IR 05000321/1997009: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot insert)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20199B822
| number = ML20203A366
| issue date = 11/03/1997
| issue date = 12/04/1997
| title = Insp Repts 50-321/97-09 & 50-366/97-09 on 970817-1004. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations, Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support
| title = Ack Receipt of 971126 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-321/97-09 & 50-366/97-09 Issued on 971103.Response Meets Requirements of 10CFR2.201
| author name =  
| author name = Skinner P
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Sumner H
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
| docket = 05000321, 05000366
| docket = 05000321, 05000366
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-321-97-09, 50-321-97-9, 50-366-97-09, 50-366-97-9, NUDOCS 9711190107
| document report number = 50-321-97-09, 50-321-97-9, 50-366-97-09, 50-366-97-9, NUDOCS 9712120078
| package number = ML20199B804
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 3
| page count = 38
}}
}}


Line 19: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:. . . . . . . . .
{{#Wiki_filter:
          .. .
        . .. .. . .
.
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
==REGION II==
            ,
Docket Nos:      50 321. 50-36t License Nos:      DPR-57 and NPF-5 Report No:      50-321/97-09, 53-366/97-09 Licensee:      Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
Facility:      E. I. Hatch Units 1 & 2 Location:      P. O. Box 439 Baxley, Georgia 31513 Dates-      Augue.t 17 - October 4. 1997 Inspectors:      B. Holbrook. Senior Resident Inspector J. Canady, Resident Inspector Accompanying Inspector:      T. Fredette Approved by:      P. Skinner Chief. Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure 2 9711190107 971103 PDR 0  ADOCK 05000321 PDR
_ _ _ _ _ . .__ __-____ - ____ _ ______-____ ______________ _____-___________    _-
 
. - _ _ _ _  _ . - _
_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
-
        !
:, +        t
..,  --
-  -
f  -
EXECUTIVE SUMMAR ;
I    -Plant Hatch. Units 1 and 2-
  -
        .
        . -
s  -NRC-Inspection Report 50 321/97-09 50-366/97-09    ;
This integrated inspection includeo aspects-of licensee ' operations engineering, maintenance, and-plant-support. The report covers a 7-week-
,
_ period _of resident inspection activitie Ooerations Le During Unit 2 startup activities on September 18,_' operator  4 procedure usage, communications, control of activities, and supervisory oversight during these activities were excellent.
 
>
Equipment problems such as control rods that were difficult to  I withdraw - turbine vibration problems during turbine roll, and main generator automatic voltage regulator problems challenged  4 operators-(Section 01.1).
 
e- Equipment al'gnment, component _o)erability, and material
"
conditions observed-during a wal(down of the Unit 1 Standby Gas  !
Treatment System were good in all areas inspected. Housekeeping L conditions in the filter train room adjacent to Unit 1 Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning room were excellent (Section 02.1).
 
e Unit I systems responded properly following a trip of the 1A Reactor Feed Pump Turbine (RFPT) and subsequent Reactor  '
Recirculation Runback on September 6. Operator response to the plant transient was good (Section 04.1).
 
. o Operations supervision failed to  llow applicable procedures to
:  correctly generate a-Maintenance Work Order (MWO) package for a Reactor Manual Control system relay replacement. Operations supervision authorized work and maintenance personnel performed
,
work using the incorrectly completed work package. This was identified as an example of Violation (VIO) 50-321, 366/97-09-01,
~
Fai',ure to Follow Procedure - Multiple Examples -(Section 04.2).
 
e The inspectors concluded that the operating crew's performance resulted in additional- challenges during a normal reactor manual scram. Operations management prompt actions to correct an operating crew's weaknesses following a routine manual scram on
,
  -Unit 2 was good (Section 04.3).
 
o Operations demonstrated poor oversight and coordination of the battery charger transfer activity. A plant equipment operator failed to properly follow arocedures governing continuous activities- that affected tie operability of Emergency Diesel
:
i        Enclosure 2 '
,
!
  .- ._~ -- - - - - - - --  - -- -
 
  . . . . _ _
_ .__ ._ . _ - _ _ . . . . _ . _ __ _ _. . _ _
x ..
  .
..
T
 
  -Generator 2A and 2C 125-volt direct current subsystems. This failure to follow procedures was' identified-as an example of-  >
VIO 50-321. 366/97-09-01, Failure to Follow Procedure - Multiple Examples (Section_08.2).
 
tialptenance o  Routine maintenance activities were generally completed in a thorough and professional manner. No deficiencies were identified by the inspectors for the maintenance activities observed (Section M1.1).      ,
o  Maintenance department response to the Rod Position Indicating ..  '
.
System (RPIS) problem on Unit I was timely 'and engineering support-of the maintenance ac.tivity was excellent. Operator actions for the failed RPIS were appropriate (Section M1.2).
 
*  Maintenance and engineering support following the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator failure to start on September 4 was excellen The review of past performance and repair history for the failed
>
fuel oil check valves that resulted in additional check valve replacements. demonstrated conservative decision making by the licensee (Section M1.3; e-  Management's oversight and pre-job planning for the forced outage on the Unit 1 main steam isolation valve limit switch adjustment was good. Craft personnel performed the work activity in a professional and timely manner. Health Physics personnel demonstrated a pro-active attitude by identifying the Low Pressure Coolant Injection check valve leak and notifying maintenance (Section M1.4).
 
e  Maintenance personnel's attention-to-detail during a walkdown which discovered broken 31eces of the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant u
Injection (HPCI) flange Jushing was superior. Engineering support of maintenance was excellent. Foreign Material Exclusion control measures were satisfactory (Section M2.1).
 
e-  Maintenance and engineering oversight of the intake structure dredging activities was excellent. Foreign material exclusion and'
security control measures were appropriate. Communications and departmental-coordination was good (Section M2.2).
 
e  For the surveillances observed all-data met the recuired acceptance criteria-and the equipment performed sat";factorily, i  The-performance of the personnel conducting the surveillances was generally professional and-competent (Section M3.1).
 
l
'
lt
'
Enclosure 2
          .
-- swe -- -- , . , , m.,- -- -.w e ,, - 4 y w~_<m y 9 y ,-, , - -
 
.
.
.
 
e The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI code requirements for visual inspections were met for the strap welding on the Unit 2 Safety Relief Valves. A procedurally required VT-1 inspection was not com)leted following work on the B fecdwater check valve hinge pin for Jnit 2. This was identified as an example of VIO 50-321, 366/97-09-01. Failure to Follow Procedure - Multiple Examples (Section M3.2).
 
e The licensee had taken appropriate actions to correct the TIP System ASME code. Class 2 issues. The GE Code requirements of the TIP equipment installed were equivalent to those of the ASME Cod The proposed UFSAR revision was appropriate (Section M3.3).
 
e The inspectors concluded that Safety Audit and Engineering Review (SAER) audit 97-SA-3. Technical Specification Administrative Control Implementation, was conducted by trained and qualified personnel. The audit was thorough and detailed. The corrective actions and proposed completion dates were appropriate for the findings (Section M7.1).
 
Enaineerina e The inspectors concluded that the licensee was making progress in resolving the divisional cable separation issues for both units (Section E1.1).
 
e The inspectors concluded that new fuel receipt. inspection, and storage were completed with appropriate oversight and control, and in accordance with applicable plant procedures. Engineerin Health Physics. and security personnel support for the activity was satisfactory (Section E4.1).
 
Plant Supoort e The inspectors concluded that a contract Health Physics technician who left the plant site after receiving an alarm on the exit portal monitor presented minimal safety significance to the individual or to the public. The actions taken by the licensee were a)propriate and no further NRC actions are planne Based upon t1e fact that the individual is no longer employed at the site and site access was immediately terminated (Section R1.2).
 
e Management personnel had placed special emphasis for improved Health Physics and general radiation worker activities. The stop work meetino, plant tours for new contractors, and radiation worker ex]ectations list were identified as a strength (Section R1.3).
 
Enclosure 2
 
.
.
 
e Overall performance during the annual emergency preparedness exercise was good. Event classifications during the exercise were correct. Operator performance in the simulator and overall performance in the operations support center was excellent (Section P4.1).
 
e The areas of security inspected met the applicable requirements (Section S2).
 
Enclosure 2
 
.      ,
.
.
.
 
ReDort Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began the report period at 100% Rated Thermal Power (RTP). End-of-cycle coast down began on September 2, On September 6. the 1A reactor feedwater pump turbine tripped during a weekly turbine test and resulted in a power reduction to 66% RTP. The unit was returned to 98% RTP. the maximum achievable povci , the same da Power was reduced on September 15 to remove the 1A feedwater pump from service due to a oil cooler leak. The unit was increased to the maximum achievable coast down power on September 17. Later on September 17, power was reduced slightly to verify turbine control valve functions. Power was returned to maximum rated the same da The unit remained in coast down for the remainder of the report period except for routine testing activitie Unit 2 began the report period at 100% RTP. On September 15. power w s reduced to approximately 75% RTP for main steam isolation valve (MSIV)
testing and was subsequently brounht to Hot Shutdown due to MSIV limit switch problems. Unit startup began on September 18. and reached 100%
RTP on September 2 The unit operated at this power level for the remainder of the report period, except for routine testing activitie I. ODerations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious: specific events and observations are detailed in the section below. In particular, the inspectors observed that during the Unit 2 startup activities on September 18. equipment problems such as control rods that were difficult to withdraw, turbine vibration problems during turbine roll, and main generator automatic voltage regulator problems challenged operators. Operator procedure usage, communications, control of activities, and supervisory oversight during these activities was excellen Enclosure 2
.
 
  .- - -  _
    - -  - - . - - . - - . . . . . - .
  . ,
  .        -i
,
i
 
6 02- (Operational Status of Facility _and Equipment-    !
02.1- Enaineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown    -
          , Insoection Scoce (71707)
Thel ins)ectors-performed an inspection of the accessible portions
          '
of the Jnit I standby gas treatment (SBGT) system. This-included-verification of valve alignment, instrumentation, condition of -
    -components in service, and general housekeeping for both trains of the system, Observations and Findinos-The inspectors reviewed applicable Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids) and filter train operability verification procedures in use for the Unit 1 SBGT system. System control switches, valves and dampers were verified to be in the correct positions. Proper operation of control room flow recorders and indications were confirmed following routine atmospheric venting of the primary containment using the "A" SBGT filter train, Conclusions Equipment alignment, component opertbility, and material condition
'
were good in all-areas inspected. _ Housekeeping conditions in the filter train room adjacent to Unit 1 Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning room were excellen .0 Operator Knowledge and Performance
  -
0 A Reactor Feedoumo Turbine (RFPT) Trio Durina Routine Turbine Testina Inspection 5 ooe (71707) (92901)
    - The insSectors reviewed procedure 34IT-N21-003-1S, "RFPT Weekly Test". Revision (Rev.) 4. and operator performance and plant-response following a 1A RFPT trip on September Observations and Findinos
'
Licensee management-had deferred routine RFPT_ testing during hot
    -
    - weather conditions and times of peak load demand. 0n' September the 1A RFPT trip. test was scheduled. This was one of the first weekly turbine tests performed following resumption of the-RFPT testing. While performing section 7.3. "RFPT 011 Trip Test " the
.
Enclosure 2
.
__----a a -*_ _m ---#_ , . .s.e-- s.w- W,-3---- g+.-r-- 4+-+ ,--sa. p y r -m-g-g r w -
tr- *--1- -r- p D-
 
.
.
.
 
operator stated that when he released the Overs)eed Trip Test Lockout Switch, the RFPT immediately tripped. Other than the RFPT
  -
The trip. there were no indications of abnormal system resp RFPf trip caused a Reactor Recirculation Systa runbac . (ons The inspectors reviewed plant data and discussed the RFPT trip with operations and management personne The inspectors observed that all systems responded correctly. The Reactor water level decreased to about 15 inches and a Reactor Recirculation System Runback occurred as expected. Reactor power stabilized at about 66% Rated Thermal Power (RTP). The region of potential instability of the power to flow map was never entere Operations personnel discussed the pump trip and later successfully completed the turbine testing on the 1A and 1B RFP During subsequent testing. the operators did not release the Overspeed Trip Test Lockout Switch until a few seconds had passed after receiving the green reset permissive light. Operations personnel told the inspectors that they believe that holding the Overspeed Trip Test Lockout Switch depressed for a few seconds longer may have prevented the initial tri Reactor power was increased to maximum rated within about 1.5 hours following the RFPT trip and subsequent testin The licensee initiated a review of the procedure and system response to determine if possible procedure problems existed or if improvements could be made to ensure that no future RFPi trips occurred. A temporary change to clarify some procedure steps for both units was completed. The licensee concluded that the root cause of the RFPT trip was mechanical linkage not being in the proper position when the overspeed lockout switch was release The procedure revision addressed this proble The inspectors observed that the testing procedure had been used numerous times in the past and no known previous problem or RFPT trips had been identified. The inspectors reviewed the procedure in detail and walked through the procedure at the local panels to ensure switch nomenclature and procedure wording were clea No procedure deficiencies were observe c. Conclusions Unit 1 systems responded properly following the tri) of the 1A RFPT and subsequent Reactor Recirculation Runbacc on September 6. Operator response to the trip and runback'was goo Enclosure 2
 
.
-
.
 
04.2 Unit 1 Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS) Relay ReDlacement Insoection Scoce (71707) (62707)
On August 15. Operations supervision prepared a maintenance work order (MWO) for the re)lacement of a failed relay associated with the RMCS on Unit T1e MWO was provided to maintenance personnel as guidance for component replacement. The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures and otler documentation associated with the work activity, Observationsandfindinas On August 15, while performing surveillance procedure 34SV-C11-003-IS. " Control Rod Weekly Exercise." Rev. 10. Edition (ED) 1. the control rods in row 34 could be selected but would not actuate the RMCS for manual insertion. Troubleshooting activities by maintenance personnel revealed that relay 1C11-K033 had failed and required replacemen Operations supervision on shift 3repared MWO 1-97-1979 and grantec approval for the maintenance tec1nician to replace the relay. Tht MWO prepared and approved was not properly complete The MWO dic not'have any work instructions or procedural references, and other items of importance were not indicated. The inspectors reviewed the MWO that was used by the maintenance technician and observed that the technician documented the work performed on the MWO. The technician documented that the K033 relay was defective, had been replaced with a new one, and the RMCS operated satisfactoril A later review by maintenance personnel identified several discrepancies with the MWO and initiated a deficiency card. The inspectors reviewed the deficiency card that identified the discrepancies on the MWO used by the technician to re) lace the failed relay. Also, reviewed was a second MWO with t1e same control number that was prepared after the relay replacement. This MWO corrected the discrepancies identified for the earlier MW The inspectors reviewed MWO 1-97-1979 to determine if the requirements of Administrative Control procedure 50AC-MNT-001-0 " Maintenance Program." Rev. 25, were met for the maintenance work activitie The following discrepancies were identified:
. Step 4.2.5 of the procedure required. in part that plant maintenance be performed and controlled within the boundaries of " work instructions" of MW0s and/or procedure Work instructions were not provided to replace a failed RMCS rela Enclosure 2 l
l
 
. - ._ _ _. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _
_ ;
2- #      s
.        .
b        t 9-Section 8.2.2 and sub-step _8,2.1.2 required, in part, that
  '
.
  ..      ..
block:23 of the MW0' state a specific sco)e of work using l referenced material as ap)licabler The iWO failed to enter ,
the specific scope of. wort and references in block 23 of the
        '
,
MW * -Step 8.5.-1 requires. in' part, that prior to the start of
    . plant maintenance, the responsible personnel will perform a-cursory review of the MWO package-to ensure the contents are'- _
adequate. Responsible operations and maintenance personnel- ,
    .did not ensure that the contents of the MWO package were -
        ;
        '
adequat c- Conclusions    a The inspectors concluded that. operations supervision' failed to
  : follow applicable procedures to correctly generate a MWO package'  <
for a-RMCS relay replacement. - Additionally, operations  4 supervision authorized work and maintenance personnel performed work'using the MW0. Operations'and maintenance personnel failed-to ensure that the MWO package contents were adequate. This was identified as an example of Violation (VIO) 50-321. 366/97-09-01,
'-
Failure to-Follow Procedure - Multiple Example '
        #
04.3 Doerator Performance Durina Normal Plant Shutdown Insoection Scoce (71707)
*
The inspectors reviewed an operating crew's performance and management's corrective actions following deficiencies identified  ,
during a forced outage of Unit 2-on September 1 Observations and Findinas    ,
  -Unit 2 was being shut down to conduct a drywell entry to~ adjust inboard main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) limit switche Maintenance activities associated with the limit switch adjustments are discussed'in Section M1.4 of this Inspection Report (IR), Following a manual scram from about 20% aower.
 
,
reactor water level increased to about 88 inches, at w1ich time
-
  -
operators closed the HSIVs. About 36 inches is the normal reactor _ ~
water level. Maintaining an approximately normal reactor water
,
  -level is generally not a problem during a manual scram condition  ,
from low )ower, and the MISVs are not normally closed during routine slutdowns._ Closing the MSIVs isolated the RFPT (normal-water control system) steam supply and the main condenser for normal pressure control. These actions can complicate a routine  -
manual scram and present additional challenges to the operating
  " crew. The. operators stated that they. closed the MSIVs to prevent-exceeding the reactor: vessel cooldown rate. The potential for Enclosure 2
,_ .. - . _ _
 
.  . . . . .
.
.
.
.
10-exceeding the vessel cooldown rate was due to abnormally high water level. Following the MSIV closure at 4:42 p.m. the Reactor-Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) was manually placed in service for reactor pressure control. The MSIVs were reopened at 6:40 p.m. and norml pressure control was establishe The inspectors-discussed the operating crews performance with operations management. The inspectors were informed that the perforinance of the operating crew did not meet managements expectations. Operations management stated that the operators'
response to chcnging reactor water level was slow. Management personnel also stated that operations )ersonnel were slow to reset the reactor scram and this also contri)uted to the high reactor water leve Operations management and the operating crew conducted a critique of the crew performance and unit response using unit chart recorders and the safety parameter display system tape information. Management stated the crew acknowledged that their performance could be inproved. As part of the corrective actions, simulator training was provided to the crew to practice similar m&nual scram con itions. Additionally, low power reactor shutdowns will be evaluated for inclusion into the regularly scheduled operator license requalification trainin Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the operating crew's performance resulted in additional challenges durin9 a normal reactor manual scram. Operations management prompt actions to correct an operating crew's weaknesses following a routine manual scre a on Unit 2 was goo .4 Review of Unit 2 Emeraency Diesel Generator (EDG) Battery Charaer Transfer Insoection Scooe (71707) (92901) (62707)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with an activity on September 11, when a plant equipment operator (PE0)
improperly transferred battery chargers for the 2A and 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 125-Volt Direct Current (VDC)
subsystems, rendering both subsystems inoperable. The inspectors reviewed the ap)licable procedures, control room logs. TSs. rfi0s, and discussed t11s problem with licensee managemen Enclosure 2
 
_ .
s
.
.
.
 
b. Observations and Findinas The control .roon -logs indicated that the unit shift supervisor had authorized a maintenance electrician to conduct preventive maintenance (PM) on battery charger feeder breakers in accordance with MWO 29701339. In order to facilitate taking the battery chargers out of service to perform the PM. the electrician requested the assistance of the outside roving PE0 to transfer battery chargers. The PE0 performed the transfer without using
)rocedure 34S0-R42-001-25. "125/250 VDC Station Service Charger Rotation & Breaker Racking." and failed to connect the in-service battery chargers to their respective 125 VDC cabinets. As a result, both EDG 125-VDC subsystems were left misaligned with control power being provided by the EDG batterie Control room operators subsequently received an annunciator for
" Battery Volts Low or Fuse Trouble" for both the 2A and 2C EDG An operator was dispatched to investigate the problem. Normal battery charger alignment was restored: however, the misaligned battery chargers had rendered the 125-VDC subsystems inoperable for a total of 36 minutes. Engineering conducted an analysis and determined that a loss of function of the 2A and 2C 125-VDC systems did not occur due to the fact that the total energy loss from the batteries was only 2 amp-hours, compared to load profiles of 66 amp-hours and 37 amp hours for the 2A and 2C DC subsystems, respectivel The inspectors reviewed procedure 34S0-R42-001-2S. Rev. 4, which is classified as a " continuous use" procedure in accordance with 10AC-MGR-019 0S. " Procedure Use and Adherence." Rev. Specifically MGR-01900S stated, in part, that a " continuous use" procedure is required at work activities that affect safety-related system operability, and that procedure steps will be reviewed, read, and initialed during the activity. The inspectors verified that the )rocedure was adequate to perform the DC system transfers for the EDG The inspector's review indicated that at the pre-job briefing, the Unit 2 shift supervisor had designated a performance team PE0 to perform the battery charger transfers. This PE0 was never in attendance at the pre-job briefing, nor was the PE0 who subsequently performed the improper transfe In addition, a review of the operations logs revealed that the shift supervisor documented the maintenance being performed under MWO 29701339 as " Battery Charger Clean and Inspect." when the actual maintenance was to clean and inspection of the battery charger feeder breakers. The inspectors determined that operations * oversight and coordination of the battery charger transfer evolution was poo Enclosure 2
 
.
.
.
12 Conclusions Operations demonstrated poor oversight and coordination of the battery charger transfer activity. A PE0 failed to pro >erly follow procedures governing continuous use activities tlat affect the operability of EDG 2A and 2C 125-VDC subsystem This failure to follow procedures was identified as an example of Violation (VIO) 50-321. 366/97-09-01. Failure to Follow Procedure - Multiple Example Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901) (82301)
0 (Closed) IFI 50-321. 366/96-13-04: Inability to Correctly Classify Events. This IFI was initiated following misclassification of events during simulator scenarios observed during a licensed operator requalification program assessment. The licensee revised procedure 73EP-EIP-001-05. " Emergency Classification and Initial Actions." to improve usability and increase training emphasis on event classifications. Based upon the inspectors' review of licensee actions and demonstrated improvements in simulated event classifications this item is close .2 (Closed) LER 50-366/97-09: Removal of DG Battery Chargers From Service Results in Inoperability of Both the 2A and 2C DG DC Electrical Power Subsystems. This LER is discussed in Section 04.4 of this IR. Based upon the inspectors review of licensee actions, this item is close II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Mcintenance M1.1 General Coments Jnsoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities:
. MWO 1-97-2223: realace RPIS 28 volt power supply
. MWO 1-96-2099: re) lock 1B EDG generater winding at next outage
. MWO 1-96-3225: inspect 1B EDG engine per applicable 6-year PM procedures
. MWO 1-97-1998: perform inspection of 18 EDG jacket
,  coolant pump in accordance with procedure l  52PM-R43-017-0S l . MWO 1-96-4145: Jerform 18-month grease inspection on iPCI CST suction valve 1E41-F004 Enclosure 2
 
    ..-e
.
.
.
.
 
- Observations and Findinas The inspectors found that the work was performed with the work packages present and being actively use Conclusions Maintenance activities were generally completed in a thorough and professional manner. No deficiencies were identified by the inspectors for the maintenance activities observe M Rod Position Indicatina System (RPIS) and Drywell-to-Torus Vacuun 3reaker Problems on Unit 1 Insoection Scope (62707) (37551) (71707)
The inspectors observed portions of the work activities associated with the re)lacement of the 28-volt RPIS power sup)ly and discussed tie activity with the system engineer. )iscussions were also conducted with operations' management concerning the opening of a drywell-to-torus vacuum breaker during drywell venting activities. Additionally the inspectors reviewed the Technical Specifications (TSs). Technical Requirenent Manual (TRM). abnormal operating procedure. MWO 1-97-2223. and applicable work packages associated with the problem Qbservations and Findinas Unit 1 entered TRM Action Statement. Section T3.3.3. on September 16. due to an inoperable RPIS. The TRM Action Statement required that the unit be in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) within 12 hours. The RPIS became inoperable due to a failed 28-volt power supply. The operators lost a portion of the full core display panel. Operators were able to determine control rod positions using the process computer. The manual and automatic shutdown functions of the control rods were still operabl Similar RPIS and drywell-to-torus vacuum breaker (DW/ torus)
3roblems occurred on June 30 and July 20. The 5-volt power supply lad failed for the RPIS system and the 1T48-F323F DW/ torus vacuum breaker had failed to close due to mechanical binding. Details of these problems are documented in section 01.3 of Inspection Report (IR) 50-321, 366/97-07.
 
i
'
The inspectors observed a portion of the RPIS power supply replacement activity and its return to service. The system indicating lights operated properly and the RPIS functioned properl Enclosure 2
 
,
 
-  - - ... .
.
.
~
J
 
Engineering personnel informed the inspectors thai; the current i 5 volt and 28-volt RPIS power supplies are obsolete and a design change to realace the existing power sup) lies ds being prepare The design clange will be installed in tie futur On Seatember 15 during drywell (DW) venting activities, the IT48 323A DW to torus vacuum breaker openec and would not clos Operations >'ersonnel entered the correct TS Required Action Statement ( RS) 3.6.1.8. Suparession Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum i Breakers. This TS requires tlat the vacuum breaker ce closed within two hours. The operating crew aligned the SBGT system to take suction from the torus as allowed by procedure and the vacuum breaker closed within the required two hours. The TS RAS for the opened vacuum breaker was terminate Operations management informed the inspectors that the operating crew allowed the DW-to-torus differential pressure (DP) to become lower than desired during DW venting activities. The F323A vacuum breaker has a history of opening sooner than the other vacuum breakers, and it o]ened at the higher DP. Operations management further informed t1e inspectors that a night order was written for the operators to use during drywell venting activities. The night order instructed the operators to keep the DW-to-torus DP greater than 0.2 pounds per square inch differential (psid). The TS opening setpoint is less than or equal to 0.5 psid. The inspectors reviewed the night order and system operating procedure 3450-T48-002-15. " Containment Atmospheric Control and Dilution,"
Rev.1.6. and no deficiencies were identifie The inspectors also reviewed Section T3.3.3 of the TRM and abnormal operating procedure 34AB-C11-002-1S. "RPIS Failure."
 
Rev.1. Edition (ED) 1. to verify that the appropriate actions were taken by the o)erating crew. The inspectors reviewed MWO 1-97-2223 whic1 provided instruction for the replacement of the 28-volt RPIS power supply. No deficiencies were identifie c. Conclusions Maintenance's response to the RPIS problem was timely; engineering support of the maintenance activity was excellent: and operations personnel took the appropriate actions for the RPIS failur Enclosure 2
 
_
.
.
.
        '
,.
        :
 
M1.3 LA Emeraency Diesel Generator Failure To Start Durina Surveillance M      ,
x Insoection Scone (61726) (92902)
        .
The inspectors reviewed applicable maintenance procedures, associated MW0s,_and work packa9es associated with the repair of  >
the 1A EDG following a: failure to start on September 4, 1997-.- The inspectors discussed the EDG failure with operations, maintenanc ,
and engineering personne b, l Observations and Findinas'
        ,
  % ring the performance of surveillance test 34SV-R43-001-1 " Diesel Generator 1A Monthly Test." Rev. 17. ED1. the-1A EDG failed to start. Operations personnel contacted maintenance for'  ,
their assistance in troubleshooting activities. Operations declared the EDG inoperable and initiated the correct TS RAS. The maintenance investigation revealed that the fuel oil check valve had stuck in the open position. This check valve is on the down-stream: side of the injectors and allowed the fuel oil to drain from the fuel oil header back into the clean fuel oil drain tan As a result an inadequate supply of fuel oil existed for the EDG  ,
-
  -start.
 
'
Maintenance replaced the-check valve and the EDG surveillance was successfully completed. Hintenance and engineering personnel o  conducted a review of pa~ nerformance and repair history for the check valves and issued at e Mneering evaluation to document the results of the review. The mspectors reviewed the engineering evaluation and other licensee documentation and observed the following:
  . .In 1987, all check valves (one for each of the five EDGs)
were replaced due to suspected problems.
 
,  e From the total of five valves, two valves had 10 years or more of service life with no problems. Check valves for
~
EDGs 2A and 2C were replaced in 1987 and in March 199 respectively, with no problems observe . One valve had five years of service life with no problem The check valve for-EDG 1B was replaced in October 1992 and  .
<
August 1997-, with.no problems observe One valve had less than five years of service life with one failur . - The check-valve for EDG 1A was replaced in April 1993 and -
had failed in September 199 Enclosure 2
<
  % - +e . . - . . - ---,e % .v -' ;m,- n.-m..y , r,-. , - - - , - -
 
  ..
.
.
.
 
Maintenance personnel inspected the check valve installed in the 1C EDG and discovered that it was also open. The check valve was replaced, and post maintenance testing was successfully performe The check valve had been replaced in March 199 The engineering evaluation recommended that the check valves be replaced every five years, however, maintenance management was evaluating whether or not the frequency snould be every 18 me h The inspectors were informed that the check valve was suspected of causing sluggish EDG start times in 1987. The inspectors were not aware of any recent operability concerns or sluggish EDG start proi>lems . Conclusions Maintenance and engineering support following the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator failure to start on September 4 was excellen The review of past performance and repair history for the failed fuel oil check valves that resulted in additional check valve replacements demonstrated conservative decision makin M1.4 Unit 2 Forced Outaae Insoection Scooe (6270171 The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures and MW0s associated with the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) limit switches on Unit 2. Limit switch adjustments were discussed with maintenance, engineering, and operations personnel. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed procederes applicable to the repairs performed on the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) check valve during the forced outage and discussed the re pairs with maintenance management and engineering personnel Observations and Findinas On September 14. While performing quarterly MSIV surveillance
)rocedure 345V-B21-001-25. "MSIV Exercise and Closure Instrument r unctional Test." Rev. 5. ED 1: the 2C71-K3G and 2C71-K3H relays failed to re-energize when the 'O' inboard MSIV was returned to its fully opened position. Because a s-imilar relay associated with the 'B' MSIV was already de-energized due to a similar failure during the previous surveillance a half scram resulted which the operators were unable to reset. The failure of the relay associated with the 'B' inboard MSIV is documented in Section M1.3 of IR 50-321. 366/97-0 The licensee decided to bring the unit to Hot Shutdown for entry into the drywell to ins)ect and/or adjust the limit switches that provide the signal to t1e relays that failed to re-energiz Enclostre 2
      .
 
. .. ~ - - . . - - - - - . . -.  . .. . - - ~ . - . . - .
n        +
-
.        i
.
        -
li    .
Maintenance work was completed for limit switch adjustments and-
    -
unit startup was commenced on September 18. The unit achieved 100% RTP on September 2 Due to the failure of the relays to reset on September 14 and on June 22,1the licensee initiated a root- cause investigation of the  ,
MSIV limit switch problems. The licensee root cause investigation:  !
concluded that the limit switch setup methodology was a-possible-  ,
contributor to the problem.-.The-limit switch reset positions  '
i  criteria was not specified by procedure and was left to the    *
judgement of the electrician performing the work. A new type of  i
-
limit switch was installed during the-last unit refueling outage and craft judgement-was again used to set the limit switch reset positions. However, small changes in valve stroke length (due to unknown causes) when steam flowed through the MSIV may have prevented the' limit switches from resetting'when the MSIV-was very close to the valve full-open position. Maintenance personnel also determined that the new limit switch reset position was not    :
consistent and predictable like the previous limit switches. The  4 4  root cause investigation report-recomnended that the maintenance department revise applicable procedures to include specific instructions on limit switch reset position The inspectors reviewed surveillance procedure 52SV-B21-001-0 "MSIV Limit Switch Inspection," P.ev. 4. The revision of the
-
procedure included an addition which required a confirmation that
. the MSIV limit switch resets when the MSIV is taken back to the fully opened )osition. Other procedure steps were either deleted or added to t1e preventive maintenance procedur Health Physics personnel identified a leak on the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) check valve 2E11-F050B upon initial entry
-
into the drywell for the MSIV limit switch adjustment work activit The valve was leaking steam from the hinge pin are Maintenance attempted to stop the leak by torquing the hinge pi The valve was_ repacked after the torquing failed to stop the lea . Conclusions l:
Management's oversight and pre-job plconing for forced outage act'vities on the MSIV limit switch adjustment was good. Craft
<
personnel performed the work activity in a professional and timely manner. Health Physics personnel demonstrated a aro-active-attitude by identifying the LPCI check valve leac and notifying maintenance.
 
,
L      Enclosure 2 L
1-
'
_. . _ _ , _ . , _ - . _ _ , , , _ . . _ , - - _ - ,
 
.
.
.
p
 
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Inocerable Unit 2 Hiah Pressure Coolant In.iection (HPCI) Pumo Inspection Scone (62707)
On August 18 the Unit 2 HPCI pump was declared inoperable due to a broken flange bushing that was discovered by maintenance personnel. The inspectors reviewed a)plicable drawing rocedures. TS. MW0s. Licensee Event Re] orts (LER), and the Jpdated Final Safety Analysis Report (U SAR) associated with repairs of the pump. The inspectors also held discussions with .
involved maintenance, engineering, and vendor personnel, Observations and Findinas On August 18. during a routine housekeeping wal!:down of the HPCI system. maintenance personnel discovered pieces of metal in the shaft drain casing of the HPCI main pump. The metal pieces were from the pump shaft flange bushing (six pieces) and one of the shaft's split rings. The flangt bushing is designed to limit the water flow from the shaft of the pump in the event of a catastrophic failure of the mechanical seal. The split ring is one of two semicircular rings that assists in maintaining the shaft sleeve in proper alignmen Operations personnel declared the HPCI system inoperable after being informed of the damage. The RAS of TS 3.5.1. Condition C, was entered. The required 10 CFR 50.72 notification was made to the NR housing and The inspectors removal of pum) observed the disassembly shaft components of the bearir.g/ repair during the inspection activities. T1e inspectors observed that the lubricant piping removed was not immediately sealed for foreign material exclusion (FME) control. The inspectors observed that sawing activitias of metal components were in progress in the immediate area and had the potential of FME contamination. Maintenance personnel eventually taped the lubricant piping for FME protection. The inspectors were later informed that the piping and components were flushed and cleaned prior to installatio The inspectors observed the recovered pieces of the bushing flange. It was noted by the inspectors that all pieces necessary to reconstruct the flange bushing were not present. The inspectors were informed by maintenance personnel that six pieces of the flange bushing were recovered and the remaining missing part or parts were not found. A search of the immediate area was conducted but did not locate the missing part Enclosure 2
 
. . . _ _ _ . _ _ .. _ -- _ _ . . ~ _ - _ _ . . _ _
  -
.
d
 
        -t
_
19-The licensee contacted the aump vendor to assist with the failure L  '
mechanism determination. Tle inspectors discussed the possible
    -
cause of the flang,e bushing failure with-the vendor
  ~
representative. nie vendor representative informed the inspectors that he suspected that shaft movement caused by the bearing-failure cn the-shaft between the main pump and the booster pump -
allowed the shaft to rub against'the flange bushing, thus causing  ,
a: failure of the flange bushin The licensee suspected that the bearing failed due to a small amount of particles that contaminated the main pump journal  1 2 earing housing. This caused damage to the bearing babbitt-  .!
material which led to increased pump vibration sufficient in  '
magnitude to cause the shaft-to impact, crack, and. break the-flange bushing and displace the spl:t ring retainer. The licensee  ;
indicated that the damage to the seal likely occurred during the performance of the HPCI operability surveillance performed on August 11, but was unable to determine the source and type of
  .contamiration that caused the bearing damag The inspectors reviewed the data package for the most recently:
  -performed o)erability surveillance procedure: 34SV-E41-002-2S,  +
  "HPCI Pump Operability." Rev. 26, and noted that the main pump inboard horizontal vibration (point H03) was in the alert rang This required the operability test to be performed at double the  ,
normal frequenc A review of MWO 2 96-0024 by the inspectors indicated that a small i
water leak at the mechanical seals had been identified earlie Since the leak did not affect pump operability the work for the mechanical seal repair / replacement was initially deferred until
>
the next Unit 2 refueling outage. The MWO was revised to include the work scope for the replacement of the damaged bearing.' the flange bushing and the split ring. All work was performed and the HPCI-system was returned to an operable status-en August 2 The inspectors reviewed LER 50 366/97-08, Main Pump Journal
>  Bearing Damage Renders HPCI System Inoperable. As part of the corrective actions, the licensee inspected and replaced the i  inboard and outboard main pump bearings and rebuilt the pump shaft bearing. The damaged outboard main pump mechanical seal was replaced and the bearing lubrication oil system was drained, flushed, and cleaned. : The lubricating' oil system filters were also replaced. Following-system repairs. maintenance engineering personnel confirmed that vibration levels and alignment of the l  turbine and main' pump were within acceptable tolerance l      Enclosure 2-l
. - - _ - - .- - . - - . . - .. _- , , -  _ . -.
 
. . . , - - --. -. - - ~ - - - - - - - -  _ . . - _ --
,
,- ..-      _;
-
 
    .20-
        ;
The inspectors-reviewed vendor. drawings S-25084. "HPCI Pump he  l Sectional-GE VPF #3076-13." and the associated drawing for t mechanical seals. Additior, ally. Unit 2 UFSAR Section 7.3.1. '
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Instrumentation and Centrol, was reviewed. No discrepancies were identifie I Conclusions--
Maintenance personnel's attention-to-detail during the walkdown which discovered the broken pieces of the HFCI flange bushing was  i FME-superior. Engineering support of maintenance was excellen control measures were satisfactor M2.2 Intake Structure Dredaina Activities
        . InsoectionScone(6272 The inspectors observed activities associated with the dredging and cleaning of the intake structure water pit. The inspectors also reviewed MWO 1-97-1453 and the data package of )rocedure 52PM-MME-006-05 " Intake Structure Pit Inspection." Rev. 6.
 
v  Discussions were conducted with maintenance supervision and engineering. A representative sampling of clearance tags was verified, Qbservations and Findinas On September 26. the inspectors observed activities associated with the preparation-to dredge and clean the intake structure pi The inspectors observed that a FME area boundary had been established inside the intake structure on the ground level and FME was properly controlled.
 
'
The inspectors verified that a representative sampling of the-clearance tags associated with the work activity was properly-place The inspectors discussed communication aspects of this activit with engineering and maintenance supervision. The inspectors
>  observed that communications had been established with the diver the divers' attendant. the control room, and with a member of the diving ~ team that--was located on the dredge platfor The dredge platform was afloat-on the river with a suction hose.-
that ran through an opening in the travelling screens. The opening was made by removing necessary sections of the traveling e  screen. The opening in the travelling screen was large enough to insert an 8-inch diameter suction line into the pump suction pit L
;  area.: Security personnel appropriately monitored the are Enclosure 2
!-
L
. _  , _ . - , .  - . .,. - - _ ~ -
 
-
.
 
A review of MWO 1-97-1453 and the data package for procedure 52PM-MME-006-0S revealed that the intake pit dredging and cleaning activity was completed by the divers on October 2. The divers had cleaned the pit to an acceptable level per the requirements of procedure 52PM-MME-006-0 Conclusions The ins)ectors concluded that maintenance and engineering oversialt of the activities was excellent. FME and security control measures were appropriate. Communications and departmental coordination was goo H3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 Surveillance Observations Inspection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors observed various surveillance activities. The procedJres to accomplish the activities provided instructions for demonstrating that the referenced safety-related equipment functioned as required by TSs and the Inservice Testing procram, Qbiervations and Fin.fdn_qi The inspectors observed all or pcrtions of the following Unit 1 and Unit 2 surveillance activities:
. 345V-E11-001-1S: Residual Heat Removal Pump Operabilit Rev. 20. ED 1
. 345V-E41-002-1S: HPCI Pump Operability. Rev. 21
. 345V-R43-003-2S: Diesel Generator 2C Monthly Test. Rev. 18
. 34SV-SUV-018-1S: ECCS Status Checks. Rev, 6
. 57SV-N62-001-2S: Off Gas Hydrogen Analyzer FT&C. Rev. 10 The inspectors attended the pre-evolution briefing for all of the surveillance activities. During the Unit 1 HPCI o)erability briefing, appropriate precautions were emphasized )y the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor regarding torus temperature. Communications between maintenance, engineering operations, and HP personnel were excellent. The inspectors observed that, during the tes operations personnel were very cognizant of monitoring suppression pool temperature. Coordination between the test lead operator and the shift operator when placing the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode was goo The inspectors observed that during the Unit 1 RHR operability pre-evolution briefing, the lead operator appeared unfamiliar with specific aspects of the test as they related to items on the Enclosure 2
 
.
.
 
pre-evolution checklist. Specifically, the operator was unsure of what permission was required to initiate this surveillance, whether FME would be a concern, and whether or not a post-evolution briefing would be conducted to discuss results of the test. The inspectors discussed this observation with operations managemen During the Unit 1 RHR pump operability test, the inspectors observed that operations personnel collected in Service Testing (IST) vibration readings at two )oints on the motor mounting flange in the radial direction. )ut took no axial vibration readings. Discussions with the licensee's IST engineer and a review of the RHR pum) IST plan revealed that these pumps were not equipped with thrust 3 earings, therefore axial vibration readings were not require The inspectors examined the IST test data for the 1A RHR pump and verified that reference parameters were correctly extracted from the Unit 1 IST data book. No deficiencies were identified, Conclusions For the surveillance activities observed, all data met the required acceptance criteria and equipment performed satisfactorily. The surveillance tests were conducted in accordance with procedures and with cversight from supervisors and system engineers. With minor excepticns, all involved personnel were knowledgeable of the tests and system performance requirements. Overall, performance was professional and competen M3.2 Review of The American Society of Mechanical Enaineers (ASME) Code Visual Examinations for Unit 2 Insoection Scoce (62707) (929021 The inspectors reviewed the work packages for maintenance activities performed during the Unit 2 Spring Outage of 199 This review was to ascertain whether applicable visual examinations, as required by Section XI of the ASME code, were met. The inspectors conducted discussions with Quality Control (OC) supervision and engineering. Additionally, the inspectors reviesed the following plant procedures:
. Engineering Service Procedure 42EN-ENG-014-05. "ASME Section XI Repair / Replacement." Rev. * Quality Control Procedure 450C-0CX-009-0S. " Quality Control Document Review and Inspection Point Assignment." Rev. Enclosure 2
 
;.
, ,
c
_
 
-
  *- Administrative C6ntrol: Procedure-40AC-0CX-001-05.J" Quality Control -Inspection Program." Rev b. .0bsersations and Findinas IThe ins)ectors were informed by quality control (0C) supervision that-a QC review of work packages for the recent Unit 2 outage (Spring 1997) revealed that-some required Section XI ASME code~
visual inspections were not performed. The work packages in-question were 2-96-0834. 2 96-0836, and 2-97-0686. The work packages were identified on deficiency card (DC) C0970369 The inspectors discussed the work packages with engineering
~
personnel assigned to perform the root cause determination for the deficiencies. Engineering informed the inspectors that the ASME Section XI Code-required visual inspections (VT-1 and VT-3) were performed but some were not performed per.the guidance provided 'in procedure 42EN-ENG-014-0 The inspectors reviewed the three work packages listed on DC-C09703695, the Root Cause Analysis Summary for the DC, and the engineering evaluation for the vendor-performed VT-1 for the feedwater check valve hinge pin installation. This review indicated the following:
,
  . Work packages 2-96-0834 and 2-96-00836 provided wark instructions for outage re) air / replacement activities on safety relief valves.2B21 :013E and 2B21-F013 respectively. The work activity in question was for the welding of a strap onto the safety relief valve to support a pilot sensing tube. The licensee treated the work activity as an ASME Section XI repair / replacement activity, thus requiring a VT-3 examination. However, the VT-3 post maintenance requirement was not listed on the Section XI
,  Examination Plan, attachment 4. of procedure
'
42EN-ENG-014-05, and the VT ' was not com)leted. However.
 
l  ' credit was taken after the tag because t1e OC inspector c  assigned to the work cctivities was VT-3 qualified and had
'
performed other visual examinations-on the valves. A review
-
of the ASME Section XI code revealed that this work was not required to be treated as ASME Section X *- Work package 2-97-0686 provided work instructions-for outage repair / replacement activities performed cn feedwater inboard check: valve-2821-F0108. The work activity in question was for the installation of a new u) graded hinge-pin assembl The Quality Control Ins)ection )oint Assignment Sheet of procedure 450C-0CX-0094S (generic hold point sheet)
required a VT-1 based upon the repair / replacement progra This generic hold sheet was in the work package. A , t Enclosure 2 4 o
i:
L
      >
.=
 
'
-
, .-
 
documentation review revealed that an initial baseline VT-1
      -
  (prior to valve hinge pin work) was performed by site OC Sersonnel in accordance with the repair / replacement program, Jut was not performed on the replacement bolting after the new hinge pin was returned to service. An engineering evaluation of the VT-1 performed by the vendor was conducted by the licensee. The evaluation concluded that the visual examinations performed by the vendor met all the requirements to fulfill the ASME Section XI pre-service examinations of a VT- '
Procedural enhancertents were recently implemented for the Section XI Examination Plan of procedure 42EN ENG-014-0S and the Quality Control Ins)ection Point Assignment Sheet of procedure 450C-0CX-009-0S. T1ese enhancements provide more clarity as to when post repair / replacement inspections are require The inspectors reviewea administrative control procedure 40AC-0CX-001-05. Step 8.6.5 of the procedure required, in part, that th? qualified OC inspector perform inspections in accordance with an a> proved Quality Control Inspect.on Point Assignment Sheet (generic lold point sheet). Site OC personnel did not perform a VT-1 inspection for replacement work activities on feedwater check valve F010B during the Unit 2 spring outage of 1997 per plant procedures. Credit was taken, after an engineering evaluation, for a vendor-performed VT- The inspectors reviewed licensee performance for the past two years with respect to Section XI ASME code VT inspections. A violation was identified in Ins)ection Report 50-321. 366/96-11 for a failure to perform an ASME Code-required VT-3 inspection on HPCI Valve 1E41-F006. The inspectors concluded that the circumstances surrounding the missed VT-3 on the HPCI valve were different and the corrective actions for that violation would not have reasonably prevented the VT-1 problem with the feedwater check valve hinge pin replacemen Conclusions ASME Section XI code requirements for visual inspections were met for the strap welding on the SRVs and the hinge pin replacement on the feedwater inboard check valve. The acceptance of credit for-the VT-1 performed by the vendor for the feedwater check valve was reasonabl The inspectors concluded that site OC personnel failed to follow the requirements of plant procedures for the VT-1 listed on the generic hold inspection sheet for replacement work on the feedwater check valve hinge pin. This was identified as an example of VIO 50-321, 366/97-09-01, Failure to Follow Procedure -
Multiple Example Enclosure 2 l
 
--
        ,
        .
.
.
,
 
Review of Traversina Incore Probe (TIP) Flance Reolacement On
        -
M Jnit 2 a.' -Insoection Scoce (62707)    .
The inspectors reviewad procedure 42EN-ENG 014-0S. "ASME Se: tion XI Repair / Replacement." Rev 9.-and documentation associated with ASME Code.Section III. Class 2. requirements for  4 i
the Unit 2 primary containment' TIP penetration flanges,
' Observations and Findinas The inspectors were informed by Nuclear Safety and Compliance (NSAC). personnel that they were conducting a review of whether or  -
not the Unit-2 primary containment TIP penetration flanges meet  :
ASME Code Section III. Class 2. requirements. Table 3.2-1 of the
  ' Unit 2 UFSAR lists the TIP piping as ASME Code Section II Class 2. This included the flange. TIP tubing, and tubing valve This review was initiated following a review of maintenance work activities conducted during the last Unit 2 refueling outage.
 
~
The inspectors reviewed E.I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Safety Assessment for Primary Containment TIP Penetrations, dated September 10, 1997, and Hatch Project Support - Engineering Operability-Evaluation - Unit 2 TIP Penetrations, dated  .
September 16. 1997. The inspectors also reviewed Table 3.2-1 of the Unit 2 UFSA GE h'd verbally informed the licensee that, even though the TIP systen flanges were not what the code s)ecified in the UFSAR, there was no operability concern with t1e TIP system. The licensee stated that GE informed it that other sites had identified similar problems with respect to the TIP system and that the components supplied by GE were equivalent to those required by ASME. By letter dated October 21. 1997. entitled-Hatch Tip System ASME Code Compliance Evaluation. GE concluded that the portion of the TIP system that is considered part of the primary containment supplied for Hatch Units 1 and 2 during construction and as replacement parts meet the intent of ASME Section III. Class 2. The licensee also informed the inspectors that a proposed UFSAR change for table 3.2-1 was being reviewed
  =for the next scheduled UFSAR submitta The inspectors reviewed applicable documentation and observed that all applicable-inspection requirements of the ASME code were met following the flange installations on Unit Enclosure 2
. _
__ _ _ ._ _ _ _._ . _ _ _ . _.__ _ _ _ _ _ _
 
  . - -- . . , .  - ~- . - - . - - -- - -
.
  *
        -;
 
        *
 
1 Conclusions-    a r
    -  -
The licensee had taken appropriate actions-to correct the TIP  . '
  .-System ASME code, Class 2-issues. ,The GE Code requirements of the  '
-"
TIP equipment installed were equivalent to those of the ASME Cod The proposed UFSAR revision was appropriat :M7_ Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities  ,
M Review of Safety Audit end Enaineerina Review (SAER) Audit ReDort 97-SA-3 (62707)
The-inspectors reviewed audit report 97-SA-3. Ventilation Filter Train Testing, dated July 24, 1997. The audit included a review of procedures, methodology, and employee performance of testing activities for plant-ventilation systems described in the
'
Technical Specifications (TSs) and UFSARs for both units to ensure that the ventilation filter testing program was being correctly implemented. The audit included a detailed review of the TS and UFSAR requirements and the testing requirements and methodology outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.52 and ASME/ ANSI N51 The inspectors concluded that the audit was conducted by trained  '
and qualified personnel. The audit was thorough and detailed. The inspectors observed that the audit findings identified were submitted to appropriate management and department personne Corrective actions were-identified and tracked in accordance with  *
applicable plant procedures. The corrective actions and proposed completion-dates were appropriate for the finding M8- Miscellaneous Maintenance-Issues (92700) (92902)
M (Closed) LER 50-366/97-08: Main Pump Journal Bearing Damage Renders HPCI System inoperable. This item is discussed in Section M2.1 of this re)crt. Based u
;-
licensee actions,- this _ER is closed.pon the inspectors' review of
        ,
M8,2_ (Closed) IFT 50-321. 366/96-14-02: Potential Single Failure Vulnerability in the Freeze Protection System. This item was opened'to review whether or not a loss of power from Unit 1 to the freeze protection for the service water cooling plaing to the IB Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) could impact t1e EDG's operability support to Unit Corportte engineering reviewed the issue and determined that a potential Ligle failure vulnerability in the freeze protection heat tracing system does not exis Based upon the ins-dated February 10.pectors* review 1997, this item of the engineering evaluatio is close r n        Enclosure 2
        '
, ,_ .
  , , - . . -  = . - . - - - . - - .  - - - , - ,. - - . -
 
.
.
      ,
 
M8.3 (Closed) IFl 50-321/96-15 04: Switchyard Maintencnce and Material Condition. Ihis item was initiated following an inspection to evaluate electrical maintenance in the switchyard as it relates to the Maintenance Rule. The following completed or long term planned corrective actions associated with the IFl were described in documentation provided by central scheduling personnel during a discussion:
* An independent review team performed a thorough housekeeping inspection of the switchyard on January 19.199 The inspection identified the items listed in the IFl and a determination was made that che housekeeping and material conditions did not meet the expectations and standards of plaat Hatch, but no items were identified that were
:  detrimental to the proper operation of switchyard equipmen . An evaluation of overdue PMs indicated that they were not applicable to Plant Hatch. PMs (performed every eight years), which are applicable to Hatch, were curren . The following long-term process was developed to avoid future concerns:
Southern Transmission Maintenance Center (STMC) will ensure that adequate housekeeping standards are maintained in the switchyard.
 
,
Dispatchers in central scheduling will function as the primary contact for planning and performing switchyard maintenanc STMC and central scheduling agreed that the policy and practice will be that there will be no overdue PMs. Those chat are currently overdue will be completed by the end of the yea STMC will arepare a yearly schcdule of planned PMs for central scleduling to review and approv The inspectors performed a tour of t5e switchyards and the switchyard cont N1 house on October 2. The inspectors questioned central scheduling personnel about untaped s)are electrical leads observed in the switchyard control house. Tlese electrical leads were identified in the IFl. The inspectors were informed by central scheduling and STMC personnel that it was a common practice of the switchyard maintenance crew state wide, to leave the ends of the electrical leads pointing straight up and un-tape Housekeeping and material conditions were goo Enclosure 2
 
_ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  . _ . . _ . . , _ . _ . . _ . - . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _
  .          ,
i I
 
i 28      j-Basea upon the inspectors * review of licensee actions, this item    I is close j
            .
M8,4 (Closed) IFI 50-321. 366/97-0 D J:    Review of Licensee's  i Assessment of the ALARA Process for the Unit 2 Reactor Coolant    !
~
Leak Repair on the RWCll Heat Exchanger,    This item was identified  :
due to a significant difference between the ALARA staff's estimated dose of (15 person rem) and the actual dose
,  (28.33 person rem) received during the leak repair activities,    '
The licensee conducted a review of the activities and identified    i that the type of welding process and the amount of welding-    !
contributed to the dose received,  Ins)ection report 50 321, 366/97-07- identified other worc coordination and exmunication deficiencies that also contributed to the increased    i dose. The licensee's review did not identify any significant new    l information. The inspectors concluded that the initial ALARA    !
assessment, the followup ALARA review, and the ALARA review      .
methodology were satisfactory. Based upon the inspectors' review
 
of licensee actions, this item is close III. Enaineerina El Conduct of Engineering (37551)
On site engineering activities were reviewed to determine their effectiveness in preventing, identifying, and resolving safety    ;
issues, events, ma problems,        ,
 
,
El.1 Review of Units 1 and ? Inadeauate Cable Seoaration Issues (37551)    i (92903)
The inspectors continued to monitor the licensee's progress and    ;
work activities associated with the cable separation issue. This    i issue was originally documented as IFl 50-321, 366/97-03 05 and    !
was discussed in Inspection Report 50 321, 366/97-07. The inspectors have concluded that-the licensee is making progress in resolving the issu E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance E4,1 Pre Outaae Fuel Insoection and Preoaration
  . Insoection Ccooe (60705l The inspectors reviewed procedure 42FH ERP-012-05, "New Fuel and    ;
-
New Channel Handling." Rev, 7. and observed licenree activities    i for new fuel receipt, inspection, and-storag >
            ;
h
            !
Enclosure 2 t
  - --- ._,-,.-....A-.  .-.,-_m.--._., .,.__._._,,..,m__ _ - . - - -
 
. _    - - -
      .
      -
.          p
          ..
            :
29      i
            !
  - Observations and Findinas      j i            i-The inspectors observed that new fuel received on site was    i
            '
temporarily stored at a location near the intake structur The area was properl        ;
materials area. yThe identified inspectors andobserved controlled theasshi> a radioactive ping crate 4  unloading, crate disassembly, and HP survey of tie new fue ;
Reactor engineering personnel were present and provided oversight and direction of the activity. Inventory sheets-for    .
accountability and tracking of the new fuel were complete !
Security personnel provided satisfactory security oversigh ,
The inspectors observed new fuel inspection and channeling    .
activities from the Unit I refueling floor. New fuel channels    !
'
were Installed and the fuel was moved to the spent fuel pool for    !
storag Conclusions The inspectors concluded that new fuel receipt. inspection, and    ;
            ^
>  storage were completed with appropriate oversight and control, and in accordance with applicable plant 3rocedures. Engineering. H :
and security personnel support for t1e activity was satisfactory.
 
I  E8 , Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)      $
E (Closed) IFI 50 321/96-14-05:  Restoration of IB EDG Motor Control  ,
Center (MCC). This item was initiated following the implementation of temporary modification (TM) 1-96-41, This TM    i was implemented because the Unit 1 supply breaker in the IB EDG    i
            '
MCC 1R24-S026 did not coordinate properly with its downstream load breakers. This was an operability concern for the MCC and the IB EDG during events re
 
A fault at any of the r:on-safety quiring alignment related loads ofsupplied the 1B EDGfrom to Unit ;
MCC 1B had the potential to cause the breaker to trip, thus
-
leaving the safety related loads su) plied by MCC IB inoperabl The TM resolved the immediate opera)ility concern t./ moving the-    .
non-safety related loads to another bu As a permanent resolution, the licensee implemented design change
  .
request (DCR) 1 96-055. The.DCR modified safety-related EDG    -
building 600/208-volt MCC 1B 1R24-S024 to eliminate possible
>
non coordination-between safety-related supply breakers and downstream non safety related loads for certain postulated fault '
Based upon the inspectors' review of DCR 1-96-055. licensee's-    !
actions, and discussions with the system engineer, this item is close ,
            !
Enclosure 2 l
  . .  .  .
            .
,
4 a.,-e-- ev-e v -
r.---4 - - - ,...<m,- - - - ,c - m..w,.,
      , - r -
w-wm-= W-v+.-e*----ww u+r- "ma? ' r e-e mr* .=-+-m4ww 'nW'"
 
--  . --.
*
  -
        !
..        t I
        :
        :
      "30    l IV P1 ant Suooort-  }
        ;
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls  t i
R1.1 Observation of Routine Radioloaical Controls insoection Scone (71750)    )
        :
General Health Physics (HP) activities were observed during the-  {
report period. This included locked high radiation area door ,
proper radiological posting. and personnel frisking upon exiting  j the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA). The inspectors made
-    frequent tours of the RCA and discussed radiological controls with  >
HP technicians and HP management. - Minor deficiencies were  t
  -
discussed with HP technicians and HP management personne R person Exits Plant Site A'ter Receivina Alarm on the Exit Portal ionitor Wearina Potentially Contaminated Clothina  ! Insoection Scoce (71750)(92904)    i t
On September 29, 1997, a contract HP technician left the plant  !
site after receiving an alarm on the exit portal' monitor. This  i was contrary to HP practices and plant procedures. The inspectors
    -
        ,
reviewed documentation provided by HP personnel and plant  ;
        ;
procedures. and discussed the issue with licensee managemen i Observations and Findinas On September 29, the ins)ectors were informed by HP supervision that a contractor HP tec1nician exited the Plant Entry Security Building (PESB) on September 26 after receiving an alarm on the
    )ortal monitor. This portal monitor is located at the exit of the  ,
    )ESB and is the final monitoring point for contamination prior to leaving the protective are l The licensee informed the inspectors that upon initial exit
'
        :
through the portal monitor the individual received an alar Since.there was a HP technician monitoring personnel leaving the area, to assure that the people used the exit portal monitor properly, the individual was monitored using a PM 6 radiation detector. This monitor also alarmed, The individual was instructed to report-to the HP office for assistance in determining why the contamination alarms were sounding. After about 10 minutes. he returned to the PESB and attemated to exit again. This time he again-received an alarm from tie monitor and was told by the HP technician that he could not leave the sit The individual ignored alarm and the instructions of the HP-technician, exited the PESB.'and left the sit ,
        !
Enclosure 2 ;
          ,
- - - . ~  +  _  :_ _
- - ,s _.~ _.- _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _  .._ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ , , ,
 
---  -.      - _ -  -
, .        !
i i
31-      !
i The inspectors reviewed a written statement provided by the HP    l foreman who spoke with the individual u)on his return to the HP    k
          -
office. The statement indicated that tle HP foreman did not recall many of the details of the conversation he had with the individual but did recall that the individual ap> eared unhappy
          '
about not being allowed to exit.from the PESB. Tie individual did    :
          '
not agree with the reasons provided by the HP assigned at the exit    '
point in the PESB for not allowing him to leave. The HP foreman also indicated in the written statement that he is certain that he    ,
would not have given the individual authorization to ignore an    .
alarming portal monitor.-
j
          ,
in followup actions by the licensee. HP supervision called site    -
security and requested that access to the protective area be denied to the individual upon his return. The individual returned    i to the site the following morning (September 27) and was met at    :
the entrance to the PESB by his contract su>ervisor and two HP    i-foremen. The individual was instructed by MP supervision to take the weekend off and report back to work on Monday morning for a    .
discussion of the issue with HP supervision. The individual objected to returning the following Honday morning for a discussion and indicated that he resigne The individual was then escorted to dosimetry by his contract    i supervisor for a whole body count. The results of the whole body    I count were normal and the individual was escorted to the exit of the PES ,
The HP survey taken when the individual initially attempted to exit the site indicated a reading of approximately 8500    .
disintegrations per minute (dpm) on one of the individual's knee '
The portal monitor was set to alarm at 5000 dp The inspectors were informed by HP personnel that four different scenarios were run using computer modeling to determine a hypothetical dose which the individual would have received. Each scenario was based upon conservative assumptions and assumed a point. source of radiation and a 4-hour exposure to the radiatio Two of the scenarios constituted a set that assumed that the    ;
contamination was due to the decay of noble gases-such as krypto '
xenon. and iodine. One of these scenarios assumed that the 8500 dpm obtained from the HP survey was contamination on the pant leg with an air gap to the skin. The dose resulting from thi scenario was 6 milli-rem (mrem) to the skin. The other scenario in this set assumed that the contamination was on the ski resulting in a dose of 79 mrem to the ski ;
Enclosure 2
  . _ _ - _ _ _    -
        -;
-- - - .- - -, ,,...-.m-- , _ _ _ - . . , _ _ . . - - - - . _ , - , , , . _ _ . - . . - _ , -
        . ~ , , -
 
. -. -- -. - - - -- .- _ - - - _ _ _ - - .
.
.
.
 
The remaining scenarios assumed that the 8500 dpm contamination was from a hot particle that resulted from activated corrosion :
products. A 1 mrem dose was received when it was assumed that the '
contamination was on the pant leg with an air gap and 28 mrem resulted when it was assumed that the contamination was on the ski The results of the above computer modeling was provioM by Plant Hatch's HP personnel to the company's corporate office. The corporate office provided the information to the states of Georgia and Alabama, Based upon the results of the computer modeling, the states decided not to pursue the issu The inspectors were informed by Nuclear Safety and Compliance management that the company will continue to pursue the matter '
because the contaminated clothing was not recovered for friskin The insores were later informed that telephone contact was later m&:e M that the individual was reluctant to discuss the issue. Tre &tn',ee also indicated that there is a high probability t u the contamination was due to short-lived decay products, but that there was a concern that it may be due to a hot particl The inspectors reviewed Administrative Control Procedure 60AC-HPX-012-05. " Overview of Radiological Work Practices and Radiation Protection ACPS." Revision 4. and observed that all procedure requirements were not met. The cause of the contamination alarm should have been determined and a)propriate corrective actions taken before the individual left t1e sit Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the contract HP technician who left the plant site after receiving an alarm on the exit portal monitor presented minimal safety significance to the individual or publi The actions taken by the licensee were appropriate and no further NRC actions are planned based upon the fact that the individual is no longer employed at the site and site access was immediately terminate R1.3 Pre-Outaae Radiolooical Protection Activities Insoection Scone (60705) (71750)
The inspectors observed licensee HP activities in preparation for the upcoming Unit I refueling outag Enclosure 2
_ _
      ]
 
.
 
b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that HP management initiated several actions to strengthen the HP area. Meetings were held with all Hatch personnel to communicate management's expectations for HP activities. The meetings included discussions on procedural requirements, required actions for unexpected conditions, and recent changes for radiological work permit (RWP) requirement Health Physics department management issued " Rad Bulletins" to remind all plant personnel of the renewed emphasis for HP improvements. The Bulletins communicated new RWP requirements a special emphasis to eliminate personnel contaminations, and to improve contamination controls and overall radiation worker practices. The Bulletins were made available to all site personnel. A new listing of radworker expectations was developed ana conspicuously posted in various areas of the plant. HP management developed a checklist for good rad practices. The checklist was used as a quick reference and feedback tool by various managers. supervisors, and coworkers during plant tours and peer check The General Manager conducted a period of stop work and assembled all available aersonnel in order to communicate his expectations for improved H) practices. A resident inspector attended the meeting and observed that several key items were discussed. A video tape was made available for site personnel who were not able to attend the stop work meetin During the last refueling outage, and for the upc'aing Unit I refueling outage the HP department conducted tours of the cite for new contractor personnel. The inspectors observed one site tour for new contractors. The tour included discussions for site-specific frisking techniques, egress points, and routine posting and boundaries. The licensee completed approximately 25 tours for about 150 personnel and additional tours were planne The inspectors attended several HP shift briefings and observed some improvements in communications. specific job assignments, and overall HP staff work practices. The inspectors observed pre-staging activities for Unit I refueling activities and observed that radiological and contamination control boundaries were correctly established. The inspectors oLserved that HP personnel routinely toured the site to assist other workers. The inspectors observed some minor deficiencies that were attributed to individual worker poor work practices. This included some anti-contamination clothing that was not properly placed in the l disposal containers. Other items were laying across the
; contamination control boundary markers, These deficiencies were l
brought to the attention to HP personnel for resolution.
 
I Enclosure 2 l
 
- . . - ---.- _~ ~ - _ - _ _        - - - - .  - _ . . -
              ,
'
  . #            j
              ;
              )
 
i Conclusions          l t
i The inspectors concluded that management personnel had placed special emphasis for improved HP and general rad worker activities. The stop work meeting, plant tours for- new contractors, and radworker expectations list were identified as a strengt P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP P4.1 Annual Emeraency Preoaredness (EP) Exercise
    - Insoection Scoce (82301)
The inspectors reviewed procedures 73EP-EIP 063 05. " Technical Support Center Activation," Rev. 6, 73EP-EIP-001 05. " Emergency Classification and Initial Actions," Rev.12. and the Hatch Emergency Plan for Unit I and Unit 2. and observed licensee actions during the annual exercise. Federal, state and county officials participated in the annual exercis Observations and Findinas On August 20, 1997, the inspectors participated in the licensee's
<
annual EP exercise. One inspector observed overall activities and monitored licensee performance._ The inspectors observed operator performance in the plant simulator technical support center (TSC), operations support center (OSC) and emergency operation facility (EOF). The inspectors concluded that operator performance in the simulator was excellent. Operators correctly classified the events in accordance with procedure 73EP EIP-001-0S. The inspectors observed that event classification problems identified in past exercises had been corrected. This was demonstrated by actual event classification and observed in training and during this and previous exercises.
 
'
The inspectors noted that the TSC was activated in accordance with procedure 73EP-EIP-063-05. The inspectors verified that minimum
"    manning,he establis  Thecommunication inspectors observed links, and that TSC analysishabitability were of plant conditions and corrective actions were correct and appropriat Interactions with offsite agencies were appropriate and timel The.-inspectors noted that several people assigned to key TSC positions were alternates. The inspectors confirmed that the alternate personnel were qualified-to perform their assigned
.
    -
position .
'
Enclosure 2 l
-      -
'*o e 4 -M-gie- @ Pe + - r b gp wa r- (- .-.g4- g -
    -'gw--4-gyam+gufe-- -u.agy-gy-p ma..pg#- c m; 4 3g grg.ip ,p p g - 4 7.s g 9 gg.99_.,-.-pys *'a-sr---g% y,%s Me-m-y-;-
 
_ .. _ _ _  - _.._e  _ _ _. ___ _ . _ . . _ _
            ,
.
'
l ;
i
 
  .The inspectors verified that the areas identified for improvement    !
during previous exercises were addressed and had improved in all    ;
'
area The inspectors did not identify an    l deficiencies with performance in the TSC. y significant    i The inspectors observed that control of the activities in the OSC    l
>  had improved over the last several exercises. Control, noise    !'
level, and individual attention were areas on which the licensee had placed increased emphasis during this and otner recent-    ,
exercises. OSC performance during this exercise was excellen :
The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique and observed    i that the licensee was very self-critical. Ope,n and frank discussions were held with respect to ir.di,idual and overall' site exercise performance. Areas for improvement were identified as
  . well as aspects of the exercise that were considered strength The ins)ectors identified the post exercise critique process as a strengt '
Following a detailed review and assessment of overall performanc the licensee determined that all exercise objectives were me The inspectors did not identify any significant deficiencies, c,. Conclusions Overall performance during the annual exercise conducted on    >
,
August 20, 1997, was good. Event classifications during the exercise were correct. Operator performance in the simulator and overall performance in the operations support center were    '
excellen .
S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment (71750)
The inspectors toured the protected area and observed that the    :
perimeter fence was intact and not compromised by erosion nor    !
disrepair. The fence fabric was secured and barbed wire was angled as required by the licensee's Plant Security Program (PSP).
 
Isolation zones were maintained on both sides of the barrier and were free of objects which could shield or conceal an individua The inspectors observed that personnel and packages entering the protected area were searched either by special purpose detectors or by a physical patdown for-firearms. explosives, and contraban Bad e issuance was observed, as was the processing and escorting of isitors. Vehicles were searched, escorted, and secured as described in applicable procedure The inspectors observed on the morning of August 21 that the elevated lights at the front of the PESB were not lit. This resulted in reduced visibility in the area leading to the entry to Enclosure 2
            .
* - , - - ....w,.- v -.,m.wr.-. . . - - . - vy.-+-. e ,- -e e v-%=,w ---re -e--o w** me wr r +c * = ' ' . - - 3.--n- -1-e -x
 
'
. .
36-
  -the protected area. -The inspectors observed upon entry into the protected area that a com)ensatory post was established to provide a visual observation of tie area-leading to the entrance of the PES The inspectors concluded th'at the areas of security inspected met the applicable requirement V. Manaoement Meetings
' Review of UFSAR Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a manner contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)' description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant aractices, procedures and/or parameters-to the UFSAR description. While performing the ins)ections discussed in this re> ort the inspectors reviewed tie applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant )ractices, procedures, and/or parameters, except as noted above in )aragraph M3.3. Table 3.2-1 of the Unit 2 UFSAR lists the TIP piping as ASME Code Section Ill. Class 2. This included the flange. TIP tubing and tubing valve All TIP flanges, TIP tubing and tubing valves do not meet the ASME Code Section 111. Class 2-requirement. The licensee is evaluating a change to table 3.2-1 of the UFSAR for submitta X3 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 16. 1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified, PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Anderson, J., Unit Superintendent Betsill'. J., Assistant General Manager - Operations Breitenbach.-C.. Engineering Support tanager - Acting Curtis. S.. Unit Superintendent Davis. D. Plant Administration Manager Fornel. P, Performance Team Manager Fraser. 0.. Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor Hammonds'. J., Operations Support Superintendent Kirkley,LW.,- Health Physics and Chemistry Manager Enclosure-2 1- .. _ _ .1 _ _i _ . . _ ,
I
 
.      l
.
.
I
 
Lewis, J., Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager  '
Madison. 0.. Operations Manager Moore. C.. Assistant General Manager - Plant Support  '
Reddick. R., Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Roberts. P.. Outages and Planning Manager Thompson. J., Nuclear Security Manager Tipps. S.. Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager Wells. P. General Manager - Nuclear Plant INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 60705: Preparations for R.efueling IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 82301: Evaluation Of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 92700: Onsite follow up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 92901: Followup - Operations IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance / Surveillance IP 92903: Followup - Followup Engineering IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Opened 50 321, 366/97-09-01 V10 Failure to Follow Procedures -
Multiple Examples (Sections 04.2. 08.2 and M3.2).
 
Closed 50-321, 366/96-13-04 IFI Inability to Correctly Classify Events (Section 08.1).
 
50-366/97-08  LER Main Pump Journal Bearing Damage Renders HPCI Systen Inoperable (Section M8.1).
 
50-321, 366/96 14-02 IFl Potential Single Failure Vulnerability in the Freeze Protection System (Section M8.2).
 
Enclosure 2
      .
 
      . . .
  .-
.
..      .
L
 
50-321, 366/97-07-01 IFl Review of Licensee's Assessment of the A&LARA Process for the Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Leak Repair on the RWCU Heat Exchanger (Section M8.4).
 
50 321/96 14-05 IFI Restoration of IB EDG Motor Control Center (MCC)
    (Section E8.1).
 
50-321/96-15-04 IFI Switchyard Maintenance and Material Condition (Section M8.3).
 
50-366/97-09 LER Removal of DG Battery Chargers From Service Results in Inoperability of Both the 2A and 2C DG DC Electrical Power Subsystems (Section 08.2).
 
Discussed 50 321, 366/97-03-05 IFI Review of 4160-VAC Wiring Separation Deficiencies (Section E1.1).
 
'
      ,
!
;
p l
Enclosure 2 L
,
y-- - ~ , , -- - ~ . , , y m ,_  y -,-
}}
}}

Revision as of 19:37, 14 December 2020

Ack Receipt of 971126 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-321/97-09 & 50-366/97-09 Issued on 971103.Response Meets Requirements of 10CFR2.201
ML20203A366
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/04/1997
From: Skinner P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Sumner H
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
References
50-321-97-09, 50-321-97-9, 50-366-97-09, 50-366-97-9, NUDOCS 9712120078
Download: ML20203A366 (3)
v • d • e


Text

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=IR_05000321/1997009&oldid=3034958"