IR 05000254/1986019: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20207P231
| number = ML20215E463
| issue date = 01/06/1987
| issue date = 01/30/1987
| title = Special Safety Insp Repts 50-254/86-19 & 50-265/86-20 on 861110-21.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Requalification Exam Results & Requalification Training Program Review.Significant Deficiencies Identified
| title = Insp Repts 50-254/86-19 & 50-265/86-14 on 861104-870115.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected: Inservice Insp Activities,Review of Program,Procedures & Licensee Action on IE Bulletins
| author name = Burdick T, Clark F, Damon D, Hare S
| author name = Danielson D, Ward D
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-254-86-19, 50-265-86-20, NUDOCS 8701150269
| case reference number = FRN-59FR979
| package number = ML20207P226
| document report number = 50-254-86-19-01, 50-254-86-19-1, 50-265-86-14, AC93-1-033, AC93-1-33, IEB-79-14, IEB-80-07, IEB-80-7, IEB-83-02, IEB-83-2, NUDOCS 8706190380
| package number = ML20215E459
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 9
| page count = 12
}}
}}


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0t9tISSION
.,.
f U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY.. COMMISSION-


==REGION III==
==REGION III==
Reports No. 50-254/86019(DRS);50-265/86020(DRS)
Reports No. 50-254/86019(DRS); 50-265/86014(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265   Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Cordova, Illinois Inspection Conducted: November 10-21, 1986 I
'. Docket Nos.- 50-254;-50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwe'alth Edison Company P. O. Box-767 Chicago, IL .60690
  ~~l S. Hare 3kM b  I-b_g7 Inspectors:
. Facility Name: Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, Illinois Inspection Conducted: November 4-5, 12-13, 18, 26, December 3-4,-10-11, 6, and January 7-8, 15, 1987 Inspector: . D. Ward    30/f 7
Date MhtL' P
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      /- 6 ' 5 7 D. Damon Date
Date b [An~
   '(h
! Accompanied By: D. F. Danielson   kud7 Date (December 3-4)
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      /'b~O F. Clark   ~
Ifa~te'
Approved By:
Approved By:
K0 T. Burdick, Chief  /'6'8)
W hk D. H. Danielson, Chief  M3e F7 Materials and Processes Section-
Operator Licensing Section Date l Inspec_ tion Sumary Inspection on November 10-21, 1986_(Rep _ orts No. 50-254/8_6019(D_RSh
      '
! No. 50-265 Areas Tnsp/86020(DRS))Special ec ted_:
Date Inspection Summary
safety inspection by regional inspectors of the NRC requalification exam results and requalification training program review (41701).
  ; Inspection on November 4-5, 12-13, 18, 26, December 3-4, 10-11, 17-18, 1986,'
and January 7-8, lb, 198/ (Report No. 50-254/86019(DRS); No. 50-26b/86014(URS))
-Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of inservice inspection (ISI) activities,includingreviewofprogram(73051), procedures (73052),
observation of work and work activities (73753), and data review and evaluation H (73755); licensee action on IE' Bulletins (92703) and licensee event reports (92700); ultrasonic examination (UT) of shroud head bolts (57080); radiographic ,
examination (RT)ofbatteryjumpercables(57090);modificationofstandby  i liquid control system (37701, 55700, 57700); and thickness checks performed on l the drywell (57080).    !
.Results: No violations or deviations were identifie j i
i 8706190380 870130    );
PDR ADDCK 05000254 G  PDR l
l


Results: No violations or deviations were identified, however, significant l deficiencies were identified in the requalification training program. Subsequent to a November 13, 1986 Management meeting (Paragraph 4) a meeting was held at the Quad Cities station between NRC and Station Management on November 21, 1986 i
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i to discuss the problems identified in this repor PDR ADOCK 05000254 O PDR l-
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l DETAILS
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  . 1'. Persons Contacted ~
DETAILS 1.- P_ersons Contacted CECO
Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco)
'
   *D. Gibson, Quality Assurance'(QA) Superintendent
.
   .
   *+ N. Kalivianakis, Division Vice President
   '*R. Robey, Services:Su~perintendent  !
*
   *C.-' Smith,. Quality. Control (QC) Supervisor  <
   *+ R. Bax, Quad Cities Station Manager
   *M.'Kool, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
   *+ R. Roby, Quad Cities Services Superintendent
   '*J. Hoeller, Lead Nuclear Engineer
   *+ C. Norton, Quad Cities Quality Assurance
   *H. Do. ISI/IST Group Leader
   #*+J. Neal, Quad Cities Training Supervisor R. Kelley, Quad Cities, Training Specialist
   : R. Bax,' Sr. Station Manager D. Thayer, Maintenance Senior Staff Engineer C. Kron1ch, Technical Staff Engineer K. Medulan, ISI Coordinator B. Wilson, level III, ND J. Ford, QC' Inspector
,
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   #W. Graham, Quad Cities Training Specialist
      !
   +L. Gerner, Regulatory Assurance Support-
Structural Integrity Associates, In ..
  +R. Holyoak, Training Manater Production Department
D. Pitcairn, Associate General Electric.(GE)
   +R. Klemm, Ph. D., PTC Program Development Administrator
R. Hooper, Manager, Inspection Services-T. Brinkman, Supervisor Morrison Construction-Company,(MCC)
'
W. Flesch, QC Supervisor Hartford Steam Boiler-Inspection & Insurance Company (HSB)
  +D. Farrar, Nuclear Licensing
F. Roose, ANII United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
'  +J. Marshall, Quality Assurance
D. Danielson, Chief, Materials and Processes Section A. Morrongi_ello, Resident Inspector The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employee * Denotes those present at the final exit interview January 15, 198 . Licensee Action on IE Bulletins (Closed)-IE Bulletin No. 83-02 (254/83-02-BB): Stress corrosion cracking in large diameter stainless steep recirculation system l
  +1. Johnson, Nuclear Licensing
  +P. LeBlond, Nuclear Licensing
   +R. Gaylord, GE Operator Training Services
,
NRC
  + N. Jackiw, Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects
;  + P. Phillips, Operational Programs Section Chief
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  +W. G. Guldemond, Chief, Projects Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects
:
  #+T. M. Burdick, Operator Licensing Section Chief
  #*+C. W. Hehl, Chief, Operations Branch, . Division of Reactor Safety
!  +C. E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects i  .+ C. J. Paperiello, Director, Division of Reactor Safety
  +N. J. Chrissotimos, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety
  + E. Hills, Operator Licensing Examiner
  * Denotes those attending the exit interview on November 12, 1986.


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   + Denotes those attending the Management Meeting in the Region III office
a
- on November 13,-198 # Denotes those attending the exit interview on November 21, 198 . Rev_iew of NRC Re, qualification Exam Results Region III administered a requalification examination (written and ,
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oral) to licensed Reactor and Senior Reactor Operator personnel at Quad Cities the week of September 15, 1986. Due to the high initial ,
, ,
failure rate (63%) and NRC examiner standard (NUREG-1021) requirements, additional examinations were scheduled and administered the week of
s
! October 13, 1986. The results of both sets of examinations are sumarized below:    :
   . pipin The inspector reviewed the fina1Lresponse, followed the activities and considers-the' bulletin close Reference: NRC Inspection Reports No.- 50-254/84-06,No.'50-265/(84-05,-
No. 50-254/85016, No. 50-265/85008). (Close'd)IEBulletinNo. 80-07(254/80-07-BB;265/80-07-BB):
Ultrasonicexamination(UT)ofUnit2JetPumfBeamBolt Assemblies._ All 20 jet pump beams were UT'd )y CECO October 20, 1986, and found to be acceptabl It'is' CECO'sintentto'continuetoUT'the~jetpumpbeamsduringeach refueling outage. Any cracked beams will be replaced prior to unit startup. The NRC inspector. reviewed the procedure utilized to UT thejetpumpbeamsandotherassociateddocumentationanddetermined that the actions implemented by.the licensee meet the intent of the
  ' Bulleti . Licensee Action on Licensee Event Reports (LER) (Closed) LER No. 86-017, Revision 00: . Weld No. 02K-S3 pinhole leak: Weld No. 02K-53 1s an elbow to aipe, 12" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel weld in tie recirculation syste Manual UT was performed on the weld in 1983, and no recordable indications were'found. On November 5, 1986, while CECO'was'
conducting a visual examination of the prepared weld surface prior to UT, a small pinhole with water seeping from it was discovere Manual UT determined the leak to be an axially-oriented crack aaproximately'0.4" long at 2 o' clock on the elbow side of the wel T1e weld was then weld overlayed, UT'd and found to be acceptabl (Closed) LER No. 86-024, Revision 00: Residual heat removal (RHR)
service water (RHRSW) supports exceed Code stress allowables. On August 11, 1986, CECO found that there were supports on the RHR service water system that would experience uplift loads or exceed the AISC Code allowable stresses during safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) loading. The hangers that exceeded the allowable stresse were supports on the original piping. During the engineering phase oftheproject,severalsupportswereidentifiedthathadthe  ,
potential for requiring modifications. However, it was later '
determinedduringtheprojectclosecutthatthesupportshadnot i been modified as required. Cause of the omission was attributed to inadequate design control by Ceco's engineering and the architect engineer, CYGN Modification M-4-1/2-86-19 was initiated to modify the necessary RHRSW supports and to bring the RHRSW to within the '
design specifications of the FSAR for long-term operation. The NRC inspector visually examined the final modification of supports M-10260-127, 145, 700, 701 and 702 and reviewed procedures, specifications, drawings and other documentation related to the modifications. The NRC inspector found the modification and l documentation acceptable and considers this item close (0 pen) LER 86-025, Revision 00: Torus attached small bore piping does not meet code allowable limits due to design error, During a re-analysis of the IE Bulletin No. 79-14 Mark I Program, it was


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Total  Passing Category Administered Passed  Failed Rate (1%)
SR0  13 7  6 5 R0  11 7  4 6 Total  7 T4  T6 E The results of these examinations resulted in a determination by the NRC that the Quad Cities requalification program was unsatisfactory in accordance with the criteria identified in NUREG-1021. This NUREG states a requalification program is unsatisfactory when less than 60 percent of evaluated operators pass all portions of the examinatio The licensee was informed of this unsatisfactory program determination by telephone on November 7, 1986. During this telephone conference, the licensee committed to certain interim actions and to meet with the NRC on November 13, 1986, to discuss their plans for upgrading the Quad Cities licensed operator requalification program. These cannitments were the subject of a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL-RIII-86-007) dated November 10, i 1986, issued to Commonwealth Ediso Simultaneous with the issuance of the CAL, regional inspectors were dispatched to the Quad Cities station to perform a performance-based requalification training inspection to determine the root cause of the unsatisfactory requalification test results. This report documents the findings from this inspection and summarizes the licensee's commitments made during the November 13, 1986 Management Meetin . L_icensed Reacto_r Opera _ tor,Requali_fication Program Review Initial NRC review of the examination results identified, operator knowledge in the following areas as weak:
*
Technical Specifications Abnormal Procedures (Q0A)
Emergency Procedures (QGA)
*
Normal Procedures (QOP)
i In the November 13, 1986 ManagementMeeting(Section4),thelicensee identified additional weaknesses in general procedure knowledge, reactor theory and selected plant system The inspectors performed interviews with station management, training personnel and licensed operators to determine the root cause for these weak areas. The inspectors found, as delineated in the following paragraphs, deficiencies in all of the required requalification program
! areas as contained in 10 CFR 55, Appendix A.


, Schedule t
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To satisfy the requirements of the licensee's requalification training program, 64 hours of lecture training was performed
discoveredthatcertainsmallboretorusattachedpiping.(four-inches-or less) did not meet FSAR: requirements to meet Code-allowable stress limits for seismic and Mark I loading condition , The architect engineer performed an operability. assessment and determined that all lines in question were operable. 'Approximately
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:20 to 30 hangers per unit will require modification. Design of the modification supports was'in progress during this outage. This
   (2 week period) once a year which culminated in the administration of a "requalification exam." This does not appear to be in
, modification may start in late 198 .(Closed) LER No. 86-033, Revision 00: Control-Room Panel Mounting ~;
Units-1 and 2. In late March 1986 unanchored control room panels were discovered at Dresden by CECO. As a result a walkdown by CECO of the Quad Cities.' control room panels was performed on March 27, 1986. The purpose of this~walkdown was.to verify whether the> lack of intentional positive anchorage found at Dresden was the case at Quad Cities.. Like Dresden,.the bolted connections. indicated on the design document (4E-1161) between the floor anchored base channel and the panels did not exist. Discrepancy Record (DR) 04-86-2451 was initiated-to document this discrepanc Unlike Dresden, which had no lositive intentional anchorage, the Quad Cities panels were attacled to the anchored floor channels-with a combination of plug and fillet weld CECO aerformed an-operability assessment on April 1, 198 The opera)ility assessment usingengineeringjudgementconcludedthatthereexistedsufficient positive anchorage to withstand significant seismic motio The recent dual unit outage allowed access into the control room-panel Sargent and Lundy (S&L) engineers were contracted to evaluate the control room panel mounting. A detailed'walkdown to record the existing positive panel anchorage was performed. An evaluation of the anchorages indicated that.the anchorage of some of the panels were not quite within allowable stresses based upon FSAR requirement Safety-related Modification No. M-4-1-86-36 was initiated to bring the control room panel anchorages within FSAR seismic requirement Workwas'completedundersafety-relatedWorkRequestNo.Q5327 'On November 13, 1986, Sargent & Lundy issued five en ineering change notices (ECN),QC-865-19throughQC-865-23. The ECN s showed the information required to bring all the panel anchorages within FSAR allowable The NRC inspector visually examined the following:
* Fillet welds that were welded by Morrison Construction Company which attached the outside of Panels 901-2, 901-10, 901-11, 901-13, 901-19 and 901-37 to the channel bas * Four brace supports that were added to attach the top of *
severalpanelstotheadjacentconcretewal * Braces that were added to panels 912-2, 912-8, and 912- y- ;
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These re) airs / modifications were completed on November 15,'1986, when bot 1 units were in cold shutdow ..
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lThe NRC' inspector reviewed the following documents: -QC Surveillance; DR;; Work' Request package 53275; Welders Certifications in Accordance
   --with.ASME Section IX; Wel ing Procedure Specifications; Five- ..
  . Engineering Change Notices (ECN);' Drawings; Operability: Assessment;
"  Weld Data Reports; Process Control ~ Checklist; Traveller Checklist; .
Station Modifications Checklist; Final Documentation Checklist; Work-Request Checklis In addition, S&L performed an operability. assessment of the as-found'
i  state of the control-room panel anchorage. The purpose of this assessment was to investigate whether the panels would have been stable in case of a safe shutdown earthcuake (SSE) in the originally constructed
  , condition. S&L concludec that even though the as-found anchorages did not always meet the FSAR requirements, the panels would have


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remained. stable during an SS ''
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The NRC inspector found the repairs / modifications and documentation-acceptable and considers;this item clos . Inservice Inspection (ISI) Unit 2
  - General This is the eighth outage of the first period of the second ten year pla CECO, GE and Conam performed the ISI in accordance with ASME Section XI, 1980 Edition, Winter 1980 addenda and Code Case N-23 CECO performed. visual examinations (VT), GE performed ultrasonic (UT), magnetic particle (MT), and liquid penetrant examinations :
  (PT), and Conam performed PT on the weld overlays onl The Level II and"III UT personnel performing UT were qualified at the EPRI NDE center after September 10 1985 by successfully performing the practical examination. Level i perso,nnel not cualified at EPRI who were performing UT scanning duties were trainec by EPRI cualified personnel onsite. Ceco's Level III UT personnel who reviewec^GE's NDE results were also EPRI qualifie In performing ultrasonic examinations on the welds, GE used their ;
data acquisition system (SMART) that is a complete UT package capable of examining welds by remote control and storing the collected-data for future review / evaluation. The display is a color presentation that is stored on a floppy disk for future referenc Normally the system uses the standard shear wave transducer for flaw detection and sizing; however, other types of transducers may be used with the system as desire The UT of weld overlays was performed to a CECO procedure based on i  techniques developed by EPRI.' The EPRI techniques for examination of weld overlays utilize duel element, pitch catch, and focused refracted "L" wave transducers. For the overlay weld metal,


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accordance with the.requiren'ents for a requalification program training schedule. Specifically 10 CFR 55, Appendix A, requires that lecture be performed on a regular and continuing basis throughout the license period. The performance of 64 hours lecture, once a year, while perhaps meeting the law, may not meet the intent of the law. This potential disparity will be tracked as an unresolved item (254/86019-01(0LS); 265/86020-01(0LS)) pending NRC resolution. The licensee's new requalification training program should satisfy this requirement. The licensee is implementing a six shift rotation with their licensed personnel which will allow for training each shift every fif th or sixth week. This will enable them to perform training on a regular and continuing basis and satisfy the requirements of the regulatio Lecture Formal classroom lectures are an integral part of any requalification training program and are a requirement of 10 CFR 55, Appendix A. The lectures should be performed on a regular and continuing basis throughout the license period and include those areas where the annual exams indicate a need for more coverag The licensee's fomal classroom lecture portion of the requalification program occurred over a two week period in which 64 hours were spent in lecture. Exceptions were noted however, where classroom time was as little as three days and as much as three weeks in one year. For all exceptions identified, the lecture time exceeded the 80 hour in two year requirement of their program. The inspector's felt the 64 hours requalification classroom training, in light of the NRC requalification exam results, was insufficient to adequately cover the required information. This was conveyed to the responsible individuals in the training department in addition to station management at the exit interview. The licensee concurred with the inspectors and outlined their plan to increase requalification lecture time from eight to 22 days per year.
0 ~ the primary examination was performed using 70 : transducers, q supplemented _with 00 creeping wave transducers at the option of ,
the examiner.- Base metal-under the overlay was examined using 60 ' '
transducers. The examinations were made-in two' directions for both -
circumferentially and axially. oriented-. flaw l
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During<the outage, a chemical' decontamination of the reactor recirculation and reactor water clean-up (RWCU) systems took
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n  place. London Nuclear Systems supplied the equipment and chemicals, operated the decontamination equipment, and provided chemistry support. Chem-nuclear systems provided'the mobile solidification services.. The process involved the injection of low oxidation state metal ion (LOMI) decontamination solvent circulating through the piping, removing the activated corrosion layer from the internal surfaces of the system. The activated corrosion products in solution-were removed from the piping with mixed bed resins.- The spent-
  . resins were slurried to a mobile cement solidification system for preparation and shipment. The NRC inspector reviewed procedures, program, drawings, and other related documentatio A total of.127 IGSCC susceptible welds were UT'd during this outage compared to'64 welds called for in the inspection plan. The
  ;following table provides a summary of the proposed inspection plan
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and the number of welds that were actually UT d.during this outag QUAD CITIES UNIT No. 2 84-11 AUGMENTED INSPECTION PLAN T
1- Total 84-11 Weld Total Total Overlays Welds System Size Total Sample Examined Examined-Recirculation Risers  12" 44 14 10 44 SE (Thermal 12" 10 2 Sleeve)    2 Header  22" 22 6 2 22 Outlets 28" 30 15 6 30 LPCI  16" 32 6  6 SDC-  20" 18 4 2 5 CS  10" 27 5  5 HS/RWCU  6" 13 3  4 Recirc/CRD HS/HV  4" 35 7  7 JPI  10 2  2 TOTAL-  241 64 20 127 l


e One area from the NRC requalification exam results which was identified as being deficient was procedure knowledge and comprehension, particularly in the Emergency (QGA), Abnormal (Q0A) and Normal (QOP) procedures. The inspectors determined that, although, some procedures were covered in training, they were generally not covered during formal lecture periods and were addressed primarily by inclusion in required reading (see Paragraph 3.c). An exception to this was the Emergency procedure The licensee had held initial fomal training on the Emergency procedures when they were written and introduced in late 198 The subject of fonnal procedure training was discussed with instructors and licensed individuals during the interview proces The general consensus of those interviewed was that procedures t
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could not be taught and attempting to do so would be non productive
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and a waste of time. Because of the pervasive opinion that procedures cannot be taught, the inspectors noted to the licensee i
that the quality of the procedure training that has been performed I
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Column 3 - TOTAL STAINLESS STEEL WELDS SUSCEPTIBLE TI IGSCC ON A PARTICULAR' SYSTEM OR SIZ .
i 4 - GENERIC LETTER 84-11 1986 TOTAL SAMPLE ON ORIGINAL. INSPECTION PLA I
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5 - FOURTEEN ORIGINAL OVERLAYS PLUS SIX NEW ONE A TOTAL OF 127 WELDS INCLUDING THE EXPANDED SAMPL The total of 20 weld overlays examined includes the 14 listed in the plan and six new overlay The previous. overlays were upgraded to full structural design thickness and the new overlays were applied to the full structural design criteri Each of the overlays was surface finished to permit application of EPRI techniques for overlay i U The overlay weld metal and the upper 25% of the original piping !
  ' material were UT' Nineteen weld overlays had sound weld metal of
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sufficient thickness to meet the design criteria. One weld overlay (weld 02A-S10) was found to have axial indications in the overlay such that the full structural design criteria were not me Ten welds previously reported as containing IGSCC flaw indications were UT'd this outage. All of these welds were treated by induction heating stress improvement (IHSI) in 1983 and have previously been shown to be acceptable based on flawed pipe analyses. Of these welds, two (both end caps) showed the presence of axial flaws and were weld :
overlay repaire The following new welds were found to require a weld overlay:
  * Weld No. 02K-S3, elbow-to pipe, 12" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel, recirculation system;
  *' Weld No. 02K-S4, pipe-to-elbow,12" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel, recirculation syste * Weld No. 02B-59, pipe to end cap, 22" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel, recirculation syste * Weld No. 02C-S3, elbow-to pipe , 12" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel, recirculation syste * Weld No. 02BS-F2, safe end to elbow, 28" diameter, 1.115" thick, stainless steel, recirculation syste * Weld No. 02A-S10, pipe to end cap, 22" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel, recirculation system: Manual UT was performed on this weld in 1983 and 1985, and the results were 360 intermittent circumfrential cracks on the cap side of the weld that were all acceptable. The manual UT and the GE Ultra Image Automatic Scanner (SMART) UT system were used this outage and detected nine separate circulation cracks totaling 8.6" in length with a maximum thru wall depth of 26%. Approximately 29 axial cracks were detected with a maximum thru wall depth of 30%; all cracks begin on the cap sid .. .
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, 97 After a full, structural; weld overlay was made and surface conditioned, a post weld overlay UT was. performed. This UT revealed several axial flaw. indications, eight of which had a remaining ligament equal to
.or -less than the minimum weld overlay design thickness. The minimum remaining ligament measure was 0.28". These flaws were associated with steam blow out repairs during the weld overlay, application. In
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addition, a 2" long circumferential1y oriented flaw indication was
to date may have been inadequate. During the November 13, 1986, Management Meeting the licensee explicitly addressed training on procedures during classroom lecture and during simulator sessions and stated that more emphasis would be placed on procedural training in their revised requalification training progra Technical Specification knowledge was also an identified deficiency from the NRC administered requalification exans. Further review revealed that a significant portion of licensee training on Technical Specifications was through the required reading process and that this process was deficient (see Paragraph 3.c). Only the sections of Technical Specifications that readily lend themselves to review of a system or component oriented basis were covered in a formal classroom environment. Additionally, the inspector noted that the licensee examination content (see Paragraph 3.d) in the area of Technical Specifications was weak. The inspectors informed the licensee of these identified deficiencies. The licensee's corrective action plan should resolve these identified deficiencie On_ _the-Job-Training The requalification training program in large part relies upon
  : observed at a remaining ligament (depth from outside surface of weld overlay) of 0.42". . UT of this specific area by a Ceco UT Level III determined that this: indication was a circumferential crack associated with'two axial indication CECO' elected to add an additional layer of weld metal. The intent wi.s to increase.the remaining ligament over all flaws of greater than the full structural overlay design thickness. Low heat input ard bead overlay parameters were utilized with the intent of minimizing flaw
.of..the welding. UT propagation due after measurements to the thehigh strains additional and layer temperatures showed a weld metal thickness of 0.48" on the cap side compared to the previous-0.42". Both manual and automated UT data were collected on the remaining ligaments over the' flaws. Manual and-automated UT were made of the entire circumference or the cap side of the weld. 'The results of the GE SMART image system generally paralleled the manual UT results. The automated UT found one circumferential and eight axial flaws to be present in the weld overlay meta A comparison of the manual and automated UT. data for the flaws with the shortest ligaments of sound metal is as-follows:
Manual-  Automated Circumferential 0.24"-0.32"  0.38" Axial  0.3" -0.4"  0.35"
-Axial  0.24"-0.28"  0.36" Axial  0.26 "0.30"  0.44" The manual UT data sheet stated that the weld was very noisy around the cracked areas and difficult to U The flaws with the least remaining ligaments were in locations where steam blowouts. occurred during overlay welding and localized weld repair In a conversation with personnel of the EPRI NDE center, GE and  j CECO's Technical Center, it was stated that the expected crack  i sizing tolerance between examinations was approximately 0.1".


on-the-job training to ensure the operators maintain familiarity and understanding of the plant control systems, design changes and abnormal and emergency procedure The regulation requires a minimum number of plant manipulations during normal, abnormal and emergency situation every year. The licensee satisfied these requirements by having their licensed staff participate in simulator training every year. Due to problems identified during the NRC requalification audit with the practical use of abnormal and emergency procedures, the inspector's reviewed the simulator training progra Through interviews with personnel, a review of the simulator training program, and NRC requalification test results the following problems with simulator training were noted:
It was agreed that the comparisons of manual and automated data discussed were within expectations for independent examination The weld overlay design thickness of 0.38" was based on nominal j
:
pipingwallthicknessandincludedaconservativelycalculated 0.030 or crack growth by fatigue over a 30 year lifetime for the  1 circumferential fla A revised design thickness was calculated by CECO based on the minimum wall thickness of 0.979" and elimination of the fatigue crack growth allowance. The new design thickness for {
  (1) Training was limited in scope because of time limitations on the simulator which limited casualty drill trainin (2) Simulator was not plant specifi The simulator training program consisted of an annual three day training session at the General Electric " Morris Simulator" for each group going through requalification training. The three days were divided into six hours of classroom and 18 hours " hands on" simulator time, the majority of which was spent going through the required manipulatior.s. The inspectors and the licensee were in agreement that simulator training time must be increased to improve operator's skills, specifically in the use of Emergency Procedures (QGAS). The licensee is increasing simulator training time from three to five days which should help overcome some of the difficulties
the overlay on Weld No. 02A-$10 is 0.33".


J
  - - _ _ __ ____
_ - - . _ _ _ _ - - - . -
Li'
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  -
 
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/CECohasconsideredbothsetsofUTdatainevaluatingtheremaining ligament of the flaws. The mean of the manual UT, data when averaged ,
  .-
  'with the automated, provides a remaining ligament of 0.33" for the .>
_
circumferential flaw. The three deep'est axial flaws have average remaining ligaments of 0.31" to 0.36 . On'this basis, the short'  I-circumferential flaw meets the full structural overlay, design
associated with using a non-plant specific simulator and increase the number and scope of casualty drills to better familiarize the operators with the use of abnormal and emergency procedure The licensee depended in large part on the required reading program as a requalification training tool. Several problems were identified with the program as follows: Inadequate / questionable documentation of required readin . No monitoring of the effectiveness of the required reading program was performed (i.e., testing, audit, etc.).
,
In several cases, the inspectors identified improper documentation of individual required reading. These situations involved individuals making a single entry to record completion of all reading assignments for the entire year which consisted of 103 various procedures and Technical Specification changes. Individuals are required to make separate entries for each item of required reading that is completed throughout the year. These instances of improper documentation are not consistent with the significant emphasis the licensee places on the required reading proces The primary problem with required reading, the resolution of which could go far in addressing the above documentation problem, is that the program did not contain a means of monitoring the effectiveness of the required reading process. The licensee needs to monitor the required reading process, be it by examination, quizzes or audit and address the method of monitoring in their new requalification training program, Evaluation Process Review The accepted evaluation method for operator knowledge and the effectiveness of a requalification training program is the annual examination. An annual examination is required by 10 CFR Part 55, Appendix A, and should be designed to determine areas where retraining is needed to upgrade operator knowledge. While the licensee did administer yearly examinations, they did not appear to completely meet this requirement. During the review, the inspectors c
thickness. The deepest axial flaw is marginally less than the design'
identified the following deficiencies:
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  (1) Examinations were administered imediately after the eight day training sessio (2) Examination security may have been compromised.
thickness for a circumferential flaw, but significantly exceeds the 1 requirements for a leakage barrier overlay for axial flaws. An ASME
! 'Section XI evaluation in accordance with Paragra)h No. IWB-3642 was performed by CECO for the minimum ligaments of tie manual sizing and acceptance of the flaws for an' operating cycle was' demonstrate CECO requested and received permission from NRR to operate Quad Cities Unit 2 for one operating cycle with end cap Weld No. 02A-S10 in the as-is condition described abov CECO stated that Unit 2 will continue to adhere to the restricted leakage detection and leakage limits contained in Generic Letter No. 84-11 for the upcoming operating cycle. Plant shutdown shall be initiated for inspection and corrective action when any leakage system indicates, within any period of two hours, an increase in rate of unidentified leakage in excess of 2GPM. The sump level shall be monitored at four-hour intervals or les Weld No. 02BD-F8, valve to elbow, 28" diameter, schedule 80,
  --stainless steel weld in the recirculation system, was found to'
have a circumferential crack intermittent 12" with a combined length of approximately 4.5" and a 15% maximum thru wall depth.


;
l  This weld was found not to require a weld overlay by NUTECH.
  (3) Questions on the Quad requalification exams were not
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comprehensive and were narrow in scop (4) Poor quality control of answer keys and the grading of l
examinatio The annual written examinations were administered after the annual eight day training session. The examination in effect, was deter-mining how well the students were absorbing the material presented


1
b The UT was expanded in accordance with Paragra)h No. IWB-2430 of the ASME Code Section XI for that system and size 3ecause of the defect The company performing the actual welding was GAPC The welding filler metal used was Type ER308L for the weld overlays. All welding was performed in accordance with welding procedure specifications written and qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX, the latest addition of the Code. The preparation, I
!
application, and examination of the weld overlays were described in the station travelers and procedures for the wor Programs and Procedures The NRC inspector. reviewed the ISI procedures and programs and found them to be acceptable. Where these rules were determined to be impractical, specific relief was requested in writing. The NRC inspector reviewed the specific relief requests including the related correspondence between the licensee and the NR Review of Material, Equipment and Personnel Certifications, Audits and Data The NRC inspector reviewed the following documents:
t


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to them in class. It was not detennining which areas the operators .
were weak and needed retraining as required by 10 CFR Part 55, i  Appendix While the licensee did perfonn statistical analysis on 4  the test results to determine weak areas, the effectiveness of
,
their statistical analysis was hampered severely by the inherent i
weaknesses within the program as described belo Through personnel interviews and review of training records, the
-  inspectors determined that examination questions may have been compromised after the first examination was administered in 198 Specifically, the licensee " exam bank" consisted of three examinations, A, B and C. Examinations A and B were distinct exams and exam C was a combination of A and B (iA +1B). Because the first exam administered in 1986 for the Senior Reactor Operators was the C exam, which was generated from exam A and B,        '
l,  examination security may have been compromised immediately. Since
'
there was affectively only two distinct exams and ten exams were
;
administered, each exam was administered approximately five times i
over the 1986 calendar year.


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The potential problems created when exam question integrity is challenged is serious and has the following ramifications:
O
  (1) The instructors could " teach the exam" either consciously
      !
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* Data reports this outage and las * Ultrasonic instruments, calibration blocks, transducers and ;
or. unconsciousl (2) The students could know what to learn, disregarding other y  materia While these examples are extreme, and the probability of it happening is strongly discounted by the licensee, the practice of       r repeatedly administering identical examinations is not acceptable
couplant certification l
,
* Liquid penetrant, cleaner and developer material * Magnetic particle., materials and equipment
t to the NRC.
* NDE personnel certifications in accordance with SNT-TC-1 * Audits and surveillance * Records or welder and welding operator qualification * Certified material test reports for the filler materia Observation of Work Activities The NRC inspector observed work and had discussions with personnel during the ISI activitie These observations included calibration, performance of the following NDE and documentation:
:  The Quad Cities requalification exam questions were reviewed by l
* Welding of recirculation system welds No. 02E-F6A, No. 02AS-S4, No. 02BD-S6, No. 02BS-53, No. 02AS-59, No. 02A-S10, No. 02K-54, No._02C-S3, No. 02BS-F2 and 02B-5 * UT of thermal sleeve Welds No. 02K-F1, No. 02J-S * Welding of RHR Weld No. 105-F * UT of core spray Weld No. 14A-S1,
the inspectors and compared with NRC generated requalification
* UT of recirculation Weld No. 02AD-F * PT safe end to nozzle Weld No. 14A-S1 Each overlay was liquid penetrant examined (PT) which included the base metal one inch of each end of the overlay. UT was performed in accordance with CECO procedures to establish the soundness of the weld overlay and its fusion to the base meta No violations or deviations were identifie . Ultrasonic Examining (UT) Shroud Head Bolts General Electric (GE) submitted an information letter to CECO that stated cracking, of shroud head bolts (SHB) had been observed at four BWR/4's and one BWR/3. The letter also stated the following, in part: the cracking occurs in the NICRFE alloy 600 shaft of the SHB in a crevices region formed by a 304 $/S sleeve welded to the bolt shaft. Complete failure was observed at one plant. Cracking at other plants was found by ultrasonic examinations (UT). After receiving the letter, CECO
:  questions. The inspectors found in areas that the Quad Cities generated questions in some areas were not as comprehensive and were narrower in scope. The questions did not require answers
+
that demonstrated in-depth operator knowledge and understanding l
of the subject area. The licensee should review their examinations in the future to ensure the comprehensiveness of l
their exams.
 
1  The inspectors reviewed the answer keys for the Quad Cities      -
requalification examinations and found disparities in answers on different answer keys for identical questions on different exams.


Other answers on the answer keys were not completely correct or lacked the complete depth required.
<


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n contracted GE to perform UT on 48 bolts for evidence of cracking. The NRC inspector reviewed procedures, personnel certifications and other related documentation including UT reports that indicated there were no indications of cracking detecte i No violations or deviations were identifie !
t
7. Battery Jumper' Cable Unit 1 & 2  ;
- w----, vw- r w w w w e, -- ,,,---,..-wo--,-ww<w,v~~m.,--,,--u-~~-e-w-- - - + , . y-e-- .v.,. . - , - --m.&,r.-e---gee ---=---,----wewe.w.-- --w--
I The battery jumper cables for the Units 1 and 2 125 volt and 250 volt '
station batterles were examined by radiography to determine the i penetration of the cable into the lug. The NRC insoector reviewed
      '
radiographs in which the radiography was performed using CECO's special process procedure NDT-A, Revision 11, for guidance. Penetrameters were not used therefore the radiographs were for information only. Four cables were found unacceptable as a result of the radiography. The cables were provided by Gould National Batteries on Ceco's Purchase Order No. 30566 No violations or deviations were identific . Standby Liquid Control System Modification The modification was made to allow simultaneous operation of the standby licuid control system (SLCS) injection pumps and increase the minimum-socium pentaborate solution concentration to 14 weiglyt percent. The NRC inspector observed a portion of the modification activities, reviewed radiographs, NRC-NRR Generic Letter No. 85-06, Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS equipment, final modification design package, Procedure No. Q.6, ' l Revision 13, and other-related documentatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Thickness Checks Performed on Unit 1 and 2 Drywell Shells Due to a problem of drywell steel liner deterioration at Oyster Creek Nuclear Station, CECO decided to have a Level II from Conam Inspection perform thickness measurements on the drywell liner plate. The thickness l was measured in eight locations on Unit 2 coinciding with each vent header penetration using a thickness measuring instrument. The UT for the eight readings was performed at aaproximately 2" above the concrete basement floor directly under eac1 penetration. The average readings ranged from 1.24" to 1.27". The original shell thickness was, by design, required to be nominally 11/8" thic(. Each location was checked in three to four spots to achieve the average. Being there is a reinforcing plate on the outside of the shell at these locations that could possibly isolate the plate from the outside shell environment, Ceco decided to reconduct the inspection (removing the paint for UT) at the midpoint between the vent headers at the floor concrete level in eight more locations. The plate material was not isolated from the outside shell environment and there were no external plates in this area. The results ranged from 1.61" through 1.226"; this was over the nominal 1.125" design


.
e
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In addition several completed examinations were brought back to the regional office for regrading. While a review was perfomed on only a few because of time limitations, disparities in grading were foun The general impression from the NRC regrading, was that the Quad grading was at times lax, resulting in complete credit for answers that weren't completely correct. The regrading resulted in generally five to ten less percentage points (out of 100 ) per examinatio Due to these apparent deficiencies in the quality control of the examination answer key and the grading of the examination, the licensee's attention to quality control in these areas should be improve Records Requirements Review
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The inspectors reviewed a large number of records associated with the documentation of operator participation in the Quad requalifica-tion program. In general records were complete and participation was well documented. However, numerous examples were found where student attendance records were not well documente (e.g.,no instructor signatures, no subject matter delineation). Licensee attention in this area should be increased to ensure training is adequately documented, especially since a new requalification program is being develope Summary The inspector's identified weaknesses in all required areas of the licensee's requalification training program. These weaknesses, which may have contributed to the observed perfomance on the NRC administered requalification exam were due in large part to; insufficient time spent in fomal classroom instruction, use of a non-plant specific simulator only three days a year, problems with licensee examination content, preparation, and administration, and the poor monitoring of the required reading proces The licensee's corrective action plan for the improvement of their requalification program, part of which is delineated in Section 4 of this report, should place emphasis on these identified weaknesse The effectiveness of the licensee's corrective action will be monitored by Region III Operator Licensing personnel through their periodic administration of requalification examination . Manageme_nt_ Me_e_t_ing_ Commi tments The following commitments were made by the licensee for their
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Requalification Training Program in the November 13, 1986 Management Meeting held at Region III: Implement an accelerated requalification program for all Quad Cities Station licensed R0's and SR0's who have not either passed one of the recent NRC administered requalification exams or passed an NRC license exam since October 1, 1985. This accelerated requalification


, _  _ __ _-. . _ _ . ._ _
i L requiremen Readings were also taken'above the floor level between vent '
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header  The'results ranged from 1.210" t .220" penetration X-5E thick which was and X-5 acceptabl In Unit ~1 an ultrasonic instrument was used to perform the eight thickness !
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measurements thru the paint at the midpoint between the vent headers at.- 1 the floor concrete level.as Unit 2. The results ranged from-approximatel .20" to 1.30'.'; this was within nominal design requirement !
program will at a minimum consist of four weeks of intensified training addressing the following topic area * QGA-(EOP) Theory and Usage
Ceco's conclusion is that this inspection confirmed that there doesn't-appear to be any thinning degradation on the drywell shells at this 1 tim No violations or deviations were identifie ~1 Exit Interview The inspector met with site. representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph)attheconclusionoftheinspectio The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this report. The  .
  * Selected Normal Procedures (QAP, QOP, QRP)
inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the  I inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by.the inspection during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such ;
  * General Integrated Procedures (QGP)
documents / processes as proprietar '
  * Technical Specifications and Bases
      . ,
  *
i
Selected Abnormal Procedures (Q0A)
  * Reactor Theory and Thermodynamics
  * Selected Plant Systems The above accelerated requalification training will be evaluated for effectiveness by' a ' written examination and oral walk-through on the QGA's (E0P's).


Additionally, the accelerated program will be expanded to include a simulator training portion if simulator time can be procure Implement a long term requalification improvement plan with the beginning of the next requalification cycle that includes as a minimum the following:
12 i
  * Increase Training Staff fonn 16 to 2 Lengthen Requalification Classroom Training from 8 to 22 Days / Yea *
Lengthen Requalification Simulator Training from 3 to 5 Days / Yea *
Modify Training to Increase Depth of Procedure Knowledg *
Upgrade QGA (EOP) Training and Procedure with Flow Charts and Increased Practical Applicatio For additional information, pleap reference Confirmatory Action Letter CAL-RIII-86 007, Amendment I where this information and other commitments regarding control room staffing is containe At the conclusion of the licensee's review of their Requalification Training Program, the licensee should review and update their Requalification Training Program Topical Report and submit the updated report for NP.C approva . Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the November 12, 1986 exit interview, the November 13 Management Meeting in the Region III office and at the conclusion of the inspection on November 21, 1986. The inspector informed the licensee of the likely informational content of the report to the licensee. The licensee did not identify any documents / processes documented in the report as proprietar
}}
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Revision as of 10:05, 18 December 2021

Insp Repts 50-254/86-19 & 50-265/86-14 on 861104-870115.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected: Inservice Insp Activities,Review of Program,Procedures & Licensee Action on IE Bulletins
ML20215E463
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/30/1987
From: Danielson D, Ward D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215E459 List:
References
FRN-59FR979 50-254-86-19-01, 50-254-86-19-1, 50-265-86-14, AC93-1-033, AC93-1-33, IEB-79-14, IEB-80-07, IEB-80-7, IEB-83-02, IEB-83-2, NUDOCS 8706190380
Download: ML20215E463 (12)
v • d • e


Text

E

.,.

f U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY.. COMMISSION-

REGION III

Reports No. 50-254/86019(DRS); 50-265/86014(DRS)

'. Docket Nos.- 50-254;-50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwe'alth Edison Company P. O. Box-767 Chicago, IL .60690

. Facility Name: Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, Illinois Inspection Conducted: November 4-5, 12-13, 18, 26, December 3-4,-10-11, 6, and January 7-8, 15, 1987 Inspector: . D. Ward 30/f 7

, .

Date b [An~

! Accompanied By: D. F. Danielson kud7 Date (December 3-4)

Approved By:

W hk D. H. Danielson, Chief M3e F7 Materials and Processes Section-

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Date Inspection Summary

Inspection on November 4-5, 12-13, 18, 26, December 3-4, 10-11, 17-18, 1986,'

and January 7-8, lb, 198/ (Report No. 50-254/86019(DRS); No. 50-26b/86014(URS))

-Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of inservice inspection (ISI) activities,includingreviewofprogram(73051), procedures (73052),

observation of work and work activities (73753), and data review and evaluation H (73755); licensee action on IE' Bulletins (92703) and licensee event reports (92700); ultrasonic examination (UT) of shroud head bolts (57080); radiographic ,

examination (RT)ofbatteryjumpercables(57090);modificationofstandby i liquid control system (37701, 55700, 57700); and thickness checks performed on l the drywell (57080).  !

.Results: No violations or deviations were identifie j i

i 8706190380 870130 );

PDR ADDCK 05000254 G PDR l

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j( -. *

l DETAILS

. 1'. Persons Contacted ~

Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco)

  • D. Gibson, Quality Assurance'(QA) Superintendent

.

'*R. Robey, Services:Su~perintendent  !

  • C.-' Smith,. Quality. Control (QC) Supervisor <
  • M.'Kool, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

'*J. Hoeller, Lead Nuclear Engineer

  • H. Do. ISI/IST Group Leader
R. Bax,' Sr. Station Manager D. Thayer, Maintenance Senior Staff Engineer C. Kron1ch, Technical Staff Engineer K. Medulan, ISI Coordinator B. Wilson, level III, ND J. Ford, QC' Inspector

.

!

Structural Integrity Associates, In ..

D. Pitcairn, Associate General Electric.(GE)

R. Hooper, Manager, Inspection Services-T. Brinkman, Supervisor Morrison Construction-Company,(MCC)

W. Flesch, QC Supervisor Hartford Steam Boiler-Inspection & Insurance Company (HSB)

F. Roose, ANII United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

D. Danielson, Chief, Materials and Processes Section A. Morrongi_ello, Resident Inspector The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employee * Denotes those present at the final exit interview January 15, 198 . Licensee Action on IE Bulletins (Closed)-IE Bulletin No. 83-02 (254/83-02-BB): Stress corrosion cracking in large diameter stainless steep recirculation system l

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a

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s

. pipin The inspector reviewed the fina1Lresponse, followed the activities and considers-the' bulletin close Reference: NRC Inspection Reports No.- 50-254/84-06,No.'50-265/(84-05,-

No. 50-254/85016, No. 50-265/85008). (Close'd)IEBulletinNo. 80-07(254/80-07-BB;265/80-07-BB):

Ultrasonicexamination(UT)ofUnit2JetPumfBeamBolt Assemblies._ All 20 jet pump beams were UT'd )y CECO October 20, 1986, and found to be acceptabl It'is' CECO'sintentto'continuetoUT'the~jetpumpbeamsduringeach refueling outage. Any cracked beams will be replaced prior to unit startup. The NRC inspector. reviewed the procedure utilized to UT thejetpumpbeamsandotherassociateddocumentationanddetermined that the actions implemented by.the licensee meet the intent of the

' Bulleti . Licensee Action on Licensee Event Reports (LER) (Closed) LER No.86-017, Revision 00: . Weld No. 02K-S3 pinhole leak: Weld No. 02K-53 1s an elbow to aipe, 12" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel weld in tie recirculation syste Manual UT was performed on the weld in 1983, and no recordable indications were'found. On November 5, 1986, while CECO'was'

conducting a visual examination of the prepared weld surface prior to UT, a small pinhole with water seeping from it was discovere Manual UT determined the leak to be an axially-oriented crack aaproximately'0.4" long at 2 o' clock on the elbow side of the wel T1e weld was then weld overlayed, UT'd and found to be acceptabl (Closed) LER No.86-024, Revision 00: Residual heat removal (RHR)

service water (RHRSW) supports exceed Code stress allowables. On August 11, 1986, CECO found that there were supports on the RHR service water system that would experience uplift loads or exceed the AISC Code allowable stresses during safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) loading. The hangers that exceeded the allowable stresse were supports on the original piping. During the engineering phase oftheproject,severalsupportswereidentifiedthathadthe ,

potential for requiring modifications. However, it was later '

determinedduringtheprojectclosecutthatthesupportshadnot i been modified as required. Cause of the omission was attributed to inadequate design control by Ceco's engineering and the architect engineer, CYGN Modification M-4-1/2-86-19 was initiated to modify the necessary RHRSW supports and to bring the RHRSW to within the '

design specifications of the FSAR for long-term operation. The NRC inspector visually examined the final modification of supports M-10260-127, 145, 700, 701 and 702 and reviewed procedures, specifications, drawings and other documentation related to the modifications. The NRC inspector found the modification and l documentation acceptable and considers this item close (0 pen) LER 86-025, Revision 00: Torus attached small bore piping does not meet code allowable limits due to design error, During a re-analysis of the IE Bulletin No. 79-14 Mark I Program, it was

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discoveredthatcertainsmallboretorusattachedpiping.(four-inches-or less) did not meet FSAR: requirements to meet Code-allowable stress limits for seismic and Mark I loading condition , The architect engineer performed an operability. assessment and determined that all lines in question were operable. 'Approximately

20 to 30 hangers per unit will require modification. Design of the modification supports was'in progress during this outage. This

, modification may start in late 198 .(Closed) LER No.86-033, Revision 00: Control-Room Panel Mounting ~;

Units-1 and 2. In late March 1986 unanchored control room panels were discovered at Dresden by CECO. As a result a walkdown by CECO of the Quad Cities.' control room panels was performed on March 27, 1986. The purpose of this~walkdown was.to verify whether the> lack of intentional positive anchorage found at Dresden was the case at Quad Cities.. Like Dresden,.the bolted connections. indicated on the design document (4E-1161) between the floor anchored base channel and the panels did not exist. Discrepancy Record (DR) 04-86-2451 was initiated-to document this discrepanc Unlike Dresden, which had no lositive intentional anchorage, the Quad Cities panels were attacled to the anchored floor channels-with a combination of plug and fillet weld CECO aerformed an-operability assessment on April 1, 198 The opera)ility assessment usingengineeringjudgementconcludedthatthereexistedsufficient positive anchorage to withstand significant seismic motio The recent dual unit outage allowed access into the control room-panel Sargent and Lundy (S&L) engineers were contracted to evaluate the control room panel mounting. A detailed'walkdown to record the existing positive panel anchorage was performed. An evaluation of the anchorages indicated that.the anchorage of some of the panels were not quite within allowable stresses based upon FSAR requirement Safety-related Modification No. M-4-1-86-36 was initiated to bring the control room panel anchorages within FSAR seismic requirement Workwas'completedundersafety-relatedWorkRequestNo.Q5327 'On November 13, 1986, Sargent & Lundy issued five en ineering change notices (ECN),QC-865-19throughQC-865-23. The ECN s showed the information required to bring all the panel anchorages within FSAR allowable The NRC inspector visually examined the following:

  • Fillet welds that were welded by Morrison Construction Company which attached the outside of Panels 901-2, 901-10, 901-11, 901-13, 901-19 and 901-37 to the channel bas * Four brace supports that were added to attach the top of *

severalpanelstotheadjacentconcretewal * Braces that were added to panels 912-2, 912-8, and 912- y- ;

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y ,y

%

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These re) airs / modifications were completed on November 15,'1986, when bot 1 units were in cold shutdow ..

'

lThe NRC' inspector reviewed the following documents: -QC Surveillance; DR;; Work' Request package 53275; Welders Certifications in Accordance

--with.ASME Section IX; Wel ing Procedure Specifications; Five- ..

. Engineering Change Notices (ECN);' Drawings; Operability: Assessment;

" Weld Data Reports; Process Control ~ Checklist; Traveller Checklist; .

Station Modifications Checklist; Final Documentation Checklist; Work-Request Checklis In addition, S&L performed an operability. assessment of the as-found'

i state of the control-room panel anchorage. The purpose of this assessment was to investigate whether the panels would have been stable in case of a safe shutdown earthcuake (SSE) in the originally constructed

, condition. S&L concludec that even though the as-found anchorages did not always meet the FSAR requirements, the panels would have

remained. stable during an SS

The NRC inspector found the repairs / modifications and documentation-acceptable and considers;this item clos . Inservice Inspection (ISI) Unit 2

- General This is the eighth outage of the first period of the second ten year pla CECO, GE and Conam performed the ISI in accordance with ASME Section XI, 1980 Edition, Winter 1980 addenda and Code Case N-23 CECO performed. visual examinations (VT), GE performed ultrasonic (UT), magnetic particle (MT), and liquid penetrant examinations :

(PT), and Conam performed PT on the weld overlays onl The Level II and"III UT personnel performing UT were qualified at the EPRI NDE center after September 10 1985 by successfully performing the practical examination. Level i perso,nnel not cualified at EPRI who were performing UT scanning duties were trainec by EPRI cualified personnel onsite. Ceco's Level III UT personnel who reviewec^GE's NDE results were also EPRI qualifie In performing ultrasonic examinations on the welds, GE used their ;

data acquisition system (SMART) that is a complete UT package capable of examining welds by remote control and storing the collected-data for future review / evaluation. The display is a color presentation that is stored on a floppy disk for future referenc Normally the system uses the standard shear wave transducer for flaw detection and sizing; however, other types of transducers may be used with the system as desire The UT of weld overlays was performed to a CECO procedure based on i techniques developed by EPRI.' The EPRI techniques for examination of weld overlays utilize duel element, pitch catch, and focused refracted "L" wave transducers. For the overlay weld metal,

r NhI v ..

0 ~ the primary examination was performed using 70 : transducers, q supplemented _with 00 creeping wave transducers at the option of ,

the examiner.- Base metal-under the overlay was examined using 60 ' '

transducers. The examinations were made-in two' directions for both -

circumferentially and axially. oriented-. flaw l

.,

During<the outage, a chemical' decontamination of the reactor recirculation and reactor water clean-up (RWCU) systems took

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n place. London Nuclear Systems supplied the equipment and chemicals, operated the decontamination equipment, and provided chemistry support. Chem-nuclear systems provided'the mobile solidification services.. The process involved the injection of low oxidation state metal ion (LOMI) decontamination solvent circulating through the piping, removing the activated corrosion layer from the internal surfaces of the system. The activated corrosion products in solution-were removed from the piping with mixed bed resins.- The spent-

. resins were slurried to a mobile cement solidification system for preparation and shipment. The NRC inspector reviewed procedures, program, drawings, and other related documentatio A total of.127 IGSCC susceptible welds were UT'd during this outage compared to'64 welds called for in the inspection plan. The

following table provides a summary of the proposed inspection plan

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and the number of welds that were actually UT d.during this outag QUAD CITIES UNIT No. 2 84-11 AUGMENTED INSPECTION PLAN T

1- Total 84-11 Weld Total Total Overlays Welds System Size Total Sample Examined Examined-Recirculation Risers 12" 44 14 10 44 SE (Thermal 12" 10 2 Sleeve) 2 Header 22" 22 6 2 22 Outlets 28" 30 15 6 30 LPCI 16" 32 6 6 SDC- 20" 18 4 2 5 CS 10" 27 5 5 HS/RWCU 6" 13 3 4 Recirc/CRD HS/HV 4" 35 7 7 JPI 10 2 2 TOTAL- 241 64 20 127 l

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Column 3 - TOTAL STAINLESS STEEL WELDS SUSCEPTIBLE TI IGSCC ON A PARTICULAR' SYSTEM OR SIZ .

i 4 - GENERIC LETTER 84-11 1986 TOTAL SAMPLE ON ORIGINAL. INSPECTION PLA I

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5 - FOURTEEN ORIGINAL OVERLAYS PLUS SIX NEW ONE A TOTAL OF 127 WELDS INCLUDING THE EXPANDED SAMPL The total of 20 weld overlays examined includes the 14 listed in the plan and six new overlay The previous. overlays were upgraded to full structural design thickness and the new overlays were applied to the full structural design criteri Each of the overlays was surface finished to permit application of EPRI techniques for overlay i U The overlay weld metal and the upper 25% of the original piping !

' material were UT' Nineteen weld overlays had sound weld metal of

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sufficient thickness to meet the design criteria. One weld overlay (weld 02A-S10) was found to have axial indications in the overlay such that the full structural design criteria were not me Ten welds previously reported as containing IGSCC flaw indications were UT'd this outage. All of these welds were treated by induction heating stress improvement (IHSI) in 1983 and have previously been shown to be acceptable based on flawed pipe analyses. Of these welds, two (both end caps) showed the presence of axial flaws and were weld :

overlay repaire The following new welds were found to require a weld overlay:

  • Weld No. 02K-S3, elbow-to pipe, 12" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel, recirculation system;
  • ' Weld No. 02K-S4, pipe-to-elbow,12" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel, recirculation syste * Weld No. 02B-59, pipe to end cap, 22" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel, recirculation syste * Weld No. 02C-S3, elbow-to pipe , 12" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel, recirculation syste * Weld No. 02BS-F2, safe end to elbow, 28" diameter, 1.115" thick, stainless steel, recirculation syste * Weld No. 02A-S10, pipe to end cap, 22" diameter, schedule 80, stainless steel, recirculation system: Manual UT was performed on this weld in 1983 and 1985, and the results were 360 intermittent circumfrential cracks on the cap side of the weld that were all acceptable. The manual UT and the GE Ultra Image Automatic Scanner (SMART) UT system were used this outage and detected nine separate circulation cracks totaling 8.6" in length with a maximum thru wall depth of 26%. Approximately 29 axial cracks were detected with a maximum thru wall depth of 30%; all cracks begin on the cap sid .. .

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, 97 After a full, structural; weld overlay was made and surface conditioned, a post weld overlay UT was. performed. This UT revealed several axial flaw. indications, eight of which had a remaining ligament equal to

.or -less than the minimum weld overlay design thickness. The minimum remaining ligament measure was 0.28". These flaws were associated with steam blow out repairs during the weld overlay, application. In

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addition, a 2" long circumferential1y oriented flaw indication was

observed at a remaining ligament (depth from outside surface of weld overlay) of 0.42". . UT of this specific area by a Ceco UT Level III determined that this: indication was a circumferential crack associated with'two axial indication CECO' elected to add an additional layer of weld metal. The intent wi.s to increase.the remaining ligament over all flaws of greater than the full structural overlay design thickness. Low heat input ard bead overlay parameters were utilized with the intent of minimizing flaw

.of..the welding. UT propagation due after measurements to the thehigh strains additional and layer temperatures showed a weld metal thickness of 0.48" on the cap side compared to the previous-0.42". Both manual and automated UT data were collected on the remaining ligaments over the' flaws. Manual and-automated UT were made of the entire circumference or the cap side of the weld. 'The results of the GE SMART image system generally paralleled the manual UT results. The automated UT found one circumferential and eight axial flaws to be present in the weld overlay meta A comparison of the manual and automated UT. data for the flaws with the shortest ligaments of sound metal is as-follows:

Manual- Automated Circumferential 0.24"-0.32" 0.38" Axial 0.3" -0.4" 0.35"

-Axial 0.24"-0.28" 0.36" Axial 0.26 "0.30" 0.44" The manual UT data sheet stated that the weld was very noisy around the cracked areas and difficult to U The flaws with the least remaining ligaments were in locations where steam blowouts. occurred during overlay welding and localized weld repair In a conversation with personnel of the EPRI NDE center, GE and j CECO's Technical Center, it was stated that the expected crack i sizing tolerance between examinations was approximately 0.1".

It was agreed that the comparisons of manual and automated data discussed were within expectations for independent examination The weld overlay design thickness of 0.38" was based on nominal j

pipingwallthicknessandincludedaconservativelycalculated 0.030 or crack growth by fatigue over a 30 year lifetime for the 1 circumferential fla A revised design thickness was calculated by CECO based on the minimum wall thickness of 0.979" and elimination of the fatigue crack growth allowance. The new design thickness for {

the overlay on Weld No. 02A-$10 is 0.33".

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/CECohasconsideredbothsetsofUTdatainevaluatingtheremaining ligament of the flaws. The mean of the manual UT, data when averaged ,

'with the automated, provides a remaining ligament of 0.33" for the .>

circumferential flaw. The three deep'est axial flaws have average remaining ligaments of 0.31" to 0.36 . On'this basis, the short' I-circumferential flaw meets the full structural overlay, design

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thickness. The deepest axial flaw is marginally less than the design'

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thickness for a circumferential flaw, but significantly exceeds the 1 requirements for a leakage barrier overlay for axial flaws. An ASME

! 'Section XI evaluation in accordance with Paragra)h No. IWB-3642 was performed by CECO for the minimum ligaments of tie manual sizing and acceptance of the flaws for an' operating cycle was' demonstrate CECO requested and received permission from NRR to operate Quad Cities Unit 2 for one operating cycle with end cap Weld No. 02A-S10 in the as-is condition described abov CECO stated that Unit 2 will continue to adhere to the restricted leakage detection and leakage limits contained in Generic Letter No. 84-11 for the upcoming operating cycle. Plant shutdown shall be initiated for inspection and corrective action when any leakage system indicates, within any period of two hours, an increase in rate of unidentified leakage in excess of 2GPM. The sump level shall be monitored at four-hour intervals or les Weld No. 02BD-F8, valve to elbow, 28" diameter, schedule 80,

--stainless steel weld in the recirculation system, was found to'

have a circumferential crack intermittent 12" with a combined length of approximately 4.5" and a 15% maximum thru wall depth.

l This weld was found not to require a weld overlay by NUTECH.

b The UT was expanded in accordance with Paragra)h No. IWB-2430 of the ASME Code Section XI for that system and size 3ecause of the defect The company performing the actual welding was GAPC The welding filler metal used was Type ER308L for the weld overlays. All welding was performed in accordance with welding procedure specifications written and qualified in accordance with ASME Section IX, the latest addition of the Code. The preparation, I

application, and examination of the weld overlays were described in the station travelers and procedures for the wor Programs and Procedures The NRC inspector. reviewed the ISI procedures and programs and found them to be acceptable. Where these rules were determined to be impractical, specific relief was requested in writing. The NRC inspector reviewed the specific relief requests including the related correspondence between the licensee and the NR Review of Material, Equipment and Personnel Certifications, Audits and Data The NRC inspector reviewed the following documents:

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  • Data reports this outage and las * Ultrasonic instruments, calibration blocks, transducers and ;

couplant certification l

  • Liquid penetrant, cleaner and developer material * Magnetic particle., materials and equipment
  • NDE personnel certifications in accordance with SNT-TC-1 * Audits and surveillance * Records or welder and welding operator qualification * Certified material test reports for the filler materia Observation of Work Activities The NRC inspector observed work and had discussions with personnel during the ISI activitie These observations included calibration, performance of the following NDE and documentation:
  • UT of recirculation Weld No. 02AD-F * PT safe end to nozzle Weld No. 14A-S1 Each overlay was liquid penetrant examined (PT) which included the base metal one inch of each end of the overlay. UT was performed in accordance with CECO procedures to establish the soundness of the weld overlay and its fusion to the base meta No violations or deviations were identifie . Ultrasonic Examining (UT) Shroud Head Bolts General Electric (GE) submitted an information letter to CECO that stated cracking, of shroud head bolts (SHB) had been observed at four BWR/4's and one BWR/3. The letter also stated the following, in part: the cracking occurs in the NICRFE alloy 600 shaft of the SHB in a crevices region formed by a 304 $/S sleeve welded to the bolt shaft. Complete failure was observed at one plant. Cracking at other plants was found by ultrasonic examinations (UT). After receiving the letter, CECO

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n contracted GE to perform UT on 48 bolts for evidence of cracking. The NRC inspector reviewed procedures, personnel certifications and other related documentation including UT reports that indicated there were no indications of cracking detecte i No violations or deviations were identifie !

7. Battery Jumper' Cable Unit 1 & 2  ;

I The battery jumper cables for the Units 1 and 2 125 volt and 250 volt '

station batterles were examined by radiography to determine the i penetration of the cable into the lug. The NRC insoector reviewed

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radiographs in which the radiography was performed using CECO's special process procedure NDT-A, Revision 11, for guidance. Penetrameters were not used therefore the radiographs were for information only. Four cables were found unacceptable as a result of the radiography. The cables were provided by Gould National Batteries on Ceco's Purchase Order No. 30566 No violations or deviations were identific . Standby Liquid Control System Modification The modification was made to allow simultaneous operation of the standby licuid control system (SLCS) injection pumps and increase the minimum-socium pentaborate solution concentration to 14 weiglyt percent. The NRC inspector observed a portion of the modification activities, reviewed radiographs, NRC-NRR Generic Letter No. 85-06, Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS equipment, final modification design package, Procedure No. Q.6, ' l Revision 13, and other-related documentatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Thickness Checks Performed on Unit 1 and 2 Drywell Shells Due to a problem of drywell steel liner deterioration at Oyster Creek Nuclear Station, CECO decided to have a Level II from Conam Inspection perform thickness measurements on the drywell liner plate. The thickness l was measured in eight locations on Unit 2 coinciding with each vent header penetration using a thickness measuring instrument. The UT for the eight readings was performed at aaproximately 2" above the concrete basement floor directly under eac1 penetration. The average readings ranged from 1.24" to 1.27". The original shell thickness was, by design, required to be nominally 11/8" thic(. Each location was checked in three to four spots to achieve the average. Being there is a reinforcing plate on the outside of the shell at these locations that could possibly isolate the plate from the outside shell environment, Ceco decided to reconduct the inspection (removing the paint for UT) at the midpoint between the vent headers at the floor concrete level in eight more locations. The plate material was not isolated from the outside shell environment and there were no external plates in this area. The results ranged from 1.61" through 1.226"; this was over the nominal 1.125" design

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i L requiremen Readings were also taken'above the floor level between vent '

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header The'results ranged from 1.210" t .220" penetration X-5E thick which was and X-5 acceptabl In Unit ~1 an ultrasonic instrument was used to perform the eight thickness !

measurements thru the paint at the midpoint between the vent headers at.- 1 the floor concrete level.as Unit 2. The results ranged from-approximatel .20" to 1.30'.'; this was within nominal design requirement !

Ceco's conclusion is that this inspection confirmed that there doesn't-appear to be any thinning degradation on the drywell shells at this 1 tim No violations or deviations were identifie ~1 Exit Interview The inspector met with site. representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph)attheconclusionoftheinspectio The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this report. The .

inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the I inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by.the inspection during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such ;

documents / processes as proprietar '

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