification practices. This item is close (Closed) Violation (285/8519-01): The NRC inspector verified that Procedures EPIP-OSC-2, EPIP-OSC-14, and EPIP-EOF-6 were revised and now provide efficient means for performing initial dose assessment and notification In addition, the inspector verified by means of walkthroughs that the shift chemists, shift technical advisors, and senior reactor operators had received additional training in this area This item is close (Closed) Violation (285/8519-02): The NRC inspector noted that, in addition to the improvements described under violation 285/8519-01, the l

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licensee conducted several drills with various scenarios requiring shift health physics technicians to ascertain habitability conditions in the control room and to make recommendations to the shift supervisor. This item is close (Closed) Violation (285/8519-03): The NRC inspectcr determined that the Safety Audit and Review Committee (SARC) conducted an internal audit in SARC Audit No. 2-86 from April to May 1986, in which the independent reviewers adequately evaluated and documented interfaces with state and local governments. This item is close (Closed) Deviation (285/8519-04): The NRC inspector determined that retraining is being accomplished within a 12-month cycl In addition, the NRC inspector noted that the site emergency planning staff is in charge of maintaining emergency response training schedules and records, and that a dedi ated microcomputer is being used for this purpos This item is close . Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program The NRC inspector verified that changes to the-emergency plan and implementing procedures were reviewed by licensee management and were in compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(q). In addition, the NRC inspector noted that prccedures had been changed to reflect actual practices (e.g.,

notification procedures). The NRC inspector reviewed a sample of previous inspection findings to ascertain whether responsibilities for the resolution had been assigned, the items had been followed up, and adequate corrective actions had been taken. The NRC inspector noted that the licensee had taken all actions necessary to adequately correct three violations and one deviation described in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/85-1 No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Audit Program The NRC inspector reviewed Administrative Procedure DAS-EP-1, " Emergency Preparedness Test Program," the SARC Charter, internal audit schedules, audit plans, and SARC independent reviews of emergency preparedness for the year 198 In addition, interviews were held with the SARC chairma The N'tC inspector noted that although the audit for the year 1986 was adequate, a more systematic approach could be used to ensure that each objective outlined in the audit plan has a corresponding set of questions in such a manner that each objective can be clearly verified. The licensee agreed that in the next audit of emergency preparedness, a greater effort will be made to ensure that questions address all the objectives of the audit plan in a more systematic manne No violations or deviations were identifie e . ,

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5. Personnel Knowledge and Performance (Training)

The NRC inspector reviewed sections of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) for Fort Calhoun Station, the RERP Implementing Procedures, Technical Specifications, the Station Training Manual (STM), the Emergency Plan Training tianual (EPTM), and previous NRC inspection reports. In addition, the NRC inspector reviewed training records, and conducted interviews and walkthroughs with on-shift emergency response personnel including: shift supervisors, reactor operators, shift technical advisors, and chemistry technician Two walkthroughs involving two different shift operating staffs and lasting approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> each were conducted in the control roo Additionally, training interviews were held with two chemistry technicians and two site directors to ascertain their proficiency under simulated- 'j emergency condition During these walkthroughs and interviews, the NRC inspector observed the following: One of two shift supervisors failed to notify the NRC that a simulated station blackout was in progress, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(iii)

and by Section E (1.1) of the Radiological Response Emergency Plan (RERP) for Fort Calhoun Station, which states that the NRC will be notified within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of the declared emergency per Standing order R-1 The two shift supervisors and two site directors interviewed failed to demonstrate a basic understanding of the design, operation, capabilities, and eme.rgency uses of the post accident sampling system (e.g., ability to perform insitu versus grab sample analysis). The two shift supervisors and two site directors interviewed failed to demonstrate a basic understanding of those aspects of meteorology (e.g., difference between stable and unstable conditions) that would have a major impact on the effects of a radioactive release and on their decisions pertaining to protective action recommendation One of two shift supervisors incorrectly understood that the containment atmosphere monitoring system discharged to the auxiliary buildin One of two shift supervisors failed to demonstrate an understandin of the differences between site area and general emergency classifications and was not aware of the requirement to make protective action recommendations at a general emergency declaratio One of two shift supervisors failed to relate challenges to failure of fission product barriers to emergency classification One of two shift supervisors exhibited a general weakness in the j knowledge and performance of his emergency preparedness duties, in

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e that a number of forceful prompts from the shift technical advisor I

and senior, reactor operator were needed in order for him to make classification and notification decision Both chemistry technicians failed to demonstrate a knowledge of the i order of severity of the different levels of emergency classification (e.g., failed to name them, and confused the order of severity).

1 One chemistry technician could not find an alternate procedure in j OI-PAP-8 to estimate the magnitude and consequences of offsite

, radioactive releases. The other technician had difficulty in finding the procedur Neither was able to perform dose projections when given the situation of failed process monitor (This is contrary to the intent of Section E (3.0) of the 'lERP which states in part that personnel resources allow for continuing monitoring and assessment of

] abnormal radioloaical conditions.)

j These examples of inadequate training are an apparent violation against l 10 CFR 50.54(q), which requires that licensees follow and maintain in i effect emergency plans according to certain standards, specifically

! those in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) which requires that radiological emergency

response training be provided to those who may be called to assist an l emergency and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F which requires that i training be provided "to ensure that employees of the licensee are familiar i with their specific emergency rMponse duties . . .," (285/8631-01).

I The NRC inspector noted that both operating shifts were able to promptly l classify the events and notify offsite authorities and the NRC. This was

a noted improvement from previous inspections. In addition, the NRC -

! inspector determined that both chemistry technicians interviewed were able

to use a new dose assessment procedure for making initial calculations j under nor. mal conditions, that is, when all process radiation monitors are 4 cperating properly. Using this procedure they were prompt in supporting

! the operating staff so that they in turn were able to make timely .

i notifications of offsite authoritie ,

No other violations and no deviations were foun , Public Notification Program i The NRC inspector reviewed the publication issued by the licensee to I

describe emergency planning information to the public within the Emergency

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Flanning Zone (EPZ). The inspector noted that this publication had the form of a yearly brochure, contained the information required, and that it

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i was distributed annually. The inspector verified that the materials were i being reviewed annually. The brochure contained methods and times i required for public notifications, a list of local broadcast stations that will be used for dissemination of information during an emergency, and protective actions planned if an emergency occurred.

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The NRC inspector also noted that the description of the effects of-radiation used in the brochure was scanty and very general in nature. The licensee agreed that in the future they would review and make necessary revisions to this portion of the brochur The NRC inspector vdrified that the licensee used other means of information dissemination aimed at the transient population. These consisted of distributing the same brochures to hotels, restaurants, and the like. In addition, the NRC inspector verified that points of contact were provided by the licensee for the public to acquire a,dditional informatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The exit interview was conducted on November 21, 1986, with licensee representatives. The senior NRC resident inspector, Mr. Phillip H. Harrell was in attendanc Mr. Nemen M. Terc, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, summarized the findings and observations. The NRC inspector identi#ied one violation (paragraph 5 of this report) and ~ closed five open items from previous inspection l

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