A finding of very low safety significance with an associated Non-Cited Violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was self-revealed when safety-related motor operated valve
1E51-F031,
reactor core isolation cooling (
RCIC) system suppression pool suction valve, failed to fully close during surveillance testing on October 29, 2012. The valve failure occurred due to the licensees failure to establish an adequate procedure to perform preventive maintenance on it. Specifically, the maintenance procedure did not contain a requirement to stroke a motor operated valve during the performance of periodic stem lubrication activities. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program for evaluation and initiated corrective actions to revise the maintenance procedure. The finding was of more than minor significance since it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute and adversely affected the
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the valve failure rendered the
RCIC system
inoperable. This finding is of very low safety significance because it: (1) was not a design or qualification deficiency; (2) did not represent an actual loss of function of a system; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train or two separate trains for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time; (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as high safety significant; and (5) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event The inspectors concluded that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance since adequate licensee resources involving personnel and procedures did not support successful human performance. Specifically, the maintenance procedure was not appropriate to the circumstances because it did not contain adequate instructions to ensure that motor operated valve stems were adequately lubricated.
