ML20127H405: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000254/1985012]]
| number = ML20127H405
| issue date = 06/12/1985
| title = Insp Repts 50-254/85-12 & 50-265/85-13 on 850401-0531.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint/Mods,Surveillance, Housekeeping,Procedures & Fire Protection
| author name = Chrissotimos N
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000254, 05000265
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = TASK-1.A.2.1, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-2.K.3.16, TASK-2.K.3.21, TASK-2.K.3.24, TASK-2.K.3.35, TASK-TM
| document report number = 50-254-85-12, 50-265-85-13, NUDOCS 8506260323
| package number = ML20127H345
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 15
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000401/2005031]]
 
=Text=
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*
                                        .
.
                              U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                            REGION III
    Reports No. 50-254/85012(DRP); 50-265/85013(DRP)
    Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265                          Licenses No. OPR-29; DPR-30
    Licensee:  Commonwealth Edison Company
                Post Office Box 767
                Chicago, IL 60690
    Facility Namc:    Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
    Inspection At:    Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL
    Inspection Conducted:    April 1 through May 31, 1985
    Inspectors:    A. L. Madison
                    A. D. Morrpngfello_
    Approved By:              is    41ii5s, M                              d f- B T
                    Reactor Projects Section 2C                          Date  /
    Inspection Summary:
    Inspection on April 1 through May 31, 1985 (Reports No. 50-254/85012(DRP);
    50-265/85013(DR))
    Areas Inspected:    Routine, unannoun'ced inspection by the resident inspectors
    of actions on previous inspections findings; operations; radiological controls;
    maintenance / modifications; surveillance; housekeeping; procedures; fire
    protection; emergency preparedness; security; quality assurance; quality
    control; administration; routine reports; LER review; TMI items; regional
    requests; Headquarters requests; and independent inspection. The inspection
    involved a total of 542 inspector-hours onsite by two MRC inspectors,
    including 50 inspector-hours onsite during offshifts.                  .
    Results:  No violations or deviations were identified. Minor areas of concern
    were identified in operations surveillance, Quality Assurance, and procedures.
    Overall, the licensee's performance has remained steady.
            O
              .
                                                                                          k
  .
 
  4
  .
                                            DETAILS
    . 1. Persons Contacted
          *N.  Kalivianakis, Superintendent
            D. Bax, Assistant Superintendent for Maintenance
            T. Lihou, Technical Staff Supervisor
            R. Roby, Senior Operating Engineer
          *N. Griser, Senior Quality Assurance Specialist
          The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees,
          including shift engineers and foremen, reactor operators, technical
          staff personnel, and quality control personnel.
          * Denotes those present at the exit interview on May 31, 1985.
      2.  Routine Inspection
          The resident inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with
          licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined
          the areas stated in the inspection summary and accomplished the following
          inspection modules:
                          37701          Facility Modifications
                          42700          Plant Procedures
                          61701          Surveillance
                          61726          Monthly maintenance observations
                          62703          Monthly maintenance observations
                          71707          Operational safety verification
                          71710          ESF system walkdown
                          71711          Review of plant operations
                          90713          Review of periodic and special
                                            reports
                          92700          Onsite review of LERs
l                          92701          TMI Action Items
                          92702          Onsite followup of Events
                          92703          IE Bulletin followup
                          92704          Headquarters Requests
;
                          92705          Regional requests
                          92706          Independent inspection
                          93702          Onsite followup of events
          The inspectors verified that activities were accomplished in a timely
          manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed
          as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were
          in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and
          industry codes or standards; approvals were obtained prior to initiating
          any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the
          Ifmiting conditions for operation were met during normal operation and
          while components or systems were removed from service; functional testing
          and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning :omponents or
                                              2
                                                              .
 
.
.
    systems to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and
                -
  . review of test results were accomplished; quality control records and
    logs were properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials, and
    equipment were properly certified, calibrated, stored, and or maintained
    as applicable; and adverse plant conditions including equipment
    malfunctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards,. fluid leaks,
    excessive vibrations, and personnel errors were addressed in a timely
    manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by
    appropriate management personnel.
    Further, additional observations were made in the following areas:
    a.    Action on Previous Inspection Findings
          (Closed) Open Item 254/84-14-01 Improper Installation of Steam
        . Jet. Air Ejector Valves. This item was addressed in IE Report
          No. 254/85-02 and dispositioned as an example of an item of
          noncompliance. As such, no further actions are required.on
          this Open Item.
          (Closed) Open Item 254/84-23-02 and 265/84-21-01 Revise QGP 2-4
          " Shutdown From Power Operations To Hot Standby" and QOP 207-2'
          " Declaring Rod Worth Minimizer Computer Inoperable." These
          changes were required due to difficulties experienced on
          October 25, 1984~and the scram that resulted on Unit 2. QGP 2-4
          was revised to allow hot shutdown to include having the Main Steam
          -Isolation Valves open and thus facilitate pressure control.
        .QOP 207-2 was revised to eliminate the confusion experienced
          by operators'on October 25, 1985. Both revisions were reviewed
          by the resident inspectors and found to be acceptable. No further
          actions are required.
          (Closed) Open Item 265/84-10-01 JumperMo'dificationToStandby
          Gas. Treatment System Heaters.. This item was= addressed.in IE
          Report 265/85-02 and dispositioned as-an example of an item of
          noncompliance. 'As such, no further actions are required on this
          Open Item.
          (Closed) Unresolved Item 254/85004-01 and 265/85004-02 High Pressure
          Coolant Injection (HPCI) Room Coolers.
          This item tracked resolution of the concern for HPCI room cooler fan
          environmental qualification requirements. The room coolers must be
          operable to ensure' operability and thus the concern. However, it
          was determined that the postulated line break that would cause a
          harsh environment for the fans is a HPCI line break. Therefore,
          HPCI would be inoperable and there would be no need for the room
          coolers. Since the normal environment for the fan is mild, this
          equipment need not be environmentally qualified.
          No violations or deviations were identified.
                                                                          .
                                          3
                                                                              ,
                                                                                .
 
        .. .  .          -      . .        .-.    -  -          - .      ._,    _ _ . --      ..
                                                                                                        l
  $                                                                                                    l
+
1-  -
                b.  Plant Operation
                      Unit 1 was in operation and Unit' 2 was shutdown for refueling at
      *
                      the beginning of the report period. On May.7, 1985 two contractor
,                    employees were injured when an electrical cable they were using
                      came into contact with the Unit 2 345 Kilovolt power line, which
1-                    was providing offsite power to Unit 2. The Unit 2 auxiliary
                      transformer tripped, causing a loss of offsite power to Unit 2
.                    and a voltage transient on Unit 1. The voltage transient on Unit 1
                      caused the isolation of several feedwater heaters and a loss of air
                      to the feedwater~. regulating valve. The Unit 1 operator responded
                      to the loss of feedwater heaters by reducing recirculation flow,
_                    thus. reducing power.      However, the loss of air to the feedwater
                    . regulating valve prevented its automatic response and the reactor              F
                    Lutomatically scrammed when reactor water level reached the scram
                      setpoint. ~During the event, the Emergency Notification System (ENS)
*
                      phones lost power. Recent changes due to the breakup of the AT & T              ,
:                    and also due to system upgrades (replacing old wires with fiber
4
                      optics) have placed ENS in a configuration not in conformance with
p                    the licensee's response to IE Bulletin 80-15. The licensee agreed
                      to revise this response.
'
'
                      At present the ENS phones receive power from the Instrumentation
                      Bus -:a very reliable source. However, as recent events point out,
                          -
                      this power source can be lost. Therefore, a single source of power
'
                      for this system is unsatisfactory. The licensee has committed.to
                      installing a new phone system which'will have a backup battery
                      supply. This backup battery will also supply the ENS phones.
                      Completion of these modifications will be tracked as an open' item
;                    (254/85012-01(DRP) and 265/85013-01(DRP)).
,
l                    Power was restored to Unit 2 by the 1/2 emergency diesel generator
                      and by a cross-tie to the Unit 1 auxiliary transformer.          Repairs to
              ~
i                    the transformer were completed May 8, 1985, and normal power was
                      restored to Unit 2.
;                    Unit I remained shutdown to facilitate replacement of the station
i                    125 volt batteries and modifications to the 1/2 emergency diesel
                      generator to comply with Appendix R commitments. Unit 1 returned
                      to power on May 17, 1985.
                      On May 22, 1985, while. performing the monthly operability test, the
                      1/2 diesel generator was declared inoperable due to a problem in the
                                                                              -
                      diesel ~ generator cooling water pump circuitry. A modification had
                      been performed on the 1/2 diesel generator to allow for switching
                      between power sources for the cooling water pump as part of
                    . Appendix R commitments.      Panels were obtained from the Hatch Co.
                      of El Paso, Texas. 'These panels contained thermal overloads and a
                      fuse as an integral part of the circuitry. The problem with this
                      circuitry was that neither the fuse nor the thermal overloads were
                      annunciated in the control room. When these protective devices
                      operated, the control room did not know that the cooling water pump
                      had tripped.
                                                        4
                                            n                                                        l
 
.
.
            Later that day, while performing Core Spray logic tests, the Unit 2
            diesel generator started as required but tripped'due to loss of
            control power. An Unusual Event was declared. The 1/2 diesel
            generator was tested and declared operable thus terminating the
            Unusual Event.    The Senior Resident Inspector questioned the
            operability of the 1/2 diesel generator and the ifcensee responded
            by jumpering out the thermal overload device and'the fuse.
            The Hatch Co. panels containing thermal overloads was considered a
            potentially generic item of concern and was forwarded to Region III
            for action.
            At 1800 on May 30, 1985 Unit 1 experienced a scram from approximately
            100% power. A shift foreman was placing the Turbine Steam Chest
            pressure instrument back in service which caused vibration on the
            instrument rack. This rack also contained main steam line low
            pressure instrumentation which, when shocked, caused a Group I
            isolation and the Main Steam Isolation valve closure resulted in
            a scram.    During scram recovery, the unit experienced a second
            scram.  This came from low vessel level when the MSIV's were
            reopened to reduce reactor pressure. No ECCS systems were called
            upon and all systems operated as expected.
            Both units were shutdown at the close of this report perioc'.
            During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspectors walked down the
            . accessible portions of the Core Spray Systems and the Residual Heat
            Removal Systems and performed the applicable portions of Inspection
            Procedure 71710 "ESF System Walkdown."
      '
            No-violations or deviations were identified.
    '
        c.  Maintenance
            The following activities were observed / reviewed:
            (1) Observed installation of Electrical Switchgear for Appendix R
                  modifications on Unit 2 emergency diesel generator.
            (2) Observed and reviewed overhaul of Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant
                  Injection system turbine.
            (3) Observed preparations for weld overlays on recirculation system
                  piping for Unic 2.
            (4) Observed and reviewed installation and testing of Unit 2 Scrci-
                  Discharge Volume.
            (5) Observed Mechanical Maintenance installing Temperature Control
                  Valve on RBCCW.
  .
                                            5
 
.
.
      (6) Observed Instrument Maintenance installing new control for
            TCV on RBCCW.
      (7) Observed Mechanical Maintenance repairing discharge valve of
            Unit 2 CRD pump.
      (8) Observed Instrument Mechanical repairing LLRT gauge (replacement
            of diaphragm in pressure regulator).
      (9) Observed Mechanical Maintenance and factory representatives
            working on new Target Rock safety relief valve.
      (10) Observed Mechanical Maintenance repairing TBCCW pump and
            installation of same.
      (11) Observed Electrical Maintenance installing new battery racks
            for Unit 2 125 VDC.
      (12) Observed in house leak rate test of one Electromatic Relief
            Valve.
      (13) Observed Mechanical Maintenance and factory representative
            inspecting Unit 2 diesel generator.
      During Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) of the Main Steam Isolation
      Valves (MSIV) the 28 and 2D outboard MSIV's showed leakage in excess
      of the allowable leakage. The resident inspector observed the MSIV
      seats and disc after disassembly and they appeared to be free of any.
      foreign matter and no cracks were visible on the surfaces. The 28
      MSIV repairs consisted of lapping the main seat and disc and the
      pilot valve seat and disc. This MSIV was retested and failed. The
      process was repeated and the valve still failed. The main disc was
      replaced and the valve passed the LLRT.
      The 2D MSIV repairs consisted of lapping the main seat, pilot seat
      and disc and replacement of the main disc. The valve was reassembled
      and successfully tested.
  d. Surveillance
      The following activities were observed / reviewed:
      (1) Reviewed Reactor Vessel Low Low Water level functional test
            Unit 2 and Unit 1
      (2) Reviewed testing of newly installed analog trip system, Unit 2.
      (3) Reviewed high drywell pressure functional test for Unit 2.            l
      (4) Observed preparations for and recovery from integrated leak            l
                                                                                '
            rate testing for Unit 2.
                                                                                l
                                    6
                    . . . - .          -  .    -  -      - --    .  ,  .- -
 
.
.
    (5) Observed Local Power Range Monitor calibrations on Unit 2.
      (6) Observed one channel of Core Spray Logic testing on Unit 2.
      (7) Observed rod scram timing on Unit 2.
      (8) Observed 25% of RHR logic test on Unit 2.
    (9) Observed 50% of Auto Start SBGTS tests on Unit 2.
    (10) Observed Electrical Maintenance performing surveillance on
          various EQ breakers.
    On May 17, 1985, Unit 2 experienced a Group II isolation signal due
    to surveillance activities. While 2A drywell radiation monitor was
      inoperable for repair purposes, surveillance of the newly installed
    analog trip system was performed.    Again, on May 18, 1985 with the
    2A drywell radiation monitor still inoperable for repair purposes,
    surveillance was performed on high Drywell Pressure instrumentation
    causing another Group II isolation. These unnecessary challenges of
    plant safety systems could have been avoided with proper communication
    and planning by the operations department. Operations personnel, by
    being fully aware of plant and equipment status should be able to
    foresee the results of surveillance testing and take actions to
    prevent unnecessary safety system actuations. The inspectors
    communicated this concern to licensee plant management and will
    continue to observe this area for improvement.
  e. Procedures Reviewed
    The following procedures were reviewed:
    QAP 200-13, Revision 10        Station Housekeeping Organization
    ,0AP 200-S2, Revision 1        Individual Housekeeping Surveillance
    QAP 200-S3, Revision 1        Fire Protection and Housekeeping
                                      Discrepancies
    QAP 200-S4,    Revision 1      Periodic Fire Inspection Report
    QAP 200-S5, Revision 1        Housekeeping Inspection Report
    QAP 200-S6, Revision 1        Housekeeping Inspection
    QAP 200-T3,    Revision 1      Housekeeping Zone Descriptions and
                                      Designations
    QAP 900-4,    Revision 1      Traceability Tag Procedure
    QAP 1900-3,    Revision 15    Station Access Control
                                    7
 
__
        .
  . . ,
              'QAP 1900-T9, Revision :1
                                                                                              '
                                              Possession of a Firearm Within the'
                                                    Station Protected Area
                QMP 800-21, Revision    1-    Disassembly, Repair, and Reas'sembly of
                                                    Safety-Related Butterfly, Ball, and
                                                    Check Valves with Pneumatic or
                                                  ' Hydraulic Actuators
                QMP 800-S16, Revision    1-    Safety-Related Butterfly, Ball, or
                                                    Check Valve and Actuator Checklist
                QMP 800-T22, Revision 1      ' Butterfly, Ball and Check Valve Shaft
                                                    Scribe Orientation
                QMP 100-S11', Revision 2      Request for'Limitorque Valve Torque
                                                    Switch Setpoint Change
                QAP 900-5,.  Revision 1        In-Plant Radiography--Required
                                                    Notifications and. Actions
                                                                                            '
                QAP 1900-10, Revision 10      Security Identification Badge / Key-Card
                                                  Assignment and Control
                QFP 100-1,  . Revision 11.    Master Refueling Procedures
                QFT 100-4,    Revision 4      Refueling Interlock Check (Checklist
                                                    Included)
                QMP 800-22, Revision 2        Target Rock Safety / Relief Valve Removal
                                                    and Installation
                QMS 100-1,    Revision 6      Monthly Fire Inspection
                QMS'100-52, Revision 8        Unit 1 and Unit 2 "R" Area Monthly Fire
                                                    Inspection Check Sheet
          f.  Quality Assurance.
                During a Quality Assurance (QA) audit in October, 1984,-it was
                determined by the Licensee that the vendor of electrical switchgear,
                Hatch Inc. of El Paso, Texas, had not submitted approved welding-
                procedures and other documentation to assure quality. In April,
                1985, acceptable' documentation was submitted.      However,.a review-
                by the on-site Q.A. manager identi'fied that while the' documentation
                was for Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) the cabinets had actually
              'been welded using Gas Metal Arc Welding (GMAW). Further-
                investigation at the vendor's facility determined that Hatch, Inc.,
                management personnel were unaware of the actual procedures >being        .
                used for arc welding in their shop.
                ~
                                                8
                                                                                          .
 
      .
      .
                    The licensee then reviewed the vendor's procedures for GMAW and
          ~
                    contacted the four welders involved in cabinets supplied to Quad
                    Cities to certify them to GMAW standards. This involved
                    considerable effort in that two of the welders no longer worked
                    for Hatch. All four welders passed certification testing and
                    the procedures were found acceptable.
                    A sample of the cabinets had been " Shaker" tested by Wyle Labs and
                    found adequate for Seismic qualifications. All other cabinets at
                    Quad Cities Station were compared to these samples by drawing weld
                    maps and comparing weld dimensions. Further, vendor Quality Control
                    (QC) inspections were reviewed for adequacy (the QC inspector had
                    performed 100% inspection) and the QC inspector was interviewed by
                    the licensee to verify his qualifications.
                    Region III dispatched a specialist to review the licensee's
,
                    actions and inspect the cabinet welds. The welds were found
                    adequate and the cabinets were released for use at the station.
'
                    These particular cabinets were being installed as safety-related
                    and were required to meet seismic qualifications as part of
                    10 CFR 50 Appendix R upgrade modifications being made to the
                    emergency diesel generators.
                    The second problem is one of communications. These cabinets s,hould
                    have been placed on hold pending resolution of QA concerns. However,
                    due to lack of adequate communication, the personnel who performed
                    the receipt inspections for these cabinets were unaware of these
                    concerns.  Thus the cabinets were accepted and installed.
                    Fortuitously, none of the cabinets were ever put into operation.
                    Formal mechanisms are in place to ensure proper communication of QA
                    concerns.  Therefore, no specific corrective actions are required by
-
                    the ifcensee. However, the licensee was cautioned by the resident
                    inspectors and agreed that better communication must be maintained
                    in the future.
                    No violations or deviations were identified.
                g. Review of Review of Routine and Special Report
                    The inspectors reviewed the monthly performance report for Units 1
                    and 2 for the months of March and April, 1985.
                    No violations or deviations were identified.
                h. LER Review
                    (1) (open) LER 85005, Revision 0 and Revision 1:      Unit 1
                          Fuel Pool Monitor Trips.
            *
        .
                                                  9
              .
  L-
 
  -.
                                                                                            c
  .
                                                                              This report documents several spurious. trips of the 1A fuel
                                                                              pool monitor caused by electronic noise. Difficulty in
                                                                              isolating the cause of the noise accounted for the number
                                                                              of spurious trips. Troubleshooting by the Instrument.
                                                                              Maintenance department continues - as yet no specific cause
                                                                              has been found. This LER will remain open pending satisfactory
                                                                              repair of the monitor.                                                            ,
                                                                        (2)- (open) LER 85012, Revision 0, Unit 1:    1A Fuel Pool Monitor
                                                                              Trip.-
                                                                              Refer to above LER
                                                                        (3) (open) LER 85014, Revision 0, Unit 1:      1A Fuel Pool monitor
                                                                              . Trip (refer to LER 85005).
                                                                        (4) (closed) LER 85002, Revision 0, Unit 2:      High Pressure Ccolant
                                                                              Injection Inoperable.
                                                                              On January 29, 1985, Unit 2 was operating at 100 percent
                                                                              thermal power. At 2300 hours it was discovered that the
                                                                              High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System's Motor Gear
                                                                              Unit.(MGU) failed to stay at its High Speed Stop. HPCI was
                                                                              declared inoperable and the required Technical Specifications
                                                                              surveillances were initiated. A jumper was placed on the
                                                                              HPCI's MGU.* HPCI was then declared operable and HPCI
                                                                              operability tests were performed. During these operability
                                                                              tests, HPCI injection valve, M0 2-2301-8,.would not open when                    .
                                                                              it was given an OPEN signal from the Control Room. HPCI was
                                                                              declared inoperable again. At 0300 hours a Generating Station
                                                                            . Emergency Procedure (GSEP) Unusual Event was declared when the.
                                                                              decision was made to shutdown.
                                                                              The cause of the MGU failure was traced to a failed capacitor.
                                                                              The cause of the valve failure was found to be a broken torque
                                                                              switch. The problems were repaired and the GESEP Unusual Event-
                                                                              was terminated at 1530 hours on January 30, 1985. No further
                                                                              actions are required.
                                                                        (5) (open) LER 85006, Revision-0, Unit 2: Main Steam Isolation
                                                                              Valves (MSIV's) fail Local Leak Rate Tests (LLRT).
                                                                              This report documents the failure of MSIV's A0-2-203-2B and D
                                                                              to pass LLRT. -When the causes for failure have been determined-
                                                                              and repairs have been completed, a supplemental report will be
                                                                              issued. This LER will remain open pending receipt of that
                                                                              supplemental. report.
                                                                        (6) (open) LER 85008, Revision 0, Unit 2:      Linear Indications on
                                                                            . Reactor. Rec'irculation System Welds.
!
i
*
                                                                                                        10
                                                                                              .
    -a-_ . . _ _ _ __ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ . - . _ _ _ _                                                                        .______.__a--r*+
 
.
?
        This report documents the finding of crack indications during
        normal In-Service Inspection (ISI). The cause is postulated
        as being intergranular stress corrosion cracking. Further
        analysis were performed and repairs (weld overlay) were
        accomplished. A supplemental report will be issued after all
        reviews are completed.    This LER will remain open pending
        receipt of that supplemental report.
  (7) (closed) LER 85009, Revision 0, Unit 2: 2A Fuel Pool Radiation
        Monitor Trip.
        On March 20, 1985, Unit Two was shutdown for the End of Cycle
        Seven Refueling and Maintenance Outage. At 0230 hours, the 2A
        Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor spiked above its trip setpoint
        of 100 mr/ hour, isolating the Reactor Building Ventilation
        starting the Standby Gas Treatment System.    The 2A Fuel
        Pool Radiation Monitor tripped because of the transfer of the
        Steam Dryer from the Reactor cavity to the Dryer-Separator
        storage pit. Radiation levels in the area around the Reactor
        cavity were monitored continuously and were not excessive.
        Since the Reactor Building Ventilation System and the Standby
        Gas Treatment System performed as designed, the safety
        consequences nf this occurrence were minimal.
        The cause of this occurrence was procedural inadequacy.
        Maintenance procedure QMP 300-3, Steam Dryer Removal, did
        not require Maintenance Department personnel to notify
        Operating Department personnel that they were beginning to
        transfer the Steam Dryer. Because of this, Operating
        Department personnel were not aware that the transfer was
        in progress at the time of the trip.    This resulted in an
        unplanned actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (Standby
        Gas Treatment System).    Procedure QMP 300-3 has been revised.
        No further actions are required.
  (8) (closed) LER 85010, Revision 0, Unit 2:      Reactor Scram and
        Late Notification to NRC.
        This event was discussed in Inspection Report 265/85007 and
        was dispositioned as Violation. As such, no further action
        is required.
  (9)  (open) LER 85019, P.evision 0, Unit 2: Leak Rate of All
        Valves and Penetrations Exceed Technical Specifications.
        This report documents that the combined leakage of all valves
        and penetrations was found to be excessive during normal local
        leak rate testing. Repairs and further testing was accomplished
        and a supplemental report will be issued to document this upon
        completion of all reviews. This LER will remain open pending
        receipt of the supplemental report.
        No violations or deviations were identified.
                                  11
                                                                      .
 
        -          -    -    ..-    .          -  -  - .    --      . --    - -
!
  6-
!
, .-
      1.    TMI Action Items-
,          :(1) (closed) Item I.A.2.1 Upgrading of Reactor Operator and
i                  Senior Operator Training.
                    NRR has-issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated April 12,
f                  -1985 accepting the licensee's submittal to comply with this
                    requirement. The resident inspectors have verified that the
.
                    licensee's program does correspond to this submittal. 'No
!                  further actions are required.
            (2) (closed) Item II.B.4 Training For Mitigating Core Damage
                    NRR has issued a SER dated April 12, 1985 accepting the
                    licensee's submittal to comply with this requirement. The
                    resident inspectors have verified that the licensee's program
(                  does correspond to their submittal. No further actions are
                    required.
'
l          (3) (closed) Item II.K.3.16 Challenges and Failures of Relief
                    Valves
l-                  In a letter dated November 14, 1984, NRR accepted the licensee's
,
                    proposed actions concerning this item. The resident inspectors
:                  have confirmed that the licensee's program conforms to their
!                  submittal. No further actions are required.
t.
L          (4) '(closed) Item II.K.3.21 Restart of Core Spray and Low Pressure
L                - Coolant Injection Systems.
L
l                  In~a letter dated October 26, 1984, NRR agreed that no
[                  modifications were warranted for Quad Cities station in
'
                    response to this item. No further actions are required.
            (5) (closed) Item II.IK.3.24 Adequacy of Space Cooling for HPCI
                    and RCIC Systems.                                                    I
                    In a letter dated August 13, 1982, NRR found the licensee's      .
                    submittal acceptable. The resident inspectors have verified
                    that the ifcensee's program complies with their submittel.
                    No further actions are required.
            (6) (closed) Item II.IK.3.35 Effact of Loss of A-C Power on Pump
t                  Seals.
                      In a letter dated December 1, 1982, NRR agreed that no
                    m.odifications were warranted at Quad Cities station in
                    re'sponse to this item. No further actions are required.
                    No Violations or deviations were identified.
              ..
                                            12
                                                                                .
 
    ,        .            ..        -                  -          -            _ - - ---.----                        -- -    . -            . - . - .-
    :,;
8:
                      J.        Regional Requests
,
                                  (1) A problem was discovered at Byron station concerning the Main
                                      ~ Steam Isolation Valve actuators. A request was made to
                                            determine if similar configurations existed at Quad Cities.
                                            The resident inspectors confirmed that actuators similar to
                                            those used at Byron were.not in use in-any applications at-                                                            ,
'
                                            Quad Cities station.
                                                                                                                                                                    ,
                                  (2) A request was received to inspect the licensees program
          .                                concerning station. battery operation and maintenance. The
                                            licensee's program was found to be acceptable with two minor
                                            exceptions:
                                            a)          No' post-maintenance testing is performed after cell
                                                        jumpering or cell replacement. The ifcensee has agreed
                                                        to change their procedures to reflect this requirement.
                                            b) ~ ~The station procedures for weekly and quarterly
<                                                        surveillances do not require the batteries to be on a
                                                        float charge as part of the initial' conditions. This has                                                  '
                                                        been a station practice in the past and the licensee,has
                                                        . agreed to change their procedures to reflect this                                                        '
                                                        requirement.
                                                                                                                                                                    '
L                                          These procedure changes will be tracked as an Open Item
                    i                      (254/85012-02(DRP) and 265/85013-02(DRP)).
                                            No' violations or deviations were identified.
                      k.        Followup on Headquarters Requests
l
                                  (1) A request was received for information to support Regional                                                                    >
,~
                                            efforts in followup of Generic Letter 83-28. The requested
i                                          information was promptly supplied.                                                                          .
j'                                (2) A request was made of the resident inspectors to determine
i                                          the' licensee's response to a recent safety issue concerning
'
                                            mispositioned control rods. The inspectors verified that
                                            procedural requirements had been written'and implemented to
                                            ensure that'a nuclear engineer was present during' scheduled
                                            control rod movements, to identify the conditions under which
                                                                                                                                                                    *
,
                                            the rod worth minimizer may be bypassed, to prohibit the use
;.                                          of scram timing equipment except for testing and emergencies,
,
                                            and to provide guidelines on the appropriate use of
                                            " emergency-in" mode'of rod insertion and notch override switch-
                                          '
U
                                            in continuous' withdrawal. The inspectors also verified that
'
                                                                                                                                                                ,
                                            training had been provided for operators in the proper movement
  .                                          of. control' rods, the consequences of improper movement, the
;                                          consequences:of operating with a mispositioned rod, the
i.                                          function of the Rod Worth Minimizer, and the scram test
  l-                                        switches.
  i
4
  f> ;
                                                                                            13
:
                                                                                                                                                          . .
    ,v. +    ~~- ,      -,-a,,w,.  ,n,,-e-,w,--.,-.          --a _. , - ~ ,, - - .-,,-,- m n - .,-,,~,w,nvr--,,----      .,,rs,-r,-,r..-w.-              -r-~ -
 
M
.
    (3) A request was made to inspect the licensee's actions concerning
          General Electric (GE) Service.Information Letter (SIL) No. 402
          "Wetwell/Drywell Inerting."
                                                                                \
          The concern was that introduction of cold nitrogen via the
          inerting system could cause cracking in vent system piping.
          A review and evaluation of the design of the Quad Cities
          station inerting system determined that the potential for
          introduction of cold nitrogen in to the suppression chamber
          was minimal. The temperature of nitrogen entering containment
          is monitored and alarms in the control room on a low
          temperature of 50 degrees F.
          A review of past performance determined that the inerting
          system has been very reliable. Procedures were also found
          to be adequate, however, precautions were added to alert
          operators to the problems of introducing cold nitrogen into
          the system.
          In response to I.E. Bulletin 84-01 both Unit suppression
          chamber vent header were visually inspected.    No abnormalities
          were found.                                                              ,
          Additionally, leakage tests are performed during each refueling
          outage and repairs are performed as necessary.
          No violations or deviations were identified.
  1. Independent Inspection
    (1) A report from Wolf Creek station reported that a security
          officer, acting in a data management capacity, had entered
          a command into the security computer for an emergency
          evacuation. He believed the computer would reject the
          command.    It did not. Subsequently, a trainee in another
          location verified the command as authentic without being
          fully cognizant of the results of his actions. This
          resulted in unlocking doors in the protected and vital
          areas.    The security officer immediately recognized his
          error but, did not know the cancellation code, resulting
          in a delay in locked condition restoration.
          A report of equipment at the Quad Cities station determined
          that a similar event was possible. As a result, Security
          personnel are being retrained on computer procedures.
          Additionally, the licensee has had the practice of assigning
          no trainees to computer console duty. All operators receive
          40 hours of training first.
                                                                                    l
                                                                                    '
                                    14
                                                                                    I
                                                                                    l
                                                                                    .
                                                            . - . _ - _ - - .. -
 
              -
-
  .
  .
              (d) A report from South Texas Project identified fabrication
                    interference on sway struts manufactured by NPS Industries.
                    It was determined that similar struts suppifed by NPS
                    Industries were installed at Quad Cities station. However,
                    their freedom of movement was verified during installation
                    and during a reinspection in June, 1984.
        Open Items
        Open items are matters which have been discussed with the ifcensee, which
        will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action
        on the part of the NRC or ifcensee or both. The open items disclosed
        during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs Ib and lj.
    4. Unresolved Items
        Unresolved items are matter about which more information is required
        in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of
        noncompliance, or deviations. The unresolved item disclosed during
        the inspection is discussed in Paragraph le.
    5.  Exit Interview
        The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
        throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on May 31,
        1985, and summariz i the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
    .
        The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the
        inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
        inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such
        documents / processes as proprietary.
                                                                                  t *
                                                              8
                                            15
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