ML20127L173: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot insert)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000408/2005003]]
| number = ML20127L173
| issue date = 05/21/1985
| title = Insp Repts 50-413/85-16 & 50-414/85-12 on 850408-0503. Violations Noted:Procedure Inadequate & Not Followed Resulting in Overpressurization of Portions of RHR & Chemical & Vol Control Sys
| author name = Jape F, Mathis J, Schnebli G, Thomas M, Vandyne K
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000413, 05000414
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-413-85-16, 50-414-85-12, NUDOCS 8506270776
| package number = ML20127L118
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 8
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000408/2005003]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:.  .
                                                UNITED STATES
    [A Mo      "
                                      NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                  REGloN 11
  hO\'d
  *N              ~t
                                          101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
                                            ATL ANTA, GEORGI A 30323
        '%)
        .....
    Report Nos.:        50-413/85-16 and 50-414/85-12
    Licensee:      Duke Power Company
                    422 South Church Street
                    Charlotte, NC 28242
    Docket Nos.:        50-413 and 50-414                  License Nos.:  NPF-35 and CPPR-117
    Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2
    Inspection        nducted: April 8 - May 3,1985
    Inspectors:          I hSh'
                    J. Li'MhttiiY  '
                                                                                  5\'2okB5
                                                                                  Date Signed
                      k$
                    G.'A. Schnebli
                                      M'                                          1720/VY
                                                                                  Date Signed
                    /
                          omas
                                      mL                Qw
                                                          / /
                                                                                  Shi/ rr
                                                                                  Dat Signed
                  *
                        Y kt11x i    Lu a                                      5 20
                    K. V. VanDyne                                                Ddte Signed
                                    ' f~
  Accompanying Personnel:          F. Jape
                                    J. 8, Macdonald
  Approved by:                    M            J                                f/A/[ff
                      F. Jape,' Section Chief          (/    /                    Date Sfgned
                      Engineering Branch
                      Division of Reactor Safety
                                                  SUMMARY
  Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 209 inspector-hours on site
  and at Duke Power Company Offices in Charlotte, North Carolina, in the areas of
  overall preoperational test program review, preoperational test witnessing,
  reactor coolant system hydrostatic testing, and review of an inspector followup
    item.
  Results: Two violations were identified - (1) Procedure was inadequate and not
  followed resulting in overpressurization of portions of the residual heat removal
  system    -
                    paragraph 9.a.(1); (2) Procedure was inadequate resulting in
  overpressurization of portions of the chemical and volume control system which
  resulted in the volume control tank being destroyed                paragraph 9.a.(2).
    8506270776 B50530
      PDR    ADOCK050pDR
      G
 
  .  -
                  . . - , - -
                                  ..          ,,              .._    .    .-
.  .
                                        REPORT DETAILS
      1.  Persons Contacted
          Licensee Employees
        *J. W. Hampton, Station Manager
        *H. L. Atkins, Project Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer - Mechanical
          H. B. Barron, Milestone Manager
          W. Beaver, Performance Engineer
        *R. Casler, Assistant Operating Engineer
        *G. Cornwell, Construction Testing Engineer
        *J. W. Cox, Technical Services Superintendent
        *L. R. Davison, Project QA Manager
          M. Glover, Startup Manager
        *C. W. Graves, Jr. , Superintendent of Operations
        *C. L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer
        *T. E. Holland, Operating Engineer
        *R. A. Jones, Test Engineer
        *P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer
        *D. Llewellyn, Construction Mechanical Equipment Engineer
        *K. Louvin, QA General Office
        *E. B. Miller, Senior QA Engineer
        *T. D. Mills, Construction Engineer - Electrical
          C. Muse, Operating Engineer
          J. Neal, Hydro Test Conductor
          L. Parker, Technical Associate
          N. Rutherford, Systems Engineer Licensing
          R. Sharpe, Nuclear Engineer, Licensing
        *D. Tower, Shift Operating Engineer
        *R. L. White, Supervisor, Catawba Station Review Group
        *E. G. Williams, Project QA Technician
          Other licensee employees contacted included test coordinators, construction
          craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, and office personnel.
          Other Organization
          ANI, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co.
          NRC Resident Inspectors
        *P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector, Operations
        *P. K. Van Doorn, Senior Resident Inspector, Construction
        * Attended exit interview
 
  . .
                                                2
    2. Exit Interview
        The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 3, 1985, with those
        persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspectors described the areas
        inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No dissenting
        comments were received from the licensee. The following new items were
        identified during this inspection:
              Violation 414/85-12-01, Procedure was inadequate and not followed
              resulting in overpressurization of portions of the residual heat
              removal system    paragraph 9.a.(1).
              Violation 414/85-12-02,    Procedure was inadequate resulting in
              overpressurization of portions of the chemical and volume control
              system which resulted in the volume control tank being destroyed -
              paragraph 9.a.(2).
        The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to
        or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
    3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
,
        This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
'
    4.  Unresolved Items
        Unresolved items were not identi*ied during the inspection.
    5.  Independent Inspection Effort (92706)
        a.  Plant Tour
            The inspectors conducted a general inspection of the Unit 2 reactor
            building, turbine building, and auxiliary building to observe ongoing
            activities    for compliance with NRC requirements        and license
            commitments.    In addition to this tour, the inspectors reviewed the
              licensee's adherence to proper housekeeping and formal behavior in the
            control room.
        b.  Chemical and Volume Control System - 3-Way Valve
            Unit 2 operators were actively involved with Temporary Operating
            Instruction T01/2/A/6150/01, Initial Filling and Venting of the Reactor
            Coolant System (NC) and Control of NC System for NC Hydro. All
            personnel appeared to be attentive to their respective assigned duties
            and responsibilities.    During the performance of this procedure,
            operators identified a problem concerning flow through 2NV-172A, a
            three-way valve in the Chemical and Volume Control System (NV).
            Subsequent investigation and inspection revealed that 2NV-172A was
            installed backwards.
                                                      -.                _ - -
                                          . _ .
 
. .
                                            3
            Under normal operating conditions 2NV-172A functions to automatically
            control level in the Volume Control Tank (VCT) by directing letdown
            flow to the VCT or diverting it to a Recycle Holdup Tank (RHT) in case
            of high level in the VCT.
            Nonconforming Item Report (NCIR) 19605 was initiated to document and
            resolve the problem. The licensee determined that the incorrect
            installation of this valve resulted from two main reasons. First, the
            installation procedure lacked sufficient information to ensure correct
            valve orientation, and second the installing craft and quality control
            inspectors apparently believed orientation of the valve-side flanges
            was of no concern.
            The disposition of NCIR 19605 included licensee action which is ade-
            quate to prevent a similar occurrence. Included are requirements to
            revise installation procedures and to instruct craft and inspection
            personnel in the proper installation of three way valves.
            In addition, the licensee identified and evaluated the installation of
            all three-way valves in Ur.it 1 and Unit 2 in order for the generic
            implications of this problem to be addressed.      Of the 53 three-way
            valves identified, only INC-172A and 2NV-172A use both side flanges as
            outlets. For this reason, according to NCR 19605, only these two
            valves could have been installed backwards under Catawba's present
            construction and quality assurance programs. Installation of 2NV-172A
            will be corrected after the NC hydro.
      Within the areas examined no violations or deviations were identified.
    6. Overall Preoperational Test Program Review (70301) - Unit 2
      The inspectors reviewed Catawba Nuclear Station Administrative Policy Manual
      for Nuclear Stations, Section 4.1, and Station Directive 3.0.1.        These
      procedures contribute to the establishment of Catawba's preoperational
      (preop) test program. Major points of interest during this review were
      program administration and document control. Within these areas the
      following specific items were verified:
      -
            Formal methods outlining turnover of plant systems or components from
            construction to Nuclear Production are established.
      -
            Specific roles of all station groups are delineated to bring plant
            systems safely and efficiently to full operating performance.
      -
            Comprehensive procedures for the management of turnover exceptions are
            established.
 
  f
    . .
                                                4
          -
                  Formal administrative measures have been established which control test
                procedures preparation, review, approval, issuance, and change.
          The inspectors also met with Duke licensing personnel in Charlotte on
          April 22, 1985, and site personnel on April 23, 1985, to discuss the Unit 2
          test program, licensing items remaining, and differences between Unit 1 and
          Unit 2 test programs.
          No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
        7. Preoperational Test Witnessing (70312) - Unit 2
          The inspectors witnessed Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) for the chemical and
          volume control system, Penetration M228. Procedures used by test personnel
          were verified to e technically adequate, special test equipment required by
          procedures was calibrated and in use, and test personnel were qualified.
          The procedures raviewad during this inspection included the following:
                PT/2/A/4200/01C      Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test
                OP/2/A/6200/20        Venting and Draining Procedure for Type C Leak
                                        Rate Tests-
          During the LLRT for penetration M228, valve 2NV872A, the licensee verified
          that the valve line-up was in accordance with Section 13.7.2.A of Procedure
          PT/2/A/4200/01C. An attempt was made by the test personnel to pressurize
          the test volume to 14.8 1 0.1 psig; however, the test volume pressure could
          not be maintained at the desired pressure because valve 2NV877 did not
          completely close. The valve indicated closed in the control room but did not
          seat properly. A work request was issued to reset the limit torque switch
          setpoint so that the valve 2NV877 would seat tightly.        A retest on the
          containment isolation valve was rescheduled following maintenance.
          Within the area inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
      8.  Reactor Coolant System Hydrostatic Test Procedure Review (70362) - Unit 2
          The inspectors reviewed the final, approved copy of the Unit 2 Reactor
          Coolant System Cold Hydrostatic Test Procedure, Construction Procedure 1072,
          and the Initial Filling and Venting the Reactor Coolant System Procedure,
          TOI/2/A/6150/01, to veri fy that the test procedures met regulatory
          requirements and licensee commitments specified in ASME Code, Section III,
          Division 1, Subsection NB, Section 6000, and Regulatory Guide 1.68. The
          review consisted of the following:
          a.    The system is properly vented during the filling operation.
!          b.    Water quality is specified as required by the latest vendor specifica-
                tions for the temperatures to be present during the test.
          c.    Reactor coolant temperature requirements are stated to ensure that
                primary components are maintained above the nil ductility transition
                temperature.
 
                                                                                        1
        -
  . .
                                                5
          d.  Hydrostatic test pressure and duration meet ASME code requirements.
          Within the areas examined no violations or deviations were identified.
      9.  Reactor Coolant System Hydrostatic Test Witnessing (70462) - Unit 2
          a.  The inspectors observed licensee activities during preparations for the
                hydrostatic test. Two incidents which occurred during the hydrostatic
                test preparations were reviewed by the inspectors.
                (1) The first incident involved various piping, valves, and equipment
                      being    overpressurized    to  approximately    2,000 psig  for
                      approximately three hours on April 19, 1985.        This included
                      portions of the residual heat removal system (RHR), boron recycle
                      system, sampling system, and chemical and volume control system.
                      The licensee is evaluating to determine the extent of the damage.
                      This item was reported as a potential 50.55(e) by the licensee on
                    May 3, 1985.
                    A temporary jumper was installed (per the procedures) to bypass
                      the check valves in the RHR cold leg injection lines. This was
                    done in order to pressurize behind the check valves so they could
                      be tested during the hydrostatic test. The check valves are
                      installed in the RHR cold leg injection lines downstream of motor
                      operated valves 2NI173A and 2NI178B. Thus, the reactor coolant
                      system (RCS) pressure boundary for the hydrostatic test was
                    established at the motor-operated valves.        These valves were
                      required to be closed per TOI/2/A/6150/01.          However,  the
                    motor-operated valves were left open when the RCS was being
                    pressurized to approximately 2,000 psig for the " mini hydro,"
                    thereby allowing RCS pressure into the RHR system. In addition,
                    the procedures were inadequate in that the header into which the
                      relief valve for this portion of the RHR system relieved was
                      isolated (as part of Units 1 and 2 separation) and no other relief
                    path had been provided. It was not identified in the procedures
I                    that there was no overpressure protection available for this
i                    portion of the RHR system. The inspectors informed the licensee
!                    that failure to follow TOI/2/A/6150/01 during the " mini hydro" and
!                    not identifying in the procedure that no overpressure protection
l
                    was available for portion of the RHR system constitutes a
                    violation.      This item will be identified as violation
i                    414/85-12-01, Procedure was inadequate art' not followed resulting
                      in overpressurization of portions of the residual heat removal
                      system.
                (2) The second incident involved overpressurization of the VCT and
                    associated piping in the chemical and volume control system
                    (CVCS), resulting in total destruction of the VCT on April 20,
                    1985. The licensee reported this item as a potential 50.55(e) on
                    April 22, 1985.      The licensee is evaluating this incident to
j                    determine the extent of the damage.
;
l
                                                            ._
 
                                                                        .
. .
                                        6
              Charging pump suction had been switched from the VCT to the
              refueling water storage tank (RWST) in order to increase VCT
              level. The charging pump was then pumping to a closed system. It
              appears that the VCT was inadvertently filled to a solid condition
              allcwing pressure to build up until the VCT ruptured. As in the
              first incident, procedures were inadequate in that the relief
              header for the VCT relief valve was isolated as part of Units 1
              and 2 separation, and no other relief path had been provided. It
            was not identified in the procedures that overpressure protection
            was not available for the VCT. The inspectors informed the
              licensee that failure to identify in the procedures that no
            overpressure protection was available for the VCT constitutes a
            violation and will be identified as violation 414/85-12-02,
            Procedure was inadequate resulting in overpressurization of the
            chemical and volume control system which resulted in the volume
            control tank being destroyed.
        (3) In discussing the above incidents with licensee personnel, the
              inspectors expressed concerns over the controls and coordination
            during the time these two incidents occurred, and the decision to
            continue testing after the overpressure        incident without
            thoroughly reviewing all relief valve paths and verifying that all
              systems and components had adequate overpressure protection.
            Licensee personnel stated that actions were taken after the second
            overpressure incident to better control activities prior to
            resuming the hydrostatic test. Some of the actions included
            better defined management controls; review of all relief valve
            paths; all out of normal conditions highlighted; instrumentation
            calibration checked; revising TOI/2/A/6150/01; operator training
            on operation of the CVCS while the VCT is out of service.
    b. After the temporary modification was completed to allow using the RWST
      as a surge volume for the CVCS, and, actions were taken to better
      control test activities, preparations for the hydrostatic test were
      resumed on April 29, 1985. The inspectors observed licensee activities
      to verify the following:
      -
            The latest revisions of the procedures were available and in use
            by appropriate personnel.
      -
            Test prerequisites were completed.
      -
            Valve lineup / system checklists were completed.
      -
            Water quality and temperature were being monitored.
      -
            Pressure gauges of the required range were calibrated and
            installed.
      -
            Relief valves were installed where required and relief paths
            verified for system overpressure protection.
 
,
                                                                                -
  .. .
                                              7
                                                                                        l
              -
                    Proper plant systems were in service.
              -
                    Special test equipment required by the procedure was calibrated
                    and in service.
              -
                    The test was performed as required by the procedure.
              -
                    Adequate coordination and test control among personnel involved in
                    the test.
              -
                    All data were collected by proper personnel.
              -
                    Temporary modifications installed were tracked per administrative
                    controls.
              The required hydrostatic test pressure was reached on April 30, 1985,
              at approximately 6:15 p.m.      The  inspectors verified that test
              conditions regarding system temperature and pressure were within the
              required range and that the hydrostatic test pressure hold time was
              met. The licensee had assembled nine teams of Quality Control (QC)
              inspectors to perform the inspection of the systems within the test
              boundary.    QA surveillance was provided during the test and several
              Westinghouse inspectors and authorized nuclear inspectors were
              available to inspect vendor-related components and ASME Section III
              piping and components, respectively. The inspectors accompanied QC
              inspection tesco s during inspection of RCS loop A, upper head injection,
              pressurizer, and the reactor vessel head. The inspectors verified that
              QC inspections of the systems and components were performed properly and
              test deficiencies were documented for review and            resolution.
              Deficiencies identified were for valve leakage, which was within the
              design acceptance criteria. The test was completed on April 30, 1985.
          No other violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
      10. Followup On Previously Identified Items (92701)
          (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 413/84-105-02, Concerning
          Modifications to the Cross-Over leg Whip Restraint Shims. The inspectors
          reviewed Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) packages 10501 and 10516 which
          modified the specified gaps at the cross-over leg whip restraints and the
          data obtained during a subsequent heatup to ensure that implementation of
          the NSM packages corrected the problem. IFI 413/84-105-02 is closed.
                                                                              ,
}}

Latest revision as of 03:39, 26 September 2020

Redirect to:

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20127L173&oldid=2945945"