05000443/FIN-2015004-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = B Cook, B Dionne, C Newport, D Silk, F Bower, J Nicholson, J Vasquez, P Cataldo, T O,'Har | | Inspector = B Cook, B Dionne, C Newport, D Silk, F Bower, J Nicholson, J Vasquez, P Cataldo, T O, 'Har | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Title 10 CFR 50.55a (g)(4), Inservice Inspection Requirements, requires, in part, that throughout the service life of a boiling or pressurized water-cooled nuclear power facility, components (including supports) that are classified as ASME Code Class 1, must meet the requirements set forth in Section XI of editions and addenda of the ASME Boiler Pressure and Vessel Code. Section XI of the ASME Boiler Pressure and Vessel Code, 2001 Edition with 2003 Addenda, Table IWF-2500-1, Examination Category F-A Supports, requires VT-3 examination of 100 percent of the ASME Class 1 supports, other than piping supports, every ISI Interval (examination item F1.40). Contrary to this requirement, from initial commercial operation until October 14, 2015, (when NextEra staff completed the initial required VT-3 examinations) NextEra did not perform the required ASME Section XI VT-3 examination of ASME Class 1 supports (i.e. seismic support plates and associated load path components) on the CRDM assemblies of Seabrook Unit 1. NextEra staff entered the issue into their CAP as AR 01991880 and completed the VT-3 examinations during the October 2015 refueling outage. The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the objective to ensure reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems, because the finding did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic initiating event. NextEra completed the required examinations on October 14, 2015. | | description = Title 10 CFR 50.55a (g)(4), Inservice Inspection Requirements, requires, in part, that throughout the service life of a boiling or pressurized water-cooled nuclear power facility, components (including supports) that are classified as ASME Code Class 1, must meet the requirements set forth in Section XI of editions and addenda of the ASME Boiler Pressure and Vessel Code. Section XI of the ASME Boiler Pressure and Vessel Code, 2001 Edition with 2003 Addenda, Table IWF-2500-1, Examination Category F-A Supports, requires VT-3 examination of 100 percent of the ASME Class 1 supports, other than piping supports, every ISI Interval (examination item F1.40). Contrary to this requirement, from initial commercial operation until October 14, 2015, (when NextEra staff completed the initial required VT-3 examinations) NextEra did not perform the required ASME Section XI VT-3 examination of ASME Class 1 supports (i.e. seismic support plates and associated load path components) on the CRDM assemblies of Seabrook Unit 1. NextEra staff entered the issue into their CAP as AR 01991880 and completed the VT-3 examinations during the October 2015 refueling outage. The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the objective to ensure reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems, because the finding did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic initiating event. NextEra completed the required examinations on October 14, 2015. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 19:53, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Seabrook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000443/2015004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Cook B Dionne C Newport D Silk F Bower J Nicholson J Vasquez P Cataldo T O 'Har |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.55a |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |