ML20206D983

Forwards Part 21 Repts Recently Received by NRC for Util Info

ML20206D983
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	04/06/1987
From:	Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Dewease J LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
REF-PT21-87-088-000 PT21-87-088-000, PT21-87-88, NUDOCS 8704130478
Download: ML20206D983 (2)

Text

.

,.' g M6 1937 In Reply Refer To:

Docket: 50-382 Louisiana Power & Light Company .

ATTH: J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations N-80 317 Baronne Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Gentlemen:

This forwards for your information reports recently received by the Consnission under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.

Although no response is required to this letter, we shall be pleased to answer any questions which you may have regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

• 0Hainel signect tto R. L,HAA19 J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch Attachments:

1. Automatic Valve Corp. Letter dated December 19, 1986

2. Niagara Mohawk Letter No. NMP2L 0989 dated February 2,1987

3. Toledo Edison Letter flo. 1-706 dated February 3,1987

4. Niagara Mohawk Letter flo. NMP2L 0979 dated January 26, 1987

5. GA Technologies Letter dated February 23, 1987

6. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. Letter dated December 1, 1986, w/ attachment

7. Vermont Yankee Letter dated November 10, 1986, w/ attachment cc w/ attachments:

Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN: G. E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator P. O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066

( t'd. nex e) [g/[h (R /A C:RPB i w:cs [JPat8.don P{ JEGagliardo  %%

4/j87 g)87 4/3/87

/

8704130478 870406 PDR S ADOCK 05000383.

PDR

r s

(

'n ,<

Louisiana Power & Light Company- cc cont'd:

Louisiana ~ Power & Light. Company ATTN: N. S. Carns, Plant Manager P. O. Box B K111ona, Louisiana 70066 Middle' South Services ATTN: Mr. R. T. Lally P. O. Box 61000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70161 Louisiana Power & Light Company ATTN: K. W. Cook, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs Manager 317 Baronne Street P. 0. Box 60340 New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 Louisiana Radiation Control Program Director becw/attachmentstoDMB(IE19) bec distrib. by RIV:

RPB D. Weiss, RM/ALF RRI R. D. Martin, RA '

SectionChief(RPB/A) DRSP R&SPB RSB MIS System Project Inspector RSTS Operator R. Hall RIV File J

n)LEDO

% Iit)lEiCIPd '

Docket No. 50-346 JOE VVLUAMS. JR.

surve,%.m e (4191249-2300 License No. NPF-3 (4191249.s223 Serial No. 1-706 February 3, 1987 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~

Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

This letter confirms our conversation with Messrs. P. Byron and P. Wohld of your staff on January 29, 1987. Toledo Edison is reporting a problem that was found in the torque switches supplied with Limitorque operators installed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. This condition is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR21.

The concern is that Limitorque did not supply adequate instructions to maintain the torque switches " balanced" so that the torque at torque switch trip is equal for both valve opening and valve closing. With the torque switch unbalanced, the torque switch can trip before the valve operator can produce sufficient torque, or thrust, to operate the valve against its design differential pressure.

Specifically, on January 26, 1987, in the review of the data for Toledo Edison's answer to IE Bulletin 85-03, it was determined that prior to June 9,1985, (torque) thrust measured for the main steam to auxiliary feed pump turbine #1 containment isolation valves (MS106 and MS106A) was insufficient to close against the design differential pressure of 1100 psig. The low closing thrust for these two valves has been determined to be a result of the operators having an unbalanced torque switch. The settings on the torque switches were correct.

Imbalance, prior to developing a method of measuring thrust, was not considered as a significant parameter. The use of equipment to measure the thrust now allows this imbalance to be measured and evaluated. Based on IE Bulletin 85-03 testing, calculations it.dicate that MS106 would have fully closed against a maximum 468 psid pressure and MS106A would have fully closed against a maximum 901 paid pressure. These pressures are below the design differential pressure of 1100 psig. A mechanical device has been developed to measure and adjust torque switch balance without having to use thrust measuring test equipment, and has been demonstrated by testing these type of switches.

R702110083 670203 PDR ADOCK 05000346 S PDR THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY EDISON PLAZA 300 MADISON AVENUE TOLEDO OHIO 43652 k

$7dbWh8

l i

TDLEDO EDISON  ;

Docket No. 50-346 JOE VVLUAMS. JR.

Senar vc, Prescent-%oser l4'91249 2300 License No. NPF-3 14$91249-5223 Serial No. 1-706 February 3, 1987 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~

Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

This letter confirms our conversation with Messrs. P. Byron and P. Wohld of your staff on January 29, 1987. Toledo Edison is reporting a problem that was found in the torque switches supplied with Limitorque operators installed at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. This condition is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR21.

The concern is that Limitorque did not supply adequate instructions to maintain the torque switches " balanced" so that the torque at torque switch trip is equal for both valve cpening and valve closing. With the torque switch unbalanced, the torque switch can trip before the valve operator can produce sufficient torque, or thrust, to operate the valve against its design differential pressure.

Specifically, on January 26, 1987, in the review of the data for Toledo Edison's answer to IE Bulletin 85-03, it was determined that prior to June 9, 1985, (torque) thrust measured for the main steam to auxiliary feed pump turbine #1 containment isolation valves (MS106 and MS106A) was insufficient to close against the design differential pressure of 1100 psig. The low closing thrust for these two valves has been determined to be a result of the operators having an unbalanced torque switch. The settings on the torque switches were correct.

Imbalance, prior to developing a method of measuring thrust, was not considered as a significant parameter. The use of equipment to measure the thrust now allows this imbalance to be measured and evaluated. Based on IE Bulletin 85-03 testing, calculations indicate that MS106 would have fully closed against a maximum 468 psid pressure and MS106A would have fully closed against a maximum 901 psid pressure. These pressures are below the design differential pressure of 1100 psig. A mechanical device has been developed to measure and adjust torque switch balance without having to use thrust measuring test equipment, and has been demonstrated by testing these type of switches.

8702110083 B70203 PDR ADOCK 05000346 S PDR THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY EDISON PLAZA 300 MADISON AVENUE TOLEDO. OHIO 43652 k

$96blHx)4'l

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Serial No. 1-706 Page 2 Limitorque was informed by phone by Toledo Edison of this problem on January 27, 1987.

Prior to implementation of the Motor Operated Valve Reliability Improve-ment Testing Program, Davis-Besse had several unexplained torque switch tripping problems which were solved by replacing the torque switch.

These could likely have been the result of unbalanced torque switches.

Toledo Edison's Motor Operated Valve Reliability Improvement Program confirmed proper operation of all torque switches prior to the restart following the June 9, 1985, shutdown. -

Very truly yours,

-4 ( / _

PC:DJS:pl cc: DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator (2 copies)

O b

l .

j , ~._.

j -

i 1

III. BASIC PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION i Balance is determined by the relative position of the torque

switch tripper arms.

I

\ -

1 L Switch Assembly \ Torque

% Switches p M x

) '

Worm

$5 t

o Springs N', ,..>.>>>-,,b,s., k) Ec ah Bearing l .

G "

$ ;a; a

Gear ~

Motor Train Splined Shaft

! O,h j Worm Gear i

i Lugs to Valve Stem

{ Rotate Stem Nut Stem Nut i

I

• e

M Y NIAGARA R uMOHAWK NI AGARA MoH AWK POWER CORPORATION'301 PLAINFIELD ROAD. SYRACUSE. N Y.13212/ TELEPHONE (315) 474 t 51 $

January 26, 1987 (NMP2L 0979)

Dr. Thomas Murley, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No. 50-410

Dear Dr. Murley:

We are hereby providing written notification in accordance with 10CFR21 regarding problems with General Electric supplied Agastat GP Series Relays.

These problems were originally identified at Nine Mile Point Unit 2. In summary, several Agastat GP Relays used at Nine Mlle Point Unit 2 have been found improperly seated in their sockets. This condition may have been caused by inadequate original installation, workers coming into contact with the installed relays, or both.

The corrective actions already taken included establishing instructions for installation and testing to ensure the relays are properly seated.

Corrective actions in progress or to be taken include the following:

1. Identify and locate Agastat GP Relays used in safety related applications for Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2.

2. Inspect and correct, if necessary, Agastat GP Relays used in safety related applications at Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2. (Completion date - February 9, 1987)

3. Reinspect once a month as described in item 2 above. We will establish a variable preventative maintenance procedure for the reinspection. The monthly frequency may~ decrease, if appropriate, based on an evaluation of the information provided by the inspections. Other corrective actions and the root cause of this problem are expected to be identified during reinspections. If necessary, a comprehensive root cause analysis will be performed.

l hY ~~

9 ;9

\

C702020401 870126 PDR ACOCK 05000410 PDR I'] l S

Page Two

4. Revise the appropriate maintenance procedures to include the recently established instructions for installation and testing of the relays.

(Completion date - March 31, 1987)

5. Include information related to this incident in appropriate training programs for electrical Maintenance personnel, Instrumentation and Control personnel, Quality Control personnel and Operators.

(Completion date - April 30, 1987)

In accor' dance with 10CFR21.21, attached is a report that describes this incident in more detail based on currently available information Very truly yours, NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION C. V. Manga Senior Vice President DAC/pns 2499G Attachment xt: Regional Administrator, Region I Ms. E. G. Adensam, Project Director Mr. W. A. Cook, Resident Inspector Project File (2) l

ATTACHMENT 10CFR21 REPORT ON AGASTAT GP RELAY SEATING DEFECT NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION I. Description of Condition:

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation found problems related to General Electric Agastat GP Relays in December of 1986. A representative of the GE San Jose Electrical Design Group was sent to the site to assist in the investigation. A relay was removed and examined. This examination indicated that the relay was fully functional. Inspection of panels that contain the relays in question showed that several relays were not properly seated. GE provided instructions that are now being used to properly seat the relays and verify that the relays are properly seated.

One problem with seating these relays in their sockets is that proper seating requires over 50 pounds of force. Additionally, the relays may appear to be seated after installation when, in fact, they are not.

Therefore, an objective test has been developed to verify that the relays are seated after installation. The test includos using a 0.030 inch thick non-metallic feeler gauge between the relay and the socket; if the gauge does not fit in between, then the relay is adequately seated.

These relays are equipped with a wire retention clip or a retention strap. If the retention equipment is installed, the relay will remain in place with up to Ig vertical force. It is unlikely that they could be vibrated loose. However, installation of the retention device (strap or clip) does not ensure that the relay is properly seated.

The problem may be solely attributable to the original installation of the relays; that is, they were not fully seated when originally installed. Another cause of the problem has been posited as personnel inadvertently coming into contact with or setting equipment on the relays. It is possible to unseat the relays by inadvertent contact. In any case, it does not appear that adequate instructions for installation were available at the time of original installation.

These relays are used in safety related and non-safety related applications, and therefore, some are basic components. Considering that they were purchased to meet safety related technical requirements and when received were not accompanied with adequately detailed information procedures necessary to ensure proper seating, it is Niagara Mohawk's opinion that the components are defective. However, the condition that was found in the field may not be solely attributable to this defect.

2499G

'), ,

II. Evaluation of Substantial Safety Hazard:

Had the defect remained undetected, systems which would be relied upon for service would be potentially inoperable. These systems could have been, but are not limited to, Residual Heat Removal, Control Rod Drive, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, and Reactor Protection System.

bNiagara Mohawk's inspection results identified relays that did not meet j

insiectioncriteria,butthese,relayswerefoundtobeelectrically functional. There are approximately 1200 of these relays in safety related uses at Nine Mile Point Unit 2, and over 100 for Unit 1. The exact number and location of reldys is being determined.

This situation could have' led to the inoperability of systems required for safe shutdown, emergency cooling, post-accident containnent heat removal or post-accident containment atmosphere cleaning. We have, )

therefore, concluded a substantial safety hazard exists.

III. Corrective Action in Progress or Planned:

1.

Identify and locate Agastat GP Relays used M safety related applications. (Completion date - February 9,-1987) 2.

Inspect and correct, if necessary, Agastat GP relays at Units 1 and 2 used in safety related applications. (Completion date - February 9, 1987)

/

3. Reinspect once per month as described in item 2 above. We will establish a variable preventative maintenance procedure for the reinspection. The monthly frequency may decrease, if appropriate, based on an evaluation of the information provided by the inspections. Other corrective actions and the root cause of this problem are expected to be identified during reinspections. If necessary, a root cause analysis will be performed.

4.

Revise appropriate maintenance procedures to include the recently established installation and inspection instructions. (Completion date - March 31, 1987) 5.

Include information related to this case in appropriate training programs for electrical Maintenance personnel, Instrumentation and Control personnel, Quality Control personnel and Operators.

(Completion date - April 30, 1987)

<1

& 9 I

2499G .

t

GENER AL OFFICES C0RP0 RATION OF AMERICA POST OFFICE BOX 183 1000 EAST EDGERTON ROAO CLEVE LAND, OHIO 44147 PHONE: 216-526-9500 TELEX: 098 5406 December 1,1986 l' l

r J

Office of Inspection & Enforcement US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Ha. Mary Wegner

Subject:

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America 6" Model C Valve and Hercury Check Device Re: IE Information Notice 84-16, dated March 2,1984 IE Information Notice 86-17, dated March 24, 1986

" Automatic" Sprinkler Notification Letter, dated December 12, 1985

Dear Hs. Wegner:

In an effort to keep you and the Nuclear industry aware of the developments concerning our 6" Model C Valve and now, our mercury check device, we are forwarding to you a copy of our November 5,1986, notification letter, and a draft copy of an advertisement we will begin to run in January 1987.

We ill notify users and customers of the valves and mercury checks by a direct mail campaign and by an advertising campaign.

On December 1st we began our direct mailing campaign. We have on our mailing list all utilities which own or operate a nuclear power plant in the United States.

The advertisement campaign will be composed of running the advertisement in the following publications: Fire Journal; Occupational Health & Safety; Sprinkler Age; Sprinkler Quarterly; and Fire Protection Contractor. The ad will run three (3) consecutive times in each publication, starting in January 1987 8612150440 861201 PDR PT21 EMVAUTS 8 PDR

)

$ fTI@vh o -

'?

, y . ,.., ..- cc..e.. ,- -e. . . - ~ , . -~ m

e

..t ..'

/

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. Mary Wegrier December,1, 1986 Page 2 -

I i

The campaign is being administered by the Quality Assurance

! Department. If you have any questions on the program, please direct them to me.

Very truly yours, i

c Yv -

Mr. John J. Gullo, Jr.

Manager, Quality Asst.rt.nce cc: ASCOA-Cleveland l Model C File I Hercury Chack File

! NRC File Writer's File

• p r - -_' y

....g......, _

GENER AL OFFICES CDRP0 RATION OF AMERICA POST OFFICE 80X 180 1000 E AST EDGERTON RO AD CLEVELAND,0H10 44147 PHONE: 216-526-1900 TELEX: 098 5406 November 5, 1986 IMPORTANT: PLEASE FORWARD THIS LETTER TO THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN YOUR FACILITIES.

1

SUBJECT:

Model C Deluge & Pre-Action Valves and Mercury Check Devices Fire Protection Systems utilizing the Model C valve have experienced two distinct operational conditions, which we are bringing to your attention.

IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE THESE CONDITIONS MAY PREVENT YOUR FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM OPERATING.

The first condition was announced in our letter to you dated December 12, 1985. That letter warned that under certain situations the 6" Model C valve clapper stuck to the latch, preventing the flow of water.

The second condition experienced relates to mercury check devices.

The following is: the nature of the condition; an explanation on how to identify whether your system is affected; and the required courst., of action.

6" MODEL C VALVES NATURE OF THE CONDITION Several years ago, we discovered certain 6" Model C valves that failed to trip properly under full flow trip testing conditions. The valve clapper stuck to the latch preventing the flow of water.

As stated in our December 12, 1985 letter, the condition was encountered in the 6" Model C valves, only. Initially we decided to include the 2 1/2" Model C valves in our corrrective action program, due to the similarity of design. Additional information received since December 1985, has demonstrated that the condition does not occur in the 2 1/2" Model C valves. Thus no corrective action is necessary for the 21/2" Model C valves. The lubrication of the 2 1/2" Model C valves mentioned in the December 12, 1985 letter, is no longer necessary.

1 l

AU TOM ATIC SPA'NnL E A COapCAATION OF AME A5CA A FIGGiE INTE ANATION AL COMPANv 5

The 6" Model C valve does require further action. The reason for the clapper latch assembly sticking to the clapper is related to a metallurgical phenomenon known as cold welding. Similiar metals, pressed together under high pressures for long periods of time, have a tendency to partially fuse together. Under certain situations, the geometry of the 6" Model C valve does not provide enough force on opening to disengage these two surfaces.

HOW W IDENTIFY WHETHER YOUR SYSTEM IS AFFECTED The 6" Model C valves are installed in Rate-of-Rise Sprinkler Systems and in Pilot Head Sprinkler Systems. The systems are further subdivided into Deluge Sprinkler Systems, Pre-Action Sprinkler Systems or Foam-Water Deluge Sprinkler Systems.

The valves and systems are also identified as " Deluge", "Suprotex",

"Suprotex-Deluge", " Pre-Action"; or "Suprotex-Pre-Action". In Foam-Water Deluge Systems, both the water deluge valve and the foam deluge valve may be a 6" Model C valve.

The 6" Model C valve has been installed by Grinnell under the name "Multitrol" and by Rockwood under the name "Dualguard".

Each valve is identified by a serial number stamped into the front edge of tbs upper flange and by the lettering "Model C" cast in raised letters on the back of the valve body.

1 Serial numbers for the affected 6" Model C valves are S6.024 thru S12.365.

It is possible that a 6" Model C valve with a serial number other than S6,024 thru S12,365 may have been repaired with a bronze clapper latch assembly and/or a bronze latch arm.

If it is suspected that the clapper latch assembly and/or the latch arm has been replaced, or if the serial number can not be found, a visual check of the clapper latch assembly and the latch arm should be made. If the clapper latch assembly and/or the latch arm is made of bronze, your 6" Model C valve is affected.

TO REPEAT, the 21/2" Model C valve is NOT affected.

y _; y. .

....; . = . g ...

a. ...

i l

REQUIRED COURSE OF ACTION There are two solutions that will alleviate the condition. We have determined that the application of the molybdenus disulfide lubricant,

. 813MS, as stated in our December 12, 1985 notification letter is a viable solution to the latching condition. The clapper latch assembly and the clapper should be inspected and lubricated at least annually. Since fire protection systems should be inspacted at least annually, the lubrication can be performed during routine inepections. The lubricant may be obtained from " Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America, at no charge through December 31, 1987 In lieu of the lubrication alternative, you may choose to retrofit your valves with a new clapper latch assembly and latch arm. " Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America will provide the necessary parts to I retrofit your 6" Model C valve at no charge.

The choice between the two solutions is yours.

There are two types of 6" Model C valves, open drain and sealed drain.

Refer to catalog page G-14 included in this letter to determine, by visual inspection, what type of valve you have.

The steps to follow for ordering the new parts or the lubricant is outlined as follows:

1. If the 6" Model C valve is in the serial number range S6,024 thru S12,365, or if upon visual inspection, you determine that the valve has a bronze clapper latch assembly and latch arm,

! then determine what type of 6" Model C valve you have: open or sealed drain, (see G-14 attached).

2. Complete one attached order form for each 6 Model C valve that you have and include with it a no-charge purchase order.

3 Send the purchase order, (including the filled out order form),

to:

' Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America 1000 E. Edgerton Road Cleveland, Ohio 44147 Attention: Quality Assurance

• t.L.r

. ".g.=g

• F;c. '. L.

r MERCURY CHECK DEVICE NATURE OF THE CONDITION The mercury check device is a component of most Rate-of-Rise Sprinkler Systems. The mercury check device is made up of two molded plastic parts which are bonded together. A number of these mercury check devices have developed a leak in the bond area. This could allow air to escape from the device. This condition may take years to develop, if at all. To be safe, all existing plastic mercury check devices should be replaced.

Lou TO IDENTIFY WHETHER YOUR SYSTEM IS AFFECTED The mercury check device is located inside a mercury check cabinet, sectional alare mercury check enclosure or the release enclosing box,.

which is mounted on a Model C valve. Do JLQI attempt to open the cabinet, enclosure or box. The fire protection system in which mercury check devices are incorporated is called a Rate-of-Rise Sprinkler System. It may also be know as a Deluge Sprinkler System, Suproter Sprinkler System, Pre-Action Sprinkler System, Suprotex-Deluge Sprinkler System, or a Suprotex-Pre-Action Sprinkler System. The mercury check devices are generally .DQ1 used in Pilot Head Deluge or Pre-Action Sprinkler Systems.

The devices may have also been installed by Grinnell with valves under the name "Multitrol" or by Rockwood with valves under the. name "Dualguard".

The mercury check devices are also used in conjunction with the following

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America Rate-of-Rise equipment:

Model 93 Electric Control; Model 131-200 Supervised Mechanical Control Release; Model 138 Booster Unit; Pneumatically Released Pilot Valves; and Sectional Alarms (consisting of Sectional Alarm Mercury Check Enclosure and Model 93 Electric Control). .

i Fire protection systems that utilize the mercury check device can be

! identified by referring to the enclosed 3 page " System and Device i Identification Sheets".

l Mercury check devices were also used in the actuation setup for Carbon Dioxide systems, Dry Chemical systems and other special application equipment manufactured by other companies, such as Ansul, Cheaetron l (Cardox and Safety First), Norris, American LaFrance and Rockwood.

i l

l M[M-I r, _ , _ _ , , ~ . - - ...,-y ,,,7my- _ . y_. . , , , ,-w,,,m_., __r_q___=m-- 9y ym,

.-l ..

i l

REQUIRED COURSE OF ACTION All plastic mercury check devices manufactured af ter January 1,1967 must be replaced. We also recommend replacement of older plastic mercury check devices because they may ultimately deteriorate with age.

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America will provide replacement mercury check devices and mercury, for all mercury check devices manufactured after January 1,1967, at no charge.

The replacement device is easily identified because it is mechanically sealed with bolts and a red gasket, between the top and the body.

The steps to follow for ordering the new parts is outlined as follows:

1. Detemine the number of 1/8" copper tubes that connect to the header bar in the Header Bar Cabinet. This can be done by refering to the enclosed instruction sheet entitled, How to Determine the Number of Mercury Checks Required.

2. Complete one attached order form for each piece of equipment that you have that utilizes a mercury check device and include with it a no-charge purchase order.

3 Send the purchase order, (including the filled out order form),

to:

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America 1000 E. Edgerton Road Cleveland, Ohio 44147 Attention: Quality Assurance If you are having trouble identifying the type of fire protection systen you have, whether or not your equipment is affected by this notification, or if you need assistance of any kind, please feel free to call

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America, at 1-800-ASCOA US, (in Ohio:

1-800-228-0595), or (216) 526-9900.

r c.: . .-

Fire protection systems and component maintenance require specialized knowledge. A competent technician should be utilized. Neither the system nor its components should be tampered with by inexperienced personnel. We strongly recommend that these changes be made by a qualified fire protection service technician.

Very truly yours,

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America a Division of Figgie International Inc.

d Mr. John J. Gullo, Jr.

Manager, Quality Assurance

_n Q &.... . m g.a,..i

. . . s..

\

e GENERAL OFFICES C0RPORATION OF AMERICA POST OFFICE 80x 180 1000 E AST EDGERTON RO AD CLEVELAND 0H10 44147 PHONE: 216 526 9900 ORDER FORM TELEX: 09s5406 6" MODEL C VALVE REPLACEMENT PARTS and MERCURY CHECK DEVICES Shipping information:

n ntact at your facility: Name Telephone hur Purchase Order Number:

6" MODEL C VALVE Serial Number: Valve Body Cast Date:

Check One: Open Drain: Sealed Drain:

Do you wish a supply of lubricant? Yes No Do you wish replacement parts? Yes No MERCURY CHECK DEVICE Description of the item that th+ sercury check device actuates:

2 1/2" Model C Valve: Serial No.: Valve Body Cast Date:

6" Model C Valve:_ Serial No. Valve Body Cast Date:

Model 93 Electric Control: Serial Number:

Model 131-200 Release: Serial Number:

Model 138 Booster Unit: Serial Number:

Other: Serial Number:

Number of 1/8" tubes into header bar:

a,.cvanc son sut o consuwanos es avia.ca a s GG4 'N?tasaneNas ccupasv g

i .

Q 1.il <

6 i.

29 CABLE CLAMP l

Ss. SEALING PLATE CD SS RELEASE / 21. guide AOO

)* ENCLoslNG BOX  % g 28 MAN. PULL BDACMET

__,},/

g S9 OVER- y{ - ^.

22 MAN PULL HINGE PIN r SPRiWG 3

, 40 Pggfy) , [ J6MANUALPULL ARM z 'b p 30 MANUAL PULL ROD n 41. RESET BRACKET \ / / 25 SPuT RINGS F St. SPRING l 0 SCREW

42. RUBBER SEAL *x'

' e RUBBER SEAL' ---p' l j'3 43.REsEr eRACxEn N. ----- 4- ->/ l RETADNING RING 35 nEtEast LEvEnsceEw..

1E I HANDHOLE COVEp M $PRING ,h#

2/GASMET s \ [ R{ SET HANDLE 4 k$ PUR W E ,

j S2. WEIGHT LATCH O  ! \ \ I bM J

( ,

N ,

$I l ivl WEIGHT (22) l { CLAPPER . 34 RELEA58NG LEVER

, =

STOPS v ~ tS.WElGHT SWITCH -WEIGHT SWITCH (25) lf

\ A 22.WE!OHT

~

s AwT: RESEAT 'N \ , d -< O - -

0 "

SPR'No ( ). VENTS o g - -

j "g * '

, , --- 20. WEIGHT GUIDE ROD l 6 CLAPPER s -

.$. '--C. % MERCURYCHECMS .

g N

's'N.

• 19. GASKET I - -

l i

SEAT RINGS'N. qs (SEAUNO PuTE)

! 7 CLAPPER s L

~

+ * * - ,'

HlNGE ANy. 16.BRACMET 2. L ATCH STUD COLL AR h ," -

sw

' ~

3 COLLAR NUT

4. DIAPHRAGM

~!'N 's '

[' ~ 66.FACIN6 RETAINING RING 5.D N N P MATE ,

N 8U-5HAPEDRLgR CLAPPER FACs 1'/

il s'

_. __T#f#MM2 7

p ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -~ ~ fj- py

..2

- '85. LATCH ARM FACING l CLAPPER LATCH SEAT RING

~ '

6 Grip PLATE NUT 7

/ . LATCH ARM PIN 9 FEING RETAmse6 PLATE 'gy. DRIP CUP so. CLAPPER FAONS SCREW' ' fp ,; 8. STUD LOCK WASHE R g,DgAppe pgyAggg pgyg

60. LATCH ARM s g#

t g

['/ - [j . STUDll LOCK NUT 6' VALVE SHOWN \ '

• SER ALS NOT N gi. wake p$l ED ON N h ARM ING'(2=ned) 12. LATCH ARM BUSHING SEALED DRAIN :s o

MODEL C - DELUGE VALVE  :

1 a e

h

9 p- TERMINAL

~

BLOCK C ABINE T I I SYSTEM AND DEVICE y ,

h

• 1@s)

IDENTIFICATION o it o 11 o

=

MERCURY =

SET O CHECK C 3 T

O CABINET C g '

g

*

• E

• CONTAINSMERCURYCHECKS mO ll ll C g p

_\@ NI O I I

( RELEASE TAG - CONTAIriS HEADER O j ?'

RELEASE SERIAL NUMBER BAR W[ g

& DATE OF MANUFACTURE g CABINET 4 o

~

(N MODEL 138 BOOSTER UNIT mEADER HEADER BAR C BAR C C A BINET C ABf NET g.

HEADER BAR

@ ENCL.

'o !i o I! o' "o ff o II O' g

)" CH W O

. - EXPLOSION-PROOF ASS'Y.

SERIAL NO. (NEAR BACK)

O C6 0 'O 11 O II O

MERCURY h h O CHECK C C C A 61N ET C O C ABINET O

= = = * = e @

• T NAL O C ABINET C

,0 ll 0 ll 0, g

.O h O 11 O.

E @

NON-EXPLOSION-PROOF ASSEMBLY SERIAL NO.

ELEC.O $ 6 ll o ll 0, (NEAR BACK) N O ,,a;o i n igg 8Oa f0NTRO { Un U 3

MO D.93 g 3 l 131-200] g g 3 ,

N

.Sil o N D c o ' '

G G o a y p cp ,

10 11 ll 11 O }

131-200 EXPLOSION PROOF MON EXPLOSION-PROOF SUPERVISED MECMANICAL MODEL 93 ELECTRIC CONTROLS CONTROL RELEASE SK3952 PAGE 1 0F 3

. .?

SYSTEli AND DEVICE IDENTIFICATION SHEET l

MERCURY  : HEADER CHECK BAR CABINET C A BINET l l I l '

1 -

I

%CONTAINSMERCURYCHECKS I _

l MERCURY b CHECK CAOINET HEADER '

% SECT. AL ARM BAR ( MERC. CHECK C A BlNET r ENCLOSURE SERIAL NO. ,

! I O ELEC. o CONT RO L-C  :

"O 16 0 !! O l M00.93 MQE MERCURY = r '

= RELEASE CHECK I DELUGE ENCLOSING O O VALVE BOX &

g /

U , TERMIN AL BLOCK

' J CABINET O C ABINET O

%

, -L J G 11 O 11 M FRONT VIEW B

2-1/2" oR s" (SHoWN) DELUGE VALVE f WITH MERCURY CHECK CABINETS

% , SERIAL NO. I

^

THE 24" AND 68' DELUGE VALVES ARE USED IN THE " RATE-OF-p ~

RISE" SYSTEMS KNOWN AS DELUGE, PRE-ACTION SUPROTEX, AND

'~r fd SUPROTEX-DELUGE; ALSO KNOWN AS "MULTITROL" WHEN INSTALLED BY GRINNELL AND "DUALGUARD" WHEN INSTALLED BY ROCKWOOD 4

SPRINKLER COMPANY.

R

$ CONTAINS MERCURY CHECKS Q , ,

2h" VALVE - 2 MAX.

6" VALVE - 4 MAX, PT'E U M AT IC RELEASED g gg PILOT VALVE MODEL 124 USED ON CARD 0X LOW PRESSURE

['

yk .

[' o

[k' k

,979

\ YEAR OF 3 'y 'A MFG.

CO2 SYSTEMS ./ tu I I REAR VIEW SK3953 PAGE 2 0F 3

o.- ...

SYSTEM AND DEVICE IDENTIFICATION SHEET g -

SPRINKLER HEADS i"s PIPE 4

PILOT LINE <

< GAUGE

/ r ,

r , r I l

_) _

n n i RELEASE r 3 ENCLOSING P DELUGE BOX VALVE l 1 u @

] (( , ) ( 4l i FRONT VIEW REAR VIEW PILOT HE AD DELUGE SYSTEM THE PILOT HEAD DELUGE SYSTEM GENERALLY D0lS NOT UTILIZE MERCURY CHECKS.

THE PILOT HEAD SYSTEM CAN BE IDENTIFIED B'i THE 1/2" PIPE ' PILOT LINE' THAT IS ATTACHED TO THE BACK 0F THE RELEASE ENCLOSING BOX. ,

1 SK3954 PAGE 3 0F 3

HOW TO DETERMINE y t w AIR SwI m THE NUMBER OF MERCURY CHECKS O REQUIRED I

. HEADER BAR CABINET MAN PROTECTIVE STEEL O* e TuBino

[h n b  :

~

! FROM

[ i l

m H.A.D.'s

([ C h N1/8" COPPER TUBING N HEADER BAR I

E I- -

E IJ C,y 6-HOLE NEADER BAR AND CABINET In order to determine the number of Mercury Checks required, open the Header Bar Cabinet (See " SYSTEM AND DEVICE IDENTIFICATION SHEETS") and count the number of 1/8" copper tubing coming from the H.A.D.'s and connected to the right side (in most cases) of the Header Bar at the lettered ( A, B, C, etc.) connections only.

Disregard connections identified as MAN and 80X.

In tne above illustration of a 6-hole Header Bar and Cabinet, the number of Mercury Checks required would be three (3). Standard Header Bars are made in 6 ,10 ,14 ,

18 , and 22-hole configurations.

NOTE: When advising us of the number of Mercury Checks required, give us the number of Mercury Checks per Header Bar_ Cabinet. For example, if you nave a 6" Deluge Valve with a Header Bar Cabinet containing 3 connections and a Model 138 Booster with a Header Bar Cabinet containing 7 connections, report 3 and 7; not 10.

SK3954

Vff J' e'. '. *

. . .. .. .. , . . . . . ~ . . . . ~ . . _ . . . . _ .

ww..)[.a*w[h..r' , .w .

-E .l'.

• w e m .m w= - m.s..m'..m" %u' .n m. ....mgi

~

m _ g* $:"angn qvy i yp

t. .

ga m l

l l I

i I

IMPORTANTNOTICEF ..

TO OWNERS OF ' :.e , . .

f MODEL C DELUGE & PRE-ACTION VALVES, J BOTII PNEUMATICALLY AND " '

ELECTRICALLY OPERATED, AND OTHER I -j EQUIPMENT USING MERCURY ~ j CIIECK DEVICES MANUFACTURED  ! BY

" AUTOMATIC" SPRINKLER OF AMERICA.

CORPORATION '

PLEASE CONIACT US PROMPTLY!

Ongoing research and development werk on our Deluge and that we must call to your attenticn. ,

ve Under fire situation mayhelp your NOT operate.

focating This the valves. condition can be corrected. But first we need The Model C Valves may bear one of several tradenames:

.MULTITROL b, .irinnet!, OURAGUARD by " Automatic *' Sprinkler. b by Rockwood, or SUPRO*EX The condit.cn can also exist with other " Automatic" ,equipment , . .

Control Reteases, and Pneumatic Released Pilot Val .

'L  :'

exist with equipment of other companies where Mercury Checks made by " Automatic" were used in the actuation setup, this may cations epuipment manufactured by Ansul, Che '1et Safety First). Norris, Ameri an LaFrance, and Rockwood.

This equipment may be found protec'Jng a variety of hazards - .

both ordinary and extra hazards. It is essential that you contact us if you think you may have any such equipment installed at your property.

" Automatic" has a total commitment to your safety. We need to hear from you promptly. So please call us at:

~

-9 1-800-ASCOA-USl (in Ohio: 1-800-228-0595)

/b" or write to:

" Automatic" Sprinkler Corporation of America .

1000 East Edgerton Road Cleveland. OH 44147 Artn: Ouahty Assurance h ' Q' uGnaTic~ Sptindfet a . . . . . g. .g, c......,,u,m.......~>...,,....~;.

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

., RD 5. Box 169. Ferry Road, Brattleboro. VT 05301 FVY 86-105

( )' - ENGINEERING OFFICE x-' 1671 WORCESTER ROAD

+

FRAMINGHAM. MASSACHUSETTS 01701 7ELEPHONE 617 872-4100 November 10, 1986 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection & Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Attn: Dr. Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator

References:

a) License No. OPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)

Subject:

Notification of Potential Existence of a Design Defect in Accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 21, Section 21, we are hereby notifying you that we have obtained information indicating that a design defect may exist with respect to Limitorque Motor Operators manufactured prior to 1975.

Enclosure I to this letter documents the details of this evaluation.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me.

Very truly yours, VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION gu. ge o Warren P. Murphy Vice President and Manager of Operations

/dm 8612220300 861110 gDR ADOCK 05000271 PDR / \g

~fh $1Uk00~ W

~

ENCLOSURE I COMPANY INFORMING Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation i THE COMMISSION RD 5, Box 160 Ferry Road l Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 FACILITY Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation PO Box 157 l Governor Hunt Road Vernon, Vermont 05354 COMPONENT Limitorque Operator Spring Packs FIRM SUPPLYING Limitorque Corporation COMPONENTS Lynchburg, Virginia NATURE OF DEFECT During the 1985-86 outage, as part of Vermont Yankee's ongoing MOV Reliability Program, extensive inspections and overhauls were performed on approximately 40 motor operators. These operators were rebuilt utilizing the most current technical manuals and with the assistance of a Limitorque Field Engineer. During the rebuilding, the actuators were repacked with new less viscous NEBULA-EP-0 grease which is recommended for use in nuclear containments by Limitorque Technical Manuals.

On June 4, 1986, Vermont Yankee experienced a motor burnout on MOV 2-438.

The conditions surrounding this event were reported to the Commission in LER 86-12, Rev. 1, dated August 22, 1986. As a result of this burnout, Vermont Yankee and Limitorque performed an investigation which concluded that, due to the unique orientation, the new less viscous EP-0 grease had leaked from the operator housing into the spring pack area creating a hydraulic lock condition, subsequently restricting the torque switch operation and, therefore, burning up the electric motor. This is the first motor burnout of this type identified by Vermont Yankee.

DATE OF INCIDENT The motor burnout of MOV 2-43B occurred on June 4, 1986. The Potential Part 21 Report Evaluation was initiated on June 25, 1986.

NUMBER OF COMPONENTS Vermont Yankee has approximately 80 safety-related valves in service.

..-w s. o Enclosure I Page 2 CORRECTIVE ACTION After the initial discovery of the failed operator, the manufacturer was contacted. Limitorque indicated that this problem had been identified some years ago and they had developed a retrofit kit to correct the problem. No evidence could be found by either Vermont Yankee or Limitorque documenting that this information was ever disseminated to the industry. Limitorque has also been unable to reproduce this type of failure in their own test facilities, however does acknowledge the potential of it to happen.

The retrofit kits were installed on all 32 safety-related and 8 non safety-related operators which had the new less viscous EP-0 grease installed during the 1985-86 outage. This included all operators in the drywell (11) and all opera-tors in the steam tunnel (7). The kits are designed to allow a flow path to prevent trapping grease in the spring pack and therefore eliminate the possibi-lity of a hydraulic lockup.

Vermont Yankee will take the required actions to ensure that the hydraulic lockup kit modifications will be installed on all remaining safety-related motor operators prior to the installation of any new grease and no later than the end of the 1987 refuel outage.

RELATED ADVICE

, Our evaluation has determined that a significant safety hazard does not exist at Vermont Yankee since we have taken appropriate corrective actions on all valves which utili e the less viscous EP-0 grease. However, Linitorque appears not to have given notification to other utilities of the possible need to retrofit pre-1975 valves, even though they have made an internal modification in their newer valves to eliminate the grease lock condition. Therefore, this Part 21 is being submitted to forewarn other plants of this potential problem.

It is recommended that utilities review this information for applicability to their locations.